THE FATHER OF ALL:

FRICTION, SPLITTING, AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS

OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

A dissertation submitted

by

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ABSTRACT

The Father of All:

Friction, Splitting, and the Philosophical Assumptions of Depth Psychology

by

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The central topic of this research is an examination of the philosophical assumptions of depth psychology as they relate to splitting in depth psychology. The intention of the researcher was to examine this topic from multiple perspectives. The researcher utilized a qualitative methodology, dialogical hermeneutics, to compare the influences and assumptions of the differing schools of depth psychology.

Depth psychology is the study of mental functioning that includes and values unconscious mental processes. Over the past 100 years, numerous splits, dissensions, and modifications have occurred. Splits have occurred between individuals and between factions within institutes, resulting in an ever-increasing plurality of depth psychological training schools. Such infighting has resulted in an erosion of prestige, which has left the discipline in danger of dissolution.

The primary questions of this research were these: What are the fundamental philosophical assumptions underlying depth psychology in general and do these philosophical assumptions contribute to splitting within the field of depth psychology?

One of the most basic assumptions of depth psychology held that nature is dualistic and that human beings are divided within and amongst themselves, which led to a belief in the reality of opposites, an ever-present ontological struggle between polar

forces. This assumption was consistently maintained in Jung's psychological system and present but inconsistently held by Freud. Jung believed that there was a fundamental unity in nature that was divided. Freud did not. Jung believed that the problem of the opposites could be transcended, leading to a higher level of integration and assimilation. Freud did not. Freud's influences flowed from objective, deterministic, and rational, materialistic assumptions, whereas Jung's epistemology was more influenced by the idealistic and romantic traditions, which emphasized a subjective, irrational, and teleological approach to knowledge. Freud understood splitting as simply conflictual, whereas Jung saw splitting as conflictual but also purposive, leading towards wholeness. Their positions reflected a philosophical split in the culture that has persisted since classical times, between objective and subjective approaches to understanding reality. Their respective personalities pulled them toward opposing sides of this classic ontological divide.

The researcher concluded that knowledge inevitably and necessarily develops through conflict, best approached with awareness and tempered with tolerance.

Dedication/Acknowledgements

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of Jung's first analytic patient, Sabina Spielrein, who knew and loved both Jung and Freud. Frau Spielrein saw these two pioneers as closer and necessary to each other than either could acknowledge. She strove to save their relationship when it foundered due to their differences. I also want to thank and acknowledge my advisor, Connie Zweig, my external reader, Lyn Cowan, and my dissertation coordinator, Allen Koehn, for their patience, encouragement, and attention to detail, which helped to shape this work. Additionally, both Michael Gellert and JoAnn Culbert-Koehn were very helpful, supportive, and containing influences. This work would never have come to fruition without the support and companionship of my Pacifica classmates and friends, Tamara Nichols, Ron Iverson, and Joan Abrams. My dear friends Suzanne Ecker and Perrin Elisha both suffered my own conflicts, friction, and fragmentation as I lived through the psychological reality of this topic. For their love, support, blood, sweat, and tears, I am forever grateful.

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πόλεμος πάντων μεν πάτήρ εστι

Polemos (conflict) is the father of all things.
(Heraclitus, trans. 1889, p. 96, Fragment 53, Hippolytus Ref. IX, 9, 4)

Without contraries is no progression.
Attraction and repulsion, reason and energy, love and hate,
are necessary to human existence.
Opposition is true friendship.
(Blake, 1926, p. 23)
from *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*

And Heraclitus says, "The unlike is joined together, and from differences
results the most beautiful harmony, and all things take place by strife."
(Aristotle, as cited in Heraclitus, trans. 1889, p. 96, Aristotle, Eth. Nic.
viii. 2, p. 155 b 1)

Unite whole and part, agreement and disagreement, accordant and
discordant; from all comes one, and from one all.
(Heraclitus, trans. 1889, p. 99, Fragment 59,
in Aristotle, de Mundo 5, p. 396 b 12)

Today humanity, as never before, is split into two apparently
irreconcilable halves. The psychological rule says that when an inner
situation is not made conscious, it happens outside, as fate. That is to say,
when the individual remains undivided and does not become conscious of
his inner contradictions, the world must perforce act out the conflict and
be torn into opposite halves.
(Jung, 1959/1968, pp. 70-71 [*CW* 9 ii, ¶ 126])

A clash of doctrines is not a disaster, it is an opportunity.
(Whitehead, in Hauke, 2000, p. 4)

Chapter 1
The Fragmentation of Depth Psychology

Introduction

Depth psychology is like a splintered tree. Some analysts believe that it is in disarray (Gill, 1994, p. 13). Others think that it is dying or already dead (Bornstein, 2001). There are well over 100 analytic training institutes in the United States (Blanken, 2005), and each one is training analytic candidates in a unique and distinct form of depth psychology. Only five of these institutes are officially accredited by the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), which is the original Freudian training and certifying institution established in 1907 (Blanken, 2005). The American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA), the first American branch of the IPA, established in 1911, has accredited 29 of these institutes. Another 30 or so are accredited by either the official Jungian sanctioning body, the International Association of Analytical Psychology (IAAP), or one of the several new accrediting boards, such as the American Board for Accreditation in Psychoanalysis (ABAP), established in 1997. The remaining hundred are nonaccredited (Blanken, 2005). This poses a confusing problem for the individual seeking analytic training and also for the consumers of depth psychological services.

How can a clinician be assured of proper and approved training? How can clients be assured of finding a properly trained depth psychologist for analytical work?

The term *depth psychology* (German: *tiefenpsychologie*) was first used by one of Jung's mentors and collaborators, Eugen Bleuler (Ellenberger, 1970). But depth psychology is generally considered to be the psychology of the unconscious as formulated by Sigmund Freud and his early associates Alfred Adler, William Stekel, Carl Jung, Sandor Ferenczi, Karl Abraham, and Hans Sachs, among others. As a discipline, it

focuses on those aspects of being-in-the-world that both affect motivation and behavior and are also outside of conscious awareness.

Over the past 100 years, from deep and hidden roots, depth psychology has evolved and grown into a stately tree with ever-increasing branches that are competing with each other and with the broader fields of psychology and psychotherapy for respect and acknowledgment, as well as for a shrinking share of the overall therapy marketplace. Many of these subgroups of depth psychology emphasize their differences over their similarities. Some disparage or dismiss the depth psychological competition in ways that are harmful to the discipline as a whole and certainly do not practice tolerance of difference, ambiguity, or paradox. Although Jung considered the ability to tolerate and hold paradox to be a goal of analytic work, and both Melanie Klein and Wilfred Bion considered the ability to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty as analytic goals and as signs of maturity, it is as though depth psychology does not appear to adhere to its own tenets or perhaps has not yet reached maturity. The field of depth psychology continues to split itself in harmful ways, despite clinical efforts to heal splitting in individuals.

This dissertation is about the way that epistemological and philosophical assumptions underlying depth psychology theory contribute to splitting within the field of depth psychology. The researcher is viewing the field of depth psychology as a whole: the field of psychology that assumes and attends to unconscious processes. This whole consists of parts that are themselves whole schools of thought.

It is the aim of this research to investigate the connection, if any, between the philosophical underpinnings of depth psychology and the phenomenon of splitting as it manifests interpersonally and meta-theoretically in the psyche of depth psychology and if

possible, to apply the clinical theories about splitting as a psychological phenomenon to the field as a whole in order to explore what this may imply as it enters the second hundred years of its history.

The phenomenon of splitting finds its early explication in the philosophy that historically shaped the rise of depth psychology. This is the focus of my research. My argument is that the assumptions of depth psychology have roots that stretch back to the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, notably Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle, and that an understanding of these epistemological roots helps to explain the current splits within the field. The epistemological evolution of Western thought from the Greeks through the Renaissance and Enlightenment to the modern era has moved back and forth in a dialectical dance of opposites, reflective of the Hegelian theory of reality (Hegel & Miller, 1998) as an endless circle of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, and new antithesis. The heart of this dissertation is the importance of holding the tension of these opposites and the Heraclitian idea that knowledge comes from this tension, hence the ontological necessity of polarity, splitting, and rapprochement. Splitting is thus a necessary developmental event, a fundamental process of discernment and differentiation, and the manner in which knowledge develops. The paradoxical nature of splitting is that it is both repudiation and creation.

Autobiographical Origins of the Researcher's Interest in the Topic

One of my earliest memories is feeling helplessly small and having to cross an infinite expanse, a task that felt endless, terrifying, and pointless. It engendered a disturbing feeling that I can now identify as Wilfred Bion's "nameless dread" (1983a). While exuberant poets describe life raging to be born and the enthusiasm and vitality of

youth for life, I have always felt ambivalent about the experience of living. On the one

hand, I am glad to be alive and hungry for novelty, ecstasy, knowing, and the fruits of the

tree of life, whereas, on the other hand, I question what seems ultimately to be a doomed

endeavor: being born to die. My life journey of 50 years has revolved around this split

between a love for engagement in the living world and a desire to be free of what feels

like the cage of the body caught in a meaningless and cruel existence. These disturbing

feelings and a concurrent search for release from the prison of the merely personal, a

hunger for experience that transcends the confines of skin-bound ego consciousness, led

me to Jung. Discovering Carl Jung and his concept of synchronicity in 1974 while taking

a class on Eastern religions reassured me that there were major thinkers within the

Western tradition and within psychology, specifically, who believed in more than a

strictly causal, positivist, logical universe. Jung's approach to the objective or

transpersonal psyche spoke to my personal life experiences and inspired my vocational

interest in psychology.

Several years ago, I heard psychoanalyst James Grotstein (2001) give a keynote

lecture at the APA Division (39) of Psychoanalysis Spring meeting and was surprised

that in the lecture, which highlighted the thinking of Wilfred Bion, the latter sounded

more like Jung than Freud, especially in his assertion of a purposive, teleological

unconscious. At the time, I had no familiarity with Bion. I began to read more about Bion

and came across Grotstein's writing on Bion; along with his own concept of

transcendence (Grotstein, 1993), I noticed a similarity between Jung and Bion. They

shared an almost mystical sense of the importance of intuition and transcendence in the

sense of climbing across a gap of unknowing. My interest was sparked, and I perused

the literature but found little about this shared sense.

The evolution of this dissertation research involves a long and winding road but

was crystallized in response to a dream in the fall of 2003. The dream unfolds as follows:

> I am in a small room with a friend, Rick Young, and he gives me a long,
> thin box, that might contain a flute-shaped object. He says it is from Bion.
> I am surprised because I never would have thought of Bion in connection
> with Rick. I can't imagine him having heard of Bion. I take and open the
> box. It contains two large bell-shaped seedpods. As I pick one up to
> examine it, it transforms into a naked, virile man at the peak of his
> potency. I am awed and have a mixed sense of admiration and fear. I am
> not sure whether to engage or run. Then the second seedpod transforms
> into another man. They are like two Greek Gods. I am overwhelmed,
> awestruck, and wake up feeling disturbed.

Later the same night, I had another dream:

> I am riding in a train through a canyon east of Santa Fe with a fellow
> student at Pacifica Graduate Institute, Claudia, who is in the class one year
> behind me. The desert mountain landscape is beautiful, numinous in the
> early morning twilight. The scene shifts suddenly to being on the IRT
> elevated subway line, rattling through dirty industrial Long Island City,
> where I was born and spent my first 18 years. I am telling Claudia about
> the Bion dream and the two seedpod daimons.

In thinking about these dreams, I associated to Rick, whom I have known for

almost 30 years. His family name was changed from Jung to Young when his

grandparents immigrated to the United States in the 19th century. Although I rarely see

him, Rick connects me with a time before my children were born when I was in my own

period of greatest potency. He offered me a place to live and a job after my marriage fell

apart. He offered a hand and a light out of the darkest part of my life to that point. We

later bought a house together and remodeled it into a duplex, the home I lived in for 23

years while my children grew up. Paralleling the splitting and reuniting theme of this

research topic, I later bought Rick out of the house and remodeled it back into a single-

family dwelling, later remodeling it again into a duplex to afford my doctoral education. Rick suffered a work-related injury at one point and descended into addiction and despair. At his lowest, he called me from a hotel where he had isolated himself while attempting to drink himself to death. I brought him to a detox center where he began a long road to recovery. Today he is almost gnome-like, a chthonic, compassionate man who is grateful to be alive and living his 12 steps.

Associating to Bion, the first thing that arose was his impenetrability. I find him hard to follow, which I have learned is partly his intention. The next idea about Bion that struck me was his ideal of tolerating disturbance and ambiguity. Bion's world is disturbing and uncertain. His clinical aim is to contain and digest (alpha function) disturbing primitive content (beta elements) for his patients (Bleandonu, 2002).

My own life has continually challenged me to contain what is ambiguous, disturbing, and unknowable. Rick has been intimately involved in this struggle. The flute-shaped box struck me as a phallic symbol, a sort of wand or something representing oneness, whereas the seedpods struck me as a symbol of potential and twoness or doubling/splitting. The box represented one thing becoming two things, a bifurcation of the masculine. The transformation into a pair of awesome and fear-inspiring gods had a numinous, archetypal quality. The fact that there were two, like Apollo and his half-brother Dionysus, seemed important as did the fact that Rick and I were the only others in the dream, two brothers in arms with similar names Rick and Rich. One had descended into the underworld and reemerged, while the other had proceeded in a more Apollonian manner, pursuing higher degrees while raising children. Here I find the twin sides of myself meeting the archetypal brothers of ascension and descent, which reminds me of

Nietzsche. The words *bionic* and *young* (Jung) came to mind. My internal dream maker

had produced a symbol to bridge unconscious contents with consciousness. This is the

process that Carl Jung called the transcendent function. The question that remains

unanswered from this dream is: "What exactly is Bion's gift?"

The second dream connected my then current living environment (Santa Fe) with

the environment of my birth (Queens, New York). There is the sharp contrast between

numinous beauty and a dirty, run down, industrial cityscape. There is the common

denominator of the train (locomotion and masculine power) and landscape. There is also

the connection to my journey at Pacifica Graduate Institute through a female student who

is both a former Santa Fean and, like myself, a native New Yorker. She once worked at

the public schools, as I do, sharing the same supervisor. I later recently accepted an

internship where she was also interning. She may represent a feminine side of my psyche

working through this supervisor (as in Jung's concept of the Self as supervisor of

individuation). This dream, like the previous one, connects different developmental

periods of my life to my current developmental task: rapprochement of split off or un-

integrated sides (complexes) of my personality and integration of psychological

information through analysis and psychological training.

These dream images ultimately resonate with a pattern of splitting and

discernment/separation along with concurrent potential for integration/union (coniunctio).

The imagery speaks to meaning making in my personal life journey but with veiled

reference to the historical journey of psychology via the characters of Jung and Bion, two

important, split-off transformers and re-vitalizers of psychoanalytic theory. Both men

plumbed the darker depths of the human soul in search of a transcendent experience of

union with greater truth, and both were alienated from their professional peers, as they were unable to stay within the given boundaries of psychoanalytic theory as it was manifested in their respective eras. A research problem and question came out of working with the dream images above as I struggled to understand the links between Bion and Jung.

The Researcher's Predisposition to the Topic

Research in depth psychology emerges, in part, from the researcher's own experience, as this research evolved from the above-related dream images and life experiences, including those of studying Jung and hearing Grotstein speak on Bion. Research from this perspective is re-search or "looking again" (Romanyshyn, 2008, p. 4). The topic can be seen as choosing the re-searcher through his or her complexes, rather than the other way around (p. 111). The researcher must be willing to be changed. I assume that I must interact with the topic and that I am not a separate, neutral observer. The topic and I affect each other. The researcher's predisposition to the topic may be thought of as foreknowledge, fore-structure, or as pre-existing assumptions and biases. Within the phenomenological and heuristic methods, the process of identifying and disclosing one's assumptions and biases is known as bracketing or epoché, which is a significant step in the research as it serves to help overcome or bridge the split between the researcher and the object of research. It was originally thought that by bracketing out one's foreknowledge, one could achieve a higher level of objectivity towards the research subject. Heidegger challenged Husserl's (Palmer, 1969; Stolorow, 2006) assumption that objectivity could be attained, believing that subjectivity and context could never be escaped. Some of the contexts we live within are, in fact, so intrinsic that we are not even

aware of them. Hence, we must proceed consciously and unconsciously within these contexts and use our subjectivity as it is revealed to us. This process will be value laden, rather than value free. Within depth psychology and within the methodology of alchemical hermeneutics (Romanyshyn, 2008), this process is thought of as working through the transference to the topic.

Romanyshyn (2008, p. 152) has identified four levels of the transference: the personal level, the cultural-historical level, the collective-archetypal-imaginal level, and the eco-cosmological level, all of which are addressed in regard to the topic. The process of research unfolds through the experience and exploration of these levels of transference with the topic. Nothing is ever merely personal but always also exists within cultural-historical, collective-archetypal, and eco-cosmological fields.

Questions arise through this process, such as: What and where is the resistance to the topic? How is it experienced? Where does the vulnerability lie? What is in shadow or unacknowledged in the researcher and the phenomenon being re-searched? Who are the figures that inhabit the transference? Who is the audience? Who does this research serve? And finally, while the mind and the ego both want to be in control, what is it that the unconscious wants?

This process acknowledges that the researcher is always in some myth, dream, or fantasy about the topic even if she or he does not know what it is and that the process of working out of this transference field is never complete. There are always shadow elements left over in one's work, or traces of an ideology.

One of the primary assumptions of depth psychology is that bringing something from unconsciousness to consciousness is healing. One of my assumptions is that I have

been captured by this topic in order to make conscious, understand, and integrate or

transcend (bridge) some of my own unconscious internal divisions or split-off parts. A

fantasy exists that this is a possible and worthwhile goal. Some of these internal divisions

I have identified are masculine vs. feminine (yang/yin); rational vs. intuitive; ideal vs. the

real; angel vs. beast; optimism vs. pessimism; differentiation vs. adaptation; control vs.

surrender; independence vs. belonging; being vs. doing; immanent vs. transcendent;

tangible vs. subtle; thinking vs. feeling; and splitting vs. integrating.

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (Jung, 1961/1965), Jung describes his two

personalities: number 1 and number 2. His number 1 personality is what he called the

persona, the face presented to the world, his scientist, doctor, and rational self, his outer

social self. Number 2 is the introverted, mystical part of himself that he kept secret,

containing fantasies and mysteries upon which he dwelled:

> The influence of personality 2 drove him to pursue philosophy, religion,
> mythology and related subjects within the humanities; personality 1 became
> manifest in pragmatic concerns for his financial security and in interest in the
> more mundane subjects of science and medicine. By entering psychiatry, he was
> able to secure the best of both worlds. (Stolorow & Atwood, 1993, p. 92)

Jung described his two-fold self in this way: "as though two rivers had united and

in one grand torrent were bearing me inexorably towards distant goals. This confident

feeling that I was a 'united double nature' carried me forward as if on a magical wave"

(Jung, 1961/1965, p. 109). It is the desire and need for this kind of unification that has

grasped me in its hold in this work on splitting.

Another belief I bring to this research is the idea of the dissertation as a pathway

and work of individuation. Hence, I am not objective but operate out of depth

psychological constructs and my beliefs in the reality of the dynamic and collective

unconscious, the psychoanalytic concept of splitting, and the Jungian notion of individuation. Other biases coming out of a depth psychological foundation and qualitative research orientation concern the nature of reality and the relationship of the researcher to the research. I assume reality to be subjective and multiple.

I am also attempting to understand how to proceed in my professional training. Having to choose one channel of depth psychology over another feels like inclusion and exclusion, another incidence of splitting. My assumption is that integration of differing models is healthy and useful. Thus an important bias or assumption that I carry is that the fragmentation of depth psychology has been problematic and unhealthy on at least some levels. I am not interested in deifying the originators or in reifying their assumptions or constructions. I do, however, want the benefit of their experience. I also believe this would be useful to others in training.

Another assumption is that some healing or rapprochement in the field has occurred over the past 50 years, and more bridging would be healthy for the field as a whole. I assume that plurality and diversity are healthy and that splitting is an essential development in the creating of plurality and diversity. I also assume that the mixing of metaphors can be useful and that there is a rhythm or cyclic nature to splitting and rapprochement that is inherent in nature, an ongoing pulse of coming together and coming apart.

On the personal level of the transference, the ghost of my deceased mother who disapproved of psychology, along with many other of my passions, yet continued to conditionally support me in my unconventional lifestyle and beliefs shadows this work. There is an inherent split and paradox in the love/hate relationship I have had with her. In

a very personal sense this is a work of reparation or rapprochement of that fundamental split.

On the cultural-historical level this work is being written for Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, celebrators of darkness, descent, and the balance between polarities; for Freud and Jung, in their brilliant dance of love, hate, and competition; for Wilfred Bion, Donald Winnicott, and Michael Fordham, who all threw off orthodoxy to pursue their work using intuition and experience rather than given psychoanalytic dogma; and finally to all sentient beings who have struggled and suffered with internal and external splits and shadows, with creativity and ambiguity and paradox yet still manage to think for themselves.

Although I am a white male in a privileged position in a paternalistic, rational, and materialistic society, my cultural and historical prejudice could be understood within the philosophical assumptions of postmodernism. I attempt to give equal weight to the marginalized, de-centered position, the irrational, intuitive, maternal, and immaterial or invisible subtle realm. I gravitate towards the small local truth as opposed to the "Grand Narrative" (Hauke, 2000) or dogma. I prefer the decentralized view of the intersubjective (Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft, 1994) context. Although I value the attempts by our historical philosophical and psychoanalytic ancestors to understand and organize their observations, I take their views as metaphors and as mythopoesis. Hence, my bias is against positivist, absolutist positions, and I hold a prejudice against some of the reifications of the psychoanalytic pioneers.

On the archetypal-collective-imaginal level of the transference, I confront my resistance to reverie and what Corbin (1998, p. xx) called "the mundus imaginalis." The

force of our collective rationality inhibits my imagination, pressuring me to understand and produce. The linear shadow of time and form-loving Chronos (Saturn) visits me daily, often with consternation and reproach, questioning my progress and authority. Am I getting enough done? Am I doing it right? Who am I to attempt such a project?

Some of the other archetypal figures haunting this research include Hermes, messenger, interpreter, rustler, trickster, and thief. He traverses the boundaries of the known and unknown, the seen and the hidden. Pluto and Persephone, gods and guardians of the underworld treasures of dreams and shadows, lurk in the undiscovered, unconscious regions of this inquiry. Apollo and Dionysus, half-brothers of ascent and descent, mind and body, appear in my imaginal wanderings and in the dream related above waiting to be recognized. Pan, the demonized horned angel/beast, half man/half goat god of fertility, panic and pandemonium, son of Hermes and member of Dionysus retinue, speaks to the split in our essential nature. This work needs the transformational poetic voice of Orpheus, the charming singer who returns from the land of the dead to reveal the poetics of loss. Oedipus, on his unconscious quest to reunite with the mother and solve the riddle of the mother complex, accompanies me on our parallel course. And finally, there is Parsifal, son of the widow (as am I), the holy fool who retrieves the treasure-hard-to-find and gains relation to anima, beginning the soul's development out of the mother complex. All of these archetypal figures make specific demands on the research and researcher, extracting what is due.

The last level of the transference Romanyshyn (2008, p. 152) calls the eco-cosmological-anima mundi level. This is the level at work in dreams and what Jung termed synchronicity or meaningful coincidence. It is the level of being-in-the-world,

where we recognize that our inner world is reflected in our outer world and vice-versa. On this level of transference, the dream world speaks to the dissertation topic and the ego hopes to notice. The wind blows at the right time for awareness to note an interesting parallel or a metaphor from the natural world that fits a particular thought arising at the same time. It is this level that Jung was most interested in and this level that produced the dream related above. It is my bias that this teleological level of the work, often called the "Great Mystery," Bion's unknowable ultimate reality "O" (1983b), or Jung's collective unconscious, is worth attention.

Relevance of the Topic for Clinical Psychology

Studying the works of Jung has led me to investigate his influences and thus the history of analytic thought. This pursuit has led to an interest in the Freud/Jung split and the development of post-Freudian and post-Jungian thought. I have found it puzzling that the history of psychoanalysis is a tale of historic splits that remain largely acrimonious and unresolved. The father of depth psychology, Sigmund Freud, spent much of his career defending his theories against the heresies of his departed disciples/sons, first Alfred Adler, then Wilhelm Stekel, C. G. Jung, Otto Rank, Wilhelm Reich, and many others.

The split between Freud and Jung was a wound from which depth psychology has never fully recovered. Jung was Freud's heir apparent, favored over all others. The depth of the painful feelings between them sent Jung into a 4-year period of intense psychological introspection and disorientation (Ellenberger, 1970). Freud spent much of the remainder of his career reifying and defending his libidinal drive theory of childhood sexuality against any other psychoanalytic theories. Had Freud and Jung sustained or

repaired their relationship, psychoanalytic theory would have developed differently. Perhaps female sexuality and gender issues would have been incorporated, and the spiritual aspects of life might have been more thoroughly integrated. Of course, contemporary psychoanalytic thought has confronted these and other concerns inadequately addressed by Freud. In psychoanalysis today, the infant's need for relatedness has displaced drive theory.

Some psychoanalytic thinkers sound distinctly Jungian. Paul Roazen (1975) commented in his biography *Freud and His Followers*: "Few responsible figures in psychoanalysis would be disturbed today if an analyst were to present views identical to Jung's in 1913" (p. 263). Roazen was referring to such ideas as the move from the father to the mother in psychoanalytic thinking, the realization that humans are motivated by more than sexual drive, an awareness that dreams are more than elaborate disguises and deceptions, the way in which psychotherapy has emerged as a two-person, relational activity instead of one expert interpreting the inner life of another person in terms of a pre-existing theory. These important developments in psychoanalysis were first introduced by Jung (Roazen, 1975; Samuels, 1985). How did these changes to psychoanalytic theory come about without acknowledgment of Jung's influence or without any conscious acknowledgment or reparation of the splitting wound?

The fragmentation of depth psychology as a subfield within clinical psychology has led to confusion among prospective analysts desiring training, prospective patients looking for quality depth psychotherapy, state licensure boards, and certification boards attempting to standardize or regulate analytic practitioners and training requirements. Depth psychology competes with other models of clinical psychology, such as the

cognitive behavioral and neuropsychology models, and has lost its prestige within psychology as a whole partly due to this fragmentation, infighting, and inconsistency. An understanding of the philosophical assumptions on which depth psychology was founded may be useful in understanding the splits within it.

Modern individuals are constantly pushed beyond what is safe and predictable. We are continually disturbed by uncertainties. An emphasis on the ego's capacity to contain uncertainty and disturbance is uncomfortable. For this very reason, this capacity deserves special attention and integration into our clinical models. I believe that an exploration of the split between Freud and Jung, from a philosophical perspective, can uncover useful knowledge for understanding why and how the phenomena of splitting continue to occur in an increasingly marginalized field. This exploration will be a fruitful exercise in learning for depth psychological practitioners on both sides of the Freud/Jung divide.

Jung (1917/1966 [*CW* 7]) criticized Freud's psychology as being too dogmatic, too reductive, and lacking any real understanding of the spiritual dimension of life. Jung's psychology has been criticized (Corbett, 2004) for focusing too heavily on the transpersonal dimension of the soul without due regard for the interpersonal, relational field of two-person psychotherapy.

Object relation-oriented psychoanalysis has focused strongly on the interpersonal dimension of clinical work. Some Jungians, such as Michael Fordham, have built a bridge between schools by adopting some of the ideas of Melanie Klein. Another possible bridge between two perspectives may be emerging in James Grotstein's work as evidenced by his conceptualization of the transcendence position (1993), which has

something in common with Jung's (and Klein's) epistemophilic instinct and the transcendent function. Jungian analyst Lionel Corbett (1989) has compared Jung and Kohut, and he utilizes a model that integrates both.

Depth psychology is enriched by these bridge-building efforts. The transcendent function and the transcendent position both refer in part to the capacity of holding two positions at once, a capacity for internal division and dialogue between different positions, conscious and unconscious, or between differing theoretical conceptualizations. Perhaps the original theoretical and very personal split between Freud and Jung, so painfully divisive over these past 90 years, is slowly being transcended. Yet misunderstanding, acrimony, and fragmentation remain significant problems within the field. More recognition of common assumptions, along with more awareness of unacknowledged assimilations and even unbridgeable divides, would be helpful for the overall health and maturity of depth psychology.

Statement of the Research Problem and Questions

Many authors have examined the Freud/Jung split, and others have written about the fragmentation of depth psychology on both sides of the Freudian/Jungian divide. Some have expressed concern over the death or diminishment of psychoanalytic thought or the overall devaluation of psychoanalysis within the general field of psychology. Others have written about the problems of metapsychological formulation and the problems inherent in the reification of theoretical concepts into concrete "things." Some authors have compared the metapsychologies of Jung and Freud, Jung and Klein, and Jung and Bion, or exposed the similar and differing philosophical assumptions, metapsychological constructs, and clinical concepts behind and within their ideas.

Grotstein's concept of transcendence within his psychoanalytic (Kleinian/Bionian) framework may reflect an unintentional incorporation of Jungian ideas that led to the original split between Freud and Jung. It also seems evident that others have built bridges between post-Freudian and post-Jungian thought. There is a need for further examination and comparison of the philosophical assumptions beneath and between the ideas of all the above theorists.

Many authors have written about pluralism, multiplicity, and postmodernism in relation to psychoanalytic theory and to the apparent divisions and fragmentation of the field. Yet there is still a lack of understanding within depth psychology about how philosophical assumptions relate to the differences between Jungian and Freudian thinkers in a general sense. It would, therefore, be useful to have a better understanding of how epistemology and philosophy relate to the fragmentation within the field. It would also be useful to understand how differences between Freud and Jung have been mediated or how similarities between Jung and Klein or Jung and Bion relate to philosophical assumptions. Some researchers (Miller, 2000) have interpreted Jung's mediating concept of the transcendent function as the central idea of his psychology. A mediating function will be necessary to connect the disparate concepts in this research.

The central topic of this research is an examination of the philosophical assumptions of depth psychology as they relate to splitting within the discipline of depth psychology. The intention of the researcher is to examine this topic from multiple perspectives. The primary questions of this research are as follows: What are the philosophical assumptions underlying depth psychology? How do these philosophical assumptions contribute to splitting within the discipline of depth psychology?

Definitions

Splitting. In this research, splitting refers to a breaching or division within a group (interpersonally), between persons, or within oneself; separating or taking apart (Moore & Fine, 1990).

> As a psychological function splitting "denotes both a universal phenomenon which occurs through our daily lives in multifarious ways and a fundamental defense mechanism. It may be defined as: the activity by which the ego discerns differences within the self and its objects or between itself and objects." (Grotstein, 1981, p. 5)

Philosophical assumptions. The word *philosophy* comes from Greek *philosophia* meaning love of knowledge or wisdom, from *philo*—"loving" and *sophia* from *sophos*, love or pursuit of wisdom. Philosophy is a search for the underlying causes and principles of reality; a critical examination of the grounds for fundamental beliefs; and an analysis of the basic concepts employed in the expression of such belief. For Whitehead (1979), philosophy is primarily metaphysics, or "speculative philosophy," which he described as the effort "to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted" (p. 39).

The word *assumption* comes from the Latin *assumptus,* meaning reception, taking up, adoption, something taken for granted, a supposition. An assumption is an idea that is supposed to be true. It is not necessary that an assumption be believed to be true. There are several kinds of assumptions: axioms are assumptions that are known to be true; postulates are assumptions that are believed to be true; hypotheses are assumptions that are believed to be probably true; guesses are assumptions of any kind; and unconscious assumptions are assumptions one has made but is not aware of. Philosophical

assumptions can be any types of assumed beliefs that are metaphysical, concerned with nature of reality.

Methodology

 General method. This proposed study is an ontological, dialogical, and alchemical hermeneutic investigation. These hermeneutic descriptors will be sequentially defined and unpacked in this section.

 Research is an act of reflection. It is a search or a re-search and re-examination into some phenomenon that may or may not have been explored before. The question presents a quest, a journey in which queries are signposts and directions along the way. Methods are mainly tools towards an end. The method of research is a portal into the material. With the subject matter of this research being the nature of splits and their mediation, the appropriate doorway or method into this material must be open and flexible enough to allow for paradox and uncertainty. It must honor the truth of many truths. It must allow borders to be crossed and re-crossed.

 Hermeneutics is clearly the most appropriate general methodology to study depth psychological texts. It gets its name from the Greek myth of Hermes, the winged messenger of Mount Olympus whose job it was to interpret the sayings of the Oracle at Delphi for ordinary mortals (Palmer, 1969). It is thus a method founded on mythos, much like psychology. Hermes was a border crosser, a transgressor, and a liminal figure who could descend into the underworld and return with the message or the needed object.

 Hermeneutics is broadly defined as the art and practice of interpretation. It is a human science rather than a natural science and a qualitative rather than a quantitative methodology. Human science is the study of meaning: descriptive-interpretive studies of

patterns, structures, and levels of experiential and textual meanings. Human science research is the activity of explicating meaning. In this respect the fundamental research orientation of all human science is more closely aligned with the critical-hermeneutic rationality of the humanities and philosophy than with the more positivist rationality of empirical-analytic or behavioral cognitive science. Ast, Schliermacher, and Dilthey developed hermeneutics (Messer, Sass, & Woolfolk, 1988) in the 19th century as a corrective to the dominant scientism of the age, with its quantification, naturalism, objectivism, ahistoricism, and technism (Messer et al., 1988).

Human science seeks to understand rather than merely explain. Meaning is emphasized over facts. Qualitative research methods focus on qualities of human experience rather than on quantities of data. Creswell (1998) writes that the aim is to produce "a complex, holistic picture" (p. 15). Although this study focuses on these "soft" qualities of interpretation, it is not the intention of this researcher to disparage or devalue quantitative "hard" science methodologies, which are in many cases invaluable tools. For this material, however, the hermeneutic method affords the most freedom with which to approach the inner world of the psyche and to begin the quest.

In a general sense, the methodology of hermeneutics seeks to reveal what is hidden or left unrevealed in a text. Depth psychology also seeks to reveal what is hidden in psyche. Hence, depth psychology is a form of psychological hermeneutics with psyche as its text. Jung's concept of the transcendent function, the capacity to contain and transform disparate elements, can be considered a hermeneutic process and, likewise, hermeneutics can be considered an application of the transcendent function (Miller & Jung, 2003). The transcendent function mediates opposites by way of a third, unknown,

and living thing: the symbol. According to *A Critical Dictionary of Jungian Thought*

(Samuels, Shorter, & Plaut, 1986):

> It facilitates a transition from one psychological attitude or condition to
> another. . . . The transcendent function represents a linkage between real
> and imaginary, or rational and irrational data, thus bridging the gulf
> between consciousness and the unconscious. . . . [It] enables thesis and
> antithesis to encounter one another on equal terms. That which is capable
> of uniting these two is a metaphorical statement (the symbol) which itself
> transcends time and conflict, neither adhering to nor partaking of one side
> or the other but somehow common to both and offering the possibility of a
> new synthesis. (p. 150)

The German philosopher and hermeneut Hans-Georg Gadamer viewed the

interpretation of text as a dialogue. He believed that prejudice is not simply inevitable but

necessary to understanding. Gadamer (1975) argued that the only approach to

understanding involved acknowledging our prejudices, knowable and unknowable,

bringing them into conversation with the work, and awaiting the emergence of something

that transcends what is previously known or consciously brought forward.

This metaphor parallels Jung's. In fact it is the essence of the transcendent

function to bring two apparently disparate entities, literal and metaphorical, rational and

irrational, known and hidden, into conversation and await the emergence of the third new

and previously unknown entity. Miller (2000) likens the transcendent function to the

"fundamental psychic activity of interacting with the unknown or 'other'" (p. iii).

Twentieth-century hermeneutics has broadened the understanding of text to

include human action, behavior, and creative expression. Theory also can be understood

to be a text. Jung's metapsychology, like Freud's metapsychology, is itself a hermeneutic

method of investigating human meaning through understanding psychological processes.

This research will conceive of Freudian and Jungian clinical and metapsychological

theory as texts and post-Freudian and post-Jungian texts as subtexts of the former. These texts will be placed in dialogue with each other and with other texts about the importance of theory and how knowledge is built, with the researcher forming a hermeneutic circle to move from the phenomenal, direct experience of the texts towards understanding.

Understanding is a back and forth process between the reader and writer, between what is read and what is written. This type of hermeneutics is known as dialogical hermeneutics. There are many subtexts, specifically Jung's essay *The Transcendent Function* (1916/1969), and generally, many other writers' work on splitting, rapprochement, the importance and limits of theory, knowledge building, transcendence, symbology, intuition, and mysticism in psychoanalysis. All of these texts and parts of texts are placed in conversation with other text parts, and the whole is reflected back into the conversation along with the unfolding meanings that are subsequently revealed to the researcher in the circling or spiraling process. It is a systematic investigation into the generals and particulars of the texts, the results of which, in turn, are related to what is already known or assumed by the interpreter. This process continues turning in a hermeneutic circle or spiral, moving from one subprocess to another, until the interpreter is convinced of a satisfactory interpretation, which then can be checked with other researchers' interpretations, most importantly those of any primary sources of data. The early hermeneut Friedrich Ast (Lee, 1988, p. 7) was trying to convey, with this idea of the hermeneutic circle, the notion that the whole cannot be understood without understanding the parts, and the parts cannot be understood without understanding the whole. Hence, he was underscoring the contextual nature of knowledge (Messer et al., 1988).

Packer and Addison (1989) have advanced an empirical application of the

hermeneutical circle.

> From the interpretive stance, the researcher's point of view and the
> evaluation of explanatory accounts (of others) are not seen as being
> separated in this way, but as in a constant dialogue. Rather than opposite
> ends of a straight line, they are on the circumference of a circle: the
> hermeneutical circle. Establishing a point of view, a perspective, is the
> forward arc, and the evaluation forms the reverse arc. . . . But the
> circularity is not . . . a "vicious" one where we simply confirm our
> prejudices. . . . If we are persevering and open, our attention will be drawn
> to the projective character of our understanding and—in the backward arc,
> the movement of return—we gain an increased appreciation of what the
> fore-structure involves, and where it might best be changed. (pp. 33-34)

Hermeneutics, by including human nature with the researcher's assumptions and biases in

the interpretative process, counters the distancing between subject and object that was

constellated in the philosophy of Descartes. An ontological hermeneutic method

concedes that there is no ultimate, objective perspective to be uncovered or revealed. The

goal of this hermeneutic interpretation is to attempt to articulate a better understanding of

this set of ideas, without a fantasy or expectation of final explanation (Slater, 1996).

Ontological hermeneutics is not so much an activity applied to an object but rather a way

of being. As a methodology, it is not primarily concerned with reliability, as life itself can

never be repeated. Packer (1985) states: "The difference between a rationalist or

empiricist explanation and a hermeneutic interpretation is a little like the difference

between a map of a city and an account of that city by someone who lives in it and walks

its streets" (p. 1091). Palmer (1969) quotes the French phenomenologist Maurice

Merleau-Ponty: "Science manipulates things and gives up living in them" (p. 7). The

ontological hermeneutics of Heidegger, utilized here, goes on living in things. It refuses

to concretize the subject/object split and emphasizes instead the horizontal nature of

being, stating that the world and self, things and the beingness-as-such that can utilize

things, are not separate but interrelated. This amounts to a fundamental paradigm shift

from the dualistic and materialistic emphasis of empiricism and positivism.

