FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF MUSIC

INTENTIONAL ACTIONS: A THEORY OF MUSICAL AGENCY

By

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ABSTRACT

The influence of studies of musical agency has been increasing in the field of music theory since the publication of Edward T. Cone's book *The Composer's Voice* (1974). Indeed, recent publications by scholars such as Robert Hatten and Seth Monahan demonstrate that musical agency continues to be a topic worthy of investigation. These authors focus on the function of agents within a piece, but have not explored the way agents arise in music. In this dissertation I work toward filling this lacuna by developing a theory of musical agency that explores the following questions: (1) How do virtual agents emerge in music? (2) What is the relationship between agency and narrative? (3) Can virtual agents influence music at levels deeper than the surface?

I propose that the concept of musical intention provides music theorists with a possible answer to this question. Action Theory, a robust subfield active in philosophy and sociology, views intentionality as a focal point in research on human agency—research that deserves more attention in studies of musical agency. Following assertions by action theorists Donald Davidson and Alfred Mele, I argue that an entity only attains the status of an agent when it performs an intentional act. With respect to music, then, I outline six categories of intentionality that can offer support to an agential hearing: gesture, contradiction of musical forces, unexpected event, conflict, repetition/restatement, and change of state. Further, I suggest that certain passages of music can be interpreted as intentional acts performed by virtual musical agents.

I begin by reviewing the literature surrounding Action Theory in philosophy and sociology, and Agency in music theory in Chapter One. After defining each category of intentionality in Chapter Two, I investigate how the categories of intentionality interact with recent theories of musical narrative and Schenkerian analysis in Chapter Three. To demonstrate

how my insights apply to analysis, I examine Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 and Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6. These two analyses also serve as an introduction to the way in which my methodology is applied in analysis. In Chapter Four, I use the categories of intentionality in combination with both narrative and Schenkerian analysis to develop an agential reading of Schubert's Piano Sonata in A, D. 959. My agential analysis adds nuance and additional layers of understanding to Hatten's (1993) and Charles Fisk's (2001) readings of the work. I suggest that two agents are present at the beginning of the movement, and I investigate how these agents act throughout all four movements of the piece. In the first three movements, the two agents are in conflict with one another, and by the end of the fourth movement the two agents achieve a synthesis that resolves their conflict. Not only does an understanding of intentionality in music clarify earlier work on musical agency, but it also provides opportunities for richer interpretive analyses. To conclude my dissertation I suggest possible avenues for further investigation, and I briefly apply my methodology to a passage of post-tonal music.

CHAPTER ONE

OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION AND EXISTING LITERATURE

1.1: Introduction

Language that personifies music currently enjoys a well-established presence in both formal and informal discussions of music. It would not be out of place, for example, to hear an instructor of a theory class state that "the leading tone wants to go to tonic," attributing a desire, or will, to $\hat{7}$. Similar metaphorical statements can also be found in scholarly publications, even when the focus is not on developing such an interpretation of the music. In a recent issue of *Music Theory Spectrum*, for instance, Mark Richards expands on James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy's conception of the medial caesura by arguing that there are degrees to which that phenomenon can be obscured in Beethoven's sonata-form compositions. Although Richards's article is not overtly metaphorical, language that personifies the music creeps into his description of Beethoven's Piano Sonata, Op. 111: "Within TR, a vigorous dialogue between the melody and bass leads to the start of a cadential function in Ab major [...]." Richards anthropomorphically attributes agency to the melody and bass by characterizing their interaction as a kind of dialogue. While such agential language is commonplace in discussions of music, a theory that explores the myriad ways in which virtual musical agents arise in music has yet to be developed.

In this dissertation I work toward such a theory of musical agency that can be used to interpret tonal music. More specifically, I investigate the following questions: (1) How do virtual agents emerge in music? (2) What is the relationship between agency and narrative? (3) Can virtual agents influence music at levels deeper than the surface? To suggest an answer to the

¹ Mark Richards, "Beethoven and the Obscured Medial Caesura: A Study in the Transformation of Style," *Music Theory Spectrum* 35/2 (Fall 2013): 182.

first question, I will draw on a robust field of study in philosophy called action theory, where the concept of intention plays a crucial role in defining whether an entity is or is not an agent. To investigate the second and third questions, I will explore two works in conjunction with two theoretical perspectives: narrative in Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 and Schenkerian analysis in Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6. These two analytical vignettes will also allow me to begin to shed some light on the third question, an endeavor I will continue in a detailed agential analysis of the entirety of Schubert's Piano Sonata in A, D. 959. I have chosen to concentrate on piano music of the common-practice period for three reasons. First, by choosing a repertoire that is played by one performer I limit the number of physical agents involved in the work. Second, although only one performer is involved, the piano offers rich possibilities for multiple lines to be played simultaneously, a situation that occurs to a lesser degree in pieces written for other solo instruments. Third, Schenkerian analysis plays an important role in my methodology, so repertoire that falls outside the scope of the common practice is not considered in detail in this study, although I do undertake a brief speculation in post-tonal matters in my concluding chapter.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will provide an overview of relevant existing literature on agency both within and outside of music. In Chapter Two, I will introduce my theory of musical agency, which relies on six categories of intentionality that represent events in music that have the potential to evoke agency. I will define and offer several examples of each category of intentionality, endeavoring to show how each category suggests agency. In Chapter Three, two shorter analyses will demonstrate how the categories of intentionality developed in Chapter Two relate to existing modes of analysis. Chapter Four provides a detailed agential analysis of Schubert's Piano Sonata in A, D. 959. Building on the work of Charles Fisk and Robert Hatten, I

show how the categories of intentionality introduced in Chapter Two support the emergence of two oppositional agents in the first movement who continue to struggle against one another in movements two and three. At the end of movement four, a sense of resolution is attained when the agents work in synthesis to achieve a unified existence. In Chapter Five, I conclude by suggesting several avenues for further investigation.

1.2: Agency Outside of Music

1.2.1: Overview

While explicit work on musical agency has only recently worked its way into music theoretical publications—many authors point to Edward T. Cone's book, *The Composer's Voice* (1974) as one of the earliest studies—implicit uses of musical agency in analyses have been around much longer. Jérôme-Joseph de Momigny in the *Cours complet* (1803–06), for example, implies agency when he hermeneutically interprets the opening movement of Mozart's String Quartet in D Minor, K. 421 by fitting a text based on Dido's Lament to the principal melodic line.² Outside of music, the explicit study of human agency has been flourishing since at least the early 1960s, and most scholars point to Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* as the first known source to deal with human action.³ Today, a large body of literature exists in philosophy and sociology dealing with the field known as action theory, and the subject of agency continues to be addressed in both of those fields as well as in music.

² Scott Burnham, "Form," in *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, edited by Thomas Christensen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 883.

³ See, for example, Alfred Mele, introduction to *The Philosophy of Action* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 4; Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff, "The Causal Theory of Actions: Origins and Issues," in *Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action*, edited by Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 3.

In this subsection, I will provide an overview and critique of some of the theories of agency and action that exist in philosophy and sociology. In philosophy theories of action largely center on the question of how to define the relationship between action and intention. Those that believe there is a causal relationship between action and intention are more unified than those who do not believe such a relationship exists. Thus, I will reference "causal theories" of action, but I will reference individuals when I speak of non-causal theories of action. In sociology, studies tend to be more individualistic. After identifying two broad sociological issues, therefore, I will introduce three different theories of agency authored by groups of scholars. Although I will discuss philosophy and sociology separately from music, the issues central to philosophy and sociology will also appear in my discussion of music.

1.2.2: Philosophy

1.2.2.1: Introduction

In the introduction to his collection of essays, *The Philosophy of Action*, Alfred Mele states that action theorists must deal with two questions: "How are actions different from mere happenings?" and "How are actions different from other actions?" Indeed, I have found that indepth discussion in philosophical action theory focuses on two key terms: "intention" and "action." The "intention" discussion is equivalent to an answer to Mele's first question, while the "action" discussion provides answers to Mele's second question. I believe, however, that the ultimate question of action theory, and indeed one of the main questions I explore within this dissertation, is "at what point does an entity rise to the level of an agent?"

⁴ Alfred R. Mele, Introduction to *The Philosophy of Action*, edited by Alfred R. Mele (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1–2.

One can define intention as purposive movement, and one finds that two questions are central to scholars' discussions of intention: "What is the relationship between intention and action?" and "How does one identify an agent's intentions?". To define action, one can provisionally accept Donald Davidson's statement that action "requires that what the agent does is intentional under some description, which in turn requires that what the agent does is known to him under some description." Davidson's definition likely raises a host of questions in the reader's mind (what does "under some description" mean, for instance?), but I will refrain from investigating them until later in this chapter. At this point, it will suffice to know that scholars who engage in the action discussion are likely to touch on three questions: "How does one account for 'basic' or 'primitive' actions, such as raising one's arm, alongside more complex actions?"; "How does one know when one action ends and another begins?; and "How does one know when an action is intentional or not?". Before delving into these three issues, it is necessary to introduce a few terms that are key to the investigation.

1.2.2.2: Basic Terms

While it seems as though there are endless terms that could be defined before attending to the issues of "intention" and "action," I will focus on three that are particularly integral: agency, act, and agent. Davidson defines agency as an attribution that is justified when some event was caused by something the agent did,⁶ while Annemarie Kalis defines it more generically as "the capacity to act." Davidson's definition poses the question "By what criteria does one prove that

⁵ Donald Davidson, "Agency" in *Essays on Actions and Events* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 50.

⁶ Donald Davidson, "Agency" in *Essays on Action and Events* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 48

⁷ Annemarie Kalis, *Failures of Agency: Irrational Behavior and Self-Understanding* (New York: Lexington Books, 2011), 47.

an event was 'caused' by an agent?", a question that will be answered in turn below. Two other definitions are necessary, however, to understand Davidson and Kalis: agent and act. Kalis regards an act as doing "something for a reason," and she argues that "one cannot perform an act accidentally." The word "reason" is related to the word intention, which will be more fully discussed below, but recall that I provisionally defined the latter term as "purposive movement." Reason differs from intention, however, in that it involves the agent's positive attitude toward the act he or she performed. That is, reason involves the idea that an action is done "for the good" of something, whereas intention does not imply such an attitude. Davidson argues that giving the reason an agent did something is often a matter of naming the pro attitude, naming the related belief, or naming both items. Most scholars, however, address the word "intention" rather than the word "reason" when they attempt to deal with Mele's question "How are actions different from mere happenings?" since there is little to debate about the difference between reason and intention, and since they involve the same issues. 11

Finally, Kalis asserts that "by calling people agents we ascribe to them the ability to manifest certain kinds of behavior, namely actions," while Davidson says that "a man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional." Notice that Davidson's definition of agent and Kalis's definition of act both essentially boil

⁸ Ibid., 39.

⁹ Ibid., 41.

¹⁰ Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," in *The Philosophy of Action*, edited by Alfred R. Mele (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 28.

¹¹ Annemarie Kalis is one author who believes that "reason" should be studied further. In her book *Failures of Agency*, she is interested in asking the question "Can one act Akratically?". Akrasia is defined as: "Free and intentional action against one's own judgment regarding what would be best to do." (Kalis 3). Kalis studies cases in which she is certain that someone did something that goes against what they judge to be best. Since it is unlikely that one can prove with certainty that a musical agent did something that goes against its better judgment, I have not pursued this line further.

¹² Annemarie Kalis, *Failures of Agency: Irrational Behavior and Self-Understanding* (New York: Lexington Books, 2011), 38.

¹³ Donald Davidson, "Agency" in *Essays on Actions and Events* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 46.

down to the way in which one defines intention and the way in which intention relates an agent to his or her action. Further, it is interesting that Davidson uses the phrase "under an aspect." Rather than saying that the act must be described as intentional, he instead argues that there must only be a part of the description that is intentional in order for the act to raise a human to the level of an agent. This subtle distinction will be important as I discuss theories of intention. Kalis's definition, a generic form of which is commonly accepted in the field, may cause us to ask "what is an action?". There are three terms, then—action, act, and agent—that all have relatively agreed-upon definitions, the understanding of which requires an investigation of the relation between intention and action, two terms that have been rigorously addressed and about which scholars continue to disagree today. Since theories of intention will help us understand theories of action, I will first deal with intention, followed by action.

1.2.2.3: Intention as Purposive Movement

What does it mean for a movement to be purposive rather than non-purposive? Put another way, if actions, as I have defined them so far, are movements that are "intentional under some description," what is the relationship between intention and action? This subsection focuses on addressing that question by investigating two camps of scholars: causalists and non-causalists. The causalists are a relatively unified group of scholars, and their viewpoint can best be represented by Davidson and Mele. The non-causalists, on the other hand, are a group of scholars with more diverse viewpoints. Two such philosophers, George Wilson and Harry Frankfurt, are widely discussed among causalists, and their theories will be taken as exemplars of non-causalist perspectives. I will begin with the causalists, followed by the non-causalists.

Widely cited as a causalist, Mele believes that actions are to be explained "partly in terms of their causes" such as beliefs, desires, intentions, or other related events. ¹⁴ Causalists assert that an agent's intentions cause that agent to act. Davidson adds nuance to the causalist approach when he asserts that actions are intentional "under some description." ¹⁵ Given that any action can be described in multiple different ways, the clause "under some description" allows one to choose to focus on a subset of the possible descriptions of an action that are intentional. While accepting that an action *could* be described in terms that render it unintentional, Davidson asserts that if the same action can also be described in terms that render it intentional, one must understand it as an intentional action. Both Davidson and Mele acknowledge a problem with their position in a concept known as "deviant causal chains."

Deviant causal chains—of which there are primary and secondary varieties—are important to consider because of their ramifications for law. They are philosophical problems that have an impact on whether and for what kind of crime a person could be legally tried. Primary deviance involves a problem with a direct connection between mental antecedents—a category that includes beliefs, desires, intentions, volitions, and other such mental events—and bodily motion. In other words, the agent's intended action and the agent's actualized action are the same, but one can question whether the intention is sufficiently linked to the result.

Developed by Davidson, the most oft-cited example of primary deviance is the following:

A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold [unintentionally].¹⁶

¹⁴ Alfred R. Mele, Introduction to *The Philosophy of Action*, edited by Alfred R. Mele (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.

¹⁵ Donald Davidson, "Agency" in *Essays on Actions and Events* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 50.

¹⁶ Ibid., 79.

The agent had the intention to rid himself of weight, and he performed an action that rid himself of weight. Since a causal theory of action holds that all actions are caused by intentions, strict adherents to this viewpoint would be forced to contend that the climber dropped the man intentionally by virtue of the fact that he intended to lessen his danger. This has legal implications in terms of whether and for what kind of crime the climber could be placed on trial. In such a scenario, one might wish to consider whether it is possible that the man unintentionally loosened his grip despite the fact that he wished to lessen his danger, or whether, since he knew that it would lessen his danger, he intentionally let go of the rope. A strictly causal theory, however, would contend that the man's letting go of the rope is intentional.

Secondary deviance identifies a problem with the consequences that might be associated with an intentional action. In primary deviance, the agent's desired and actualized actions were the same, but a question still arose as to whether the agent's intentions should be causally linked to that outcome. In secondary deviance, the agent's desired and actualized actions are different, but one may nevertheless wish to link the agent's desired intentions to the actualized action.

Developed by Mele, the most often cited scenario postulates that "a man may try to kill someone by shooting at him. Suppose the killer misses his victim by a mile, but the shot stampedes a herd of wild pigs that trample the intended victim to death." Whereas in the primary deviance scenario there is a question about whether there is room to allow for accidental death versus intentional murder, in secondary deviance one already knows that there is the intention to murder, but the route by which the murder occurs is circuitous. In this case, a causal theory of action would contend that the murder is not intentional by virtue of the fact that the shooter did not intend to release a herd of wild pigs. Yet one might wish to consider that it does not matter

¹⁷ Alfred R. Mele, Introduction to *The Philosophy of Action*, edited by Alfred R. Mele (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 6.

how the result was achieved, that it was the result that mattered and not the route the shooter inadvertently took to get there.

Largely in response to these deviant causal chains, non-causalists hold that actions are not caused by intentions. Unlike in a causalist viewpoint, however, non-causalists are not unified in their proposed alternatives. Instead, non-causalists tend to posit more unique theories regarding the relationship between intention and action. I will discuss two of the most popular alternatives to causalism: theories proposed by George Wilson and Harry Frankfurt. Despite their differences, the two authors share an interest in teleology. That is, in response to primary and secondary deviance, they believe that it is the goal of the action that should be linked to intention, but they attempt to derive that link in different ways.

Rather than viewing intentions as causing actions, Wilson argues that intentions are best viewed as goals toward which actions are directed. Wilson's approach deftly allows us to account for the examples of primary and secondary deviance introduced above. In the primary deviance scenario, the question becomes "was it the goal of the higher climber to murder the lower climber by loosening his grip?". If yes, then the action was intentional. If no, then the action was not intentional. With respect to the example of secondary deviance, the question becomes "was it the shooter's goal to murder the victim?". Since one knows that the answer is yes, the way in which the victim was killed does not matter.

For Frankfurt, on the other hand, the goal of every action is purposive movement.¹⁹ Intentional action for Frankfurt occurs only when the movement is guided to completion by the agent. Like Wilson, Frankfurt's explication allows us to deal with primary and secondary

See George M. Wilson, *The Intentionality of Human Action* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
 See Harry G. Frankfurt, "The Problem of Action," in *The Philosophy of Action*, edited by Alfred R. Mele (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 42-52.

deviance by asking if the agent's action was guided to completion by the agent and not by dealing with the events that occur. Unlike Wilson, Frankfurt's definition is one in which the temporal present is the most important. For Frankfurt, intentional action is something that necessarily occurs in the present, and he believes that the problem with causal theories is that they link mental events in the past with a supposed event in the future without considering what occurs in the present.

In response to non-causal theories, Mele has developed a question that neither Wilson nor Frankfurt's theories is able to answer:

Sebastian may have a pair of reasons for mowing his lawn this afternoon. He wants to mow the lawn when the grass is dry and he also wants his spouse, Fred, to see him mowing the lawn when Fred gets home from work in order to impress him. It turns out that Sebastian only acts for one of these reasons.²⁰

Mele asks non-causalists how it can be true that Sebastian mowed his lawn for only one reason if not that intentions cause actions. Since Wilson only deals with the generic goal of the action and not the individual intentions, and Frankfurt deals only with guided motion and not individual intentions, neither can account for this phenomenon.

For musical agency, I believe it is useful to keep both Davidson and Wilson in mind: a consumer of music can take on the perspective of first-time analyst (or naïve listener) or an informed analyst (or informed listener), which can influence how one views intention. For an analyst who is in the initial stages of investigating a particular agential reading (the first-time analyst or "naïve" listener), I think it is useful to use George Wilson's understanding of the link between action and intention to think of intentions as the goals of action.²¹ This perspective is necessary largely because the naïve listener recognizes most moments of intentionality only after

²⁰ Alfred R. Mele, "Agency and Mental Action," *Philosophical Perspectives* 11 (1997): 240.

²¹ See George M. Wilson, *The Intentionality of Human Action* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).

an action has been completed. An ascending leap after a descending scale, for example, signals a moment of intentionality because the leap represents a change in an established pattern (both in direction and in intervallic size). In most cases, the naïve listener only recognizes the leap after it occurs, however, since they cannot predict the direction of the music, and the assignment of agency occurs as a post-event thought.²² The listener may think "the agent must have had the intention to reach that higher note." After having completed the investigation, however, I believe a change in perspective can occur in which the informed analyst or listener, having knowledge of the agential analysis and the way in which the music progresses, can anticipate the moments of intentionality, such that the leap is no longer a surprise. Instead, the informed listener, on approaching the leap, may think "the agent intends to leap soon." This different perspective represents a causalist approach to the relationship between intention and action that is closely aligned with the way in which Donald Davidson links intentionality and action.²³

1.2.2.4: Action

Having discussed the ways in which intentionality has been addressed in philosophical literature, I am now in a position to investigate the issues associated with action in philosophy. Perhaps the most fundamental question in action theory is how to differentiate intentional actions from mere happenings. Segal highlights the complexities of making such a distinction with the following anecdote:

Imagine that I have an arrangement with my [stock] broker such that unless I reject a proposal he will go ahead and execute it. He sends me a telegram or leaves me a message on my answering machine saying that he will buy five

²² There are certain cases where the listener may be able to predict a moment of intentionality. Such situations occur when the listener has stylistically-based expectations about the way in which a particular passage should proceed. A listener might expect the so-called "Mozart trill" at the end of a cadenza in a piano concerto, for example, and therefore may think "the agent intends to trill at the end of this cadenza."

²³ See Donald Davidson, "Agency" in *Essays on Actions and Events* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

hundred shares of IBM at market price. I think it over and conclude that it is a good purchase. Therefore I do nothing; as a result, he executes the order, and I have bought the stock.

From a moral point of view, and from a legal point of view, I have bought the stock. I have done something, and I am responsible for my action. Moreover, in virtue of having bought the stock I may have done a variety of other acts. For instance, I may have kept a promise, I may have proved a point, I may have demonstrated my cleverness, I may have ignored the advice of my wife, I may have risked our life savings, I may have endangered my child's college education, I may have disgraced the family name. [...] And in our ordinary use of English, it would be quite appropriate, presuming that I was aware and possibly motivated by these implications of my allowing the stock broker to exercise the purchase, to say that I did some or all of these things intentionally. It is a bit odd to say that my intentional doing of these things was not an action. Yet in one sense I have done nothing.²⁴

To understand how to differentiate action from mere happening, one must examine the situation from both a causalist and a non-causalist position. From a causalist position, "doing nothing" can be considered an action in that restraint may be involved. That is, the agent had to make the decision to either respond or not respond to the broker, and the agent restrained himself or herself from responding with the intention of indicating that the broker should buy the stock. If the agent could not have explained why he made the decision to refrain from calling the broker, then the agent's action would by necessity be considered a mere happening. From a Wilsonian non-causalist position, the goal is to incur the purchase of a stock, and the agent's restraint from calling the broker is an intentional action by virtue of the fact that it works to achieve the goal of buying the stock. If the agent's restraint was not designed to work toward the goal of buying stock, then the purchase of the stock would be considered a mere happening.

A secondary question involved in the definition of action is how one should distinguish actions from one another when multiple actions are involved in a single process. Mele identifies

²⁴ Jerome M. Segal, *Agency and Alienation: A Theory of Human Presence* (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 5.

the scenario of starting a car. In the fine-grained view, turning the key and starting the car are considered separate actions. In the coarse-grained view, starting the car and turning the key are the same action under different descriptions. In the componential view, starting the car is comprised of various smaller actions, which include turning the key. ²⁵ In practice, one probably does not have to make a choice between these views. Instead, one can think of them as different levels of detail. One can choose to focus on a higher level of action (coarse-grained view), a more local level of action (fine-grained view), or one can allow details to permeate the large-scale actions (componential).

1.2.3: Sociology

1.2.3.1: Introduction

While philosophy is largely focused on two core issues—intentionality and action—sociology is less unified in its investigations. Scholars explore a wide variety of issues depending on the particular branch of sociology they study (e.g., human behavior from a psychological standpoint or archaeology). Moreover, scholars in sociology tend not to spend time defining terms as they do in philosophy. Instead, sociologists briefly address the terms they wish to use in their article and move on to investigating other issues. Despite the more diffuse treatment of the topic, one can still identify two key issues that sociologists often address: the relationship between structure and agency, and the level of detail on which one's study should focus: individual agency or collective agency. After briefly introducing these two issues, I will explore

²⁵ Alfred R. Mele, Introduction to *The Philosophy of Action*, edited by Alfred R. Mele (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2.

three theories: Actor-Network Theory as discussed by John Law, the temporal theory of Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, and the typology theory of Steven Hitlin and Glen Elder, Jr.

1.2.3.2: Structure Versus Agency

Gil Musolf defines structure broadly as referring to "social arrangements, social relations, and social practices which exert enormous power and constraint over our lives." Structure in sociology refers to any factor that constrains an agent's interaction with the world. Examples of structure might include the various roles one could portray such as graduate student, lawyer, mother, or pilot, all of which come with particular expectations and values that are dependent upon the culture in which the agent resides. Other examples of structure are less dependent on individual roles and more related to general societal beliefs such as gender roles or the treatment of elders. Musolf identifies two schools of thought with regard to the interaction of agency with structure: determinists and interactionists.

Determinists emphasize the power of structure as a controlling force on human life. They believe two things: (1) "the way social arrangements, relations, and practices are is the way they are supposed to be"; and (2) "the way we behave is determined by biology, genes, culture, structure, or some other source that constitutes escape from responsibility."²⁷ Determinists see agents as passively interacting with the world, the structure of which requires them to act in certain ways. Interactionists, on the other hand, believe that structural factors are:

predispositions or constraints on action without automatically or necessarily determining the character of that action....Social actors take into account the structural and cultural constraints...that impinge on situations in which they find themselves in the course of developing their respective lines of action.²⁸

²⁶ Gil Richard Musolf, *Structure & Agency in Everyday Life: An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 6.

²⁷ Ibid 8

²⁸ David A. Snow, "Extending and Broadening Blumer's Conceptualization of Symbolic Interactionism," *Symbolic Interaction* 24 (2001): 373-4.

Interactionists allow agents to take a more active role in shaping their lives, while still acknowledging that societal norms and pressures influence an agent's decisions. Musolf states that today most scholars do not view structure and agency as a binary, but rather as two sides of the same coin.²⁹

I view structure and agency on a kind of interactional spectrum (Figure 1.1). As the pressure of structure increases, the degree of agency decreases, and as the degree to which an agent exerts control over a situation increases, the degree to which structure determines a particular outcome decreases. The diagram in Figure 1.1 allows for some flexibility in the amount that structure or agency influence a particular situation. The collective agency and denial of norms arrows will be explained shortly.




Figure 1.1 – Diagram of interaction between structure and agency

²⁹ Gil Richard Musolf, *Structure and Agency in Everyday Life: An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 9.

1.2.3.3: Individual Versus Collective Agency

Related to the issue of structure versus agency is the level at which agency operates. Sociologists sometimes question whether they should be investigating individual agency or collective agency. Archaeologist Jennifer Dornan discusses an extreme example of individual agency in which scholars assert that one should view agency through the "lived lives" of individuals.³⁰ That is, that one can only understand agency as a unique feature of people's lives based on their individual experiences, beliefs, and cultural pressures. It has been criticized for two reasons: (1) that it is impossible to analyze agency through such a focused lens since a researcher cannot fully understand all of the structural constraints imposed on a specific individual; and (2) that since structures are often shaped by a collective agency, a focus on the "lived lives" of individuals denies a broader connection between structure and agency. 31 By contrast, scholars who study collective agency are interested in studying groups of people, whether or not that group is represented by an individual. This perspective has been criticized for denying the unique creativity of the individual.³² In addition to individual and collective agency, psychologist Albert Bandura recognizes a third agency (of three, which he terms collectively the "agential modes") called proxy agency, in which "people influence others who have the resources, knowledge, and means to act on their behalf to secure the outcomes they desire."33

It is instructive to integrate individual and collective agencies within the structure-agency interaction diagram in Figure 1.1. Collective agency is what creates societal structures: when the influence of collective agency is at its highest, it can actually create new structures such that

³⁰ Jennifer Dornan, "Agency and Archaeology: Past, Present, and Future Directions," *Journal of Archaeological Method and* Theory 9/4 (Dec., 2002): 310-11.

³¹ Ibid., 315.

³² Ibid

³³ Albert Bandura, "Toward a Psychology of Human Agency," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 1/2 (Jan., 2006): 165.

what was an expression of agency becomes a conformance to structure. Thus in Figure 1, an arrow labeled "collective agency" runs from high agency to high structure. Conversely, structures can only be defined in terms of norms or expectations that entail both "what one should do" and "what one should not do." Since such contrasts are the only way to establish norms, when structure is high, individual agency in terms of a denial of norms is also high. This why an arrow relates high structure to high agency in Figure 1. As I will demonstrate, the way in which structure and agency interact have ramifications for music: a denial of musical expectation (structure in sociological terms), for example, may indicate the presence of a musical agent.

Having surveyed two common issues in the sociological literature, I now turn to three particular theories as exemplars of the kind of work being done on agency in sociology: Actor-Network Theory as discussed by John Law, the temporal theory of Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, and the typology theory of Steven Hitlin and Glen Elder, Jr.

1.2.3.4: Actor-Network Theory

Actor-Network Theory (ANT) began to flourish in the 1980s, when its first major proponents were Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, and John Law. Law describes ANT as "a relational and process-oriented sociology that treats agents, organizations, and devices as interactive effects." The goal of ANT is largely to identify the ways in which objects of the world are connected to one another in a kind of network. As such, ANT does not differentiate between human and non-human entities. Rather, it is the existence of a relationship between entities in the network that is important, and not the type of elements that comprise the network. Proponents of ANT, therefore, define an actor as "a patterned network of heterogenous relations,"

³⁴ John Law, "Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering, Strategy, Heterogeneity," *Systems Practice* 5 (1992): 389.

³⁵ Ibid., 383.

or an effect produced by such a network."³⁶ In ANT, actors are defined by the network of relations they develop, and an actor cannot exist without that network. Moreover, networks are understood as dynamic processes that are maintained by continuously adding more entities and relationships to the network, rather than as pre-existing structures that have a finite number of elements and relationships.

While ANT was overwhelmingly popular at the end of the twentieth century, scholars have recently begun to criticize its main tenets, and ANT studies are less prominent today. Olga Amsterdamska, for example, voices three main criticisms of ANT. First, ANT only requires analysts to create connections between entities in the network. It does not require researchers to examine the nature of the connections they identify between objects.³⁷ The focus of such studies is thus directed more toward building the network than to exploring the implications of the network. This realization leads to Amsterdamska's second point: that ANT can turn into a kind of battle in which one wins by including as many elements as possible in a given network, an exercise that tends to overshadow other, more significant aspects of Science.³⁸ Finally, Amsterdamska's third criticism is that since ANT is non-hierarchical, it does not recognize varying degrees of the ability of elements to create connections with other entities in the network. Moreover, all connections between entities in the network are viewed as equally important. There is no difference between a scientist's connection to a microbe, and the same scientist's connection to a policeman.³⁹

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³⁶ Ibid., 384.

³⁷ Olga Amsterdamska, "Surely You Are Joking, Monsieur Latour!," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 15/4 (Autumn, 1990): 501.

³⁸ Ibid., 502.

³⁹ Ibid., 501.

Although ANT-based studies are currently dwindling, one important concept that has emerged from this work is that entities are connected in a mutually influential network, which relates to the structure versus agency discussion I addressed earlier. That is, the network may be viewed as a kind of structure that has the ability to affect its entities and relationships, and those entities and relationships, which may be viewed as agents can, in turn, alter the network.

1.2.3.5: The Temporal Theory of Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische

Emirbayer and Mische provide a different view of agency in which temporality is viewed as the locus of human action. They introduce three elements that together constitute what Emirbayer and Mische call the "chordal triad" of agency: iterational, projective, and practical-evaluative. Each element corresponds to a particular temporal orientation (i.e., past, future, and present), and the theory is recursive such that each element can manifest its own chordal triad of agency. The iterational element of the triad corresponds to the past, and denotes the "selective reactivation of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity...." Thus, the iterational element represents received structure, and serves to ground the agent in socially accepted practices. The projective element is associated with the future, and "encompasses the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action...." It represents the actor's synthesis of the received structures from the iterational element with their own outlook on the future, which may serve to reconfigure those past structures. Finally, the practical-evaluative element engages the present, and is described as "the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of

⁴⁰ Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, "What Is Agency?," *American Journal of Sociology* (Jan., 1998): 971.

⁴¹ Ibid.

action...."⁴² The information from the iterational and projective elements is reconciled with the present context, and the actor makes an informed decision about the course of action he or she will pursue. Emirbayer and Mische make it clear that while any of the three elements may be highlighted in a given agential situation, all elements must be present in order for agency to occur. Their theory represents an interesting attempt to incorporate the structure-agency pairing without entering the debate surrounding which term takes precedence. Moreover, their theory may find applications in music, where the idea of temporality has also been widely discussed.

1.2.3.6: The Typology Theory of Steven Hitlin and Glen Elder, Jr.

Finally, Hitlin and Elder's typology theory represents yet another approach to understanding human agency, in this case by attempting to categorize the various types of agency one might encounter. They identify four types of agency: existential, identity, pragmatic, and life course. Existential agency underlies the other three categories, and can be defined as any type of self-initiated action, regardless of whether or not that action is habitual.⁴³ Additionally, this level of agency is free of societal structure, and is only constrained by physical reality. Identity agency refers to situations in which an agent follows the expectations of established societal roles.⁴⁴ Humans internalize many different identities (e.g., scholar, mother, etc.) throughout their lives, and each identity comes with a set of assumptions regarding how one might act when performing a given role. When agents act as society expects of a given identity, they are engaging with identity agency. By contrast, pragmatic agency refers to the activities that are creatively performed when the habitual responses established in identity agency are not

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Steven Hitlin and Glen H. Elder Jr., "Time, Space, and the Curiously Abstract Notion of Agency," *Sociological Theory* 25/2 (Jun., 2007): 177.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 179

followed or do not suggest a course of action for a given scenario. Finally, life course agency encompasses those moments in which one transitions from one social identity to another. It refers to the human capacity to shape one's own destiny by accepting or rejecting various societal roles. Hitlin and Elder argue that humans are able to focus their attention at various times on one or more of these types of agency, while at the same time acknowledging that the boundaries between each category are not firmly delineated. Like the temporal theory of Emirbayer and Mische, the typology theory of Hitlin and Elder attempts to account for both structure and agency as mutually influential without entering the debate that surrounds these terms by avoiding overt use of the two words. Perhaps most useful for music is the idea that an agent can transition between different roles throughout the course of its lifetime, and that an agency is to be found both in those instances where an agent follows expectations and in situations where an agent is forced to create new actions to respond to the present.

1.3: Agency Within Music

1.3.1: Overview

So far I have shown that studies of agency in philosophy are largely concerned with defining the terms intention and action, and that any theory of action in philosophy will hinge on those two terms. Sociology exhibits a more diffuse treatment of the subject, where definitions are less important than developing ways to treat human interaction with the world. Interestingly, it is rare for philosophers to reference studies in sociology, or for sociologists to reference studies in philosophy. The same holds true for music: it is uncommon to see references to philosophical or sociological studies of agency. Two notable exceptions are Anthony Newcomb and Fred Maus,

⁴⁵ Ibid., 178.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 184.

who both cite Davidson's definition of action as "intentional under some description." Rather than interacting with existing literature outside of music, musical scholars seem more inclined to develop their own theories of musical agency. This section will therefore contain brief summaries and responses to seven individual authors' theories of musical agency: Anthony Newcomb, Edward T. Cone, Fred Maus, Seth Monahan, Edward Klorman, Arnie Cox, and Robert Hatten. Despite the more individualistic approach to agency in music, there are at least two common issues that arise, and I will briefly examine them first: intentional versus unintentional action and the identity of the agent. 48

1.3.2: Common Issues

Musical scholars appear to agree that the most interesting thing to study in music is intentional action. Unlike in philosophy, there is little discussion of the ways in which one might differentiate between intentional versus unintentional action. Scholars who cite musical action as intentional include: Maus (1988, 69), Anthony Newcomb (1997, 131), Hatten (2004, 112; Hatten means intentional on the part of the composer), and Matthew Baileyshea (2011, 10). While I cannot say that there are no unintentional motions in music, I can readily agree that the most interesting musical actions to study are those that are intentional. Further, I would advocate for a multi-faceted approach that understands musical intention from the perspectives of both Davidson and Wilson, as I outlined above.

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⁴⁷ See Fred Maus, "Music as Drama," *Music Theory Spectrum* 10 (Spring, 1988): 66; Anthony Newcomb, "Action and Agency in Mahler's Ninth Symphony, Second Movement" in *Music and Meaning*, edited by Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 131.

⁴⁸ To focus this section, my summaries are of studies that are explicitly and overtly developing a theory of musical agency. As Michael Buchler has pointed out (personal correspondence), many scholars casually use agency in their writing and teaching, and these studies will lie outside the scope of this particular essay. I will reference other studies as appropriate, however, especially in the "common issues" section.

There is widespread agreement that musical action should be understood as intentional, but there is substantially less agreement over the degree to which one can specifically identify musical agents. I believe that there are three schools of thought, which I term extramusical, intramusical, and hybrid. In an extramusical approach to agential identification, the composer is always understood as the agent, and the pursuit of identifying strictly musical agents is deemed superfluous. Authors who subscribe to this view include: Byron Almén and Hatten (2013, 60), Maus (1988, 71), Baileyshea (2011, 14), Marion Guck (1989, 16), and Eric Drott (2001). On the other hand, theorists who support an intramusical approach to agential identification focus on strictly musical agents with little or no acknowledgement of composer influence. Scholars who belong to this group include Klorman (2013) and Cox (2011). Finally, a third, hybrid group of critics straddle the line between the extramusical and intramusical viewpoints. They acknowledge that the composer ultimately controls the music, but allow for intramusical agents to exist. Those who subscribe to this view include Cone (1974: identifies the vocal persona and instrumental persona as part of the composer's voice), Monahan (2013: his four classes demonstrate this viewpoint), Newcomb (1997, 136). My view is closely aligned with the hybrid camp. While I acknowledge that the composer is the original creator of the work, I believe it is productive to engage in an imaginative consideration of how strictly musical agents might interact within the world of the piece.