Research approach. This hermeneutic endeavor is approached with a postmodern

lens that views all knowledge as socially constructed and historically and culturally

situated. An imaginal approach to the alchemical hermeneutic method, described by

Romanyshyn and Goodchild (2003), will be utilized. "The imaginal approach . . . is open

to all methods" (p. 4). The vocational aspect of research is emphasized, and the

transference relation between researcher and topic is acknowledged and utilized. They

continue:

> The imaginal approach then is not only open to the value of each method
> for what it reveals, it is also critical of each method for what it conceals
> about the nature, character and quality of psychological life and what it
> leaves hidden of the visions, fantasies, dreams, etc. of the researcher. . . . I
> would say that in their symptomatic character, methods are to
> epistemologies as symptoms are to individuals. They are shared neuroses,
> collective and cultural expressions of the unconscious. An imaginal
> approach, as inherently and necessarily a process of dialogue among
> different perspectives, is, therefore, something of a therapeutic
> epistemology. . . . In addition and perhaps more importantly it attends to a
> perspective that has largely been ignored: the imaginal life of the soul,
> which is neither a matter of facts nor ideas. . . . There is a domain of
> knowledge, a way of knowing, a kind of gnosis characterized by
> indirections and distortions, by twists and turnings, by allusions and
> displacements, which indicate that we know only through our complexes,
> and which betray, therefore, the complex character of our knowing. (p. 5)

Procedures. The procedural steps envisioned in this research begin with

examining my pre-existing assumptions and biases as described above, my so-called

transferences to the topic on the four levels of the transference: the personal level, the

cultural/historical level, the collective/archetypal/imaginal level, and the eco-

cosmological level, while understanding that this is an ongoing and never completed

aspect of the research. Romanyshyn and Goodchild (2003) advise that those

transference aspects or assumptions that come too easily indicate the absence of the

soul's voice and that "the desire to make sense of the material is rooted in an ego

consciousness with its fantasies of mastery, control, progress, efficiency and

comprehensiveness" (p. 10). They are suggesting that it is important to surrender to the

material and pay attention to the places where one feels stuck or where images, anxieties,

uncertainties, reveries, and dreams are constellated. It is by attending to this level of the

transference and resistance that one can get beneath the ego to the complex knowing that

reveals what the unconscious wants. In these ways the imaginal approach and the

alchemical hermeneutic method resemble the alchemist's vessel that holds the work

(research and researcher) being created and transformed. Amplification, personification,

and active imagination will be used as needed as tools to engage the transference

dimensions.

Other procedures include gathering and reviewing the literature, contacting

whatever primary sources of data were available to me, analyzing the data in the

hermeneutic process described above, and then checking back with primary sources for

clarification. This spiraling circle of understanding, as Romanyshyn and Goodchild

(2003) describe it, returns the re-search to the same point but at greater and greater levels

of complexity and depth. "In alchemical hermeneutics, what begins as vocation ends as

transformation, and it is in this journey that new knowledge is produced" (p. 30).

Limitations and Delimitations

As stated above, this dissertation is about how the philosophical assumptions

underlying depth psychology relate to concepts of splitting and rapprochement as they

manifest both intrapersonally, interpersonally, and meta-theoretically in the history of depth psychology. It is the aim of this research to understand if and how these assumptions can inform or contribute to splitting as a psychological phenomenon in the field of depth psychology as a whole and also to explore what this may imply as depth psychology enters the second hundred years of its history. The research will be limited in its scope by narrowing the many conceptualizations of splitting to the definitions described above and by contextualizing the Freud/Jung split as the fundamental and most significant split in psychoanalytic history. This is, of course, a debatable issue but will be taken as a given assumption here, because examining all the splits in the hundred-year history of depth psychology would demand more time and space than is allotted for this research.

Some of the limits of qualitative and specifically hermeneutical methodologies are described above. This research is not attempting to establish any specific or absolute notion of truth, certainty, reliability, validity, or generalizability. An ontological, dialogical, alchemical hermeneutics with an imaginal, postmodern, and alchemical approach relies on the subjectivity of the researcher and hence is value laden and intrinsically nonobjective, operating out of the assumptions that no real objectivity is attainable and that all truth is relative, local, socially constructed, and both historically and culturally situated. This is speculative research that is focused on understanding the philosophical roots of splitting within the depth psychological domain rather than explaining hard and fixed facts. It is a limited interpretive endeavor that views consciousness and thus understanding itself as situated within a historical context that it

cannot transcend. Rather than seeking precision, this research aims at mediating and tolerating paradox, uncertainty, and ambiguity.

Organization of the Study

This dissertation has begun with an introductory chapter that introduces the topic, the autobiographical origins of the researcher's interest in the topic, the author's predisposition to the topic, the clinical relevance of the topic to the field of clinical psychology, a statement of the problem, and the research questions, relevant definitions, and a section on methodology. Chapter 2 presents a brief review of the literature and the need for this research. Chapter 3 will explore the development of epistemology as it relates to the philosophical assumptions of depth psychology. Chapter 4 investigates and defines theory, distinguishing it from meta-theory, clinical theory, and metapsychology. It will also examine some of the criticisms of metapsychology and theory building. It will then address the more direct influences on Freud and Jung. Chapter 5 will deal with the topic of splitting. Splitting will be explored as a psychoanalytic construct and phenomenon, its origins and evolutions, and different conceptualizations. The relationship between duality, the concepts of opposites, and splitting will be addressed. Chapter 6 is devoted to Freud and Jung and will examine the Freud/Jung split and briefly address specific historical splits within the field of depth psychology. Chapter 7 will consist of an assessment of what has been uncovered and what still remains hidden, along with personal reflections on the researcher's experience, transferences, and suggestions for further study and concluding thought.

Chapter 2
Literature Review

As this is a textual, hermeneutic dissertation, the literature relevant to the research

questions makes up the text that is being re-searched and uncovered. Hence the relevant

literature will be primarily reviewed in the body of the text as the research unfolds and

progresses. This brief overview details the areas of interest.

This proposed research is oriented by the theoretical sets of depth psychology.

Depth psychology presumes the existence of unconscious, unknown elements in the

psyche. Depth psychology in this work is considered to have originated with Sigmund

Freud (Ellenberger, 1970; Gay, 1988).

The literature can be divided into sets consisting of the following:

Literature About Epistemology, Philosophy, and Theory

The first set of literature is about epistemology, philosophy, and the development

of knowledge and theory. This includes literature about theory and metapsychology. This

study is ultimately concerned with the assumptions that underlie depth psychological

theory. It is necessary to examine the philosophical history and epistemologies of

Western thought. The idea of an unconscious sphere has an illustrious history, which

included such great minds as Plato, Goethe, Schiller, Carus, von Hartmann, William

James, Nietzsche, and others. Ellenberger (1970) has exhaustively investigated the

development of the concept of the unconscious and the philosophical influences involved.

He has delineated the links between romantic philosophy, literature, and psychiatry to

many of the essential ideas in depth psychology.

Tarnas (1991) has done a comparably exhaustive treatment of the evolution of the

epistemology of ideas in the Western mind and how they relate to depth psychology.

Edinger has explored the influence of the Greeks on depth psychology (1999). Ricoeur

(1970) and Heaton (1989) have probed the philosophical aspects of psychoanalysis.

Horne, Sowa, and Isenman (2000) have examined the philosophical assumptions of

Freud, Jung, and Bion. Jones (1953, 1955, 1957), Gay (1988), Roazen (1973, 1975),

Breger (2000), Sulloway (1979), Young and Brook (1994), and Ellenberger (1970) have

delved into the roots of Freud's ideas. Von Franz (1998), Hannah (1991), Douglas

(1997), and Smith (1996) have traced the roots of Jung's ideas, including the influence of

culture, family, and religion. Haule (1984) has illuminated Jung's debt to French

somnambulism and the Nancy school. Shamdasani (2003) has done a comprehensive

study of the formation of Jung's analytic psychology and also traced Jung's ideas to the

French psychiatrists Charcot and Janet and found links to Theodore Flournoy, William

James, and John Stuart Mill's pragmatism. Clough (1997) has researched Jung's interest

in philosophy. Weldon (2004) has explored the Platonic roots of analytical psychology.

Nagy (1991) has investigated philosophical issues in Jung's ideas and the importance of

Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, idealism, and vitalism in his

epistemology. De Voogd (1984) has appraised Jung's understanding of Kant. Huskinson

(2004) has done an extensive investigation of Nietzsche and Jung. Rychlak (1984) has

explored Jung's dialectical and teleological influences. Freud (1925/1959) himself has

written about his influences, obscuring some of his sources and dismissing his debt to

philosophy. Jung (1921/1971; Jung, 1961/1965) too has written about his influences,

generously citing his sources. Online resources include *The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy* (Zalta, 2008); *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fieser & Dowden,

2008); *the Philosophy Pages* (Kemerling, 2008); and *Plato and His Dialogues* (Dickinson, 2003; Plato, trans. 1961).

Literature About Splitting

The second set of literature is about the phenomenon of splitting as a normal and abnormal part of psychic development, discernments between different kinds of splitting and between splitting and fragmentation, repression, and avoidance. This set also includes literature about the concept of the opposites, duality and dualism, dissociation, and the plural psyche.

Moore and Fine (1990) define splitting as "the separation of psychological representations according to their opposing qualities" (p. 183). Hinshelwood (1991) makes a distinction between four types of splits (p. 435). Lichtenberg and Slap (1973) have reviewed the literature on splitting as a psychoanalytic concept. They summarize Freud's first references to splitting and note his many different uses of the term. They place the various meanings of splitting under four headings:

a. Splitting as a general organizing principle.

b. Splitting and the organizing of mental contents in infantile life.

c. The defense mechanism of splitting of representations.

d. Splitting of representations as a factor in pathological intersystemic suborganizations. (p. 786)

Breuer and Freud (1950) first spoke of splitting in describing hysteric patients, distinguishing between "splitting of consciousness" (pp. 12, 67, 69, 123) and "splitting of personality" (p. 45) and "splitting of the mind" (pp. 225, 234).

Grotstein (1981) points out that the concept of the splitting of the psyche was a focus of interest for 19th-century novelists such as Dostoyevsky (*The Double*) and Stevenson (*Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*). He thinks of splitting as both a mental mechanism and an experience or conversely as a way of not experiencing something. He makes a distinction between the experience of splitting and the splitting of experience and suggests that splitting may have a neurological basis in the split halves of the brain. Grotstein provides a history of the concept of splitting from Freud's early work on dissociation, through Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, Bion, and Kohut to the present understanding of the concept.

Dean (2004) notes that most authors conceive of splitting as a defense mechanism (p. 29). Splitting generally has been conceived as a defense against anxiety that gets stimulated when one needs to integrate contradictory perceptions or affective states related to the self or to others (Freud, 1940/1964).

Others (Grotstein, 1981; Kernberg, 1975; Klein, 1946) view splitting as a normal and adaptive process that begins in infancy as an organizing principle. Klein (1946) extends normal splitting into adulthood. Thus splitting has been thought to be a common process in psychic activity that is normal in infancy and leads to the capacity for discrimination and can be pathologically utilized in later periods of development. It is related to the processes of introjection, projection, and denial (Dean, 2004).

Literature About the Freud/Jung Split

The third set of literature is about Jung's break with Freud. Freud suggested in 1913 that he and Jung broke off all personal and professional ties (Bair, 2005; Donn, 1988; Ellenberger, 1970; Freud, Jung, & McGuire, 1974; Hogenson, 1983; Jung,

1961/1965; Samuels, 1985; Steele & Swinney, 1982). There were different philosophical foundations underlying Freud and Jung's assumptions about the psyche. Most authors describe Freud as a material determinist (Aziz, 2007; Breger, 2000; Freud, 1925/1959; Gill, 1994; Glover, 1991; Hogenson, 1983; Horne et al., 2000; Jones, 1955; Jung, 1915, 1974, 1975; Papadopoulos & Graham, 1991; Samuels, 1985; Stolorow & Atwood, 1993; Sulloway, 1979; Tarnas, 1991), whereas others trace both Freud and Jung to romantic roots (Ellenberger, 1970; Gay, 1988; Huskinson, 2004; Kirschner, 1996; Nagy, 1991; Ricoeur, 1970). There are different ways of evaluating the split between Freud and Jung. Some authors have seen it as theoretical (Glover, 1991; Jones, 1955), whereas others have understood it as a combination of factors, including both theoretical and personal issues (Donn, 1988; Ellenberger, 1970; Roazen, 1975; Samuels, 1985; Samuels, 2003; Stolorow & Atwood, 1993). Roazen (1975) describes the personal and theoretical reasons for the split and includes a brief analysis of Jung's psychological condition following the split. Kirsner (2000) has looked at the split as a power issue.

Literature About Other Theoretical Splits

The fourth set of literature is about other metapsychological splits within depth psychology including institutional splits and the fragmentation of the field. Roazen (1975) relates that in June 1911 Adler resigned from the Vienna Society with some other members to set up his own organization of Individual Psychology and that Stekel too resigned from the Vienna Society in October 1912. Roazen (1975) describes the personal and theoretical reasons for these and other splits, divisions, and defections (e.g., Rank, Reich, Ferenczi, Tausk, Silberer, Klein, and more). Leitner (1998) points out that Rank, Jung, and Adler were treated as dissidents, whereas Pfister, Aichhorn, Salomé, and

Binswanger were able to stay in the movement despite their deviating theories. Dissidents were discredited, psychiatrically diagnosed, and pathologized (p. 459).

While most historians of psychoanalysis (Ellenberger, 1970; Roazen, 1975) have focused on the theoretical differences behind the splits, some authors (Leitner, 1998; Paskauskas, 1988) have emphasized personal and political motives, even asserting that pathologizing dissenters as a way of handling conflict was common among Freud's inner circle of adherents. Freud wrote Jung (October 7, 1906) that "all those who are able to overcome their own inner resistance to the truth will wish to count themselves among my followers" (Freud et al., 1974, p. 6). Freud referred to Adler as paranoid (p. 373). Stekel was said to be "infantile and perverse" (Leitner, 1998, p. 464). Jung is described by Jones as "mentally deranged to a serious extent" (p. 464) and in a "florid neurosis" by Freud to Ferenczi (p. 465). Years later, as Rank fell out of favor, he was described as paranoid and hypomanic by Freud and Jones (p. 466). Near the end of his life even Ferenczi, one of Freud's longest and closest associates, was pathologized after expressing theoretical differences with the Freudian canon (p. 470).

Melanie Klein's revisions of Freudian theory brought her into a long-running conflict with Anna Freud and initiated the so-called "controversial discussions" (Grosskurth, 1986; King & Steiner, 1991) that split the London group into three parts.

Literature About Pluralism and Postmodernism

The fifth set of literature is about pluralism (Samuels, 1989), postmodernism (Hauke, 2000; Jones, 2007; Samuels, 1985), and multiplicity. This set of literature is to be reviewed in relation to rapprochement and future direction of the field.

Other Literature

In addition to the foregoing works, the general literature set for this research includes *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Freud, Strachey, A. Freud, Rothgeb, Richards, & Scientific Literature Corporation, 1953), *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Jung, n.d.), *The Freud/Jung Letters* (Freud et al., 1974), and literature about the Freud/Jung split (Alister & Hauke, 1998; Corbett & Cohen, 1998; Donn, 1988; Frey-Rohn, 1974; Hogenson, 1983; Paskauskas, 1988; Roustang, 1982; Samuels, 1985; Steele & Swinney, 1982).

The Need for Research on this Topic in Clinical Psychology

This literature review has examined relevant literature on epistemology, metapsychology, theory, splitting, and rapprochement. Ample literature has been found on epistemology, philosophical roots, and the concept of splitting in its various meanings and evolutions. Literature about specific metapsychological splits has been reviewed, as well as literature about institutional splits within the field of depth psychology. The growing concern regarding depth psychology's fragmentation and diminishing influence in the field has been examined. Evidence of rapprochement of the fundamental metapsychological split has been explored.

What this literature review does not include is literature or research about the philosophical assumptions underlying depth psychology as they apply to the splitting of the psyche of the field as a whole. The review has identified the mediating role of Jung's concept of the transcendent function but has not found literature that conceptualizes the transcendent function in conjunction with the splitting in metapsychology. Grotstein (2001) has acknowledged how similar his ideas are to Jung's but states that he does not

know enough Jung to know where they differ. I have not found literature that contrasts

Grotstein's use of transcendence with Jung's idea of the transcendent function. This

dissertation aims to understand how philosophical differences developed, where

rapprochement has occurred, and what approaches may serve either to unify or to

diversify analytic thought in the future; these topics are important to the field as it enters

its second century.

Chapter 3
Epistemology and Philosophy

> Philosophy and psychology are linked by indissoluble bonds kept in being
> by the interrelation of their subject matters. Psychology takes the psyche
> for its subject, and philosophy . . . takes the world. . . . Neither discipline
> can do without the other, and the one invariably furnishes the unspoken—
> and generally unconscious—assumptions of the other. (Jung, 1931/1969,
> p. 343 [*CW* 8, ¶ 659])

Introduction

All psychologies are based on philosophical assumptions about human nature.

The split within depth psychology that occurred between Freud and Jung may have been

inevitable, due to their different personalities, personal histories, clinical experiences,

interests, and basic assumptions about the world and how knowledge is gained and

verified. Freud and Jung lived within the context of the late 19th century. This was a time

when the philosophical revolution of the Enlightenment had reached its zenith. The

successes brought about through the evolution of the Newtonian/Cartesian paradigm had

changed the face of the modern world and ushered in an industrial revolution driven by

development of a scientific method, informed by data that was arrived at and interpreted

by way of rational and empirical methodologies. This chapter will review the

philosophical, cultural, and individual contexts from which depth psychology emerged in

order to understand the nature of the split between Freud and Jung: where they agreed or

disagreed in their basic epistemological approaches and philosophical assumptions.

Before examining the individual epistemologies of Freud and Jung, it will be

instructive to examine the epistemological and philosophical context of the late 19th

century and early 20th century. The reader should come to understand the relationship

between epistemology (the way one arrives at truth), philosophical assumptions about the

nature of reality and the human psyche and mental process, and how these assumptions form metapsychological principles, which are the building blocks of clinical theories and how the clinician thinks about a patient.

Epistemology

Epistemology, from the Greek word *episteme* (knowledge) and *logos* (word/speech), is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge (Truncellito, 2007, online). It is essentially the study of how we know what we know.

Philosophy is a wisdom tree that is generally considered to encompass three branches: ontology (the study of being), epistemology (the study of knowing), and ethics (the study of how to act as a being). Epistemology has been the major focus of attention in philosophy since the 17th century when René Descartes became concerned with how he could ever truly know something. Long before Descartes, the classical Greek philosophers struggled to make meaning of the world around them through observation, contemplation, and insight and by conceptualizing about the nature of knowledge.

An understanding of the development of epistemological systems influencing Freud and Jung is necessary to this research because epistemology informs the unconscious or implicit assumptions in metapsychologies. Therefore an understanding of Freud and Jung's epistemologies clarifies the understanding of their theoretical differences and similarities.

The Greek influence. Depth psychology is heir to the philosophical tradition of dialogue in the search for knowledge. The Classical Greek culture is considered by most scholars to be the fundamental influence in the development of epistemology in the

history of Western philosophy (Edinger, 1999; Ellenberger, 1970; Tarnas, 1991). The

Greek philosophers were the first to articulate certain ideas and images for the Western

psyche. Nietzsche (1873/1962) observed: "The Greeks personified and embodied all the

eternal types [and] . . . all the archetypes of philosophical thought" (p. 2).

The pre-Socratic philosophers began to reject purely mythological explanations of

the phenomena that they encountered in favor of more rational explanations. Many of the

pre-Socratic philosophers were monists, believing that there was a single substance

behind the multiplicity of phenomena.

The Milesian philosophers. Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes

(approximately 580–525 BCE) articulated two primordial concepts, *physis* (nature) and

arche (first principle, original substance). Hence, we have the first root of Jung's concept

of the archetypes. Thales (often considered to be the first of the Greek philosophers)

(Kemerling, 2001g) considered water to be the arche, or the original substance.

Anaximander believed the arche to be the boundless or infinite. Anaximenes thought it

was air or pneuma, breath. Regardless of these differences, this arche or first principle

was considered divine. For Pythagoras (approximately 580–490 BCE) and his followers,

number was the arche. Pythagoras also was the first to articulate the concept of enantia or

opposition (Edinger, 1999) and then delineate 10 pairs of basic opposites and the idea of

enantiodromia, the principle of one thing turning into its opposite. Jung frequently

referred to enantiodromia as the consequence of one-sided living. The Pythagoreans were

schooled in the Orphic mysteries and were dedicated to Katharsis or the purification of

their souls. Freud was captured by the cathartic method in his early career, and

psychoanalysis as a process can be thought of as a catharsis, or suffering through symptoms towards their resolution.

Of the various schools of the pre-Socratic Greeks, some were generally naturalistic, looking to the environment for the causes of life, whereas others, such as the members of the school of Hippocrates, looked to biological causes in the working of the body.

Milesian philosophy was based on a binary law, which postulates a binary existence: objects either fully exist as completely identical to themselves or do not exist at all. There are two states: off or on.

Heraclitus. For Heraclitus (approximately 500–450 BCE) existence can be both off and on: a middle state of existing that is to some degree off and to some degree on. Perhaps Heraclitus was the most influential of the pre-Socratics for Jung and for depth psychology. Jung refers to him more than 50 times in his *Collected Works*, letters, and seminars. He is considered the first dialectical philosopher because of his belief in universality of change and the idea that development occurs through the friction of internal contradictions as articulated in his well-known statement:

> On those who enter the same rivers, ever different waters flow. . . . We step and do not step in the same rivers, we are and we are not. . . . For it is not possible to step twice into the same river . . . nor to touch mortal substance twice in any condition: by the swiftness and speed of its change, it scatters and collects itself again—or rather, it is not again and later but simultaneously that it comes together and departs, approaches and retires. (Barnes, 1987, p. 103)

Pythagoras' concept of *enantia* or opposition was central for Heraclitus. Contradictory statements such as "the path up and down is one and the same" (Barnes, 1987, p. 103) or "cold things grow hot, the hot cools, the wet dries, the parched moistens

. . . beginning and end are common" (p. 115) are typical of Heraclitian contradictions.

Plato thought of him as the philosopher of flux or change as evidenced by this quotation:

> By cosmic rule, as day yields night, so winter summer, war peace, plenty famine. All things change. . . . Men do not know how that which is drawn in different directions harmonizes with itself. The harmonious structure of the world depends upon opposite tension like that of the bow and the lyre. (Barnes, 1987, p. 116)

Jung quotes him in *Psychological Types*, "Fate is the logical product of enantiodromia, creator of all things" (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 425n [*CW* 6, ¶ 708]). Heraclitus believed that character is fate and thus the product of the tension of opposites. Many later thinkers such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx made this tension a central notion of their own philosophical constructs. In his 1943-44 lectures, Heidegger (Kemerling, 2001b) credits the very coining of the term *philosophy* to Heraclitus, evidently because of the latter's high regard for "sophon" (wisdom).

For Heraclitus, fire (energy) was *the* arche and all of the other elements were condensed from it. He believed that eternal fire (energy) was the basis for *physis* (nature), which corresponds with the concept of the libido in both Freud and Jung's theories. Heraclitus related the term *logos* with fire, a concept later adopted and developed by the Stoics. Logos meant word and also reason, representing the rational principle in the universe. In analytical psychology, *logos* is the masculine principle of rationality and consciousness.

Anaxagoras. The contribution of Anaxagoras (approximately 460 BCE) was the central idea of nous, which can be translated as mind or consciousness. Anaxagoras believed that nous was infinite and omniscient. It referred to a numinous spiritual energy that created an ordered, meaningful universe. Kant will later refer to the noumena in his

work *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, Guyer, & Wood, 1998) to describe an unknowable reality underlying all things, a concept that influenced Jung. In *The Psyche in Antiquity* (1999), Edward Edinger writes, "in modern psychological terms we can consider it the dynamic, creative aspect of the Self" (p. 45).

 Empedocles. Empedocles (approximately 450 BCE) was the first of the pre-Socratic philosophers to articulate that the universe was made up of four arche, four elements or roots rather than one. He also defined two primary moving forces, love (*philia*) and strife (*neikos*). Empedocles' philosophical ideas are the early sources of the alchemists (and Jung's) quaternity and the Freudian opposing principles of eros and death (*thanatos*) (Edinger, 1999).

 Socrates and Plato. Socrates (470–399 BCE) was the first of the great Greek trio (with Plato and Aristotle) who were the most influential in shaping the philosophical foundations of Western culture (Edinger, 1999; Ellenberger, 1970; Tarnas, 1991). Socrates admonished his student to "know thyself." Socrates believed that before one was able to understand the world, it was first necessary to understand oneself. And the only way to accomplish that was with rational thought. His teaching method consisted largely of asking probing questions (as a psychoanalyst does), which cumulatively revealed the students' unsupported assumptions and misconceptions. This is known as the "Socratic method." The philosophical work of Plato (427–347 BCE) is practically inseparable from that of Socrates, as Plato was the interpreter and transcriber of Socrates' oral philosophy. Thus, Plato's epistemology evolved from the Socratic method of dialogue in which doubt and questioning bring forth an inner knowledge that Socrates believed to be innate. In Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus* (Plato, trans. 1961), which is an inquiry into the nature of

knowledge, Socrates compared himself to a midwife helping to bring forth knowledge that came from within his students, who were pregnant with thought. He did not claim to be a dispenser of knowledge or wisdom (p. 855, ¶ 150-152). In the *Symposium* (Plato, trans. 1961) Socrates said that ideas are the product of the intercourse that men have with their disciples (pp. 561-562, ¶ 209a–e). Plato also saw knowledge as something given rather than gained and then forgotten. Knowledge had to be remembered and uncovered by looking within. For Socrates and Plato, knowledge is not empirical. It comes from insight. This is essentially the epistemology that depth psychology advocates through analysis. Uncovering what has been repressed or that which has yet to be born into consciousness through dialogue and exploration of psychical material such as dreams and associations became the hermeneutic method of psychoanalysis. Plato believed that knowledge must be justified. How or whether knowledge can be justified has been one of the concerns of epistemology.

According to Socrates, physical objects and physical events are "shadows" of their ideal or perfect forms and exist only to the extent that they instantiate the perfect versions of themselves. Just as shadows are temporary, inconsequential epiphenomena produced by physical objects, the objects are themselves fleeting phenomena caused by more substantial causes. The phenomenal objects are mere instances of the ideals they represent. These forms are the soul's objects of knowledge. They are the basis of its teleological purpose, whether the soul is conscious of it or not. This relationship between the soul and forms exists because forms *are* knowledge in Plato's philosophy. For Plato, the act of knowledge creates being. Information can be imparted but truth can only be experienced and recollected (Edinger, 1999; Ellenberger, 1970; Tarnas, 1991).

Horne, Sowa, and Isenman (2000) write that "following the pre-Socratics, Plato, via his concept of the forms, made a systematic attempt to formulate the essence of reality and therefore, by implication, causality" (p. 109). Plato's theory of forms conceptualized multiple universal absolutes. He essentially contradicts Heraclitus' (and all pre-Socratic Greek philosophers') monist view. Abstract forms are seen as metaphysically more basic than material things. Even so, Plato's philosophy is not ontological dualism because the two levels (the invisible, intelligible form and the visible form of reality) function essentially as one.

Like Socrates, Plato believed that the material world as it seems to us is not the real world, but only a shadow of the real world. The forms, according to Plato, are archetypes or abstract representations of the many types and properties (universals) of things we see all around us. *Platonic realism* is a term usually used to refer to the idea of realism regarding the existence of universals. It is also known as *Platonic idealism*. This belief in absolute values rooted in an eternal world distinguishes Platonism from the philosophies of the pre-Socratics and from later philosophies inspired by them. Intuition, memory, aesthetics, imagination, mathematics, and observation were all equally important in Plato's epistemology. He had a distrust of knowledge gained through the senses (later to be known as empiricism) because he believed such knowledge to be inconsistent and particular to individuals. Only knowledge directly derived from the forms was justifiably called real knowledge.

Aristotle. Aristotle's influence on later Western science and philosophy also has been vast. He became a student of Plato in Athens. Aristotle distinguished his philosophy from Plato's by declaring that the assumption of the existence of a separate realm of

transcendent Ideas is unnecessary and that the world of perceived things is the real

world. For Aristotle the particular was more real than the universal, a reversal of Plato's

ontology. This difference represents an early incidence of the split between rationalism

and empiricism and between realists and nominalists (Jori, 2003).

Aristotle divides philosophical topics into ethics, physics, and logic. To him, logic

was required for the study of every other topic. Although all knowledge must begin with

information acquired through the senses, its results are achieved by rational means. In a

sense this is a combination of empiricism and rationality. Aristotle's method was both

inductive and deductive, whereas Plato's was essentially deductive from a priori

principles (Jori, 2003).

The function of Aristotelian logic was to discriminate or split things into

opposites, yet Aristotle also identified a mean between opposites, an idea later taken up

by Jung as the third or transcendent function. Immanuel Kant stated in the *Critique of*

Pure Reason (Kant et al., 1998) that Aristotle's theory of logic had arrived at a complete

account of the core of deductive inference.

Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causes—material, formal, efficient, and

final—and postulated an unmoved mover (Divinity) as a necessary element of physics. In

ethics, he argued that "good" for human beings (or anything else) lies in fulfilling their

purpose or *entelechia*, the root (*telos* meaning goal or completion) of what later came to

be known as teleology, a concept that was to become an important point of difference

between Freud and Jung. Horne, Sowa, and Isenman (2000) sum this up well:

> Following the pre-Socratics, Plato (via his concept of the forms) made a
> systematic attempt to formulate the essence of reality and therefore, by
> implication, causality. . . . Aristotle . . . observed human and non-human
> nature directly . . . he developed a four-fold concept of causality. . . . The

two most important categories were the efficient cause, that which pushes a process into action, and the final cause, that which explains why an entity reaches a specific state of being. For example, the final end of an acorn is an oak tree, its goal. The Greek word for final expression is telos and the mode of conceptualizing in terms of telos is called teleology. Teleology was Aristotle's reworking of Plato's idea of the forms. (p. 110)

The Stoics. The Stoics adopted much of Aristotle's philosophy, including his interpretation of Heraclitus. For the Stoics the basic principle of the universe was *logos*. Logos, fire, *nous* were synonymous, all referring to transcendent or divine reason. Stoicism held that the universe was guided by *pronoia* or providence. Chance was ruled out. Everything developed according to a divine foreknowledge or *entelechia* (Edinger, 1999). Thus the universe was purposeful and had meaning. This is an idea or belief that would be a major divisive factor in the history of philosophy and in the fundamental split in depth psychology. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung (1961/1965) wrote:

> The world into which we are born is brutal and cruel, and at the same time of divine beauty. Which element we think outweighs the other, whether meaninglessness or meaning, is a matter of temperament. If meaninglessness were absolutely preponderant, the meaningfulness of life would vanish to an increasing degree with each step in our development. But that is—or seems to me—not the case. Probably, as in all metaphysical questions, both are true: Life is—or has—meaning and meaninglessness. I cherish the anxious hope that meaning will preponderate and win the battle. (pp. 358-359)

Although the Stoics maintained that there were certain "common notions" that are present in the minds of all persons a priori, they also claimed that the human mind is a clean slate that came to be filled up with ideas by way of the perceptions of the senses. This was a foreshadowing of John Locke's *tabula rasa*. Other important ideas of Stoicism were *apatheia* and *autarcheia.* The Stoic philosopher strove for a detachment from emotions. The word *apatheia* is the source of the word *apathy*. Its literal meaning was "without pathos" (Edinger, 1999, p. 79). This was unlike Aristotle who strove for the

mean between one emotion and another. Both positions can be seen in depth

psychology. Analytic work strives for an objectification of and dis-identification (rather

than a detachment) with affects and also strives to find the third position between two

extreme affects. *Autarcheia* referred to self-sufficiency or literally to "self-rule" (Edinger,

1999, p. 81). By achieving *apatheia*, a Stoic could achieve self-rule or a sense of mastery

over his affective moods and behaviors. Both Stoic concepts are precursors to Jung's

concept of individuation, and Jung devoted attention to them in the last chapter of

Mysterium Coniunctionis (Jung, 1955/1970, pp. 471-472 [*CW* 14, ¶ 672]).

    The Skeptics. The Skeptics believed that the possibility of human knowledge is

severely limited in scope and application. Skepticism dates back to Pyrrho of Elis (365–

270 BCE), who taught that apart from the information provided by the senses, we could

have no genuine knowledge of the nature of things. Unable to achieve certainty about the

general structure of the world, one should often practice suspension of judgment, which

is the only rational response to situations in which one is ignorant. If one can only be said

properly to know what is absolutely certain or beyond doubt, then little will be known, an

idea found later in the thought of David Hume and Immanuel Kant (Edinger, 1999).

    Philo. Edinger (1999) states that Philo's (25 BCE–45 ACE) philosophical ideas

and work were important for depth psychology as "an example of translating psychic

realities from a concrete religious context to another framework, in order to make them

viable for a new age . . . the task confronting Jungian psychology today" (p. 90). Philo's

method was based on the use of allegory, which he employed to reconcile Greek

philosophy and Hebrew scripture as it related to the inner life of an individual. Allegory

allowed Philo to find hidden meanings within the literal, a method that foreshadowed

Jung's symbolic hermeneutic. The connection to Philo was recognized by Jung in a 1948 letter to Victor White: "The earliest use of the word (*archetypos*) that I have found occurs in Philo: De Opificio mundi (On the Creation of the World), 1, par. 69" (Jung, 1973, p. 507).

Plotinus. Plotinus (204–270 ACE) developed a form of neoplatonism in the 3rd century that was further modified by his successors. It came to dominate the Greek philosophical schools and remained predominant until the teaching of philosophy by pagans ended in the late 6th century. It postulated an all-sufficient unity, the One, from which emanated the Divine Mind, or logos, and below that, the "World Soul" or *Anima Mundi*. Those transcendent realities were thought to support the visible world. All things emanated from the One, and individual souls could rise to mystical union with the One through contemplation. He conceived of the world soul as the animating force that created through division and separation, essentially a splitting force (Edinger, 1999).

Greek philosophy was dominated by the problem of reality and the question of what is real. It was based on the faith that reality is divine, and that the soul must enter into communion with it. It was an effort to satisfy what Jung later called the religious instinct, which he made an essential component of his psychology. Freud's conscious attitude toward the religious dimension of life was dismissive. At best, he saw religion as a compensation for meaninglessness and an illusion.

The Greek philosophers expounded some of the major metaphysical and archetypal concepts concerning the nature of psychic reality: *physis* (nature), *arche* (the primal, original matter), *arithmos* (number), the *tetractys* (divine image of quaternity), *enantia* (the opposites), *enantiodromia* (the turning into the opposite), *aletheia* (truth),

doxa (opinion), *nous* (mind), *rhizomata* (the four roots or four elements), *katharsis*

(purification), *maieusis* (the art of obstetrics, as in psychological birth), *eidos* (the eternal

form or idea), *anamnesis* (recollection of what was forgotten at birth), *aition* (the four

causes), *entelecheia* (potential at the beginning and realization at the end), *logos,*

allegoria, *hen* (the One)*,* and *psyche* (the soul). Historian Richard Tarnas (1991) writes:

> Speaking in these broad terms, and mindful of the inexactness of such
> generalities, we may say that the Greek universe was ordered by a
> plurality of timeless essences which underlay concrete reality, giving it
> form and meaning. These archetypal principles included the mathematical
> forms of geometry and arithmetic; cosmic opposites such as light and
> dark, male and female, love and hate, unity and multiplicity; the forms of
> man (*anthropos*) and other living creatures; and the Ideas of the Good, the
> Beautiful, the Just, and other absolute moral and aesthetic values. (p. 4)

In summary, Greek philosophers sought to know and understand the world. The Greek

influence on the development of epistemology in Western thought in general and depth

psychology was fundamental and is impossible to underestimate. Dialectics, naturalism,

skepticism, rationality, empiricism, and humanism are an important few philosophical

schools of the vast legacy the Greeks bequeathed to psychology. As Alfred North

Whitehead (1979) aptly put it:

> The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition
> is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the
> systematic scheme of thought, which scholars have doubtfully extracted
> from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through
> them. (p. 39)

Both Freud and Jung were fascinated with Greek classicism, but they each

adopted different assumptions from these ancestors, some of which would lead to an

irreconcilable split.

Epistemology During the Middle Ages

The centuries between the decline of the Roman Empire and the European Renaissance have been called the middle ages or the medieval age. These were not times of great philosophical achievement (Tarnas, 1991, p. 209). Although Plato's work had essentially been lost to Western scholars, the influence of Aristotle grew. Much of his philosophy, including the importance of empirical observation and logic, were adopted, adapted, and advanced by Church scholastics. One of the decisive developments in the Western philosophical tradition was the merging of the Greek philosophical tradition and the Judeo-Christian scriptural tradition. The most significant philosopher in the early middle period relevant to this development and to this exploration of epistemology was Augustine (354–430 ACE).

Augustine. Augustine rejected the epistemological criticisms of the skeptics. Even if it were true that he was mistaken about nearly everything that he supposed to be true, he reasoned in City of God XI.26, one inescapable truth would remain: "Si fallor, sum" ("If I am mistaken, I exist") (Mendelson, 2000, p. 36). This doctrine anticipates what later became known as the Cartesian Cogito "Cogito ergo sum" (I think therefore I am). Augustine's profound influence on modern hermeneutics has been acknowledged by Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2005).

Bacon. In the late middle ages, Englishman Roger Bacon (1214–1292) foreshadowed the development of empiricist thinking in Britain in the 16th century. Bacon proposed a systematic plan for supplementing knowledge of the external world. He applied the mathematical principles valued by Plato and the Platonists to the empirical observation of the Aristotelian empiricists. The combination of reasoning and observation

in experiments would become a model for the development of modern science (Kemerling, 2001f).

Aquinas. One of the most influential of the late medieval philosophers was Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274). He also employed rational argument along with the metaphysical and epistemological ideas of Aristotle. For Aquinas, the application of reason could yield the demonstrative certainty of theoretical knowledge and thus also demonstrated the essential autonomy of the human mind (Tarnas, 1991, p. 220). Like Augustine, Aquinas was influential in the development of hermeneutics (Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2005).

Ockham. William of Ockham (1285–1349) was an English philosopher and priest who used the logic, physics, and metaphysics of Aristotle to deny the reality of universals. Like Aristotle, he stressed the primacy of concrete particulars over universals such as Platonic forms. Universals were only names or mental concepts. Nothing but concrete experience could serve as a basis for knowledge for Ockham. He is best known for his "law of parsimony" often called "Ockham's Razor": "It is pointless to do with more what can be done with less" (Kemerling, 2001e). According to Ockham, we ought never to postulate the reality of any entity unless it is logically necessary to do so. By this standard, the ontological analysis of any situation should make reference to existing entities only when the features at issue cannot be explained in any other way. Anticipating Kant, he believed that the scope and extent of human knowledge was restricted by the limitations of our finite understandings. Anything beyond the limits had to be taken on faith. Reason was a useful tool for the skeptical Ockham, but it was only valuable when in relation to concrete empirical facts. This notion of the importance of

empirical knowledge and the limits of reason would also become a significant feature of later British empiricism and a significant move toward the scientific revolution.

With Aquinas, Ockham, and Bacon, the late medieval period saw an epistemological move away from the authority of the Catholic Church, which had both supported and suppressed the development of knowledge for centuries. The gap between faith and reason began to grow. Critical thinking, empiricism, and logic began to overshadow metaphysics. Fourteenth, 15th, and 16th-century European intellectuals had a renewed interest in classical antiquity, and this interest generated excitement about the prospect of achieving greater knowledge of the world. This period, approximately from the 14th to the 17th centuries, has become known as the European Renaissance, which would foster a swing back towards Plato, revaluing the subject.

The Renaissance

Renaissance literally means a rebirth of vigor or productivity ("Renaissance," 2002, online). A legend (Romanyshyn, 1989; Tarnas, 1991) states that the Renaissance began when the Italian poet Francisco Petrarch (1304–1374) looked back to classical antiquity and called the intervening thousand years "the dark ages" because of the diminishment of literary and philosophic excellence (Tarnas, 1991, p. 208). Petrarch, along with his immediate predecessor, Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), restored poetry to a position of esteem. Petrarch employed poetic methodology—observation and introspection free of dogma. Because of his belief in the natural dignity and artistic potential of human beings, Petrarch has been called the father of humanism (Tarnas, 1991, p. 210).

Renaissance humanists revisited the ideas, poetry, essays, and letters of classical Greece and Rome. They held the belief that the ancient world was the pinnacle of human intellectual achievement. Humanism was more a method of study than a philosophy. Humanists studied ancient texts in the original, analyzing with a combination of reasoning and empirical evidence. It was essentially a hermeneutic methodology. New translations of Plato and classical Greek philosophy invigorated Platonic principles of mathematics, and Aristotelian principles of logic and empirical observation. Prominent Renaissance humanists such as Marsillio Ficino, Giovanni, and Pico della Mirandola, along with the great Florentine artists Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo (a student of Ficino), and Raphael were inspired by Plato's rediscovered work. Science and art were intermingled. Da Vinci made observational drawings of anatomy and nature, along with blueprints for architecture and machines. Imagination again became a valued method of achieving knowledge.

While the empirical tradition of Aristotle continued to advance, a new Platonic humanism began to evolve that valued interiority both countering and complementing the focus of the empiricists. A new balance and tension between Aristotelian and Platonic concepts, such as immanence and transcendence, reason and imagination, nature and spirit, was reached, which set the stage for a new era of inquiry and achievement. Because of the rebirth of neoplatonism, archetypal meaning could again be found in concrete facts, and mythology was again used as a vehicle for metaphysical and psychological insight. Other classical philosophical Greek schools such as skepticism, Epicureanism, and stoicism were also re-examined. The renewed interest in mathematics and in Pythagoras fueled a more accurate quantitative measurement of the world and led

directly to new revelations of nature's mysteries through a process for discovery that would become known as the scientific method. A combination of empirical evidence and mathematics, the new methodology discarded Aristotelian teleology (the concept of a final cause), in favor of a mechanical model that led directly to the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, and ultimately further erosion of the authority of the Church. The Renaissance represents an extraordinarily productive time period in which both objective and subject values and methods were interwoven.

The term "Copernican Revolution" (Tarnas, 2006, p. 6) refers to the paradigm shift that occurred when Polish astronomer Nicolas Copernicus (1473–1543) proposed a heliocentric view of the universe, a proposition that would supplant Ptolemy's model of an earth-centered solar system and that would lead to a fundamental change in human understanding. By immersing himself in the rediscovered ideas of Plato and Pythagoras, Copernicus came to the conviction that nature and the universe were comprehensible and describable by the use of elegantly simple mathematical principles. Although his sun-centered model was not accepted during his own lifetime, his work was defended, refined, and advanced by others, most notably the German astrologer and mathematician Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) and his Italian contemporary, Galileo Galilei (1564–1642). Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo were the first to apply rigorous mathematical analysis to physical problems. The discoveries made by these three through the mathematical use of reason and observation of data to describe celestial mechanics ushered in the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century (Tarnas, 1991).

From the Platonic revival of the poets Dante and Petrarch at the dawn of the 14th century, through the invention of the printing press, the discoveries of the world

explorers, to the plays of Shakespeare at the dawn of the 17th century, and from the

publication of Copernicus' opus *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* (trans.

1995) in 1543 to the publication of Descartes' (trans. 2008) *Discourse on Method* in

1637, the period now called the Renaissance, knowledge expanded in every area of

human endeavor at a rate never known before. A split between the controlled

supernatural order of the Judeo-Christian cosmogony and a new objectivist epistemology

was emerging. God, the ineffable subject, was being further removed from his object, and

the human subject was beginning to split into mind and body, subject and object.

    The Church, the human being, and the earth itself had been de-centered from their

respective positions. Yet the new perspective was not easily adopted. It conflicted with

long established principles of physics and cosmology. It also conflicted with a literal

interpretation of the Bible and data from the senses. Physical sensation demonstrated that

the earth stood still, and that it was the sky full of planets that moved. If the planet was

moving, common physical sense indicated that people would surely fall off. For the

Copernican hypothesis to be reasonable, reason had to be redefined. A new epistemology

had to be created. The entire world had to be re-visioned. This entailed a process and

struggle that took many generations.

    Copernicanism also opened a way to immanence, the view that a divine force

pervades all that exists—a view that has been developed further in philosophy.

Immanence led to subjectivism, the theory that perception creates reality, that there is no

underlying reality that exists independent of perception. In the next century, Kant would

develop and refine this subjectivist philosophy.

Some argue that what became known as the Copernican Revolution demolished the foundations of medieval science and metaphysics (Ellenberger, 1970; Tarnas, 1991). Galileo fought for his life defending Copernicus and presenting his view of a material world existing independently of human consciousness. His scientific method was based on observation, experiment, induction, and a mechanical, causal conception of Nature. Galileo's epistemology was sophisticated. He separated ethics from knowledge and science from the legitimate domain of the Church. The tension between faith and reason became unbearable, and religion and science split apart.

In 1610, harkening back to the Mileasian pre-Socratic Greeks, a barely literate German cobbler, Jakob Böhme (1575–1724), had a vision from which he extracted the idea that God was a binary, fractal, self-replicating algorithm and that the universe was a genetic matrix resulting from the existential tension created by His desire for self-knowledge. Böhme's writings circulated among the more curious minds of Europe, influencing Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Jung, and many others. Böhme believed that prior to the creation of humanity, God was an undifferentiated single unity defined by the absence of everything else—the "Ungrund." Creation was the result of the Ungrund dividing from its state of original unity. Prior to the initial split, God was only a potential mind with an unformed longing to know itself. After the split, God iterated into a binary-based matrix, continually increasing in complexity as He collected more and more information about Himself. In contrast to the Judeo-Christian God, Böhme's God evolves. Böhme believed that this essential conflict defined the universe's logic and processes. Since this tension is inherent in the design of all reality, evil and suffering are a necessary part of reality ("Jakob Böhme," n.d., online). Böhme was influenced by neoplatonism and alchemy,

especially Paracelsus, and he was a significant influence on William Blake, Schelling, and the German romantic movement ("Jakob Böhme," 1911, p. 114).

The Age of Reason

The "Age of Reason," an epithet coined by Thomas Paine (2003), as the title of his famous work, succeeded the Renaissance and preceded the Enlightenment. It is considered to stretch from about the mid-17th century until 1800. Reason, emerging empirical methods of investigation, and individualism began to replace tradition and established religious doctrine. The periods known as "The Scientific Revolution" and "The Enlightenment" in Western Europe overlap within the Age of Reason. The Scientific Revolution usually dates from Copernicus' heliocentric model of the solar system to the end of the 17th century. It is sometimes extended to include developments in biology, chemistry, and physics through the 19th century. Although "The Enlightenment" originally referred to the period of time in France that preceded and encompassed the French Revolution in 1789, the term has been broadened by popular usage. For the purposes of this research, these periods will be considered as one long period, with "The Age of Reason" and "The Enlightenment" used interchangeably. It was during this period that the modern world and the corresponding views of reality that Freud and Jung inherited were born. This was the view that reality could be known through scientific inquiry and described by universal laws or theories that could be tested and proven.

Francis Bacon, René Descartes, followed by Baruch Spinoza, Isaac Newton, and John Locke were the most prominent early contributors at the dawn of this age. Gottfried Leibniz, George Berkeley, and David Hume also became influential figures in the

development of epistemology in the decades before the philosophical revolution and innovations of Immanuel Kant. All had important influences on depth psychology.

Bacon. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) was an English philosopher best known as a philosophical advocate and defender of the scientific revolution. Bacon was one of the leading figures in natural philosophy and in the field of scientific methodology in the period of transition from the Renaissance to the Age of Reason. Bacon did not propose an actual philosophy but, rather, a method of developing philosophy. He articulated an inductive methodology for scientific inquiry that eventually became "the scientific method" of modernity. His carefully planned procedure for investigating natural phenomena based on observation harkened back to Aristotle but marked a new empirical turn in the rhetorical and theoretical framework for science (Klein, 2003).

Bacon split natural science into physics and metaphysics. The former investigated variable and particular causes, the latter reflected on general and constant causes, for which he used the term *form*. Forms were more general than the four Aristotelian causes, and that is why Bacon's discussion of the forms of substances as the most general properties of matter was the last step for the human mind when investigating nature. Final causes were discredited, since they led to difficulties in science and to theological and teleological points of doctrine (Klein, 2003).

Bacon believed that knowledge was the power of establishing human dominion of man over the earth. To arrive at this knowledge, it was necessary to study "natures" with the intention of grasping their "forms." For Bacon "natures" were the natural phenomena of heat, sound, and light; "forms" were the immanent forces of the natural phenomena. The experimental manipulation of nature in Bacon's scheme was very influential in the

development of the Scientific Revolution. His belief that the world was an objective resource for humanity to manage and rule over has been criticized as one of the primary assumptions creating the ecological crisis of our current era (Bacon, 2000). The distinction between empiricist and rationalist method was characterized metaphorically by Bacon (2000) in his 1620 *Novum Organum* as that between the empiricist ant's collecting (i.e., of facts found lying about) and the rationalist spider's spinning (of theory from within).

Descartes. René Descartes (1596–1650) is frequently cited at the first modern philosopher (K. Smith, 2007, ¶ 1) and the "Father of Modern Philosophy" (Newman, 2005, ¶ 1), because of the questions that he raised and problems that he created, particularly the "Problem of Knowledge" and the "Mind-Body Problem." At a time when philosophy and science were not distinguished from each other, Descartes was a famous physicist and mathematician as well as a philosopher. Living at the same time as Galileo and Pascal, he was inspired, like Plato, to trust mathematics (reason) over experience (senses). His *Meditations on First Philosophy* is the ultimate representation of his work and according to some "the inaugural moment of modern philosophy" (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 105). First philosophy simply means what is done first in philosophy. Descartes changed "first philosophy." What stood first in philosophy since Aristotle had been metaphysics, the branch of philosophy that studies the makeup, function, and organization of reality, the system of first principles underlying a particular study or subject of enquiry.

Metaphysical terms such as *forms*, *essences*, *categories*, *substance*, and *spirit* refer to how reality is organized and how it works. God, for instance, is a metaphysical

concept. The term is now also used to refer to whatever cannot be verified by observation. Materialism and idealism are two kinds of monistic metaphysics.

The first question for philosophy to answer was "what is real?" In *Meditations* questions about knowledge come to the fore (Descartes, trans. 2007). Descartes realized that the question of what was real depended on what was knowable. Questions about knowledge had to be settled first. Descartes thus established "epistemological priority" for philosophy, which led to the creation of the theory of knowledge, epistemology, as a separate discipline within philosophy for the first time.

A major problem for Descartes was that the relation between cause and effect did not appear to be symmetrical. When a cause was observed, one effect was observed. But given an effect, many causes were able to produce the same effect. For Descartes, perceptions were the effects of external causes; professing knowledge of external objects was reasoning backwards from effect to cause. Descartes wondered how he could have knowledge through perception of external objects. Modern philosophy became centered on this question about knowledge without ever reaching a consensus.

Descartes provided a philosophical framework for the natural sciences to develop that came to be called methodological skepticism: the rejection of any idea that could be doubted in order to acquire a firm foundation for genuine knowledge. This knowledge was gained without any sensory experience. Truths attained by reason were broken down into elements that his intuition could grasp, which, through a purely deductive process, he believed resulted in clear truths about reality. His famous dictum, "cogito ergo sum" in the Second Meditation, was a conclusion reached a priori and not through any inference from experience. The only indubitable knowledge he found was that he was a thinking

thing. Thinking was his essence as it was the only thing about him that cannot be doubted. Descartes concluded that he could be certain that he exists. Thus the mind was better known than the body. He proceeded to construct a system of knowledge that discarded perception as unreliable and admitted only deduction as a method. Descartes' epistemology was based on extreme skepticism. He thought that only knowledge of eternal truths—including the truths of mathematics, and the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the sciences—could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method. He also argued that although dreams appeared as real as sense experience, these dreams could not provide knowledge. Also, since conscious sense experience could be the cause of illusions, sense experience itself was doubtable. As a result, Descartes deduced that a rational pursuit of truth should doubt every belief about reality.

Descartes' commitment to innate ideas places him in a rationalist tradition tracing back to Plato, yet much of Descartes' philosophy had precedents in late Aristotelianism, the revived stoicism of the 16th century, or in earlier philosophers like St. Augustine. He was one of the key figures in the Scientific Revolution and a major figure in 17th-century continental rationalism, later advocated by Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, and opposed by the British empiricist school of thought consisting of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

Bacon and Descartes both proposed the rejection of the legacy of supposed knowledge from the past. However, they had different epistemologies. Bacon developed an inductive empirical methodology primarily based on careful observation and cataloguing (more Aristotelian/objective), whereas Descartes developed a deductive

methodology using reason (more Platonic/subjective). Bacon and Descartes both radically split subject and object in their epistemologies. This is implicit in Bacon with his conception of nature as the object of experiment and investigation by the human subject. Descartes came to believe that there were two fundamental substances in the world, souls and matter. The essence of soul for him was thinking. The essence of matter for him (given in the fifth meditation) was extension, or the concept that matter takes up space. Thus for Descartes, dualism is explicit: the mind is made of something other than matter. It inhabits matter but is primary. Cartesian dualism set the agenda for philosophical discussion of the mind-body problem for centuries. Many current writers and philosophers believe that his dualism led to the depersonalization and desecration of the world and the major split between the mind and the body (Stevens, 1994; Tarnas, 1991, 2006).

In essence, the first act of modern epistemology, through the ideas of both Bacon and Descartes, was the splitting of subject and object. Bacon concerned himself chiefly with the object, whereas Descartes was most concerned with the subject. Bacon focused on the external and Descartes on the internal. This difference evolved into a philosophical debate between epistemological externalists on the one hand, and epistemological internalists on the other, over the nature of knowledge. Externalists think that only factors outside of the psychological states of the knowledge seeker can be conditions of knowledge. Freud and Jung would end up on different sides of this debate.

René Descartes' epistemological solution ultimately became known as rationalism, the idea that knowledge can be obtained through reasoning alone or even without direct experience. Francis Bacon's (and later John Locke's) alternative solution

became known as empiricism, the idea that knowledge was best obtained through direct experience through the use of human sense perception.

Both rationalism and empiricism rely on logic. Aristotle had developed logic as a system of reasoning through deduction to ascertain what might be discerned based on what is already known to be true. Like Aristotle, Descartes' logic was deductive. Bacon found that logic also could be used to predict a probable (not certain) conclusion through induction. Bacon's scientific method employed induction to generate hypotheses about what might be true or untrue.

The long-lasting period of contention between rationalists and empiricists (externalist and internalists; or extraverts and introverts in Jung's model) commenced. The difference in emphasis on experience or reason has remained a contrast between the British and Continental lines of development ever after. Bacon's one-sidedness underestimated the role of imagination and hypothesis in the production of new scientific knowledge. On the other side of the debate, Descartes underestimated the importance of sense experience.

In the next generation, Baruch Spinoza in Europe (an admirer of Descartes) and Thomas Hobbes (Bacon's pupil) in England, along with his successor John Locke, wrestled with the separation of subject and object. This is the period concerned with the dichotomy of *dualism* and *monism*.

Monism. Monism ("Monism," 2002, online) is any (metaphysical) view claiming to find unity in a certain sphere. The main forms of monism have been: a strong form (there is only one object) (Spinoza, Hegel) and a weaker form (there is only one kind of object, and matter and mind are not two independent entities) (materialism). Another

form of monism stems from Heraclitus: things are related together or unified by their

being governed by a simple law or principle (Lacey, 1993d, p. 350). It can be argued that

Jung was a strong monist, as his concept of the psychoid level included both psyche and

soma or spirit and matter in an undifferentiated unity, yet his system is based on a

dualistic tension of opposites.

Dualism. Dualism is a set of views that analyzes a given subject, be it the universe

as a whole or some area of concern, in terms of fundamentally distinct and opposed ideas

or substances, such as spirit and matter or body and soul (Lacey, 1993b, p. 161). Dualism

began with the claim that mental phenomena are nonphysical. Both Plato and Aristotle

maintained that intelligence (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with or

explained in terms of the physical body.

Philosophers since Descartes have articulated two primary forms of dualism:

substance dualism and property dualism. Substance dualism is the view that there exist

two kinds of substance: physical and nonphysical (the mind), and subsequently also two

kinds of properties that adhere in those respective substances.

Plato anticipated Descartes and his formulation of the doctrine of substance

dualism. The term *property dualism* generally holds that while the world is constituted of

just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of

properties: physical properties and mental properties. It is the view that nonphysical,

mental properties (such as beliefs, desires, and emotions) adhere in some physical

substances (namely brains). Substance is a philosophical term for that which exists. It can

mean material matter and spiritual matter. Substance dualism is contrasted with all forms

of materialism, but property dualism may be considered a form of emergent materialism

and thus would only be contrasted with nonemergent materialism. Variations of dualism have evolved that describe how the two oppositions are related. Descartes' dualism was an interactionist theory that posited that the pineal gland in the brain was responsible for the interaction and collaboration between the mind and body (Kemerling, 2001a). Freud's scientific materialism might best be described as a property dualist stance, whereas Jung's stance is best considered weak monist. This difference proved crucial to their eventual split.

Hobbes. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) took as his starting point Bacon's principle that all knowledge comes from the senses. He was 21 when Bacon's (2008) *Natural History for the Building Up of Philosophy* was published in 1609, and he was in touch with Bacon from 1619 till the latter's death in 1626. Hobbes visited Galileo in Florence in 1636, and he received Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (trans. 2008) in 1637 and participated in debate with Descartes (Kemerling, 2001h).

Thomas Hobbes continued the evolution of empiricism by a consideration of how the action of matter on the sense organs generates thought in the mind. John Locke continued this line of development (Kemerling, 2001h).

Spinoza. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) was influenced by Descartes but his ideas are really very different. He built his theory on the proposition that only nature exists, being the cause of itself (*causa sui*). He called this creative nature "Substance," which had the properties of both extension (i.e., spatial existence) and thought. This idea contrasted with the dualism of both Descartes especially, and the empiricists who were dealing with the difficult problem of explaining how thought reflected matter. Spinoza's amendment to Descartes eliminated the problem of the coordinating extension-less

thought and unconscious matter (Descartes' dualism) by proposing a world made up of

"Substance" which has attributes of both extension and thought. Thus nature thinks itself,

as in an "Anima Mundi," and the problem of mind-body coordination does not arise.

Spinoza was thus the first to offer a solution to the subject-object problem, the first true

monist. Monism does not become a dominant feature of epistemology until Hegel

(Kemerling, 2001a).

Like Descartes, Spinoza is also a rationalist, in the sense that he appeals to reason

rather than to the evidence of the senses, and a logicist in that he proposes that any theory

should be developed by formal-logical proof from axioms, modeled on the only science

to have by then achieved the status of genuine science: mathematics. Spinoza's substance

was God, which for him was synonymous with nature or simply what is, and which exists

in all things, and this single substance had different modes. He conceived that a mode

was in a substance as a wave was in the ocean. Modes accounted for the different shapes

of things. Essentially this was pantheism. Spinoza believed matter was capable of thought

and that all of reality was alive and capable of knowing. This is vitalism. He believed

there was only limited free will. His epistemology was based on self-evident axioms

(Kermerling, 2001a).

Spinoza was a contemporary of the British empiricists, Hobbes and Locke. He is

regarded as a materialist, because for him thought is an attribute of objectively existing

substance. Substance may or may not exhibit the attribute of thought. In line with the

development of positive science at that time, his view of the material world is exclusively

mechanical, and the world unfolds with determined necessity. Spinoza's rational

materialism finds further development in Leibniz's objective idealism. His ideas also

influenced the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant and then became central to the romantic movement that arose in the 18th century when Goethe revisited and promoted his pantheism and naturalism. Spinoza's importance for depth psychology is reflected in his statement, "He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions" (Spinoza, 1997, online).

Vitalism. Vitalism is a doctrine that states that the functions of a living organism are due to a vital principle distinct from physicochemical forces. The processes of life are not explicable by the laws of physics and chemistry alone, and life is in some part self-determining. Vitalism has a long history. Hippocrates identified vital forces as the humors. Psychology has been rich in vitalist concepts, particularly through the ideas of the French mesmerists and Jung, which will be explored in another section (Ellenberger, 1970; Nagy, 1991).

Newton. Isaac Newton (1643–1747) was an English alchemist and exegist (interpreter of the Bible), as well as a physicist and mathematician. He articulated classical mechanics, the theory of universal gravitation, calculus, and he provided the foundation for the scientific explanation of many phenomena of nature in mechanical terms. Newton's epistemology was complex and provided the basis for the most integral picture of the world yet conceived. His natural philosophy combined mathematics with the mechanics of physical observation and created a coherent system of verifiable predictions (Tarnas, 1991).

Newton's 1687 work *Philosophiae Naturalis, Principia Mathematica* (Newton, trans. 1999) completed the Copernican revolution by providing a consistent physical

explanation of how the planets are kept in their orbits by the force of gravity. He was able to confirm Kepler's laws as good approximations and to get more accurate predictions by taking account of the gravitational interaction between the planets.

Newton's contribution to the development of science and philosophy was monumental. He built a theoretical system that brought virtually all phenomena of the universe within the scope of a single, rational, mathematical theory. In Newton's physics, the thinker steps outside of the process, but leaves a proxy of the subject in the object itself and places the body of the subject into Nature while removing the Mind of the subject outside of Nature. In other words, Newton observes the object as if he could be both inside of it and outside of it at the same time. Newton theorized that nature works by differentials (or relatives), not absolutes. There was a relative subjectivity within the object being observed, not some universal and absolute objective truth.

With this development, the Subject disappeared into the Object.

Leibniz. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) made important contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of religion, as well as mathematics, physics, and geology. A rival of Newton, he made claims to being the original developer of calculus. Like Spinoza, he was a rational monist with a radical understanding of how reality is ordered. He denied the actual existence of the material world. Like Spinoza, he was interested in math and logic, believing that the world reflects logical relationships. Logic was the basis for reality. Leibniz's philosophy saw people as partly distinct from everything else that existed. He believed that everything, including people, was made up of monads, simple substances that cannot be broken down further, like Democritus' atoms or like Socrates' soul. Monads did not take up space but were able to perceive

reality. Leibniz believed that the world contained infinite variety, but that it was only possible to know the world within limits (pre-Kantian). There was not much room for free will in Leibniz's philosophy (Stevenson, 1998, p. 140). Leibniz's logical construction was based on these principles:

1. The principle of noncontradiction: any contradictory relation is false.

2. The principle of sufficient reason: there is a good or "sufficient" reason for everything that is true, even if we don't know that it is.

3. The principle of predication: everything that happens to something (all of a thing's predicates) is a part of what that thing is, both logically and in fact.

4. The principle of the identity of indiscernibles: no two things can be exactly alike (indiscernible) without being the same thing.

5. The principle of the best world: God made this world the best of all possible worlds: it is logically the most various and the simplest to understand.

Leibniz had access to the unpublished manuscripts of Descartes and Pascal, and he communicated with Spinoza. His philosophical goal was to reconcile modern philosophy with the philosophy of Aristotle, Plato, and Renaissance humanist tradition (rapprochement). Yet his philosophy is actually a reaction to two sets of modern opponents: Descartes and his rational dualist adherents, and Hobbes and Spinoza and the empirical materialists, whose ideas Leibniz found morally and socially destructive because they led to atheism and necessitarianism. Necessitarianism (Swartz, 2003, p. 38) is the theory that external antecedents predetermine human actions. Results follow by

invariable sequence from causes that necessitate them. It is a form of determinism that denies all mere possibility and all free choice. There is exactly one way for the world to be.

Leibniz's system contrasted with the deterministic natural science of Newton. He restored "God the creator," as opposed to Spinoza's "God as nature," transforming the human being from an agent of God's will to a creation of God who is, in turn, capable of knowing the system of the universe. Leibniz attempted to build a bridge and reconcile opposites. He wondered how it was possible that reasoning (which was faulty and imperfect) could arrive at conclusions that coincided with the outcome of processes occurring in reality. In other words, how could something so untrustworthy often seem to be correct? He hypothesized that unconscious perceptions must be supplementing conscious ideas.

Locke. The British empiricist philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) developed a materialist theory of knowledge that opposed Descartes' "innate ideas" and declared experience to be the sole source of all ideas, but via the influence of external objects on the sense organs (ideas of sensation) or alternatively through attention being directed to the activity of the soul. Locke described human understanding in empirical terms, arguing that there were no "a proiri" innate ideas (Kemerling, 2001c).

According to Locke, empiricism is the basis for how all people learn everything they know. All ideas come from experience, including ideas about abstract concepts like number, shape, and size. He believed that the senses and the mind work together to turn experience into understanding. Understanding is made up of impressions, ideas, sensations, and reflections, all responding to experience. For Bacon, dualism was not

explicit, but it was made explicit in Hobbes and Locke. Ideas did not just come from sensations, but the distinction between sensations and ideas had disappeared altogether; ideas were but reflexes.

Nature was given in the form of sensation and ideas where these sensations plus further sensations derived from the contemplation of other ideas. Sensation was at this time identified as the connecting medium between Nature and consciousness. The objective existence of the material world was not questioned, nor was the validity of the impressions made by Nature upon the senses deemed in any way problematic. The material world was held to be given in sensation and knowable. However, the mind had become a passive organ of Nature. Thus the dualism inherent in Bacon was only overcome by the denial of an active reason altogether.

Locke believed that the mind at birth was a *tabula rasa*, an idea that Leibniz strongly disagreed with, arguing that Locke didn't give enough attention to reason and logic and left too much to chance. Leibniz thought that knowledge was not accidental but by divine design. Locke believed that substance existed, but that all that can be known about it are ideas that come through sense impressions. He elaborated the most fully worked out philosophy of the time, based on an empiricist epistemology. His strong opposition to authoritarianism characterized Locke's work.

Berkeley. British empiricism led to an increase in atheism, and another Englishman, Bishop George Berkeley (1748–1832), reacted by defending religion against Hobbes and Locke's empiricism and by turning the empiricist theory against itself. Berkeley proved that empiricism leads to subjective idealism, by drawing the development of empiricism to its logical conclusion. His attack on materialism attempted

to show that the assertion that something exists outside the individual mind was absurd, useless, and improvable. Bacon had asserted, as a materialist, that we had to use our eyes, ears, and hands and go out to Nature to discover truth. Hobbes and Locke developed Bacon's empiricism in the narrow sense, by reducing the investigation of Nature to experience to sense perception, equating sense perception with ideas, and ultimately equating the rational faculty as a whole with the action of the external world on the senses, with sense perception. Berkeley showed that this line of development leads to knowledge of phenomena only, in the form of sensations, not the essence of things existing outside of and independently of our perception. Perception had become not people's connection with Nature, but a barrier sealing us off from Nature absolutely. The logical conclusion of empiricism was, thus, a subjective idealism. If all that was given to consciousness was sensation, then logically there was no sense in the concept of knowing anything beyond sensation. He argued against the existence of substance itself by saying that empiricism tells us only that our ideas exist. According to him, all that exists were ideas and the souls that perceive them. The only place that anything existed was in the mind or soul. If no one perceived it, it didn't exist (Downing, 2004).

This led to a student asking him, "If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make any sound?" Berkeley replied that all things existed in the mind of God, so God heard it and it did make a sound (Downing, 2004). This was an idealist (Platonic) stance (ideas exist outside of the mind). Plato had made a distinction between ideas and material reality: ideas caused material reality. Berkeley believed that material reality isn't real at all. Yet Berkeley was still an empiricist in an odd way because he believed that ideas are essentially all we can experience. God, soul, and ideas were the

makeup of all that existed and were behind all sense impressions. He disagreed with Locke's idea that reality consists of the material world. For Berkeley, like Jung, psyche was primary.

The essence of this period was the opposite ways in which Berkeley and Newton dealt with the subject-object relationship developed by empiricism. Berkeley, as Newton's peer, understood the social and religious implications of Newton's physics. Newtonian physics pushed God to the margins. Like Leibniz, Berkeley foresaw that empiricism informed by Newtonian classical mechanics would lead to atheism, necessitarianism, and socioeconomic exploitation, if not the complete breakdown of morality. From the Newtonian perspective, nature acted according to laws that were entirely open to rational-empirical elaboration and understanding. The internal causes of phenomena did not matter. Religion and metaphysics did not matter. Newton was simply continuing Bacon's project. For Newton, value was in Nature, and the human being was able to appropriate Nature. What people had no use for had no value.

Berkeley proved that if all that was given to consciousness was sensation, then logically there was no sense in the concept of knowing of anything beyond sensation. He created a philosophic problem that both British and Continental philosophy has never resolved. Berkeley rejected the value of knowledge absolutely. Whereas for Newton, God was relegated to the role of Maker and Prime Mover and as Bacon believed, we were left to learn God's Will by the study of His works (Nature), for Berkeley, Nature was not at all given in sensation. On the contrary, a thing existed only by virtue of its being perceived, if not by me, then in the eye of God. The object existed only by virtue of the subject.

The Enlightenment

In the 17th century, there had been a shift in the understanding of reason. Metaphysical speculation was no longer acceptable as a legitimate form of inquiry. Tarnas (2006) writes, "The heliocentric discovery . . . became the source and impetus for a tremendously magnified confidence in human reason. It revealed the human being's divinely graced capacity for direct, accurate knowledge of the world at the most encompassing macrocosmic level" (p. 6). The new scientific methodology of observation, hypothesis, and experiment led to impressive achievements in physics, biology, astronomy, and applied mathematics. Philosophers sought to use the same techniques to understand human thinking and human nature. The success of reason and rationality in the scientific achievements of Newton and others led to a backlash against teleology. Teleology was marginalized to the area of theology, and the "world as machine" metaphor became dominant. "Efficient causality became the only legitimate form of expression. This type of thinking was called determinism" (Horne et al., 2000, p. 111).

This is the period of conflict between dogmatism and skepticism. In Europe, the French Revolution was approaching, while in Britain the Industrial Revolution took hold. The Enlightenment period established the cultural, philosophic, and scientific foundations for the modern period in the late 19th century. Rationality overturned established traditions. Geometric order, scientific rigor, and reductionism were seen as the most important Enlightenment values.

David Hume (1711–1776) was a Scottish philosopher, psychologist, and historian who held that the task of knowledge was not to comprehend being, but to provide a guide to practical life (utilitarianism); the only objects of authentic knowledge could be

mathematics because no other relations can be deduced by logic, but only from experience. After Descartes, philosophers began to doubt progressively more and more and were able to be sure of progressively less and less until the development culminated in the "radical associationism" of Hume. Trusting introspection alone as an investigating tool, associationists divested themselves of metaphysical presuppositions to limit themselves to the bare facts: the conscious stream of images and ideas. These they conceived on the model of Newtonian physics, as something akin to tiny spheres of matter in motion, determined by laws of attraction and repulsion. Hence Hume attempted to rescue the positive, objective content of Locke's philosophy from the subjectivist critique of Berkeley. He accepted Berkeley's proof, but further developed the philosophy of skepticism as a British compromise, in which, although the knowledge gained from experience could not constitute theoretical knowledge or necessity, it was good enough for practical purposes, sufficient for practical life. Theory could not be trusted; only experience would tell (Ellenberger, 1970; Morris & Brown, 2001).

Building on Locke's ideas, Hume developed a philosophy of human nature describing the limits of scientific reasoning. He said much of reality, including substance, causality, and even the nature of the self, could never be fully known. Based on an analogy he noticed between physical and mental processes, he proposed a new way of thinking about how sense impressions come together to form ideas. Just as masses in space were attracted to each by the force of gravity, our impressions were attracted to one another too. This was the idea of associationism, based on empirical observation. His own self-observation led Hume to the conviction that there were three associating qualities: resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect. What was

knowable was put together out of resemblances and coincidences but was not reliable.

He noticed a distinction between facts and reason. This split became known as "Hume's

fork." Facts were just facts. They said nothing certain about other facts nor are they

logically necessary. There was no way of knowing that what existed had to exist or

whether it was an accident and something else might just as well have been in its place.

Logical connections could be made among ideas that explain how they may be related but

not about facts. Facts and relationships about or between facts were split like the prongs

of a fork. Facts did not exist in any necessary logical relationships, and relationships do

not presuppose any particular facts. Hume used this fork to criticize metaphysical

concepts, including causality. He criticized philosophers who made assumptions about

reason based on facts and about facts based on reason in order to come up with

metaphysical ideas about reality. These metaphysical notions could not be proved by

either relating them to other ideas or by experiment. Although people may believe in

causes, there was no way to know what things, in particular, cause other things. Instead

people formed beliefs about cause based on associations they have made. These

associations did not explain how things actually happen. Instead, they reflected the way

natural instincts, habits, and social conventions have formed beliefs as in the well-known

aphorism "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." Much of what people thought depended

on human nature, not reason or empiricism. Our actions were more determined by desire

than logic or reason. Hume's law "no is from an ought" addressed the naturalistic fallacy

or the mistaken idea that how things ought to be can be determined based on knowledge

of how things were (Morris & Brown, 2001). Hume was anticipating Kant and the later

associationists, Bentham, Mill, and the idea of subjective influence, "the personal

equation," which will be further elaborated by Fichte, Nietzsche, and Jung, among others, and discussed below.

German Idealism and the Romantic Philosophers

In the 19th century, the Enlightenment emphasis on empiricism and determinism was bolstered by the success of the physical sciences. New disciplines arose, such as sociology, anthropology, and psychology, and came to be known as the human sciences. Human science utilized both the empirical-determinist epistemology of natural science and the teleological views of the romantics and idealists. Eventually an intense conflict emerged with two radically different views of the nature of the human being. Determinists viewed humans as being driven by forces beyond their control to which they had to adapt. Teleologists saw humans as having a purpose, which was some version of striving towards self-development and wholeness (Ellenberger, 2000).

The group of German philosophers who became known as idealists reacted to British empiricism by giving a special place to the power of the mind and nature. For the idealists, awareness was not limited by experience; people and reality were part of a transcendent unity. Mind and human understanding structured reality. German idealists believed that a spiritual reason was woven into the fabric of reality, so the world was not just a cause-and-effect mechanism. Idealist philosophy was closely related to the romantic movement in art, literature, and psychiatry that also arose as a counter to the dehumanizing, mechanical aspects of the enlightenment and the new industrial revolution. Essentially these movements expressed an outlook on life, a Weltanschauung that revalued the irrational, the mystical, and the individual human being (Ellenberger, 2000).

German idealism and romanticism reached its peak in the first quarter of the 19th century and had lasting effects on European culture through the remainder of the century, including a particularly strong influence on the development of depth psychology. Romantics held a reverence for nature and a desire to enter into deep relationship with the natural world and the inner life of soul and human emotions. Interest in dreams, symbols, mythology, genius, mental illness, hidden powers of fate, and miracles increased. There was a rebirth of interest in particular cultures, local folkways, myths, dreams, poetry, language, dialects, and histories. Advocates emphasized spontaneity, intuition, and improvisation and focused on the particular and the absolute uniqueness of each individual. Whereas Enlightenment rationalists believed in the power of reason, the romantics believed in the unfoldment of the soul, something Jung would later call individuation (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 200).

Natural science, according to the romantics, involved rejecting mechanical metaphors in favor of organic ones; in other words, they chose to view the world as comprised of living beings with sentiments, rather than objects that merely function. Romantics believed that science should not bring about any split between nature and humanity. An important romantic notion that influenced Jung was that of an inner universal sense by which humankind was able to understand nature and the universe. This inner sense was believed to allow some direct understanding or contact with the world soul by way of poetic or scientific inspiration, dreams, and ecstatic or mystical experience, or through the magnetic somnambulism practiced by Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815) and Marquis de Puységur (1751–1825) (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 77).

Goethe. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) was one of the key figures of German romantic literature and philosophy. As a young adult, Goethe immersed himself in mysticism, alchemy, and theosophy, discovering neo-Platonism, Paracelsus, Gnosticism, Hermetics, and the Kabbalah. This period of self-education profoundly affected his development and his influence on the romantic movement (Bishop, 2008, p. 21). His contemporary, Immanuel Kant, was also an influence upon him, while his own philosophic and scientific ideas, along with his poetry, drama, and nonfiction, most of which were philosophic and aphoristic in nature, influenced many other philosophers, notably Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Cassirer, Freud, Jung, and countless others.

Echoing Plato, Goethe described primordial phenomena and the metamorphoses deriving from them as a formative force. A botanist as well as a poet, philosopher, and playwright, he believed in a primordial (archetypal) plant from which all plants were modeled, an idea that influenced Darwin (Bishop, 2008).

Goethe held neither teleological nor deterministic views of development. He believed that the world as a whole and individual parts within the world, such as human beings, grew through continual, external, and internal strife. He did not embrace the mechanistic views that were prevalent in science and denied rationality's superiority as the sole interpretation of reality. Goethe asserted that all knowledge was related to humanity through its functional value and that knowledge presupposes a perspectival quality, an idea that became important for Nietzsche and the postmodern philosophers.

Kant. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was really the first of the German idealists, calling it "transcendental idealism." Kant thought that the order and consistency of our experience was provided by our understanding, and not by God. He suggested that the

mind and the rest of reality were part of the same unified picture. Kant was a traditional rationalist, having studied Leibniz. After studying skepticism in Hume's works, he developed a distinctive and very influential rationalism of his own, which attempted to synthesize the traditional rationalist and empiricist traditions. His reading of Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber and led him to become the "critical philosopher," synthesizing the rationalism of Leibniz and the skepticism of Hume (Ellenberger, 1970).

Kant proposed that objective reality is known only insofar as it conforms to the essential structure of the knowing mind. Only objects of experience, *phenomena*, may be known, whereas things lying beyond experience, *noumena*, are unknowable, even though in some cases we assume a priori knowledge of them. The existence of such unknowable "things-in-themselves" can be neither confirmed nor denied, nor can they be scientifically demonstrated. Therefore, as Kant showed in 1781 in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant et al., 1998), the great problems of metaphysics, such as the existence of God, freedom, and immortality, are insoluble by scientific thought.

Kant revised the Enlightenment view on epistemological grounds, saying that knowledge of the world is limited by human cognitive capacities (Kant et al., 1998). This led him to divide the world of objects into what we could know, which he called the phenomenal world, and what we could never know, which he called the noumenal world or the thing-in-itself. Kant's epistemological move opened the way to new formulations of teleology.

Kant brought rationalism and empiricism together in two ways. He looked at rationalist ideals as empirical conditions of the mind (an idea Jung would elaborate in his

work as the empirical reality of the psyche). The fact that philosophers want to believe in god (a rational idea) shows what the mind is like (an empirical fact), so rational thought is an empirical fact of the mind. He also looked at empirical facts and reasoned that we can only know them with our minds. As a result there is a lot about the world that depends on how our mind works. This has become known as idealism, the view that reality is in some way mental, or depends intrinsically—and not just causally—on mind. Idealism does not apply to Platonic Ideas or Forms as they are not material nor mind dependent. Idealism is opposed to materialism and realism (Lacey, 1993c, pp. 264-265).

In his critical philosophy, Kant attempted to establish a system of concepts and categories in order to resolve the struggle between skepticism and dogmatism, determinism, and teleology, and between empiricism and rationalism. He proposed that there were certain principles given a priori and that on the basis of these principles, knowledge of all possible objects of perception was attainable. Knowledge had to be confined to propositions about what was given in experience. Any attempt to attribute to objects that were "beyond sensation" metaphysical traits, such as "value," led to antinomies and error. Kant was thus able to reconcile empiricism and rationalism on the basis of these a priori notions, healing the subject-object split that would be influential but would not last for long.

The essence of Kant's theory of knowledge was the rejection of skepticism simultaneously with the rejection of an empirical basis for universal knowledge. Like Descartes, Kant asserted that human beings have innate capacities, awakened by experience, but absolutely independent of experience. It was this assertion that was necessary to overcome the absolute skepticism of the final product of British empiricism

(Berkeley and Hume). Freud would become and remain an absolute skeptic of the empirical tradition, while Jung would follow Kant.

Kant was both interested in and skeptical about logically inexplicable psychic phenomena. His essay *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* (Kant & Manolesco, 1969) was an investigation of the telepathic experiences of Immanuel Swedenborg, in which Kant describes his own self-analysis and his struggle with reconciling his rational philosophy with his inner experience. Jung would later be drawn to Kant through his identification with this particular essay (Nagy, 1991).

The group of idealist German philosophers following Kant were also reacting to British empiricism. They gave a special place to the power of the mind. Awareness was not limited by experience. Kant's idea of a two-tiered reality was taken up by these philosophical heirs, fostering the development of German idealism in the work of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The neo-Kantianism of the late 19th century applied his insights to the study of the physical sciences and romantic psychiatry. The idealist-romantic philosophers, led by Schelling, posited a state beyond immediate experience that could be realized through intuition, imagination, and feeling (Schelling, cited in Horne et al., 2000). The idealists, led by Hegel, said that mind could progressively realize itself through human historical development.