Having surveyed two commonly addressed issues in musical agency, I now turn to seven theories of musical agency. For each theory I will offer a summary of key points that speak to the question "How might one identify agents in music?" followed by my own critique of their theory.

1.3.3: Individual Musical Theories of Agency

1.3.3.1: Anthony Newcomb (1997)

In one of the most oft-cited articles on musical agency, "Action and Agency in Mahler's Ninth Symphony, Second Movement," Newcomb identifies musical agency as the imagination or performance of music as a reenacted human action. 49 He argues that musical agency is fleeting in the sense that it may not be continuously recognizable throughout the entirety of a given piece. 50 That is, a given musical agent's presence may be overt at one time, and unrecognizable at other times. One cannot locate these musical agents in a single musical attribute; rather, they are identified by the combination of various musical elements by the composer. 51 Despite Newcomb's insistence that agency "must, or at least can, be indeterminate," he identifies three different types of agency that music may depict. 52 Insistutional agencies may be manifest when the music is evocative of places such as cities, countrysides, and courts. Natural agencies arise when various aspects of nature are suggested, such as storms, wind, or thunder. Finally, some aspects of sentient agencies, such as animals and humans, may also be depicted by music. 53

Newcomb lays out a series of steps one can take to identify agency in music.⁵⁴ First, one must select musical attributes that are marked.⁵⁵ Second, one interprets those attributes as aspects of human character or behavior in those instances where human agency is evoked. Third, human

⁴⁹ Anthony Newcomb, "Action and Agency in Mahler's Ninth Symphony, Second Movement," in *Music and Meaning*, edited by Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 134.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 133.

⁵¹ Ibid., 136.

⁵² Ibid., 149.

⁵³ Ibid., 136.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 135.

⁵⁵ On markedness, see Robert Hatten, *Musical Meaning in Beethoven* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 34–44. As Hatten defines it, markedness is the "valuation given to difference" (34). In general, given two oppositional terms, one is marked when its features are distinctive with respect to the other, unmarked term. In Newcomb's case, one might select, for example, a bVI chord as marked at a cadence in a major key, where one might have expected the tonic to appear.

attributes are combined in various configurations as possible human agencies. Finally, one interprets these agencies as relevant in the unfolding of a chain of human actions. To demonstrate how his theory may be applied in analysis, Newcomb analyzes the second movement of Mahler's Ninth Symphony. He identifies three dances in the movement—the clumsy ländler, the sophisticated waltz, and the slow ländler—and he suggests that each dance portrays an agency. The first dance, for example, projects behavior that one might term "clumsy" or "rustic." Newcomb takes great care to argue that it is the imagined agency of the piece, not the literal piece or the performers, who are clumsy.

One of the things I admire most about Newcomb's approach is his conscious attempt to demonstrate the steps one might take to perform an agential analysis. It would be easier to follow Newcomb's approach, however, were he more explicit in defining his terms. At the beginning of his essay Newcomb states that "Music as heard is thus a representation and reenactment of a complex pattern of intentional human action," and he specifically references Donald Davidson's definition of intentionality. Later, however, Newcomb seems to suggest that agency does not necessarily entail intentional action. When Newcomb discusses types of agencies that can be represented in music, for instance, he lists things such as "city" and "storm." While anthropomorphic language that creates analogies between human actions and cities or storms is common, one must remember that a city or a storm does not itself possess an agency that can be analogously applied to music. Rather, when one anthropomorphizes the city or storm in music, it is the *comparison* of the storm or city to human characteristics that may cause one to imply a virtual agent, and not the invocation of the city or storm. That is, if one had not anthropomorphized the city or storm in the first place, the implication of agency would not be

⁵⁶ Ibid., 131.

present. Newcomb's inclusion of these examples as "types" of agency in music calls into question his initial assertion that music is a reenactment of intentional human action. Later, Newcomb asks "what aspects of a human agent can be represented or expressed?" And he answers "at least some external ways of behavior." ⁵⁷ His answer is confusing because in philosophy "behavior" is usually associated with "mere happening," which is the opposite of intentional action. At the very least, it is unclear whether Newcomb is specifically referencing intentional human action or not. Finally, in his analysis of the Waltz dance, Newcomb equates "agency" with "action-force," which he argues can be understood as: (1) an external agency (e.g. "urbanness"), (2) another person, or (3) an element within the protagonist's own personality. ⁵⁸ With the variety of possible elements that agency can entail in Newcomb's theory it is difficult to pin down exactly what Newcomb means by "agency," and what forms agency might take in his analyses. ⁵⁹ How, for example, is "urbanness" an agency?

His analysis does not appear oriented toward the identification of agency or action.

Rather, it involves the recognition of emotional states which, given their presence, imply the presence of some agent. In Dance A (the clumsy ländler), Newcomb identifies a clumsy agency by virtue of the clumsy feeling the ländler projects. In Dance B, Newcomb identifies an agent by virtue of the feelings of "loss of center, violation of innocence, and alienation" in the section.

Dance C, Newcomb argues, is comprised of a "nostalgic" agent. 60 Newcomb, of course, admits that he is not interested in identifying who or what the agents are when he states that they can remain "indeterminate." Indeed, the goal of his agential analysis is not to gather information

⁵⁷ Ibid., 134.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 140–41.

⁵⁹ It is difficult to understand "urbanness" as agency, for example. One might begin to make a case with reference to some of the sociological literature reviewed above, but the difficulty is that Newcomb does not explicitly link humans or actions with urbanness. It would be interesting to further explain Newcomb's sense of "urbanness" in light of the sociological literature reviewed above.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 137–49.

about the agents, but to create a narrative (step four in his process). What Newcomb actually creates, then, is a narrative analysis that implies the presence of agents via emotional states. Newcomb's agents are ones that embody emotions rather than ones that intentionally act, a trait that is essential to the identification of agency according to most musical scholars and non-musical scholars alike. Newcomb's analysis does suggest a way to proceed: by looking for evidence of an agent, rather than the presence of an agent. Moreover, as I will argue below, the strong link Newcomb identifies between agency and narrative is integral to an agential analysis.

1.3.3.2: Edward T. Cone (1974)

In *The Composer's Voice*, E. T. Cone identifies a triad of personas in accompanied song. ⁶¹ The instrumental persona is a virtual presence implied by the accompaniment. Since it refers to the environment of the vocal character or to its actions, gestures, and physical condition, it must be conscious of the vocal character. It may present the character's point of view, its own, or a combination of the two. Regardless of the point of view, the instrumental persona understands all motivations of the participants. It represents the impingement of the outer world on the vocal persona and the subconscious reaction of the vocal persona to this impingement. ⁶² In his analysis of Schubert's *Erlkönig*, for example, one does not hear the actual sound of hooves, but a transformation of those sounds—their resonance in the subconscious of the protagonist as interpreted by the consciousness of the instrumental persona. ⁶³ The vocal persona is created by the singer's melody, and it is not aware of the fact that it is singing or that it is being accompanied. ⁶⁴ It participates in, and is largely formed by, an all-encompassing

⁶¹ Edward T. Cone, *The Composer's Voice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 17.

⁶² Ibid., 35.

⁶³ Ibid., 15.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 30.

environment of nonverbal sound, an environment to which it also contributes through its own melodic line and vocal timbre. Finally, the composer's voice is the complete musical persona inferred from the interaction of the instrumental and vocal personas. After defining these three characters—vocal persona, instrumental persona, and composer's voice—in accompanied vocal music, Cone transfers his findings to instrumental music. He identifies six types of agents that might arise in instrumental music: permanent (subsists for the entire piece), temporary (most common), unitary (portrayed by a single instrument), implicit (derived from multiple instruments), leading (the protagonist), and subordinate (those that are supportive). These agents may arise in music through at least three means: (1) each instrument might play a dramatic role, (2) the instrument's sound might be the locus of each agent, and (3) the virtual agent of an instrument may become individualized as the marker of a significant musical gesture.

I am intrigued by Cone's conception of the agents he identifies as being within the mind of a composer's persona. I believe that given the cognitive research that has recently been done on mirror neurons—something I will address in more detail below in my review of Arnie Cox's research—it is reasonable to expect that all humans conceive of music as somehow analogous to human action because neurons associated with a given action fire when a subject hears a sound that is also associated with that action. Positing a composer's persona to account for an analyst's representation of an action, then, is a useful way to think about the music.⁷¹

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⁶⁵ Ibid, 21.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 17.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 96.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 81.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 105.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 96.

⁷¹ On the link between mirror neurons and musical agency see my summary below of Arnie Cox, "Embodying Music: Principles of the Mimetic Hypothesis," *Music Theory Online* 17/2 (2011).

I find Cone's description of the interaction between the vocal persona and the instrumental persona difficult to conceive. Cone writes that the vocal persona both participates in and is created by the environment, a concept that is not difficult to envision since, as I pointed out in my discussion of sociological agency, humans also participate in and are created by their environment. Humans are a product of societal pressures, and they contribute to society. The instrumental persona seems to be in a more nebulous position: it sometimes acts as its own agent, and it sometimes comments on the vocal persona, it sometimes knows what the vocal persona thinks and represents those thoughts, and it sometimes represents the environment of the vocal persona (it is the outer world "impinging on" the vocal persona). How does the listener know which one of these roles the instrumental persona is portraying at a given moment? And how might the change in role impact our understanding of the piece? For example, Cone argues that the instrumental persona refers to the environment, but also that when one hears hooves in Erlkönig, one hears them through the vocal persona. In such a scenario, how can the accompanimental persona simultaneously represent the outer world impinging on the vocal persona and be a kind of remembered sound filtered through the memory of the vocal persona? It would be productive to explore such a question, unpacking Cone's worthwhile observations, in a future study.

While Cone's work is a landmark for theories of musical meaning, I believe there are several areas that Cone's theory reveals as needing further study, including in-depth investigation of the way in which agents arise in instrumental music and of the types of agents that might be present, references to literature outside of music, and a consideration of agents in instrumental music beyond those represented by a given instrument or group of instruments.

Indeed, as Newcomb describes them, agents are often comprised of a multitude of musical elements, and they may not reside in any single instrument or group of instruments.

1.3.3.3: Fred Maus (1988)

In "Music as Drama," Fred Maus argues that one should view action in music as being generated by the ascription of psychological states to an agent. These psychological states represent the agent's reasons for performing the action.⁷² The identification of an agent's psychological state is tantamount to identifying agency in a given work. Like Newcomb, Maus insists that musical agents must be indeterminate, and as such he finds that actions and agents may sometimes collapse into one another. That is, a triad may be regarded equally as an action and an agent.⁷³

As his title suggests, Maus's main point is that one should understand music as a drama that happens in the conceptual present, attributing actions to actors that are on a metaphorical stage, rather than to the composer (who is in the past) or the performers (whose future actions are already prescribed). As a result, he has relatively little to say in this article about agency in comparison to Cone and Newcomb, whose studies are more focused on agency in particular. Nevertheless, I am drawn to his implication of free will in his rejection of the attribution of action to performers because their actions are already prescribed. Free will is an integral part of agency in sociology, and it has been explored rigorously in studies of free will in philosophy. If an agent is to be able to "intend" to do something, then it must first of all have the freedom of will to do that thing.

⁷² Fred Everett Maus, "Music as Drama," Music Theory Spectrum 10 (1988): 66.

⁷³ Ibid., 70.

I do not agree, however, that composers and performers should automatically be exempt from action attribution due to their temporal placement in relation to a listener's real-time experience of the music. As I will show in my summary of Seth Monahan's position below, it is useful to differentiate between the historical composer who wrote the work and the fictional version of the composer one might imagine writing the work. While the historical composer is an agent in the past, the fictional composer may be viewed as an agent in the present whose actions may affect both the present and future musical path of the composition. That is, an interpretation that posits the existence of metaphorical agents within the composition who are affected by the choices of the fictional composer may suggest that the future actions and existence of those agents are bound to the decisions that the fictional composer makes in the present. Thus, the fictional composer can participate in both the present and future events in the course of a composition. Similarly, while the score provides a set of instructions for realizing a composition, most scores do not define every parameter under the control of a performer.⁷⁴ Decisions involving such things as tone color, relative dynamic level, degree of *rubato*, and the shaping of phrases are often left to the performer. Like the fictional composer, then, one can imagine the performer as an agent who participates in both the present and future action of the composition. Indeed, as Monahan (2013) points out, the performer acts as a kind of "stand in" (or "avatar") for what he calls "individuated elements"—his lowest level of agent classes in a hierarchy of agents that he develops. 75 Nevertheless, one might posit that Maus is attempting to counteract the critique that narratives require a narrator to facilitate temporal relationships. As Almén has

⁷⁴ One possible exception to this idea may be that of works written for an electronic medium. Even in these instances, however, differences in technology or equipment may cause variations in the outcomes of performances.

shown, the reader of literature is competent enough to do that without a narrator, and the same should hold true for music.⁷⁶

As I have already mentioned, Maus, like Newcomb, stands out as a musical scholar who appeals to some existing literature outside of music. In particular, he evokes Davidson, and embraces the general sentiment that giving an agent's reasons for performing something is sufficient to demonstrate that the agent intended to perform something. I am troubled, though, by his assertion that actions and agents may collapse into one another. I agree that the same object might be viewed on the one hand as an agent and on the other hand as the result of an action, but I do not agree that it may be both at the same time. For example, I do not agree that an F minor triad could be the agent of an action that caused the same F minor triad to sound. Such an assertion seems counterintuitive to me: a nonexistent entity cannot bring itself into being.⁷⁷

1.3.3.4: Seth Monahan (2013)

As I hinted above, in "Action and Agency Revisited," Seth Monahan builds on Newcomb's work by developing a hierarchy of agential classes. At the lowest level of the hierarchy resides the individuated element, which Monahan describes as "any discrete component of the musical fabric that can be construed as having autonomy and volition." Individuated elements may include, among other things, themes, motives, or gestures. At the next higher level, the work persona is a character who represents the composition. This work persona may be subject to the events of the piece, or the events of the piece may take place

35.

⁷⁶ See Byron Almén, *A Theory of Musical Narrative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 32–

⁷⁷ I am assuming for now that when Maus characterizes the F minor triad as an action, he means the goal of an action, and not that F minor is literally an action in itself. It might be interesting to consider whether "F minor" could actually be an action, but that is beyond the scope of this project.

⁷⁸ Seth Monahan, "Action and Agency Revisited," *Journal of Music Theory* 57/2 (2013): 327.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 328.

within this agent's psyche. The fictional composer, who resides at the next higher level, is a person imagined by the analyst to control the work. This fictional composer is different from the historical composer, who is the individual that actually composed the music. Represent the historical composer, who is the individual that actually composed the music. Represent the historical composer, who is the individual that actually composed the music. Represent the historical composer, who is the individual that actually composed the music. Represent the historical composer, who is the individual that actually composed the music. Represent the historical composer is different from the music. Represent the music. Represents to the music. Represents th

Monahan's goal is to examine agency ascriptions in analytical writing to better understand how musicians talk about agency. Monahan makes it clear that he is not prescribing how to do an analysis, but rather reporting how analysis has been done in the past. Nevertheless, Monahan's theory may prove useful in an attempt to classify agents in musical analysis. What I have found, however, is that in order to identify the level at which an agent is operating, it is easiest, if not necessary, to build a narrative. This obligation extends in part from the idea that each class of character has a particular amount of knowledge and a particular degree to which it can affect the events of the work. An individuated element, for example, cannot be said to have

80 Ibid., 329.

⁸¹ Ibid., 332.

⁸² Ibid., 333.

⁸³ Ibid., 348.

knowledge of future events and therefore to knowingly make a decision that causes that future. It can, of course, have a desired outcome, and that outcome may arise, but the individuated element could not have predicted the outcome and chosen its actions based on that prediction. This is not to say, of course, that the agent's present actions do not affect the future. As I argued in my discussion of Maus's perspective, a performer (as individuated element) may make decisions that impact a listener's interpretation of future events in the composition. To make decisions about the level of control and influence an agent has, then, some account of the way in which it interacts with the music around it is in order, and I believe that such an account is likely to develop into a narrative. Therefore, I do not believe that Monahan's theory can be used as a starting point for an agential analysis—rather, some work in identifying agents and addressing their relation to each other and to an overarching narrative must be in place before one can reliably classify the agents according to his theory. Such an assertion is in line with the approach Newcomb suggests, wherein the first three steps in an agential analysis are to begin by identifying marked musical attributes, to interpret those attributes as aspects of human character, and to configure those aspects into human agencies.⁸⁴

1.3.3.5: Edward Klorman (2013)

In his dissertation, "Multiple Agency in Mozart's Chamber Music," Edward Klorman investigates the metaphor of "conversation" in Mozart's chamber works. Klorman notes that when a work is described as "conversational," most authors are pointing to a dialogic quality in

⁸⁴ Anthony Newcomb, "Action and Agency in Mahler's Ninth Symphony, Second Movement," in *Music and Meaning*, edited by Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 135. This approach is also largely in line with the first two "narrative levels" Byron Almén describes in *A Theory of Musical Narrative*. At the agential level, one identifies musical agents and defines their characteristics. At the actantial level one describe the relationship of the agents to each other and the musical environment. The relationship between the two perspectives of Almén and Monahan will be examined in Chapter Three. See Byron Almén, *A Theory of Musical Narrative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 55–67.

the music that allows one to interpret characters, often represented by individual instruments, as engaging in the interaction of musical ideas. Klorman believes, however, that the term "conversation" brings with it a host of issues that render it a poor term to describe the metaphorical action that takes place in a piece. In a conversation, for example, participants usually take turns exchanging ideas, but in a string quartet all members may be exchanging ideas simultaneously. As an alternative, then, Klorman proposes the term "multiple agency" which he feels is more neutral since it avoids the connotations associated with the term "conversation."

One unique aspect of Klorman's dissertation is his focus on the level of the individuated element in Monahan's theory, rather than on the level of the work persona or the fictional composer, as many studies of musical meaning have done. Klorman thus demonstrates one way to focus on individuated elements in his analyses. Klorman's work differs from my own and from the others I address in these summaries, however, in that he focuses on one particular metaphor (that of conversation) and he does not consistently address the way in which agents arise in his analyses.

1.3.3.6: Arnie Cox (2011)

In "Embodying Music," Arnie Cox employs cognitive research to argue that recalling, playing, or otherwise thinking about music is an embodied action, and he details his findings in a hypothesis that consists of eighteen principles, which I have collected in Table 1.1. On hearing the violin, for example, Cox suggests one might: imagine playing the violin, imagine playing the same thing on a different instrument or reproducing it vocally, or one might imagine an analogous motion in a different domain that is not primarily acoustic.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Edward Klorman, "Multiple Agency in Mozart's Chamber Music," Ph.D. diss. (CUNY Graduate Center, 2013), 114.

⁸⁶ Arnie Cox, "Principles of the Mimetic Hypothesis," *Music Theory Online* 17/2 (2011): 10.

Cox's article is important for studies of musical agency because it suggests that an active physical response to music is an innate, unconscious, and uncontrollable phenomenon. An interesting future project might be to consider which of Cox's principles are active at each stage of Monahan's agential model. For example, are there some principles that are more important in experiencing an individuated element versus a work persona? Cox's argument is made stronger by the discovery of mirror neurons in humans, an observation made a year before Cox's study in

Table 1.1 – Principles from Arnie Cox's mimetic hypothesis

| Principle | Description |
|-----------|--|
| 1 | Sounds are produced by physical events: sounds indicate (signify) the physicality of their source |
| 2 | Many or most musical sounds are evidence of the human motor actions that produce them |
| 3 | Humans understand other entities (animate or not, human or not) and events in the environment in part via overt and covert imitation |
| 4 | Overt and covert imitation constitute bodily representations of observed actions |
| 5 | Humans understand one another's behavior in part via mimetic behavior and mimetic motor imagery (MMI – imagined imitative actions) |
| 6 | Imagined actions are informed by performed actions |
| 7 | Imitation involves the three variables intention, consciousness, and overt-ness |
| 8 | Imitation is more strongly activated in observation of goal-directed actions |
| 9 | Mimetic action and MMI occur in real time & in recall (and possibly in planning) |
| 10 | Mimetic motor imagery and action occur in three modalities: intra-modal, cross-modal, and amodal |
| 11 | Any and all acoustic features can or will be mimetically represented |
| 12 | Different kinds of music "invite" (afford, motivate) different kinds of mimetic engagement |
| 13 | Some music attenuates the mimetic invitation |
| 14 | Ensemble music offers multiple invitations |
| 15 | Mimetic responses often are stronger in live contexts than in recorded contexts |
| 16 | MMI varies in strength and accuracy among different people |
| 17 | MMI motivates and constrains conceptualization (metaphoric or otherwise) |
| 18 | Mimetic behavior and MMI result in mimetic participation, communication, and affect |

2010.87 Moreover, since his article has been published, new research has discovered the existence of so-called "audio-visual mirror neurons" in monkeys, which researchers believe is suggestive of the function of neurons in humans. Audio-visual mirror neurons are a single neuron that fires in response to all of the following: (1) the monkey performs an action; (2) the monkey sees someone else performing the action; (3) the monkey hears, but does not see, someone else performing the action.⁸⁸ If audio-visual neurons are present in humans, the implications could be profound for studies of musical agency. In particular, the presence of audio-visual mirror neurons in humans would indicate that humans experience innate responses to music that they associate with particular actions, or with the sound of performing a particular action. With respect to my own theory of musical agency, research in mirror neurons may allow me to make more concrete connections between the actions of the agents I identify and physical analogues to those metaphorical actions. Before such connections can be made, however, further research is needed in the cognitive domain.

1.3.3.7: Robert Hatten (2013 and 2004/2001)

In a series of online lectures, which formed the foundation for his later book *Intepreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes*, Robert Hatten argues that the implication of agency is hard to avoid when one identifies a musical event as a gesture. ⁸⁹ Although Hatten attributes much of the agency he identifies in music to the intentional act of the composer, he acknowledges that the composer need not have intended to produce a gesture in order for the

⁸⁷ On mirror neurons in humans see Roy Mukamel et al., "Single-Neuron Responses in Humans During Execution and Observation of Actions," *Current Biology* 20 (2010): 750–56; and Christian Keysers and Valeria Gazzola, "Social Neuroscience: Mirror Neurons Recorded in Humans," *Current Biology* 20 (2010): 353–54.

⁸⁸ On audio-visual mirror neurons in monkeys see Brenda Ocampo and Ada Kritikos, "Interpreting Actions: The Goal Behind Mirror Neuron Function," *Brain Research Reviews* 67 (2011): 260-67.

⁸⁹ Robert Hatten, "Lectures on Musical Gesture," Cyber Semiotics Institute (2001), http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/semiotics/cyber/hatout.html (accessed August 25th, 2013), Lecture 7, Pgph 1.

listener to interpret its presence. Moreover, Hatten identifies four different types of agency that may be cued by gestures. The principal agent is the individual with which one primarily identifies, akin to the protagonist in literature; the external agent is the agency that acts upon or against the principal agent; the narrative agent is responsible for ordering the sequence of events that concern the principal and external agents; and the performer-as-narrator may direct the listener's attention to the structuring of those events.⁹⁰

It is difficult to evaluate how Hatten's understanding of agency interacts with those of other scholars. He argues that gestures need not be understood as intentional on the part of the composer, but does not comment on whether they must be understood as intentional on the part of the gesturer. To be commensurate with non-musical definitions of agency, one would have to understand gestures as intentional actions. Moreover, Hatten does not provide an example that utilizes all of his agent classes, so it is difficult to evaluate their effectiveness.

In an unpublished paper delivered in 2013 titled "Toward Virtual Agency in Tonal Instrumental Music," Hatten further develops his conception of musical agency by postulating a series of stages through which listeners might progress in order to fully recognize a virtual presence in instrumental music. I have diagrammed these stages in Figure 1.2. For Hatten, the ascription of agency begins when the listener perceives movement in music. If the analyst identifies motivation in this movement, an actant is produced. Hatten defines an actant as "the individual source implicated whenever force is considered to be an action." After recognizing the movement as motivated by the actant, the analyst may embody the movement, which has the effect of producing an agent with human characteristics. As I argued earlier, Cox also views

⁹⁰ Ibid., Lecture 7, Pgph 5.

⁹¹ Robert Hatten, "Toward Virtual Agency in Tonal Instrumental Music," lecture given at Indiana University (2013), 10.

embodiment as integral to the emergence of agency. A useful future study, then, might be to make more explicit the link that connects musical theories of agency with musical theories of embodiment. As the identity of the agent emerges in Hatten's theory, the possibility of actants merging into a single identity becomes distinct, and a dramatic trajectory may develop. This dramatic trajectory, in turn, produces actors. Together with the experience of the listener, a fully developed human subjectivity emerges, which may result from the fusing of the actors that take




Figure 1.2 – Robert Hatten's stages of agential development

part in the dramatic trajectory. Finally, narrative and performative agencies account for the interaction of the composer, analyst, and performer with the music. The careful way in which Hatten thinks through the stages associated with an emerging agency in music may act as a starting point for further research. Indeed, in this dissertation, I will interact with only a small portion of Hatten's process: that which involves intention, which Hatten calls motivation (Figure 1.2). In keeping with the philosophical literature I reviewed earlier, I will argue in later chapters that the perception of a movement as intentional allows the analyst to identify the presence of a musical agent who influences the music's progress. My agent, therefore, appears to come earlier, replacing "Actant" in Figure 1.2.92

1.4: Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I provided an overview and critique of some of the theories of agency and action that exist in philosophy, sociology, and music. In philosophy, I demonstrated that theories of action largely centered on the question of how to define the relationship between action and intention. In sociology, I found that studies tended to be more individualistic, although several common issues and trends were also explored in each discipline. Like sociology, music tends toward individual theories as well. What is lacking in musical studies of agency, however, is a theory that accounts for the important role that studies of human agency place on intention.

Recall that in action theory, an entity only rises to the status of an agent when, as Davidson puts it, the entity's actions can be said to be intentional under some description. While both Maus and

⁹² It is not entirely clear why embodiment is the key to producing an agent from an actant in Hatten's theory, and it is not clear why Hatten implicates *human* agency specifically. While human agency is certainly the most developed type of agency researched in action theory, I have shown that other types of agency have been discussed in my reviews of sociology and philosophy above. It may be, then, that while embodiment is part of the process of identifying agency, it comes earlier in the process, and that the difference between actant and agent requires some elaboration. Indeed, as Hatten himself notes in his talk, these steps do not necessarily happen in a manner that can be as perceptibly ordered as that which is given in Figure 1.2

Newcomb cite Davidson's assertion, neither author investigates intention as a key component of their theory. Moreover, many theories of musical agency either begin with the assumption that agents exist in music, or they provide a limited explanation of where their agents are located in the music. In the next chapter, then, I work toward bridging the gap between Action Theory and studies of musical agency by exploring the concept of "intention" in music. More specifically, I develop six categories of intentionality that can be used to identify locations in the music where agency can be implied. As I shall show in later analyses, the categories of intentionality enable analysts to support claims that a metaphorical virtual agent controls a given passage of music.

CHAPTER TWO

MUSICAL AGENCY AND THE CATEGORIES OF INTENTIONALITY

2.1: Introduction

In Chapter One I discussed several theories of agency both within and outside of music. For the most part, I attempted only to respond to the information in each study or summary of a discipline, reserving my own definitions for Chapter Two. In this chapter, then, I explore my own conception of musical agency, linking my thoughts to those of the authors I addressed in the first chapter. I will begin by defining musical agency, for which I rely heavily on action theorists' conception that an entity must perform an intentional action before it rises to the status of an agent. This idea leads me to develop six categories of intentionality that point to the presence of virtual agents in music. After defining musical agency, I examine the six categories of intentionality individually, providing examples of each and addressing how each category constitutes an intentional action. I reserve a demonstration of the way in which these categories interact in analysis for Chapter 3, where I investigate how an agential analysis can be combined with narrative and Schenkerian analyses to produce fruitful interpretations of music.

2.2: Defining Musical Agency

Musical agency involves the metaphorical interpretation of music as analogous to human action. Such a definition requires an answer to the question "What is human action?" Generally speaking, studies of human action involve the identification of a person as an agent, a status that is achieved when the person has performed, or is performing, an intentional act. While I believe a causal relationship exists between intentions and actions in studies of human agency, I will

argue that a broader approach is more beneficial in music.¹ A more refined view of musical agency, then, involves identifying musical moments—which may be of varying lengths from large passages to individual notes—that metaphorically invoke a sense of intentionality. This sense of intentionality may be intimately connected with the way in which Cox discusses mimetic motor imagery with respect to music, although more research on the cognitive aspects of the mimetic hypothesis is necessary before this connection can be detailed.² In an agential analysis, I believe that the identification of such moments of intentionality is a productive first step.³

What are moments of intentionality? I define a moment of intentionality as the result of an action performed by an agent. Such moments may be highlighted in a variety of different ways that I will categorize below. For now, I will proceed with the knowledge that they provide evidence for the existence of an agent because they signal that a metaphorical entity must have made the conscious decision to perform an action. As in sociological studies, moments of intentionality necessarily entail the structure-agency pairing. Structure in music refers to stylistic expectations the listener may have for a particular piece, or piece-specific expectations that are established due to the recurrence of a particular event. As I showed in Chapter One, when structure is highest it may also signal a high degree of collective agency; when an agency that opposes an established structure is high, it may actually create a new structure.

¹ Since I already addressed the issues associated with intentionality in Chapter One, I will avoid reviewing the same issues here.

² See my summary of Arnie Cox's mimetic hypothesis in Chapter One, or his article: Arnie Cox, "Principles of the Mimetic Hypothesis," *Music Theory Online* 17/2 (2011): 10.

³ I do not mean a sense of intentionality on the part of the composer, though certainly that kind of intentionality may also exist in these passages. Instead, I mean a sense that some virtual presence must have influenced the music in some way. The six categories of intentionality I identify below represent the ways in which I believe music can signal this kind of intentional influence.

My categories of intentionality differ from the strategies for cueing agency proposed by Byron Almén and Robert Hatten in their article "Narrative Engagement with Twentieth-Century Music: Possibilities and Limits." Almén and Hatten's list of ways in which musical agency might be cued, which they do not claim to be complete, includes program, text, topical reference, and thematic or motivic integrity.⁴ Moreover, their cues are ones in which the composer is explicitly present; my categories of intentionality do not place so much emphasis on the role of the composer.

Philosophical studies would argue that in order to prove that an agent's action is intentional, one must be able to cite the agent's reasons for performing the action, but I do not believe that such a requirement is feasible in music since the metaphorical existence of the agent makes it impossible to question the agent about its reasons. Fred Maus attempts to satisfy this condition by arguing that one can ascribe psychological states to the agent that make the action appear reasonable to the agent and that cause the action. Beyond asserting that the agent intended to perform an action, however, I do not believe that further psychological analysis of virtual agents in music is necessary, and I prefer instead to do away with this condition in musical analysis in favor of focusing on defining particular classes of situations in which intentionality is implied.

I use the word "intentionality" with a kind of dual perspective, understanding that a consumer of music can take on the role of first-time analyst (or naïve listener) or an informed analyst (or informed listener), which can influence how one views intention. When in the role of an analyst who is in the initial stages of investigating a particular agential reading (the first-time

⁴ Byron Almén and Robert Hatten, "Narrative Engagement with Twentieth-Century Music: Possibilities and Limits," in *Music and Narrative Since 1900*, edited by Michael L. Klein and Nicholas Reyland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 60.

⁵ Fred Everett Maus, "Music as Drama," *Music Theory* Spectrum 10 (Spring, 1988): 66.

analyst or "naïve" listener). I think it is useful to use George Wilson's understanding of the link between action and intention to think of intentions as the goals of action, a perspective that will be helpful in identifying the categories of intentionality I define below. As I explained in Chapter One, this perspective is necessary largely because the naïve listener recognizes most moments of intentionality only after an action has been completed. An ascending leap after a descending scale, for example, signals a moment of intentionality because the leap represents a change in an established pattern (both in direction and in intervallic size). In most cases, the naïve listener only recognizes the leap after it occurs, however, since they cannot predict the direction of the music, and the assignment of agency occurs as a post-event thought. The listener may think "the agent must have had the intention to reach that higher note." After having completed the investigation, however, I believe a change in perspective can occur in which the informed analyst or listener, having knowledge of the agential analysis and the way in which the music progresses, can anticipate the moments of intentionality, such that the leap is no longer a surprise. Instead, the informed listener, on approaching the leap, may think "the agent intends to leap soon." This different perspective represents a causalist approach to the relationship between intention and action that is closely aligned with the way in which Donald Davidson links intentionality and action.8

After identifying moments of intentionality, I believe the next step is to identify which moments belong to which musical agents. This step is likely to involve the construction of a

⁶ See George M. Wilson, *The Intentionality of Human Action* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).

⁷ As I intimated when I addressed the pairing of structure and agency from sociology, there are certain cases where the listener may be able to predict a moment of intentionality. Such situations occur when the listener has stylistically-based expectations about the way in which a particular passage should proceed. A listener might expect the so-called "Mozart trill" at the end of a cadenza in a piano concerto, for example, and therefore may think "the agent intends to trill at the end of this cadenza."

⁸ See Donald Davidson, "Agency" in *Essays on Actions and Events* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

musical narrative that acts as a kind of frame that binds actions and agents together. At least two questions may arise with respect to this step: (1) What are musical agents? (2) Why does this step entail narrative?

With respect to the first question, I define musical agents as metaphorical entities that relate to each other hierarchically according to Seth Monahan's model, and which are analogous to human agents. While the analyst should be understood as the ultimate "musical agent" who controls the reading, I believe the most interesting observations will come from the levels of the individuated element and work persona. This conception is similar to Cone's in that it acknowledges a higher-level agent (in my case, the analyst; in Cone's case, the composer's voice), who imagines the agents acting within the piece. Like Newcomb, I believe that musical agents are fleeting: they need not be continuously displayed, and can enter and exit the music freely. While I would not hesitate to say that, as Newcomb argues, most musical agents arise through the combination of various musical elements, I do not wish to be so restrictive as to deny the possibility that a single musical parameter may give rise to a musical agent. Moreover, unlike Newcomb, I do not wish to identify psychological states such as "clumsy" as actions that imply agency. Instead, I believe the first step should be to identify moments of intentionality, as I have outlined above.

With respect to the second question, in order to understand which moments of intentionality belong to which agents, it is necessary to identify two related characteristics: (1) the degree to which each moment of intentionality affects the music around it; (2) what kind of agent-ascription is most appropriate given the affective range of a given moment. Indeed, Monahan's categories are particularly useful in this regard due to the varying degrees of control an agent in a given class can exert on music. An individuated element, for example, has little

control over the music in comparison to the fictional composer. In order to identify the level of control an agent has, it is necessary to understand how it functions as part of the larger musical fabric, a goal that can be achieved in the context of a narrative reading.⁹

Within the context of the theory developed in this dissertation, then, an agential analysis begins with an identification of moments that can be categorized as the product of an intentional action performed by a virtual agent, a first step that relies on the categories of intentionality I develop below. This first step allows one to posit the presence of an agent, but it does not necessitate the assignment of actions to particular agents, thus it may not be initially clear how many agents are present in a given piece. The second step in an agential analysis, then, is to determine how many agents are present in a given piece, and to assign the intentionally performed actions in a piece to those agents. This step relies on the development of a narrative, a frame within which one can construct the logic for linking actions with particular agents. This second step will be examined more fully in Chapter Three.

Having introduced the steps one can take to form an agential analysis, I now turn to an examination of the six categories of intentionality with which an agential analysis can begin: gesture, contradiction of musical forces, unexpected event, change of state, repetition/restatement, and conflict. The first two categories involve existing theories of musical analysis, and thus require more space to develop. The remaining four categories of intentionality, however, are more intuitive, and require less explanation. As will become apparent, the categories of intentionality are not meant to be mutually exclusive. It may be possible to describe a single passage of music using multiple categories of intentionality. This issue, which I term

⁹ Note that what I am proposing is not the same as Newcomb, who suggests that the ultimate goal of an agential analysis is the construction of a narrative. The difference may simply be one of emphasis. Rather than viewing agents as serving the narrative, I instead wish to view narrative as a vehicle that serves to highlight relationships between agents.

"descriptive multiplicity," will be addressed in more detail after I introduce the categories.