Hegel. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) was one of Kant's immediate followers. He drew on Kant to form a new view of history. For Hegel, the categories of understanding kept changing and tended to conflict with each other, working themselves out through time. Hegel called this "the dialectic," a concept borrowed from Plato, who used it to describe Socrates' technique of reasoning in a back

and forth manner. An idea, which he called a thesis, came into conflict with an opposing idea, which he called the antithesis. The conflict was eventually resolved in a third idea, called a synthesis, which was then a new thesis as the cycle began again. This process was directed toward a universal experience of self-recognition in which reality figured itself out and becomes free. Until then, suffering and alienation would continue. Alienation was what happened when ideas became fragmented and split off from other ideas.

Hegel saw reality as unified by reason. Kant's "Transcendental Dialectic" was an attempt to show the general futility of abstract metaphysical speculation (Stevenson, 1998, p. 168), but dialectic was, for Hegel, the fundamental process of development—in both thought and reality—from thesis to antithesis to synthesis. Hegel believed that the telos was the complete realization of all that could be known. He called this "absolute mind," which was by inference the mind of God.

According to Hegel, Kant considered the question of knowledge solely from the point of view of the subject-object relation, and in so doing placed the entire content of cognition on the side of the subject, leaving nothing to the object. Instead of seeing appearance as a barrier between subject and object, Hegel conceived of the subject and object as a single entity. Kant, he said, like all those who have gone before, first defined the object and subject as separate, pushed them together, and then proved that their only genuine existence was separate. For Hegel, "appearance" was a stage in the process of self-distinction of object into subject. Thus Hegel dealt with both the dualist-monist and the rationalist-empiricist problems. The abstractions of sense perception were just as much abstractions as those of conceptual thought; but in either form, the abstractions had

a content. Rather than holding that contradiction was a defect of thought, which cannot

pertain to the world outside of thought, Hegel declared that contradiction was a property

of the world and thought only grasped and reflected thought through being itself

contradictory. This required a radical revision of the concept of logic, which instead of

avoiding contradiction, had contradiction as its motive force. This idea harkened back to

Heraclitus and Socrates: the concept that knowledge and creation was the product of the

perennial clash of opposites. Hegel saw a relation between nature and freedom,

immanence and transcendence, and he discussed the unification of these dualities without

eliminating either pole or reducing it to the other.

Hegel's philosophy can be understood as a development within the Platonic

tradition that included Aristotle, Plotinus, and Kant, as well as Meister Eckhart, Leibniz,

Spinoza, and Jakob Böhme. What distinguished these philosophers from materialists like

Epicurus, the Stoics, and Hobbes, and from empiricists like Lock and Hume, was that

they regarded freedom or self-determination as real and as having important ontological

implications for soul or mind.

Two of his fellow students and close friends were also influential in the

development of his ideas and the development of German idealism, Friedrich Wilhelm

Schelling and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin. Hegel influenced several generations of

thinkers, admirers such as Marx and later Sartre and Derrida, and detractors such as

Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and later Heidegger.

Jung was particularly critical of Hegel. In his essay "On the Nature of the Psyche"

(1947/1969), Jung asserted that Hegel was not an influence on him:

> A philosophy like Hegel's is a self-revelation of the psychic background
> and, philosophically, a presumption. Psychologically, it amounts to an

invasion by the unconscious. The peculiar high-flown language Hegel uses bears out this view: it is reminiscent of the megalomaniac language of schizophrenics, who use terrific, spellbinding words to reduce the transcendent to subjective form, to give banalities the charm of novelty, or pass off commonplaces as searching wisdom. So bombastic a terminology is a symptom of weakness, ineptitude, and lack of substance. (p. 170 [*CW* 8, ¶ 360)

It is strange that Jung denied Hegel's influence on his own ideas, as they were so similar to Hegel's in relation to the tension of opposites and the emergence of a third and new synthesis that they could be considered Hegelian. Perhaps he was convinced by Schopenhauer's argument against Hegel. Still, the influence is clear.

Fichte. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) was a figure whose idealist philosophy formed a bridge between the ideas of Kant and the German idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Fichte is an important philosopher for the development of depth psychology due to his original insights into the nature of self-consciousness or self-awareness. Like Descartes and Kant before him, the problem of subjectivity and consciousness motivated much of his philosophical rumination. He may have been the first to articulate what became known as the problem of the personal equation, the idea that one's own personality and subjective experience influences the theories that one creates or is drawn towards, an argument later taken up by Nietzsche and Jung. In 1794 he argued that

what sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of man one is; for a philosophical system is not a piece of furniture that we can reject or accept as we wish; it is rather a thing animated by the soul of the person who holds it. (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 59)

Fichte did not endorse Kant's argument for the existence of noumena, of "things in themselves," the supra-sensible reality beyond the categories of human reason. Fichte saw the rigorous and systematic separation of "things in themselves" (noumena) and

things "as they appear to us" (phenomena) as an invitation to skepticism. Fichte argued

that consciousness is not grounded in anything outside of itself. He rejected the

assumption of anything that was not through and through merely our representation. He

was an important influence on Schopenhauer.

Naturphilosophie and Schelling. A specific idealist philosophical school of

thought, Naturphilosophie, founded by Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling (1775–1854),

contended that nature and spirit both emanated from the Absolute, the world soul, and

constituted an indissoluble unity. Schelling was a schoolmate of the poet Hölderlin and

later a roommate of Hegel and a friend of Goethe. Schelling represented a bridge between

Fichte and Hegel. Fichte attempted to show that the whole structure of reality follows

necessarily from the fact of self-consciousness. Schelling took Fichte's position as his

starting-point. From Fichte he derived the ideal of nature as fully unified and also the

formal method to which he largely continued to adhere. Schelling posited that nature

should not be conceived as a merely abstract limit bounding the infinite striving of spirit,

or as a mere series of necessary thoughts for mind. Nature had reality for itself, a reality

that did not stand in conflict with its ideal character, a reality whose inner structure was

ideal and had its origin in spirit. Nature as the sum of what was objective, and

intelligence as the complex of all the activities making up self-consciousness, appeared as

equally real, as equally exhibiting an ideal structure. Thus the philosophy of nature and

transcendental philosophy were two complementary philosophies making up one

philosophy that focused on the whole. Spirit, humankind, and nature were one. Human

life was a participation in an organized whole cosmos, in which everything was

sympathetically connected to everything else (Ellenberger, 1970, pp. 202-203).

Nature could not be understood solely in mechanical terms and physical concepts. Analogy, poetry, and metaphor were better means of understanding and describing what was otherwise ineffable. The old Heraclitian law of polarities, pairs of antagonistic and complementary forces, was restated as a principle of the philosophy of nature. His later work focused on the philosophy of religion and mythology. Fichte, Spinoza, Jakob Böhme and the mystics, and the great Greek thinkers, with their descendants, the Neoplatonists and Gnostics, all shaped his thinking as he, in turn, would influence both Freud and Jung (Bowie, 2004, online).

Carus. Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869) was a physician who attempted to articulate a complete theory of unconscious psychological life. He defined psychology as the science of the soul's development from unconsciousness to greater levels of consciousness (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 207) and differentiated three layers of the unconscious: the general absolute, the partial absolute, and the relative or secondary unconscious. According to Carus, the unconscious was the source of healing and possessed its own innate wisdom. It also provided a means of connection to all other beings. Carus, foreshadowing Jung, distinguished forms of intrapersonal (within oneself) and interpersonal relationship (between people): from the conscious to the conscious; from the conscious to the unconscious; from the unconscious to the conscious; and from the unconscious to the unconscious.

Herbart. Johann Herbart (1776–1841) was the chair of philosophy at Konigsberg after Kant. He described himself as a higher skeptic in line with Hume and Kant. Like Leibniz, he saw the mind as a dynamic system in which ideas as the basic units were like psychic atoms that either collide and cause problems or coalesce into greater wholes. He

likened this process to mechanics. He saw that some ideas were observable and thus conscious and others were not. He also noticed that ideas tended to be grouped together by unconscious association (Corbett, 2004).

Von Schubert. Von Schubert (1780–1860) proposed that the human was a "double star" (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 205) with a second center that gradually emerges, similar to Jung's concept of individuation in the second half of life. He also wrote about symbolism in dreams, and how the dream speaks in images not words, also foreshadowing Jung's ideas. He postulated a three-fold nature that corresponds directly to Freud's structural model of the psyche, the Id, Ego, and Superego. Von Schubert also proposed that there were two basic longings: a longing for love and a longing for death, both of which are longings for home or a return to nature.

Troxler. Paul Vital Troxler (1780–1866), a student of Schelling, believed that the human psyche is comprised of four principles, made of two polarities: soma-soul and spirit-body held together by a living center analogous to Jung's concept of the Self. Development, according to Troxler, was a progression of distinctions, from the ego to the non-ego, between the body and the soul to greater levels of consciousness of spiritual realities, a progression also similar to Jung's process of individuation (Ellenberger, 1970).

Schopenhauer. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) was an important voice in romantic idealist thought. As a young man he was a protégé of Goethe. The oriental scholar Friedrich Majer was another important influence upon him. Majer stimulated in Schopenhauer a life-long interest in Indian thought and introduced him to a translation of the Sanskrit Upanishads. Schopenhauer was 25 years old at the time and was finishing his

doctoral thesis, which he self-published as *The Principle of Sufficient Reason* (Wicks, 2007). He was soon to incorporate these new Eastern ideas into his life's major work and the foundation of his philosophic system, *The World as Will and Representation* (Schopenhauer, trans. 1969) which was completed before his 30th year. He spent the rest of his life elaborating upon it.

Schopenhauer's philosophy was based on his affinity for the ideas of Plato, Kant, the Vedic texts, and Buddhist teachings. His position was eccentric for his era, as he was an irrationalist, a pessimist, and an atheist. He was tough minded and fearless in his irreverence for conventional assumptions. There was a mystical thread in his thinking, and he was widely read in both Eastern and Western esoteric thought, being particularly informed by Meister Eckhart. In the 1860s he was discovered by a new generation of intellectuals including Richard Wagner, Leo Tolstoy, Eduard von Hartmann, and Frederick Nietzsche, who were all heavily influenced by him.

Schopenhauer's ideas grew in stature after his death and, by the last two decades of the century, he was the most widely discussed philosopher in the German-speaking world (Young & Brook, 1994). He challenged Hegel's rationalism, and explained that the other side of reality was the will, which was forever seeking expression (Schopenhauer, trans. 1969). He said that the will was guided in its expression by forms, similar to those described by Plato, and that the ultimate goal of human life was to escape, via asceticism, from the power of the will. Schopenhauer's concept of the will influenced Freud in his development of the libido hypothesis.

Comte and positivism. Auguste Comte (1798–1857) was a French thinker who was the first to apply the scientific method to the social world. He pioneered the

philosophy of positivism in the general tradition of empiricism. Positivism stated that

the only authentic knowledge was scientific knowledge and that such knowledge could

only come from positive affirmation of theories through strict scientific methodology.

Positivists insisted on a scientific approach to the human and the natural world. For

Comte, the sciences formed a hierarchy, which was also reflected in their historical

development from mathematics through physics and biology to sociology. According to

Comte, society and human thought underwent three different phases in the quest for truth,

according to the Law of three stages. These three phases are the theological, the

metaphysical, and the positive phases. Comte observed the circular dependence of theory

and observation in science, and he saw the scientific method as replacing metaphysics

and teleology in the history of thought because of its insistence on testability. Theory had

to be verified, confirmed, or falsified by the empirical observation of reality (Lacey,

1993e).

Positivism was closely related to reductionism as both subscribed to the view that

entities of one kind were reducible to entities of another such as societies to numbers, or

mental events to chemical events. It also involved the contention that processes were

reducible to physiological, physical, or chemical events, and even that social processes

were reducible to relationships between and actions of individuals, or that biological

organisms were reducible to physical systems. Positivism later developed into logical

positivism in the early 20th century (Lacey, 1993e, p. 319). Freud would adopt this

perspective without reservation, whereas Jung would question its universality.

Mill. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was the eldest son of the Scottish philosopher

and historian James Mill. John Stuart was educated by his father, with the advice and

assistance of Jeremy Bentham, a proponent of associationism. J. S. would carry on the

cause of utilitarianism and its implementation after his father and Bentham died

(Kemerling, 2001d). His canonical statement can be found in his work *Utilitarianism*

(Mill, 1936). This philosophy had a long tradition, although Mill's account was primarily

influenced by Bentham and his father. Mill's famous formulation of utilitarianism was

known as the "greatest happiness principle" (p. 5). It held that one must always act so as

to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.

In his writings, Mill argued for a number of controversial principles. He defended

radical empiricism in logic and mathematics, suggesting that basic principles of logic and

mathematics were generalizations from experience rather than known a priori. The

principle of utility—that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote

happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness" (Mill, 1936, p. 9)—

was the centerpiece of his ethical philosophy. He became a strong advocate of women's

rights and labor unions (Kemerling, 2001d).

Mill's most abstract works, such as the *System of Logic* (Mill, 1991b) and his

Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (Mill, 1991a) served polemical

purposes in the fight against the German, or a priori, school called at the time

"intuitionism." In Mill's view, intuitionism needed to be defeated in the realms of logic,

mathematics, and philosophy of mind if its pernicious effects in social and political

discourse were to be mitigated. In the *System of Logic* (1991b) he suggested that there are

nonconscious intellectual processes in the mind that allow us to make inferences and

judgments. Mill's *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (1991a) argued

against certain unconscious states of mind posited by Hamilton, among them unconscious

mental associations, since for Mill these were the trappings of intuitionism. The argument between Mill and Hamilton was about the contents of consciousness. One of Mill's many concerns was the connection between science and philosophy. He stressed that the two overlap and that the difficulties of metaphysics lie at the root of all science.

Mill discussed the dispute between the nominalists (who denied general substance and held there was nothing general except names) and the conceptualists and placed Hamilton among the conceptualists. Freud would translate some of his works into German.

William Hamilton. Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856) was a Scottish philosopher and metaphysician who studied in Germany and was well versed in German philosophy. Freud was born on the very day that Hamilton died. Twenty years later he read and translated Mill's critique of Hamilton and became familiar with his ideas. Hamilton's positive contribution to the progress of thought was in insisting on the great importance of psychology as opposed to the older metaphysical method, and by his recognition of the importance of German philosophy, especially that of Kant. His most important work was an 1829 essay, "Philosophy of the Unconditioned" (as cited in Mill, 1991a), which was a critique of *Cours de philosophie* by Auguste Comte, the father of positivism. Hamilton advanced development of the principle that for the human finite mind there can be no knowledge of the Infinite. Deeply impressed with Kant's antithesis between subject and object, the knowing and the known, Hamilton laid down the principle that every object was known only by virtue of its relations to other objects, which was a version of associationism, and a forerunner of contextualism. From this perspective it followed that limitless time, space, and power were, humanly speaking, inconceivable. The fact,

however, that all thought seems to demand the idea of the infinite or absolute provided a sphere for faith, which was thus the specific faculty of theology. Hamilton thought it was a weak characteristic of the human mind that it could not conceive any phenomenon without a beginning: hence the conception of the causal relation, according to which every phenomenon had its cause in preceding phenomena, and its effect in subsequent phenomena. Regarding the problem of the nature of objectivity, Hamilton simply accepted the evidence of consciousness as to the separate existence of the object. Because of this assumption, Hamilton's philosophy became a natural realism. Hamilton professed allegiance to Aristotle above all others. His ideas were precursor to postmodern philosophy and to Lacan's idea that the unconscious was structured like a language.

The End of Romanticism

After 1850, the philosophy of nature and romanticism almost completely disappeared. It was the period of the rise of positivism and the triumph of the mechanistic Weltanschauung. However, romanticism lingered, and two of the later romantics who are of particular importance for depth psychology are Fechner and Bachofen.

Fechner. Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) was, like Jung, the son of a Protestant minister, and studied medicine in Leipzig. His first interest led him into experimental physics. In 1840, at age 39, he fell into what modern nosology would term a severe neurotic depression with hypochondriacal symptoms. It can also be considered as an instance of what Ellenberger (1970) called "sublime hypochondriasis" (p. 216), a creative illness from which a person emerges with a new philosophical insight and transformation of personality. Fechner was convinced he had discovered a universal principle as important for the spiritual world as Newton's principle of gravitation had

been for the physical world. He called it the "principle of pleasure-unpleasure." After his illness he became interested in the philosophy of nature. Fechner contended that the earth was a living being at a higher level than humans. He became interested in the relationship between the spiritual world and the physical world and tried to find a general law that governed the relationship. He turned to experimental psychology and published his findings in the two volumes of *Psychophysics*, published in 1860. In a critical survey of Darwin's theory of evolution, Fechner formulated his "principle of the tendency to stability" and the idea of "sensory thresholds," which were analogous to what Freud later called the repression barrier between conscious and unconscious mental activity. In 1879 his student, William Wundt (1832–1920), founded the first institute of experimental psychology.

Freud incorporated several basic concepts from Fechner's psychophysical philosophy of nature into his metapsychology. Freud quoted him in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900/1953), *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (Freud, 1905/1960), and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (Freud, 1920/1955).

Bachofen. Jakob Bachofen (1815–1887) was another neo-romantic. He advocated the theory of matriarchy. He wrote with a keen interest in world mythology and history. Nietzsche adopted his concepts of the Dionysian and the Apollonian civilizations (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 221). Turel (in Ellenberger, 1970, p. 222) described similarities in the basic concepts of Bachofen and Freud. He pointed out that Bachofen had discovered the defensive phenomena of repression and reaction formation 50 years before Freud.

Hartmann. The speculations and findings of German romantic philosophy in the first two-thirds of the 19th century culminated in 1869 in Eduard von Hartmann's (1842–

1906) *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (Hartmann, 1931/2005). In this work the "will" of Böhme, Schelling, and Schopenhauer and the "idea" of Hegel took the name "the unconscious." Von Hartmann's unconscious acquired the qualities of Hegel's idea as an intelligent but blind dynamism underlying the apparent universe. His doctrine was a form of spiritual monism and held that the world was produced by will and idea, but not consciously; for consciousness, instead of being essential, was accidental to will and idea, which were the two poles of the unconscious. Matter, he believed, was both idea and will. Von Hartmann described three layers of the unconscious: (1) the absolute unconscious, which constituted the substance of the universe and was the source of the other forms of the unconscious; (2) the physiological unconscious, which, like Carus' unconscious, was at work in the origin, development, and evolution of living beings, including human beings; (3) the relative or psychological unconscious, which lay at the source of conscious mental life.

Nietzsche. It was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) who seems to have recognized most intensely the full implications of the modern development and experienced in his own being the inescapable plight of the modern sensibility: the romantic soul at once liberated, displaced, and entrapped within the vast cosmic void of the scientific universe. He depicted the annihilation of the metaphysical world and the death of God wrought by the modern mind. Nietzsche captured the pathos of the late modern existential and spiritual crisis:

> What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? . . . Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? (cited in Tarnas, 2006, p. 34)

Nietzsche saw the will to power as the fundamental component of human nature. Everything human beings did was an expression of that will. *The Will to Power* (Nietzsche, 1901/1967) was a psychological analysis of all human action and was accentuated by self-overcoming and self-enhancement. Contrasted with living for procreation, pleasure, or happiness, the will to power was the summary of the individual human struggle against the surrounding environment as well as the reason for living in it.

Nietzsche was deeply influenced by Schopenhauer, although he downplayed and even concealed (either consciously or unconsciously) this influence. In Nietzsche's writings (as in Jung's), there were more references to Schopenhauer than to any other philosopher.

Nietzsche famously put forward the idea that "God is dead," and this death either resulted in radical perspectivism or compelled confrontation with the fact that humans have always regarded truth perspectivally. The rise of morality and of moral disputes thus became a matter of psychology; Nietzsche's perspectivism reduced epistemology to psychology. In his notebooks (trans. 2003) he wrote: "Against the positivism, which halts at phenomena [and says] 'There are only facts' – I would say: no, facts are just what there aren't, there are only interpretations" (p. 139).

Nietzsche repeatedly called into question the value of truth. Nietzsche's perspectivism stated that there were radically different and incommensurable conceptual schemes (ultimate ways of looking at the world) or perspectives, one of which we must (consciously or unconsciously) adopt, but none of which was more correct than its rivals. It was a form of relativism. Nietzsche's influence remains substantial within and beyond philosophy, notably in existentialism and postmodernism.

Freud stated "that he (Nietzsche) had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any man who ever lived or was likely to live" (Jones, 1955, p. 344). Freud actually told Jones that he stopped reading him because he feared Nietzsche had anticipated many of his own ideas (p. 344). Nietzsche's ideas had in fact anticipated Freud's drive theory, guilt, repression, dreams and wishes, projection and sublimation, as well as the repetition compulsion (Nietzsche's notion of eternal recurrence). Freud even borrowed Nietzsche's term *da Es* (translated by Strachey as the Id) to refer to an unconscious source of energy.

Nietzsche conceived of the unconscious as containing contents unavailable and ungraspable by the ego. Freud's conception of the unconscious held that it was a product of consciousness and held no autonomy of its own. Nietzsche's construct was closer to Jung's autonomous unconscious that can function in opposition to the ego. Huskinson (2004) has examined similarities and difference between Nietzsche and Jung and found Jung closer to Nietzsche than Freud in most areas. Both Nietzsche and Jung held a constructive or prospective view of the unconscious as opposed to Freud's reductive view. Nietzsche and Jung's use of the symbol differs from Freud's way of understanding symbolism. For Freud, the symbol is a signal or disguised representation for something known, whereas for both Nietzsche and Jung the symbol was conscious and unconscious, pointing towards something unknown and not fully graspable.

For Nietzsche (and Jung), a self becomes whole by synthesizing unconscious psychic material with consciousness. Opposites occupied a central place in Nietzschean philosophy. Like Heraclitus and Hegel, Nietzsche regarded reality as an interplay of opposites in which the tension inherent in conflict created energy and knowledge. Like his philosophical ancestors, he believed in a primary unity (which was analogous to what

Schopenhauer had called the "will"). He saw opposites as inextricably linked, incommensurable, and inseparable. They defined each other. Neither was primary.

The Apollonian and the Dionysian principles identified in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872/1995) were Nietzsche's essential opposites. Nietzsche's ideas of the Apollonian and the Dionysian are related to Schopenhauer's distinction between representation and will. Both understood life to be a conflictual dance between the ascension (civilization/light) and the descension (primitive/dark, natural experience) of the life force. He felt that Western culture had been in a one-sided Apollonian tendency since Socrates. In his essay "The Problem of Socrates" in *Twilight of the Idols* (1888/2004), Nietzsche argued that a tyranny of reason had repressed humans' instinctual nature to an unhealthy degree.

In his late writings, Nietzsche equated the concept of opposites with metaphysics, which he increasingly eschewed. He began to believe that metaphysics were superfluous and that the metaphysician or philosopher did not actually seek a truth but rather a view that corresponded with his own nature. His perspective on personal bias in philosophy echoed Fichte. In *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886/2007) he wrote:

> It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; moreover, that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown. (p. 203)

Müller and the Helmholtz school. Most modern psychology developed along the lines of John Locke's view that the source of human knowledge was through experience; hence Locke's influence on Freud. Locke believed that all information about the physical world comes through the senses and that all correct ideas can be traced to the sensory

information on which they are based. However, some European psychologists remained loyal to Descartes' ideas that some mental organization is innate, and this concept still plays a role in theories of perception and cognition (Ellenberger, 1970).

The first European experimental psychologists, Fechner and Wundt, introduced methods for measuring sensations in terms of physical magnitude of the stimuli producing them, and in 1879, Wundt opened the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Europe. Complementary to this philosophical background, psychology also received contributions from physiology. Wundt had been a student of the most famous German physiologist, Johannes (1801–1858). He made the shift away from the philosophy of nature to the mechanistic trend inspired by positivism and tried to relate sensory experience both to events in the nervous system and to events in the organism's physical environment. Müller's other famous student, Hermann von Helmholtz, was one of the founders of the first law of thermodynamics. His associate Ernest von Brücke (1819–1892) also had been a student of Müller. In his *Lectures on Physiology*, Brücke supposed that all living organisms are energy-systems governed by the first law of thermodynamics (the conservation of energy) (Ellenberger, 1970).

Another Müller alumnus, Emil du Bois-Reymond, gave a frequently cited speech in 1872 in which he attempted to set the limits of knowledge. He distinguished between things we do not know (ignoramus) and things we will never be able to know (ignorabimus). All that was knowable pertained to matter. It was assumed to exist and that a perceiving exists. He declared that it was impossible to know what matter was in itself and what mind was in itself (Nagy, 1991). Helmholtz, along with Brücke, du Bois-Reymond, and Carl Ludwig formed an alliance that became known as the "Helmholtz

school of medicine" after its most famous member. Their stated purpose was to eliminate any form of vitalism or finalism (teleology) in science. They were dedicated to positivist-materialist assumptions and claimed that no other forces other than physical-chemical forces, reducible to attraction and repulsion, were at work in the biological organism. They strove to reduce even psychological processes to physiological laws. Their ideas were the source of Freud's "Model of the Mind" essay of 1895, and the ideas presented influenced his later metapsychological constructions.

James. William James (1842–1910), an American philosopher and psychologist, opened the very first experimental psychology lab in the world at Harvard University. He thought of himself as a functionalist psychologist and a pragmatist philosopher in line with Charles Peirce, the essence of which is a theory or an idea is useful if it works (Ellenberger, 1970). True beliefs, he asserted, were those that prove useful to the believer. Whereas empiricists were concerned with reifying concepts into things, James noted the problems of the opposite fallacy created by the lack of concepts and specific language when he wrote, "It is hard to focus our attention on the nameless" (James, 1990, p. 195).

James attempted to define the emerging discipline of psychology in his major work *The Principles of Psychology* (1990). Just a few years before (1883), the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) proposed the idea of two different kinds of science, natural science, *Naturwissenschaften* and human science, *Geistenwissenschaften* in order to mediate the growing split between philosophical psychology and experimental psychology. Dilthey asserted that natural sciences investigated sense-based facts, whereas human science dealt with inner experiences and social phenomena. He thought that

psychology could be a foundational human science only if it is conceived as being primarily descriptive.

The particular clash that James addressed was the long-standing opposition of the rationalists and the empiricists, whom he dubbed tender minded and tough minded, respectively. The former were rationalistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, monistic, and dogmatic whereas the latter were empiricist, sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, and skeptical. In *Pragmatism* (James, Bowers, & Skrupskelis, 1978), he declared that the history of philosophy had been largely a clash of opposing human temperaments (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 59). He saw reality as contextual and truth as relative. "The greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths" (James et al., 1978, p. 43).

James advanced a new approach that he called radical empiricism, which presumed that nature and experience could never be frozen for absolutely objective analysis and that, at the very least, the mind of the observer will affect the outcome of any empirical approach to truth since, empirically, the mind and nature are inseparable. Radical empiricism broke with Cartesian notions that the real world is an extension of a larger world that exists within the mind.

Whereas Locke's empiricism became foundational to positivist views that would focus exclusively on an individual's experienced reality, James's radical view of reality had a pronounced phenomenological bent. For James, mental events stood on an equal footing with observable events as representations of reality. Ideas, feelings, sensations, perceptions, concepts, art, science, faith, conscious, unconscious, objects, and even so-called illusions all merited attention and investigation. James believed that an individual's

immediate experience represented the essence of psychological truth. Moreover, the mental and physical events—the immediate experiences—that an individual uses both for self-understanding and to understand others are selected and interpreted by the individual. James's subjective, pragmatic, and radically empirical psychology influenced Jung's idea of the reality of the psyche and psychic contents as empirical facts.

James, whose father was a follower of the mystical Swedish philosopher Emanuel Swedenborg, studied mystical and religious phenomena and his ideas on religion and mystical experiences influenced Jung. When they met in 1910, they both found their ideas congruent and inspiring (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 57). In contrast, James found Freud to be a "man obsessed with fixed ideas" (p. 58). Jung would turn to James's ideas on typology and pluralism when he was trying to understand the split between Freud and Adler, and then between Freud and himself.

Determinism and causality. Determinism is the idea that what happens has to happen as a result of natural laws, a divine plan, or human nature. Mechanical determinism is the view that everything is caused by something. As discussed, the British empiricists (Bacon, Hobbes, Newton, Locke, and Hume) gave rise to mechanical determinism. Determinism in Western thought is most often associated with Newtonian physics, which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed, knowable laws (Lacey, 1993a, pp. 144-145). The opposite of determinism is the idea that at least some events have no cause, a concept that is similar to Jung's acausal concept.

Horne et al. (2000) have traced the development of rational speculations about causality from the pre-Socratics, through Plato's forms, and Aristotle's four-fold

explanation of causality: "Since the Enlightenment and the growth of science, exponents of the two most important concepts, determinism and teleology, have been in conflict" (p. 109). The presence of a divine order or universal intelligence proper to early mythological explanations of the universe remained present in the Greek idea of "telos," the final expression of original cause. Teleology was Aristotle's reworking of Plato's forms. Teleology implies an intentionality to the order of the universe that is not completely determined as in the mechanical universe of the Enlightenment.

> In the 17th century, with the beginning of the Enlightenment, there was a shift in the understanding of reason . . . a change in the interpretation of sense data occurred whereby it was shorn of its teleological associations. This empirical method led to the successes of Newton and Galileo and the rise of deterministic science. (p. 111)

Materialism is the most obvious form of causality and the most obvious implication of reductionism espoused by positivism and the biological determinism of modern science. Dualism implies causality on the physical level but leaves a separate realm, that of the soul or mind, to theology, teleology, or both. The most far-reaching consequence of the Enlightenment mind was to strip sense data of its teleological associations. In other words, the physical world was made bereft of its own intrinsic meaning. This was the culmination of the spirit/matter split that began with the birth of the Western mind. This split, which implicitly created a division between a meaningful or meaningless universe, is significant in the eventual splitting of Freud and Jung.

Freud and Jung were the two most important champions of the idea of unconscious causality. They both sought to prove that factors outside of awareness were more significant than conscious factors in human behavior. Jung took in account aims as well as causes (1916/1967, p. 291 [*CW* 4, ¶ 675]). Tarnas (1991) has reviewed the

development of Western knowledge in *The Passion of the Western Mind.* He covers

the post-enlightenment development of modern thinking described above and how

Freud's revelations about the unconscious served to further shift the way in which we

understand human knowledge. He writes:

> When Nietzsche in the nineteenth century said there are no facts, only
> interpretations, he was both summing up the legacy of eighteenth-century
> critical philosophy and pointing toward the task and promise of twentieth-
> century depth psychology . . . but it was Freud who effectively brought it
> into the foreground of modern intellectual concern. . . . On the one hand,
> as he said in the famous passage at the end of the eighteenth of his
> *Introductory Lectures*, psychoanalysis represented the third wounding
> blow to man's naive pride and self-love, the first being Copernicus's
> heliocentric theory, and the second being Darwin's theory of evolution.
> For psychoanalysis revealed that not only is the Earth not the center of the
> universe, and not only is man not the privileged focus of creation, but even
> the human mind and ego, man's most precious sense of being a conscious
> rational self, is only a recent and precarious development out of the
> primordial id, and is by no means master of its own house. With his
> epochal insight into the unconscious determinants of human experience,
> Freud stood directly in the Copernican lineage of modern thought that
> progressively relativized the status of the human being. And again, like
> Copernicus and like Kant but on an altogether new level, Freud brought
> the fundamental recognition that the apparent reality of the objective
> world was being unconsciously determined by the condition of the subject.
> (p. 422)

The personal equation. Western philosophy has oscillated between the opposite

concepts of the universal and the particular. At the end of the 19th century, the question

arose of whether it was possible to form a scientific psychology that dealt with

individuals and particularities when science had always focused on universals. The notion

of a "personal equation" was put forth as a way of understanding observational

differences in astronomy. It became an issue in the efforts to develop an objective

scientific psychology and it created more epistemological uncertainty. Shamdasani

describes the genesis and history of the concept in his extensive work *Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology* (2003).

Essentially, it was discovered that individual observations of the same phenomenon differed and perfect measurement was not possible, because of the personal equation. In psychology, James noted that most psychologists made their personal peculiarities into universal rules. Psychologists were prone to see what they were led to expect based on their own preconceptions, a kind of epistemological solipsism. He divided the opposing temperaments into tough minded (empiricists) and tender minded (rationalists). This idea of personal bias undermining objectivity was in the air. Edmund Husserl was saying as much about philosophical interpretation. As noted above, Fichte and Nietzsche had also noted it. Jung was to come to the conclusion that it represented the most critical issue in the possibility of psychology as a science of subjectivity and that the personal equation was the distinguishing trait of psychoanalysis. In a lecture in 1928, he questioned whether it was possible for the psyche to be recognized through itself. As all psychological theories were subjective confessions, "the founder of a psychological theory must get accustomed to the thought that he is not only its founder but also its sacrifice" (in Shamdasani, 2003, pp. 89-90).

Summary

In this chapter, epistemology and philosophy have been explored in relation to the concepts of depth psychology. Some of the basic assumptions of any discipline are implicit in the historical and cultural context of the time. Some of the assumptions are consciously adopted and some are unconsciously taken for granted. The founders of depth psychology were educated men. It can be assumed that they were aware of where

their ideas came from. Yet it has been shown or will be shown that sometimes they were not.

One of the observations/interpretations of this research in relation to this chapter is that each shift from one pole of a continuum to another, as in the subject-object axis, is a reaction to one-sidedness. A hypothesis arises that as one idea or epistemological position becomes status quo, those other ideas or positions that are left out or unconsciously split off become constellated as a compensation created through the principle of enantiodromia.

The Greek classical philosophers dealt with ideas that are still very much alive today, such as the fundamental unity of reality, the *arche*, the many related to the one, being uncreated and indestructible, the one becomes two and the two becomes three, the concept of opposites, universals and particulars, eternal flux, four fundamental forces, four elements, the relativity of truth, no certainty, thought is a movement of atoms, knowledge is power, knowledge is virtue, seeing is believing—not knowing metaphysics as a desire to know (an epistemological instinct), *entelechy*, the difference between sensing and understanding, the senses can mislead, types of reasoning, *nous*, *logos*, *altheia*, *quaternity*, *allegory*, *autarchy*, an intelligent cosmos, and on and on.

In summary, rational (e.g., logical) and irrational (e.g., intuitive or mystical) and subjective (rational) and objective (empirical) methods have been used to justify knowledge claims. Different philosophical approaches have arisen over the centuries. Western philosophers have distinguished between two opposing kinds of knowledge. A priori knowledge is gained or justified by reason alone, without the direct or indirect

influence of experience (here experience means observation of the world through sense perception.) A posteriori (empirical) knowledge requires reference to experience.

One of the fundamental questions in epistemology is whether there is any a priori knowledge. Rationalists believe that there is, whereas empiricists believe that all knowledge must ultimately be derived from some kind of external experience perceived through the senses. By these definitions, Plato can be considered to be a rationalist. His student, Aristotle, is thought of as a teleological empiricist. "Teleology was Aristotle's reworking of Plato's idea of the forms" (Horne et al., 2000, p. 110). The dialectic between them was described well by Heinrich Heine (quoted from Jung, 1921/1971):

> Plato and Aristotle! These are not merely two systems, they are types of two distinct human natures, which from time immemorial, under every sort of disguise, stand more or less, inimically opposed. The whole medieval world in particular was riven by this conflict, which persists down to the present day, and which forms the most essential content of the history of the Christian church. Although under other names, it is always of Plato and Aristotle that we speak. Visionary, mystical, Platonic natures disclose Christian ideas and the corresponding symbols from the fathomless depths of their souls. Practical, orderly, Aristotelian natures build out of these ideas and symbols a fixed system, a dogma and a cult. (p. 2 [*CW* 6])

The play of opposites (as first described by Heraclitus) can be seen from the pre-Socratics through the Neoplatonists in the swing back and forth between a focus on the subject or internal and a focus on the object. During the middle ages, the subjective and internal went underground or south and east to Arabic countries. The Renaissance restored the value of the subjective and a new integration of the opposites propelled a fertile period of creativity. With the dawn of the Enlightenment the success of reason and rationality in the scientific achievements of Newton and others led to a backlash against metaphysics and teleology. Teleology was marginalized to the area of theology and the

"world as machine" metaphor became dominant. "Efficient causality became the only legitimate form of expression. This type of thinking was called determinism" (Horne et al., 2000, p. 111). The objective and externally oriented determinism and empiricism dominated the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, but teleology and subjective values made a comeback with the romantics and idealists of the 19th century. "The determinists saw humans as being driven by forces beyond their control to which they had to accommodate. The teleologists saw humans as having a purpose, which was some version of striving towards individual self development" (p. 112).

From the tangible successes of empirical scientism, positivism developed in the early part of the 19th century in Vienna. Positivists were skeptical of theological and metaphysical propositions. The logical truth of a proposition had to be ultimately grounded in its accordance with the material world. All arguments had to be based on logic applied to propositions grounded in observable facts. From Comte, Fechner, and Wundt to the German physiologists, Müller, du Bois-Reymond, Brücke, and the rest of the Helmholtz school, reductive materialism, determinism, empiricism, and the scientific method eclipsed the late romantics, and the external focus on the object in a mostly meaningless world became the dominant paradigm at the turn of the 20th century when Freud and Jung were creating depth psychology.

The following charts each display the flow of the ideas discussed throughout this chapter as they relate to the epistemological and philosophical assumptions of Freud and Jung. Chart 1 presents the individual philosophers that have been discussed. The position of the name on the page, whether from the bottom up, as a tree would grow, or by its distance from the center, reflects how influential (in a general sense) that person was for

each man. When a name appears closer to the vertical dashed line in the middle of the

chart, that philosopher was influential for both Freud and Jung. Chart 2 presents

epistemological and philosophical assumptions paired as opposites. Again, the position

on the page reflects the relevance of each idea or assumption to each man. When the

concept was held by both men, it appears centered.

Chapter 4
Theory, Meta-Theory, and Metapsychology

Introduction

The subjective contexts within which the founders of depth psychology were

embedded inform and structure all of historic depth psychological theory and are

fundamental to understanding the splits that have occurred. Investigation of these

contexts is a task of this research. By examining the splits at the level of epistemology,

theory, and finally metapsychology, this research offers a multidimensional

understanding of the nature of the split between Freudian and Jungian paradigms. In that

way the research can discover how philosophical assumptions are involved in depth

psychological theory.

This section of the research aims to uncover the theoretical splits between these

schools and to distinguish or relate these differences to the splits at the level of

epistemology or metapsychology. This understanding is relevant to this research because

the split between Freud and Jung and other splits within depth psychology have been

primarily attributed to theoretical disagreements. Some authors believe that the most

important split between Freudian and Jungian psychologies lies at the level of theory

(Glover, 1991; Jones, 1955). It is, therefore, useful to understand the place of theory in

depth psychology.

Language always has been problematic in the evolution of science. Psychology, in

particular, has had difficulty defining terms in language that is agreed upon across the

field (James, 1990). A term such as *ego*, *self*, or *symbol* can be used in many ways by

different authors. For the purposes of this research, distinctions must be made between

the terms *theory*, *structural theory*, *clinical theory*, *meta-theory*, *metapsychology*,

metaphysics, and *epistemology*.

Theory

Theory, from the Greek *theōria*—the act of viewing, contemplation,

consideration, and *theōrein*—to look at, behold, contemplate, consider, refers to a set of

statements or principles devised to explain a group of facts or phenomena. Theory

represents the branch of a science or art consisting of its explanatory statements, accepted

principles, and methods of analysis as opposed to practice. It is abstract reasoning,

speculation or conjecture, and assumption based on limited information or knowledge

("Theory," 1993, p. 2371). A structural theory hypothesizes rationally about how

something (e.g., psyche) is organized. Freud's structural model of the psyche as a

construct of the Id, Ego, and Superego is a structural theory, as is Jung's model of

complexes made up of archetypal cores. Clinical theory is practical and functional rather

than rational and structural. *Clinical*, from the Greek *klinikē*, medical practice done at the

sickbed and *klinē* or bed from *klinein*, to recline, is defined as "involving or depending on

direct observation of the living patient" ("Clinical," 2002, online). Clinical theory is thus

consideration of patients with whom one is directly involved. It is "experience near," as

opposed to structural theory, which is "experience distant" or more abstract. Clinical

theories include motivational hypotheses, situational hypotheses, and genetic hypotheses

(e.g., the hypothesis of the development of situation (Rubinstein 1975)).