Although many categories may be active in a single passage, during the descriptions that follow I will, with few exceptions, discuss only a single category at a time in order to focus my definitions. In Chapters Three and Four, however, I will discuss passages wherein multiple categories of intentionality are active at once.

2.3: The Six Categories of Intentionality

2.3.1: Gesture

I define a musical gesture as a marked figure, lasting about two seconds or less, which consistently recurs in some recognizable fashion. My definition is similar to the way in which Robert Hatten defines a thematic gesture in *Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes*, except that I do not require the gesture to develop into the basis for the work's discourse, though it certainly may do so. ¹⁰ In addition to Hatten, my understanding of gesture is also influenced by Naomi Cumming, Adam Kendon, and David McNeil. To more fully develop my definition of gesture, I will briefly discuss the aspects that have been the most influential from each of these sources. ¹¹

Hatten defines gesture as "movement (implied, virtual, actualized) interpretable as a sign, whether intentional or not, and as such it communicates information about the gesturer (or

¹⁰ Robert Hatten, *Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 125.

¹¹ There is still much work to be done in the field of musical gesture. Hatten's theory is quite different from that of Kendon or McNeil, two of the most prominent researchers of human gesture. While it is not the focus of this dissertation, a fascinating study for the future could involve a reconciliation of the way in which theories of human gesture and theories of musical gesture might interact. For instance, Kendon, McNeil, and Hatten all acknowledge that gestures can be comprised of multiple "sub gestures," so to speak. Yet in practice, Hatten's gestures are usually single, short figures. It may prove fruitful to attempt to apply the theories of Kendon and McNeil to a study of music.

character, or persona the gesturer is impersonating or embodying)."¹² As I argued in Chapter One, identifying music as movement is already a layer of metaphorical interpretation. Hatten's use of the phrase "intentional or not" may at first appear to contradict the theory I describe here, in which the action must be understood as intentional under some description in order to give rise to the perception of an agent. Earlier in his book, however, Hatten makes it clear that he is speaking of intention on the part of the composer. That is, in my view, a musical figure may rise to the status of a gesture whether or not the composer intended that it be understood as a gesture by his or her audience.¹³

Hatten identifies ten characteristics of gestures: (1) they are grounded in the communication of human affect; (2) their meaning is related to basic human expressive movements; (3) they may be inferred from musical notation or from a performance, even when one cannot see the performer; (4) they are perceptual gestalts, involving all musical parameters, not just rhythm or pitch; (5) they occur in the perceptual present, typically lasting two seconds or less; (6) they may be hierarchically arranged, providing a degree of continuity to a passage by encompassing several different events; (7) they may become thematic for a movement; (8) they may help express rhetorical action; (9) they may be used by a performer to direct a listener's attention to structural aspects of the music, or to an expressive genre; (10) they reveal intentions and modalities of emotion and action.¹⁴

His second principle, that a gesture's meaning is related to human expressive movement is particularly important because it allows one to assert that when one identifies a gesture, one has also identified a moment of agency. Indeed, Hatten emphasizes this point when he states that

¹² Robert Hatten, *Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 125.

¹³ Ibid., 112.

¹⁴ Ibid., 93.

his view of gesture "acknowledges the embodied interpretation of listener expectation, and extends it to a virtual, experiencing body." Naomi Cumming also highlights the importance of embodiment in recognizing musical gestures when she argues that:

A gesture is an inflected performance of some patterning, uniquely realized in a moment of time. It is a notated feature, closely aligned with a figuration or motif. It is also an aspect of melodic patterning that is systematically developed in some styles, in ornaments or short conventional figurations. To be realized as gestural, a pattern must be embodied in a specific act, but the inflected performance needs also to answer to the suggestions of notated shaping, understood within a stylistic milieu. ¹⁶

Thus, by classifying a particular musical figure as a gesture, one imbues it with an embodied signification that implies the presence of a virtual agent.

In Hatten's theory five types of gestures exist, the descriptions for which are reproduced in the chart in Table 2.1. As I stated earlier, my definition is similar to the way in which Hatten defines a thematic gesture, but this does not mean that the other types of gesture Hatten identifies are left unacknowledged in my theory of musical agency. Rather, in my theory they are often better classified under other categories of intentionality. Rhetorical gestures, for example, will often fall under the "unexpected event" category of intentionality, but would not rise to the status

Table 2.1 – Robert Hatten's five gestural types

| Type | Description |
|--------------|--|
| Spontaneous | Unique gestures composers may introduce that represent original inventions |
| Thematic | Gestures that are foregrounded as significant and used consistently throughout |
| | a composition |
| Dialogical | Occurs when two or more gestures appear in conversation with one another |
| Rhetorical | Includes any event that disrupts the unmarked progress of the movement |
| Tropological | Occurs when two distinct gestures merge to create a new gesture whose |
| | meaning is derived from the combined meanings of the original two gestures |

¹⁵ Ibid., 115.

¹⁶ Naomi Cumming, *The Sonic Self* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 138.

of a gesture unless they consistently recurred in some recognizable fashion.¹⁷ For Hatten, then, two traits of gesture are particularly important: that it be interpreted as movement, and that the gesture be embodied. This last trait is indispensable in Cumming's theory.

Hatten is not the only scholar to recognize gesture as movement. Both Kendon and McNeil, two of the most important researchers of human gesture, also define gesture as movement. Beyond movement, however, Kendon identifies four other characteristics as significant for gestures: (1) they are expressive, used to communicate information, rather than practical (used to do something like take a drink); (2) they are excursions: that is, they do not represent a change of state. They are motions that move away from a stable position, then return to a stable position; (3) they have obvious points of onset and offset; and (4) they are not made under the influence of gravity: that is, they are made under the voluntary control of the agent. It is these qualities that I would point to as significant for musical gesture, even more so than the idea that gesture is movement.


For me, then, musical gestures are events that have obvious points of onset and offset; are not attributable purely to melodic gravity (something that will be discussed further in section 2.3.2), but are made under the voluntary control of an implied agent; are understood as expressive or communicative on the part of the listener; and represent excursions, not changes of state: that is, they are marked musical moments. ¹⁹ Note that this last quality does not preclude the change of state category of intentionality from being active at the same time as a gesture is present. By "change of state" Kendon refers to a complete change of position. For example,

¹⁷ A gesture can also create an unexpected event. Identifying something as a gesture does not preclude it from inclusion under other categories of intentionality.

Adam Kendon, Gesture: Visible Action as Utterance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10.
 This quality of markedness in musical gestures is often accomplished by repetition, though the gesture may be marked in other ways as well (e.g., registrally, dynamically, etc.)

shifting one's weight from the right foot to the left foot is not a gesture because it involves a complete change of position—one that does not shortly return to its initial state of rest. It is more difficult to argue in music whether something genuinely represents a change of position or not. Instead I will rely on the idea that the gesture should be marked in some way for the listener's recognition.²⁰

An example of a gesture occurs in Schubert's Allegretto in C Minor, D. 915. In Example 2.1 I have circled the gesture's first appearance in m. 2 (labeled G). By m. 6 (G¹), the gesture has already undergone some alteration: while in m. 2 the right and left hands played the gesture in octaves, in m. 6 the gesture is played by the right hand and accompanied by a held chord in the left hand. This gesture can be defined as a lengthier note followed by a leap to a shorter note, with both notes appearing on strong beats. Later in the piece, the gesture is altered again such that the two notes are separated by a step rather than a leap (Example 2.2, G²-4). In G² the step is



Example 2.1 – Initial appearance of a gesture in Schubert, Allegretto in C Minor, D. 915 (mm. 1–6)

²⁰ More work is certainly needed to expand the literature on musical gesture, a project whose magnitude lies outside the scope of this dissertation. One difficult aspect of gesture is to differentiate gestures from motives and figures, and to determine the role that embodiment plays in setting gesture apart from those two terms. In this dissertation, at least two characteristics separate motives from gestures: (1) iterations of the same motive may be found on both the surface and at deeper levels of structure, while gestures are restricted to the surface of the music; (2) a motive will be associated with a particular scale-degree pattern, while a gesture will not be so restrictively defined. The word "figure" will be reserved for something that has the potential to rise to the status of a motive or gesture, but which has not yet fulfilled that potential, perhaps due to lack of repetition, or lack of markedness. Note also that these terms are not mutually exclusive.

²¹ The gesture might suggest the quality of a kind of sigh accompanied by a shrugging of the shoulders.



Example 2.2 – Subsequent reappearances of the gesture in Schubert, Allegretto in C Minor, D. 915 (mm. 62–70)

ascending, while in G^3 the step is descending. In G^4 , the gesture seems to be expanded beyond two notes to encompass four notes. It is as if an escape tone, $E
bigs_5$, has been added to what would have been a single ascending step from C5 to $D
bigs_5$. Since vestiges of the characteristic rhythmic profile of the gesture are maintained, however, one can understand the manifestations of the gesture in Example 2.2 as related to that which appeared at the beginning of the piece in Example 2.1. Moreover, the alteration of the gesture suggests that the agent who initially performed the gesture at the beginning of the work has done something different later in the piece.

Not only can the alteration of a gesture suggest that an agent does something different, but changing relationships between multiple gestures performed by a single agent may also suggest that an agent has undergone some change (for example, from a weakened state to a position of strength). Two gestures appear in Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 119, No. 2, a static gesture and a descending gesture (Example 2.3). The static gesture, labeled S in Example 2.3, is defined by the following features: its rhythmic profile consists of two triplets followed by a single eighth note, it begins on beat two of a measure and leads to a downbeat, it involves a



Example 2.3 – Gestures in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 119, No. 2 (mm. 1–3)²²

chromatic double neighbor figure (DN), and its contour is "static"—that is, it ends on the same note as that with which it begins. Like the static gesture, the descending gesture, labeled D in Example 2.3, also consists of two triplets followed by a single eighth note, and it also begins on beat two of a measure and leads to a downbeat. Unlike the static gesture, however, the descending gesture involves an upper neighbor (UN) followed by a series of descending steps. In addition, while the static gesture often tonicizes notes other than the tonic, the descending gesture usually leads to tonic, whether the tonic of the entire work, or the local tonic of a given passage.

Both figures meet the criteria for gestures I identified above. They consistently recur and are both marked for significance in that they stand out from the plodding accompanimental figure in the right hand. They both have obvious points of onset and offset—it is clear when both gestures begin and end—and they do not blend in to the unmarked flow of the accompanimental background. Neither gesture can be attributed solely to melodic gravity; rather, both contradict

²² For more musical context see the entire score in Example 2.4.

gravity: the static gesture contains an ascending leap, while the descending gesture begins with an upper neighbor before descending.²³

The static gesture begins in a higher register, and is juxtaposed with the descending gesture, which begins in a lower register. While at first the two gestures alternate, as the piece progresses their relationship changes, not only temporally, but also registrally. Before commenting on these changes, it is interesting to consider whether the gestures are performed by two different agents, or whether they are different actions performed by the same agent. The decision may often rest on the particular reading an analyst wishes to project, but two factors in particular may sway one's decision: (1) the presence of an event that interrupts the flow of one gesture, and (2) the particular stylistic environment or *topos* that accompanies the gestures. When one gesture begins and a second gesture seems to interrupt the flow of the first, it may suggest that the second gesture belongs to a second agent. Such an interruption suggests opposition, which most often occurs between two entities. When two gestures seem not to interrupt one another, however, it may simply suggest that a single agent performs both gestures.²⁴ When the stylistic environment that accompanies the gestures is unified, the passage may suggest the presence of a single agent, whereas when the two gestures are accompanied by different stylistic environments, the presence of two agents may be implied. A stylistic environment may be established by such things as *topoi*, texture, rhythm, dynamic, and register.

The upper neighbor may be understood as a way to imbue the music with enough potential energy to descend through the semi-stable platform G, \hat{S} . It is as though \hat{S} is akin to a permeable platform on which a ball rests, and in order for the ball to push through the platform, it requires some extra energy.

²⁴ Robert Hatten and Michael Klein, among other authors, have sometimes read works as a kind of internal struggle on the part of a single protagonist. While the action, in such a case, takes place inside an overriding persona, one might still argue that two oppositional agents create the struggle. These agents would be associated with the emotions the authors identify as being in opposition with one another. See, for example, Robert Hatten's reading of Schubert's Piano Sonata D. 959 in Robert Hatten, "Schubert the Progressive: The Role of Resonance and Gesture in Schubert's Piano Sonata in A, D. 959," *Intégral* 7 (1993): 38–81; or Michael Klein, "Chopin's Fourth Ballade as Musical Narrative," *Music Theory* Spectrum 26/1 (Spring 2004): 23–56.


While other factors may also support an analyst's decision to a read multiple agents or a single agent within a given passage, these two factors are particularly important to consider.


I would suggest that this excerpt is controlled by a single agent, and that the two gestures are different actions performed by this agent. 25 No sense of interruption exists between the two gestures that would suggest the presence of a second agent. Although they are strikingly separated by register initially (they do not maintain the same separation later on: see mm. 7–9 below), many other parameters point to a unified stylistic environment: the accompanimental texture is consistent for both gestures, they are part of a single phrase, they employ the same rhythmic and metric profiles involving the same durations and beginning and ending in the same metrical positions, and they are played at the same dynamic level. Significant changes in the gestures themselves, or in the relationship between the two gestures, are summarized in Table 2.2 and are labeled on the score in Example 2.4. A full gestural analysis would explain how these changes contribute to the expressive meaning of the piece. It would also account for the striking absence of overt statements of either gesture at the end of the piece(mm. 32ff.). Since my goal in this portion of the chapter is simply to discuss the features of gestures and some of the ways in which they can arise and contribute to a sense of agency in music, I will refrain from developing a full analysis here. Instead, I will focus on two particularly interesting moments that are referenced in Table 2.2: mm. 7–9 and 16–18. To provide context I will briefly discuss the entire passage from mm. 1–21 first.

²⁵ Note that while I present a reading in which a single agent performs both gestures, it may also be possible to instead identify two different agents associated with each gesture. The difference between these two readings is largely a matter of whether one chooses to focus on the differences or similarities between the two gestures. For me, the similar stylistic environments in which they appear and the similarity of their rhythmic profiles outweighs the differences that exist between the two gestures (such as contour and initial register, for example).

Table 2.2 – Gestural changes in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 119, No. 2

| Measure(s) | Domain | Comment |
|------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| 4ff. | Temporality | The amount of space between the static and descending gestures decreases from two and a half beats to half a beat, so that during the first phrase each gesture is only heard once, but during the subsequent phrase both gestures are heard twice |
| 7–9 | Temporality and Register | The descending gesture now appears in place of the static gesture both temporally and registrally. Where before the two gestures had always alternated, now the descending gesture is repeated three times. Further, the descending gesture is stated for the first time in a high register in m. 9 |
| 10 | Register | The static gesture now appears in the low register, following a statement of the descending gesture in the high register |
| 12–15 | Profile of Descending Gesture | An inversion of the descending gesture takes place in m. 13, where a lower neighbor is followed by a series of ascending steps. This ascending variant is enchained with statements of the original descending gesture |
| 16 | Profile of static gesture | The static gesture is fragmented such that its final note is missing, and these fragments are repeated in two different registers |
| 16–18 | Temporality | The static gesture is repeated without a statement of the descending gesture to separate iterations |





Example 2.4 – Annotated score of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 119, No. 2



Example 2.4 – continued

At the beginning of the work a pattern is established wherein the static and descending gestures alternate. The static gesture centers on \hat{S} , while the descending gesture is concerned with descending motion from \hat{S} to $\hat{1}$. Thus, I associate the static gesture with an emphasis on the dominant, while I associate the descending gesture with the tonic, since the goal of its descent is $\hat{1}$. In mm. 7–9, however, the descending gesture seems to take the place of the static gesture. Narratively, this may be read in several ways, including: as a play for power on the part of the descending gesture, as a weakness on the part of the static gesture, or as confusion or indecision on the part of the agent who enacts both gestures. In the first phrase (mm. 1–4), there is no doubt that C major is the tonic, something that is confirmed when the descending gesture lands on C2 in m. 4. In the second phrase (mm. 5–8) the gestures effect a modulation toward A minor. As in the first phrase, A minor as local tonic is confirmed when the descending gesture lands on A2 on the downbeat of m. 8.

Once the cadence in A minor sounds in m. 8, one might expect the static gesture to reappear. Instead, however, the descending gesture is repeated twice, and it attempts to effect a modulation to G major, sounding its descent from $\hat{S}-\hat{1}$ in that key. It is as though, having taken over the registral and temporal position of the static gesture, the descending gesture is also attempting to usurp the scale degree $(\hat{S}, \text{ or } G)$ with which the static gesture is associated by turning it into a local tonic, the scale degree with which the descending gesture is associated. That is, at the beginning of the Bagatelle, the static gesture centered on G, which was \hat{S} . In mm. 9ff., the descending gesture attempts to claim G as $\hat{1}$, the note with which it is associated at the beginning of the piece.


The strength of the arrival in G major is undercut by the right hand of the piano, which seems to refuse to descend to 1 as it had in both the C major and A minor passages that came

before it. Both of the earlier passages feature the melodic figures $\hat{3}$ - $\hat{4}$ - $\hat{2}$ - $\hat{3}$ and $\hat{1}$ - $\hat{2}$ - $\hat{7}$ - $\hat{1}$ in the right hand of the piano. The overall descent from local $\hat{3}-\hat{1}$ in these passages, where the final arrival on local î coincides with the descending gesture's arrival on î, confirms the tonic. In mm. 9ff., however, the same double-neighbor figures do not occur, and the melody appears to become stuck on 3. The lack of descent to 1 in the melody means that no PAC materializes in G major. Indeed, the way in which G is asserted as a pedal in mm. 14–20 makes it sound more like a dominant preparing for a return to the tonic than like a tonic itself, with the result that the arrival on C in m. 21 sounds like a convincing return to the home key, rather than like an arrival on the subdominant in G. The way in which G major is undercut, coupled with the firm return to C major in m. 21, causes me to retrospectively hear mm. 14–21 as prolonging G major as an active dominant chord rather than as a local tonic despite the descending gesture's motions which mimic $\hat{5}-\hat{1}$ in G major, motions that had previously so firmly established both C major and A minor as local tonics. The less firmly established G-major tonic may be heard, then, as a failure on the part of the descending gesture to fully usurp the static gesture's role. Indeed, the fragmentation in m. 16 of the static gesture eventually leads toward a threefold repetition of its double neighbor figure, as opposed to the two repetitions the double neighbor figure had previously received. The three repetitions may be seen as a strengthening of the static gesture, and it both finishes the prolongation of the active dominant in m. 17, and begins a new phrase in m. 18, one that will end with the descending gesture reestablishing tonic.


My analysis here is not intended to be complete, but rather to be suggestive of the powerful contributions that gestural analysis can make to a theory of musical agency. More specifically, tracking gestures in a piece allows the analyst to do the following things: assert the continual presence of the same agent, interpret changes in the gestures as communicative acts

that may reveal characteristics of the agent (for example, the threefold repetitions of the static gesture may indicate that the agent felt stronger at that point), and develop a narrative from the interaction of the gestures.


Gestures need not be defined as specifically as those I have discussed so far. In Schubert's unfinished Allegro in F# Minor D. 570, one might consider the repeated C#5s in m. 2 as a gesture, one that is defined generically by the repetition of a note in the pattern short-short-long (Example 2.5). Coming as it does after a series of rapid sixteenth notes, the gesture may give the impression of an attempt to slow oneself down after a flurry of activity. The gesture is, in a sense, immediately subject to augmentation in mm. 3–4, where the repeated C#5s suggest that the inter-onset pattern from m. 2 has been doubled in length. Further iterations of this gesture occur, for example, in m. 9, where the gesture has been truncated. The quarter note has been left off of the gesture and the repetition consists of a chord rather than a single note (Example 2.6). In mm. 41–42, the gesture begins on an upbeat, and the entire gesture undergoes immediate repetition (Example 2.7). It is as if an upbeat has been added to the truncated version from m. 9, and this new iteration seems to generate a theme in the measures following. In mm. 64–72 the repetitive gesture is successively explored on multiple pitch levels (Example 2.8).



Example 2.5 – Initial presentation of a gesture in Schubert, Allegro in F# Minor, D. 570



Example 2.6 – Truncation of the gesture in Schubert, Allegro in F# Minor, D. 570




Example 2.7 – Repetition and addition of upbeat to truncated version of gesture in Schubert, Allegro in F# Minor, D. 570




Example 2.8 – Repetition of gesture at multiple pitch levels in Schubert, Allegro in F# Minor, D. 570

Lastly, gestures may imply the presence of different agents in a piece. Two gestures appear in Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2, each associated with a single agent. The arpeggiated gesture is characterized by: short durations; its arpeggiated contour, wherein the first three notes outline a chordal skip of a third in which the first and third notes are the same; and its particular metric profile of beginning on a weaker part of the beat and ending on a stronger part of the beat (Example 2.9). The cadential gesture is defined by: a syncopated rhythm in the melody, and an ascending leap that is followed by descending stepwise motion, the third note of which is embellished by a chordal skip (Example 2.10). At least two factors support reading these two gestures as under the control of two different agents. First, they are separated temporally. Whereas the arpeggiated gesture occurs at the beginning of the piece, the cadential



Example 2.9 – Arpeggiated gesture in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 1–2)



Example 2.10 – Cadential gesture in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 24–26)

gesture does not appear until m. 24. Second, they are articulated in different stylistic environments. The arpeggiated gesture occurs within the context of a *tempesta topos*, while the cadential gesture is more topically neutral. Since I will discuss how these two agents and their respective gestures interact in the next chapter, I will refrain from commenting further here.

As embodied musical figures, gestures can play an important role in an agential analysis. The presence of multiple gestures in a given piece may indicate either different actions performed by a single agent or the presence of multiple agents. These gestures may be well defined, appearing in nearly identical form throughout a composition, or they may be more loosely defined, undergoing alteration throughout a given work.

2.3.2: Contradiction of Musical Forces

In his 2012 book *Musical Forces*, Steve Larson introduces a theory in which certain metaphorical musical motions are understood as responses to musical analogues of the physical forces gravity, magnetism, and inertia. His definitions of these forces appear in Table 2.3. Larson employs the tune from "Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star" as a simple example of the effect of


Table 2.3 – Definitions of the musical forces from Larson $(2012)^{26}$

| Force | Definition | |
|-----------|--|--|
| Gravity | The tendency of a note (heard as "above a stable position") to descend (85). | |
| Magnetism | The tendency of an unstable note to move to the closest stable pitch, a tendency | |
| | that grows stronger as one approaches that goal (88). | |
| Inertia | The tendency of a pattern of motion to continue in the same fashion, where the meaning of "same" depends on how that pattern is represented in musical | |
| | memory (96). | |

²⁶ Robert Hatten has expanded Larson's original three forces by including such things as friction, repulsion, and momentum. See Robert Hatten, "Musical Forces and Agential Energies: An Expansion of Steve Larson's Model," *Music Theory Online* 18/3 (Sept., 2012).


melodic gravity (Example 2.11).²⁷ The melody begins on the stable platform C4, quickly performing what Larson refers to as an "athletic leap" to G4 in m. 2. Since G4 is above the stable platform C4, Larson argues that one may experience the effect of melodic gravity pulling the G4 down toward C4; and, of course, the melody eventually gives in to melodic gravity when it descends by step in mm. 4–8 from G to C. This descent is also subject to the melodic forces of inertia and magnetism. Inertia suggests that the pattern of descending steps will continue, while the tonic, C4, exerts a magnetic attraction that strengthens as the melody approaches it.

The musical forces are largely responsible for shaping one's impression of the environment within which virtual musical agents interact. That is, certain musical motions can be attributed to the influence of the musical forces, accounting for one way in which some passages of music may feel less agential than others. A short example of such a passage occurs in mm. 15–16 of the first movement of Beethoven's Piano Sonata Op. 2, No. 3 (Example 2.12). Here, a series of descending parallel thirds follows the pattern "descend by step, repeat." Gravity pulls the melody downward, magnetism pulls the melody from its high starting position on E6 down toward C6, and the inertia of the pattern carries the motion beyond that tonic. In cases like these, it may be useful to imagine the music as though it were a ball rolling along a course, with the



Example 2.11 – Musical forces in "Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star"

²⁷ Larson notes that these forces are meant to be understood in an intuitive way, rather than as an isographic mapping from their physical counterpart.



Example 2.12 – Musical forces in Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op. 2, No. 3 (mm. 14–16)

contour of the music suggesting places where the ball either rolls along a flat surface, ascends an incline, or descends a slope. This particular passage may suggest that the ball is rolling down a set of stairs, an image defined by the contour of the melodic sequence: when the ball rolls across a step a note is repeated, and when the ball descends to the next lowest step, the music also descends by step. It is useful to recognize that even though the ball is descending under the influence of gravity and inertia, the events surrounding its descent still suggest agency: the ball had to be placed at the top of the steps by an agent, and something may have to stop the ball from continuing to roll at the bottom of the steps. The ball may be gradually slowed by a force such as friction, or an agent may intervene to suddenly force the ball to stop or change direction (either by physically moving the ball, or by placing an object in its path to deflect the ball in a new direction).

As in the physical metaphor above, musical passages such as this one that appear to be responding to the musical forces are often surrounded by passages that cannot be explained as responding to the musical forces. When one considers the music that surrounds mm. 15–16 in Beethoven's Piano Sonata, one finds that this is exactly the case (Example 2.13). Measure 13 marks the beginning of the continuous sixteenth-note texture that characterizes mm. 15–16.



Example 2.13 – Musical forces in Beethoven, Piano Sonata Op. 2, No. 3 (mm. 13–21)

Motion begins from the tonic, C4, and ascends to the E6 in m. 14 from which the descent that responds to the musical forces will begin. Not only does the music ascend, but it moves by arpeggiating upward through the notes of the tonic triad, a move that may require more energy on the part of an agent (and perhaps even on the part of a performer) than if the melody had simply ascended by step. Thus, mm. 13–14 are akin to the agent placing the ball at the top of the stairs. The action of this agent is highlighted by the sudden extreme change in dynamic from *piano* throughout mm. 1–12 *to fortissimo* at m. 13 where the ascending motion begins.

Moreover, at m. 17, the agent from m. 15 seems to intervene to stop the music from continuing its pattern of descent. It repeats the material from mm. 13–14, repositioning the ball at the top of the stairs once again to descend. As the descent is repeated in mm. 19–20, the ball descends past the tonic to the leading-tone, B, in a passage that begins a modulation toward the dominant.

The fact that motion stops on B may be attributed to the agent, but it may also be attributed to other environmental factors. The decision between whether an agent intervenes to stop motion, whether friction gradually slows an object, or whether some other environmental factor is at play largely depends on the analyst's reading. It is therefore up to the analyst to describe the environmental conditions under which an interpretation takes place, and the amount of description necessary will likely vary depending on the way in which the analysis progresses. An interpretation in which a sense of agency is weaker, for example, may require more description of the musical environment that influences the piece's progress. A passage that contradicts musical forces, then, implies the presence of an agent as someone who actively works against those forces.

Not only does melodic contour define the effect of the musical forces in a given passage, but harmony also plays a significant role in shaping the effects of the musical forces. An

example of the way in which harmony can contribute to one's sense of the musical forces appears in Example 2.14. Above the music, I have shown the influence of the musical forces on the melody. The first four measures of the work constitute the presentation of an eight-measure sentence. The initial statement of the basic idea constitutes a motion from I to V_3^4 with the soprano descending from \hat{S} to $\hat{4}$, a melodic motion that gives in to both the force of gravity and the magnetic attraction of the tonic. In mm. 3–4, one might expect the pattern established by the initial presentation of the basic idea to continue, a motion that would give in to all three forces as in Example 2.15, where the melody descends from $\hat{4}$ to $\hat{3}$. Instead, however, the melody moves



Example 2.14 – Musical forces in Mozart, Rondo K. 485 (mm. 1–4)



Example 2.15 – Recomposition of Mozart, Rondo K. 485 (mm. 1–4)

up from $\hat{4}$ to $\hat{5}$, not only contradicting all three forces, but also creating an unresolved chordal 7th.²⁸ The ascending motion suggests that an intending presence forced the melody to move upward despite the downward pull of the forces.

Not only do musical forces affect local musical motion, but they can also influence larger spans of music, and they can be present at hierarchical levels below the surface of the music. ²⁹ What follows is a discussion of the way in which musical forces affect both local and larger-scale motions in Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 38, No. 5. The piece is in a kind of modified strophic form with three large sections followed by a coda. While musical forces are most overtly active on the surface of the music in the first strophe, in the second strophe musical forces influence deeper levels of the structure. In my discussion of strophe 2, then, I will use Schenkerian analysis to reveal aspects of the larger structure that are under the influence of the musical forces. ³⁰ Since the purpose of this section of my dissertation is to introduce each of the categories of intentionality, and not to provide detailed analyses, I will refrain from detailed discussion of strophe 3 or the coda.

As the strophes unfold, a dramatic trajectory involving an ascent to a higher register takes place. Strophe 1 (mm. 1–17) is characterized by an agent who strives to state the *Kopfton* at a higher register, an emotional state that is unfulfilled at the end of the strophe. In strophe 2 (mm. 18–35) the agent makes a second attempt to achieve a higher register, this time successfully accessing the higher register, but failing to complete a descent to the tonic in that register. The


²⁸ William Rothstein has also noted the unusual way in which this chordal 7th is unresolved. See William Rothstein, "Playing with Forms: Mozart's Rondo in D Major, K. 485," in *Engaging Music: Essays in Music Analysis*, ed. Deborah Stein (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 205.

²⁹ Indeed, Steve Larson has shown how Schenkerian analysis interacts with his theory of musical forces.

³⁰ Larson's analyses of musical forces are primarily of melodies, often folk or popular tunes. At the end of part one of his book, Larson promises future analyses of entire works, but he sadly passed away before he was able to publish that book. This analysis, then, represents my attempt to envision how the musical forces work in a larger piece that requires consideration of both melody and harmony, something Larson did not have the opportunity to do in his book.


piece closes in the low register in strophe 3 (mm. 36–41). The *Kopfton*'s place is confirmed as being in the low register by the coda (mm. 41–54).³¹

The strophes are related by the presence of an initiatory melody (first stated in mm. 1–4) that signals each strophe's beginning (Example 2.16). When this melody returns at the beginning of the second strophe (mm. 18–21), its first three measures are exactly the same as in mm. 1–4 (Example 2.17). Its last measure begins the same, but beats two to four of m. 21 harmonize the melody in a different way than in its analogous statement in m. 4. When the melody returns at the beginning of the third strophe (mm. 36–37) it has undergone two variations (Example 2.18). First, it begins in a different metrical position than that in which it has begun before. While in strophes 1 and 2 the melody begins on an anacrusis to beat one of the next measure, in strophe 3, the melody begins on an anacrusis to beat three, making the first HC sound on beat two, rather




Example 2.16 – Initiatory melody at the beginning of strophe 1 in Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 38, No. 5 (mm. 1–4)

³¹ The *Kopfton* in this reading becomes almost like a heavy weight that prevents an agent from maintaining a higher position.



Example 2.17 – Initiatory melody at the beginning of strophe 2 in Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 38, No. 5 (mm. 18–21)




Example 2.18 – Initiatory melody at the beginning of strophe 3 in Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 38, No. 5 (mm. 35–38)

than beat four. Second, the last half of the melody that should have occurred in mm. 38–39, which would have been analogous to mm. 3–4, begins but is cut short in m. 38 by the entrance of contrasting material. Since the contradiction of musical forces is most active in the first two strophes, I will concentrate my attention on those two strophes, with only cursory remarks on the third strophe and coda.

In strophe 1 musical forces are most overtly contradicted at the surface of the music, although there is one location where forces are contradicted at a deeper level of structure. At the surface one of the figures that is most characteristic of this piece, indeed one that rises to the status of a gesture, is akin to an appoggiatura (Example 2.19). It involves a leap up followed by a step down, where the high note of the leap is on a stronger beat or part of the beat than the note to which it steps down. The high note of the leap may or may not be a chord tone, differentiating the figure from an appoggiatura, which typically involves a non-chord tone. Nevertheless, I will call this gesture the "appoggiatura gesture" since the term "appoggiatura" is a convenient way to describe the gesture's contour. In strophe 1 characteristic forms of this gesture occur in mm. 2, 4, and 5–8 (bracketed in black in Example 2.19). A variant of this gesture occurs in mm. 11–12 (bracketed in red in Example 2.19). Here, the high note of the leap occurs "too early" on a weak part of the beat and it is tied to a stronger part of the beat, creating syncopation.

Each time the ascending leap occurs in these gestures it represents a contradiction of melodic gravity, suggesting that an agent is present who pushes the melody upward through the leap. After the leap, the melody descends, giving in to gravity. Several of the leaps also contradict the magnetism of the tonic, including those in mm. 4, 5–7, and 9–11. The leap in m. 4 contradicts the magnetism of the tonic, A4, by leaping away from it to C5 (3). Likewise, in m. 11, the key has changed to E minor, and the leap from E5 to G5 is easily understood as a



Example 2.19 – Appoggiatura gesture and musical forces in mm. 1–12

contradiction of magnetism since the leap occurs from $\hat{1}$ up to $\hat{3}$. In mm. 5–6 the leap up to D5 is preceded by a leap from G#4 (raised $\hat{7}$) to B4 ($\hat{2}$), notes that surround the tonic (A). Rather than descending from B to A, however, the melody leaps up further to D5, contradicting the magnetic pull of the tonic. In m. 7 the appoggiatura gesture from mm. 5–6 is repeated and followed by another instance of the gesture, one that now leaps from D5 ($\hat{4}$) up to F5 (lowered $\hat{6}$). F5 is closer to the upper tonic, A5, than it is to the lower tonic, A4. One might posit, therefore, that the step down from F5 to E5 is a contradiction of the magnetic pull of the upper tonic over F5. Such a description does not accurately capture my experience of the music. Rather, it is as though the non-tonic members of the tonic triad ($\hat{3}$ and $\hat{3}$) exert a strong magnetic attraction over the notes that are immediately above them. That is, $\hat{5}$ exerts an attraction over $\hat{6}$, and $\hat{3}$ exerts an attraction over $\hat{4}$. When there is a half step between $\hat{3}$ and $\hat{4}$ or $\hat{5}$ and $\hat{6}$, the magnetic pull of the lower scale degree is all the more apparent.³² In the second half of m. 7, then, I experience the leap from D5 to F5 as a contradiction of the local magnetism exerted by C5 ($\hat{3}$), which would pull D5 ($\hat{4}$) downward. The descent from F5 gives in to both gravity and magnetism when it moves to E5.

The ascending leaps in mm. 2 and 8 respond to magnetism differently than those in mm. 4, 5–7, and 9–11. Measure 2 represents a particularly interesting case. From a purely melodic standpoint, the leap from E4 (\hat{S}) in m. 2 responds to the magnetic pull of the upper tonic, A4. And yet, this A4 represents a dissonance within the dominant harmony that supports it.³³ Agency may be of particular help in explaining passages such as this one. While the leap up to A4 does

³² This idea of one scale degree exerting an attraction over another scale degree is not new. Brian Hyer argues that Fétis, drawing on earlier writers such as Castil-Blaze (1821), Geslin (1826), and Jelensperger (1830), popularized the notion of tonality in the 1830s and 40s. Fétis characterized each note of the scale in terms of its relative attraction or repose. For the "minor fifth" between 4 and 7, for example, Fétis embraced the term "appellative consonance," noting that both pitches "call forth" their resolutions to 3 and 1, respectively. See Brian Hyer, "Tonality," in *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, edited by Thomas Christensen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 728–33.

³³ Larson's theory deals only with melodic forces. He does not delve into situations such as this, where the note that exerts a magnetic attraction is a harmonic dissonance.


respond to the global magnetism of the key, an agent actually changes the local magnetic environment—something that is perhaps akin to reversing the poles on a magnet. By employing a dominant chord, the agent makes G# (raised $\hat{7}$) exert a temporary magnetic attraction over $\hat{1}$, one that is only fleeting. Once the A $(\hat{1})$ gives in to magnetism and resolves to G# (raised $\hat{7}$), one again feels the sense that the G# as leading-tone is attracted to A when it is harmonized by a tonic chord. Thus, the harmonic environment has the ability to shape our understanding of the local magnetism of a given passage.

Measure 8 represents a special case where the tonic that controls the passage is ambiguous because m. 8 is part of a passage that serves to transition from A minor to E minor. One's sense of magnetism in this passage may be largely dependent on the speed with which one's ears change keys from A minor to E minor. Those who maintain a sense of A minor as the key at the beginning of m. 8 may be inclined to hear the leap from F#5 to A5 as conforming to magnetism. Those who already anticipate a change to E minor at the beginning of m. 8 may feel that the leap from F#5 (2 in E minor) to A5 (4 in E minor) is contradicting the magnetic pull of E5.34 Beyond the key, I believe that inertia also plays an important role in determining the way this particular passage responds to magnetism. Both of the leaps that occurred in the arpeggiated gestures in m. 7 involved a contradiction of magnetism. A pattern has therefore been established in m. 7 in which the leap within the arpeggiated gesture contradicts magnetism. In the third

 $^{^{34}}$ This issue may be made even more complex by considering the notes of the tonic triad as exerting varying degrees of magnetism over the notes that surround them. Candace Brower has diagrammed the strength of attraction of $\hat{1}$, $\hat{3}$, and $\hat{5}$. She shows that the tonic exerts the strongest attraction, the mediant exerts the weakest attraction, and the dominant lies somewhere between those two scale degrees. Considering the passage at m. 8 in a minor, one might reasonably ask whether the attraction of E, $\hat{5}$, is enough to outweigh the attraction of A, $\hat{1}$, given that F#, raised $\hat{6}$, is closer to E than to A. If $\hat{6}$ has not been raised, the answer would surely be that $\hat{5}$'s attraction over lowered $\hat{6}$ is stronger than $\hat{1}$'s attraction over lowered $\hat{6}$. More research is needed on the relative attraction of scale degrees in a given key. See Candace Brower, "Pathway, Blockage, and Containment in *Density 21.5*," *Theory and Practice 22/23* (1997–98): 42.


iteration of the pattern in m. 8, then, I tend to hear the leap contradicting magnetism because the leaps in the previous two instances of the pattern both contradicted magnetism.³⁵

Aside from mm. 7–8, one other location at which inertia comes into play is in mm. 1–4 (Example 2.20). Measures 3–4 at first sound as though they will be an exact repetition of mm. 1–2 since m. 3 is the same as m. 1. On beat two of m. 4, however, the melody leaps up to A4 rather than stepping up to F4 as it had done in the analogous place in m. 2. This change represents a contradiction of inertia since the pattern proposed in mm. 1–2 was altered in m. 4.




Example 2.20 – Contradiction of inertia in Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 38, No. 5 (mm. 1–4)

³⁵ The idea that these three repetitions constitute a pattern is strengthened by the fact that the interval of transposition between successive iterations of the gesture remains the same. That is, each statement of the gesture is consistently transposed up by a third from the previous statement. Some readers may question whether the status of the notes as embellishing tones changes my interpretation. That is, in m. 7 both high notes of the leap were dissonant, while in m. 8 the A5 is a chord tone. It is not the status of the two high notes in m. 7 as embellishing tones that renders the leaps as contradictions of gravity; rather, it is the fact that both leaps ascend away from the tonic that causes them to contradict gravity and magnetism. Inertia would suggest that the pattern of contradicting gravity and magnetism will continue. According to inertia, the listener may also expect the A5 to be an embellishing tone in a manner similar to those leaps in m. 7, and that expectation is thwarted. The issue of contradicting gravity, however, need not be linked to whether A5 is an embellishing tone.



Example 2.21 – Deep middleground graph of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 38, No. 5



Example 2.22 – Shallow middleground graph of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 38, No. 5

While the contradiction of musical forces at deeper levels of structure is most apparent in strophe 2, one location at which it is powerfully active in strophe 1 is when the *Kopfton* (E, $\hat{5}$) descends to $\hat{4}$ (Example 2.22). Rather than stepping down to D4, the line ascends to D5 in m. 5 in a contradiction of gravity and magnetism.


In strophe 2 musical forces are contradicted at both the surface and deeper levels of structure. The way in which musical forces are contradicted at the surface in strophe 2 remains

much the same as the way in which they were contradicted in strophe 1. Instead of reiterating the points I made above, therefore, I will concentrate on the way in which musical forces are contradicted at deeper levels of structure. In the deep middleground graph in Example 2.21, I show that before the *Kopfton* descends to $\hat{4}$ it is prolonged via a 5–6 motion, which contradicts gravity and magnetism. The way in which the 6th above the bass is approached also represents a contradiction of gravity and magnetism (Example 2.22). The F is approached via a reaching-over G in a kind of parallelism to the contour of the arpeggiated gesture. The leap from E up to G contradicts gravity. Not only is the F approached via reaching over, but the E to which it resolves is approached via its own two-note reaching-over figure: in yet another contradiction of gravity and magnetism, the F ascends by step to G, which in turn moves through F to E. Moreover, the initial motion from $\hat{5}$ to $\hat{4}$ is shown as an ascending 7th rather than as a descending 2nd. Thus, four deeper-level contradictions of gravity and magnetism occur: (1) the *Kopfton* ascends to $\hat{4}$ rather than descending, (2) the *Kopfton* is prolonged via a 5–6 motion, (3) the 6th is approached via a reaching over, (4) the return to E is delayed by a two-note reaching-over gesture.

As I have demonstrated, musical forces can be contradicted at both the surface and deeper levels of structure. It is most common for gravity and magnetism to be contradicted, although the contradiction of inertia can also imply the presence of an agent. In the next chapter, I will show that the contradiction of musical forces plays an important role in identifying a gestural agent in Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6.

2.3.3: Unexpected Event


An unexpected event is a musical figure or passage that is marked by virtue of the fact that it somehow defies the listener's expectations. A simple example of an unexpected event appears in Example 2.23. In mm. 9–16 of the first movement of Beethoven's Piano Sonata



Example 2.23 – Unexpected event in Beethoven, Piano Sonata No. 27, Op. 90/I

No. 27, Op. 90 the melody descends in register from the 5th octave to the 3rd octave. In m. 17, however (see the red box), the melody suddenly leaps up to the 6th octave before returning back to a lower register in m. 18, an event that is repeated in m. 21. Other unexpected events include such phenomena as deceptive resolutions, *sforzando* dynamic markings, or the recurrence of some unusual musical figure, such as the low trill in the first movement of Schubert's Piano Sonata in Bb, D. 960. An unexpected event is a moment of intentionality because a defiance of norms points to an entity-as-agent who, in sociological terms, actively contradicts an existing structure.

A similar effect to that which appears in Beethoven's Piano Sonata No. 27 occurs in Schubert's Scherzo in B_b Major, D. 593, No. 1 (Example 2.24). Here, however, several factors besides register combine to make the event seem unexpected, including a contradiction of inertia. The first phrase and the beginning of the second phrase together set up a parallel structure, as though the second phrase will be a varied repetition of the first phrase. The melody from mm. 1–



Example 2.24 – Unexpected event in Schubert, Scherzo in Bb, D. 593 (mm. 1–18)

2 is the same as that in mm. 9–10, although the last beat of m. 10 is altered to lead to slightly different material in m. 11 than that which appeared in m. 3. The upbeat to m. 13 and m. 13's downbeat are the same as the analogous position in the first phrase (the upbeat to m. 5 and the downbeat of m. 5), but the material on beats two and three of m. 11 is unexpected. It is stated at the loudest dynamic yet, in a high register, and with notes that are sustained longer than those that would have occurred had m. 13 been the same as m. 5. It therefore breaks the pattern that has been initiated, contradicting the inertia of that pattern. After this second unexpected event, the phrase comes to a tonicized half cadence in m. 16, and it is repeated in mm. 17–32 (not shown in the example).³⁶

³⁶ Further examples of unexpected events involving a high register appeared in Example 2.4 during my discussion of gesture in Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 119, No. 2. At m. 9, for example, the descending gesture is

Not only can a sudden motion to a high register give rise to an unexpected event, but an unprepared low register can also have the same effect. In Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 62, No. 5, a rising line that contradicts gravity and magnetism appears to be heading for a higher register (Example 2.25). The line pauses on A5, harmonized by a D#⁰⁷ chord in m. 29, and in m. 30 one of the tritones from that chord, D#—A, is played in a low register at a loud dynamic. The choice of interval here, coupled with the sudden lack of harmonic motion given the previously established two-chord per measure harmonic rhythm, makes this moment stand out as particularly unexpected. After m. 30, the melody from the beginning of the piece (mm. 5ff.) returns in an altered form, as if it has been changed by this unexpected event (compare Example 2.25 to Example 2.26). In m. 6, the melody reaches up to G5, while in m. 33, which is analogous to m. 6, a repetition of m. 32 occurs, as if the melody has been weakened such that it is no longer able to attain the higher G5. A full reading of this piece might connect the registral collapse in m. 30 with the inability to reach G5 when the opening melody returns.


So far I have investigated unexpected events that last a relatively short amount of time, but the length of the event is not limited to short durations. An example of a lengthier unexpected event occurs in Chopin's Mazurka Op. 6, No. 1 (Example 2.27). The passage in mm. 17–24 represents an unexpected change in several musical dimensions: the dynamic increases to *fortissimo* from *pianissimo*; the highest notes yet, C‡6s, are stated in mm. 17, 19, 21, and 23; the texture changes from melody and accompaniment to one that is homorhythmic without the characteristic mazurka-style ("oom-pa-pa") accompaniment that had previously dominated the left hand. Importantly, m. 25 marks a recognizable return to the character of the passage that

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stated for the first time in a high register, something I indicate with an exclamation point in my labeling of that gesture. Its appearance in the high register is only temporary: it is repeated in m. 11, then returns to its original position in the low register in m. 12.



Example 2.25 – Unexpected event in Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 62, No. 5 (mm. 26–35)



Example 2.26 – Beginning of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 62, No. 5 (mm. 1–10)

occurred in mm. 1–16, although the loud dynamic from mm. 17–24 continues in mm. 25ff. The character of the unexpected event, therefore, does not completely alter the course of the music. When a significant change occurs that seems to alter the course of the music, it may best be

considered under the change of state category of intentionality, something I discuss below in subsection 2.3.4.³⁷




Example 2.27 – Unexpected event in Chopin, Mazurka Op. 6, No. 1 (mm. 1–27)

³⁷ One might argue that this unstable material is actually expected given its formal position: it is the B section of a rounded binary. Such a B section also requires a change in order to differentiate itself from the surrounding A section material. One does not know from the outset, however, that one will be hearing a rounded binary form. It is only after this B section has occurred and the return of A appears that one understands how the material fits into the formal structure of the piece.

Finally, I present two examples in which register does not play an important role in defining the unexpected quality of the event. In Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 33, No. 3, the choice of the key to which Beethoven modulates in the initial modulating parallel period is unexpected (Example 2.28). An IAC in the home key of F major occurs in m. 4. Beethoven begins the next phrase in m. 5 in D major (VI#!) without any transitional passage to smooth the juxtaposition of these two distantly-related keys.

Harmony also plays a role in an unexpected event in Mozart's Rondo K. 485, where an expected cadence fails to materialize (Example 2.29). Measures 36ff. mark a varied restatement of the theme from this rondo in the key of A major (the dominant). At m. 43, one expects a PAC to occur. At least three factors create the expectation for a cadence: (1) measure 43 is analogous to m. 8, which marks the initial cadence for the rondo theme; (2) the harmonic progression in m. $42 (V_{4.3}^{6-5})$ leads us to expect tonic on the downbeat of m. 43; (3) measure 43 falls on hyperbeat 4,



Example 2.28 – Unexpected event in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 33, No. 3 (mm. 1–8)



Example 2.29 – Unexpected event in Mozart, Rondo K. 485 (mm. 35–50)

a hyperbeat that often marks a cadential measure. A sense of cadence is evaded in m. 43, however, in several ways: (1) rather than moving to $\hat{1}$ in the bass on the downbeat of m. 43, $\hat{5}$ is maintained, such that a strong aural motion from $\hat{5}$ to $\hat{1}$ is avoided; (2) a restatement of the first two measures of the theme begins in m. 43, causing a hypermetric reinterpretation, where the expected hyperbeat 4 sounds as though it has been replaced by hyperbeat 1; (3) perhaps most

strikingly, a role reversal, something I discuss as part of the change of state category of intentionality (see below) occurs in m. 43: the right hand, which had previously played the melody, and the left hand, which had previously played an accompanimental role, switch material. Now, the left hand plays the melody, and the right hand plays the accompaniment. All of these factors lead to an evaded cadence, such that what is unexpected about this passage is the *absence* of the cadence. Similar situations abound in the literature, with a common example being the deceptive motion in which V moves to vi, an example of which can be found at m. 136 in this same rondo. ³⁸ Unexpected events, then, can be of a variety of different types, and they often represent the incursion of an agent into the piece.

2.3.4: Change of State

A change of state occurs when some dimension of the music has been altered. By "dimension" I mean any musical parameter whose uninterrupted and continued existence would not surprise the listener. Examples of dimensions that may undergo alteration include such things as texture, dynamics, register, *topos*, rhythm and meter, and the role of a particular line (expressing the melody or accompanying the melody). There may be some degree of overlap between changes of state and unexpected events—indeed, it may best to think of these two categories as two poles of a spectrum of possibilities as in Figure 2.1. On one end, changes of state represent more long-term alterations to the music and may be effected either gradually or suddenly. On the opposite end of the spectrum, unexpected events are temporary and usually sudden. The choice between reading a moment of agency that lies somewhere in between these

³⁸ An interesting future study might be to consider whether deceptive motion always constitutes an unexpected event. Repeated deceptive motion, for instance, may set up the expectation for deceptive motion such that the expected resolution itself becomes unexpected. On expectation in music see David Huron, *Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).

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Unexpected event

- Temporary
- Sudden
- Usually involves a surprising change

Change of state

- More long term
- May be sudden or more gradual

Figure 2.1 – Unexpected event and change of state arranged on a spectrum

two extremes as an unexpected event or as a change of state may simply depend on the reading an author wishes to espouse. In some cases either category may be appropriate—the point is more that the presence of either category supports the implication of a musical agent, rather than the decision to invoke one category over another. Unexpected events are likely to give the impression that an agent is being deliberately forceful or that one agent is interrupting another. Changes of state, on the other hand, likely signal an agent taking control of a passage, or perhaps sneaking its influence into a passage that had previously been controlled by a different agent. While myriad examples of changes of state exist in the literature, I will present three here as representatives of this category. More changes of state will be explored in chapters three and four.

As I noted when I discussed Mozart's Rondo K. 485 in the context of the unexpected event category of intentionality, m. 43 marks a role reversal. Role reversals are most often categorized as a special type of change of state in which a voice that was playing an accompanimental part takes the melody and the voice that was playing the melody takes the accompaniment (Example 2.29). This kind of interplay between different voices is discussed

further, especially in the context of Haydn's string quartets, by Charles Rosen.³⁹ This passage, however, is an example of the ambiguity that exists between an unexpected event and a change of state. The reversal at m. 43 is sudden, which may initially suggest the unexpected event category of intentionality. As the reversal continues in mm. 44–46, however, one might begin to question whether this event qualifies as temporary or long term, a binary that represents the main distinction between unexpected event and change of state. The two hands resume their original roles, with the right hand playing the melody and the left hand playing the accompaniment, in m. 47, such that the reversal only lasts for four measures. In such cases, the reading one wishes to espouse for the piece as a whole may have an impact on one's decision to highlight unexpected event over change of state or vice versa. Alternatively, choosing between unexpected event and change of state may have little bearing on one's reading, and the decision may therefore be unimportant: both categories allow an analyst to imply the presence of an agent. Several possibilities exist for the special way in which a role reversal may suggest the presence of agents. It may suggest, for example, that a single agent is present who controls the distribution of melody and accompaniment among the different voices. Likewise, it may also suggest that two agents are present, perhaps each vying for the attention that playing the melody often brings.

Another simple kind of change of state occurs at the end of the transition in the first movement of Beethoven's "Waldstein" sonata (Example 2.30). In m. 29, a passage of descending arpeggios in sixteenth notes begins, a dimension that is altered in m. 31 (where the red box occurs) when the melody ascends in eighth notes.

Finally, a change in *topos* is also indicative of the presence of an agent. Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 6 is framed by two passages that suggest the brilliant style with their

³⁹ See Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven* (New York: Norton, 1998), 116–119.



Example 2.30 – Change of state in Beethoven, Piano Sonata No. 21, Op. 53/I (mm. 29–36)

rapid passagework and *forte* dynamic (Examples 2.31 and 2.32). Indeed, this passage may be indicative of the kind of disjuncture that Carolyn Abbate suggests is necessary to identify the presence of a narrator. ⁴⁰ Between these brilliant-style introductory and concluding passages lies a pastoral-style *topos*, suggested by pedal perfect fifths (mm. 7–12), the predominance of thirds and sixths in the treble parts, and the related *ländler*-style dance that materializes in mm. 19–21. The change from brilliant style to pastoral at m. 7 and the return to brilliant style at m. 69 both represent locations at which an agential presence can be implied. Moreover, the *topos* may help define characteristics of the agent in question, such as its mood or its personality. The brilliant style, for example, may suggest an agent who is extroverted and who craves attention. The pastoral, on the other hand, may suggest an agent who is introverted and prefers the solitude one finds in nature. As I will discuss in Chapters Three and Four, however, the particular persona one develops for an agent is also dependent on the narrative one envisions for a given piece.

⁴⁰ See Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 19.




Example 2.31 – Change from brilliant-style *topos* to pastoral-style *topos* in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 6 (mm. 1–24)



Example 2.32 – Return of brilliant-style *topos* at end of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 6 (mm. 69–74)

2.3.5: Conflict

A conflict occurs when at least two oppositional manifestations of the same musical parameter are presented simultaneously such that competing ideas are suggested to the listener. One of the most common musical parameters in which this category is manifest is meter (Example 2.33). In "Abschied" from Schumann's *Waldszenen*, the melody and accompaniment sound as though they are in a compound meter despite the simple time signature. In mm. 8–9, however, the right hand performs a duple division of the beat, while the left hand maintains the triple division that had been established since the beginning of the piece, a metrical conflict that suggests the presence of two agents—one that continues the triple division and one that superposes the duple division. This kind of metrical conflict can be characterized as a grouping dissonance (G3/2) under Harald Krebs's system.⁴¹ Other parameters that might manifest conflict include keys or modes, topoi, or formal functions.




Example 2.33 – Metrical conflict in Schumann, "Abschied" from *Waldszenen* (mm. 8–9)

⁴¹ See Harald Krebs, *Fantasy Pieces: Metrical Dissonance in the Music of Robert Schumann* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31–33.

A different kind of metrical dissonance appears in mm. 25–28 of Mozart's Gigue K. 574, where articulation plays a key role in defining two different beat divisions (Example 2.34): a grouping of two eighth notes into quarter notes is suggested by the particular distribution of articulation. In m. 25, for example, two notes are played staccato, followed by two notes that are slurred. This alternation between articulation styles continues through beat one of m. 26. Meanwhile, the left hand continues articulating the dotted-quarter beat.

The metrical dissonance need not be explicit in order to be considered a conflict. An example of Krebs's subliminal dissonance occurs in mm. 37–38 of Schumann's "Jagdlied" from *Waldszenen*, where a duple division of the beat occurs in both the left and right hands (Example 2.35).⁴² These measures are flanked by passages in which a triple division of the beat occurs. While overt metrical dissonances may suggest the presence of two oppositional agents at the same time, subliminal dissonance likely indicates the presence of one agent who interrupts



Example 2.34 – Conflict in Mozart, Gigue K. 574 (mm. 24–31)

⁴² Ibid., 46.



Example 2.35 – Conflict in Schumann, "Jagdlied" from *Waldszenen* (mm. 33–40)



Example 2.36 – Conflict in Schubert, Piano Sonata in Bb, D. 960/I (mm. 196–200)


another; that is, the two agents exist in succession. Alternatively, subliminal dissonance, like grouping or displacement dissonances, may also suggest conflict within the mind of a single agent.

Conflict may also exist when two different keys are suggested. Such a situation arises in mm. 196–200 of the first movement of Schubert's Piano Sonata in B $_{\flat}$, D. 960 (Example 2.36). The right hand's melody suggests FM in at least two ways: (1) when this theme is first introduced at the beginning of the piece, it begins on $\hat{1}$ (B $_{\flat}$), thus one is likely to hear the F with which the restatement of the theme begins in m. 197 as tonic as well; and (2) the consistent motion between E-natural and F is suggestive of motion between the tonic and leading tone in

FM. By contrast, the left hand suggests D minor by repeating the D minor triad in mm. 196–97, and with the authentic cadence in D minor that it creates in m. 200.⁴³

2.3.6: Repetition/Restatement

A repetition or restatement is any material that recurs either immediately in succession (repetition) or separated in time from the original presentation (restatement). Both phenomena suggest the presence of a virtual agent because the decision to return to material previously stated represents an intentional act. An example of repetition occurs at the beginning of the first movement of Mozart's Piano Sonata K. 279 (Example 2.37). An initial presentation of material in mm. 1–2 is elided with a repetition of that material in mm. 3–4 in a phenomenon that James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy have termed "Mozartian Loops." The elision in combination with the rolled chord in the right hand at the beginning of the repeated segment makes the repetition seem particularly abrupt, highlighting the sense that the repetition was intentional.



Example 2.37 – Repetition in Mozart's Piano Sonata K. 279/I (mm. 1–6)

⁴³ Of course, when the melody is played with the accompaniment, D minor becomes solidified at m. 200 when the cadence forces the issue.

⁴⁴ See James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, *Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late Eighteenth-Century Sonata* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 80–85.

Numerous examples of restatement can be found in Mozart's Rondo K. 485 every time the refrain theme recurs. The first such restatement begins at m. 36 (Examples 2.38 and 2.39). This instance of restatement is particularly surprising because the refrain theme recurs in the unexpected key of the dominant rather than in the tonic—as one might have expected given the generic norms of rondos.

The repetition need not be of a particular passage or motive. Indeed, the repeated material may be as short as a single note, such as that which occurs at the beginning of Chopin's Mazurka Op. 6, No. 2 (Example 2.40). The note G# is incessantly repeated multiple times at the beginning of the mazurka in mm. 1–8. In the left hand, the fifth G#–D# is repeated using the same rhythm as the melody. Interestingly, mm. 9ff. may be heard as a kind of development of the repetition.



Example 2.38 – Initial statement of rondo theme in Mozart, Rondo K. 485 (mm. 1–4)



Example 2.39 – Restatement of rondo theme in the dominant in Mozart, Rondo K. 485 (mm. 36–39)



Example 2.40 – Repetition in Chopin, Mazurka Op. 6, No. 2 (mm. 1–15)



Example 2.41 – Return of Repeated G# in Chopin, Mazurka Op. 6, No. 2 (mm. 46–57)

The note G# is still featured in the melody, but it is surrounded by other notes as well. The way in which G# is featured in mm. 9ff. is representative of much of the piece. This kind of repetition may suggest a fixation on the part of an agent (mm. 1–8), one that persists despite other thoughts which enter the agent's mind (mm. 9ff.). Near the end of the piece, the obsessive repetition of G# returns, indicating that the agent has been unable (or, perhaps, unwilling) to let go of the thought (Example 2.41).

2.3.7: Descriptive Multiplicity


As I stated at the end of subsection 2.2, the categories I defined above are not mutually exclusive. Sometimes a single passage of music may be described under multiple categories of intentionality, and sometimes the decision of whether to invoke a particular category may be less obvious than in those examples I presented above. Indeed, sometimes the manifestation of one category may necessitate invoking a second category: the repetition/restatement category of intentionality, for example, is implicated in my definition of gesture, since I require that a figure be repeated or restated before I categorize it as a gesture. Table 2.4 presents a summary of attributes that either confirm or negate the presence of a given category of intentionality. One may use the information given in Table 2.4 to determine the degree to which it is appropriate to invoke a particular category: column 1 presents attributes that confirm the presence of a category, while column 2 indicates attributes that would negate the presence of a category. The table is meant to be used as a kind of accumulative checklist: the more attributes present from column 1 for a given category of intentionality, for example, the more strongly that category is represented. One may also occasionally find that most items from column 1 for a given category are present, but one item from column 2 is simultaneously present. In such a situation, the

Table 2.4 – Attributes that confirm or negate the invocation of a given category of intentionality

| | L | • | L | • |
|-------------|--------------|---|---|--|
| Column #: | \downarrow | Ī | | 7 |
| Category | | Confirmation Attributes | | Negation Attributes |
| | • | Short temporal span (about two seconds or less) | • | Lengthy temporal span |
| | • | Marked for significance (often through repetition) | • | Unmarked |
| | • | Recognizably repeated and/or restated throughout the | • | Not repeated |
| Gesture | | work | • | Lacks a distinctive profile that can be used to identify |
| | • | Capable of being defined in terms of a distinctive | | later manifestations of the gesture |
| | | profile that can be generalized to identify later | | |
| | | manifestations (whether altered or exact repetitions) | | |
| Contraction | • | Determination that musical forces are active in a | • | Musical forces not active in a given composition |
| Musical | | given composition (need not be stated explicitly) | | (should be explicitly stated for tonal works) |
| Forces | • | Opposition of at least one of the three melodic forces: | • | No opposition of melodic forces present (follows |
| LOICES | | gravity, magnetism, or inertia. | | gravity, magnetism, and inertia) |
| | • | Establishment of normative, unmarked flow of music | • | No established unmarked flow of the music to which |
| | • | Marked event that disrupts the unmarked flow of the | | one can compare the event to determine markedness |
| | | music | • | No marked event present |
| Unexpected | • | Event is relatively contained and temporary (i.e., the | • | Attributes from the event cause a more lasting change |
| Event | | marked parameters of the event do not constitute a | | in the unmarked flow of the music that follows the |
| | | newly established norm). Note that this does not | | event |
| | | mean the event must be short, though many | | |
| | | unexpected events are. | | |
| | • | Establishment of normative, unmarked flow of music | • | No established unmarked flow of the music |
| Change of | • | Change in the original unmarked flow | • | No change in the unmarked flow |
| State | • | A new unmarked flow becomes established based on | • | No newly-established unmarked flow |
| | | characteristics indicated by the change | • | Change is temporary or fleeting |
| | • | At least two manifestations of a single musical | • | Only one manifestation of a given musical parameter |
| Conflict | | parameter present | | is present |
| | • | Manifestations are in opposition to one another | ٠ | No opposition is indicated |
| Repetition/ | • | Material is stated then either immediately repeated or | • | Material does not recur either immediately or after |
| Restatement | \downarrow | restated after some time has passed | | some time has passed |

analyst must judge from the context whether it is appropriate to invoke a category or not, explicitly identifying one's reasoning for the decision one makes.

In Example 2.42 two different musical textures are presented in alternation: a monophonic passage and a homophonic passage. One might reasonably ask whether it would be appropriate to invoke the change of state category of intentionality to describe the action of shifting between the homophonic and polyphonic textures. Changes to other musical parameters serve to highlight the shifting textures: the monophonic texture is always played *pianissimo*, in tempo, and *legato*. The homophonic texture is always played *mezzo forte*, with a looser sense of tempo, and *staccato*. Table 2.4 suggests that to confirm the presence of a Change of State, one expects: (1) an unmarked musical flow to be established, (2) a change in the original unmarked flow, and (3) the establishment of a new unmarked flow. Table 2.4 also suggests that the absence of any of these three conditions, or a change that is only temporary may be indicative that the



Example 2.42 – Alternation of monophonic and homophonic texture in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 845/I, mm. 1–10

change of state category of intentionality is not active. What makes the decision difficult in Example 2.42 is the relatively short timespan each texture occupies and the fact that the textures alternate. Is the first statement of the monophonic texture enough to establish an unmarked flow of music? Is the first statement of homophonic texture enough to indicate a change that is more substantial as opposed to temporary? In less clear situations such as that in Example 2.42, one's choice to invoke a certain category of intentionality may also be bolstered by the reading one wishes to espouse; that is, evidence from later in the piece may support one's decision to activate a given category. In any case, it is important for the analyst to clearly indicate the reasoning behind his or her intention. 45

Perhaps further complicating the issue here is the possibility that another category of intentionality may better describe the situation at the beginning of Example 2.42: that of a contradiction of musical inertia. Example 2.43 shows that in the passage that follows Example 2.42 the alternation between monophonic and homophonic textures does not continue, contradicting musical inertia, which would suggest that the pattern of alternation established in



Example 2.43 – Discontinuation of alternation in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 845/I, mm. 10–16

⁴⁵ It is beyond the scope of this subsection to give a full analysis of this piano sonata, and thus the two questions I posed earlier will remain for the reader to consider since the answers probably depend on how one wishes to frame one's interpretation of the movement. Given that the monophonic texture seems to return at numerous points throughout the movement, it may be useful to advocate for alternating changes of state at the beginning of the movement in order to assert the presence of an agent or agents associated with those texture.

Example 2.42 would continue. One might view Example 2.42 as simply creating a pattern, then, paving the way for agential intervention in Example 2.43. In this alternative reading, the agent's presence may not be revealed until Example 2.43, whereas positing that the change of state category of intentionality is active in Example 2.42 would suggest that an agent intervenes at the beginning of the piece. One might also consider the possibility that both categories of intentionality are active simultaneously. That is, that the pattern initiated at the beginning of the piece involves rapid changes of state, and that inertia is contradicted when that pattern is discontinued in Example 2.43. Three readings of this passage are thus possible: (1) changes of state are active in Example 2.42, and the contradiction of musical inertia in Example 2.43 is not important, (2) changes of state are not active in Example 2.42, but a contradiction of musical inertia is a factor in Example 2.43; or (3) changes of state are active in Example 2.42 and there is a contradiction of musical inertia in Example 2.43. The decision to highlight one of these readings instead of another rests with the analyst, and it relies on the interpretation one wishes to develop for the piece. If changes of state are important later in the piece, for example, then it may be that the analyst highlights the change of state category of intentionality at the beginning of the work as well. If, on the other hand, a contradiction of musical inertia seems to be important to one's reading, then it may be more beneficial to highlight the contradiction in Example 2.43. In cases such as this where the manifestation of a particular category is not clear, it is important for the analyst to point to the evidence that governs his or her decision.

2.4: Concluding Thoughts

In this chapter I have defined musical agency as the metaphorical interpretation of music as analogous to human action. Since action theorists emphasize that an entity must perform an

act intentionally before it can be raised to the status of an agent, I have argued that music theorists must also identify moments of intentional action in music in order to posit the existence of a virtual agent. These moments are classified under six categories of intentionality: gesture, contradiction of musical forces, unexpected event, change of state, conflict, and repetition/restatement. These categories are not intended to be mutually exclusive—rather, multiple categories can be active in a single passage, and it is possible for a single event to be understood under two or more categories. Identifying the categories of intentionality that are active in a piece represents the first step in an agential analysis. The second step, which will be explored in Chapter Three, involves determining the number of agents that are active in a piece, and attributing the actions one identified in the first step to those agents, a process that requires the development of a musical narrative.

CHAPTER THREE

MUSICAL AGENCY, NARRATIVE, AND SCHENKERIAN ANALYSIS

3.1: Introduction

Having discussed the categories of intentionality in detail in Chapter Two, this chapter examines the way in which the categories of intentionality can be analytically applied. The first section of the chapter will be devoted to a study of the interaction between agency and narrative. I will begin by reviewing and commenting on some of the ways in which scholars have already attempted to address agency within the context of narrative theory. More specifically, one of the central arguments against viewing music in the context of narrative centers on the issue of whether music can express agents. Following Seymour Chatman, I will argue that since music can express agency, it can also be understood in the context of a narrative. In a detailed analysis of Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 I will demonstrate how the categories allow me to identify agents in the Bagatelle and offer an alternative reading to that which Janet Schmalfeldt develops in her article "On the Relation of Analysis to Performance." I will argue that the development of a narrative allows one to associate actions with particular agents, and to posit the continued existence of those agents throughout a given work.

In the second section of this chapter I will examine an interaction between agency and Schenkerian analysis. I will briefly review the ways in which other scholars have paired Schenkerian analysis with theories of music and meaning before delving into an analysis of Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6. Both narrative and Schenkerian analysis will be integral tools in Chapter Four, where I present an agential analysis of Schubert's Piano Sonata in A Major, D. 959.

3.2: Agency and Narrative

Several scholars have questioned the degree to which agency entails narrative, or conversely, the degree to which narrative entails agency. Table 3.1 shows various scholars' answers to two questions: (1) does narrative entail agency; and (2) does agency entail narrative? As it turns out, most scholars believe that agency entails narrative, but conversely scholars are less definitive on the question of whether narrative necessitates agency. Neither Philip Rupprecht nor Joshua Mailman provide strong indications that they believe narratives require agency, while Gregory Karl attempts to avoid the term "narrative" by instead discussing "plots" that entail agency. Part of the reason that scholars may be more likely to argue that narrative does not require agency is because of the strong reactions on the part of critics such as Carolyn Abbate and Jean-Jacques Nattiez against the existence of musical narratives due to the lack of a narrator, a point to which I will return shortly.

Contrary to the majority of scholars listed, I believe that narrative analysis entails agency. The scholars who argue that it does not entail an agent often create a narrative from a succession of emotional or psychological states. In my opinion, these emotions and psychological states must be attached to an implicit character, or agent, in order to be plausible. Therefore, while the focus of such an analysis may not be on the actions of the agent, the agent is implicitly present in the background. When it comes to identifying which actions in a given piece belong to which agents, narrative theory can be a useful tool, and I would therefore align myself most closely with the "agency entails narrative" camp. I wish to emphasize, however, that narrative analyses and agential analyses have different foci. In narrative analysis, the focus is on understanding musical events, actions, or psychological states as arranged in a coherent plot. In an agential analysis, the focus is on agents and the actions for which they are responsible, and the ways in

Table 3.1 – Authors' answers to two questions: (a) does agency entail narrative? (b) does narrative entail agency?

a. Does agency entail narrative?

| Page | Quotation or Description |
|------|---|
| 133 | "Multiple agency analyses can focus on individual moments without necessarily weaving them into a narrative that exhaustively addresses an entire movement or composition." |
| 135 | Explicitly includes it as the fourth step in an agential analysis: understanding of this fictional agency or these fictional agencies as relevant in the unfolding of a plausible chain of human actions and events |
| N/A | Characterizes the vocal and instrumental persona as interacting in a way the implies narrative (example: the instrumental persona might comment on the events in the vocal personas world) |
| 29 | "In listening to the piece, it is as though one follows a series of actions that are performed now, before one's earsit is as though the future of the agent is open." |
| | Strictly speaking, Maus argues for understanding actions in the context of a musical drama rather than in a narrative in order to avoid the problem of identifying a musical narrator who can mediate the temporal past. Since his description of actions is as though they are arranged in a series, though, I have included him as essentially arguing that agency requires emplotment in a similar fashion as a narrative. |
| 13 | "The inevitable indeterminacy of musical agents, especially in instrumental music, does not mean that we cannot |
| | construct compelling musical narratives based on the actions of various imagined agents." |

b. Does narrative entail agency?

| "Transvaluation, as the fundamental condition for narrative, may or may not be enacted through the staging of a higher-level narrative agency (a "teller") or of basic-level internal and external agents (as "protagonist" and "antagonist")." | "Instead of mapping a particular story of actors and actions onto the music, I shall describe expressive states evoked by this music and the ways that their unfolding implies a narrative." | N/A While he does not outright state it, his analysis describes the plot as a succession of emotional states, suggesting that at least agential action is not necessary. | 189 Accounts of narrative in instrumental music frequently invoke a concept of agency | 133 It is difficult to say what Mailman believes. While he states that "Agency is important to narrative," he also says that the assertions of agency most important to narrative need not occur within the timeframe that the narrative focuses on. He concludes that, especially in processive music, we might understand the important agency as either setting the narrative in motion or observing and experiencing the narrative as it progresses. Therefore the agent, strictly speaking, is outside the narrative. Since Mailman seems to require an agent to set a narrative in motion, however, I have included him in this category. 16 For the purposes of this article, the claim that a musical work is organized by a plot means that some of its elements | can be understood to represent quast-sentient agents and men action. |
|---|--|--|---|--|--|
| Almén/Hatten (2013) | Klein (2004) | Kraus (1991)* | Rupprecht (2013) | Mailman (2013) Karl (1997) | |
| Not necessarily | | | | sə X | |

^{*}In conversation Kraus agreed that his 1991 article gave the impression that narrative does not necessitate agency. Today, however, he believes that narrative entails agency. Thus, while Kraus (1991) is in the "not necessarily" camp, Kraus (2014) can be firmly placed in the "Yes" group.

which they interact with one another.¹ In an agential analysis, then, narrative becomes a useful frame in which one can coherently describe the actions of the agents one identifies.

Compared to agential analysis, narrative analysis has enjoyed more attention as a subfield within music theory, and recently it has experienced a surge in popularity with the publication of Byron Almén's *A Theory of Musical Narrative*, and Michael Klein and Nicholas Reyland's *Music and Narrative Since 1900*. Prior to the increased popularity of musical narrative, scholars such as Abbate and Nattiez questioned whether it was appropriate to apply narrative theory to musical analysis at all. In what follows, I examine one thread of the discussion begun by Abbate and Nattiez that relates directly to musical agency, and I discuss recent responses to these critiques by Almén, Klein, and Robert Hatten.