Theory provides a structure that helps to organize thinking. Lindon (1991) says

that we need theories "to help us organize what is otherwise a chaotic jumble of

meaningless material and to widen our perceptual scope" (p. 15). Meissner (1984) defines

theory as the most general and abstract group of coherently organized propositions that can be used as principles of explanation for a class of empirical phenomena.

In 1907, William James reflected on theory in *Pragmatism* (James et al., 1978):

> Theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. . . . Our theories are wedged and controlled as nothing else is. Yet sometimes alternative theoretic formulas are equally compatible with all the truths we know, and then we choose between them for subjective reasons. We choose the kind of theory to which we are already partial: we follow "elegance" or "economy." (p. 104)

Freud never had much to say about theory in general but, according to Jones, he often quoted Charcot: "Theory is good, but it doesn't keep things from existing" (Freud, 1924/1953, p. 13, n2 [*SE* 3]).

Jung, on the other hand, had much to say:

> Theories in psychology are the very devil. It is true that we need certain points of view for their orienting and heuristic value: but they should always be regarded as mere auxiliary concepts that can be laid aside at any time. (1928/1970, p. 7 [*CW* 17])

> We in applied psychology today must be modest and allow an apparent plurality of contradictory opinions to be valid, for we are still far from knowing anything fundamental concerning the most distinguished object of the science, the human soul itself. For the present we only have merely more or less plausible opinions that are still nowhere satisfactory. (1931/1966, p. 38 [*CW* 16, ¶ 71])

> For a certain type of intellectual mediocrity characterized by enlightened rationalism, a scientific theory that simplifies matters is a very good means of defence because of the tremendous faith modern man has in anything which bears the label "scientific." Such a label sets your mind at ease immediately. . . . In itself any scientific theory, no matter how subtle, has, I think, less blame from the standpoint of psychological truth than religious dogma, for the simple reason that theory is necessarily highly abstract and exclusively rational, whereas dogma expresses an irrationally whole by means of imagery. This guarantees a far better rendering of an irrational fact like the psyche. (1938/1958, p. 45 [*CW* 11, ¶ 81])

Ekstrom (2002), complaining of a "cacophony of theories" in psychoanalytic

thought, suggested that theories are "often concealing rather than explaining" (p. 339).

He described three ways in which theory conceals:

> Theory as a denial of a particular form of loneliness that is intrinsic to the profession; theory in the service of idealizing "The Founder" and creating a sense of being part of a lineage going back to the originator, the cultural hero; theory as a way to maintain that we have special knowledge that allows us to know everything about our patients. (p. 343)

Arguments about theory, he suggests, become a way to conceal the need for personal

recognition, which then gets projected onto institutes and schools of thought.

Theory Building

In "The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious" (1928/1966 [*CW* 7])

Jung, while noting that psychology was a young and vastly incomplete science, writes,

"The first things to be discovered are facts, not theories. Theory building is the outcome

of discussion among many" (p. 211 [*CW* 7, ¶ 340]). So, theories are not built in isolation,

nor, again, are they ever devoid of subjective contexts.

In their psycho-biographical study, *Faces in a Cloud* (1993), Stolorow and

Atwood point out that

> the powerful effects of subjective and personal factors on theory building . . . coexist with equally powerful historical issues. A theory's language, its implicit and explicit postulates, even the empirical problems to which it addresses itself will all be conditioned by the period's prevailing paradigms and conceptual frameworks which themselves are embedded in an encompassing scientific and philosophical weltanschauung and in still broader cultural and sociological processes. . . . In the context of our present analyses, every theory of personality can be shown to contain elements deriving not only from the theorist's personal world, but also from the external social field of ideas and concepts within which he lives and works. (p. 13)

Meta-Theory

According to *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, the prefix "meta-"
from Greek *meta*, means after, as used in "ta meta ta physika"—the work after the
physics; or beyond—"occurring later, in succession to, after, behind . . . changed, altered,
more highly organized" or "higher, beyond, transcending" ("Meta," 2002, online). A
meta-theory is a theory that concerns itself with another theory or theories. As such, its
generalization may be called a theory of theories. *Encyclopædia Britannica* defines meta-
theory as theory whose subject matter is another theory ("Metatheory," 2008). The
following is an example of a meta-theoretical statement: Any physical theory is always
provisional, in the sense that it is only a hypothesis; you can never prove it. No matter
how many times the results of experiments agree with some theory, you can never be sure
that the next time the result will not contradict the theory. On the other hand, you can
disprove a theory by finding even a single observation that disagrees with the predictions
of the theory (Hawking, 1988).

Metapsychology

Metapsychology ("Metapsychology," 1993, p. 1421) in general refers to a theory
that aims to supplement the facts and empirical laws of psychology by philosophical
speculations on the structure, origin, and function of the mind and the relationship
between the mind and objective reality. It reflects on the connection of mental and
physical processes or on the place of mind in the universe. Thus metapsychology is
different from meta-theory, although many authors have confused the two.

Beyond the clinical concepts there is, without sharp boundaries, a more abstract
kind of concept such as cathexis, psychic energy, Eros, death instinct, archetype,

complex, individuation. Here we reach the level of metapsychology. Freud

distinguished metapsychology from metaphysics, which is the branch of philosophy that

studies how reality functions, how it is organized, and what it is made of ("Metaphysics,"

1993, pp. 1420-1421). The most common metaphysical terms include form, substance,

essence, category, spirit, monads, noumena, God, or absolute truth. Metaphysics is also

used as a term to refer to whatever cannot be verified by observation. Aristotle used the

term to connotate something beyond physis. Freud (1901/1960) conceived of

metapsychology as transformation of metaphysics through inclusion of unconscious

factors (p. 259 [SE 6]). He believed that mythological and religious views of the world

were unconscious projections onto the world. Hence, by understanding these unconscious

factors, one moves from metaphysics to metapsychology.

Metapsychology reflects epistemological assumptions and informs clinical theory.

Samuels (1985) has written that metapsychology was a term invented by Freud. Samuels

is mistaken, but Freud did adopt the term in the late 1890s, mentioning it in several letters

of 1896 and seeking approval of its use from Wilhelm Fliess in a letter of 1898 (Freud,

Masson, & Fliess, 1985, pp. 172, 180, 216, 266, 301, 302). According to Samuels (1985),

the word refers to the most theoretical or abstract view of psychology, a distanced view

of concepts that treats theoretical entities as though they are real and concrete (p. 8).

Metapsychology deals with aspects of the mind that cannot be evaluated on the basis of

objective or empirical evidence. Freud's metapsychology was divided into dynamic,

topographical, and economic aspects.

Freud first used the term *metapsychology* specifically as a way to describe the

aspect of his theory that aimed to supplement his treatment of conscious mental processes

with the concept of "the unconscious" or unconscious mental process, and his concept

of the motivation of behavior by a theory of unconscious psychical energy using emotion

as a process of discharge (1901/1960, (p. 259 [SE 6]).

It is difficult to define the distinction between psychology and metapsychology.

Rapaport and Gill (1959) see metapsychology as comprising the fundamental

propositions of psychoanalysis that are not empirical in nature. Freud did not originally

define metapsychology in this manner, nor did he consistently follow one definition of

the term, as some parts of what he terms metapsychology are abstract and some relatively

empirical. Some self psychologists and intersubjectivists (Stolorow & Atwood, 1993)

suggest that metapsychology is too abstract. Nonetheless, understanding the differences

between Freudian and Jungian metapsychologies aids in further clarifying the essential

nature of the split between the two paradigms.

Clinical Theory vs. Metapsychology

Although they are rarely used with patients, analytic concepts become the main

focus when psychoanalysts present their work to the public or to colleagues. One of the

many problems identified with metapsychology and theory is confusion about

terminology. Universal agreement on language does not exist. Another issue is that many

authors become defenders of a jargon particular to the institute in which they were

trained, the analysts with whom they trained, and, most of all, the jargon of some

prominent founder of analysis, whether it be Freud, Jung, Klein, or Kohut.

Stolorow and Atwood (1993) have distinguished metapsychology from clinical

theory:

> Home (1996), Gill (1976), and Klein (1976) have largely clarified the
> distinction between psychoanalysis's metapsychology and clinical theory.

Metapsychology and clinical theory, they hold, derive from two totally different universes of discourse. Metapsychology deals with the material substrate of subjective experience; it is couched in the natural science framework of impersonal structures, forces, and energies, while clinical theory deals with intentionality and the personal meaning of subjective experiences, seen from the perspective of the individual's unique life history. . . . Home, Gill, and Klein maintain that the natural-science framework of metapsychology is completely inappropriate for the elucidation of the data of the psychoanalytic situation, but that clinical theory is uniquely applicable. They wish to disentangle metapsychological and clinical concepts, and to retain only the latter (now purified of mechanistic reifications) as the only legitimate concern of psychoanalytic theory. (p. 172)

These authors believe that the concept of metapsychology is the problem that leads to the splitting and fragmentation of the field as it gravitates towards absolutes or reifications. Competing factions, organized by belief in such reifications, creates fragmentation in the field of depth psychology, a situation that does not facilitate clinical understanding and utility. Stolorow and Atwood (1993) comment: "Metapsychology resembles metaphysics in that it preoccupies itself with absolutes and universals" (p. 4). They see the fragmentation and disunity of depth psychology as a result of metapsychologies that cannot be meaningfully tested against each other. In their view, metapsychological thought is at the heart of the devaluation of the field within its larger mental health context. They are making the argument that metapsychology is too abstract, absolute, and experience-distant to be relevant in a field dedicated to understanding human problems, which are subjectively constructed within contexts. They believe that any theorist's metapsychology is too subjectively idiosyncratic to be applicable in any general sense.

Furthermore, Stolorow and Atwood believe that metapsychologies reflect the personality conflicts of their creators. Their 1979 book, *Faces in a Cloud* (1993),

examines the metapsychologies of Freud, Jung, Reich, and Rank and correlates them

with their respective psychobiographies. This work launched their own interest in and the

subsequent development of their intersubjective theory (p. 177).

Holt (1985) has done extensive writing on the concept of metapsychology and

declares it extinct. He listed many of the criticisms of metapsychology found in the

literature:

> The relationship between metapsychology and the clinical theory has not
> been clarified. Thus, the limits of each and the borderline between them
> are matters of dispute . . . there is no consensus on what is the total body
> of clinical theory and of metapsychology. Concepts are poorly defined.
> Existing definitions are so vague, imprecise, and multiple that much of
> theory cannot be pinned down enough to test it empirically, and different
> writers are free to use the same term in quite different ways. Concepts
> overlap one another partly or completely. . . . Concepts are often reified,
> abstractions treated as if they refer to substantial entities. The worst form
> of the error is personification or anthropomorphism, treating concepts like
> drives or structures as if they were persons or had attributes such as
> striving and insisting that properly belong only to whole people. (¶ 4)

Summary

This chapter has made distinctions between theory, types of theories, meta-theory,

metaphysics, and metapsychology. Metapsychology was originally conceived by Freud to

mean a combination of his topographic, dynamic, and economic models of the psyche,

which takes into account unconscious factors, something other psychologies of his time

did not account for or give credence to. Much confusion in the field has arisen over the

differences between theory, meta-theory, and metapsychology, and many authors have

suggested that metapsychology is too abstract, too confusing, and a major factor in the

splitting within the field of depth psychology. Holt (1985) has suggested that Freud had

too weak a grasp of metaphysics and philosophy to build a consistent abstract model (¶

4). Stevens believes that Jungian psychology has no metapsychology in the sense that

Freud meant it. Jung does have a very abstract theory, perhaps best described as a

meta-theory. Jung, however, made many assertions about the weakness of theory and the

problems inherent in theory building. As discussed above, Jung felt strongly that "the

personal equation" or subjective factor was always operating, and theory was thus never

objective or all encompassing. Like William James, he advocated a pluralism of theories,

or as Ekstrom stated, a cacophony.

Chapter 5
Splitting

Introduction

Because this research is concerned with how epistemological and philosophical

assumptions relate to splits in the field of depth psychology, it is important to understand

what splitting is, how it is conceptualized, conceived, manifested, and what purposes it

serves. This section of the research will explore the concept of splitting.

Splitting is a word used in many ways within the field of psychology and within

depth psychology. The verb *to split* ("Split," 1993, pp. 2201-2202) comes from the

Middle Dutch word *splitten* and the Old High German word *spaltan* and means to divide

or separate. Psychoanalytic theory has generally thought of splitting as an intrapsychic

function. The word also has been used to refer to splits within the field, such as the

Freud-Jung split, or the splitting of institutions. In general usage, it may refer to splits of

one group from another, such as Martin Luther's split from the Roman Catholic Church,

or an ontological division such as the mind/body split or human beings being split from

nature. In this research, the word is being used both in a traditionally psychoanalytic way

and in a more general way, as both refer to division and separation, something being split

or separated from something else. Splits are cracks, fissures, gaps, or schisms.

Splitting is repudiation, differentiation, and creation, potentially at the same time.

In this chapter splitting will looked at again, re-searched. The first section will explore

duality, the idea of a fundamental ontological split between nature and human beings, the

divided world and the divided self. Then an attempt is made to distinguish splitting from

dissociation and repression. Next, the history of the concept of splitting will be explored

from pre-Freudian usage to Melanie Klein's elaboration and other psychoanalytic

extensions or modifications of Freud's conception. The research then discusses how splitting was conceptualized by Jung.

The Divided World and the Divided Self

The ancients told various creation stories of one becoming two, and two becoming three, ad infinitum. The term *dualism* was originally coined by Thomas Hyde in his 1700 *History of Ancient Persia*, in which he credits the use of the concept to Zoroastrians (followers of the prophet Zarathustra) around 1000 BCE to denote the coeternal binary opposition of God and the Devil (Malandra, 1983). This early proto-religion, along with the related Vedic tradition, influenced both Eastern and Western religions more than any other source. At the heart of this cosmology was an ethical dualism that saw the principles of Truth and Falsehood in fundamental opposition. Their creation story involved identical twins, one good and one evil. Reality was conceived as the result of the good and bad choices of these archetypal twins. Twins represent a split cell. Thus dualism was not primordial but arose out of the right and wrong choices made by one spirit become two.

In the Aztec cosmolology, *Ometeotl* is a unified God who splits into two: the lord (Ometecuhtli) and lady (Omecihuatl) of duality. As simultaneous opposites, male and female, Ometeotl represented for Aztecs and Toltecs the idea that the entire universe was composed of polar opposites: light and dark, night and day, order and chaos (Black, 2000). In the book of Genesis, God's first act creates opposites—heaven and earth. The word dualism denotes two parts. The word's origin is the Latin *duo*, meaning two. The idea of a divided cosmology has been around for a long time, predating and outlasting the pre-Socratic philosophers. There are many ways that duality as a concept is now used,

split, or specified, but dualism most often refers to the tendency of humans to

perceive and understand the world as being divided into two, such as good and evil, I and

thou, the world and me, or subject and object. Ideas on mind/body dualism originate at

least as far back as Plato and Aristotle. As noted in the above section on epistemology

and philosophy, from Descartes to the present day Western people have come to

experience reality and themselves as primarily split into mind and body, psyche and

soma, or spirit and matter. Modern philosophy, following Descartes, particularly Hume's

(2008) and James's (1990) accounts of human nature, posits that we are divided selves.

Freud, for the most part, maintained a psychophysical property dualist position

(Sulloway, 1979, p. 48). In monism no fundamental conflict is recognized. There is a

single force or principle operating. Freud's libido theory was essentially monist during

the period between the breakdown of his initial instinctual dualism (sexual versus self-

preservative drives) when he recognized only the sexual drives (1915/1957), and his later

period when he reaffirmed dualism in a final drive theory (Eros vs. Thanatos)

(1922/1955). In dualism the clash of opposites is fundamental. Conflict is built into the

very nature of reality or the psyche.

While Jung embraced the dualistic clash of opposites, like Hegel he saw a third

step in the dialectic, a transcendence towards a new unity, which makes Jung's position

actually monist. He did, however, embrace the idea of a divided self (James, 1990).

Following Heraclitus, Jung (1928/1966) believed that reality was divided into opposites,

and so was the individual. Freud made the same assumption. The difference, as

discussed, was that Jung also believed in a unity, "a unio mystica" with "an unus

mundus" (1955/1970, pp. 462-476 [*CW* 14, ¶ 660, 663, 679]), behind the duality, an idea

also held in Vedic philosophy and Taoism. In *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (1955/1970),

he wrote:

> The division into two was necessary in order to bring the "one" world out of the state of potentiality into reality. Reality consists of a multiplicity of things. But one is not a number; the first number is two, and with it multiplicity and reality begin. (p. 462 [*CW* 14, ¶ 659])

Jung also saw the personality as necessarily split by nature. To recognize

something was to separate from it. So for Jung (1921/1971) consciousness *was* splitting:

"Differentiation is the essence, the sine qua non of consciousness" (p. 206 [*CW* 6, ¶

329]). In order to differentiate from a complete unconscious identification, a

"participation mystique" (p. 206 [*CW* 6, ¶ 329]), one must make discernments, identify

this from that, I from thou, subject from object. He saw the individual further split by the

demand of adaptation to societal roles and expectations. This also can be seen in his

concept of the persona:

> The persona is a complicated systems of relations between the individual and society . . . a kind of mask, designed on the one hand to make a definite impression upon others, and, on the other, to conceal the true nature of the individual. . . . What goes on behind the mask is then called "private life." This painfully familiar division of consciousness into two figures, often preposterously different, is an incisive psychological operation that is bound to have repercussions on the unconscious. The construction of a suitable persona means formidable concession to the external world, a genuine self-sacrifice, which drives the ego straight into identification with the persona, so that people really do exist who believe they are what they pretend to be. (Jung, 1928/1966, pp. 192-193 [*CW* 7, ¶ 304, 305, 306])

Splitting

In *Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts*, Moore and Fine (1990) define splitting as

"the separation of psychological representations according to their opposing qualities" (p.

183). It is, they note, a process ascribed to the ego and is encountered in psychic

development both adaptively and pathologically. The authors emphasize that multiple

meanings have emerged and that a lack of clarity around the term has resulted.

Vertical splitting (experiences which, when separated, remain in awareness) is

differentiated from horizontal splitting (experiences which, when separated, are placed

outside of awareness). Hinshelwood (1991) makes a distinction between four types of

splits: a coherent split (good vs. bad) of the object, a coherent split of the ego, a

fragmentation of the object, and a fragmentation of the ego (p. 435).

Lichtenberg and Slap (1973) have reviewed the literature on splitting as a

psychoanalytic concept. They summarize Freud's first references to splitting and note his

many different uses of the term: Breuer and Freud (1950) first spoke of splitting in

describing hysteric patients. "Splitting of consciousness" (pp. 12, 67, 69, 123) referred to

separating a group of mental contents from the dominant mass of ideas; "splitting of

personality" (p. 45) described opposite behavioral states, and "splitting of the mind" (pp.

225, 234) noted the simultaneous existence of conscious and unconscious ideation. "The

motive for the splitting of consciousness was that of defence" (p. 166).

After surveying the evolution of Freud's and other's use of the term, Lichtenberg

and Slap (1973) place the various meanings of splitting under four headings:

1. Splitting as a general organizing principle.
2. Splitting and the organizing of mental contents in infantile life.
3. The defense mechanism of splitting of representations.
4. Splitting of representations as a factor in pathological intersystemic
suborganizations. (p. 786)

Lichtenberg and Slap (1973) would restrict the use of the term *splitting* by itself to

the tendency in infancy by which the organization of memory traces of early experience

is based on the primordial quality of pleasurable-good or painful-bad.

Grotstein (1981) points out that the concept of splitting had originally been referred to as "double consciousness" (p. 3). People have historically been fascinated with this phenomenon, and it was a focus of interest for 19th-century psychiatry and also 19th-century novelists, such as Dostoyevsky (*The Double*) and Stevenson (*Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*). Grotstein (1981) observes that

> splitting denotes both a universal phenomenon which occurs throughout our daily lives in multifarious ways and a fundamental defense mechanism. It may be defined as the activity by which the ego discerns differences within the self and its object, or between itself and its objects. (p. 3)

Grotstein (1981) thinks of splitting as both a mental mechanism and an experience or conversely as a way of not experiencing something. He makes a distinction between the experience of splitting and the splitting of experience. He suggests that splitting may have a neurological basis in the split halves of the brain. Citing the research of Gazzaniga and Ledoux, he hypothesizes that individuals seem to experience two separate consciousnesses, one for sensory, objective, abstract experience and one for spatial, subjective, and phantasy experience. Primary process correlates with the right brain and secondary with the left brain. He conceives of analysis as "good splitting" in the sense that differentiation, discernment, and reflection on unconscious material is liberating.

Grotstein (1981) provides a history of the concept of splitting from Freud's early work on dissociation, through Klein (who made splitting a central and necessary mechanism of her theory of object relations) and her followers, notably Rosenfeld and Bion, as well as other psychoanalytic contributors such as Fairbairn and Winnicott, to the present understanding of the concept. Freud encountered and addressed splitting early in his career while working with hysterics. He identified split-off subpersonalities that

alternated with each other in their hold on consciousness (1909/1977, p. 19). By the time of *On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement* (1914/1957), the concept of splitting was absorbed into his concept of repression as a defense. Freud revisited splitting in a paper on Fetishism (1927/1975) and again in *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1933/1964) as a splitting of the ego in some cases and a splitting between the ego and its object in others.

It was Melanie Klein and W. R. D. Fairbairn who made splitting a central theme of their work. Klein conceived of splitting as an essential process in an infant's stability. By splitting good from bad, the security of the ego was secured through the vicissitudes of intense emotional experience, such as persecutory anxiety. This first discernment is the precursor of self-consciousness. This period of primal splitting was followed by a period of integration, which Klein termed "the depressive position." If this integration was not achieved, splitting continues and becomes pathological. Before the depressive position is achieved, the good object and the bad object were not in any way related. In the depressive position polar opposite qualities could be seen as different aspects of the same thing.

For Klein, splitting and ambivalence were not the same. Ambivalence was the simultaneous experience of two incompatible attitudes within the state of consciousness. Splitting then became the more mature defense of repression. In "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms" (1946), Klein discussed the importance of splitting for determining psychic life. She called the splitting phase the paranoid position (to be later called the paranoid-schizoid position by Fairbairn), because of the persecutory nature of the infantile anxiety. In this conception, a split-off object or element of self could be

denied by being projected into another object, a process she called projective

identification. When the object is projected, it can be related to, which is how it gets

assimilated. In essence, an object (or inner psychic content) must be differentiated before

it can be assimilated. Klein (1946) extends normal splitting into adulthood in "Notes on

some Schizoid Mechanisms." She notes that splitting can be found "in minor degrees and

in a less striking form in normal people" and that "all of us are liable at times to a

momentary lapse of logical thinking which amounts to thoughts being cut off from one

another; in fact the ego is temporarily split" (p. 104).

Grotstein (1981) relates that Fairbairn explicitly stated that the personality is

divided or split into subgroupings. These subgroups are functionally autonomous. He

believed that splitting was the prime phenomenon confronting the personality, and the

task of growth (and of analysis) was uniting the splits. Fairbairn conceived a primary

unity at birth that was perforated by traumatic experiences of intense affect into splits of

ego and objects. The ego, according, to Fairbairn, is essentially schizoid and comprised

of splits, normally and pathologically. Grotstein attributes Kernberg's later object-

relations and Kohut's self psychology theory to the influence of Fairbairn (p. 46).

D. W. Winnicott also considered splitting to be an important aspect of infantile

development. He conceived of good enough situations in which phantasy was split from

reality, in essence, creating the inner life experience and the outer life experience. If there

was trauma or disappointment in the early environment, the infant withdrew the true

feeling self into an isolated inner world, leaving a denuded self on the outside to adapt to

the external world. He called these two selves, the true self and the false self (Grotstein,

1981, p. 47). Winnicott (1964) believed that Jung had been such a case of a mentally split

child. He hypothesized that Jung's No. 1 personality was his false self, and No. 2 was his true self, withdrawn due to his mother's depression and the feelings of anxiety and distrust that she engendered in him. Winnicott sees Jung's entire psychology as a projected search for a unified self (pp. 450-453).

Rosenfield, following Klein as an object relations theorist, makes distinctions between normal and pathological splitting. Normal splitting leads to the differentiation of body parts, emotional states, external objects, and a healthy capacity for repression, cognitive discrimination, and development. Abnormal splitting was characterized by excessive splitting, splintering, and destructive fragmentation of the personality (Grotstein, 1981, p. 49).

Bion, who was Grotstein's analyst, first wrote about splitting in regard to patients who had created imaginary twins as screens for projection (Grotstein, 1981). He wondered if the capacity to personify split-off projections was related to the capacity for symbol formation. As Bion worked with psychotic patients (as Jung did), he noticed that schizophrenics lacked the capacity for symbol formation because they could not grasp whole objects. They had not achieved Klein's integrating depressive position. Hence they maintained splits at all costs in order to avoid persecutory anxiety and any emergence of significance.

Excessive destructiveness attacked all links that might lead to conscious coherence and integration. Bion made a distinction between splitting and dissociation, concluding that dissociation was a gentler form of avoiding painful or overwhelming psychic contents. He believed that dissociation respected psychic boundaries that splitting crossed.

Lionel Corbett (1989) has compared Heinz Kohut's concept of splitting to Jung's idea of split-off complexes. He noted that

> both Jung and Kohut stress the importance of intrapsychic splitting. Kohut (1971) makes a major distinction between vertical and horizontal splits. In the former case, intrapsychic material is not repressed, but its emotional significance is ignored. Such disavowal leads to the coexistence of intrapsychic contents that do not communicate with each other. This emphasis is similar to Jung's (1969a) fundamental theory of neurosis, which concerns the inherent dissociability (splitting tendency) of the psyche, and the autonomy of the resultant split off "complexes," or clusters of associated images, feelings, ideas, and associations, that can potentially behave like "splinter-psyches," conscious to varying degrees and more or less in harmony with the larger personality. . . . Jung's view of the importance of splitting is similar to Kohut's description of the intrapsychic barrier that does not allow the psyche's "right hand" (the reality ego, with its low self-esteem) to know what the "left hand" (the grandiose, split-off self) is doing (Kohut, 1971). Kohut's "vertical split" describes two contradictory feeling states, so that there exist, side by side, "cohesive personality attitudes with different goal structures, different pleasure aims, different moral and aesthetic values." (p. 23)

Dean (2004) has written that most authors conceive of splitting as a defense mechanism that acts to separate perceptions of the self and others into either "all good" or "all bad" evaluations. More complex, holistic evaluations are negated in favor of a simplistic good or bad dichotomy (p. 29).

Splitting generally has been conceived as a defense against anxiety that gets stimulated when one needs to integrate contradictory perceptions or affective states related to the self or to others. Freud (1940/1964) asserted that splitting occurs under pressure when a desire to satisfy instinctual needs conflicts with the realization that satisfying those needs will "result in an almost intolerable danger" (p. 275).

Others view splitting as a normal and adaptive process that begins in infancy as an organizing principle (Kernberg, 1975; Mahler & Goslinger, 1955). Freud also believed it to be common in ordinary neurotic adults (Grotstein, 1981). Thus splitting has been

thought to be a common process in psychic activity that is normal in infancy and

leads to the capacity for discrimination and can be pathologically utilized in later periods

of development. It is related to the processes of repression, projection, dissociation, and

denial (Dean, 2004).

Dissociation

Dissociation is currently thought to be a state of mental decompensation in which

certain thoughts, emotions, sensations, or memories are compartmentalized because they

are too overwhelming for the conscious mind to integrate. This unconscious strategy for

managing powerful negative emotions is sometimes referred to as splitting, as these

thoughts, emotions, sensations, or memories are "split off" from the ego. But there is

confusion in the psychological literature about splitting and dissociation. The two terms

are conflated primarily because the word *splitting* was first used by the dissociationist

Janet in his *L'Automatisme psychologique* (1889/1973).

Interest in spiritualism, parapsychology, and hypnosis blossomed throughout the

19th century, harkening back to Locke and Hume's views that there was an association of

ideas requiring the coexistence of feelings with awareness of the feelings. Hypnosis,

pioneered in the late 1700s by Franz Mesmer and Marques de Puységur, provided

observations that second personalities emerged in trance states. By the late 19th century

there was a general realization that emotionally traumatic experiences could cause long-

term disorders that manifested a variety of symptoms, including multiple personalities

and dissociative states. The French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893)

introduced his ideas about the impact of nervous shocks as a cause for some of these

neurological conditions. His student Pierre Janet (1859–1947) took these ideas and went

on to develop his theory of dissociationism. He emphasized splitting as a defense

mechanism employed in response to psychological trauma. Jungian analyst John Ryan

Haule (1984) has written that

> dissociationism accepted the notion that ideas and images tend to combine
> into complexes. . . . [The dissociationists] held that every aggregation of
> ideas and images possessed in some measure or other its own personality.
> The guiding image for this was the phenomenon of multiple personality.
> (p. 637)

Following Glover (1943) and Kernberg (1975), most psychoanalytic writing

implicitly or explicitly equates dissociation with the concept of splitting. Some more

recent authors (Loewenstein, 1993; Young, 1988) have asserted that the concept of

dissociation as a specific response by the ego to severe external trauma represents an idea

distinct from that of splitting because the splitting concept is insufficient to account for

the phenomenology and intrapsychic dynamics of the dissociative person.

Dissociation and Splitting in Jung's Psychology

Following in the tradition of Kant's *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* (Kant & Manolesco,

1969), Flournoy's *From India to the Planet Mars* (1900/1994), French psychiatry, and

the psychical research of William James and Frederic Meyers, Jung wrote his doctoral

thesis *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena* (1902/1970) on

dissociation and somnambulism. In it he wrote: "It is . . . conceivable that the phenomena

of double consciousness are simply new character formations, or attempts of the future

personality to break through" (p. 79 [*CW* 1, ¶ 136]).

He later focused on the evidence of dissociation in the normal individual. He

came to believe that dissociation was necessary for consciousness to operate in one

faculty unhampered by the demands of its opposite. He credited the French

dissociationists for his understanding of this phenomenon:

> It is, in particular, the phenomena of somnambulism, double
> consciousness, split personality, etc., whose investigation we owe
> primarily to the French school, that have enabled us to accept the
> possibility of a plurality of personalities in one and the same individual.
> . . . The possibility of a dissociation of personality must exist, at least in
> the germ, within the range of the normal. And, as a matter of fact, any
> moderately acute psychological observer will be able to demonstrate,
> without much difficulty, traces of character-splitting in normal individuals.
> . . . We are, therefore, fully justified in treating personality dissociation as
> a problem of normal psychology. (Jung, 1921/1971, pp. 464-465 [*CW* 6, ¶
> 797, 798, 799)

Jung explained pathological manifestations of dissociation as special or extreme cases of

the normal operation of the psyche. Structural dissociation, opposing tension, and the

hierarchy of basic attitudes and functions in normal individual consciousness were the

basis of Jung's typology theory.

Jung's interest in dissociation and splitting began as a child. As noted earlier, he

identified two personalities in both his mother and himself. No. 1 represented his

conscious ego, and No. 2 represented the unconscious side of his nature, which Jung had

early and easy access to. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung (1961/1965) wrote:

> Somewhere deep in the background I always knew that I was two persons.
> One was the son of my parents, who went to school and was less
> intelligent, attentive, hard-working, decent, and clean than many other
> boys. The other was grown up—old, in fact—skeptical, mistrustful,
> remote from the world of men, but close to nature, the earth, the sun, the
> moon, the weather, all living creatures, and above all close to the night, to
> dreams. . . . The play and counterplay between personalities No. 1 and No.
> 2, which has run through my whole life, has nothing to do with a "split" or
> dissociation in the ordinary medical sense. On the contrary, it is played out
> in every individual. (pp. 44-45)

Thus Jung didn't think his double nature was pathological. He thought the psyche

to be inherently dissociable, that it splits but is only pathological when the split becomes

so extreme that self-fragmentation or "being torn asunder into pairs of opposites"

occurs (1917/1966, p. 73 [*CW* 7, ¶ 113]). Here, he seems inconsistent. In *Two Essays on*

Analytical Psychology, he wrote "neurosis is self division" (p. 20 [*CW* 7, ¶ 18]) and

"human nature bears the burden of a terrible and unending conflict between the principle

of the ego (self preservation) and the principle of instinct (union with the idealized

object)" (p. 34 [*CW* 7, ¶ 43]). He also says "all energy can only proceed from the tension

of opposites" (p. 29 [*CW* 7, ¶ 34]), and

> there is no energy unless there is a tension of opposites . . . without which
> no movement is possible. The conscious mind . . . seeks its unconscious
> opposite, lacking which it is doomed to stagnation, congestion, and
> ossification. Life is born only of the spark of the opposites. (p. 53 [*CW* 7, ¶
> 78])

He is saying that the split is necessary, as is the move toward relationship between

the opposites. Jung seems to be saying that splitting is normal, and thus neurosis is a

necessary part of development. Jung wanted to create a psychology of personality that did

not pathologize spontaneous and autonomous expressions from the No. 2 side. In this, he

was agreeing with Janet, not Charcot, that dissociation had a normative quality and

function. Freud's response to the French dissociationists was to conceptualize

dissociation as a pathological state. He thought that it was defined by some fixed idea that

it was the analyst's job to identify. Freud assumed that behind the dissociated state was a

trauma, that dissociation was a feature of pathology, and that the normal psyche was

unified.

Dissociationism morphed into Jung's psychology with his incorporation of Janet's

"abaissement du niveau mental" and the idea of mental exhaustion, the purposive nature

of psychological phenomena, the replacement of causality with teleology, and the

recognition that different parts of selves coexist within the personality and that these different part selves could be opposites. Jung later added his ideas of psychic energy, compensation, and the theory of opposites. This is the beginning of Jung's complex psychology, which he was later to define in this way:

> Complexes are autonomous groups of associations that have a tendency to move by themselves, to live their own life apart from our intentions. I hold that our personal unconscious, as well as the collective unconscious, consists of an indefinite, because unknown, number of complexes or fragmentary personalities. (Jung 1935/1977, p. 73 [*CW* 18, ¶ 151])

Jung's word association experiments (1903–1910) revealed the reality of complexes. The concept is central to his theory of the psyche. Jung's archetype theory came out of his work on complexes. A complex consists of two parts, an archetypal core such as the mother archetype, surrounded by a cluster of images, feelings, memories that act like a magnet. The complex can be more or less conscious and healthy, or problematic. Jung said that the ego is a conscious complex. Complexes can be in harmony with the larger personality or incompatible with the conscious attitude.

The psyche can splinter because of the impossibility of sustaining the tension between opposing fragments when their demands are too different from each other. Then pathological splitting occurs, and the complex may become autonomous, acting like a splinter psyche that is alien to the ego. It may then possess a personality, living a life of its own within the person. Jung's complex theory is teleological. The differentiation of the complex, through identification with symptoms, leads to greater consciousness and unity. Freud, on the other hand, was thinking more causally and temporally, in terms of stages of development.

Repression, Projection, and Shadow

It has been noted that dissociation and splitting are processes that can occur when psychical contents, such as those related to trauma, are too overwhelming to bear. Exactly how dissociation and splitting are different from the central psychoanalytic concept of repression is a difficult question. Freud (Breuer & Freud, 1950) realized early in his career that disagreeable memories, impressions, wishes, or feelings could be repressed by the ego into unconsciousness. In his theory, neurosis occurs due to forces that check or restrict the free expression of instinct, forcing these instinctive contents to go underground. In a sense, these contents are split off into what Jung would call the personal unconscious or his No. 2 sector. Splitting and projection are related to the concept of repression. For Freud, splitting, dissociation, and repression were synonymous in his early formulations. Later splitting was seen as a type of repressive psychical process. For Klein and her followers, splitting led to the mature defense of repression when the depressive position was achieved. Bion considered dissociation a gentler psychic denial. Projection for all was a process in which split-off psychic content (object) was projected out onto an external object. Jung's formulation of the shadow represents projection of disavowed parts of the personality. All of these processes are defenses, which help to preserve some coherence and security in the ego when it is faced with material it cannot assimilate. All of these defenses have been conceived to be relatively normal aspects of psychic functioning, but they can also be pathological. Jung, Klein, and Bion viewed these processes as necessary for integration and wholeness, essentially processes of negation in service of creation.

Splitting on the Group Level

On the level of individual psychopathology, excessive splitting inhibits adaptation to reality. One is unable to cohere or to achieve enough integration to function (Klein's depressive position). At the level of the group, splitting destroys community.

Eisold (1994) believes that several unconscious processes are at work. One of these stems from the fact that conflict, whether between competing groups, or individual personalities within a group, constellates projective processes, such as the projection of deviancy or other disavowed (shadow) psychic contents into (onto) a single scapegoat. As noted above, psychoanalytic theory holds that unwanted thoughts and feelings can be unconsciously projected onto another who becomes a scapegoat for the sender's problems. When this concept is extended to the group level, the chosen individual or group becomes the scapegoat for the group's problems.

Another process at work involves anxiety, whether over the loss of an authority figure or the feeling of disempowerment. Anxiety causes splitting. The presence of such anxiety and the conflicting and pathological defenses invoked against anxiety create more anxiety, under which extreme all-good or all-bad evaluations are made and vigorously defended. Real or imagined marginalization and fear of annihilation demand the preservation of identity, fostering "us and them," insider/outsider, and superior/inferior projections, along with irrational thinking. Ideals and theories are protected at all costs due to their orienting, anxiety containing capacity. Extreme idealization and denigration takes place. Positions become entrenched and concretized. Conservative positions are reinforced and intolerance of diverse points of view grows. Such intolerance is a social defense against loss (Eisold, 1994; Ulanov, 2007).

Psychoanalytic institutes and similar professional organizations have been repeatedly beset with destructive splits, often singed with the fanatical fury of religious wars. In contrast to the often-expressed psychological value of tolerance (for ambiguity, frustration, etc.), analytic institutes are notoriously fragile and intolerant of diversity (Eisold, 1994). Intolerance inevitably leads to splitting.

Psychoanalyst Leo Rangell (1974) observed that in the field of psychoanalysis, "rational argument and scientific discourse do not generally prevail, lost in the face of group psychology" (p. 6). Freud (1921/1955) stressed the essentially conservative and conformist nature of group life in his discussion of group psychology. He asserted that groups are held together primarily by two factors in addition to libidinal bonds—a common object, idea, or leader, which replaces the ego ideal of the individual members, and the identification of members with each other, originating in their common allegiance to the leader or idea. The group becomes unstable or divisive in the absence of the leader or the idea. This can occur when the paradigm shifts, or when a theory falters and loses validity. When boundaries get blurry, hard lines and sharp edges compensate.

Analyst Ann Ulanov (2007), in speaking about splitting on the group level, has suggested that splitting brings marginalized material into focus. Another benefit is that blind spots can be identified. Through projection we come to know the other, what we are not, which both defines us and expands us. Ulanov has said that "splitting as repudiation" wants merger or evacuation, either identification or destruction. If it is not possible to merge with the other, or have the other merge with us, the next best thing is annihilation. She has characterized "splitting as differentiation" as having the strength to look into the process with conscious reflection, allowing parts to separate and remain separate, while

remaining open to unknowing or loss. The gift of splitting, Ulanov stated, is the recognition of the reality of the shadow. Differentiation from the shadow must precede assimilation. According to Jung, differentiation leads to individuation. Negation works in service of creation.