In "What the Sorcerer Said," Abbate argues that music does not have a past tense like that which exists in literary narrative, and that therefore music cannot narrate in the same way as literary narrative.² She continues along similar lines in her book *Unsung Voices*, published seven years after her article. Here she still argues that music has no past tense, and she maintains that in the majority of cases music cannot narrate. Yet she also allows that certain gestures in music can constitute a narrating voice. She argues that these gestures must be something special, marked by multiple disjunctions in the passages around it, in order for us to understand it as a narrator.³ In Abbate's terms, then, music on the whole cannot express narrative, but it can express moments of narration. These moments require marked disjunctions that indicate the presence of a narrator who establishes a past tense in which one can understand that moment of the music unfolding.

¹ My description here is influenced by Byron Almén's three narrative levels. At the agential level, agents in a given work are identified and described. At the actantial level, the analyst discusses the interaction between agents. See Byron Almén, *A Theory of Musical Narrative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 55–57.

² See Carolyn Abbate, "What the Sorcerer Said," 19th-Century Music 12/3 (Spring 1989): 221–30.

³ Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 19.

Like Abbate. Nattiez also rejects the notion that music can be understood as projecting a narrative. In "Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music," Nattiez tries to show that the narratives one ascribes to music are created by the listener and not by the music itself. He argues that music is at best imitative of literary narrative, but that such metaphorical borrowings are superfluous.⁴ Fundamental to Nattiez's argument is the idea of causality between events.⁵ Nattiez argues that to invoke narrative an analyst needs two objects that have been placed in a linear and temporal dimension to one another. The distinction between a "metaphorical" narrative and a nonmetaphorical narrative for Nattiez seems to rest upon where causality is established. That is, if the reader establishes causality between the events, then the narrative is metaphorical. If the relationship of causality is *established by agents* in the work, then narrative is non-metaphorical. One might question why Nattiez sees metaphor as somehow less persuasive than other, presumably non-metaphorical, ways of describing music. As several cognitive linguists have articulated, metaphors are powerful tools humans use to understand the world around them.⁷ Given that metaphors are essential to the way in which humans process information, it makes sense that humans would also apply metaphor to the interpretation of music.

Responding to Nattiez, Klein acknowledges that musical narrative exists in the mind of the listener, and he counters Nattiez's argument by positioning musical narrative in terms of

⁴ Jean-Jacques Nattiez, "Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?," *Journal of the Royal Musical Association* 115/2 (1990): 257.

⁵ Nattiez bases his argument on Seymour Chatman's definition of narrative, in which "One cannot account for events without recognizing the existence of things causing or being affected by those events." See Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 34.

⁶ Jean-Jacques Nattiez, "Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?," *Journal of the Royal Musical Association* 115/2 (1990): 246.

⁷ See, for instance, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); or Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, "Rethinking Metaphor," in *The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought*, edited by Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 53–66.

Nattiez's own tripartition. Klein states that one can understand narrative in poietic, esthesic, and immanent terms: a composer may wish to write music that narrates, focusing on musical attrributes that signal narration (poietic); music may have narrative attributes, regardless of whether the composer intends to write narrative music (immanent); and a listener may want to hear music as a narrative, regardless of the composer's intent (esthesic). Klein essentially argues that there may be different ways to perceive narrative according to Nattiez's own semiotic model. Klein also acknowledges Abbate's argument that narrative requires a narrator to establish a "past tense" for the work. Klein draws on E.T. Cone's personae in *The Composer's Voice* to assume the existence of a persona behind the music. Klein's narrative develops from the arrangement of a series of expressive states in the music that he attributes to an overriding persona who governs the work.

Klein seems not to have a particular problem with the constraints that Abbate or Nattiez place on musical narrative. Rather, he embraces their restrictions by: (1) showing that according to Nattiez's own model, musical narrative *can* exist in the mind of the listener; and (2) by encouraging analysts to be imaginative in positing the existence of a persona who governs the work, and to whom events can be attributed. In response to Klein, however, Nattiez could maintain that the narrative Klein develops is metaphorical and that metaphor is superfluous in musical analysis. Further, one might also imagine Abbate objecting that a lack of significant and multiple disjunctions in Chopin's ballade precludes the possibility that a persona is portrayed by the music.

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⁸ Michael Klein, "Chopin's Fourth Ballade as Musical Narrative," *Music Theory Spectrum* 26/1 (Spring 2004): 24.

⁹ A useful future study may be to consider how Klein's narrative for Chopin's ballade might be enhanced by the way in which I have described musical agency in this dissertation. As Klein acknowledges, he spends his time discussing the expressive states and how their arrangement allows one to attribute meaning to the persona rather than focusing on the agents (Ibid., 26). It may be useful to consider how actions are manifest in the ballade in the context of the expressive states Klein identifies.

Almén takes a different approach than Klein. He identifies a fundamental problem with the way in which musical narrative is conceived, arguing that one cannot compare musical narrative to literary narrative in a kind of "descendent model" in which all attributes of literary narrative have analogues in musical narrative. Instead, Almén suggests that one should view musical and literary narrative in a kind of "sibling" relationship, where the parent is simply "narrative." In this way, some attributes of literary narrative will have analogues in musical narrative, some will not, and some may be extended or expanded in interesting ways.

Almén still addresses arguments made against musical narrative by those who have been advocating for what he calls the descendent model. Important for my purpose is how he addresses Abbate's claim that music needs a narrator. Almén identifies three functions of a narrator. First, narrators situate related events in the past. Almén draws on Gérard Genette, who identifies two ways in which temporality can be established in a narrative: (1) summary, in which the narrator describes what happens; and (2) scene, where the words and actions of the characters are directly presented to the audience. When scene predominates in a given work such that a narrator is not explicitly present, the story does not simply fall apart, a point that speaks to the fact that a narrator is not always necessary. Almén argues that fiction often creates its own past tense through juxtaposition of different, seemingly opposed tenets. Thus a narrator is not required to establish the past tense for readers—they may establish the past tense based on contextual cues in a given work. Abbate could argue, however, that she has addressed this point by allowing the rise of a narrator when disjunctions occur in the music. Second, a narrator typically organizes the plot or story in a coherent manner. Almén argues that readers can

¹⁰ Byron Almén, A Theory of Musical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 32.

¹¹ Ibid., 33.

¹² Ibid., 34.

organize the plot themselves. While a narrator may give the reader a preferred reading, the narrator's version of the story is not an absolute reading. The reader is free to believe or deem as suspicious the narrator's version of the story, and certain events may lead one to believe the narrator's version of the story with varying degrees of confidence. Third, the narrator usually mediates between the tale and the reader. In literature written in the "Free Indirect Style," however, no such mediation exists. Genette recognizes this style as evoked when "the narrator takes on the speech of the character, or, if one prefers, the character speaks through the voice of the narrator, and the two instances then are *merged*."

Unlike Klein, Almén explicitly discusses musical agents in the narratives he develops. What he does not do, however, is explore how the figures he identifies *become* musical agents. Moreover, there is a fundamental difference between the way in which he conceives of agency in his work and the way in which I conceive of it in the theory I develop here. Whereas he calls musical figures *agents*, I call these figures the resulting *actions* of agents who are "behind the scenes" so to speak. In his analysis of Chopin's Prelude in G major at the beginning of his book, for instance, Almén identifies two motives, A and B, which he calls agents. He describes motive A as "striving upward," while motive B is "yielding." Almén would likely argue that it is these attributes that make them akin to human agents. His analysis could be strengthened, however, if he viewed these two motives as actions of agents because the agents would be free to interact in other ways beyond places in which the two motives are present. This issue will be explored further in the analysis of Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 that I present below.

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¹³ Ibid., 32.

¹⁴ Ibid., 34.

¹⁵ Gerard Génette in Randall Stevenson, *Modernist Fiction: An Introduction* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 32.

¹⁶ Byron Almén, A Theory of Musical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 5.

Perhaps moving one step beyond Almén's original claim that the presence of a narrator is not a condition for musical narrative, Almén and Hatten together claim that narratives do not require any agents at all in their article, "Narrative Engagement with Twentieth-Century Music."¹⁷ Instead, they imagine a "continuum of narrative possibilities along which agency becomes more or less pronounced." Instead of agency, Almén and Hatten argue that James Jakob Liska's concept of transvaluation is the fundamental condition for a narrative. The idea of a change in the relationship between two objects, however—in this case a transgression and an order-imposing hierarchy— implicates agents. Something significant must happen in the work in order for transvaluation to occur, and it is difficult to imagine this significant event as being ungoverned by an agent's actions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a narrative in which no agents are involved, whether implicitly (as I have been arguing in this dissertation) or explicitly. As I mentioned in earlier chapters, several other authors have argued for the importance of agents in narrative. Chatman explicitly states that "a narrative without an agent performing actions is impossible." ¹⁹ In music, Seth Monahan has also acknowledged the importance of musical agents in the musical fictions analysts create. Moreover, the three levels Almén identifies as integral to his theory—agential, actantial, and narrative—seem to require the identification of agents.²⁰

¹⁷ Byron Almén and Robert Hatten, "Narrative Engagement with Twentieth-Century Music," in *Music and Narrative Since 1900*, edited by Michael Klein and Nicholas Reyland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 59–85). It is important to keep in mind that this statement occurs within the context of an article on agency in twentieth-century music. Their statement may be limited to twentieth-century repertoire, but it is difficult to tell whether they wish to apply their sentiments to all musical agency, or only cases of musical agency in twentieth-century music. In either case, however, my argument remains the same: narratives require agents, whether implied or explicitly present.

¹⁸ Ibid., 60. Although Hatten and Almén are careful with the way in which they link narrative and agency, one wonders just how strong they believe the link between narrative and agency is given the continuum they identify. While the idea of a continuum suggests that agency is active in most compositions, they do not explore the question "does agency require narrative?"

¹⁹ Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 34.

²⁰ The first two levels of this model, agential and actantial, come from James Jakob Liska. The third, narrative, is Almén's addition.

Figure 3.1 shows the interaction between my categories of intentionality and the theories developed by Almén and Monahan. Almén's theory is primarily one within which an analyst will work, while Monahan's theory is written from the perspective of a reader who learns about the agents that are present in an analyst's writing. They are labeled "analyst perspective" and "reader perspective," respectively. The three levels of analysis within Almén's theory appear on the left




Figure 3.1 – Categories of intentionality in relation to the theories of Almén and Monahan

side of the chart, while the levels within Monahan's hierarchy of agent types are on the right side of the chart, with the highest level in the rightmost column. The arrows along the bottom of the chart that point from one level of agency to another are intended to indicate the hierarchical relationship among the agent types: each higher level of agency subsumes the lower levels of agency. All of Monahan's agent types can be present at any of Almén's three levels. Thus, each column containing one of Monahan's agential types spans all three rows that depict Almén's analytical levels. I will begin by describing each of Almén's levels, followed by a reminder of the various agent types in Monahan's theory. Then, I will explain how my categories of intentionality interact with each theory.

The agential level is the point at which the analyst identifies musical agents in a given work and defines their traits. Almén compares this level to the act of doing a paradigmatic analysis. It is at this point where the analyst decides what will represent the order-imposing hierarchy and what will represent transgression. Following the agential level, the analyst proceeds to the actantial level. The actantial level is the point at which the agents identified at the agential level rise to the status of actors. Analysts describe how the agents interact with each other and their environment. If the agential level is akin to paradigmatic analysis, the actantial level is similar to syntagmatic analysis. It is also at this point where the analyst identifies transvaluations between the order-imposing hierarchy and the transgression. Finally, the narrative level is the point at which the activities from the actantial level are described in terms of Nothrop Frye's four archetypes: romance, tragedy, comedy, and irony. At this level the analyst interprets how the various transvaluations within a piece and their outcomes will be

²¹ Byron Almén, A Theory of Musical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 55.

²² Ibid., 56.

understood: positively, negatively, as desirable, or as undesirable.²³ An analysis within Almén's theory begins at the agential level and finishes at the narrative level. The levels themselves are arranged in a kind of hierarchy, such that one cannot arrive at the narrative level without having examined the piece through the agential and actantial levels. Thus, the arrows on the left side of the diagram only point from bottom to top, indicating the direction in which analysis proceeds within Almén's theory.

Since I discussed Monahan's theory in Chapter One, I will refrain from discussing it in detail here, save to remind the reader of the definitions of the four agent types: (1) the Analyst: the person interpreting the work; (2) the Fictional Composer: an imagined entity who composed the work, and who is comprised of a mix of historical research and societal perceptions of the composer; (3) the Work Persona: a fictional character who governs the piece's overall progress; (4) the Individuated Element: a discrete component of the music that is understood as having autonomy and volition.²⁴

Within Monahan's theory, each of my categories of intentionality occurs at the level of the individuated element.²⁵ Since Monahan's theory is hierarchical, however, the identification of intention at this individuated element level also opens up the possibility for one to identify higher-level agents in the work. The length of the shaded columns that contain each category represents the location within Almén's theory at which one can detect those categories. Gesture, unexpected event, and repetition can all be detected at the agential level. That is, to identify these

²³ Ibid., 64–66.

²⁴ See Seth Monahan, "Action and Agency Revisited," *Journal of Music Theory* 57/2 (Fall 2013): 327–33.

²⁵ I do not wish to imply that no categories of intentionality exist at higher levels of Monahan's structure, nor that there may be certain manifestations of the categories that may only occur at higher levels in Monahan's theory. Indeed, by including all categories at the lowest level of Monahan's hierarchy I suggest that the categories may be present at any level. A possible future project may involve identifying particular manifestations of the categories of intentionality that allow us to differentiate between the levels Monahan identifies, but that is outside the scope of this study.

types of intentional actions, one need not view an agent as having interacted with other agents or with its environment. It is possible, on the other hand, to identify all categories of intentionality at the actantial level. Any of the categories of intentionality may be articulated when agents interact with each other and their environment. Restatement, change of state, and conflict can also be identified at the narrative level. Manifestations of each of these categories may be recognized when one considers the arrangement of the events and agents that have been identified at lower levels, and the way in which this arrangement fits within Frye's archetypes.²⁶

When a category's shading ends, it is not available for detection at that level of Almén's theory. New gestures in addition to those identified at the agential and actantial levels, for example, will not be discovered when one considers the narrative level, since the narrative level involves larger spans of time, and gestures occur in shorter timespans. Similarly, conflict necessitates that an agent interact with either another agent or its environment. It cannot be identified at the agential level. The level at which an agent is initially identified, however, does not preclude the possibility that it may affect higher levels of the analysis; rather, no *new* manifestations of those categories will appear outside the shaded region for that category. What this diagram shows, then, is that my categories of intentionality can interact with both Monahan's theory (a reader's perspective) and Almén's theory (an analyst's perspective). It may also be that the categories of intentionality are an area of common ground between the two perspectives. By indicating which categories of intentionality led the analyst to recognize an agent, the analyst offers substantial evidence for his or her interpretation that may be appealing

²⁶ I do not wish to imply that one must complete an Almén-style narrative analysis when one uses my categories of intentionality. Indeed, it is not necessary to invoke Almén's particular method of analysis when identifying a musical narrative in conjunction with the categories of intentionality. Since Almén's theory is an important development in the subfield of narrative analysis, however, I wish to acknowledge the way in which my categories of intentionality interact with his theory.

to readers. Finally, the diagram articulates my belief that agency is essential to narrative theory. One cannot establish a narrative without the presence of agents and their actions who move the plot forward. Similarly, an agential analysis necessitates a narrative reading. One can identify agents without completing a narrative, but such an analysis would not speak to the way in these agents interact, nor would it allow one to trace the continued presence of an agent in the piece's temporal unfolding.

As I articulated in Chapter Two, the first step in an agential analysis is to use the categories of intentionality to identify locations at which one may posit the presence of a virtual agent who influences a piece of music. The second step is to determine how many agents are present in a given piece and to identify which actions belong to which agents, a step that relies on the development of a musical narrative as a frame within which one can construct the logic that links particular actions to particular agents. As Almén has shown, developing a musical narrative is a multi-stage process involving the identification of agents (the agential level), the description of the ways in which they interact (the actantial level), and the categorization of the story under one of Northrop Frye's narrative archetypes (the narrative level). While the narratives I develop in this dissertation do not employ Almén's methodology, the steps he articulates are still important. That is, I do not mean to imply that once one has identified moments of intentionality that one can suddenly express a fully developed narrative. Rather, the process is more fluid. Some actions, such as the repetition of a single gesture, are likely to lead one to posit the continued influence of a particular agent. Other actions, such as unexpected events, may represent incursions by additional agents. Examining how the intentional actions are arranged in a given piece can lead one to develop a reading of events that explains how the various actions, and the agents with which they become associated, interact in a given piece. The development of these events will feed the process by which actions are assigned to agents, which will in turn contribute to furthering the arrangement of these events into a coherent plot. As the plot develops, a narrative frame will also begin to form, such that the arrangement of the events can be understood in the context of a generic trajectory such as "triumph" or "defeat." It is only within the context of a narrative frame that a complete agential analysis can take place. The process of performing an agential analysis is diagrammed in Figure 3.2.

To demonstrate one way in which agency and narrative interact in a more concrete manner, I now turn to an analysis of Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2. I will explore the narrative frame that Janet Schmalfeldt has established for this piece in her article "On the Relation of Analysis to Performance." Using her frame will allow me to focus on the nuances that an agential analysis involving the categories of intentionality can bring to an already existing narrative analysis—one in which the original analytical focus was not on the agents themselves. I will begin with a brief review of Schmalfeldt's overall narrative for the piece. Then, I will divide the piece into six units. For each unit, I will provide further details with respect to the way in




Figure 3.2 – The agential analytical process

which Schmalfeldt's plot unfolds in that unit, comment on her narrative, then present an alternative view that involves the identification of agents using the categories of intentionality. The reader may wish to refer to the score in Appendix A for the following discussion.

3.3: Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2: The Interaction Between Agency and Narrative

Employing terminology that would eventually appear in William Caplin's *Classical* Form, Schmalfeldt identifies a sixteen-measure period at the beginning of the work in which the antecedent's basic idea (mm. 1–4) and contrasting idea (mm. 5–8) are more strikingly different than is customary. She lists several features that sharply differentiate the basic idea from the contrasting idea, including register, texture, contour, articulation, dynamic, and rhythmic values. The degree of difference between the two ideas leads Schmalfeldt to suggest that they are juxtaposed in a kind of rivalry. She suggests that the duality of these opposing characters will impact the movement in terms of its dramatic process and formal design, and that therefore the first eight measures present "a major issue of the work." As the first reprise of the piece unfolds, Schmalfeldt finds that the basic idea is motivically weakened, both on the surface of the music and at deeper levels of structure, while the contrasting idea gains strength. In the second reprise, this relationship is reversed. The basic idea eventually regains strength, while the contrasting idea's position is destabilized. Ultimately, however, Schmalfeldt finds that neither rival overcomes the other, but that the codetta modules at the end of the piece present a synthesis of the two rivals in which only residues of their original forms remain.²⁸

While I agree with her initial identification of agents, it is not always clear how the later manifestations of these agents that Schmalfeldt identifies are related to the original agents. That

²⁷ Janet Schmalfeldt, "On the Relation of Analysis to Performance: Beethoven's 'Bagatelles' Op. 126, Nos. 2 and 5," *Journal of Music Theory* 29/1 (Spring 1985): 6.

²⁸ Ibid., 16.

is, if the contrasting idea is itself an agent, it is difficult to imagine how later passages that do not contain melodic material related to the contrasting idea can be evidence of the agent associated with the contrasting idea. By repositioning the basic and contrasting ideas as the actions of two different agents rather than as manifestations of the two agents themselves, I allow for the possibility that a single agent performs different actions—a concept that is more easily understood as analogous to the physical world. Moreover, I identify the presence of a third agent, something that alters Schmalfeldt's original reading. In the alternative narrative I develop, then, I initially agree with Schmalfeldt that a conflict between two agents is introduced at the beginning of the movement. In contrast to Schmalfeldt, however, I argue that this conflict involves an argument between the two agents at the beginning of the piece, one that serves to "derail" the piece's progress, resulting in weakened cadences created by these two agents. These weakened cadences require a third agent to step in and "save the day," so to speak. This third agent is associated with the cadential gesture introduced at the end of the first reprise. In the discussion that follows, I have divided the work into several units. For each unit I will provide more detail in terms of Schmalfeldt's reading of the piece, comment on the reading, then offer an alternative reading in which agency can add nuance to Schmalfeldt's original. While Schmalfeldt's focus is on the drama created by the two agents and the way in which that drama influences the piece, my focus will be on the agents and the ways in which they interact.²⁹


3.3.1: Unit 1 (mm. 1–16)

At the heart of the rivalry Schmalfeldt identifies is the suggestion that the basic and contrasting ideas each "steal" melodic material from the other. The basic idea contains a $\hat{5}-\hat{6}-\hat{5}$

 $^{^{29}}$ A chart that summarizes Schmalfeldt's narrative reading and the alternative reading that I present here appears in Appendix B.

motion that is preceded by an arpeggiation from $\hat{1}-\hat{5}$ (Example 3.1). The contrasting idea also contains an ascent to $\hat{5}$, this time filled in with steps, then a motion to $\hat{6}$, which eventually returns to $\hat{5}$ (Example 3.1). The resolution back to $\hat{5}$ is achieved via a chromatic turn figure that will eventually be stolen from the contrasting idea by the basic idea. The consequent phrase simply marks a repetition of the antecedent's events, albeit with a modulation to the mediant.³⁰

I agree with Schmalefeldt that there are two agencies present at the beginning of the work. While she discusses the basic and contrasting ideas *as* agents, however, I would argue that these ideas are actions *performed* by agents, and that these actions point to the presence of virtual agents who control the music. The first four measures are under the control of an agent I call the *Tempesta* Agent because the first four measures express the *tempesta topos*. This topic is manifest in this work by: the minor mode, the presence of more disjunct rather than conjunct



Example 3.1 – Janet Schmalfeldt's reading of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 1–8)


³⁰ Janet Schmalfeldt, "On the Relation of Analysis to Performance: Beethoven's 'Bagatelles' Op. 126, Nos. 2 and 5," *Journal of Music Theory* 29/1 (Spring 1985): 8.

motion (especially in mm. 1–2), a loud dynamic, and a restless rhythmic effect that is created by the alternation of the hands and a continuous stream of sixteenth notes.

As I have argued in previous chapters, a discussion of musical agency should be grounded in the way in which the presence of intentional actions allows a listener to imply the existence of a virtual agent. One can conveniently display this information in an intentionality graph. I have provided two versions of this graph that the reader may wish to peruse: a summary version (Table 3.2) and a detailed version (Appendix C). The summary version lists the categories of intentionality down the left hand column, with measure numbers across the top row. The categories are color coded for ease of reading. In general, the presence of many categories of intentionality simultaneously has the effect of enhancing the sense of agency in a given passage. I will also argue, however, that a particularly striking instance of just one category of intentionality can strongly imply the presence of an agent.

Note that I have discussed a sense of agency in a given passage rather than in each individual measure, as my graph may imply at first glance. Although my graph displays temporality in terms of measures as a convenience for comparison with the music, I do not wish to imply that agents necessarily flit in and out of the music as each measure passes. In m. 22 of my graph, for example, no categories of intentionality are active, but several categories of intentionality are active in the measures that surround m. 22. Indeed, m. 22 is part of a larger subphrase which lasts from mm. 19–22. It may be possible, then, to imply the presence of an agent throughout mm. 19–22 whose influence is simply not felt in m. 22. Such a situation is comparable to the physical world, in which humans are consistently understood as agents who do not constantly perform intentional actions. The detailed version of my graph pairs the categories of intentionality with the score and explains how each category is manifest in a given measure.

Table 3.2 - Intentionality graph of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (summary version)




In addition, Table 3.3 is a listing of which agents are active in a given passage and which material points to the presence of that agent.

Three categories of intentionality imply the presence of the *Tempesta* Agent at the beginning of Beethoven's Bagatelle: gesture, repetition, and contradiction of musical forces. The first four notes of the piece constitute a gesture that I call the "arpeggiated gesture" (Example 3.2). The gesture is characterized by: short durations; its arpeggiated contour, wherein the first three notes outline a chordal skip of a third in which the first and third notes are the same; and its particular metric profile of beginning on a weaker part of the beat and ending on a stronger part of the beat. Note that in the right hand the gesture ends on beat one, while in the left hand the gesture ends on beat two, something that will be important later in my reading. When this gesture returns in the major mode in mm. 17–18, Schmalfeldt labels it a "fanfare gesture." Schmalfeldt does not label this initial appearance as a fanfare, and indeed its initial appearance in the minor mode within the context of a tempesta topos does not suggest fanfare. Due to its changing topical association, I prefer to label the gesture with the more neutral term "arpeggiated," rather than calling it either a tempesta gesture or a fanfare gesture. The repetition category of intentionality is evoked when the arpeggiated gesture is repeated in mm. 1–2 (Example 3.2). Each arpeggiated gesture ascends from the tonic, contradicting both gravity and magnetism. In m. 2 a stepwise figure descends toward the tonic, but it does not linger on the tonic for long, moving away from it in mm. 3 and 4, where an embellished arpeggiation of the dominant triad begins (Example 3.2: note that passing and neighbor tones fill in what is essentially an arpeggiation of the dominantseventh chord). One might argue that a pattern of repeating the arpeggiated gesture has been set up in mm. 1–2, demonstrating that the music is giving in to inertia. The break from this pattern in m. 2, however, suggests that the *Tempesta* Agent intervened to move the passage along. I read

Table 3.3 – Agents active in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2


| Agent | Active measure(s) | Associated material |
|--------------|-------------------|---|
| Tempesta | 1–4 | Tempesta topos, arpeggiated gesture |
| Oppositional | 5–8 | Texture (pedal-tone inner voice that separates a bass and |
| | | soprano moving in mostly conjunct motion) |
| Tempesta | 9–12 | Tempesta topos, arpeggiated gesture |
| Oppositional | 13–16 | Texture (pedal-tone inner voice that separates a bass and |
| | | soprano moving in mostly conjunct motion) |
| Tempesta | 17–18 | Arpeggiated gesture |
| Oppositional | 19–23 | Texture (pedal-tone inner voice that separates a bass and |
| | | soprano moving in mostly conjunct motion) |
| Cadential | 23–26 | Cadential gesture |
| Cadential | 27–41 | Concealed repetition if motive from cadential gesture |
| Tempesta | 42–57 | Arpeggiated gesture |
| Tempesta | 58–77 | Tempesta topos, arpeggiated gesture (mm. 66ff.) |
| Cadential | 78–89 | Cadential gesture |



Example 3.2 – The actions of the *Tempesta* Agent in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 1–4)

the entirety of mm. 1–4 as under the control of the *Tempesta* Agent because the *tempesta topos* is present throughout and no significant disruption occurs in these measures which might suggest the intervention of a second agent.

In m. 5, however, a significant change occurs that marks the entrance of a second agent that I call the Oppositional Agent (Example 3.3). While it would be convenient to describe mm.



Example 3.3 – The actions of the Opppositional Agent in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 5–8)

5–8 under a single unified topical designation as in mm. 1–4, I would instead argue that the most salient feature that unifies this passage is its texture, which consists of a pedal-tone inner voice that separates a bass and soprano moving in mostly conjunct motion. Naming the agent "Oppositional Agent," then, highlights its function in relation to the *Tempesta* Agent that came before it: it begins a kind of argument with the *Tempesta* Agent, an argument that I believe derails the work.

Like the *Tempesta* Agent, the presence of the Oppositional Agent is implied by three categories of intentionality: change of state, unexpected event, and contradiction of musical forces. Beyond the dramatically different expressive character of mm. 5–8 in comparison to mm. 1–4 that Schmalfeldt and others have noted, two additional musical elements also exhibit a


³¹ The passage is difficult to categorize under a single *topos*, and indeed a single topical designation would downplay the wonderfully illusive character of the passage. Instead, I believe that a more nuanced view is in order, one that recognizes that the passage carries traits from multiple *topoi*. While characteristics from each of these *topoi* are present, the passage does not seem to fit any one designation neatly because key characteristics are missing from each *topos*. The possible *topoi* I hear in this passage include: Pastoral (tonicization of the subdominant; tonic pedal in the alto voice; mostly stepwise motion, which often occurs in parallel 6ths), *Amoroso* (stepwise motion, descending chromatic half step motion simulating the sigh figure, quiet dynamic), *Empfindsamkeit* (quiet dynamic, light texture), *Religioso* (parallel motion, which becomes contrary motion toward the cadence), singing style (thinner texture, stepwise motion).

marked change here. The dynamic changes from forte (mm. 1–4) to piano (mm. 5–8), and the register becomes higher. While much of the activity in mm. 1–4 takes place in the third octave, the fourth and fifth octaves are central to the activity in mm. 5–8 (compare Example 3.2 to Example 3.3). The sudden change in these musical elements invokes the unexpected event category of intentionality. Moreover, the line in mm. 5–8 ascends from the tonic contradicting gravity and magnetism. As in mm. 1–2, a kind of pattern is established in mm. 5–6 that is broken in m. 7, suggesting that the Oppositional Agent intervened to move the passage along.

The Oppositional Agent creates a half cadence (HC) at m. 8 that represents the central problem in the work (Example 3.3). The dominant harmony is displaced from the downbeat by suspensions in the bass and alto voices and by a retardation in the soprano. Rather than landing on the metrically strong downbeat, the line controlled by the Oppositional Agent seems instead to continue past the downbeat, only to be interrupted abruptly by the *Tempesta* Agent, who takes over the passage by restating the arpeggiated gesture beginning on the second sixteenth-note of beat two. The half cadence, then, is metrically unstable. It was attempted by the Oppositional Agent, but it is as if the Oppositional Agent was distracted by its argument with the *Tempesta* Agent, who interrupts its thought in m. 8. Performing a metrically strong cadence in the home key is the central goal of my narrative for this piece, and it is something that will not be achieved until the end of the work. A close reading of the way in which the agents are implied by the music, and the way in which their actions affect the music's progress, has so far revealed a different central problem than that which Schmalfeldt identifies (described in more detail below). In m. 9 the parallel consequent begins and the *Tempesta* Agent repeats its passage from the beginning of the piece in full. The Oppositional Agent begins a restatement of its passage from the beginning of the piece, but this time, as Schmalfeldt noted, it affects a modulation toward Bb

major, completing a perfect authentic cadence (PAC) in the new key (Example 3.4). The PAC's metric placement is stronger than that of the HC's: the bass of the tonic chord occurs on the downbeat of m. 16, but the upper voices are still displaced, forcing the musical motion beyond the downbeat to stop on a very weak part of the beat. In addition, while the melodic motion from $\ddagger \hat{4} - \hat{5}$ at the HC is one that creates tension, the melodic motion at the PAC from $2 - \hat{1}$ is one that releases tension. Although the Oppositional Agent has managed to create a modulating periodic structure then, it is one made less stable by the metrical displacements at the cadences. Moreover, the Oppositional Agent is interrupted by the *Tempesta* Agent at both cadences. Note also that the *Tempesta* Agent's passages have continually ended on a stronger part of the beat than those of the Oppositional Agent.

While the number and location of agents in the alternative reading I have presented has so far agreed with Schmalfeldt, several new details have emerged. The agents are no longer embodied by the passages in which they are located, but rather the passages are understood as the results of actions performed by these agents. I have also noted the metrical displacement that




Example 3.4 – PAC created by the Oppositional Agent in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 12–16)

occurs at the two cadences, and I have more clearly defined the gesture played by the *Tempesta* Agent, including the metrical profiles of the right and left hands, something that will become important later.

3.3.2: Unit 2 (mm. 17–26)

In Schmalfeldt's reading, the upbeat to m. 17 marks the point at which the rivalry between her basic and contrasting ideas begins (Example 3.5). She notes that while the basic idea begins to reappear at m. 17, it is in a transformed state: only the head motive (my arpegiated gesture) appears, and it is only stated twice rather than three times. These statements are separated in time by rests, a stretching in time that weakens their impact. The basic idea has been so weakened that the contrasting idea is simply able to "reach over" it to complete the phrase




Example 3.5 – Janet Schmalfeldt's interpretation of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 17–26)

(m. 19).³² One might question why Schmalfeldt associates the material at mm. 19–26 with the contrasting idea as it is originally manifest in mm. 5–8. To be certain, the texture of mm. 19–22 is similar to that of mm. 5–8. However, the contour of mm. 19–22 is oppositional to that of mm. 5–8, and the quality of tension in mm. 5–8 that is generated by the striving augmented sixth chord is absent in mm. 19–22, which drive toward a tension-releasing PAC. If the thematic material in mm. 5–8 represents a manifestation of an agent, it is hard to imagine the same agent returning without the same thematic material. By arguing that the agents are not embodied by the thematic material, however, one can attribute passages containing different thematic material to a single agent as different actions of that agent. While this point may seem like a small distinction, it has significant ramifications for narrative readings.

My interpretation of this unit initially agrees with Schmalfeldt's (Example 3.6). In mm. 17–18, the *Tempesta* Agent's presence is signaled by the return of the arpeggiated gesture. It appears as though the *Tempesta* Agent will now repeat its actions in major, as if continuing to argue with the Oppositional agent, but now within the parameters set by the Oppositional Agent's PAC. The Oppositional Agent is quick to interrupt the *Tempesta* Agent this time, resulting in an incomplete statement of the *Tempesta* Agent's material, and, as Schmalfeldt has noted, giving the sense that the Oppositional Agent has the upper hand. In addition to a change of state as in mm. 5 and 13, the presence of the Oppositional Agent here is also indicated by the the conflict category of intentionality. While a regular four-bar hypermeter had been established in mm. 1–16, the entrance of the Oppositional Agent at m. 19 disrupts what would have been another passage in a regular four-bar hypermeter: I read mm. 21–22 as an insertion that serves to expand the dominant (Example 3.6). I link the passage at mm. 19–22 to the Oppositional Agent

³² Janet Schmalfeldt, "On the Relation of Analysis to Performance: Beethoven's 'Bagatelles' Op. 126, Nos. 2 and 5," *Journal of Music Theory* 29/1 (Spring 1985): 7.




Example 3.6 – Alternative reading of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 17–26)

because, as I stated earlier, this passage's texture resembles that of mm. 5–8. In both cases, a bass and soprano line are separated by an inner-voice pedal tone.

While Schmalfeldt attributes mm. 23–26 to her contrasting idea, I instead read this passage as the entrance of a third agent, which I call the Cadential Agent. The presence of this agent is suggested by four categories of intentionality: change of state, contradiction of musical forces, gesture, and unexpected event (Example 3.6). First, m. 23 marks a change in texture from the previous passage. While mm. 19–22 are more contrapuntal in nature, mm. 23–26 are homophonic. Further, the harmonic rhythm of mm. 23–26 is markedly faster than that of mm. 19–22, the latter of which serves as a prolongation of a single harmony (the dominant). Second, in mm. 19–21 the Oppositional Agent establishes a melodic pattern of "step up, leap down," a pattern that is not continued in mm. 23ff., signaling a disruption of musical inertia. Instead of

continuing the pattern, the melody of mm. 23–26 ascends, even skipping past the local tonic, Bb4, in a contradiction of the musical forces gravity and magnetism. Third, mm. 24–26 feature a figure that, through its repetition at the end of the work, rises to the status of a gesture.³³ The location at which it most often appears in the piece is at a cadence; therefore, I call the gesture a cadential gesture. The four-note gesture (D–C–A-Bb) is defined by a syncopated rhythm in the melody, and an ascending leap that is followed by descending stepwise motion, the second note of which is embellished by a chordal skip (Example 3.7). Fourth, the texture of this cadential gesture is perhaps more ornate than one might have expected given the preceding chorale-style passage. Instead, one might have expected a cadence like that which appears in Example 3.8. As if predicting that another metrically displaced cadence may arise, then, the Cadential Agent takes over in mm. 23–26 to conclude the A section on a metrically strong beat. Note that the length of the phrase is an irregular ten measures due to the expansion initiated by the Oppositional Agent.



Example 3.7 – The cadential gesture in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 24–26)

³³ Recall that my definition of gesture is restricted to only those figures that are repeated. Thus, while this figure is not immediately repeated, the fact that it undergoes significant reiteration later in the piece qualifies it as a gesture under my definition.




Example 3.8 – Recomposition of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 23–26)

Using the categories of intentionality to analyze agency in this unit, I was able to highlight a more satisfactory connection between the appearances of the Oppositional Agent in mm. 5–8, 13–16, and 19–22. Moreover, I identified the presence of a third agent in mm. 23–26 who affects a metrically strong cadence, something that the argument between the *Tempesta* and Oppositional Agents had previously prevented.

3.3.3: Unit 3 (mm. 27–41)

In Schmalfeldt's reading, this *cantabile* section is connected to the previous section via Schenker's linkage technique. The cadential gesture of mm. 24–26 is given two concealed repetitions in the *cantabile*, which Schmalfeldt shows in her Example 1 (See the solid stems in my transcription in Example 3.9). She argues that this section represents the contrasting idea in a *cantabile* guise, and that the contrasting idea eventually loses control, arriving on the dominant of the subdominant in a measure that would be hypermetrically "too soon" for a cadence. Indeed, she notes that m. 32 from the first phrase of this section (mm. 27–34) has been omitted from the analogous place in the second phrase of this section (mm. 35–41), creating a contracted second



Example 3.9 – Schmalfeldt's reading of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 27–42)

phrase.³⁴ Although Schmalfeldt links this *cantabile* section to her contrasting idea, perhaps due to the concealed repetitions, I argue that this passage is under the control of the Cadential Agent. The presence of the Cadential Agent is confirmed by the change of state and repetition categories of intentionality. A change in *topos* to singing style occurs at m. 27, marked by a clear melodyand accompaniment division among the right and left hands in the piano, the relatively limited range of the melody, and the melody's mostly conjunct contour. Further, the repetition of the first phrase (mm. 27–34) beginning at m. 35 serves to reinforce the presence of the Cadential Agent.

Narratively, this passage represents an attempt by the Cadential Agent to create a periodic structure in which the cadences that end each phrase occur in metrically strong positions (Example 3.10). The HC at m. 34 is stronger than either of the cadences created by the Oppositional Agent, but the PAC that would have satisfactorily closed this period at m. 42, a

³⁴ Ibid., 11.




Example 3.10 – Hypermeter and cadences in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 27–42)

point that would create a consequent equal in length to the antecedent, never materializes. Indeed, as Schmalfeldt points out, the second phrase is contracted to become seven, rather than eight, measures long. It is not clear whether Schmalfeldt reads a HC in the subdominant at m. 41. In my reading, however, m. 41 represents the point at which one might have expected a cadential dominant to appear before a strong-beat tonic chord in m. 42 at a PAC. The contraction, then, is not so much surprising as necessary in the consequent; it occurs to place the cadential dominant on hyperbeat three in preparation for the PAC in C minor that should have taken place on hyperbeat 4 in m. 42 (Example 3.10). Had the contraction not occurred, the cadential dominant would have appeared on hyperbeat four as in the antecedent. Instead of creating the PAC at m. 42, it is as if the Cadential Agent becomes distracted by the argument between the *Tempesta* and Oppositional Agents—an argument that begins to intensify in m. 42 when the *Tempesta* Agent makes its presence known once again. What the categories of intentionality allow me to do in this unit, then, is to identify passages that contain intentional actions that can be identified as under the control of a particular agent, bolstering the link between the *cantabile* and the agents that appeared in the first reprise.

3.3.4: Unit 4 (mm. 42–57)


Schmalfeldt argues that the silent downbeat of m. 42 confirms the failure of the contrasting idea to maintain its stability within the mediant. For Schmalfeldt, this unit represents the basic idea gradually reassembling its forces. In her Example 1, she identifies three stages where the silences between statements of the arpeggiated gesture are shortened until the basic idea achieves its original continuous sixteenth-note rhythm within the time span of its original four measures.³⁵ Having regained its full strength, in mm. 54–57 the basic idea steals the chromatic turn figure that the contrasting idea had first presented in mm. 7–8 (Example 3.11).

My alternative reading agrees with Schmalfeldt's in that this section is under the control of the *Tempesta* Agent (her basic idea). Perhaps the most obvious feature of the music that points to this association is the return of the arpeggiated gesture. While Schmalfeldt argues that this section represents a strengthening of the basic idea, however, I believe this passage represents the *Tempesta* Agent attempting to rearticulate its point, which begins to change from its initial presentation. This change is signaled by the subtle differences between the way in which the arpeggiated gestures are presented here in comparison to their original statement in mm. 1–4 (Example 3.12). In mm. 43–49, more silence occurs between repetitions of the gesture than had



Example 3.11 – Schmalfeldt's reading of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 54–57)

³⁵ Ibid., 12.




Example 3.12 – Alternative reading of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 42–57)

occurred previously, although the amount of silence between repetitions will eventually decrease. The right hand metric profile of the gesture, where the gesture ends on the downbeat of a measure, is played by both hands, and the left-hand metric profile, where the gesture ends on beat two of the measure, is absent. The lack of the left-hand metrical profile indicates that part of the *Tempesta* Agent's original argument is missing. In mm. 50–54, the gesture is doubled in the right and left hands, something that has not happened previously. While Schmalfeldt sees this doubling as a strengthening of her basic idea's position, I instead see the change as representing a loss of the initial message. While the right-hand metric profile dominated mm. 43–49, it is now absent, and both hands play the left-hand metric profile, again signaling a loss of part of the

Tempesta Agent's original argument. In mm. 55–57, both metric profiles are restored, but the hands that play them are reversed with respect to their arrangement in mm. 1–4. That is, the right hand's arpeggiated gesture now ends on beat two, while the left hand's arpeggiated gesture now ends on beat one. Moreover, the contour of the gestures has changed. In the right hand, the first three notes of the gesture in mm. 55ff. no longer involve a chordal skip of a third in which the first and third notes are the same. In the left hand, the overall contour of the gesture descends rather than ascends. Rather than representing a gaining of strength, these erratic changes in the actions of the Tempesta Agent indicate that it is losing sight of its original message. Paying attention to the particular actions the Tempesta Agent performed at the beginning of the movement in comparison to those that it performs in this unit has provided a level of nuance that allows us to account for the subtle variances in the different presentations of the arpeggiated gesture within the narrative.

3.3.5: Unit 5 (mm. 58–77)

The end of this unit marks the structural close of the movement. In Schmalfeldt's reading, the basic idea continues to control the contrasting idea's turn figure. The continuous sixteenth notes from the basic idea accompany a melody that uses the slowest rhythmic pattern from mm. 38–39 in the *cantabile* section (Example 3.13). For Schmalfeldt, this juxtaposition represents the




Example 3.13 – Rhythm from *cantabile* section (mm. 57–61)

moment of direct confrontation between the basic and contrasting ideas. She notes that the unusually weak metric placement of the tonic arrivals at mm. 73 and 77 strongly undermines the effect of finality, creating the need for a series of codettas.³⁶ Her argument that both the basic and contrasting ideas are presented in the same passage in this unit causes her to posit that they have achieved a synthesis.

In my reading, this section does not represent a moment of direct confrontation or synthesis between the *Tempesta* and Oppositional Agents, rather it is entirely controlled by the Tempesta Agent, who rushes to close the section before the Oppositional Agent can influence the piece further. Having seen its gesture become subtly altered in the previous unit, one now sees the original form of the gesture—that is, short durations; arpeggiated contour wherein the first three notes outline a chordal skip of a third in which the first and third notes are the same; and a particular metrical profile of beginning on a weaker part of the beat and ending on a stronger part of the beat—emphatically repeated: the *Tempesta* Agent has regained its strength, with the both the right- and left-hand metrical profiles represented (Example 3.14). Invoking the gesture category of intentionality allows me to identify the continued presence of the *Tempesta* Agent in this unit. As Schmalfeldt has noted, the cadences of this section at mm. 73 and 77 occur on metrically weak parts of the measure, although melodic motion certainly stops on a stronger part of the beat than that with which the Oppositional Agent's cadences had stopped in the A section. The metrically weak cadences here are reflective of the *Tempesta* Agent's rush to attain structural closure before the Oppositional Agent can intervene, but it is ultimately unsuccessful at creating a sense of finality due to the metrically weak position of the cadences at mm. 73 and 77.

³⁶ Ibid., 16.



Example 3.14 – Alternative reading of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 62–77)

In this unit my reading contrasts with Schmalfeldt's in that I do not associate the lengthy note values in mm. 58–65 with the *cantabile* section (that is, those notes played by the hand that does not play sixteenth notes in mm. 58–65: right hand in mm. 58–61, left hand in mm. 62–65). In her reading, this link causes her to interpret the presence of her contrasting idea (my Oppositional Agent). While I agree that the duration of a half note tied to a quarter note is also used in the *cantabile* section, the contour, articulation, harmonic rhythm, and texture are distinctly different from that which is present in the *cantabile* section (compare Example 3.10 to Example 3.15). The *cantabile* features mostly conjunct motion in the melody, legato notes under slurred articulations, a harmonic rhythm of one harmony per measure, and a texture in which there is a clear division between melody and accompaniment: the right hand plays the melody



Example 3.15 – Alternative reading of Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2

while the left hand plays the accompaniment. By contrast, the lengthy note values in mm. 58–65 are part of a disjunct passage, with *staccato* articulations, a slow harmonic rhythm where only two harmonies appear in the entire passage, and an unclear division between melody and accompaniment: do the lengthy note values accompany the compound melody created by the sixteenth notes, or do the sixteenth notes accompany the lengthy notes? These striking differences between the cantabile and mm. 58–65 prompt me to suggest that Schmalfeldt's contrasting idea agent is not present in mm. 58–65.³⁷ Thus, I do not read thus unit (mm. 58–77) as representing a direct confrontation between the two agents; rather I read the unit as under the control of the *Tempesta* Agent.


³⁷ Moreover, in my reading the *cantabile* is associated with the Cadential Agent rather than with the Oppositional Agent (Schmalfeldt's contrasting idea).

3.3.6: Unit 6 (mm. 78–89)

Schmalfeldt argues that in the coda, Beethoven subtly alludes to the contrasting idea, but overtly develops the cadential gesture from the end of the first reprise. She states that the failure of the contrasting idea to assume its original form undermines one's impression that it is victorious. In addition, while the basic idea's sixteenth-note rhythm is no longer present, Schmalfeldt wonders whether the repeated-note gesture at the upbeats to mm. 86 and 88 could be a rhythmic augmentation of the basic idea's arpeggiated gesture. In Schmalfeldt's view, neither agent wins. Instead, a dialectic is completed: the codettas represent a confirmation of the synthesis of the basic idea and the contrasting idea that was achieved in the previous unit. In the codettas, only residues of their original forms remain.³⁸

Aside from the presence of the cadential gesture, which Schmalfeldt associates with her contrasting idea (my Oppositional Agent), it is difficult to perceive even residues of the contrasting idea or basic idea in the coda of this work. In my reading, the cadential gesture is under the control of the Cadential Agent, and thus evidence for the presence of the Oppositional Agent is further diminished. Rather, invoking the gesture category of intentionality, I view this unit as under the control of the Cadential Agent, who steps in to create a more satisfactory sense of closure than either the *Tempesta* or Oppositional Agents have been able to achieve. The Cadential Agent performs its cadential gesture four times (Example 3.16). The first two iterations are accompanied by prolongations of tonic harmony: a neighboring $_4^6$ separates root position tonic chords. The final two instances, however, are accompanied by motion from dominant to tonic, with the gesture in m. 86 doubled in the bass and soprano. It is as if the Cadential Agent is simply tired of hearing the argument between the *Tempesta* and Oppositional

³⁸ Ibid.



Example 3.16 – The cadential gesture in Beethoven, Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2 (mm. 78–89)

Agents, and thus emphatically closes the piece. The Oppositional Agent, who caused the failed cadences in the A section of the piece, is not given the chance to rebut the *Tempesta* Agent before the end of the work. In contrast to Schmalfeldt, then, I do not read the piece as a kind of synthesis. Rather, it falls to the Cadential Agent to bring closure to the piece, something that the *Tempesta* and Oppositional Agents were unable to accomplish in the course of their argument.

In this section of the chapter I have shown how my categories of intentionality can be used to identify the presence of agents within a complete movement from a work. Perhaps even more importantly, I have established criteria by which one can determine whether actions and events belong to the same or different agents. Further, I have shown how a careful consideration of the actions of agents within a narrative can provide nuance to one's reading. Responding to claims made by Abbate and Nattiez, I would argue that music can express agency through intentional actions, and that following Chatman, a narrative can exist so long as agents are present. In the next section of this chapter, I will consider how an agential analysis can interact


with Schenkerian analysis in a close reading of Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6. Before delving into the piece, however, I will briefly consider how other scholars have discussed the interaction between expressive and structural modes of analysis.

3.4: Agency and Schenkerian Analysis

There have been several efforts to combine Schenkerian analysis with theories of musical meaning, including works by Kofi Agawu, Joseph Kraus, and Steve Larson. In *Playing with Signs*, for example, Agawu promotes a methodology in which musical *topoi* are identified across the top of a sketch of a given work. As some reviewers pointed out, however, Agawu fails to consistently address the interaction between the topics he identifies and the sketches he presents.³⁹ The lack of reciprocity between *topoi* and sketches in Agawu's methodology is perhaps most clearly revealed in his analysis of Haydn's String Quartet Op. 76, no. 2, which omits a sketch of the movement entirely. One of the tools Agawu develops as a way to bridge the gap between Schenkerian analysis and musical expression is something he calls the "beginning-middle-ending paradigm." He shows how this paradigm can be coordinated with the *Ursatz* (Example 3.17). His occasional discussions of the interaction between this paradigm and the musical *topoi* he identifies are more suggestive than those passages in which he simply places topical labels above his Schenkerian sketches. Indeed, scholars such as William Caplin have explored this concept further.⁴⁰ William Drabkin, however, is skeptical that the beginning-

³⁹ See, for example, Jonathan Berger, "Playing with 'Playing with Signs': A Critical Response to Kofi Agawu," *Journal of Music Theory* 38/2 (Autumn 1994): 295; Vera Micznik, review of *Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music* by V. Kofi Agawu and *Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music* by Jean-Jacques Nattiez in *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 45/3 (Autumn 1992): 533; Robert Hatten, review of *Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music* by Kofi Agawu and *Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music* by Jean-Jacques Nattiez in *Music Theory Spectrum* 14/1 (Spring 1992): 90.

⁴⁰ See William Caplin, "On the Relation of 'Topoi' to Formal Function," *Eighteenth-Century Music* 2.1 (2005): 113–124. Caplin reaches the conclusion that certain topics imply formal a functional location while others do not.




Example 3.17 – Agawu's beginning-middle-ending Paradigm

middle-ending paradigm has any usefulness at all. With respect to Agawu's analysis of Beethoven's String Quartet in A Minor Op. 132, Drabkin asks "...how does this explanation enable us to *hear* the music more coherently? Does invoking the beginning-middle-ending paradigm make it easier to recognize 'how [Beethoven] reaches [his] audience'?" audience'?"

In contrast to *Playing with Signs*, Joseph Kraus has much more convincingly shown how an analysis of musical *topoi* can interact with a Schenkerian interpretation. ⁴² Kraus identifies two *topoi* in Mozart's String Quintet in E-flat Major, K. 614: a hunt topic and a more refined melody (Example 3.18). While the *Kopfton* could have been understood to appear as early as m. 3 (G5), Kraus chooses to take the G5 in m. 9 as the true *Kopfton* because that location represents the convergence of the hunt topic and the more refined melody. That is, the hunt topic is transferred

⁴² Joseph Kraus, "Coaching Mozart's String Quintet in E-Flat Major: Finding the Rhythmic Shape," *Music Theory Online* 15/2 (2009).

⁴¹ William Drabkin, review of *Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music* by Kofi Agawu, in *Music Analysis* 10/3 (Oct. 1991): 386.



Example 3.18 – Interaction of *topoi* and structure in Mozart's String Quintet in E-flat Major, K. 614 (after Joseph Kraus in "Coaching Mozart's String Quintet")

from its initial appearance in the fourth octave to the fifth octave, where the more refined melody was first stated. The convergence of *topoi* provides support for Kraus's argument that it is the later G5 rather than the earlier G5 that should be understood as the true *Kopfton*. The idea that the expressive details of a work can influence the structural decisions one makes is important to my conception of the way in which musical agency and Schenkerian analysis interact.

The way in which Steve Larson accounts for both structural and expressive concerns in analysis is similar to Kraus's approach in that he shows how an understanding of one domain can influence the other. While Kraus supported his structural decision with evidence from the expressive domain, Larson often shows how his analyses of musical motion are consonant with

an underlying structural framework. One of the driving principles behind Larson's work is the idea that listeners often have strong expectations for how they expect a given passage of music to proceed. Larson argues that the musical forces represent a convenient metaphor to explain the kinds of expectations tonal music generates, and he likewise believes that listeners expect music to complete the kinds of hierarchical structures that Schenker describes. He uses Schenkerian analysis as a convenient tool to show deeper levels of expected motions generated by the musical forces, something that I will also demonstrate in my analysis below. What Kraus and Larson demonstrate, then, is that Schenkerian analysis and analyses of the expressive domains of music can influence one another.

While not drawing on a single theory of musical meaning as Kraus and Larson do, several other prominent Schenkerians have analyzed texted music, connecting their analyses to the way in which the music expresses the meaning of the text. These authors have tended to connect motives and their enlargements and diminutions to events in the text. To my knowledge, however, no one has yet explicitly connected Schenkerian analysis to musical agency, although Schenker himself makes agential statements in his writings. As Lee Rothfarb has argued, "Schenker's *Harmonielehre* acknowledges the 'biological urges' of tones and the 'force of the scale-step' that subsumes several chords into one unit." Indeed, in *Harmony*, Schenker asserts that "tones have a biological urge to procreate, which causes repetition, which

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⁴³ Steve Larson, *Musical Forces: Motion, Metaphor, and Meaning in Music* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 131.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Carl Schachter "Motive and Text in Four Schubert Songs," in *Unfoldings: Essays in Schenkerian Theory and Analysis*, edited by Joseph Straus (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 209–20; or Charles Burkhart the analysis of Schubert's *Erlkönig* in Charles Burkhart, "Schenker's Motivic Parallelisms," *Journal of Music Theory* 22/2 (Autumn 1978): 157–59; Burkhart's analysis was later expanded by Deborah Stein in "Schubert's 'Erlkönig: Motivic Parallelism and Motivic Transformation," *19th-Century Music* 13/2 (Autumn 1989): 145–58.

⁴⁵ Lee Rothfarb, "Energetics," in *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, edited by Thomas Christensen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 937.

raises a musical figure to the status of motive, the basis of all music." Rothfarb also notes that Schenker's description of counterpoint in three or more voices exhibits "causalities that increase in free composition because scale steps have their own logic." As seen in previous chapters, causal relationships are strongly associated with theories of action. Schenker's agential language continues in *Free Composition*. In characterizing the structural levels, for example, Schenker invokes a metaphor that suggests agency: "Just as life is an uninterrupted process of energy transformation, so the voice-leading strata represent an energy transformation in the life which originates in the fundamental structure." The idea of the fundamental structure as a "life" that undergoes energy transformations is indicative of the presence of an agent.

Schenker is even more explicit about the idea of the fundamental structure representing an individual at the beginning of *Free Composition*: "Origin, development, and present I call background, middleground, and foreground; their union expresses the oneness of an individual, self-contained life." Later, he argues that "music is not only an object of theoretical consideration. It is subject, just as we ourselves are subject." ⁵¹

In addition to the suggestion that music is a life force, Schenker often discusses musical motion in *Free Composition*, a concept that can imply the existence of a musical agent. He characterizes the fundamental line, for example as "a melodic succession of definite steps of a second, [which] signifies motion, striving toward a goal, and ultimately the completion of this

⁴⁶ Heinrich Schenker, *Harmony*, edited by Oswald Jonas, translated by Elisabeth Mann Borgese (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 6.

⁴⁷ Lee Rothfarb, "Energetics," in *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, edited by Thomas Christensen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 938.

⁴⁸ One might also note that the title of Schenker's series of pamphlets, *Der Tonwille* [*The Will of the Tones*] is itself highly agential.

⁴⁹ Heinrich Schenker, *Free Composition*, edited and translated by Ernst Oster (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon Press, 1977), 160.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁵¹ Ibid., 9.

course."⁵² An important distinction separates Schenker's conception of musical forces and energies from mine. As Rothfarb has argued, the musical forces and energies that Schenker discusses are not metaphors, but actual manifestations within a composition that help govern the piece. ⁵³ By contrast, I view musical agency as a metaphorical interpretation of a given work rather than as a literal explanation for that composition's musical motion. Viewing musical motion as metaphorical rather than literal allows for a greater degree of flexibility in one's interpretation since one is not tied to a strict set of principles. It also accounts for alternative interpretations of passages of music since metaphors are free to change depending on the terms of the metaphor and the experiences of the listener.

Having surveyed several of the most influential sources for the way in which I view the relationship between musical agency and Schenkerian analysis, I am now in a position to articulate four of the ways in which I believe these two modes of analysis interact:

- 1. Schenkerian analysis can show the effect of the musical forces on a given passage, and the musical forces are integral to defining the musical environment.
- Agential explanations can support connections between motives in the music that are enlarged, diminished, or concealed, and these connections may form the basis for the development of an overarching musical narrative.
- 3. Agential explanations can support structural interpretations of the music, especially in situations where a given reading is not an obvious choice, or where two readings appear equally possible and an analyst wishes to advocate for one over the other.

⁵² Ibid., 4.

⁵³ Lee Rothfarb, "Energetics," in *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, edited by Thomas Christensen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 937.

4. The process of arriving at a Schenkerian analysis encourages careful attention to detail, which, in turn, can help one identify places where a sense of agency is heightened.

Each of these interactions will be explored in the analysis of Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6 that follows. Before presenting my reading, however, I will discuss three analyses of the piece by Schenker, Poundie Burstein, and Edward Levy in order to demonstrate how incorporating musical agency can add layers of meaning to an interpretation that is grounded in Schenkerian principles.⁵⁴

3.5: Four Schenkerian Interpretations of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6


3.5.1: Schenker

An analysis of the entire song with commentary appears in *Der Tonwille*, with fragments and a deep middleground graph of the song reappearing in *Der freie Satz*. Schenker's graph from *Der Tonwille* is reproduced as Example 3.19. Since the goal of Schenker's analysis in *Der freie Satz* is to use the fragments to illustrate techniques in his mature theory, rather than to provide a detailed analysis of the piece itself, I will refrain from commenting further on these fragments. ⁵⁵ Instead, I will focus on the key points Schenker presents in his discussion in *Der Tonwille*.

Schenker concentrates on four key points in his analysis. First, he finds that an interplay of registers is important to the structure of the piece. He notes that the A3 introduced in the first

⁵⁴ The score for Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6 can be found in Appendix D.

⁵⁵ In Figure 108/3, Schenker presents a deep middleground graph of mm. 1–43, which is essentially the entire piece without the coda. This deep middleground structure is largely the same as that which he presented in *Der Tonwille*. He uses this graph to illustrate registral coupling and the introduction of dissonance in a consonant state. In Figure 112/2, Schenker presents a foreground graph of mm. 21–35. This figure is used to illustrate bass unfoldings, and the addition of a root to harmonize the E-natural passing tone that occurs in the upper voice. The addition of the root, F#, implies the presence of an auxiliary cadence. In Figure 106/3c, Schenker provides a middleground graph of mm. 21–36 to illustrate an ascending register transfer in which an F#4 passes through an E#5 to an E5.



Example 3.19 - Schenker's graph of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6 (from Der Tonwille)

measure resolves to G#4 in m. 4, and that the D4 introduced in m. 5 resolves to C#5 in m. 7. He argues that the lower register in each pair of notes belongs to the water, while the upper register in each pairing belongs to the singer of the song, presumably the Venetian gondolier.⁵⁶ This interplay of registers continues in the B section of the piece (mm. 21ff.) where F#4 (m. 21), which stands for an F#5, passes through E#5 (m. 29) to E5 (m. 33) in an ascending register transfer. Second, he notes that an apparent contradiction exists in m. 6 in terms of the harmony that is being prolonged. While the bass clearly participates in a dominant prolongation, the upper voice plays three notes (A–B–C#) that imply tonic prolongation. Further, Schenker argues that the motion from D4 in m. 5 to C#5 in m. 7 points to C#5 as the goal of a tonic span in the upper voice. Despite the dominant implication of the bass, Schenker argues that tonic is prolonged through m. 6, and he cites the A-B-C# melodic motion in mm. 11-12 as confirmation that the earlier instance of the three notes in m. 6 were indeed part of a tonic prolongation. Third, Schenker notes the surprising appearance of C#6 in m. 32, but is strangely dismissive of its presence, arguing that it may be understood as "nothing more than an artistic imitation of the naturalistic Italian singing style."⁵⁷ This C#6 plays an important role in my own analysis of the piece. Finally, Schenker notes that two particular thirds are prominent in the piece: A–C# and B– D. While my sketch of this movement is influenced by Schenker's, there are several key points on which we disagree, most of which are attributable to my agential reading of the movement.

⁵⁶ Note that Schenker does not offer any justification for this reading, although the way in which Schenker assigns meaning perhaps makes intuitive sense. The water (lower register) supports the weight of the boat and its gondolier (higher register), a metaphor that aptly captures the way in which Schenker views the bass as providing harmonic support for the soprano in a musical work. Perhaps more obviously, singers usually sing above (either literally or hierarchically) the other musical materials.

⁵⁷ Heinrich Schenker, *Der Tonwille*, edited by William Drabkin, translated by Ian Bent et. al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 148.

The two other authors I will discuss presently, Burstein and Levy, also take Schenker's reading as their respective starting points, though they express two different opinions of his work.

3.5.2: Burstein

Burstein notes that the first pitches of the melody, E#–G# (mm. 3–4), are dissonant with the bass, but he suggests that one can understand these notes in comparison to a contrapuntal model.⁵⁸ His Example 1 is reproduced as my Example 3.20 below. In Examples 3.20b and c,



Example 3.20 – Burstein's analysis of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6 (Burstein's Example 1): (a) score excerpt; (b)–(d) strict counterpoint reduction and voice leading analysis

⁵⁸ Poundie Burstein, "Of Species Counterpoint, Gondola Songs, and Sordid Boons," in *Structure and Meaning in Tonal Music*, edited by Poundie Burstein and David Gagné (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon Press, 2006), 33.

Burstein shows the E# and G# as a lower neighbor and a passing tone, respectively, within a larger prolongation of tonic. In Example 3.20d, Burstein shows how his contrapuntal model articulates an interesting way to hear the beginning of Mendelssohn's song: as a prolongation of tonic in which the initial tonic note is implied. Burstein's contrapuntal model forms the basis for my own sketch of the beginning of this movement.⁵⁹

3.5.3: Levy

Levy disagrees with Schenker's reading of the piece from $\hat{3}$, and he provides his own reading from $\hat{3}$ (Example 3.21). Levy argues that three features favor his interpretation over Schenker's. First, $\hat{5}$ receives strong emphasis in mm. 7–10, where it is stated multiple times over root position tonic chords. By comparison to the emphasis that $\hat{5}$ receives, $\hat{3}$ is largely unstressed at the beginning. Indeed, the A5 ($\hat{3}$) that Schenker chooses as the *Kopfton* in m. 9 occurs in a very weak metrical position. Second, choosing $\hat{3}$ as the *Kopfton* underscores the importance of the change in harmonization when the melody from mm. 15ff. returns in mm. 37ff. While the C \sharp s ($\hat{3}$ s) in the melody of mm. 15ff. are harmonized within a tonic expansion, the C \sharp s in the melody of mm. 37ff. occur over an elided authentic cadence in the progression V $_{4-3}^{6-5}$ -I. Choosing $\hat{3}$ as *Kopfton* shifts the focus away from $\hat{5}$ at m. 37. Finally, Levy argues that structural support for $\hat{4}$ occurs in mm. 35–36 where the subdominant is tonicized. A reading from $\hat{3}$ downplays the importance of this subdominant area.

⁵⁹ Burstein makes two other points in his article: (1) that although the opening melodic figure (m. 6) is supported by a dominant prolongation in the bass, its motion from $\hat{3}$ up to $\hat{5}$ instead suggests a prolongation of tonic; (2) that the leap to A5 in m. 9 creates a hypermetric downbeat that conflicts with the previously established 4-bar hypermeter, which would instead suggest that m. 9 is hyperbeat 3. When this leap recurs in m. 39, however, it coincides with a downbeat in the prevailing hypermeter.



Example 3.21 – Edward Levy's 5-line sketch of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6


It may be that Levy is responding to Schenker's dismissive attitude toward \hat{S} . Recall that Schenker undercuts the value of the striking C#6 in mm. 33–34 when he characterizes that note as a structurally unimportant imitation of the Italian singing style. While I agree that an analysis should account for the degree to which Mendelssohn emphasizes \hat{S} , I disagree that this emphasis justifies reading the song with \hat{S} as *Kopfton*. The *Kopfton* is usually the starting point for numerous descents over differing time spans, such that local descents (*Ursatz* replicas) as well as larger-scale descents both occur. Perhaps most detrimental to Levy's interpretation, then, is the fact that in his sketch no local descents from \hat{S} occur. In addition to the lack of local motion

⁶⁰ Heinrich Schenker, *Der Tonwille*, edited by William Drabkin, translated by Ian Bent et. al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 148.

from \hat{S} in his sketch, at least two other details warrant further consideration. Levy is forced to read the consequent phrase of the initial period (mm. 15–21) differently when it returns in mm. 37–42, without any apparent justification for this change in his commentary: in mm. 15–21, no descent occurs; in mm. 37–42, however, a final descent from $\hat{3}$ is present, which may suggest that the consequent's initial statement in mm. 15–21 should also contain this descent. Levy's sketch also appears to prolong $\hat{4}$ through the V_{4-3}^{6-5} motion at mm. 37–38, though it is unclear how such a prolongation is tenable given his insistence that a sketch of this work should recognize the importance of \hat{S} at m. 37. While Levy's analysis presents some challenges, his discussion highlights the fact that although \hat{S} receives emphasis in the piece, its role has been largely overlooked in Schenker-inspired analyses. My agential analysis seeks to remedy this situation.

3.5.4: Alternative Interpretation Influenced by Schenker and Burstein

Having briefly surveyed Schenkerian interpretations of Mendelssohn's song by Schenker, Burstein, and Levy, I now present an alternative sketch that is influenced by both Schenker and Burstein (Example 3.22). Since my goal in this section of the chapter is to demonstrate how agential and Schenkerian analyses interact, I'll focus on five points in my sketch that will be important as I discuss my agential reading below: interruption, initial ascent, the location of the first appearance of the *Kopfton*, the superposition of C#6 at m. 33, and an auxiliary cadence. Like Schenker, I interpret $\hat{3}$ as the *Kopfton*, but unlike Schenker in *Free Composition*, I read an interruption at m. 30 where the so-called "gondolier's call" sounds in the fifth octave at the loudest dynamic yet. Some analysts may be surprised by my interrupted structure because the tonic triad does not sound immediately after the interruption, a requirement that William Marvin



Example 3.22 – Foreground graph of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6

holds as crucial to the spirit of interruption.⁶¹ Nevertheless, I will argue below that my agential reading supports an interrupted view of the fundamental structure.

My reading also differs from Schenker's in that I show an initial ascent in mm. 1–5 that leads to the *Kopfton* in the fourth octave in m. 6. Schenker does not show an initial ascent, and he takes the first appearance of the *Kopfton* to be at m. 9 in the fifth octave. My reading is largely based on the contrapuntal model developed by Burstein. It also allows me to highlight a motive that becomes one of the defining features of the work, and which plays a crucial role in my agential reading: the third spanned by A and C#, which first appears in m. 1 in an inner voice (labeled "X" in Example 3.22). Instead of highlighting this motive, Schenker reads the A3 in m. 1 as moving to the G#4 in m. 4. As Levy's discussion highlighted, the role of the note C# is also diminished in Schenker's sketch even though it is so prominent in the music. My sketch highlights the expressive moment at m. 33 when a trill on C#6 sounds as part of a retrograded and enlarged version of motive X, which, as I argued above, is first stated in the inner voice in m. 1. The note C# also plays an important role in my agential analysis.

Shortly after the trill on C#6 occurs, Schenker implies a tonicization of the subdominant (m. 35) via the addition of the root, F#, in mm. 33–34, something that was not present in his early analysis of the piece in *Der Tonwille*, but which appears when he revisits the piece in *Der freie Satz* (Example 3.23). Instead, I subsume the subdominant in m. 35 into an auxiliary cadence in the tonic, completed in m. 39. I will argue that this cadence is motivated by a dissenting agent whose presence is made evident by the C#6 in m. 33.

⁶¹ William Marvin, "The Reprise Constraint: Considering Schenkerian Interruption," paper presented at the 34th annual meeting of the *Society for Music Theory*, Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 27, 2011.



Example 3.23 – Schenker's Figure 112/2: Sketch of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6

3.6: Combining Agential and Schenkerian Analyses

3.6.1: The Narrative Frame

The summary version of my intentionality graph appears as Table 3.4 below, while the detailed version of my graph appears in Appendix E. The reader may wish to refer to both versions as I discuss the narrative frame for this work. Rather than present a detailed narrative of the piece, I will instead focus on several points that demonstrate the way in which agential and Schenkerian analyses interact. Before I embark on that pursuit, however, I will briefly outline the narrative in which these events take place. A more detailed account of the narrative is presented in Appendix F. Both Burstein and Schenker have personified the G#4 that occurs in m. 4, and like Burstein and Schenker my alternative reading also attributes human qualities to the figure in m. 4. Schenker attributes the G#4 to a singer, while Burstein characterizes the motion from E# to G# as the "Gondolier's call," suggesting the image of a human figure producing the sound. I identify the Gondolier's call as a gesture, and I associate it with an agent that I call the Gondolier. The call is a gesture for at least four reasons: (1) it is relatively short, (2) it always spans a third between $\hat{7}$ and $\hat{2}$, (3) both notes occur on relatively strong beats (in other words, it never creates syncopation), and (4) the notes occur in close proximity to each other—there is never more than a measure that separates attack points. I prefer to label the call a gesture

Table 3.4 – Intentionality graph of Mendelssohn, Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6 (summary version)

| Formal Section Measures Categories Gesture Unexpected Event | 2 | 6 | 4 | ν. | ٥ | 7 | 00 | 0 | 10 | A 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | |
|---|---------|----|----|----|----------|----|----|----|----|------|--------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|--------|--------------------|----------|-----------|--------|----|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1 | | | | _ m | | | | | | Expect | ect A' | A' antcdnt | Ħ | 1 | A' c | consequent returns | luent | retu | l sin | |
| 23 | 3 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| Ш | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| | | | | | - (| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - | | | | | Coda | ga | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| _ | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (cont.) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

rather than a motive because its characteristic identity relies on a particular metric profile, and it does not appear in enlarged, diminuted, or concealed forms at deeper levels of structure.⁶²

The Gondolier's Call expresses a kind of hopeful longing: hopefulness is suggested by its ascending contour, while a sense of longing is inherent in its continually frustrated implication of resolution to the tonic. As I show in my sketch (Example 3.21), the Gondolier's Call is part of a larger initial ascent toward the *Kopfton*, $\hat{3}$, in m. 6. That is, the Gondolier performs the Call to begin the initial ascent, and thus the entire initial ascent is controlled by the Gondolier. I associate the *Kopfton* with the Gondolier Agent, then, since that note is the goal of the initial ascent. Having reached the *Kopfton*, the Gondolier quickly pushes upward in a manifestation of a motive consisting of the third A–C‡, which I label motive X in my sketch. The presence of the Gondolier, then, is indicated by two categories of intentionality: gesture (the Gondolier's Call) and contradiction of musical forces (the initial ascent contradicts gravity and the tonic's magnetism).

Upon reaching C#, a cover tone in Schenkerian terms, the line appears to become "stuck," as if unable to move beyond this C#. The reiteration of this note in mm. 7–8 invokes the repetition/restatement category of intentionality, inviting one to interpret the presence of a second, dissenting agent, who dominates the fifth octave by force of repetition. I call this second agent a Covering Agent because it becomes associated with the cover tone, C#. The conflict between the Gondolier and the Covering Agent continues throughout the piece. The Gondolier consistently tries to initiate a third descent from the note A5 in order to establish its presence in a

⁶² Recall that in Chapter Two I noted that the terms motive and gesture are not mutually exclusive, but that in this dissertation two features distinguish gestures and motives: (1) gestures are defined in more generic terms rather than associated with specific scale degrees, and (2) gestures appear only on the surface of the music, though they may have an impact on musical motion at deeper levels of structure.

register higher than that in which it began, but no convincing descents materialize. Instead, the Covering Agent maintains its control over the higher octave, and the Gondolier's final structural descent to 1 takes place in the fourth octave where it originally stated the *Kopfton*.

The defeat of the Gondolier is signaled in the coda (mm. 43–55) in at least two ways. First, in contrast to the initial ascent at the beginning of the piece which rose to A, motion from the final tonic of the *Urlinie* (m. 43) *descends* to A (m. 51). The syncopation of the descending line gives the impression that the motion is reluctantly accomplished, as if the Gondolier is forced to admit defeat by descending rather than ascending. Second, Burstein has argued that the Gondolier's Call is "shortened" in the coda, such that E#5 (m. 46) does not progress to G#5 as one might have expected, but instead resolves to the tonic, F#5 in m. 47. Note, however, that the resolution to F#5 is delayed by a downward arpeggiation from C#6. The resolution, then, occurs underneath a covering C#6, solidifying the dominance of the Covering Agent. Moreover, the alteration to the Gondolier's Call strips it of its quality of hopeful longing: it no longer avoids resolution to the tonic by leaping upward to G#, an additional sign of defeat.