Summary

In this chapter dualism, reality split into two as a cosmological principle, has been explored. The binary nature of reality has been a part of the human psychological landscape for thousands of years. Modern philosophy from Descartes to the present day has been trying to reconcile the problem of the opposites and the splits inherent in nature. The concepts and history of a divided reality and a divided self were addressed. The processes of splitting and dissociation were differentiated and explored as defensive, intrapsychic activities. The history of the concept of splitting was discussed and the contributions of the major theorists noted. Splitting as a psychological mechanism was first articulated by Pierre Janet of the French dissociationist school, which evolved out of interest in double consciousness and hypnotic states. Both Freud and Jung were influenced by the French dissociationists, but each took different ideas into his respective psychological system. Both Freud and Jung embraced a dualistic clash of opposites as fundamental to their theories, recognizing that conflict is built into the nature of reality and the psyche. Freud, working with hysterics, recognized psychical splits within the personality that he attributed to trauma. Jung, in addition, discovered a teleological or purposive element at work in psychical splitting.

Splitting has been construed by the Freudian school as a general organizing principle, as a defense mechanism against anxiety, and as a method of establishing

discrimination as a mental capacity. The relationships between splitting, dissociation, and other well-known defenses, such as repression, projection, and projective identification, were considered. The term has been used in many ways, and confusion remains in the literature about the distinctions between these terms and their usage. Confusion also exists in the professional field as to what type of splitting is normative versus what is pathological. Grotstein suggests splitting may have a neurological basis in the split halves of the brain. Splitting is related to other defense mechanisms such as dissociation, repression, denial, projection, and projective identification.

Jung saw the personality as necessarily split and that consciousness itself was splitting. Jung's conception was that splitting represents repudiation in service of differentiation en route to greater assimilation and a greater sense of conscious wholeness. This is an essential difference from the Freudian perspective, which can be linked to the essential philosophical divide between Freud and Jung's psychologies. Jung's understanding of symptoms represents the psyche's attempts at healing, and this stems from his romantic philosophical assumptions which lead back to Plato and Heraclitus. For Freud, though conflict was an ever-present psychic reality, his causal deterministic viewpoint had no such purposive aim towards unity, reflecting his bias towards the empirical positivist side of the enlightenment/romantic divide. Essentially, Freud was concerned with causes, whereas Jung was interested in aims, and this is seen in their different conceptions of splitting.

This research considers splitting as both a normal and a defensive process that can be intrapsychic, interpersonal, or collective as seen in splits between groups or on the group level of an individual psyche.

Chapter 6
Freud and Jung

Introduction

In this chapter, other factors that influenced the individual contexts and theories

of the ideas of Freud and Jung will be explored. Their respective theories and so-called

metapsychologies will be examined briefly in relation to the philosophical assumptions of

each and the differences between them. The Freud/Jung split will be explored as the

fundamental split within depth psychology, along with passing reference to other early

and significant bifurcations, dissensions, and modifications, before examining some of

the institutional splits within the field of depth psychology. The conclusion of the chapter

will attempt to synthesize and analyze the various splits discussed on the level of the

theoretical conception of the function of intrapsychic splitting, which was explored in the

previous chapter and applied to interpersonal and group psychology.

Other Influences on Freud's Epistemology and Basic Assumptions

Freud was the author of a powerful synthesis of ideas. The sources of Freud's

psychoanalysis are multiple and intentionally obscured. It is an almost hopeless task to

discern what came from outside and what were his original contributions. Many of

Freud's theories predate him or belonged to contemporary trends (Ellenberger, 1970). He

was an educated man of a great scientific and literary culture, who was at the crossroads

of the main cultural currents of his time and an omnivorous reader. His ideas represent a

confluence of disparate streams flowing through his work. His Jewish roots penetrated to

a very deep level and his Greek (Aristotle, Epicurus, the Skeptics) affiliations are

evidenced in his embrace of the universal science and rationalism of his time, which

forged a powerful link with classical culture. There was also a fundamental German

current, for it was in the German language that he erected the awesome edifice of psychoanalysis, while German culture was the constant point of reference in his thought.

Freud's primary personal influences were his parents, his family, and his Jewish culture. Freud's father, Jacob, had been married once before marrying his mother, Amalia, and was more than 20 years her senior. His father's first wife had died and left him with two sons (Breger, 2000; Ellenberger, 1970; Gay, 1988). Sigmund, a German name meaning victor or conqueror, was the first child of the new marriage, born May 6, 1856 in Frieberg, Moravia (now part of Czechoslovakia), a Catholic area with a very small population of Jews. His parents had distanced themselves from orthodox beliefs and were married by a rabbi of the Reform movement. His father was a moderately successful merchant in the Freud family wool business. Sigmund's family, which included the two older sons from the previous marriage, soon included two more children, and all lived for several years in a cramped one-room apartment where young "Sigi" was exposed to the intimacies of his parents' marriage. His brother, Julius, his first rival, was born 11 months after his own birth, taking his mother's attention, and he tragically died at 9 months of age when Sigmund was almost 2. He had seen his brother born at home and witnessed his death as well (Breger, 2000; Gay, 1988). His mother's brother died as well, and grief was a real presence in his early home life, a situation that affected the young boy enough to remember his dreams and fears of maternal absence and death for the rest of his life, as he reported in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud, 1900/1953). When Freud was between 3 and 4, his father's business foundered and the family moved to Leipzig, Germany, where they stayed unhappily for a year and then moved on to the Jewish ghetto of Vienna, where Freud would spend the next 78 years of

his life. The uncertainty, changes of habitat, poverty, and fear of loss left him with a life-long "travel anxiety" (Freud et al., 1985, p. 268) and the need to establish a secure and certain home life. Five more siblings were born in Vienna, and there would never be enough money for the family to be comfortable. Freud's oldest half brother, Emanuel, had a son who was a year younger than Sigmund, and they were constant companions and rivals. In his later recollections, he related ambivalence, rivalry, and guilt to his competitive relationship with his nephew:

> An intimate friend and hated enemy have always been indispensable to my emotional life; I have always been able to create them anew, and not infrequently my childish ideal [his nephew John] has been so closely approached that friend and enemy have coincided in the same person, not simultaneously, of course . . . as was the case in my early childhood. (Freud, 1900/1953, p. 385 [*SE* 5])

Whereas Freud was respectful toward his father, he was also critical of him and saw him as weak (Breger, 2000). An important memory that he reported in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud, 1900/1953) related an incident in the streets of Vienna, where Freud's father was abused by a Christian man simply for being Jewish. Freud felt that his father should have fought back, but instead, he simply and quietly walked away. His father has been recalled as a kind, easy-going, and gentle man, who became more simple and child-like as he aged (Breger, 2000).

Freud's relationship with his mother was more complicated. Amalia had been pregnant eight times, had seven children in 10 years and lived with loss, poverty, and uncertainty for her entire adult life. Sigmund was his mother's favorite, "her Golden Sigi" (Breger, 2000; Jones, 1953), in whom her hopes for redemption and success were seeded and watered. Males were more valuable than females to her, and his sisters sacrificed in order that Sigmund got the best. Amalia Freud has been described by her

grandson Martin as an emotional woman of indomitable will, impatient, aggressive, insensitive, and determined to get her way (Breger, 2000; Gay, 1988). Freud's niece, Judith Bernays Heller, described her as a "tyrant" (Breger, 2000, p. 29). Sigmund was consciously dutiful towards her but quietly felt that she was dangerous, so he learned to guard and control his emotions. He must have felt angry at her for the early losses, the uncertainty and abandonment, her attention constantly going to a new infant, her domineering and impatient volatility. Yet in order to placate her he strove to be the golden boy she envisioned, reading and studying voraciously, avoiding any outbursts, neediness, or distracting emotional entanglements, especially with females.

Stolorow and Atwood (1993) have hypothesized that Freud split off his negative, rageful feelings toward his mother in order to preserve an unambivalent idealization of her and to ward off his anxiety of losing her or her love through his omnipotent destructiveness (pp. 42-43). They point to dreams Freud reported in *The Interpretation of Dreams* as evidence of his aggressive and destructive feelings towards his mother (pp. 48-49). Stolorow and Atwood (1993) wonder to what degree this split-off negativity towards the mother affected his later theoretical and clinical work, citing discrepancies between case notes and published accounts, in particular in the case of the "Rat Man," in which Freud barely mentions the influence of the mother and cites the father as the significant negative influence. One is left to wonder whether his exclusion of the mother (out of a defensive need to protect her idealized image) can be extended to his creation of a theory in which hostility is primarily directed toward the father (the Oedipus complex), who thus plays a more influential role in the development of personality?

Freud was always fascinated with the military and, in the spirit of the meaning

of his name (conqueror), was drawn to hero stories. He convinced his mother to name his

youngest brother after Alexander the Great (Breger, 2000). Ernest Jones (1953) quotes

him in his biography of Freud: "A man who has been the indisputable favorite of his

mother keeps for life the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success which often

induces real success" (p. 5).

Much of what he would later become as a man, and what would be important to

his work and theory, was already evident in the boy before he entered the gymnasium.

His feelings of anxiety, sadness, inferiority, duty, his drive for success, his need to be the

general of his own psychoanalytic army, his ambivalence toward male relationships, and

his prudish, suspicious, deferential but superior attitude toward women were well

established.

Freud was deeply influenced by the Greeks and quotes the tragedians and both

Plato and Aristotle frequently in his writings. He was inspired by the German romantic

poets and satirists Heinrich Heine (1797–1856), Karl Ludwig Börne (1786–1837), and

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799). Heine and Börne were both Jews who

converted to Christianity. Shakespeare, Goethe, and Schiller are also often cited

throughout his work. Norwegian playwright Henrik Johan Ibsen (1828–1906) dramatized

the French method of demystification (an unmasking of self deception and uncovering

the underlying truth) in many of his plays, and in one play *Ghosts* (Ibsen, 1881/1966), he

has a character say that "we live in a world of ghosts," referring to reenactment of actions

from parents in childhood. Ellenberger (1970, p. 537) writes that Freud quoted Ibsen in

The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953), and this idea of a ghost-haunted world is famously incorporated in Freud's theory of transference.

Freud spoke of having been greatly influenced by his early reading of the Bible (Jones, 1953, p. 19), but Ernest Jones believes he meant that he was influenced in an ethical sense. Jones relates that Freud grew up devoid of any belief in a God or immortality and did not appear to have ever felt the need of it. His mother was orthodox and his maternal great-grandfather was the chief rabbi of Hamburg, but he was a resolute atheist, and his mixture of atheism, scientism, and positivism were best revealed in *The Future of an Illusion* (Freud, 1927/1975), in which he considers religious belief to be a neurosis.

Freud had a negative reaction to his father's passivity towards anti-Semitism. His father was an unsuccessful wool merchant, who worked for his wife's father. There was never enough of anything. Lower-class Jews like the Freuds were marginalized to the outskirts and crowded ghettos of Vienna. His family moved frequently, and basic economic and cultural instability was a prime motivator for Freud's desperate ambition to escape this dreary existence and make something of himself. He had a distant and ambivalent relationship to his Jewish roots. He did not want to be on the outside. He wanted to distinguish himself. He was the family hope and his mother's golden child, much more attached to her than to his father.

The emotional needs that usually manifest themselves in adolescence found expression first in rather vague philosophical yearnings and later in an earnest adherence to the principles of science (Jones, 1953, pp. 19-20). Jones once asked Freud how much philosophy he had read. The answer was: "Very little. As a young man I felt a strong

attraction towards speculation and ruthlessly checked it" (p. 33). Jones relates that for

Freud

> science meant objectivity, exactitude, measurement and precision,
> qualities Freud felt he was lacking. In the nineteenth century the belief in
> scientific knowledge as the prime solvent of the world's ill was beginning
> to displace the hopes that had preciously been built on religion, political
> action, and philosophy in turn. As a young man, Freud had the need to
> believe in something and it turned out to be Science with a capital S. (p.
> 34)

He remained a true believer to the end.

Historians of psychoanalysis (Ellenberger, 1970; Roazen, 1975; Sulloway, 1979)

have divided Freud's career into a pre-psychoanalytic period focused on biology and

neurology and the psychoanalytic period that began after this work on *Project for a*

Scientific Psychology (1895/1975). During his gymnasium years, Freud became deeply

interested in Darwin and biology. In *An Autobiographical Study* (1925/1959), he recalled

"the theories of Darwin, which were then of topical interest, strongly attracted me, for

they held out hopes of an extraordinary advance in our understanding of the world" (p. 20

[*SE* 20]). Darwin was believed to have shown that no spirits, no superior plans or

ultimate purposes were at work. The physical energies alone caused effects in the world.

Freud's biographer and associate Ernest Jones (1955) writes:

> Freud himself, inspired by Goethe . . . passed through a brief period of the
> pantheistic Naturphilosophie. Then, in his enthusiasm for the rival
> physical physiology, he swung to the opposite extreme and became for a
> while a radical materialist. (p. 45)

According to Jones, Freud attended three lectures on Aristotle by Franz Brentano

(Jones, 1955, p. 37). Brentano (1838–1917) was a German philosopher-psychologist who

studied the way the mind operates and authored a widely read text *Psychology from an*

Empirical Standpoint (Brentano, Kraus, & McAlister, 1973). Brentano noticed that

whenever thinking happens, it is thinking about something, a thing that may or may not actually exist. He called his notion *intentionality*. The intentionality of a thought is the attitude brought to the thinking process. It is the relation between the thing being thought about and manner of the thinker. This means that ideas are never simply objective but have significance in relation to how the thinker feels about the idea.

Another of Brentano's famous students, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), a German Jewish philosopher and psychologist, developed Brentano's ideas into a philosophical method and school that he called phenomenology. It is a descriptive approach to understanding that intended to examine the relationship between the phenomenal world and the individual human consciousness experiencing the phenomena. According to Husserl, it was impossible to separate the subject and object. External reality (the phenomenal world) and the awareness of it are interconnected parts forming a single relationship. Hence science, while trying to remain objective, has its own intentionality. Science imposes its own attitude (subjectivity) on the world, thus coloring and changing what it examines. Husserl suggested that assumptions brought to phenomena be examined and bracketed aside. Husserl's method of interpretive understanding advocated a return to the things themselves, through what he called "a phenomenological reduction" (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 389).

Ricoeur (1970) has written that "there is a clear affinity between Husserlian explication and Freudian exegesis by reason of their regressive (reductive) orientation" (p. 381). He also commented that "no reflective philosophy has come as close to the Freudian unconscious as Husserl's phenomenology" (p. 376).

The ideas of both Freud and Husserl unfolded during the same time period; while Husserl was critical of depth psychology and psychologisms, Freud (in contrast to Jung) seems to have been uninformed regarding Husserl's work, remaining loyal to the objective stance of positivist materialism and ignoring any philosophical examination of his assumptions. Ricoeur sees Freud's influences and method as essentially hermeneutic but not phenomenological in the Husserlian sense (1970, p. 390).

Behind all of Freud's work was his belief in a universal law of determinism. In terms of physical phenomena this was largely derived from his experience in the laboratory of the aforementioned Ernest von Brücke. In his third year of medical studies at the University of Vienna, Freud adopted Brücke as his mentor and went to work in the latter's Physiological Institute (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 431). This work shaped his mechanistic determinism and his psychobiological, reductionist ideas (Sulloway, 1979).

Thus, Freud's firm foundational roots in physical biology are evident. He named his third son after Brücke and wrote that he had "carried more weight with me than anyone else in my whole life" (1925/1959, p. 9 [*SE* 20]). He referred to Helmholtz as "one of my idols" (Jones, 1955, p. 41). Sulloway (1979) contends that the biological roots of Freud's psychology have been hidden. Obviously, any serious theory of human behavior has to be, in part, biological, but Sulloway contends that most of Freud's fundamental conceptions were biological by inspiration and by implication. He devotes a whole chapter to Darwin's influence on Freud and his theory in his study *Freud: Biologist of the Mind* (1979). Sulloway cites Ernest Jones as bestowing the title "Darwin of the mind" upon Freud (p. 4). It was Brücke who eventually advised Freud to practice medicine as a neurologist, suggesting that Freud would not be able to make an adequate

living as a research biologist. It was also Brücke who arranged for Freud to visit the French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) in Paris in late 1885, where Freud would become interested in hypnosis, hysteria, and psychology. By the winter of 1885, Charcot was no longer studying nervous diseases that were based on organic changes and was devoting himself exclusively to research into the neuroses, particularly hysteria. Charcot gave his permission to have a German translation made of his lectures by Freud (1886/1975a, p. 19 [*SE* 1]).

Freud's time with Charcot and later Bernheim in Nancy marked the shift in his career from neuropathology to psychopathology (Freud, 1886/1975b, pp. 5-15 [*SE* 1]). It was also in Brücke's laboratory that Freud met Dr. Josef Breuer, who would later become the colleague and mentor with whom Freud would collaborate in 1893 on *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer & Freud, 1950). Jones (1955) believed (p. 45) that Freud's psychological theories were more influenced by Brücke than by Charcot or Breuer.

Freud recounted that he remained faithful to the work started under Brücke but transferred it from the spinal cord of fish to the human nervous system (1925/1959, p. 10 [*SE* 20]). Freud was still a student working at Brücke's Laboratory and taking classes with Franz Brentano when he was commissioned to translate some of John Stuart Mill's works into German. Brentano had recommended him to the philosopher Theodor Gomperz (1832–1912), who was a friend of Mill, for the translating job. Freud became exposed to the utilitarian philosophy of Mill, which he found both useful and faulty. His translation of J. S. Mill brought him in contact with the tradition of British empiricist philosophy and associationist psychology (Jeremy Bentham, 1748–1832), both of which can be traced back to Locke and Hume. His reading of Mill's essay on Plato informed

him of the controversy between the advocates of intuition and faith and the advocates

of perception and reason (Bentham and the Mills). Associationism refers to the idea that

mental processes operate by the association of one state with its successor states. The

idea is first recorded in Plato and Aristotle and later associated with the "Associationist

School," including John Locke, David Hume, and John Mill and his son John Stuart Mill,

who asserted that the principle applied to all or most mental processes.

The only books of Mill's later found in Freud's library included the one that he

himself translated and Mill's *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*

(1991a)*,* which while not translated by Freud found its own way into his own work. He

used this work as background for *On Aphasia* (1891/1953, p. 122)*,* where he cites it as he

is discussing the idea that the word *aphasia* acquires meaning by being linked to an

object-presentation, and this object-presentation borrows its truth only from an assumed

chain of associations. These ideas recur in Freud's description of the unconscious as the

traits differentiating conscious from unconscious mental activity (Ellenberger, 1970;

Ricoeur, 1970).

In his *Autobiographical Study* (1925/1959), Freud refers contemptuously to "the

philosophers, for whom 'conscious' and 'mental' were identical, and who protested that

they could not conceive of such an absurdity as the 'unconscious mental'" (p. 31 [*SE*

20]). The philosophers to whom he was referring included both Brentano and Mill.

Freud's extension of the physiological determinism that he absorbed from the

Helmholtz school into the field of mental phenomena was influenced by his teacher, the

psychiatrist Theodor Meynert (1833–1892) and philosopher Johann Herbart (1776–

1841). In 1883 Freud went to work in the laboratory of Meynert, who was considered the

greatest brain anatomist in Europe (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 434). Meynert headed the

psychiatric department at the Viennese General Hospital. He has been criticized as

having lapsed into brain mythology, a mid-century trend describing "psychological and

psychopathological phenomena in terms of real or hypothetical brain structures"

(Ellenberger, 1970, p. 434). Brain mythology produced vast speculations that were as

improvable as many of the romantic ideas that Meynert and Brücke decried. Although

Freud's association with Meynert was short-lived, Freud learned and followed Meynert's

method of scientific investigation of first building a theoretical model and then seeing

how the facts fit in, recasting the model if necessary, as opposed to first gathering facts

and then deducing laws and generalizations (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 477). Ellenberger

relates that Freud

> shared Meynert's description of psychological processes in terms of
> quantities of excitation and of reflex neurology . . . [and] he took from
> Herbart and from the English empiricists the doctrine of associationism,
> but he reduced it to a reflex neurology similar to that of Brücke, and to his
> own concepts of the structure and functioning of the brain. (p. 479)

Meynert had distinguished between a primary ego and a secondary ego, a discernment

that foreshadowed Freud's primary and secondary process. Freud also adopted Meynert's

ideas on the etiology of perversion and homosexuality.

Sigmund Exner (1846–1926) was another of Freud's neurological teachers whose

ideas Ellenberger considers to represent a synthesis of Brücke's and Meynert's systems.

> Exner discussed how quantities of excitation could be transferred at the
> junctions between neurones, where he believed that summations of
> excitations took place. . . . He described emotion centers, particularly the
> pain, or unpleasure, center. Under the name of instincts, he described
> associations between ideas and emotion centers. He extensively developed
> his neurological psychology, giving explanations of perception, judgment,
> memory, thinking, and other mental processes. (Ellenberger, 1970, pp.
> 479-480)

Meynert eventually distanced himself from Freud because of Freud's involvement with

hypnosis and he ridiculed Freud's idea of male hysteria (Jones, 1953, pp. 405-415).

Ellenberger (1970) and Sulloway (1979) credit Freud's intellectual stance in *The Project*

for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895/1975) as stemming from Herbart, Fechner

(psychophysic theories; constancy principle), Heinrich Sachs, Ernst Brücke, Meynert,

and Exner:

> Its initial dynamic speculative philosophy can be traced back to Herbart
> and the greatest part of its energetics to Fechner. The principle of inertia
> and the principle of constancy are very similar to what Fechner called
> absolute stability and approximate stability. Fechner had already
> connected the pleasure-unpleasure principle with the idea of approach and
> retreat from approximate stability, and he also equated quality of
> perception with the periodicity of the stable movement. These Fechnerian
> principles were later complemented by Heinrich Sachs with his alleged
> law of the constant quantity of psychic energy: "The sum of the tensions
> of all present molecular waves is, within certain time limits, in the same
> individual approximately constant." (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 479)

Brücke, Meynert, and Exner, as reductionists, strove towards a scientific

orientation in psychology based on a neurological model. Brücke had "explained the

entire functioning of the nervous system as a combination of reflexes" (Ellenberger,

1970, p. 479). Herbart taught the dynamic concept of a fluctuating threshold between the

conscious and the unconscious. He developed a theory of psychic economy based on

mental processes striving for equilibrium, with conflicting psychical contents, some

repressed, some struggling for access to consciousness. Freud was certainly exposed to

these ideas (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 536). The influence of romantic psychiatry is also

clearly evident:

> Reil taught that many mental diseases had a psychogenic cause and could
> be cured by psychotherapy. Ideler considered the passions as the main
> cause of psychoses (especially frustrated sexual love). Heinroth

emphasized the noxious effect of guilt. . . . Neumann pointed out the
relationship between anxiety and frustrated drives. (p. 536)

Many researchers have noted Schopenhauer's influence on Freud, including

Thomas Mann and Luis Granjel (Horne et al., 2000; Young & Brook, 1994). According

to Granjel (1975), Schopenhauer and Freud have three main points in common: "an

irrationalistic conception of man, the identification of the general life impulse with the

sexual instinct, and their radical anthropological pessimism" (p. 65). Granjel believed that

this shared pessimism was related to the two men's basic personalities and that, for

differing reasons, both Schopenhauer and Freud shared resentment against their

respective contemporary societies. Christopher Young and Andrew Brook (1994) take

Freud to task for not acknowledging Schopenhauer's influence upon his ideas. Young

and Brook note that Freud states in *An Autobiographical Study* (1925/1959, p. 29) that he

had not read Schopenhauer until late in life or before 1915. The authors suggest that

statement to be false and cite references to Schopenhauer several times in Freud's

Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953). They summarize the similarities between

Schopenhauer and Freud as follows:

> Schopenhauer's concept of the will contains the foundations of what in
> Freud became the concepts of the unconscious and the id. Schopenhauer's
> writings on madness anticipate Freud's theory of repression and his first
> theory of the etiology of neurosis. Schopenhauer's work contains aspects
> of what became the theory of free association. And most importantly,
> Schopenhauer articulates major parts of the Freudian theory of sexuality.
> These correspondences raise some interesting questions about Freud's
> denial that he even read Schopenhauer until late in life. (Young & Brook,
> 1994, online)

Sulloway (1979) dissected the mythology and legend of Freud, in an attempt to

correct assumptions about Freud's absolute originality and to discern what were truly his

original ideas. He pointed out the paradox of Freud's life-long interest in unmasking the

myths and illusions by which men live, while also perpetuating his own by often

downplaying or denying his influences. Twice in his life, he completely destroyed all of

his manuscripts, private diaries, notes, and correspondence. The first incidence (when he

was 28 and still a relatively unknown researcher), he recounted in a letter to his fiancée

Martha Bernays: "As for the biographers, let them worry, we have no desire to make it

too easy for them. Each of them will be right in his opinion of the 'The Development of

the Hero,' and I am already looking forward to seeing them go astray" (E. Freud, 1960,

pp. 140-141).

It is evident that Freud saw himself in grand measure and in mythological terms.

He would not allow himself to be found out by later authors or devalued through his

immature ideas or any revelation of his synthesis of sources. Throughout his life, he

would continue to maintain an atmosphere of mystery about himself that helped to keep

him aloof and above reproach. Such grandiosity and disregard for his sources should be

placed in the mental context that Freud was in at the time. He wrote his famous paper

"On Coca" that year, in 1884, when he was 28. In it he described the history and effects

of cocaine and spoke glowingly of its therapeutic benefits. A penniless young physician,

Freud thought cocaine would bring him fame and fortune. One of the results of Freud's

systematic destruction of his formative years and his carefully constructed creation of the

mystery of his development is that, for much of the past century, psychoanalysis and its

central themes and theory seemed to have arrived like a sudden psychological vision in

Freud's mind during his legendary self-analysis when, in fact, it was a long and careful

assimilation and accumulation of ideas predating Freud's arrival on the stage of science.

Freud's interest in hypnosis and hysteria began with Breuer in 1882 (Freud, 1925/1959). His curiosity was heightened when he translated Charcot in 1885, a few months before hearing Charcot in Paris in 1886 (Freud, 1886/1975a). He translated *De la suggestion* by Bernheim in 1889 after staying with him in Nancy. Both Bernheim and Charcot utilized the concept of rapport. Freud has written in *On the History of the Psycho-analytic Movement* (1914/1957) that the roots of psychoanalysis lie in a mixture of the psychophysical science of neurology through Fechner and Helmholtz, biology through Brücke and French, and hypnotism through Charcot and Bernheim. The French hypnotists dated back to Franz Anton Mesmer and Marquis de Puységur. Through his fellowship under Charcot, who was a neurologist and professor of anatomical pathology, Freud realized how his work affected the developing fields of neurology and psychology. Charcot's work focused on hypnosis and hysteria. He believed that hysteria was a neurological disorder caused by hereditary problems in the nervous system. He used hypnosis to induce a state of hysteria in patients and studied the results.

Although he often cited Charcot as an important influence, Freud often dismissed Charcot's student Pierre Janet's (1859–1947) influence on his own ideas (Freud, 1925/1959, pp. 13, 19, 30-31 [*SE* 20]). He did acknowledge Janet's priority of 7 years in articulating the role of subconscious fixed ideas in the etiology of hysteria. Janet anticipated Freud in showing that traumatic memory needed to be re-associated with feeling, not simply remembered (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 539). Freud later called his system psychoanalysis to differentiate it from Janet's psychological analysis. Freud called repression what Janet had termed "narrowing of consciousness." Herbart had preceded

both with this same idea. Janet's automatic talking predated Freud's free association, and his "function of reality" was later called "the reality principle" by Freud.

Freud downplayed the influence of philosophy. After publishing *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900/1953), Freud wrote to Fliess (Freud et al., 1985, 2/1/1900) that he had just acquired Nietzsche but had not yet had time to read him. He did quote Nietzsche, concerning dreams, three times in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900/1953, pp. 330, 549, 655 [*SE* 4, *SE* 5]) and refers to him more than a dozen other times throughout his collected writings, as noted in the index volume of the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (1974, p. 216 [*SE* 24]). He notes that the term *id* or (*it* in English) was first used by Nietzsche (Freud, 1923/1961, pp. 15-16 [*SE* 19]; 1933/1964, p. 72 [*SE* 22]) and that Nietzsche also had written about the repetition compulsion and the doubling or divided nature of the self (Freud, 1919/1955, p. 234 [*SE* 17]).

In *An Autobiographical Study* (1925/1959) Freud acknowledged that many of his concepts could be found in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and other romantic philosophers and that he had read and adopted the ideas of Fechner, but he had purposely avoided reading Nietzsche and most philosophy in general (pp. 59-60 [*SE* 20]). According to Ernest Jones, Freud frequently referred to Nietzsche as having "more penetrating knowledge of himself than any man who ever lived or was likely to live." Yet Jones also reported that Freud emphatically denied that Nietzsche's writings influenced his own psychological discoveries. Given his history of obscuring his sources, such assertions are certainly questionable.

Freud had a close relationship with Lou Andreas-Salomé after 1910. Andreas-Salomé had been a close confident of Nietzsche and was very familiar with his work. She would eventually become a psychoanalyst and was one of the few women who commanded Freud's intellectual respect. In 1921, she challenged Freud's concept of narcissism in a paper entitled *The Dual Orientation of Narcissism* (Andreas-Salomé, 1922), in which she proposed a positive view of narcissism (a dual direction) whereby narcissism, in addition to the development and possible stagnation of self-love, also was a part of the development of an identification with the totality of nature, a union with the (m)other environment, a concept that foreshadows Kohut's dual view of narcissism by 50 years. Andreas-Salomé's ideas can be seen later in Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Helene Deutsch, Karen Horney, and others who focused on the feminine within psychoanalytic theory. It is interesting that Freud was able to tolerate Andreas-Salomé's challenges to his theoretical views, whereas he seemed unable to tolerate similar challenges from male followers.

Freud's frequent assertions that he had not read Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Nietzsche seem to be a case in which he "doth protest too much." Psychology before Wundt had been philosophy. Freud's physicalist mentor Brücke and his hero Helmholtz often decried philosophers. Perhaps Freud had to split off his romantic and idealist roots in order to preserve his image as a scientist. As previously noted, Ricoeur (1970) has made a strong case that Freud's epistemology is not actually an empirical science but rather a form of hermeneutics. As Chessick (2005) summarizes, "There is a tension-ridden paradox running all throughout Freud's work in his wish that psychoanalysis be a

rigorous empirical science and his being forced to straddle the natural sciences and *Geisteswissenschaften* (human science) together" (p. 140).

As noted, many of Freud's ideas were not original. He was an original and brilliant synthesizer of ideas. To summarize, the two dominant explanations of the origins and development of psychoanalysis are: the biological—it was a direct outgrowth of Freud's prior physicalist-physiological training with the positivist-materialist influence of Brücke and the psychophysical theories of Fechner; and the psychological—Freud's experiences with Charcot, Bernheim, and Breuer led to his formulating psychoanalytic theory, after he rejected the biological orientation when he abandoned his *Project for a Scientific Psychology* in 1895. In reality, it was all of the above.

Freudian Theory and Metapsychology

Clinically, Freudian theory is an original method. As a theory of neurosis, it has two closely connected subtheories: one of psychopathological symptom formation and one of overall normal and abnormal psychosexual development of personality and human behavior in general (i.e., instincts and their psychobiological manifestations). As a theory of the normal mind, it is based on the assumption that normal and abnormal functioning stand in a continuous relationship with each other. In certain psychical states, such as dreaming, the basic principles of normal and abnormal function are identical. While the normal and the abnormal or psychopathological are the chief poles of psychoanalytic theory, they comprise an essential unity and are directly related. Freud believed that he stumbled upon a theory of normal mental function by studying the abnormal. He found that the dreams and the parapraxes of normal people operated in the same way as those of neurotics (1926/1959, pp. 266-267 [*SE* 20]).

Freud's theory went through many modifications. Metapsychologically, Freud developed two models of the mind. In the first, which was the most deterministic, he thought of consciousness as being impelled by the unconscious sexual instinct, which he called libido. In this topographical model (Freud, 1900/1953), he asserted that if libidinal expression was inhibited intrapsychically, it would be discharged as anxiety. By the time of the second structural model (Freud, 1923/1961), he had added aggression as a second instinct (Freud, 1920/1955). In this model, instinctual expression was brought under control by the superego, the repository of cultural attitudes. Later, he said that anxiety was the response of the ego, under the hegemony of the superego, to the pressure of instinctual demands for expression (Freud, 1926/1959).

In the single instinct model, libido, via the process Freud called sublimation, was channeled into culturally acceptable forms of expression (Freud, 1905/1960). In his final dual instinct theory, a more complex view of sublimation was developed in which aggressive and sexual drives amalgamated to form more complex modes of expression (Freud, 1923/1961).

Although all these models were deterministic, there was a teleological element implied in the concept of sublimation in that its activity, by implication, led to an increasingly more mature ego. More teleological still were Freud's concepts of identification as an outcome of the Oedipal conflict, and of secondary narcissism, which relate to the desire to live up to the goals of the ego ideal.

However, as noted earlier, for Freud there was no final resolution of inner strife. There was no synthesis of opposites in a higher unity and Freud was firmly opposed to all

teleological concepts of God. He maintained that there was no divine reason, plan, or purpose in nature. Nor did he think that there was a lasting order in human nature.

Thus Freud's most deterministic thinking occurred in the early part of his career, and this aspect of his thinking was challenged by some of his followers. Adler was the first dissenting colleague, then Stekel, then Jung. Others such as Rank (1924/1929), who developed some of the first ideas on object relations, and Ferenczi (1955), who stressed the importance of the therapeutic elements in the analytic relationship, differed from Freud but stayed within the psychoanalytic fold, although both broke off personal relations. Many, if not most, of the differences were framed in terms of disagreements on the primacy of libido as a motivating force, but with hindsight, the arguments are more about challenges, via teleology, to the hegemony of determinism.

Freud told Jones that psychoanalysis was born between 1895 and 1900 or in between (Jones, 1957, p. 462), between *Studies on Hysteria* and *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Freud had gone from biological researcher to neuroanatomical researcher to clinical neurologist using psychotherapy to a psychologist using his psychoanalytical method. Jones contended that although Freud continued to use the language of his neuro-biological years (out of habit and necessity), he had fundamentally left the physical explanations behind after his own self-analysis. He himself later stated, "Psychoanalysis must keep itself free from any hypothesis that is alien to it, whether of an anatomical-chemical or physiological kind, and must operate entirely with purely psychological auxiliary ideas" (1916/1963, p. 21 [*SE* 15]).

Freud's theory was at times in conflict with itself in regard to the underlying assumptions inherent in his concepts, partly because Freud never went back over his

metapsychology and systematically pulled it all together. He also made extensive use of metaphor and other figures of speech at points of theoretical uncertainty, a practice that concealed more than it revealed. For example, much of his metapsychology utilized terms of outdated physiology, anatomy, and early evolutionary biology. Freud's first effort to go beyond clinical theorizing, the "Project," was an explicitly mechanistic, biological model of the organism with particular reference to the structure and functioning of the brain. He abandoned it as a failed attempt but continued to use much of the same language.

After suppressing his early love for philosophy, Freud avoided facing philosophical aspects and implications of his theory. His metapsychology failed to take clear and consistent stands on basic philosophical issues, for example, on the mind-body problem, or the problem of freedom and determinism, or the nature of reality. Much of the time psychic energies, forces, and structures were assigned a metaphysical status separate from the world of material realities like measuring instruments. Therefore, propositions involving these central terms could not be tested, nor can any of the key entities be measured. Holt (1985), therefore, framed Freudian metapsychology as a closed system.

The contradictory ideas revolved, in part, around core issues of causality. The conflict between teleology and causality was centrally situated in the opposing approaches of empiricism and romanticism. A mechanical universe was ostensibly reducible to its causally related elements and necessarily implies the absence of the teleology implied in romantic notions of an underlying order or intelligence, which could

be sought through the interior and subjective means of feeling or intuition. A materialistic, reductive approach negated teleology.

Tarnas (1991) placed depth psychology in the middle ground between empiricism and romanticism because it embraces both reductive causality and teleology. A teleological organization can be thought to infer meaning or not. The idealistic Shelling believed that there was a unifying organization of meaning underpinning the universe. Schopenhauer, also an idealist, believed in the intangible nature of reality and deduced neither meaning nor purpose at the heart of the universe, but rather the Will to become.

Freud's foundation in the natural sciences and neurophysiology, along with his early desire for a reducible theory of the mind, indicated a dualistic and materialistic worldview. Yet his later work emphasized the meaning in the symptom, seen in the hysteric patient's repression of forbidden wishes resulting in psychosomatic symptoms. These notions were more closely related to the idealist stance. Freud said that the ego, in order to reduce anxiety, represses a wish, also indicating a teleological purpose. Both types of theories presupposed a metaphysics. The descriptive theories presupposed a materialistic, mechanistic, positivistic theory based on a trust in the idea that nature is so ordered that it can be described mathematically.

As previously noted, Freud lived at a time in which he was subject to the philosophies of the German idealists and romantics, as well as to emerging power of Enlightenment scientism. This basic conflict was encountered by Kant in 1781, and it created a tension in Freud's metapsychology, which Chessick (2005) described as

> an attempt on the order of Newton to describe mental functioning according to orderly laws incorporating the great expansion of mental functioning to include the unconscious; . . . [combining] a Newtonian system complete with forces, energies, dynamics and so on . . . with the

conception of man as a free-willing, creative being with a capacity for wondering, enjoying beauty, and experiencing the sense of the joy of being alive. . . . Nobody has been able to reconcile these apparently contradictory aspects of reality. How can one harmonize man as a machine, with even his mind as ruled by causal laws, and man as a joyous creature creating and reaching out for transcendence. (p. 133)

Other Influences on Jung's Epistemology and Basic Assumptions

Discovering and tracing the influences that shaped C. G. Jung's psychology and personality is as difficult and complicated a task as tracing Freud's, requiring a breadth of knowledge spanning the history of thought and civilization. Like Freud, Jung was a product of his era, culture, parents, temperament, and the education he received as a boy and young adult. His work drew from the ancient civilizations, mythology, philosophy, religion, art, literature, the occult, science, and his own subjective experience. Jung believed that the psyche was inherently split and that human beings are divided by nature. This idea was based on his own experience of having more than one personality. In fact, there were many Jungs: a natural scientist, empirical observer, a romantic philosopher, an occult investigator, an esoteric man interested in alchemy, the I Ching, astrology, Eastern and Western mysticism, synchronicity, and subatomic physics. Jung was teacher, doctor, writer, and a minister of souls. He was full of paradox, and he embraced paradox as a fundamental principle of the universe and a central theme of his theory.

Jung was born 19 years after Freud, on July 26, 1875 in Kesswil, a small village on Lake Constance about 100 km from Basel. Although the Jung family had only lived in Switzerland for a generation and a half, Jung was thoroughly Swiss. James Joyce described Switzerland as a "national park of the spirit" (Hannah, 1991, p. 11). It is a romantic and dramatic landscape of forests divided by mountains, rivers, and lakes. Basel, the general area of Jung's early life, is in the northwest corner, is surrounded by

Germany on the north and east and France on the west and south. It is a multicultural

population where both French and German are spoken. It is a country in the middle,

neutral in European politics, often mediating between other countries. The Swiss are

practical, proud (even arrogant), earthy, romantic, precise, steady, and stubborn, qualities

that also could describe Jung. He spent his early years isolated in a remote parish, next to

Laufen Falls near the headwaters of the Rhine River. His was a lonely childhood, full of

inner fantasy. The forest was thick and the waterfall a constant roar. There were no other

children until his sister was born when he was 9. These environmental and cultural

factors shaped his world.

Like Freud, Jung was a great synthesizer of ideas that predated him. He was a

minister's son, and his maternal grandfather and eight of his uncles were clergymen. His

mother's family was prone to visions and spiritualism. His mother and aunts regularly

held séances. Religion played a central role in the development of his ideas. He was

given a classical education, in contrast to Freud, and thus was more familiar with Greek

and Roman mythology, literature, and thought. He was also well versed in philosophy

from the ancients to the modern era. Whereas Freud read Goethe and wanted to become a

zoologist, Jung read the ancients and wanted to become an archeologist or Egyptologist.

It wasn't until he read Kraft-Ebbing's *Psychopatich Psychology*, with its descriptions of

weird, odd, ill, bizarre, and interesting human behavior, that he started to consider

psychiatry as a fitting occupation (Douglas, 1997, p. 20).