3.6.2: The Relationship Between Schenkerian and Agential Analyses

Having introduced the narrative frame for the piece, I will now discuss several of the ways in which my Agential and Schenkerian analyses have supported one another, adding nuance and richness to my interpretation of the work. As I noted above in §3.5.4 there are several ways in which my analysis differs from that of Schenker's.⁶³ The rationale behind these decisions can be explained in agential terms. While the initial ascent at the beginning of the work

⁶³ Recall that: (1) I read an initial ascent at the beginning of the work where Schenker does not; (2) I take the *Kopfton* to be at m. 6, while Schenker takes the higher A at m. 9; (3) I read an interrupted structure, while Schenker does not; (4) I identify an auxiliary cadence in the tonic at m. 39, while Schenker implies an auxiliary cadence in the subdominant at m. 34; (5) Schenker dismisses the C#6 at m. 33, while I highlight its importance.

is based on Burstein's contrapuntal model, the implied tonic also allows me to explain the origins of the ascending motion within the work. That is, the Gondolier Agent is presumed to be initially at rest, and starting from the stable platform of the tonic highlights this idea.⁶⁴ When the work begins, the Gondolier performs the Call gesture, which pushes the music upward.


This initial ascent leads to the A4 in m. 6, which partly explains why I read it as Kopfton rather than the A5 in m. 9, which Schenker takes as *Kopfton*. There are at least two reasons Schenker might have chosen his interpretation. First, it allows him to highlight the registral coupling that he feels is a feature of this piece: he shows how the third A–F# is articulated in both the fourth and fifth octaves. Second, when the A' section occurs in mm. 37ff., only the A section's consequent returns, which means that the A4 I choose as Kopfton is not present. While the idea of A4 as the goal of the initial ascent may not be convincing enough by itself, my agential reading offers further support for this interpretation. While I agree with Schenker that registral play is important in the piece, I would characterize the higher register as something that is desired by the Gondolier Agent, but which is ultimately not obtained. Choosing the lower A4 as Kopfton highlights the register in which the majority of the Gondolier's descents take place. Indeed, F#4, rather than F#5, marks the structural cadence (m. 43), as if confirming that the Gondolier has not gained a higher registral position. In Schenkerian terms, I would argue that the fourth octave in which the piece closes marks the obligatory register for the piece—a register which is obligatory for the Gondolier, but which is not desired.

⁶⁴ Note that this does not mean that *every* work should begin on a stable platform. If one were comparing musical motion to the path that a ball might follow as an agent pushes it down the street, one might imagine that the agent lifts the ball to an unstable starting location above the ground in order to imbue it with potential energy. Under this analogy, a work whose starting notes are above the tonic may be interpreted as imbued with potential energy given by an agent who has preemptively lifted the music above that tonic's stable platform.

My assertion that an interruption exists at m. 30 also lies in distinct contrast to Schenker's interpretation of an uninterrupted structure. Traditionally, an interruption consists of two events: the arrival on $\hat{2}$ in the soprano supported by a dividing dominant in the bass and a restatement of the tonic and *Kopfton* following the point of interruption. In addition, interruptions are most often followed by a thematic return, although one can imagine situations in which such a return does not materialize, such as in a contrasting period in which the antecedent ends with a half cadence, and the consequent begins on tonic without a thematic return. Schenker likely chose not to interpret an interruption at m. 30, then, for two reasons: (1) because a return to tonic does not immediately occur after the point of interruption, and (2) because the antecedent phrase (mm. 6–14) from the beginning of the piece is absent after the interruption.

I would nevertheless argue that three factors support reading an interruption at m. 30. First, half of the formula for an interruption is unequivocally present: the arrival on $\hat{2}$ supported by a dividing dominant occurs in m. 30. Second, the consequent from the A section of the piece returns at m. 37, marking the presence of a partial thematic return that only lacks the antecedent phrase. The absence of the antecedent can be attributed to the Covering Agent, which as I will argue below, usurps the antecedent's place. As if supporting the expectation for thematic return at m. 33, an inner-voice figure that has consistently heralded the return of the opening theme sounds in mm. 31–32 (Example 3.24). Third, the return of the consequent also involves a restatement of the tonic at m. 39, which is established through an auxiliary cadence. Thus,

⁶⁵ As I noted earlier, William Marvin has argued that a thematic reprise is integral to the concept of interruption, but I have chosen to be less strict with this requirement. William Marvin, "The Reprise Constraint: Reconsidering Schenkerian Interruption," paper presented at the 34th annual meeting of the *Society for Music Theory*, Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 27, 2011.



Example 3.24 – Figure creating expectation for thematic return (mm. 31–32)

although the tonic is not initially present after the interruption, it *does* eventually appear, and the auxiliary cadence points toward its appearance as a harmonic goal.⁶⁶

The lack of tonic and thematic return at m. 33, the location where one would expect them to occur in a traditional interruption scheme, can be explained in agential terms. A return of the opening theme would have been equivalent to providing the Gondolier Agent with another opportunity to establish itself in the fifth octave, something that it continually attempted in the A section of the piece (mm. 1–21). Moreover, in the B section of the piece (mm. 22–32), the end of which marks the point of interruption, the Gondolier has made its strongest attempt yet to establish itself in the higher register. The B section is comprised entirely of an ascending passage that leads to the most emphatic statement of the Gondolier's Call in the fifth octave (mm. 29–30)at the point of interruption. Recall that at the beginning of the work, the Gondolier's Call started an initial ascent that lead to the *Kopfton* stated in the fourth octave, a register in which the

⁶⁶ See William Rothstein, *Phrase Rhythm in Tonal Music* (New York: Schirmer, 1989), 191: "A recapitulation need not restate the entire opening section. However, if that section originally began with a tonic harmony or tonic prolongation, a true recapitulation will somehow reestablish the original harmonic state." Rothstein argues, however, that Mendelssohn's Song Without Words op. 30, No. 6 does not fit this definition because it does not reestablish the tonic harmony (192–96). Rothstein does not view the harmony in m. 39 as part of an auxiliary cadence: he argues that this harmony is treated simply as the third bar of the theme. Instead, I hear a misalignment between harmony and theme. While the harmony suggests an elided cadence, the consequent's melody has begun *too early*, as if in an attempt to replace the missing antecedent.

Gondolier successfully descended to tonic. Rather than be confronted with the possibility that the Gondolier will also gain a strong hold in a higher register by establishing a third descent from A5, then, the Covering Agent preemptively takes control of the music after the interruption, sounding C#6 and drawing attention to this note with a trill, a move that blocks the antecedent from returning at all. The return of the *Kopfton* in the fifth octave at m. 39, then, can be understood as a last feeble attempt by the Gondolier to gain control of the higher octave. Note, however, the presence of a covering C#6, a note which was absent in the analogous bars in the A section (mm. 17–18). The appearance of the C#6 suggests that the Covering Agent is present, confirming its dominance of a higher register than that which the Gondolier is able to achieve. The Gondolier returns to the fourth octave to sound the final structural cadence in m. 43.

The initial ascent, first statement of the *Kopfton* in the fourth octave, interruption, statement of C#6, and auxiliary cadence all contribute to my agential reading in important ways. Similarly, my agential reading supports the way in which I read each of these features in my graph—features that are salient and which call for interpretation in an analysis. The relationship between Schenkerian analysis and agential analysis is one of reciprocity: each method informs the other. One may perceive a degree of circularity in this argument; agential arguments can be used to support a particular structural interpretation, while structural interpretation is also used to bolster one's agential reading. Yet it is precisely this circularity that provides for such rich possibilities when these two modes of analysis are combined. When events in an agential or structural reading are mutually supportive, the entire interpretation is strengthened.

3.7: Conclusion

In this chapter I have articulated two main points: (1) that agential and narrative analyses are inextricably linked, and (2) that one can use agential and Schenkerian analyses in such a way

as to gain a more nuanced interpretation than one might have produced using either approach alone. To investigate the relationship between narrative and agency, I followed Janet Schmalfeldt's reading of Beethoven's Bagatelle Op. 126, No. 2, discovering locations in her narrative at which the categories of intentionality could prove particularly helpful in developing an alternative reading. During the course of developing this alternative reading, I also demonstrated how one might make decisions about whether multiple events are associated with the same or different agents. To demonstrate the mutually beneficial relationship between agency and Schenkerian analysis, I offered a reading of Mendelssohn's Song Without Words Op. 30, No. 6 that I contrasted with sketches by Poundie Burstein, Edward Levy, and Schenker himself. In both analyses I also explored how the categories of intentionality could be used in an analysis of a complete work or movement from a complete work to identify moments that were particularly agential. The task to which I turn next is to demonstrate how all of these tools can work together to create an interpretation of a larger-scale work, the entirety of Schubert's Piano Sonata in A, D. 959.

CHAPTER FOUR

AN AGENTIAL ANALYSIS OF SCHUBERT'S PIANO SONATA IN A MAJOR, D. 959

4.1: Introduction

In Chapters Two and Three I introduced the tools necessary for performing an agential analysis in the context of my theory of musical agency. In this chapter, I bring together those tools in an agential analysis of Schubert's Piano Sonata D. 959. This piano sonata is particularly interesting from an analytical standpoint because of its cyclical design. As both Robert Hatten and Charles Fisk have noted, material introduced in earlier movements appears in subsequent movements. Since observations made by both Hatten and Fisk in their respective analyses of the work are integral to my own analysis of the piece, I will begin by summarizing their findings. ¹


4.1.1: Robert Hatten's Analysis of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959

In his article "Schubert the Progressive," Hatten laments that Schubert is often unfavorably compared to Beethoven, but that Schubert should be acknowledged as progressive for two compositional features that are foregrounded in his Piano Sonata in A Major: resonance and articulation-as-gesture.² By resonance, Hatten means "techniques other than doublings or traditional application of the damper pedal," though he allows that these may increase the effect of resonance created by some other means.³ He offers three examples of Schubert's novel approach to resonance (Examples 4.1–4.3). At the beginning of the first movement the left

¹ Note that both Edward T. Cone and Arnie Cox have also analyzed portions of Schubert's Piano Sonata D. 959. Since neither of these analyses is influential in my analysis, I will refrain from summarizing them here. See E.T. Cone, "Schubert's Unfinished Business," 19th-Century Music 7/2 (1984): 222–32; Arnie Cox, "Hearing, Feeling, Grasping Gestures," in Music and Gesture, edited by Anthony Gritten and Elaine King (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 45–60.

² Robert Hatten, "Schubert the Progressive: The Role of Resonance and Gesture in Schubert's Piano Sonata in A, D. 959," *Intégral* 7 (1993): 41.

³ Ibid., 42.



Example 4.1 – Hatten: resonance in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 1–3)



Example 4.2 – Hatten: resonance in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III (mm. 99–101)



Example 4.3 – Hatten: resonance in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II (mm. 132–35)

hand's staccato notes intensify the right hand's sustained chords. Similarly, in the trio of the third movement, a *forzando* low A is articulated by the left hand while the right hand holds a chord. Hatten argues that this effect is also achieved in the B section of the second movement when low

rolled chords help to sustain the right hand's single-line melodic notes. By "articulation-asgesture," Hatten means to identify melodic or rhythmic gestures that carry a particular articulation that separates them from the other melodic or rhythmic figures that surround them. He describes two gestures. He identifies the opening of the first movement as containing a thematic gesture. Although he does not explicitly define the gesture, he contrasts it with the second gesture he identifies, such that one can infer that it begins on a downbeat and ends on an upbeat, and that it involves the resonance characteristics that I described above in Example 4.1a. A second gesture involves "two sound events separated by a lift, with the first given less weight and duration than the second." He notes that, in contrast to the opening thematic gesture, this second gesture begins on an upbeat and ends on a downbeat and that it "reverse[s] the resonant and expressive character of the opening theme" (Example 4.4). In my analysis I label Hatten's first gesture X, and his second gesture Y, and I attribute their performance to a single agent.

Hatten argues that both resonance and gesture become thematic to the movement and he traces their interaction throughout all four movements. Important for my own analysis are the following analytical claims made by Hatten:

• The opening phrase of the movement has a heroic character, which Hatten contrasts with a "more human-scale reaction" in the second phrase. He identifies a sense of effort at the beginning of the movement as the inner voice struggles to ascend, as if "capped" by the upper-voice A pedal.⁸

⁴ Ibid., 42–43.

⁵ Ibid., 44.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 44–5.

⁸ Ibid., 59.

- The two gestures he identifies from the beginning of the first movement are integrated into a three-note motive that is treated imitatively later in the movement. Although Hatten does not provide examples of this motive or the measures in which one can find this motive, it is relatively easy to infer that he refers to motives such as those in Example 4.5.9
- The second movement's left-hand ostinato echoes textural and gestural ideas from the first movement (Example 4.6).¹⁰
- The third movement revisits the effect of resonance with the high-note arpeggiations with which it begins and with the heroic gesture returning in the scherzo's B section (Examples 4.7–4.8). Again, Hatten does not give specific measure numbers or an example of the return of the heroic gesture in the scherzo's B section, but he may mean the passage in Example 4.8.¹¹
- The thematic gesture recurs at the beginning of the fourth movement, now shifted to the downbeat (Example 4.9: here Hatten presumably refers to his second gesture even though he references "the thematic gesture," which he identified at the opening of the first movement).



Example 4.4 – Hatten's second gesture in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I

⁹ Ibid., 62.

¹⁰ Ibid., 67.

¹¹ Ibid., 69.



Example 4.5 – Likely location of Hatten's three-note motive



Example 4.6 – Left-hand ostinato in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II (mm. 1–4)



Example 4.7 – Hatten: arpeggiated gesture in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III (mm. 1–4)



Example 4.8 – Possible location of Hatten's heroic gesture in B section of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III (mm. 34–36)

Hatten: thematic gesture shifted to downbeat

Example 4.9 – Recurrence of thematic gesture in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV (mm. 1–2)

4.1.2: Charles Fisk's Analysis of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959

Fisk begins his analysis of Schubert's Piano Sonata by arguing that the opening of the first movement is, in some sense, incomplete, and that the theme that would complete this opening statement fails to materialize at all in the first movement. Fisk argues that the completion of this theme only occurs with the fourth movement's rondo theme, and thus his general trajectory is similar to mine: that the fourth movement is a goal to which the other movements of the sonata progress. Like Hatten, Fisk also identifies two gestures at the beginning of the first movement, that he calls motives. Also like Hatten, Fisk argues that the three-note motive Hatten identifies grows out of the first two motives. Unlike Hatten, Fisk's focus is on identifying the recursive nature of the piece. He shows how the three motives return throughout movements two through four.

His expressive interpretation of the movement also differs from that of Hatten. He identifies a single protagonist who only becomes apparent in the second phrase of the first movement. Hatten's subject was present from the outset. Fisk's protagonist explores its own subjectivity, with its goal being to create a singable melody, something that Fisk argues only

¹² Charles Fisk, *Returning Cycles: Contexts for the Interpretation of Schubert's Impromptus and Last Sonatas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 205.

materializes in the fourth movement. I am indebted to both of these analyses for the careful way in which they identify the materials that recur throughout the sonata. I now turn to my own agential analysis of Schubert's Piano Sonata D. 959.

4.1.3: Summary of Agential Analysis of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959

My analysis adds an interpretive layer that is quite different from that which Hatten and Fisk articulate. As I stated earlier, an agential analysis focuses on the agents, the ways in which they arise in the music, their actions, and their interactions with each other and their environment. These observations are framed by a narrative that unites them in a cohesive trajectory, but a detailed description of the narrative is not the analytical goal. My analysis selects certain passages of music that are particularly important from an agential standpoint and eschews a measure-by-measure account of the entire narrative.

Unlike Hatten, who identifies a single agent via the unified heroic passage at the beginning of the first movement, I hearthe presence of two agents, which I call a Gestural Agent and a Motivic Agent. The Gestural Agent becomes associated with two gestures, which I label X and Y below. In addition, the Gestural Agent is consistently the agent that initiates motion in the *Urlinie*, whether by beginning an ascent to the *Kopfton* or by beginning the actual descent from the *Kopfton*. As such, I associate the Gestural Agent both with the *Kopfton* and with the general goal of completing a descent from that note. The Motivic Agent's presence is associated with an upper-neighbor scale-degree pattern, $\hat{5}-\hat{6}-\hat{5}$, as well as with contractions of that motive such as $\hat{5}-\hat{6}$ or $\hat{6}-\hat{5}$. Since this pattern is essentially a prolongation of $\hat{5}$, the Motivic Agent's influence can also be implied in passages where $\hat{5}$ is emphasized through lengthy durations or repetitions that make it sound as a cover tone. In addition, this agent can also be heard influencing the course of the piece in places where a more general 5–6 motion occurs.

Two issues arise between these two agents: (1) the Motivic Agent continually offers distractions from the Gestural Agent's descents, often covering portions of the descent or interrupting a descent in progress; and (2) the two agents work in opposition to one another, rather than together, often appearing in separate passages wherein they can individually exert control over the music. The tension from these two issues is present throughout the first three movements. It is resolved in the fourth movement when the Gestural Agent is able to complete both local and large-scale descents that are not covered by the Motivic Agent and when the two agents appear at the end of the movement working in synthesis to create a unified passage. A summary of the narrative appears in Appendix G.

4.2: The First Movement

4.2.1: Introduction


As one might expect, the first movement of Schubert's piano sonata is in sonata form.

The exposition introduces the tension between the two agents and is representative of the way in which the agents interact throughout the movement. I will therefore look in more detail at the exposition than at the development and recapitulation.

4.2.2: P and TR (mm. 1-54)

Both the Gestural and Motivic Agents are introduced at the beginning of the movement. As I mentioned earlier, the Gestural Agent is associated with two gestures that were both identified by Hatten and Fisk. These are labeled X and Y in Example 4.10. Gesture X is defined as two short attacks separated by a large descending leap. As Hatten noted, Gesture X begins on a strong beat and ends on a weak beat. In this initial presentation, iterations of each gesture are separated by rests. Gesture Y bears a relation to X in that it involves two successive attacks. By

Gesture X: Two short attacks separated by a large descending leap




Gesture Y: Two unequal durations that rise by step


Example 4.10 – Gestures X and Y in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 1–11)

labeling the gesture Y rather than X', however, I highlight the differences between these two gestures: Y is comprised of two *unequal* durations that *rise* by step. In addition, Y begins on a weak beat and ends on a strong beat, a complementary metrical profile to that of Gesture X. The relationship between these gestures leads me to associate both of them with the Gestural Agent, but their differences cause me to assert that they are different actions performed by that agent.

At the beginning of the movement, the gestural agent performs Gesture X, initiating what might have been a normative 4-bar hypermeter (Example 4.11). The Gestural Agent articulates hyperbeats one and two, but in m. 3 a second agent, the Motivic Agent, interrupts the continuation of this normative hypermeter by extending hyperbeat three, an occurrence that evokes the unexpected event category of intentionality. Both the Gestural and Motivic Agents can also be identified by the fact that they contradict musical forces (Example 4.12). The Gestural Agent's first gesture begins on $\hat{3}$ underneath a covering $\hat{1}$. The musical forces gravity and magnetism would pull the melody down to $\hat{1}$, but instead the Gestural Agent pushes the line



Example 4.11 – Introduction of Motivic Agent in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 1–6)



Example 4.12 – Musical forces in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 1–6)

upward past $\hat{4}$ to $\hat{5}$ where the Motivic Agent takes control of the passage. This Motivic Agent continues to contradict gravity by pushing the line from $\hat{5}$ up through $\hat{6}$ to lowered $\hat{7}$, a move that continues the ascending inertia of the line. The magnetism of the tonic, A4, increases as the melody approaches it, but the lowering of $\hat{7}$ —perhaps the intervention of the Motivic Agent—creates a strong magnetic pull downward to $\hat{6}$, which gives in to gravity and inertia when it moves to $\hat{5}$. The Motivic Agent's label, then, points to its association with the upper-neighbor motive $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$, an affiliation that is important in my narrative reading. As I noted in Chapter


Two, in this dissertation a gesture is a surface-level event described in generic terms, while a motive may be surface level or more concealed or enlarged as in Schenkerian theory, and it is associated with a particular scale-degree pattern. As I will demonstrate below, in Schubert's sonata the scale-degree pattern is also extended to become an intervallic pattern, often involving a 5–6 motion.

At the background level, P and TR constitute a motion from $\hat{5}$ down to $\hat{2}$, but this descent to $\hat{2}$ is filled with several detours that complicate this motion. In particular, several attempts to descend made by the Gestural Agent are covered by the Motivic Agent, delayed, or even thwarted altogether. The result is that the Gestural Agent's descent to $\hat{2}$ from $\hat{5}$ is hard won. In mm. 16–22, an initial motion from $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{3}$ takes place (Example 4.14). This passage contains similar material in the bass as that which appeared in the left hand of mm. 1–6 (Example 4.11). The right hand now plays a counter melody, one that is influenced by both the Gestural and Motivic Agents.


The influence of the Gestural Agent is indicated by the presence of Gesture Y in both the right and left hands (Example 4.14). In the right hand, it occurs in its characteristic metrical position, where the leap happens from beat two to beat three. The initial duration of the gesture has been shortened to an eighth note, and the final duration of the gesture has been lengthened by a quarter note. In the left hand, the gesture is shifted metrically by two beats to begin on beat four. As in the right hand, the left hand's version of Gesture Y is altered such that the initial duration is shortened by an eighth note, and the final duration is lengthened by a quarter note. There is the sense that it will redouble its effort, indicated by the fact that the gesture is played in both hands. This second approach is gentler, expressed by the quiet dynamic (*piano* becomes *pianissimo* in m. 22), and the higher register in which Gesture Y appears.



Example 4.13 – Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 12–15: compare to Example 4.14)



Example 4.14 – Change of State in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 16–22: compare to Example 4.13)



Example 4.15 – Foreground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 1–22)

Besides gesture, two other categories of intentionality also indicate the presence of an agent: change of state and contradiction of musical forces. Two parameters have been altered: the dynamic changes from *fortissimo* to piano at m. 16, something that began with the decrescendo in m. 13, and the rhythmic profile of the passage changes from a continuous stream of triplet eighth notes in mm. 12–15 to the articulation of the quarter-note pulse in m. 16 (Compare Examples 4.13 and 4.14). Gravity and magnetism are contradicted by the ascending leap from A, $\hat{1}$, to E, $\hat{5}$ (Example 4.14). This leap is followed by a step up to F# ($\hat{6}$), a motion that represents an incomplete version of the $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ upper-neighbor motive associated with the Motivic Agent.

As my graph in Example 4.15 shows, a local descent from $\hat{5}$ to $\hat{3}$ takes place over the course of mm. 16–18 (see the red circles in Example 4.15). This descent is covered by the $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motive (see the beamed notes in Example 4.15). Rather than being stated as an upper-neighbor pattern, however, the motive arises through two escape tones; that is, the F# and the second E are both escape tones. It is as if the actions of the motivic agent interrupt each descending step created by the gestural agent. After its stuttering descent to $\hat{3}$, the melody gives in to gravity and magnetism and descends further to A#. This A# represents a significant moment in the course of the melody. Gravity and magnetism would pull the melody down to A4; instead, the note that the melody reaches is A#4, as if the tonic has been altered by an agent who sends the melody upward once again. The agent who alters the course of the music may be associated with the Motivic Agent for at least two reasons: (1) the location at which the A# appears is analogous to the location at which the Motivic Agent first interrupted the Gestural Agent in m. 3, and (2) the surface-level goal of the ascent is $\hat{5}$, a note that is associated with the Motivic Agent. Thus the Motivic Agent evades a descent to $\hat{1}$ by sending the line back up to $\hat{5}$. Upon reaching $\hat{5}$, another

local descent from $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{3}$ occurs, with the motion again covered by the Motivic Agent, this time in the form of an incomplete neighbor, $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$.

Having interrupted two local descents to $\hat{3}$, it appears as though the Motivic Agent relents, allowing the *Urlinie* to descend unfettered from $\hat{4}$ (m. 21) to $\hat{3}$ (m. 22). It is interesting to note that this descent is not under the control of the Gestural Agent. Indeed, it appears in a passage that is more heavily influenced by the Motivic Agent, and it follows gravity and magnetism. There is more the sense that the Motivic Agent allows the melody to descend, as opposed to the Gestural Agent forcing the issue.


Although the Motivic Agent has allowed the line to descend to $\hat{3}$ at m. 22, it does not allow the line to descend directly to $\hat{2}$ (Example 4.16, circled notes). Instead, the Motivic Agent pushes the line back upward through D# (m. 27) to E (m. 28) in a contradiction of gravity and magnetism. This upward motion is associated with the Motivic Agent because the goal of the ascending line is $\hat{3}$. Perhaps realizing that it will take effort to descend to $\hat{2}$, the Gestural Agent changes its approach for a third time. At the beginning of the movement it was forceful. In mm. 16–28 it became much gentler. Here, at m. 28, it begins to increase its strength again. The continued presence of the Gestural Agent is suggested by Gesture Y, which still occurs in both the right and left hands (Example 4.17). The right hand plays the version of Gesture Y that begins on beat four, while the left hand plays the version that begins on beat two. Note that this constitutes a change of state from the disposition of this gesture in the hands at mm. 16–22, where the right hand's Gesture Y began on beat two and the left hand's began on beat four. The

 $^{^{13}}$ Note that $\hat{4}$ is supported by a weak V_3^4 chord, as opposed to a stronger root position V^7 chord. I do not read this support for $\hat{4}$ as "problematic" because weak support for $\hat{4}$ is so commonplace in 5-line descents.

 $^{^{14}}$ Note that on the surface of the music this is a descent in register, moving from C \sharp 5 to E4. At a shallow middleground level, however, one can understand the motion as constituting an ascending contour. Indeed, the D \sharp 5 of m. 27 eventually resolves to E5 in m. 28 on the fourth quarter note, a motion that represents a delayed resolution in the higher register.




Example 4.16 – Ascent from C# to E in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 22–28)



Example 4.17 – Samples of continued presence of Gesture Y in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I

The change in inversion of the secondary dominant speaks to the erratic action of the agent: the descending thirds cycle is initiated as though it will be stated in sequence, but a sense of sequence is only weakly maintained after the statement of the model and its first copy (Example 4.17). The model is stated in mm. 28–29, and its first copy appears in mm. 30–31.



Example 4.18 – Cycle of descending thirds in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I

Note that in the left hand of the model and copy, Gesture Y begins on beat two and is followed by quarter notes. It might be described as the "leading voice" of the model in the sense that it begins motion in the model. In the right hand, Gesture Y begins on beat four and is followed by triplets. It might be described as the "following voice" of the model in the sense that its gesture begins after the left hand's has been stated. Rather than continuing the pattern established in mm. 28–31, the Gestural Agent suddenly performs a role reversal in mm. 32–35, one that weakens a sense of sequence and contradicts musical inertia. Now, the right hand becomes the "leading voice," taking the rhythmic profile that had previously belonged to the left hand, and the left hand becomes the "following voice," taking the rhythmic profile that had previously belonged to the right hand. 15 The appearance of a secondary V_2^4 chord also causes the ensuing temporary tonic to appear in the weaker first inversion, delaying an arrival of the chord's root in the bass until later in the measure. Further highlighting the erratic behavior of the Gestural Agent is the delayed arrival of the triplet motion of the "following voice." When they are first introduced in m. 29, the triplets begin on beat three and arrive on beat one of the next measure. This metrical profile is continued when the triplets reappear in mm. 31 and 33. In m. 35, however, the triplets overshoot the downbeat of m. 36, ending instead on beat three of that measure.

The triplets now become a kind of rallying point for the Gestural Agent, an action that allows it to force the appearance of $\hat{2}$. Three triplet figures arrive on B ($\hat{2}$) at mm. 39, 41, and 43 (Example 4.19). One way to read these three arrivals on B is as an emphatic confirmation of $\hat{2}$, one that is colored by the increased erraticism on the part of the Gestural Agent that I referenced above. Following the initial arrival on $\hat{2}$ in m. 39, one might expect to attain what James

 $^{^{15}}$ Placing the material of the "following voice" in the bass, then, causes the change in inversion of the secondary V^7 s from root position to third inversion that I mentioned previously.



Example 4.19 – Arrival on 2 in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 36–43)


Hepokoski and Warren Darcy have termed the medial caesura. The first two arrivals on B, however, are followed by statements of Gesture Y, which appears to prompt a re-beginning of triplet motion, postponing the sense of rest that a medial caesura usually engenders with a cadential extension comprised of a dominant lock. With each restart of triplet motion, the actions of the agent become more shrill: in m. 39 the triplets begin in the fifth octave, but in m. 41, the triplets begin in the sixth octave. The arrival on $\hat{2}$ here is thus erratically emphasized by the Gestural Agent, and its prolongation of the dominant evades a sense of medial caesura-like repose until m. 49 when caesura-fill leads to the Secondary Theme Zone in m. 55.

4.2.3: S (mm. 55–123) and C (123–34)

The Secondary Theme Zone (mm. 55–123) is organized in a ternary ABA' design. The A sections are dominated by the Motivic Agent, with only vestiges of the Gestural Agent present. A descent from the note B (\$\hat{3}\$ in the key of the dominant) is interrupted at m. 76 in the first A section (mm. 55–77). By contrast, the B section (mm. 78–117) represents the Gestural Agent's attempt to gain strength, something that will be thwarted when the A section returns at m. 117.

Some readers may object to the location at which I argue that the A section ends and the B section begins. My formal interpretation is based around the idea of an interruption occurring at m. 76, something that is supported by my agential reading.

Having so emphatically emphasized B (large-scale 2) at the end of TR, it is as if the Gestural Agent has temporarily expended its energy, and the Motivic Agent is easily able to dominate the section. The presence of an agent at the beginning of S is indicated by the change of state, repetition, and contradiction of musical forces categories of intentionality (Example 4.20). Three parameters undergo a change of state. The dynamic changes to *pianissimo* from *piano*, the division of the beat changes from triple (mm. 42–50) to duple (m. 51), ¹⁶ and a change of articulation occurs in m. 55: mm. 51–53 contain staccato eighth notes; m. 54 prepares for the entrance of the S theme with staccato eighth notes underneath a slur, creating a kind of tenuto




Example 4.20 – Categories of intentionality at beginning of S in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I

¹⁶ This change does not take place right at the beginning of S, but it takes place in a passage that prepares for the entry of S, perhaps indicating that an agent prepares for the S theme to arise.

effect; and m. 55 removes the staccatos altogether, though they return in m. 56. The overall effect is one of disconnected notes in mm. 51–54 contrasted with more lyrical, legato notes in mm. 55ff. The repetition category of intentionality is invoked when the melody from mm. 55ff. is repeated with some alteration in mm. 60ff.

In addition to these two categories of intentionality, the contradiction of musical forces can be seen in this passage when one notes that B, local \hat{S} , seems to be a focal point in mm. 55– 64, as if the Motivic Agent wishes to highlight that note. The emphasis it receives often contradicts forces at both a local level and at a level below the surface. On the surface, an initial leap from B up to E in m. 55 contradicts gravity, but gives in to the magnetism of the tonic. The magnetism of the tonic is contradicted when the line descends by step to B immediately after arriving on E. This descent can be seen as giving in to gravity, but if E5 is understood as a stable platform, then some agent must push the line down below the E5 before the gravitational pull of the next lowest tonic, E4, acts upon the melodic line. A second surface-level contradiction of musical forces occurs in mm. 58–60. In m. 58, the melodic line reaches 2 (F#), which is subject to the gravity and magnetism of the tonic a step below. Rather than descend to tonic, however, the melody ascends to the dominant in m. 60, where a restatement of the melody from m. 55 occurs. At a level just below the surface, the $\hat{5}-\hat{6}-\hat{5}$ motive happens twice in this passage (Example 4.21). Each time, the motion from $\hat{5}$ - $\hat{6}$ can be understood as a contradiction of gravity and magnetism. The first occurrence of the motive (mm. 55–8) covers a descent from $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{2}$. The second occurrence covers a local descent of a third that prolongs B, which eventually moves to A (m. 64). The presence of this $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motive is what indicates that it is the Motivic Agent who controls this passage.



Example 4.21 – Foreground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 55–76)

Note the distinctive rhythmic profile of mm. 57, 58, 62, and 63, in which two quarter notes lead to a half note on beat three (Example 4.20). 17 In m. 57, not only does the half note provide durational emphasis to beat three, but the half note itself is accented. This emphasis on beat three is reminiscent of the original statement of Gesture Y, in which a short attack on beat two leads to a lengthier note on beat three. It is as if the Motivic Agent has subsumed the Gestural Agent's action, appropriating it into the broader $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motion. There is a sense in mm. 55–64, then, that the Motivic Agent has taken possession of the Gestural Agent's space by covering two descents from $\hat{5}$ and by sounding a kind of imitation of the Gestural Agent's Gesture Y, something to which I will return shortly.


As my middleground graph shows, the A section of the S zone descends from local $\hat{5}$ to $\hat{4}$ in m. 63, after which the line continues to descend to $\hat{2}$ in m. 76, where it is interrupted (Example 4.21). Rather than view the dominant that is prolonged from mm. 72–77 as resolving to the tonic

¹⁷ The rhythm in mm. 58 and 63 differs slightly from that in 57 and 62: the half note on beat three is tied across the bar line to another half note.

that appears in m. 78, I instead interpret the dominant of mm. 72–77 as driving toward a cadential tonic that never materializes, creating the effect of an "abandoned" cadence. That is, the tonic to which the dominant from mm. 72–77 should resolve never materializes, and the music simply begins again, in the manner of the second branch of an interruption scheme. ¹⁸ The apparent consequent phrase that begins in m. 78 becomes preoccupied with the Imitative Gesture, such that the phrase appears to veer off in a different direction than the previous phrase. Some readers may wish to interpret mm. 79–82 as a kind of post-cadential extension, an effect created by the melody which remains static on B and the bass, which simply neighbors E. If this passage were a true post-cadential extension, it would suggest that the dominant of mm. 72–77 does, in fact, resolve to the tonic of m. 78. In m. 82, however, two distinctive changes occur that thwart the sense of post-cadential function. In mm. 80–81, a half note is followed by two quarter notes, but in m. 82, this rhythmic pattern is retrograded, and two quarter notes lead to a half note on beat three—the rhythm of the Imitative Gesture. This Gesture leads to an F‡ at the end of the measure rather than an F# as had happened in mm. 80–81. The presence of this new rhythm in combination with the change to F\ rather than F\ seem to mark the passage as beginning something new, thwarting its post-cadential function. Perhaps enhancing this effect is the presence of an accent on beat one of m. 82. As Hatten and Fisk also pointed out, this Imitative Gesture is subject to development in mm. 82–95 (Example 4.22).


As my middleground graph shows, this passage also represents an ascending arpeggiation that contradicts gravity and magnetism (Example 4.23). The goal of the ascent is B (local \$\frac{5}{2}\$),

¹⁸ Some readers may prefer to view mm. 72–77 as a dominant arrival in the manner of William Caplin. Caplin reserves the term dominant arrival for situations in which a dominant harmony is prolonged and no genuine half cadence emerges. Nevertheless, the point remains that in a Schenkerian sense this dominant is back-relating, rather than resolving to the forthcoming tonic. See William Caplin, *Classical Form: A Theory of Formal Functions for the Music of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 75.



Example 4.22 – Beginning function at m. 78 and Mimicry Gesture subject to imitation in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 76–99)


which suggests that the passage is under the control of the Motivic Agent. This ascending arpeggiation is supported in the bass by a cycle of descending major thirds. The presence of the Mimicry Gesture in combination with the cycle of major thirds, something that had previously



Example 4.23 - Middleground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I

been heard under the control of the Gestural Agent, suggests that the Motivic Agent continues to appropriate the Gestural Agent's actions.

At m. 95, however, a change of state takes place that may suggest a point at which the Gestural Agent begins to take control of the passage, something that will be confirmed by the presence of a variant of Gesture X at mm. 105–11. As Example 4.24 shows, after ascending to B in m. 95, the upper voice descends. From mm. 95–117, two descents take place, both of which are covered by $\hat{3}$. The first descent takes place from mm. 95–101, where $\hat{3}$ is simply maintained as a cover tone in the upper voice. The second descent takes place from mm. 101–17. Here, the covering $\hat{3}$ is prolonged via a 5–6 motion that more overtly signifies the presence of the Motivic Agent than the previous covering $\hat{3}$. Note that this 5–6 motion involves the notes B–C \ddagger , rather than C \ddagger . This particular motion will return at an important juncture later in the movement. This second descent also features the return of Gesture X, now shortened such that each note of the gesture lasts an eighth note and no space occurs between iterations of the gestures (Example




Example 4.24 – Foreground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 91–117)


4.25). It is as if the Gestural Agent injects further energy into this second descent, but to no avail.

The descent remains covered by the Motivic Agent.