Jung's parents had an unhappy marriage, with a profound lack of intimacy and

sex, a situation that led the boy to develop a rich inner fantasy life. In fundamental ways

his psychological system was based on inner fantasy. Jung's mother was an earthy,

creative, musical, and nurturing woman but was unstable, sometimes remote, and

prone to moods and visions. He described her as having a split personality (Jung,

1961/1965, p. 50). She exposed Jung to mythology, the occult, and esoteric religions.

Like Freud's mother she had lost a child early (2 years prior to Carl's birth) and was

prone to depression. She had a psychological breakdown when Carl was about 3 and was

hospitalized for some period of time, leaving him alone with his depressed father (p. 8).

They shared a room for many years thereafter, attesting to the lack of sex in the marriage.

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (Jung, 1961/1965), Jung wrote that the hospitalization

incident left him feeling abandoned. He developed a distrust of women that he never

relinquished (pp. 8, 112). His mother problem led to a complex that put him on a heroic

journey to save the world from the dragon (mother). It also required him to develop a

creative unconscious in order to free himself from the grip of the mothers. Consequently,

his psychology was more focused on the maternal than Freud's paternal psychology, as a

way of working out his mother complex.

Jung's father had a PhD in Oriental languages and his large library was important

to Jung's development, but Jung saw him as a failed scholar. His father was a reliable but

passive man, and their discussions often left Jung feeling unsatisfied. His father seemed

to lack conviction in his ideas and even faith in his religion. Jung grew to view his father

as bitter and rigid. His father symbolized hypocrisy and powerlessness. He believed that

he had died prematurely rather than dare to allow his thoughts to stray beyond the creed

he preached from his pulpit on Sundays. Consequently Jung was horrified by dogma, and

the lack of a strong father led him to hunger for a male authority to model himself on.

Such a father complex also led to the critical rejection of such authority, a factor that

played out in his bonds with Bleuler and Freud and his lack of lasting relationships with men.

Jung received an excellent education in the classics and was fascinated by ancient cultures. Like Freud, he was inspired by Goethe, whose masterpiece *Faust* was central in his own psychology. His paternal grandfather had scandalously bragged to be the great poet's illegitimate son (Bair, 2005, p. 8), a story Jung retold often. The Jung family was directly related to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), a German philosopher and theologian who attempted to reconcile romantic criticism of the enlightenment with Protestant orthodoxy. His psychology took as its basis the phenomenal dualism of the ego and the non-ego and regarded the life of the human as the interaction of these elements with their interpenetration as its infinite destination. Plato, Spinoza, and Kant were all deeply woven into his system, which was also largely indebted to Schelling for its fundamental conceptions. Schleiermacher's work had a profound impact upon the development of the philosophical field of hermeneutics and on Jung.

Jung read Schopenhauer in school and, in contrast to Freud, cited his influence upon his theories extensively throughout his writings. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (Jung, 1961/1965), he writes:

> The great find resulting from my researches was Schopenhauer. He was the first to speak of the suffering of the word, which visibly and glaringly surrounds us, and of confusion, passion, evil—all those things which the others hardly seemed to notice and always tried to resolve into all-embracing harmony and comprehensibility. Here at last was a philosopher who had the courage to see that all was not for the best in the fundaments of the universe. He spoke neither of the all-good and all-wise providence of a Creator, nor of the harmony of the cosmos, but stated bluntly that a fundamental flaw underlay the sorrowful course of human history and the cruelty of nature: the blindness of the world-creating Will. This was confirmed not only by the early observations I had made of diseased and dying fishes, of mangy foxes, frozen or starved birds, of the pitiless

tragedies concealed in a flowery meadow: earthworms tormented to death by ants, insects that tore each other apart piece by piece, and so on. My experiences with humans too, had taught me anything rather than a belief in man's original goodness and decency. . . . Schopenhauer's somber picture of the world had my undivided approval. (p. 69)

It was through Schopenhauer that Jung got interested in Immanuel Kant, who distinguished between things as we know them (phenomena derived from the senses) and the "thing-itself," the real thing (noumena). Kant believed that the noumena existed as such, in a priori categories, an idea that harkened back to Plato's Idea. Kant held that our sensory observations do not necessarily reflect and do not exhaust reality, which is unknowable but "true." This idea is carried through Schopenhauer to Jung and appears as the idea of the archetype. Jung writes in *Psychological Types* (1921/1971) that "the archetype would thus be, to borrow from Kant, the noumenon of the image which intuition perceives and, in perceiving, creates" (p. 401 [*CW* 6, ¶ 659]). Kant asserted that noumena were perceived through intuition. Jung extended this idea in *Psychological Types*. He wrote that

introverted intuition apprehends the images arising from the a priori inherited foundations of the unconscious. . . . In these archetypes . . . all experiences are represented which have happened on this planet since primeval times. (p. 400 [*CW* 6, ¶ 659])

The idea of archetypes, which came to Jung from Plato by way of Kant and Schopenhauer, was one of the foundations for Jung's concept of the collective unconscious. The influence of Kant and Schopenhauer also appeared in Jung's respect for the objective reality of the interior life and his constant emphasis on human continuity with nature and natural law. Jung's theory of synchronicity was based on the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. Kant (and Schopenhauer) believed that things-in-themselves (noumena) were not subject to causality. In his monograph

Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle (Jung, 1952/1973, pp. 11-12 [*CW* 8,

¶ 828]) Jung actually credited a Schopenhauer treatise, *On the Apparent Design of the*

Fate of the Individual, as being the godfather of his ideas on synchronicity. Jung also

attributed the idea of the persona to Schopenhauer in *Psychological Types* (1921/1971):

"The persona is, in Schopenhauer's words, how one *appears* to oneself and the world, but

not what one *is*" (p. 218 [*CW* 6, ¶ 370]).

Jung's focus on the dialectic of opposites stems from Heraclitus but has many

similarities to Hegel's dialectic. Jung said that he never read Hegel properly, meaning in

the original work. He acknowledged the similarities but found Hegel to have not

sufficiently understood or included the unconscious dynamics of the psyche in his theory.

Jung may have inherited his dislike or distrust of Hegel from Schopenhauer, who had

been caustic and bitter in his criticism of his archrival. Nonetheless, Hegel's dialectics

and use of Heraclitian opposites had many similarities with Jungian thought. Whereas

Kant had introduced his "transcendental dialectics" as an attempt to show the futility of

abstract metaphysical speculation, for Hegel dialectic was the fundamental process of

development in both thought and reality (thesis to antithesis to synthesis, analogous to

Jung's conception of the "Transcendent Function" (1916/1969, pp. 67-91 [*CW* 8, ¶131-

193]).

Jung was also introduced to Eastern mystical thought through Schopenhauer,

which led to his deep interest in mysticism and alchemy. In *Psychological Types*

(1921/1971), Jung commented on Schopenhauer's theory of "world negation," which

came from Buddhist influences:

> Psychologically, "world" means how I see the world, my attitude to the
> world; thus the world can be conceived as "my will" and "my idea." In

itself the world is indifferent. It is my Yes and my No that create the differences. Negation, therefore, is itself an attitude to the world, a particularly Schopenhauerian attitude that on the one hand is purely intellectual and rational, and on the other a profound feeling of mystical identity with the world. This attitude is introverted; it suffers therefore from its typological antithesis. But Schopenhauer's work far transcends his personality. It voices what was obscurely thought and felt by many thousands. (pp. 190-192 [*CW* 6, ¶ 322])

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (Jung, 1961/1965), Jung related an incident of revelation that occurred on a trip to India, while ascending the hill of Sanchi, where Buddha gave his first sermon:

A new side of Buddhism was revealed to me there. I grasped the life of the Buddha as the reality of the self which had broken through and laid claim to a personal life. For Buddha, the self stands above all gods, a *unus mundus*, which represents the essence of human existence and of the world as a whole. The self embodies both the aspect of intrinsic being and the aspect of its being known, without which no world exists. Buddha saw and grasped the cosmogonic dignity of human consciousness; for that reason he saw clearly that if a man succeeded in extinguishing this light, the world would sink into nothingness. Schopenhauer's great achievement lay in his also recognizing this, or rediscovering it independently. (p. 279)

Jung's interest in Eastern philosophy and religion was also aroused through his friend Richard Wilhelm, who asked to him write a psychological commentary on the Chinese Alchemical text, *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (1929/1968, pp. 1-56 [*CW* 13, ¶ 1-84]). He discovered that alchemy was a fitting descriptive metaphor for the psychological transformation he had gone through and was trying to articulate with his own theories. Jung researched and studied the Renaissance philosophers and alchemists Ficino and Paracelsus. These neo-Platonists awakened his curiosity to go back to the Greeks: Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Pythagoras, and the Stoics and Skeptics. His interest in the religious dimension of the psyche led him to Gnosticism and Christian mystics like Meister Eckhardt and Jakob Böhme.

Whereas Plato, Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Carus, Hartmann, and Nietzsche all are philosophical godfathers to Jung's ideas, Schopenhauer was the central figure whose influence was pervasive. He was Jung's portal to Kant and such Jungian concepts as the archetypes, the collective unconscious, synchronicity, typology, the structure of the psyche (Jung's concept of the Self came from the Atman concept in the Upanishads by way of Schopenhauer), the libido, the shadow, and the dark side of God. Jung said of Schopenhauer:

> He was the first to speak of the suffering of the world, which visibly and glaringly surrounds us, and of confusion, passion, evil—all those things which the others hardly seemed to notice and always tried to resolve into all-embracing harmony and comprehensibility. (1961/1965, p. 69)

Ellenberger (1970, pp. 731-732) found elements of Jung's theoretical ideas in the work of the French novelist Léon Daudet (1867–1942), specifically, *L'Hérédo* and its sequel, *The World of Images*. Daudet proposed a new science that he called "metapsychology" that would address the primary goal of human life, which he saw as overcoming the uncontrolled impulses of the ego and discovering and actualizing one's self, by which he meant a person's true, original essence. When the ego predominates, Daudet wrote, the personality lost unity and came under the influence of one or more ancestral "personages" that could take possession of the personality. Such an ancestor possessed person Daudet called an *heredo*. An *heredo* is moody, restless, and impulsive. Daudet conceived of imagination as a function of the self that helped a person become aware of his "*heredisms*" in order to become more discriminating. He claimed that a human "lives and dies by his images" (cited in Ellenberger, 1970, p. 731). Jung referred to *L'Hérédo* in the seminars of 1925 (Jung, 1929/1989, pp. 33, 37), in "The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious" (1928/1966, pp. 146-176 [*CW* 7, ¶ 233-270]), and

at least once in an unpublished seminar in the winter of 1934, *The Interpretation of Visions* (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 731). Daudet's ideas foreshadowed Jung's yet unborn notions of complexes, the archetype of the self, and the work of individuation.

It is interesting that Ellenberger (1970) claims that Daudet was one of the first Frenchmen whom Freud met on his sojourn to the Saltpêtrière to study under Charcot in late 1885:

> Léon Daudet, who was a keen observer and had a good memory for people he met, apparently did not notice the Viennese neurologist, because he never mentioned having met him, whereas Freud kept a lasting memory of the young Daudet. . . . Curious similarities could be found between Freud and Léon Daudet, two men who had been deeply influenced by Charcot's personality. Some of Daudet's novels are about incest and other sexual deviations, morphine addiction and psychopathic heredity. (p. 754)

Jung's Theory and Metapsychology

> A psychological theory, if it is to be more than a technical makeshift, must base itself on the principle of opposition. . . . There is no balance, no system of self-regulation, without opposition. The psyche is just such a self-regulating system. (Jung, 1917/1966, p. 61 [*CW* 7, ¶ 92])

Jung's theories reflected his personality and his own psychological issues. The creative use of fantasy was a central theme that had its roots in Jung's lonely childhood. His focus on the religious dimension of psychological life was rooted in his need to work through his father's inner religious conflict. His mother had fostered and exposed him to a view of the world and the soul that was unconventional and mediumistic. His first psychological work was based on his cousin's channeled psychic experiences. Many of his beliefs and curiosities were already in place before he left the university. In his *Zofingia Lectures* (1896–1899) to his fraternity brothers, he articulated the limits of natural science, specifically the positivistic determinism of the Helmholtz school that was so fundamental in shaping Freud's theories. The first of the lectures ("The Border Zones

of Exact Science") was a passionate exhortation against the claims of mechanistic science to exhaust the limits of reality and a plea in favor of a vitalist view. Jung didn't believe that life could have come from dead matter.

The second of these student lectures ("Some Thoughts on Psychology," 1897) continued arguing for a nonmechanistic worldview and plunges into the questions of the origins of life and consciousness. He criticized the limited empiricism of modern science. The primary elements of Jung's epistemology were already visible: the orientation of his career would be toward experience of religious nature: no rational or formulaic expression or dogmatic formula would suffice to achieve the goal of a religious point of view; real knowledge for Jung would be based on real experience, and that meant experience in which the individual was moved by numinously felt inner feelings that convinced him or her of the reality of the mental/psychic/spiritual sphere. Jung's own account of how he arrived at the epistemological views that were to characterize his psychology was set down in two early chapters of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (Jung, 1961/1965). He devoted nearly 85 pages of his memories to the theme of his childhood religious dilemmas, to his philosophical readings as a young student, and to their connection with his experience of his father. Jung took on as his own his father's unsolved problem of belief and made the reality of the psyche the motive of his life.

Jung's theories were built on the idea that it is possible to experience a higher, more refined state of awareness than the normal waking condition. The path to this experience lies in an active exploration of the unconscious, either voluntarily or as a reaction to sickness or trauma. Jung made a distinction between what he called his "Complex Psychology" and "Analytical Psychology," the former consisting of his

metapsychological hypotheses on psychic structure and dynamics and the latter of his practical methods of psychological analysis (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 14).

Following Hippocrates, his theories were built on the idea that the psyche, as a natural component of a human being, was self-regulating, like the physical body. Jung theorized that the psyche orients towards healing, which meant that it orients towards wholeness. The word *wholeness* has the same old German root as the word *healing*. To heal is to make whole ("Wholeness," 2006, online). Jung believed that an active exploration of the unconscious, either voluntarily or as a reaction to sickness or trauma, would lead to increasing levels of differentiation and integration, a process of growth he called "individuation." Individuation was the result of an inward journey fueled by a dialogue between the ego and an overarching organizing principle that Jung called "the archetype of the Self."

Jung's method, like Freud's, was oriented by the human capacity for symbolization, but instead of focusing exclusively on wish fulfillment as the origin of the neurosis, Jung saw mythology as the symbolic stories of the human race, more like wish-fulfilling prophecies that recapitulated the entire evolutionary psychic life of the species. Jung looked to the growth-oriented dimension of personality, rather than limiting his inquiry to the causes of psychical problems. He believed that the unconscious contained the seeds of the highest evolutionary capacities, not merely its darkest impulses.

As previously discussed, what Freud primarily meant by metapsychology were those theories that addressed the structure, function, and dynamics of psychological (mental) processes. Jung's metapsychological model of the structure of psyche was organized around the central archetype of the self. He stated enigmatically that the self

was both the center and the circumference of the psyche (Sameuls et al., 1986, p. 135). Metaphorically, his conceptual self existed in the core of a three-layered circle. This core consisted of a collectively shared layer of psyche that Jung called "the collective unconscious," composed of collectively shared, biologically inherited patterns of potentiality that he referred to as archetypes. Originally called primordial patterns, archetypes were Jung's evolution of Plato's forms. Jung conceived of another layer of unconscious material surrounding the core, made up of individual personal experience and personal inherent potentiality. This layer he called the personal unconscious, and he conceived of it as basically equivalent to Freud's conception of the unconscious. This layer of the psyche was composed of functional units that he identified as complexes, by which he meant groups of associated ideas bound together by some shared emotional charge and centering around an archetypal core within the collective unconscious level. These units could function autonomously as split-off splinter psyches as previously noted. He had become convinced of the reality of complexes and the unconscious layer of the psyche while carrying out word association experiments in his early career. Jung considered archetypes and the complexes that surrounded them to act as functional components of dynamic systems that are constantly interacting and changing under the coordinating influence of the self. He conceived of complexes as personifications of archetypes or the way that archetypal patterns manifest within the personal psyche. Complexes formed around archetypally anticipated figures, such as the mother, or situations, such as initiation or death, through the laws of association, principles that harkened back to Aristotle and evolved through Locke, Hume, Kant, Bentham, Mill, James, and 19th-century psychologists. The dynamic energy of the psychic system was

supplied by the friction of opposites that acted and reacted in a compensatory

relationship similar to the second law of thermodynamics (the principle of entropy). The

distribution of energy in the psyche sought an equilibrium or balance. The whole system

functioned in accordance with the biological principles of adaptation, homeostasis, and

growth.

He thought that the inward journey necessary for psychological individuation was

fueled by a dialogue between the ego and the Self over which part would wield central

control of the mature personality. The ego, for Jung, was the central controlling force

during early life, while the Self began to emerge. Eventually, depending on whether or

not the person stayed true to the path of spiritual self-realization, individuation, by means

of an integration of the opposites, occurs as the goal of personality development. At this

point the Self became the more mature center of the person.

Jung noticed that individuals differ in their preference for objective or subjective

experience. He categorized those whose energy flowed primarily toward the object as

having an extraverted attitude and those whose energy flowed primarily toward their own

subjectivity as having an introverted attitude. Additionally, he recognized four primary

functions: two rational functions (thinking and feeling) and two irrational functions

(sensing and intuiting). This typological aspect of his metapsychology developed as an

attempt to understand the split between Freud and Adler and, more poignantly, his own

split with Freud. Jung's typology had a rich philosophical history, going back to the

Greek humors and influenced by Goethe, Alfred Binet (1857–1911), Nietzsche, and

William James (Shamdasani, 2003).

Jung's theoretical world was an ordered emergent one (Tresan, 1996, p. 412), consisting of four realms that supervene on one another. In the diagrams in *Aion* (Jung, 1951/1969, pp. 247-248 [*CW* 9ii, ¶ 390, 391]), Jung posits a mineral world, plant world, animal world (with the human at the apex), and ultimately a spiritual world. The collective unconscious could be seen as yet a further and more comprehensive emergent level. In 1916, Jung postulated the "transcendent function" (Jung 1916/1969), referring to the symbol-forming function of the psyche, a factor that catalyzes emergent activity and provides a mediatory function in the conflict of the opposites. In *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1921/1971)*,* he described his synthetic or constructive method (p. 422 [*CW* 6, ¶ 701]), detailing an emergent rather than reductive process.

In his essay, "On Psychic Energy" (1928/1969), Jung attempted to define his own theory of libido. He divests libido of its qualitative (exclusively sexual) dimension, thus turning it into a quantitative concept of pure psychic energy. He conceived that this pure psychic energy was capable of transformations into different phenomena and different levels of organization. This new concept of libido allowed for emergent activity, whereas Freud's libido, a purely exclusive sexual energy, did not. This difference in the concept of libido was central to the split between the two as it underlined and emphasized their different epistemological methods and philosophical assumptions. In this essay, Jung used concepts such as psychic energy, entropy, the law of psychic compensation in energic terms, and the possibility of the quantification of psychic energy. Yet Jung warned not to think of his notion of psychic energy in the reductionist manner of Freud, but as autonomous to the psyche, where it was simply the measure of the intensity of psychic value or meaning (Jung, 1928/1969, pp. 9-10 [*CW* 8, ¶ 14-17]).

In his last major theoretical essay "On the Nature of the Psyche" (1947/1969), he gave a defense of natural science, trying to defend the independence of natural-scientific psychology from philosophy, which from his description of it, can be identified primarily as rationalist. He criticized the father of experimental psychology, William Wundt, for refusing to accept the concept of the unconscious for philosophical reasons. Jung held a different idea of what constitutes natural science. He was influenced by his relationships with Einstein, Bohr, Pauli, and Heisenberg, natural scientists and physicists, who helped create a new scientific paradigm that was acausal, systemic, and utilizing a participant and relativist epistemology. Jung went into new territory using symbol, mythology, and metaphor, the language of the poet, to describe how the psyche worked, while still using the language of 19th-century scientism.

Jung conceived much of his metapsychology during his years of solitude after this split with Freud. Considering what he had gone through in the years leading up to the break (his struggle with Freud and the inner circle, combined with the confusion and embarrassment of the sexual allegations of his patient-student Sabina Spielrein), his hypothesis of the archetypes, persona, shadow, and anima could be seen as representing a distillation of those conflicts and experiences (Carotenuto, 1982/1984).

Jungian theory reflected its vitalistic, romantic, and idealistic roots. Like his relative Schliermacher and his psychoanalytic mentor Freud, his method was essentially hermeneutic, but it was also phenomenological, thought not in a purely Husserlian sense. Brooke (1991) has remarked that the tension between experience and knowledge in Jung's work was a tension between "profound insight and an apparent conceptual eclecticism" (p. 3). Jung didn't write or think from any one perspective and demonstrated

a consistent dissatisfaction with his own formulation, perhaps reflecting the tension between his No. 1 and No. 2 personalities and ambivalence towards both his scientific and religious traditions. Brooke also noted that Jung's theories reflected his insistence on the perspectival (Nietzschean) and historically contingent nature of knowledge, which foreshadowed postmodern approaches (p. 3).

Jung sometimes wrote scientifically, seeing through the lens of psychiatry, medicine, and natural science with all of the inherent assumptions of modern science. At other times he wrote poetically, using the language of religion, myth, and alchemy, the language of his No. 2 personality. And as he aged, he felt most comfortable with this style (Jung, 1961/1965, p. 17). He believed that metaphor was the best way to speak of human beings because in every statement about psyche, including all interpretations personal or collective and every scientific explanation, there is an "as-if" quality (Jung 1940/1968, pp. 156, 157, 160 [*CW* 9i, ¶ 265-271]).

He wanted to study the phenomena of the psyche directly, through the images it produced. His epistemology was psychic data. For him, psychological material, such as dreams and fantasies, were psychological facts and thus empirical data. This was a nonobjectivist epistemology, but he insisted that it was scientific and not metaphysical. Like William James, he intentionally rejected the absolutist claims of objectivism. He also rejected the opposite position of relativism. Jung was trying to forge a middle way between these poles, a mediatory science.

Jung's scientific discoveries and research dealt with meanings as the fundamental evidence of human experience. He insisted that he was a phenomenologist and his central criticism of Freud was his reductionism or the "nothing but" explanation, such as

religious experience was nothing but a regressive retreat to the oceanic experience of the mother's womb.

Jung denied that his psychology was metaphysical. Although he wrote extensively on religion and spirituality, he often emphasized that he was focusing on the psychological aspects of these subjects and not making any metaphysical claims, such as the ultimate existence of a supreme being because it could not be proven.

Because he realized the essentially subjective (Kantian) nature of reality, Jung saw psychology as intrinsically metaphorical or poetic. Whereas Freud used 19th-century scientific terminology, Jung went back to older language: *anima*, *eros*, *psyche*, *soul*, *spirit*, and the symbols and terms of alchemy and astrology. In *Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology* (Jung, 1931/1969) he wrote that analytical psychology "will certainly not be a modern psychology" (p. 344 [*CW* 8, ¶ 661]). He saw materialism as a religious vision that resurrected God in a new form (p. 341 [*CW* 8, ¶ 655) and scientific philosophy as another form of myth making. Jung wrote that psychology "translates the archaic speech of myth into a modern mythologem—not yet, of course, recognized as such—which constitutes an element of the myth 'science'" (1940/1968, p. 179 [*CW* 9i, ¶ 302]).

Jung's attitude toward his own theories reflected his nonabsolutist and uncertain perspective. Jung stated that his own "theory of the collective unconscious posits nothing, it designates only my unknowing" (1973, p. 411). While he made distinctions between philosophy and his psychology, he understood that psychology like philosophy was really an attempt to understand human experience and not some kind of truth in itself. He wrote:

> It does not surprise me that psychology debouches into philosophy, for the thinking that underlies philosophy is itself a psychic activity, which, as

such, is the proper study of psychology. I always think of psychology as encompassing the whole of the psyche, and that includes philosophy and theology and many other things besides. (1948/1969, p. 276 [*CW* 8, ¶ 525])

Theoretical Differences Between Freud and Jung

One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil.
(Freud et al, 1974, p. 491, Nietzsche's Zarathustra, quoted by Jung to Freud in the Freud/Jung letters, March 3, 1912)

Although Freud maintained what Sulloway (1979) called "a sophisticated dualist spirit" (p. 130) in that he thought both psychologically and neurologically, Freud maintained his dependence on reductionism, a principle that underlies all of the science of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. Freud's reductive materialism was a philosophical concept that addressed the way scientists explained events that occurred in a physical world taken to be real. Materialism has been historically mixed with scientific realism, which stated that reality was built of tiny material building blocks. Reductionism held that breaking phenomena down to these building blocks revealed that the greater was the sum of the smaller and that later events can be explained by earlier ones. In this view, lower (earlier) level explanations replaced upper (later) level explanations. The present was caused by an event in the past. Basing his theory and metapsychology on these assumptions, Freud thought he had found the truth and was on a mission to convince the world of that truth.

Jung was much less certain of his theories. In his memoriam to Freud, Jung (1939/1966) wrote that Freud told him he had never read philosophy because "it hadn't ever occurred to him" (p. 41 [*CW* 15, ¶ 61]). Jung saw Freud as philosophically naïve, because he lacked any real education in the history of ideas. Jung reasoned that Freud never questioned his own ontological or epistemological assumptions because he never

learned to think philosophically (1929/1967, pp. 335-336 [*CW* 4, ¶ 774-784]). He considered that fact to be the main difference between them. They had different basic assumptions, and he felt that Freud left his assumptions unexamined.

Jung repeatedly criticized Freud's psychophysiological and materialist assumptions, his historical determinism, and his inability to acknowledge that his findings were not merely objective but were constituted by a historically conditioned perspective. In a foreword to *Studies in Analytical Psychology* (Adler, 1949/1999), Jung wrote:

> A psychology that wants to be scientific can no longer afford to base itself on philosophical premises such as materialism or rationalism. If it is not to overstep its competence irresponsibly, it can only proceed phenomenologically and must abandon preconceived opinions. (Jung, 1949/1977, p. 523 [*CW* 18, ¶ 1239])

Jung wrote about his differences with Freud over and over again. Jung saw theory as the subjective confession of its creator. "They bring to light not only the best in us, but our worst insufficiencies as well" (1929/1967, p. 333 [*CW* 4, ¶ 770]). Both Freud and Jung focused on symbolism in their respective psychologies, but they differed over the meaning of symbols. For Freud, symbols signified something known but repressed. He reduced them to basic sexual meanings. Jung thought of symbols as the best possible representation for something unknown. He looked to the growth-oriented dimension of symbols and what they might indicate about the actualization of the individual's highest potential. He believed that the unconscious contained the seeds of the highest evolutionary capacities. This is a teleological theoretical stance and directly oppositional to the reductive orientation of mechanical determinism, which fantasized that everything could be linearly reduced to its smallest origins.

Freud hypothesized that the ego emerged out of the unconscious (id) and

functioned as a mediator between unconscious drives and wishes and collectively held

values (superego). Jung's concept was not dissimilar. He also conceived of the ego as the

mediator of the personality, but for Jung it was arbitrating simply between the objective

and subjective realms of experience. Freud had conceived of complexes as problems

whereas Jung saw them as essential parts of psyche, healthy or otherwise. This difference

was fundamental, again the old determinism/teleology split. Freud was interested in

causes, whereas Jung was interested in aims. For Freud, the past defined the future. For

Jung, the future drew us forth. There was a final cause, an Aristotelian telos, the oak

within the acorn, pulling us forward, as Nietzsche's Zarathustra was drawn forth. Jung

saw Freud's determinism as one-sided. He felt it created an overly pathologizing

perspective focused primarily on defects (Roazen, 1975, p. 291). Jung's focus always led

him towards meaning. He considered the drive toward meaning to be a sort of religious

instinct, a truth seeking, epistemological need for understanding and for inclusion in

something larger than oneself. This was the other biggest difference between them. Jung

saw the value in such a need. He recognized that it had always been and therefore must

be valid psychologically. Whereas Freud dismissed religion as nothing but a neurotic

need, "nothing but" a regressive retreat to the oceanic experience of the mother's womb,

for Jung, this epistemological need was essential. Dis-ease and mental distress were due

to a lack of meaning in the psyche, and healing required a religious instinct, the need to

seek knowledge and make links with the transcendent to become whole again, to be

reborn and renewed.

Freud occasionally referred to the possibility of vague constitutional predispositions or even archaic memories of a phylogenetic nature, but for the most part he saw the newborn human baby as a *tabula rasa*. Jung had a different view. He did not see the human infant as a *tabula rasa* but rather, as a bundle of potentialities: archetypal forms looking to be filled with content (Stevens, 1994, p. 18). Unlike Freud, Jung believed that development proceeds throughout the whole life cycle, and that every stage had its own archetypal goals (p. 87).

Jung's ideas could not be easily reckoned with Freud's positivistic topographical metapsychology. Their respective theories both contained an implicit ontology and epistemology caught in the Cartesian and realist heritage of the 19th century. But Jung became increasingly aware of the limits of positivism and causal determinism. Although both had romantic and idealistic roots, Freud's mature ideas inclined more towards positivism, materialism, determinism, scientism, and Darwinism (Ellenberger, 1970). Freud seems to have split off his early interest in spiritualism, the occult, and ancient religions. This interest emerged in his superstitious beliefs in numbers and dates, his large collection of religious and mythological figures, and his odd phobias and paranoid episodes. Whereas Freud believed that there was no divine plan or purpose inherent in life or in human nature, and that human motivation could be reduced to the discharge of drives (Horne et al., 2000), Jung came to believe that psychic causality is teleological and purposive rather than deterministic. Freud was very uncomfortable with Jung's interest in the occult, spirituality, and mysticism. Jung was equally uncomfortable with Freud's paternalism, authority, and absolutism. Jung questioned the concept of truth. He valued

doubt and believed that "as surely as light comes out of darkness, truth is born of error" (1917/1966, p. 118 [*CW* 7, ¶ 200]).

Throughout his life, Jung developed other concepts of psychic causality. In his early theory of archetypes, he said that they were patterns of instinctual expression, an efficient cause, analogous to those seen in animals (Jung, 1919/1969). He also saw archetypes teleologically, as representations of ultimate forms, a concept identical to Plato's (Jung, 1917/1966). In his final concept of archetypes he combined teleology and determinism, saying that archetypes had a spiritual and an instinctual pole, implying that psychological development often involved a conflict between instinct expression and spiritual development (Jung, 1947/1969). Despite this interesting attempt to take account of efficient and final causality, in his mature writings such as *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, Jung was primarily a teleologist (Jung, 1955/1970). Here he proposed that mature ego development occurred via the integration of archetypal polarities, in particular anima (the feminine archetype) with the ego complex of the male, and animus (the masculine archetype) with the ego complex of the female.

The Freud/Jung Split

> My emotional life has always insisted that I should have an
> intimate friend and a hated enemy. I have always been able
> to provide myself afresh with both, and it has not
> infrequently been so completely reproduced that friend and
> enemy have come together in a single individual. (Freud,
> cited in Roazen, 1975, p. 31)

This section of the research will briefly review how the Freud/Jung split has been discussed in the literature. Much has been written about Jung's break with Freud (Bair, 2005; Breger, 2000; Corbett & Cohen, 1998; Donn, 1988; Ellenberger, 1970; Freud, 1914/1957; Gay, 1988; Hogenson, 1983; Jung, 1961/1965; Roazen, 1975; Smith, 1996;

Steele & Swinney, 1982). Some have attributed the break to theoretical differences,

some to individual psychology, personalities, or typology, and others to the dynamics of

power and authority, still others to the process of the evolution of ideas. Perhaps it was a

combination of all of these factors.

The working, personal relationship between Freud and Jung ended in 1913 when

Freud suggested that they break off all personal and professional ties (Davis, 1997;

Ellenberger, 1970; Freud et al., 1974). The tensions between them had been building for

several years and reached a theoretical impasse with Jung's 1911–1912 publication of

Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, later revised and reissued as *Symbols of*

Transformation (Jung, 1912/1967 [*CW* 5]). The ostensible issue was Jung's refusal to

accept what he believed to be Freud's limited view of the libidinal drive or the primary

motivational energy. Jung contended that libido expressed itself through symbols, an idea

that later led to his concept of the collective unconscious. Jung enlarged the concept of

libido from a purely sexual force to a more inclusive psychic force. His exchange of

letters with Freud from 1906 to 1912 demonstrated his consistent reluctance to adopt a

purely sexual motivational drive. As this idea was so central to Freud's metapsychology,

it became a symbolic issue between them. Freud attributed Jung's reluctance to his

Christian Puritanism. Jung attributed Freud's singular focus to be a product of his sexual

frustration. Jung retained the term *libido*, which, as Jung chose to define it, was similar to

Schopenhauer's *will*. Freud often criticized Jung for using psychoanalytic terminology

after they parted ways. He believed Jung was confusing and misrepresented

psychoanalytic theory. In his paper "On Psychic Energy," first conceived in 1913 but not

published until 1928, Jung proposed that psychic causality is primarily teleological

(Jung, 1928/1969), which indicated a more extensive break from Freud's determinism.

Freud had found the first part of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*,

which appeared in 1911, more or less acceptable; it was the second part that upset him.

When Freud read it in September 1912, he was angry about the revision of libido theory,

and Jung had great difficulty tolerating Freud's anger (Freud et al., 1974, pp. 507, 509).

There was a brief attempt at reconciliation in the letters, but the tone deteriorated, and

they began addressing each other more formally. Freud said that Jung's disagreements

were caused by his neurosis. Jung insisted that he wanted to be understood intellectually

and not to be "measured by the yardstick of neurosis" (p. 526). Eventually, Jung attacked

Freud for treating his pupils like patients and suggested that Freud sniffed out all the

symptomatic actions around him, thus reducing everyone to the level of sons and

daughters "who blushingly admit the existence of their faults. Meanwhile you remain on

top as the father, sitting pretty" (p. 535). Jung went on to say that self-analysis was

useless, and therefore Freud was not out of his own neurosis, and that he needed to look

at his own weak spots instead of pointing out everyone else's. To that, Freud replied that

he felt it impossible to continue their private relationship, and Jung agreed. Freud wrote

that he did not recognize the Swiss innovations as a legitimate development of

psychoanalysis and that Jung was in full retreat from psychoanalysis. The finale occurred

in October 1913, when Jung heard that Freud had said that he doubted Jung's good faith

(p. 550).

Jung resigned from all official positions—the editorship of the Jahrbuch and the

presidency of the Association. The analysts of Freud's circle were delighted, and Freud

wrote to Abraham, "I cannot suppress a hurrah" and a week later, "So we are rid of

them at last, the brutal holy Jung and his pious parrots" (quoted by Gay, 1988, p. 241).

This jibe is yet another projection, as Freud himself liked to be surrounded by people who

mirrored him. In the future, the members of the psychoanalytic movement allowed Jung

and Adler to carry the shadow of their own disagreements with Freud, while outwardly

maintaining a dogged loyalty to the Freudian dogma. Thus were the splits perpetuated.

But there were other personal issues between them that played a more significant

role in their parting. Freud was 50 years old and had attained a secure reputation in the

psychological world. Jung was 31 and hungry to make a mark in that world. He already

had some published successes. But in Freud he saw what he wanted to become. Jung

idealized Freud as a mentor and father figure, while Freud idealized Jung as a son/heir to

his psychoanalytic empire. Both men had father-son issues, as mentioned above. Jung

both needed a mentor and father he could respect and had an equal need to go beyond

him. His own father had stimulated an intense aversion to dogma and authority. Jung had

difficulty rebelling against his actual father, probably because of his perception of his

father's vulnerability, but he devalued him, as he did Bleuler, his chief at the Burgholzli.

After the break, Jung turned from idealization of Freud to a kind of patronizing

pity for him, rather than to hatred, possibly because Jung was still contained within his

father transference; he had felt superior to his own father. Freud was a most dogmatic

mentor. On Jung's second visit to Vienna (March 1909), Freud asked him to promise

never to abandon the sexual theory and to make a dogma of it, a bulwark against the

"black tide of occultism" (Jung, 1961/1965, p. 150) (meaning, apparently, religion and

philosophy, as well as overt occultism). Jung was alarmed by this notion of dogma, not

surprisingly, in view of his father's problem. He said that this comment struck at the heart of their friendship. It seemed to Jung that sexuality had a religious quality for Freud and that Freud was in flight from the spiritual side of himself. At the height of his difficulties with his idealized heir, Jung stated, "We possess the truth; I am as sure of it as I was fifteen years ago" (Jones, 1955, p. 148).

Freud could not escape the fears that his sons would try to kill him off. He had a paranoid need to retain his authority at all costs. Jung often cited an incident that occurred on their 1909 voyage to the United States. They exchanged dreams, and Freud interpreted Jung's dream as a parricidal death wish against him. When Jung tried to explore one of Freud's dreams, he would not provide associations to the material. Jung felt the dream had to do with a triangle involving Freud, his wife, and his sister-in-law, Minna. Freud replied, "I could tell you more, but I cannot risk my authority" (Jung, 1961/1965, p. 158). In his memoir, Jung wrote, "At that moment, he had already lost it altogether. That sentence burned itself into my memory; and in it the end of our relationship was already foreshadowed" (p. 158). Like Jung's biological father, Freud had become the disappointing, devalued father that Jung had to leave behind.

As detailed in the previous section, for Freud the idea of the unconscious was limited to preconscious and repressed psychic material, whereas Jung asserted that the unconscious had an autonomous line of development, was complementary to consciousness, and held primordial images or archetypes. Jung also never fully accepted the centrality of Freud's use of the Oedipal complex as the sole myth. He saw the myth of the hero as the more central myth, but saw value in using multiple mythic themes to explain human behavior (Ellenberger, 1970). Jung's prospective, teleological orientation

to psychological symptoms was alien to Freud. Jung repeatedly characterized Freud's approach as useful but limited, overly reductive, too personalistic, and too pessimistic. Freud thought Jung to be too vague, unclear, unscientific, and elitist. These differences, along with their differences about the meaning of symbols and the religious dimension of life, were their main theoretical disagreements.

Jung attributed much of the tension and disagreement to typology. He was so disturbed by the loss of the relationship that he spent years working through the possible meanings behind it. He acknowledged that ultimately they had different assumptions (Jung, 1929/1967, p. 340 [*CW* 4, ¶ 784]) and different basic personality types. Although he never stated it explicitly, Jung saw Freud to be like Darwin, an object-oriented, extraverted, thinking sensation type (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 361 [*CW* 6, ¶ 601-603]), whereas he thought of himself as more like Kant and Nietzsche, a subject-oriented, introverted, intuitive thinking type.

Both men had troubled childhoods, Freud coming from marginalized, poor, Jewish immigrant stock, and a crowded, desperate, depressive household, whereas Jung's family, although also a generation from immigration, had better means, and fit seamlessly into the dominant culture. Because of his higher socio-economic status, Jung received a broader, more classical European education. Freud's education was more narrowly focused on the hard sciences, and he was thus under-informed philosophically.

Like Freud, Jung's parents were also depressive. Consequently Freud and Jung had some similar object relations and self-object needs. Both had strong ambitions, but different psychological needs and temperaments. Freud was the more aggressive and militaristic, perhaps because of the shadow side of cultural persecution and because he

was the first of a large family of children. He needed to conquer and lead. Victims of abuse tend to identify with the abuser and aggressor.

Freud's parents were not very religious, perhaps because their religion was the source of their persecution. They both needed to be admired, and to become great men, reflecting the narcissistic wounds they incurred having depressive mothers. Jung's parents were actively religious, even if conflicted or unconventional. His inherited psycho-spiritual task was to make sense of his parents' religiousness. Freud had a need to dismiss religion and spirituality, perhaps because his own left him feeling inferior and underappreciated. Freud seemed to have a need to own the truth, to be certain and evangelical in his certitude. Jung was better able to tolerate uncertainty. Perhaps Jung was less single-minded, less a unitary personality, as Winnicott (1964) and Stolorow and Atwood (1979, 1993) have proposed.

Freud and Jung were from different generations. Freud was more bound to the 19th-century *weltanschauung* than Jung. His positivism and biological determinism were mid-century collective truths. Jung lived most of his life in the 20th century, and his ideas were more affected by the shifting intellectual tide towards relativity, perspectival nonabsolutism, and postmodernism.

There are different ways of evaluating the split between Freud and Jung: as a disaster from which psychotherapy has never recovered or as a healthy exorcism of mysticism or occultism by the psychoanalytic world (Samuels, 2003). This latter position overlooks Jung's contributions to the analytic endeavor (Ellenberger, 1970), such as the concepts of complex, imago, introvert, and extravert. He introduced the techniques of

play and art therapy, the creative use of the imagination, and the idea of development across the life span, all currently accepted within psychoanalytic circles.

A third way of evaluating the split is purposive: the split was necessary. Jung needed to differentiate his own ideas from Freud's, creating an oppositional perspective on the same object, the unconscious, one deterministic and one teleological. Freud needed an enemy, someone to hate and rally his troops against. He established a "secret committee" (Grosskurth, 1991), complete with mysterious intaglio rings, to promote psychoanalysis by, in part, deriding and pathologizing dissenters and opponents. Freud the conqueror always needed a battle. The psychological dynamics between Freud and Jung, as well as their respective contexts, both similar and different, created an almost perfect storm to slowly build and simmer, before erupting. Jung needed to become his own authority. He had to leave the father in order to do so, to have his own ideas, and Freud's fear of being superseded by his son was in the way. Freud needed someone to hate.

Thomas Kuhn's influential book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970) argued that new knowledge comes from splitting and can lead to more integrated and complex forms of knowledge. Kuhn hypothesized that "a scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs" (p. 4) and that the received beliefs exert a "deep hold" (p. 4) on the student's mind. Normal science "is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like" (p. 5) and scientists take great pains to defend that assumption. To this end, "normal science often suppresses fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments" (p. 5). A shift in shared assumptions takes place when new ideas "subvert

the existing tradition" (p. 6). These shifts are what Kuhn describes as scientific revolutions.

New assumptions (paradigms/theories) require the reconstruction of prior assumptions and the reevaluation of prior facts. This is difficult and time consuming, and Kuhn asserted that it is strongly resisted by the established order. Young theorists want their ideas to be considered and taken seriously. Bolstered by budding egos, they want to make their mark. The older generation holds the power and prestige and thus is usually loath to relinquish them. They have much invested in their ideas and positions. There is not much room for the new. In order for the young ideas to become established, a split often occurs between the old and the new. Eventually, an assimilation occurs, and the cycle begins anew.

This cycle was described by Hegel with his theory of the dialectic. As Heraclitus knew, knowledge comes out of conflict, and conflict creates splits. The projection of the shadow, or other rejected perspective, in the split creates a cohesion on one side, an enemy to attack or react to, which supports identification and order. When the order becomes too one-sided and rigid, enantiodromia (Paramedes and Heraclitus) occurs and the poles are reversed, eventually leading to a new order. The inheritors of depth psychology have been living with the consequences and shifts of this conflict for almost 100 years, and much has come out of it, even assimilation and rapprochement to increasing degrees, as shown by Ellenberger (1970) and Samuels (1985).

Dissenters and Modifiers

Wilhelm Stekel and Alfred Adler were two of the original four members of Freud's Wednesday Night group who began meeting in 1902 to discuss Freud's new

work and early psychoanalytic ideas. They were also the first to split off. Adler was

frustrated that psychoanalytic ideas and the community of psychoanalysts were so

dominated and controlled by Freud, and that there was little room for competing ideas or

even meaningful discussion. Other members thought their ideas were compatible, but

Freud felt that his authority was in question, and that Adler was overly ambitious (Breger,

2000). Roazen (1975) related that in June, 1911, Adler resigned from the Vienna Society

with some other members to set up his own organization, "The Association for Free

Psychoanalytic Research," later renamed Individual Psychology when Freud insisted that

he owned the name *psychoanalysis*. Stekel resigned from the Vienna Society in October

1912. Roazen (1975) described the personal and theoretical reasons for these and other

splits, divisions, and defections (e.g., Rank, Reich, Ferenczi, Tausk, Silberer, Klein, and

more). Although most historians of psychoanalysis (Ellenberger, 1970; Roazen, 1975)

have focused on the theoretical differences behind the splits, some authors (Leitner, 1998;

Paskauskas, 1988) have emphasized personal and political motives, even asserting that

Freud's inner circle of adherents resorted to pathologizing dissenters as a way of handling

conflict. Leitner (1998) pointed out that Rank, Jung, and Adler were treated as dissidents,

whereas Pfister, Aichhorn, Salomé, and Binswanger were able to stay in the movement

despite their deviating theories. Dissidents were discredited, psychiatrically diagnosed,

and pathologized (p. 459). Freud referred to Adler as paranoid (Freud et al., 1974, p.

373). Stekel was said to be "infantile perverse" (Leitner, 1998, p. 464). Jung is described

by Jones as "mentally deranged to a serious extent" (p. 464) and in a "florid neurosis" by

Freud to Ferenczi (p. 465). Years later, as Rank fell out of favor, he was described as

paranoid and hypomanic by Freud and Jones (p. 466). Near the end of his life even

Ferenczi, one of Freud's longest and closest associates, was pathologized after expressing theoretical differences with the Freudian canon (p. 470).

Leitner (1998) wrote that Freud and many of his loyal adherents had a passion for seeking the truth and sincerely believed they had found it. This true belief led to viewing dissent as resistance to the truth, a mechanism of defense, neurosis, or some other mental disturbance (p. 460). Freud wrote Jung (October 7, 1906): "All those who are able to overcome their own inner resistance to the truth will wish to count themselves among my followers" (Freud et al., 1974, p. 6). At the end of Freud's life, other divisive troubles were brewing in England and in the United States.

Institutional Splitting

Eisold (1998) has asserted that the split between Freud and Jung was more than theoretical and personal. It was also institutional. Jung was head of the international association (IPA) and editor of the annual journal of psychoanalysis. The so-called "secret committee" (Grosskurth, 1991; Paskauskas, 1988) was formed at Jones's suggestion specifically to displace Jung. It was a political power move.

Institutional psychoanalysis began to split apart with the departures (1911–1913) of the early adherents (Adler, Stekel, Jung, and others) from the original International Association. Although there were more dissenters and modifiers, the institutions that represented psychoanalysis around Europe and the United States grew and remained relatively stable until the death of Freud in 1939. With the instability of war came instability within psychoanalysis.

In 1941, Karen Horney and four colleagues left the New York Psychoanalytic Society (Eisold, 1998). Tensions had been growing for years over Horney's deviations

from Freudian theory. Soon after, Sandor Rado, another European Freudian with independent ideas, was stripped of his role as education director (p. 872). Horney, along with Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm, quickly founded their own group, the American Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis.

Similar events took place in England. After her father died, Anna Freud was seen by many as the heir to Freud's authority, both by virtue of her extreme closeness to her father and by her emergence as a child analyst and respected theorist with the publication of the her influential *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (1936/1946), a foundational work in the psychology of the ego. Anna Freud had significant disagreements with Melanie Klein, another continental analyst whom Ernest Jones had invited into the London group in 1926. Freud felt Klein's ideas were too far from classical psychoanalysis. This disagreement led to the so-called "controversial discussions" (Grosskurth, 1986, p. 282) held by the British Psychoanalytic Society from 1940 to 1945 (King & Steiner, 1991). The primary question was whether her work was a continuation of psychoanalysis, along the lines formulated by Sigmund Freud, or whether her contributions were diverging from Freud's basic hypotheses enough for it to be said that she was founding another school of psychoanalysis, rather as Carl Jung had earlier.

Attempts to resolve fundamental controversies often end in bitter interpersonal feuds, long-running conflict, and the banding together of adherents against opponents, which was the case in London. Yet through the tedious 5-year process, a compromise was reached. Rather than split the institute into two separate entities, the ultimate outcome of the "controversial discussions" was to have multiple training tracks, an "A" track that followed the object relations developmental theory and the methods of Melanie Klein, a

"B" track that followed the "classical" instinct model of development employed by

Freud and shepherded by his daughter Anna, and a third track that wove a way between

the two known as the "Middle School" or the "independent group" led by Donald

Winnicott. Klein, a "modifier," and her followers managed to remain within the fold of

psychoanalysis.

Eisold postulated that the issues behind these events were largely political rather

than theoretical. "All that remained (after Freud's death) were his words and into that

vacuum came the apostles and their projections" (1998, p. 880).

He thinks that most of these splitting problems centered on the issue of

professional authority (power) in psychoanalysis and whether to grant analyst status to

anyone other than medical doctors. Eisold (1998) has written that the professional

authority of psychoanalysis has been progressively weakened since the death of Freud.

He thinks, like Bornstein (2001) and Gill (1994), that psychoanalysis has lost its standing

in the overall field of mental health. With so many diverse schools, Freud is no longer the

authoritative central figure. Eisold sees the problem as the fragmentation of the

psychoanalytic community:

> Split apart, psychoanalysts lost the capacity to talk across their differences.
> The normal processes of competition . . . passionate disagreements, of
> criticism, of challenges to questionable or merely divergent practices, all
> these were severely curtailed as each camp withdrew behind its own
> barriers. . . . On the level of individual psychopathology, splitting inhibits
> adaptation to reality. On the level of the group, it destroys community.
> (1998, p. 882)

These issues are at the core of the countless splits that continue to the present day

and have led to the creation of the many certifying boards and uncertified independent

psychoanalytic institutes that now exist. Eisold writes "in 1952, a committee of the

American Psychoanalytic Association reported, after four years of deliberation, that it was impossible to find a definition of psychoanalysis that is acceptable to even a large group of members" (1998, p. 879).

Splits have occurred in many of the primary Jungian institutes (Zurich, London, New York, Los Angeles) and controversies over the role of the Zurich Institute and the international certifying institution, the IAAP, have been ongoing and divisive (Eisold, 2001, p. 335). He writes that these internal conflicts are often overshadowed by the conflict between Freudians and Jungians.

The Jungians are often perceived as the splinter offshoots of an early psychoanalytic schism. Ellenberger (1970) and Shamdasani (2003) have protested this perception. "Neither Adler nor Jung is a psychoanalytic deviant, and their systems are not mere distortions of psychoanalysis" (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 571). They have argued that Jung's roots were deeper than his decade-long involvement with Freud and that his ideas were derived more from German idealism, romantic philosophy and psychiatry, William James, and the French dissociationists than from Freud. Yet the psychoanalytic split loomed over all subsequent developments. Fordham put his view of it with exceptional bluntness: "The notion of Jung's personal and scientific incompatibility with Freud was a disaster, and in part an illusion, from which we suffer and will continue to do so until we have repaired the damage" (cited in Eisold, 2001, p. 335).

The institutional history of analytic psychology did not begin until after World War II. Prior to that, analytical psychology clubs existed in a handful of places (London, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles), modeled after Jung's Club in Zurich. The Society of Analytical Psychology in London was the second institute after Zurich to

begin training analysts (Eisold, 2001; Kirsch, 1996). Fordham became one of leaders

of the London group and, finding fault with the clinical skills of the some of Zurich

group, was influenced by Klein and, to a lesser degree, Winnicott, who were both in

London at the same time. This precipitated a future split in 1976 between Gerhard

Adler's more classical Jungian followers (the Association of Jungian Analysts or AJA)

and Fordham's group of developmentally oriented Jungians. The AJA split again in 1982

and a new group, the Independent Group of Analytical Psychologist (IGAP), was formed.

Eventually a fourth group emerged in London, the Jungian division of the British

Association of Psychotherapists.

In America, similar tensions between those Samuels (1985) called the

"classicists" and the "developmentalists" (those who wanted more collaboration with

psychoanalysis) have grown, and splits have occurred in several institutes. More recently,

Samuels (1998) has suggested that the split throughout the worldwide Jungian

community is becoming more pronounced. Whereas in 1998 he still saw three schools of

Jungian thought, he now sees four. In addition to the classical and developmental schools

mentioned above, Samuels (2003) now notes a "Jungian fundamentalism" school, and an

emerging group that fuses Jung and Freud, concentrating more on process than content

(pp. 20-22).

Summary

This chapter has reviewed other influences on the theories of both Freud and

Jung. Their respective theories and so-called metapsychologies also have been reviewed

and differences uncovered. A brief review of the literature concerning the split between

the two men has been covered and a review of the other splits, individual and collective, has been briefly examined.

The problems that have historically plagued depth psychology can be understood as consequences of Freud and Jung having differing philosophical assumptions about the nature of psychic causality and what it means to be a human being (Stolorow & Atwood 1979, 1993; Horne et al., 2000). They were heirs to and influenced by the prevailing philosophical ideas in Europe in the closing decades of the 19th century, ideas that were framed within the tension held between the scientific materialism of the Enlightenment (positivism, physiological psychology, mechanical determinism), stressing the rational and the collective society, and the remnants of romanticism (idealism, vitalism, Naturphilosophie, teleology), stressing the irrational and the individual. Hence, Freud and Jung were influenced by a dualistic worldview in which both materialism and idealism were heavily employed to explain the relationship between the recently divorced subject and object (mind and body). Their philosophical influences drew largely from the German idealists and romanticists, whereas their scientific training emphasized a materialistic world in which objectivity between the scientist and his subject was considered imperative.

Inherent in the conflicts of Freud and Jung's time in history is the pervasiveness of the belief in a causal mechanical universe and the distancing from teleological implications associated with religion and mythology of previous times. Conversely, the origins of the concept of the unconscious can be traced to the romantic roots of hypnotism, whose healing power was originally assumed to be related to the borderline mental-physical properties of magnetic fluid (Puységur and Mesmer). At every turn we

find contradictions and unconscious conflicts of philosophical presuppositions and

worldviews. Freud and Jung lived in a time when thinkers were struggling with the

complexity of how the psyche and soma (subject and object) might be related based on

the relatively new sense that they were separate. The thrust was towards isolating one

from the other and explaining the interactions scientifically. Placing Freud and Jung in

the context of this time results in the generalization of a historical process of which they

were a part. Historian of ideas Richard Tarnas (1991) explained:

> With the bifurcation of the modern mind between Romantic and depth
> psychology interiority on the one hand and the naturalistic cosmology of
> the physical sciences on the other, there seemed to be no possibility for a
> genuine synthesis of subject and object, psyche and world. (p. 387)

The birth of depth psychology occurred at a time when neither Freud nor Jung had

yet defined himself on one side or the other of this split. Tarnas (1991) describes Freud

and Jung's depth psychology as

> a fruitful middle ground between science and the humanities—sensitive to
> the many dimensions of human experience, concerned with art and
> religion and interior realities, with qualitative conditions and subjectively
> significant phenomena, yet striving for empirical rigor, for rational
> cogency, for practical, therapeutically effective knowledge in a context of
> collective scientific research. (p. 385)

Both sides of the subject/object split influenced Freud and Jung. While they were

clearly schooled in the emerging scientism of the latter half of the 19th century, the

romantic movement in literature and philosophy also influenced them. Both read and

admired Goethe. Ellenberger wrote that there is hardly a single concept of Freud or Jung

that had not been anticipated by the philosophy of nature and romantic medicine,

including the later comers of romanticism, such as Fechner, Bachofen, and Nietzsche

(Ellenberger, 1970, pp. vii-viii). The romantics and idealists were all philosophic

ancestors of depth psychology (p. 205). Jung's notion of the *anima mundi* or world soul was a romantic idea that goes back at least to the cosmological myth told in Plato's *Timeaeus.* The concept moved forward through stoicism, the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus in the middle ages, and through Gnosticism and reappears in the Renaissance Platonism of Ficino, the humanism of Bruno, and the alchemical work of Paracelsus. The idea of the world soul was eclipsed by the mechanism and scientism of the Enlightenment but remained alive in poetry, Naturphilosophie, and the romantic movement. Another Platonic concept, the myth of the androgyne, from the *Symposium*, was considered one of the primordial phenomena, as the blueprint for the romantic idea of the inherent and fundamental bisexuality of humans, an idea later adopted by Freud and found explicitly in Freud's correspondence with his friend Wilhelm Fliess (Freud et al., 1985). Androgyny is implicit in Jung's anima/animus complex (Jung, 1928/1966, pp. 188-211 [*CW* 7, ¶ 296-340]).

The idea of the unconscious had been employed by Augustine as forgotten memories and by Leibniz as unclear perceptions, but the romantic philosophers conceived of the unconscious as the very fundament of the human being, rooted in the invisible life of the universe, and the bond linking humanity and nature.

Ernest Jones (1955) observed the romantic influence in Freud's concepts of mental life as they were dominated by polarities (dualism of instincts, polarities of subject-object, pleasure-unpleasure, active-passive), and he adds that a peculiar feature of Freud's thinking was "his constant proclivity to dualistic ideas" (p. 318). He also notes that the romantic concept of *Urphanoment* reappears as Jung's archetypes and Freud's Oedipus complex.

Although Jung was a full generation (19 years) younger than Freud and was often considered as a renegade disciple of the older mentor, in actuality the two men influenced each other and both shared many of the same influences, from the Greeks to the French hypnosis-dissocation school. They came from different parts of German-speaking Central Europe, from different cultures, countries, religions, and social classes. They had different temperaments, personal histories, and personalities and thus were drawn to different influences. Freud was more inclined towards the objective and the rational, whereas Jung was more inclined toward the subjective and the irrational. But they both were interested in concepts, meaning, the signified, the symbolized, and uncovering the truth about the psyche. The split between them is another instance of the subject/object split, or in other words, the split between science and religion, spirit and matter, the secular and the sacred, or the personal and the transpersonal.

Both Freud and Jung postulated the concept of unconscious causality to explain the clinical phenomena that confronted them. They initially insisted that psychoanalysis was a physical science. Freud proposed libido, an efficient cause, as the determinant of all psychic phenomena. Freud's adherence to determinism, however, led Jung to discover its limits, and to propose teleological explanations for mental life. Their respective inabilities to tolerate deterministic and teleological explanations led to their eventual break. Freud had a strong inclination to keep his psychological theory in the realm of positivism, natural science, and biological determinism. Yet, there were many ways in which Freud's theory and methodology were not really consistent with pure natural science but rather a mixture of natural and human science, quantitative and qualitative data and methodologies. When Jung was interested in mythology and mystical

phenomena, Freud was very uncomfortable and critical. He attempted to rein Jung in.
When they both attempted to write about mythology, Jung in *Psychology of the Unconscious* or Freud in *Totem and Taboo*, they were looking at psychological phenomena through different lenses. They both seemed to realize that they were seeing from different perspectives, and Jung was more comfortable with a phenomenological and human science approach than Freud was, even though Freud was in fact combining qualitative and quantitative science. The paradox is that Freud thought Jung was outside the bounds of science; yet it is almost as if Freud was in some kind of denial of the way in which he himself was evolving away from a biological determinist version of his theory because it did not fully fit his data.

The ultimate irreconcilable difference between the two men is that Freud never got to the point where he could embrace a teleological view of the psyche, which is a split that harkens back to the epistemological differences between the two men. Freud believed in meaning in the symptom, but not in meaning in the universe. Jung believed in meaning in the symptom, which inherently reflected meaning in the universe.

Chapter 7
Conclusion

> I believe that the disenchantment of the modern universe is the direct
> result of a simplistic epistemology and moral posture spectacularly
> inadequate to the depths, complexity, and grandeur of the cosmos. To
> assume a priori that the entire universe is ultimately a soulless void within
> which our multidimensional consciousness is an anomalous accident, and
> that purpose, meaning, conscious intelligence, moral aspiration, and
> spiritual depth are solely attributes of the human being, reflects a long-
> invisible inflation on the part of the modern self. And heroic hubris is still
> indissolubly linked, as it was in ancient Greek tragedy, to heroic fall.
> (Tarnas, 2006, p. 40)

Primary Research Question

The central topic of this research is an examination of the philosophical

assumptions of depth psychology as they relate to splitting in depth psychology. The

intention of the researcher was to examine this topic from multiple perspectives. The

primary question of this research was this: What are the fundamental philosophical

assumptions underlying depth psychology in general and do these philosophical

assumptions contribute to splitting within the field of depth psychology? In this

conclusion, the researcher refers to himself in the third person, reflecting a split that

occurs when the subject is attempting objectivity. Convolution inevitably occurs.

Discussion of Findings and Methodology

In the first chapter, the fragmentation of depth psychology was framed as a

problem relevant to the field of clinical psychology as a whole. The splits between depth

psychological pioneers, such as Freud and Adler, Freud and Jung, and the further

dissensions and splits between institutes have been numerous, ongoing, and costly for the

significance and relevance of depth psychology within the larger field of clinical

psychology. Depth psychology has lost prestige among psychologists, and the many

varied subschools present challenges of choice for those interested in training or even those looking for depth psychological therapy.

The origins of the topic in relation to the researcher's personal interest and psychology were discussed. The researcher had a desire to understand the splits within the field and within himself, in order to make his own training choices. The inclusion of some theorists in training programs at the cost of exclusion of others presented a dilemma. What constitutes right sacrifice?

A lecture and a dream led to a broader version of the final research question, which revolved around similarities and differences between the two major depth psychological schools: why and how had they grown apart? The rationale for a hermeneutic methodology was examined and an alchemical approach was chosen and explained. As depth psychology is ultimately an interpretive process of unconscious psychical material, the dialogical hermeneutic method was appropriate, putting two differing perspectives on the same object—the unconscious—in dialogue with each other. The alchemical approach provided a transformational metaphor and a methodological structure for the process that would unfold. The researcher was expecting to be changed by the process of the research and assumed that the topic had chosen him as much as he had chosen it. Delimitations and definitions relevant to the research were stated. The researcher's biases and assumptions were revealed and discussed in relation to the method and construed as transferences to the topic. An organizational structure was proposed.

In chapter 2, the existing literature was briefly reviewed and the need for the research established. The research was deemed to be useful because a psychological

understanding could mitigate the confusion and despair created by destructive splits in the field. Because the research material was itself textual, literature was reviewed throughout the research process.

Chapter 3 presented the epistemological and philosophical roots of depth psychology and Western thought in general, distinguishing epistemology from ontology and philosophy in general. A dialectical pattern of opposing tensions between subjective and objective epistemological orientations in the history of philosophy was revealed in the chapter.

Because theoretical differences have been considered by some authors, including the principal theorists, Freud and Jung, to be the main factor in the splits, chapter 4 addressed and differentiated theory, clinical theory, metapsychology, meta-theory, and metaphysics, in order to clarify the terms and explicate the relationships between them. Problems with and criticisms of metapsychology in the literature, relevant to the philosophical and epistemological assumptions underlying theoretical differences within depth psychology, were explored as they related to splitting and fragmentation within the field.

Chapter 5 attempted to provide a discourse on splitting as both a pathological and nonpathological natural psychological phenomena. An attempt was made to differentiate the many ways splitting is conceived, and how splitting can be distinguished from similar psychological functions and defenses such as dissociation, repression, projection, and denial. Splitting was explored historically in pre-psychoanalytic psychology and within the Freudian and Jungian modalities. Splitting was construed as purposive, as a strategic unconscious defense against anxiety but also as a way of first repudiating, then

projecting, what cannot be tolerated, so that it can be experienced outside of oneself, related to and thus known. This process leads to differentiation and ultimately assimilation of new or disavowed psychical contents and greater conscious wholeness.

Chapter 6 presented specific influences on Freud and Jung's personalities and the development of their assumptions and ideas. Their respective theories and so-called metapsychologies were reviewed, along with theoretical differences that reflected the different personalities and assumptions they had. The subjective nature of their theories was explored in relation to their different psychologies and assumptions. The split between Freud and Jung was discussed from the different views within the literature, and a third, purposive perspective was introduced, which was inclusive of other perspectives and reflective of the perennial philosophical split between the subjective and the objective approach to understanding reality. Other splits within the field were noted as other examples of the same phenomenon at individual and group or institutional levels.

There were different philosophical foundations underlying Freud and Jung's assumptions about the psyche; romanticism and idealism influenced both, but Freud was more influenced by positivism, materialism, determinism, scientism, and Darwinism than Jung (Ellenberger, 1970). Freud was a firm material reductionist, whereas Jung can be considered to be a synthesist. Freud looked for causes, whereas Jung looked for aims. Jung came to believe that psychic causality is teleological and purposive, rather than simply deterministic, whereas Freud believed that there was no divine plan or purpose inherent in life or in human nature, and that human motivation could be reduced to the discharge of drives (Horne et al., 2000) and behaviors and symptoms retraced to etiological influences in the past. Freud was uncomfortable with Jung's interest in the

occult, spirituality, and mysticism. Jung was uncomfortable with Freud's exclusive

focus on sexuality. Jung was critical of both Freud and Adler for "emphasizing the

pathological aspect of life and for interpreting man too exclusively in terms of his

defects" (Roazen, 1975, p. 291).

Whereas Freud articulated his theories and metapsychology in the physiological

language of his mentors, Jung used older classical language: *anima*, *eros*, *psyche*, *soul*,

spirit, the symbols and terms of alchemy and astrology. Jung's emergentism, historically

associated with religion and romantic philosophy, did not agree with Freud's determinist,

material reductionism and was an inheritance from the vitalistic tradition, which

postulated a force over and beyond blind evolution and survival of the fittest. This line of

thought leads to a notion of a supraordinate intelligence or a meaningful universe, a

notion that Freud would never accept. Freud's mentors Brücke, Meynart, and Exner,

along with Helmholtz and duBois-Reymond, split off and effectively annihilated the

vitalist movement in scientific philosophy with their hard-line biological determinism.

Both Freud and Jung postulated the concept of unconscious causality to explain

the clinical phenomena that confronted them. They both initially insisted that

psychoanalysis was a physical science. Freud proposed libido, an efficient cause, as the

determinant of all psychic phenomena. Freud's adherence to determinism, however, led

Jung to discover its limits and to propose teleological explanations for mental life. Their

respective inabilities to tolerate deterministic or teleological explanations led to their

eventual break. This philosophical difference was related to basic assumptions, some of

which were unconscious and related to their individual personal contexts, made up of

genetics, cultural and environmental influences, such as geography, ethnicity, religious

affiliations, class, family of origin dynamics, such as parental complexes, birth order, psychological type and temperament, biographical events, traumas, typologies, and educational experiences, including mentors and teachers.

Freud had a strong inclination to keep his psychological theory in the realm of positivism, natural science, and biological determinism. Yet there were many ways in which Freud's theory and his methodology were not really consistent with pure natural science but were, rather, a mixture of natural and human science, quantitative and qualitative data and methodologies. Although both had an interest in mythology and symbolism, this interest led each man in a different direction, according to his personal psychology. Freud was very uncomfortable with and critical of religion and mystical phenomenon. He attempted to rein in Jung; when they both attempted to write about mythology, Jung in *Psychology of the Unconscious* or Freud in *Totem and Taboo*, they were looking at psychological phenomena through different lenses. Jung was more comfortable with a phenomenological and human science approach than Freud, even though Freud was in fact combining qualitative and quantitative science. The paradox is that Freud thought Jung was outside the bounds of science; yet it is almost as if Freud was in some kind of denial of the way in which he himself was evolving away from a biological determinist version of his theory because it did not fully fit his data.

The ultimate irreconcilable difference between the two men is that Freud never got to the point where he could embrace a teleological view of the psyche, which is a split that harkens back to the epistemological differences between them. Freud was oriented toward the object and what he believed was objective data. Jung was convinced that objective data was elusive if not impossible to obtain, and he was oriented toward

subjectivity and understood psychic facts as empirical data. Freud believed in meaning in the symptom, but not meaning in the universe. Jung believed in meaning in the symptom, which inherently reflected meaning in the universe. Both believed in the reality of oppositional conflict at the center of being human.

The title of this dissertation, "Father of All," reflects this understanding of conflict and strife as the fundamental dynamic of the psyche and universe. As Heraclitus aptly said (quoted in the frontispiece of this work) over 2500 years ago, strife and conflict fathers reality. The friction of opposites creates knowledge and the dual-aspected world we live in.

Discussion of Implications for Clinical Psychology and for Depth Psychology

Methodology. The alchemical hermeneutic method used in this research does not necessarily provide answers or final truths. It is a process rather than product-oriented methodology. The process produces an experience of the topic at a deep and personal psychological level. The implications of using such a method are that the findings are more subjective than objective in nature. A new understanding of splitting, which includes the healthy and purposive dimension of this phenomenon, has emerged. When this new understanding is applied to the split between Freud and Jung or the fragmentation in the field of depth psychology in general, new meanings emerge. What was construed as problematic or tragic can be held as a natural developmental process.

One of the limitations of the methodology is that no one perspective or truth can be valued over another. Another limitation is the psychologically and emotionally intense transference to the topic for the researcher, which can be painful, confusing, and uncertain. However, if psychological maturity is considered to consist of having the

capacities for bearing pain, ambivalence, and uncertainty, the suffering inherent in this process is in service to growth by building such capacities.

Findings. The implications of the research findings for both clinical and depth psychology are profound. Splitting and fragmentation within depth psychology have been construed by most authors to be negative, destructive, and leading towards erosion of value and prestige and towards the eventual death of depth psychology. Depth psychologists have valued the capacities for bearing ambivalence, conflict, and uncertainty, yet the history of the past 100 years is evidence that depth psychologists have not been able to bear the conflicts and uncertainty of differing perspectives without pathologizing the opposite positions. Inability to contain ambiguity leads to reification and bifurcation. If the question can't be kept open, someone has to be wrong. Psychoanalysis requires movement into the unknown, discovering meaning where meaning has been obscured. This cannot be done without the capacity to hold ambiguity. Perhaps the meaning and purpose of the splits within the field have been misconstrued or not fully comprehended. Splitting may be necessary for the development of the capacity to hold ambiguity, as well as for the development of knowledge and healthy differentiation. The ideal of holding the tension of the opposites may be one to aspire towards, but splits will continue to occur regardless. The knowledge that this is a natural and possibly neutral process in the evolution of consciousness provides a useful container for the field. The ability to hold tension between opposites and the conscious acceptance of a plurality of perspectives and methodologies facilitate differentiation after repudiation has occurred.

If depth psychologists understand both the positive and negative aspects of splitting within themselves and within their own discipline, they may be better able to help patients contend with their own conflicts and splits.

Social and cultural implications. Splitting is not the sole province of depth psychology. It is a universal ontological necessity and occurs all the time, everywhere. The conception of the dual nature of reality or of the universe is an ancient philosophical attempt at understanding human and natural experience. Philosophers and psychologists from Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche to Freud and Jung have noted and attempted to explain and reconcile the divided nature of the human being. Understanding the fundamental and natural process of splitting, where and how it is both useful and harmful, is valuable knowledge for all people. There are individual, intrapsychic splits, splits between individuals, splits between individuals and collectives, between groups, religious, political, cultural, or otherwise. The insight that splitting happens, that we are fundamentally split, that consciousness is in fact splitting, is helpful when people experience the pain and alienation inherent in division. There is a point to splitting: it can be a productive development and not simply destructive. *Polemos* or conflict, as Heraclitus said 2500 years ago, is at the heart of creation and is the seed or father of reality. Conscious acknowledgment of this fact aids in the task of finding meaning or finding growth where there is also loss. This knowledge is valuable on all levels of human endeavor, social, political, cultural, or personal.

Suggestions for Further Study

When this research was gestating, the researcher was struggling with understanding conflicts in his chosen field of interest. Wanting to understand the whole

history of depth psychology in order to benefit from the experience of the ancestors,

he found the marginalization of theorists and the antipathy of differing factions, Freudian,

Jungian, or other, to be unsettling and even disturbing. If psychologists, who are best able

to understand human behavior and who propose tolerance, acceptance, containment of

ambivalence, uncertainty, and destructiveness could not tolerate or accept differences

between each other, what hope was there for anyone? The interesting similarities between

some theorists from differing factions, such as Jung and Bion, offered a hopeful sign that

rapprochement was possible. The dream related in the first chapter left the dreamer with

the question "What was Bion's gift?" In the dream it was a dual image, a double seedpod

that transformed into a double birth, adult male twins at their prime. The associations to

double consciousness, the twice-born mythologem, splitting, the essentially plural nature

of being, led to this research. Yet the question remains, what was Bion's gift? And

another question, how did Bion, schooled in the hard sciences, in the reductive

hermeneutics of Freud, come to a belief in what Grotstein has called "the ineffable

Subject?" How did Bion come to a position so close to Jung's purposive collective

unconscious?

Other psychoanalysts such as Grotstein, Eigen, and Ogden have moved towards a

perspective that seems more subjective than objective, more teleological than

deterministic, more open to a supraordinate cosmological order or meaning in the

universe. More research is needed in understanding how and why this shift in

epistemology and the relevant philosophical assumptions is occurring. This researcher

had intended to include more of this inquiry in the present work but found himself with

more than he could already manage in a reasonable amount of time and space. How and

why rapprochement develops between split positions, especially in relation to the troubled field of depth psychology, would be valuable research as a continuation of the work presented here.

Concluding Statement

Splitting in depth psychology historically has been seen as a problem because of the fragmentation and polarization within the field between individuals and institutes. This leads to the overall erosion of the vitality and significance of depth psychology. But splitting is a natural process of discernment and differentiation. Intrapsychically, the process of splitting is how we build a mind and discern good from bad, one from another. This process begins in infancy at the mother's breast. When splitting is unconscious, there is the potential for it to be merely destructive. With such destructive splitting, one loses the ability to see how the two parts are still related and essentially two sides of a unity, just as the good breast and bad breast are part of one mother. When destructive splitting occurs, one wants merger or annihilation, an either/or standoff. If held consciously, repudiation can become differentiation, assimilation of disavowed aspects of personality or theory, and ultimately lead to individuation and a more conscious sense of wholeness and unity, a unity in plurality or a both-and position.

Essentially the subject and the object are part of an essential unity, as are psyche and soma. The dance of duality is the interplay of opposites. As we have seen through the discussion of the evolution of epistemology within philosophy from Heraclitus to Freud and Jung, reality and knowledge itself are the products of the clash of opposites. Conflict is a necessary process, propelling an understanding of the natural world and human condition—from Plato's subjective internalism to Aristotle's objective externalism, to the

battle between the nominalists and the realists, and between Descartes' subjective

rationalism and Bacon's empirical objectivity, to Freud's determinism and Jung's

teleology—this play of opposites is how knowledge develops.

Freud and Jung both understood and valued the centrality of conflict. Both

utilized and embraced dualistic oppositions in explaining the psyche and human behavior.

This can be traced to their philosophical assumptions, conscious and unconscious. Some

assumptions are so collectively accepted as to be relatively invisible to individual

consciousness. Freud's movement toward the psycho-physicalists of the Helmholtz

School required the splitting off of his prior romantic assumptions. Jung's lifelong

awareness of his dual self allowed him greater capacity to hold two opposing

epistemological positions, yet he inclined more towards the Heraclitian, Platonic,

Kantian, and subjective oriented side of the subject/object split. Freud's personality and

context led him to embrace the assumptions of a more objective epistemology, affiliated

with Aristotle, Bacon, Newton, Comte, Wundt, and the Helmholtz School. Jung came to

believe that objectivity or absolute truth was not possible, in psychology or in life. Freud

could not accept that view. Perhaps it was a generational difference, but it also related to

their individual subjectivities.

Jung ascribed to what James had called the personal equation, which Fichte had

recognized and Nietzsche had meant when he wrote that all theory was essentially "the

subjective confession" of its author. Stolorow and Atwood rediscovered this old truth

when they investigated the theories of Freud, Jung, and Wilhelm Reich. Their subjective

contexts led to allegiance with particular epistemological and philosophical orientations,

which echoed the ancient bifurcation of nature, the tension between subject and

object, spirit and matter, the rational and irrational, and the universal and particular.

Each person's issues, conflicts, biases, history, contexts, and complexes draw him

or her to assumptions that best fit developmental needs. Thus our conscious and

unconscious basic assumptions reflect our deepest subjective psychologies and are

reflected in our opinions, behaviors, likes and dislikes, and theoretical constructions. We

are drawn to what we believe we are. Our truths are ultimately subjective truths. What we

are not, what we disavow, dislike, or reject gets projected (split off) onto the world, the

other, and related to, reacted against, so that we may know the other and ourselves.

Intrapsychic splitting as a psychological and developmental phenomenon is

mirrored in the fractional splitting between schools of thought such as psychoanalysis and

analytical psychology. The destructive aspect of this phenomenon manifests in either/or

absolutism and pathological devaluation of the other. This is essentially intolerance and

ignorance of opposing views.

John Stuart Mill, the utilitarian feminist who first proposed to parliament that

women be given the right to vote, and whom Freud translated in his student years, made a

wise observation of philosophical debates in an essay on Coleridge. He wrote that both

sides of intellectual controversies tended to be "right in what they affirmed, though

wrong in what they denied" (cited in Tarnas, 2006, p. 13). Both paradigms can be at once

valid, while also part of a larger paradigm in which two opposite interpretations are

precisely interwoven to form a complex and integrated whole, not only informing each

other but also actually making each other possible. Quantum physicist Neils Bohr put it

this way: "The opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth. . . . What

is difficult is to see both truths simultaneously: to suppress nothing, to remain open to

paradox, to maintain the tension of the opposites" (cited in Tarnas, 2006, p. 14).

In *Cosmos and Psyche* (2006), Richard Tarnas described the Enlightenment and

romanticism as the two great myths of Western culture:

> If we examine many of the major debates in the post-traditional
> intellectual culture of our time, it is possible to see looming behind them
> two fundamental paradigms, two great myths, diametrically opposite in
> character, concerning human history and the evolution of human
> consciousness. As genuine myths, these underlying paradigms represent
> not merely illusory beliefs or arbitrary collective fantasies, naïve delusions
> contrary to fact, but rather those enduring archetypal structures of meaning
> that so profoundly inform our cultural psyche and shape our beliefs that
> they constitute the very means through which we construe something *as*
> fact. They invisibly constellate our vision. They filter and reveal our data,
> structure our imagination, permeate our ways of knowing and acting. (p.
> 12)

What happened at the beginning of the modern era, at the dawn of the "Age of

Reason," was an objectification of the world. The world lost its subjectivity, which was

split off in a Cartesian subject-object divorce. The world lost its inherent meaningfulness,

its sacredness and interiority. The romantic movement tried to restore it. So did the

hippies of the 1960s and 1970s. It is still being restored. In the entire intellectual

progression from Copernicus to the existentialists of the 20th century, there has been little

attention paid to the soul, that "ineffable Subject." Freud primarily aligned with the

Enlightenment myth, whereas Jung was primarily and solidly with the romantics. He

believed in a meaningful universe, and that belief created an unbridgeable divide between

Freud and himself.

Many now recognize subject and object, inner and outer, to be mutually

constituted. The very idea of a subject knowing an object has become problematic. The

postmodern and deconstructionist movements, as well as the development of quantum

physics, have illuminated the relative and contextual nature of truth. No one school, no one side of any clash of opposites owns the truth. This is a philosophical explication of Melanie Klein's postulation of the depressive position, in which both the good and the bad (breast) are acknowledged as two sides of a single unity (mother). In Klein's formulation, this recognition is a necessary developmental step.

Perhaps splitting within the field of depth psychology is analogous to Klein's paranoid-schizoid postulation in which ideas are separated, distinguished, and advanced before they can be accepted, reabsorbed, digested, and tolerated as part of the overall development of the field. In essence, a depressive position fosters rapprochement of the differing perspectives. We can see this in the recent history of the overall field of depth psychology. As Samuels and others have pointed out, many of Jung's diverging ideas that led to his break with Freud have become reabsorbed into modern psychoanalysis. Similarly, many Jungians, such as Fordham, Corbett, and Culbert-Koehn, have adopted psychoanalytic ideas such as those of Fairbairn, Klein, Kohut, Stolorow, and others. Bridges have been built, some differences have been transcended, and at the same time fundamentally different orientations remain.

While Grotstein, Eigen, Ogden, and Bion have moved towards a more teleological understanding of unconscious phenomenon, the vast majority of psychoanalysts remain primarily wedded to developmental determinism. The vast majority of Jungians adhere to an archetypal teleology or design. Yet movement towards the opposite side has begun. In the words of psychoanalyst Anne Alvarez, "The Jungians have been coming down to earth while the Kleinians (Freudians) have been trying to make their way to heaven and the two groups have recently crossed somewhere in the middle" (1992, p. 165).

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