The return of the A theme brings with it the completion of a fifth-descent from B, one that remains covered by the $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ upper-neighbor motive just as the descents in the A theme's original statement had been. Unlike the initial presentation of the A theme, however, the restatement of the A theme includes an important phrase expansion (Example 4.26). At m. 120, the upper voice reaches F# (local $\hat{2}$), and before it can descend to E (local $\hat{1}$), a rhythmically



Example 4.25 – Sample of return of Gesture X in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 104–08)



Example 4.26 – Phrase expansion in the return of the A theme in the S Zone

compressed statement of the A theme occurs that restates the covering $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motive. Thus the Motivic Agent interrupts the fifth descent to confirm its domination over the exposition of the movement.

In the Closing Zone, the Imitative Gesture is preoccupied with B (local $\hat{5}$), and underneath it an ascending line of triplets repeatedly moves from $\hat{5}-\hat{2}$, then eventually descends by step to $\hat{1}$ (Example 4.27). The repeated motion $\hat{2}-\hat{1}$ across the bar line serves to emphasize the cadential motion that was previously withheld at mm. 72 ff., the location at which the cadence was "abandoned" when the cadential tonic failed to materialize, acting as reinforcement that it is the Motivic Agent who has been, and still is, in control of the movement.

The exposition began with the Gestural Agent who, perhaps unable to begin descending motion from $\hat{3}$, chooses to rise to $\hat{5}$. At $\hat{5}$, however, it encountered the Motivic Agent, who took control of the music and began to distract the listener from the Gestural Agent's repeated attempts at overt upper-voice descents. It often accomplished this task by covering the descent, but it occasionally interrupted the descent, or deflected it such that the line was sent rising back upward. Toward the end of the exposition, the Motivic Agent even began to incorporate characteristics of the Gestural Agent's own actions using the Imitative Gesture. In the development the Motivic Agent continues to dominate the movement.




Example 4.27 – Imitative Gesture and highlighting of $\hat{2}-\hat{1}$ in C Zone of Schubert, Piano Sonata, D. 959/I (mm. 123–28)

4.2.4: The Development (mm. 134–201)

Indeed, the Motivic Agent's motive appears to influence the key in which the development begins (Example 4.28). At the end of the Closing Zone, the Imitative Gesture repeats B in the soprano. In the first measure of the development, the repeated B moves to a C\(\daggera\), which becomes the tonic of a C-major passage. Recall that the way in which the covering \(\hat{3}\) was prolonged in mm. 101–17 was through a 5–6 motion involving the notes B–C\(\daggera\). That same motion now launches the development and brings with it a change of key. The key is distantly-related to both A major and E major, the home key and the key of the dominant, both of which were initiated by the Gestural Agent.

The entire development, save for the retransition (mm. 184–201), is occupied with varied statements of the A theme from the exposition's S Zone. As in S, the presence of the A theme in the development continues to signify that the Motivic Agent is in control of the music. A few of these statements warrant further comment. At the beginning of the development, statements of the theme over a C pedal (mm. 134–39, 145–49) alternate with statements of the theme over a B pedal (140–44, 150–54). The choice of pedal tones (C and B) is significant—although the key is




Example 4.28 – Seam between Closing Zone and Development in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 133–34)

no longer E major, these two notes serve as reminders of how the motion from B to C\(\frac{1}{2}\) influenced the beginning of the development (Example 4.29). At mm. 165ff. a statement in C minor ensues, a key that is far removed from the A-major key in which the movement began (Example 4.30). The phrase makes two attempts to effect a PAC in C minor, but each attempt is thwarted. The first evasion (m. 170) simply restates the final subphrase that drives toward the PAC. The second evasion (m. 172) effects an enharmonic modulation to A minor, a key that is more closely-related to A major than C minor. The rhythmic activity at m. 172 may also lead one to pause. Marked by a pianissimo dynamic, m. 172 represents a subtle change of state to a less active rhythmic profile, something that, along with the evaded cadences and shift to A as tonic, may foreshadow a weakening of the Motivic Agent's position.


Despite this suggestion, the Gestural Agent does not immediately return. Instead, an iteration of the S theme in A minor ensues in mm. 177ff., complete with a statement of the $\hat{3}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motive that confirms the presence of the Motivic Agent (Example 4.30). As in the C minor section, the A minor statement drives toward a PAC at m. 182, but the cadence is evaded (Example 4.31). It appears as though a second attempt will be made at a PAC in mm. 182–83, but the cadential $\frac{6}{4}$ at the beginning of m. 183 fails to resolve to V, instead moving to a secondary leading-tone chord that tonicizes the dominant, forcing that chord to appear on the downbeat of m. 184. Rather than reaching a PAC in the tonic, then, the dominant is prolonged to begin the retransition. The inability of the Motivic Agent to effect an authentic cadence in A minor is a further sign of its weakening. More evidence for the weakening of the Motivic Agent can be seen after the failed PAC in the tonic at m. 184, when the A theme from the S zone suddenly disappears.



Example 4.29 – S theme over C and B pedals in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 135–44)




Example 4.30 – Evaded cadences in the Development of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 163–80)



Example 4.31 – Seam between Development and Retransition in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 181–84)

As the Motivic Agent weakens, the Gestural Agent begins to rebuild its strength. The presence of an agent in the retransition is indicated by the change of state, repetition, and unexpected event categories of intentionality (Examples 4.31 and 4.32). The change of state is apparent in the fact that the S theme is no longer present, while the repetition can be seen in the repeated instances of V⁶ on the downbeats of several measures. The unexpected event category of intentionality is evoked by the lack of a PAC in m. 184. Figures resembling Gesture X begin to emerge during the retransition (Examples 4.31 and 4.32). The first two figures (labeled "1" on the music) bear a resemblance to Gesture X in the fact that they both contains leaps and they both articulate beats one and two of their respective measures. The contour of these figures is different from Gesture X, which descends rather than ascends as these figures do. The figures marked "2" in Example 4.32 resemble the contour and metric profile of Gesture X, though they involve shorter durations than the quarter notes that were involved in the original statement of Gesture X. In mm. 190–99, figures marked "3" are interspersed with those marked "2" in Example 4.32. Those marked "3" bear a relation to the descending leap contour of Gesture X, but the metric and rhythmic profiles are different. The faster note values here, along with the forte dynamic attained at m. 198, give the impression of gaining strength. Finally, at mm. 200–

01, only figures marked "3" in Example 4.27 appear, and they lead to the recapitulation, and the return of Gesture X in its original form, signifying that the Gestural Agent has regained its initial strength.




Example 4.32 – Retransition in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 185–201)

4.2.5: The Recapitulation (mm. 202–334) and Coda (mm. 335–61)


As expected, the original ordering of themes recurs, and the drama is once again played out between the Gestural and Motivic Agents. Two significant events that point to the unresolved tension between the two agents warrant attention. First, in the exposition the *Kopfton* descends in P from $\hat{5}$ to $\hat{3}$ before TR occurs, although this descent is covered (Example 4.15). In the

recapitulation, this descent does not occur in P (Example 4.33). Instead, it is delayed by a 5–6 motion that represents the incursion of the motivic agent at a deep level of structure. Moreover, this 5–6 involves the notes E to F \ddagger rather than F \ddagger , a modality that is analogous to the modality of the B to C \ddagger 5–6 motion that occurred in the dominant key during the S Zone and which launched the development. In the recapitulation, the 5–6 motion, the latter note of which arises from an emphasis on \ddagger VI that was not present in the exposition, actually delays the descent of the *Kopfton* rather than merely covering the descent as it had done in the exposition. Like the descent at the end of S in the exposition, the final descent of the *Urlinie* at the end of the recapitulation is also covered by the 3–3 motive (Example 4.34). Moreover, just as in the exposition, the final motion from 2–3 is interrupted by an insertion whose purpose is to remind us of the motive.

The second significant event occurs at the end of the Closing Zone and into the Coda. The Closing Zone, now transposed to the tonic, begins in the same way as the Closing Zone in the exposition with the Imitative Gesture highlighting $\hat{5}$ while triplet motion in an inner voice



Example 4.33 – Delayed descent in Recapitulation (mm. 204–60)



Example 4.34 – Final descent at end of Recapitulation in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 324–29)

points to the seam between $\hat{2}$ and $\hat{1}$ that was interrupted by the $\hat{3}-\hat{6}-\hat{5}$ motive (Example 4.35). In m. 334, the Closing Zone is abruptly silenced, and in m. 335 the Gestural Agent makes another appearance, this time sounding almost feeble: it reiterates the opening measures of the movement in a higher register at a *pianissimo* dynamic rather than the *forte* dynamic at which Gesture X initially sounded. This time, no hypermetric disruption occurs at the point where the Motivic Agent entered in m. 3 of the exposition. The Gestural Agent is allowed to create a descent from $\hat{3}$, but this descent comes too late—after the structural close of the movement—and the beginning of the descent still occurs underneath a 5–6 motion. At end of the coda one hears what might have been a kind of altered plagal progression $I-\beta II-I$, except that at the last minute the gestural agent adds a $G_7^{\#}$, turning the βII into a German augmented sixth chord built on $\beta \hat{2}$ (Example 4.36). Unconventional progressions in which the harmonic motion is unpredictable have a history of being associated with the sublime. The progression $I-\beta II-I$ is such an unpredictable progression, and the effect here has been intensified by the added $G_7^{\#}$, which is

¹⁹ See Clive Mclelland, "Ombra and Tempesta," in *The Oxford Handbook of Topic Theory*, ed. Danuta Mirka (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 291–94. A future project could explore how the idea of the sublime is expressed throughout the other movements of this sonata.



Example 4.35 – Return of Gesture X and descent in Coda of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 330–46)



Example 4.36 – Altered plagal progression in Coda of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/I (mm. 353–61)

unexpected. The added G# draws our attention to the sublime. The idea of elevation to a greater spiritual realm may serve to foreshadow the state of synthesis that will be achieved at the end of the fourth movement. That is, at the end of the fourth movement the Gestural and Motivic Agents work together to create a unified whole that is greater than either agent individually.

At the beginning of the first movement, then, a tension between a Gestural and a Motivic Agent is established. The Motivic Agent continually distracts our attention from the descents effected by the Gestural Agent. By the end of the movement, this tension is left unresolved, but the tranquil coda foreshadows the possibility of resolution at the end of the narrative. In movement two, however, resolution must wait, as the tension between the two agents continues.


4.3: The Second Movement

4.3.1: Overview

The second movement is in ternary form. The A section (mm. 1–68) comprises an initial repeated parallel period (mm. 1–32) that is itself subject to a written-out repeat in mm. 33–64. A short post-cadential extension follows the perfect authentic cadence at m. 64. The original period is presented in mm. 1–18, and its repetition follows in mm. 19–32. This repetition is subject to some variation. Its antecedent (mm. 19–26) begins off tonic with a tonicization of the relative major (Example 4.38). The melody of the antecedent's basic idea (mm. 19–22) is an exact restatement of the original from mm. 1–4 (Example 4.37), but the beginning of the continuation is embellished with a turn figure, and D5 in m. 24 is preceded by an incomplete neighbor. The harmonic context that supports the melody is also different: the dominant-seventh of the mediant is prolonged via neighboring $\frac{6}{4}$ chords at the repeated antecedent's beginning. The consequent is subject to more variation than the antecedent. Measures 9–12 from the beginning of the original



Example 4.37 – Initial antecedent phrase (mm. 1–8) in A section of second movement



Example 4.38 – Restatement of antecedent phrase (mm. 19–26) in A section of second movement

presentation of the consequent are omitted in the repetition of the consequent that begins at m. 27, with the result that the repeated consequent begins on an unstable neighboring $_{4}^{6}$ chord in a similar manner to the way that the repeated antecedent began on an unstable accented $_{4}^{6}$ (Examples 4.39 and 4.40). In addition, the first four measures of the melody in the repeated consequent (mm. 27–30) are covered by $\hat{1}$ in m. 27 and $\hat{5}$ in mm. 28–30.

The B section (mm. 69–148) represents a remarkable *fantasia*-like passage that sounds quasi-improvisatory. It can be divided into a number of subsections: mm. 69–85, 85–103, 103–122, 122–33, and 133–48. Measures 148–59 represent a retransition that returns to the A section at m. 160. The first half of the A section (mm. 1–32) is restated in its entirety (mm. 160–89), but



Example 4.39 – Initial consequent phrase (mm. 9–18) in A section of second movement



Example 4.40 –Restatement of consequent (mm. 27–32) in A section of second movement

a countermelody is added above the original melody. This countermelody alters the structure of the A section, such that what was once a repeated parallel period is now a parallel double period. These changes will be discussed in more detail below. A coda (mm. 190–203) follows this A' section.

As my analysis will show, the Gestural Agent again prepares for a descent from the Kopfton, this time $\hat{3}$, rather than $\hat{5}$ as in the first movement. Its presence is notable at the beginning of each phrase in the A section, but the Motivic Agent once again acts as a distraction toward the end of each phrase, preventing an unencumbered descent from taking place. The B section is under the influence of the Motivic Agent, and as my middleground graph shows, it is concerned with attaining $\hat{2}$ (Example 4.41). Once $\hat{2}$ appears, a modulation to the dominant takes


Example 4.41 – Middleground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II

place, and this large-scale $\hat{2}$ is understood locally as $\hat{5}$. Local $\hat{5}$ is prolonged via its own fifth-descent, but the fifth-descent is almost entirely harmonized by the dominant. With the return of the A section comes the return of the Gestural Agent's presence, but the Motivic Agent covers the A theme's melody, dominating the passage. In the coda, something resembling Gesture X appears, and it sinks to a very low register, perhaps indicating temporary resignation on the part of the Gestural Agent.

4.3.2: The A Section (mm. 1–68)

The gestural agent makes its presence known in the accompanimental pattern that is repeated throughout the A section, which employs a pattern related to Gesture Y from the first movement. Gesture Y was partly defined by the short-long durational pattern, but in the second movement the lengthy duration has been divided into a legato octave leap (Example 4.42). 20 Moreover, the descending octave leap on beats two and three is reminiscent of Gesture X from mm. 1–2 of the first movement, which also featured a descending octave leap. As my analysis in Example 4.44 shows, this movement is a 3-line, where the *Kopfton* is stated at the beginning of the antecedent. In m. 5, however, an inner-voice \hat{S} is superposed above the fundamental line in an unexpected event that also contradicts the gravitational and magnetic pull of the tonic, F#, on the previous note in m. 4, G#. The sudden appearance of \hat{S} represents the Motivic Agent's intrusion into the movement, and indeed the \hat{S} – \hat{G} – \hat{S} upper-neighbor motive sounds in mm. 5–7 (Example 4.42). Had the agent not intruded, this sentential phrase might have resembled my recomposition in Example 4.43. Instead, the Motivic Agent disrupts the phrase in at least three ways: (1) C#5 replaces the A4 that appears at the beginning of my recomposed continuation;


²⁰ The connection to Gesture Y is readily apparent in Mitsuko Uchida's recording of the sonata.



Example 4.42 – Measures 1–8 from Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II



Example 4.43 – Hypothetical recomposition of mm. 1–8



Example 4.44 – Foreground graph of original statement

(2) it forces the melody upward into the fifth octave, a register that had only fleetingly appeared in m. 2; and (3) it pulls the bass, which has harmonized all previous downbeats in tenths, up to an A in m. 5, leaving the previous leading tone, E#, unresolved. After this moment, the melody

gives in to gravity and returns to the *Kopfton*, which descends to $\hat{2}$ over the dominant as it had been doing at the beginning of the movement. Thus, the Motivic Agent temporarily distracts one's attention from the $\hat{3}$ – $\hat{2}$ descent.

In the consequent, the Gestural Agent re-begins the process of creating a descent. At m. 13, the Motivic Agent affects the harmony of the phrase (Example 4.39). Rather than resolving directly to a root-position tonic in m. 13, the V⁶ chord of m. 12 resolves instead to a tonic that is embellished by a neighboring 6th and 4th above the bass. Both the 6th and the 4th contradict gravity and magnetism, suggesting the presence of the Motivic Agent. Indeed, one may understand this $\frac{6}{4}$ chord as having been brought about by the 6th in the tenor voice, which participates in a $\hat{3}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motive. Had this $\frac{6}{4}$ chord not been present, the passage may have proceeded as in Example 4.45. Instead, however, it is as if the Gestural Agent is distracted. In m. 15, just after the Motivic Agent's disruption, the melody is on $\hat{2}$, ready to descend to $\hat{1}$. Instead, in a contradiction of magnetism and gravity, the melody ascends to $\hat{3}$, creating an expanded phrase. In m. 18, the melody finally descends to $\hat{1}$ to complete the initial period.

As I noted above, when the period repeats the antecedent begins with a harmonization of the melody in the relative major (A). Instead of the tonic of A major, however, a pedal $\hat{5}$ (E)



Example 4.45 – Hypothetical recomposition of consequent from Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II

appears in the bass, as if the Motivic Agent is attempting to usurp the Gestural Agent's control over the left-hand accompanimental pattern (Example 4.38). The presence of the Motivic Agent, then, is suggested by the repetition category of intentionality: \hat{S} in A major is repeated on the downbeats of mm. 19–25. Further evidence for the Motivic Agent's presence occurs at the end of the tonicization in m. 25, where \hat{S} (E) moves through $\sharp \hat{S}$ (E \sharp) to \hat{G} (F \sharp) in an incomplete version of the \hat{S} – \hat{G} – \hat{S} motive. As my middleground graph shows, on a larger scale the F \sharp in m. 25 is understood as a reiteration of the tonic of the home key (F \sharp minor), which supports a return to the *Kopfton* in the upper voice (Example 4.41). The fact that the *Kopfton* is approached from above via \hat{S} may also suggest the influence of the Motivic Agent, who covers the action of the *Kopfton*. The effect of the Motivic Agent on the upper voice continues in the restatement of the consequent where the reappearance of the *Kopfton* at m. 28 is covered by \hat{S} (Example 4.40).


In the A section of the movement, then, the Gestural Agent is ever-present in the repeated accompanimental pattern. It controls the beginnings of the original statements of the antecedent and consequent, but the Motivic Agent intervenes in each of its descents. During the repetition of the period, the Motivic Agent's presence grows stronger as it appears in both the soprano and bass. The codetta that appears in mm. 64–67 perhaps indicates resignation on the part of the Gestural Agent: it moves into a very low register, and the accompanimental pattern is static on F‡, suggesting a loss of will to move. At the deep middleground level of the work, the A section serves to prolong the *Kopfton*, 3, which will descend to 2 in the B section.

4.3.3: The B Section (mm. 69–148) and Retransition (mm. 148–59)

The B section is controlled by the Motivic Agent, whose influence is felt in two important ways: (1) at a deep level of the middleground in a large-scale $\hat{6}$ - $\hat{5}$ motion that

eventually leads to large-scale $\hat{2}$, and (2) in the prolongation of large-scale $\hat{2}$ via a fifth-descent. As my deep middleground graph shows (Example 4.46), after the *Kopfton* is prolonged via a third-descent in the A section, the upper voice leaps up to D ($\hat{6}$), a note whose motion originates from an inner-voice C#, which resolves to C# as an inner voice underneath G# ($\hat{2}$). The leap up to $\hat{6}$ represents a contradiction of gravity and magnetism, implying the presence of the Motivic Agent. Thus, it is the Motivic Agent rather than the Gestural Agent who pushes the music forward toward $\hat{2}$.

Once $\hat{2}$ is reached, the piece modulates to the minor dominant (C# minor) and $\hat{2}$ (G#) is understood locally as $\hat{5}$, prolonged via a fifth-descent. This fifth descent is controlled by the Motivic Agent, something that is suggested by the way in which a 5–6 motion is incorporated into the descent. Local $\hat{5}$ (G#) is retained through mm. 120–43. In m. 144, it moves up to $\hat{6}$, contradicting gravity and magnetism, before descending through $\hat{5}$ to $\hat{4}$ (see the red labels in Example 4.46). Here, the 5–6 motion propels the line downward to $\hat{4}$ —it is as if the Motivic



Example 4.46 – Deep middleground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II

Agent pushes the line higher so that it will gain more potential energy to descend through $\hat{3}$ to $\hat{4}$. Indeed, after reaching $\hat{4}$, the line appears to continue via inertia through $\hat{3}$ and $\hat{2}$ to $\hat{1}$. Note that $\hat{3}$ and $\hat{2}$ are articulated using the same durations, articulations, and dynamics as the passing $\hat{3}$ and $\hat{4}$ in m. 146 (Example 4.47). It is significant that the descent from local $\hat{3}$ to $\hat{1}$ is harmonized almost entirely by the dominant, a note and chord that is associated with the Motivic Agent, rather than by the tonic, as would have been more typical. That is, it is not $\hat{4}$ that is left unsupported here, but $\hat{3}$.

The retransition (mm. 147–59) sounds as though it is a codetta to the B section. Its purpose is to confirm the arrival on C# as local tonic. The soprano is especially important in giving this impression as it consists almost entirely of repetition of the note C#4, invoking the repetition category of intentionality (see, for example the repeated C# in mm. 147–51 of Example




Example 4.47 – Inertia in descent at end of B section in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II (mm. 140–151)

²¹ Schenker notes that either $\hat{4}$ or $\hat{3}$ will be unsupported in a 5-line descent, but it is more common for $\hat{4}$ to be weakly supported than $\hat{3}$. In this case, $\hat{3}$ occurs within a dominant prolongation, as a passing tone between $\hat{4}$ and $\hat{2}$. See Heinrich Schenker, *Free Composition* (Longman: New York, 1979), 20.

4.47). Indeed, in the context of the home key of the piece, C# is the dominant. Thus the influence of the Motivic Agent continues to be felt through the retransition.

4.3.4: The A' Section (mm. 160–89) and Coda (mm. 190–203)

Not only does C# dominate the retransition, but it is also featured in the A' section's countermelody. While the ways in which the Motivic Agent influenced the Gestural Agent's descents in the A section still appear in the A' section, the Motivic Agent manages to influence other aspects of the piece as well. In m. 160 the antecedent from the A section returns, but repeated C#s (\$\hat{3}\$) have been added above the original melody, covering the recapture of the *Kopfton* (Example 4.48). The repetition category of intentionality signals the presence of the Motivic Agent. The restatement of the *Kopfton* at the beginning of the consequent is also covered by the Motivic Agent's \$\hat{3}\$, and the Motivic Agent influences the cadence with which the consequent ends. While in the initial A section both consequents ended with PACs (mm. 18 and 32), here the consequent ends with an IAC (Example 4.49). This change occurs because \$\hat{5}\$ is repeated on top of the original melody, essentially covering what should have been a descent to \$\hat{1}\$. The weakening of the authentic cadence also changes the structure of the A' section. While mm. 1–32 of the A section consisted of a repeated parallel period, the A' section is comprised of a parallel double period, with a PAC ending the section at m. 189.




Example 4.48 – Return of A' covered by 5 in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II (mm. 158–62)



Example 4.49 – Consequent with changed cadence in A' section of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959 (mm. 168–77)

Measures 178–85 are analogous to the restatement of the antecedent in the A section. As in the A section, these measures begin off tonic with a tonicization of the mediant (Example 4.50). Following the design of the previous two phrases, \hat{S} (E) in the key of the mediant sounds as a covering tone above the original melody. The rhythmic interaction between the covering tone and the melody is reminiscent of the short-long rhythmic profile of Gesture Y. After the previous three phrases, which have all been eight or more measures in length, the structural cadence that ends the double period at m. 189 sounds abrupt, signaling the end of a short four-measure phrase. It is as if the Gestural Agent rushes toward the cadence, not wishing to allow the Motivic Agent any further opportunity to disrupt the descent. The result is that the structural cadence feels unsettled. In the coda that follows this unsettled cadence, the connection between the accompanimental pattern in the A sections and Gesture Y is made more apparent when the two slurred eighth notes that typically follow the eighth note on the downbeat are collapsed into a single quarter note appearing on beat two (Example 4.50). As in the A section, the Gestural



Example 4.50 – End of A' and beginning of Coda in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/II (mm. 178–94)

Agent descends to a low register, and the rolled chords give the sense that the agent is simply plodding along in defeat.

The second movement represents a low point for the Gestural Agent. It controls the accompaniment at the beginnings of each phrase in the A section, but the Motivic Agent influences each *Urlinie* descent. At the end of the A section, the Gestural Agent appears to have given up, and the Motivic Agent takes control of the B section. When the A section returns at the end of the movement, the Gestural Agent returns, but the Motivic Agent's presence has increased, and it is now felt even at phrase beginnings. The Gestural Agent signals its resignation at the end of the movement with low plodding chords. In the third movement, the Gestural Agent appears more prominently on the surface of the music, while the Motivic Agent affects much of the deeper-level structure.


4.4: The Third Movement

4.4.1: Overview

The third movement is a scherzo and trio where both principal sections are rounded binary forms. While in the previous two movements both the Gestural and Motivic Agents have been present at the surface of the music, in the third movement the Motivic Agent leaves much of the surface activity to the control of the Gestural Agent, instead showing its influence at the middleground. While in the first two movements the two agents have been combatants on the surface, in the third movement the conflict between the two agents is less direct. Still, the Gestural Agent is unable to secure an unfettered descent due to the influence of the Motivic Agent.

4.4.2: The Scherzo


The first location at which the tension between the Gestural and Motivic Agents is apparent is in the initial phrase of the scherzo's A section. Here, a gesture whose two parts are related to gesture X from the beginning of the first movement marks the presence of the gestural agent (Example 4.51). As in the second movement, the Gestural Agent initiates a sentential



Example 4.51 – Gestural and Motivic Agents at the beginning of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III (mm. 1–8)

phrase structure. Rather than achieving a cadence in the home key, however, the continuation of the phrase veers off toward the unexpected key of B minor. This Unexpected Event is evidence of the Motivic Agent's presence. In Example 4.52 I show the *Kopfton*, $\hat{5}$ prolonged through the first phrase by a motion from $\hat{5}$ to $\hat{6}$ in a large-scale version of the $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ upper-neighbor motive melodic gravity and magnetism when $\hat{5}$ ascends to $\frac{1}{7}$. This scale-degree succession returns once more later in this movement. In the second phrase of the A section, a descent does materialize, but the motion from $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{3}$ is covered by the $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motive (see the blue text in Example 4.52).


In the B section, the Gestural Agent becomes more insistent, and it expands on Gestures X and Y. Four expansions of the original statements of Gestures X and Y appear in Examples 4.53 and 4.54. Note that I am not intending to argue that these expanded gestures are *instances* of Gestures X and Y. Rather, I am arguing that these expanded gestures carry traits that relate them to X and Y such that it is plausible that they were performed by the same agent who performed X and Y. The first expanded gesture appears in m. 25. The initial presentation of Gesture X



Example 4.52 – Foreground graph of scherzo's A section from Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III (mm. 1–16)



Example 4.53 – X-related Gesture in m. 25 of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III




Example 4.54 – X- and Y-related Gestures in mm. 33–39 of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III


involved a descending octave leap, ending on a weak beat. In the third movement, the leap is filled in with an arpeggiation. Moreover, the upper note of the leap is embellished with an accented neighbor tone. The metrical profile of beginning on a strong beat and ending on a weak beat remains. The relationship between this gesture and Gesture X prompts me to argue that they are performed by the same agent. Several iterations of this new gesture in mm. 31–33 lead to an articulation of a figure related to Gesture Y in the left hand of m. 34 (Example 4.54). The shortlong rhythmic profile, as well as the fact that both notes are articulated on the beat identifies this gesture as related to Gesture Y. This gesture is different, however, in that Gesture Y began on a weak beat, whereas this gesture begins on a strong beat. Nevertheless, its clear rhythmic connection to Gesture Y suggests that it is performed by the same agent who performed Gesture Y. Note that the gesture category of intentionality is not the only category to suggest agency in

m. 34. This passage also represents an unexpected event and a change of state. Measure 34 is unexpected in that it marks the point of a direct modulation to C# minor, a key that is a half step above the previous key of C major. Highlighting this direct modulation is a sudden *fortissimo* dynamic, a change from the previously *piano* passage. The abrupt appearance of the Y-related gesture is followed by an X-related gesture in m. 36 (Example 4.54). The connection between this gesture and Gesture X can be seen in the fact that they both begin on a downbeat and they both involve large leaps of an octave or more. The gesture in m. 36 differs from Gesture X in contour: Gesture X descends, while the gesture in m. 36 ascends. This X-related Gesture is followed by further Y-related gestures, the first of which can be seen in mm. 38–39 (Example 4.54). Gesture Y was partly defined by the durational pattern short-long, and its metrical profile involved beginning on a weak beat and ending on a strong beat. A similar situation arises here. The part of the gesture that is Y-related in m. 38 begins on beat four with an eighth note that leads to a half note on beat one of the next measure. This Y-related core is preceded by a flourish of eighth notes.

The Gestural Agent, then, exerts its presence on the surface of the music in the B section, suggesting that it is in control of that portion of the movement. As my middleground graph shows, the scherzo's B section contains an interrupted descent from \hat{S} (Example 4.55). Even though the Gestural Agent appears to control the passage, then, it is still unable to complete a full descent—it is perhaps distracted by what occurred in the A section. The varied return of the A section at m. 50, then, can be understood as an attempt to rectify the situation. The modulation to B minor that occurred at the end of the first phrase is replaced with a modulation to D major, one that still supports an upper neighbor $\hat{6}$ to the *Kopfton* $\hat{5}$, suggesting the influence of the Motivic Agent (Example 4.56). This $\hat{6}$ descends through $\hat{5}$ as a passing tone to structural $\hat{4}$ (Example



Example 4.55 – Middleground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III



Example 4.56 – Modulation to D Major supporting $\hat{6}$ as incomplete neighbor to $\hat{5}$ in Scherzo's A' section




Example 4.57 – Covered appearances of structural 4 and 3 in Scherzo's A' section


4.55). The appearance of structural $\hat{4}$, however, is covered on the surface of the music by $\hat{5}$, as is its movement to $\hat{3}$ (Example 4.57). Although the Motivic Agent seems to participate in the structural descent, it also covers a portion of the descent, unwilling for it to be unencumbered.

4.4.3: The Trio

The key of the trio section is influenced by the Motivic Agent (Example 4.55). As I show in my middleground graph, the trio's function is to provide consonant support for a large-scale upper neighbor, $\hat{6}$, to the *Kopfton*, $\hat{5}$. The trio is in D major, providing no opportunity for a descent from the *Kopfton* for the Gestural Agent since the *Kopfton* is not present. The Motivic Agent's influence is also felt closer to the surface of the music (Example 4.58). In mm. 89–92, which mark the beginning of the Trio's B section, the alto voice sounds the notes E–F–G–F–E, notes that are connected to the Motivic Agent's first appearance (Example 4.8). Although F\(\daggerappea sounds rather than F\(\daggerappea as in the first movement, the two passages still seem remarkably similar, especially given that the notes appear in the same register underneath a repeated A4. An even more surface-level appearance of the $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motive occurs in the left hand in m. 92, just after the scale-degree succession I discussed above (Example 4.58).



Example 4.58 – Reappearance of motive from first movement in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/III (mm. 89–92)




Example 4.59 – Y-related Gesture at the beginning of the trio

Despite the impossibility of effecting a descent from the *Kopfton* in the trio, the Gestural Agent maintains a presence, indicated by repeated statements of a Y-related gesture. The first instance of this gesture appears in m. 1 (Example 4.59). While Gesture Y involved the durational pattern short-long, this gesture reverses the pattern to articulate the pattern long-short. As the scherzo returns, the tension between the Gestural and Motivic Agents is reiterated. Like the first and second movements, the third movement ends without having achieved the goal of an uncovered complete descent from the *Kopfton*.

4.5: The Fourth Movement

4.5.1: Overview

While the Gestural and Motivic Agents exhibited a relationship of tension in the first three movements, the fourth movement dissipates that tension, and the agents eventually work together to create an uncovered descent from the *Kopfton*. The movement ends with the two agents synthesized into a unified whole. The movement is in sonata-rondo form. The chart in Table 4.1 uses terminology from James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy's *Elements of Sonata Theory* to indicate the formal divisions of the movement. For the purposes of this analysis, the most interesting sections of the form are P^{rf} ("the refrain"), S, and the coda. While I will make



Example 4.60 - Middleground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV

Table 4.1 – Form of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV


| Measure | Formal Section | Formal Division |
|---------|----------------|----------------------------|
| 1–32 | τ | \mathbf{P}^{rf} |
| 33–46 | tioi | TR |
| 46–116 | osi | S |
| 117–125 | Exposition | RT |
| 126–141 | | P ^{rf} |
| 142-220 | Development | |
| 221–244 | uc | \mathbf{P}^{rf} |
| 244–258 | Recapitulation | TR |
| 258–318 | | S |
| 318–327 | | RT |
| 328–372 | | \mathbf{P}^{rf} |
| 373–382 | Coda | |

brief reference to the other sections, I will not explore them in as much detail. Before delving into my agential reading, however, three important features of the form deserve mention. At the end of the development (mm. 212–220), a false recapitulation in F-sharp minor sounds before the true return of the refrain at m. 221. As my middleground graph shows (Example 4.60), I interpret this false recapitulation as an area that embellishes the mediant, which is itself part of a larger arpeggiation from the tonic to the dominant, a chord that sounds at the end of the false recapitulation. The final refrain of the movement is different from the others in that the theme is fragmented, something that has not happened in previous iterations of the refrain. I interpret this fragmentation as a sign of hesitancy on the part of the Motivic Agent. Finally, as both Hatten and Fisk have noted, the coda makes reference to the first movement's grand opening, something that will signal complete synthesis in my narrative. Since both P^{rf} and S recur, I will discuss the first iterations of each of these sections in detail, and their restatements in more general terms.


4.5.2: The First Instance of P^{rf} ("the refrain")

Already in the refrain the Motivic Agent is in a weaker state. The Gestural Agent has begun each of the previous movements, and the fourth movement is no exception. As Hatten has noted, a gesture related to Gesture Y occurs at the beginning of the movement, now with the first note of the gesture shifted from beat two, where it occurred in movement one, to the downbeat in movement four (Example 4.61). The short-long rhythmic profile is maintained. In addition to the gesture category of intentionality, a contradiction of gravity and magnetism also indicates the presence of an agent at the beginning of the fourth movement, both at a local level and at a deeper level of structure. The movement begins on $\hat{3}$, $C\sharp4$, and both gravity and magnetism would pull this $C\sharp4$ down toward the tonic, A3. Rather than move downward, however, the melody leaps up further to E4, even continuing to ascend beyond E4 to the upper tonic, A4. Note that there is a subtle sense of effort contained within the E4's duration. The syncopated effect created by the half note on beat two perhaps suggests that the agent requires a little extra force to overcome the pull of gravity downward in order to push the line toward the upper tonic.

As Example 4.62 shows, the C# with which the movement begins represents the *Kopfton*. The first eight measures constitute a parallel period, and thus represent a local interrupted



Example 4.61 – Agency at the beginning of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV (mm. 1–4)



Example 4.62 – Foreground graph of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV (mm. 1–16)²²

structure. In both branches of the interruption, the *Kopfton* ascends to $\hat{2}$, rather than descends, contradicting gravity and magnetism. The fact that $\hat{3}$ ascends to $\hat{2}$ rather than descending in the two branches of this local interruption is significant. In previous movements, the Motivic Agent has always appeared within the first phrase, interrupting the design of each phrase that was perhaps proposed by the Gestural Agent. Here, however, no such interruption occurs. Scaledegree 5 appears on beat two of m. 1, highlighted by its half-note duration which creates a syncopation, and signaling the possible threat of the Motivic Agent's intervention. This $\hat{3}$ is enfolded in the Gestural Agent's arpeggio, however, such that a disruption from the Motivic Agent does not occur; indeed, $\hat{3}$ is part of an unfolding that prolongs the *Kopfton*. Thus, the scale degree with which the Motivic Agent has been associated throughout the piece becomes a

 $^{^{22}}$ An interesting point to consider in this sketch is the obligatory register of the *Kopfton*. The register in which the *Kopfton* in m. 1 appears is not in the obligatory register: indeed, it is not until m. 12 when the *Kopfton* appears in the "correct" register. One might question, therefore, whether the initial C# in m. 1 really wants to descend, or whether it strives to attain the higher register it finally gains in m. 12. One might imagine an alternative reading in which an initial ascent moves from A in m. 1 to the *Kopfton* in m. 12, rather than asserting that the *Kopfton* appears in m. 1. Such a reading would contradict the parallel periodic design of the first two phrases, but might reflect the interesting impulse of the melodic line. No matter which reading one espouses, the fact remains that \hat{S} is less disruptive than it has been in previous movements.

mechanism for prolonging the *Kopfton*, rather than one for disrupting the Gestural Agent's goal of creating an unfettered *Urlinie* descent. The success of the Gestural Agent is confirmed by the register in which the descent of the upper voice takes place in both phrases of the parallel period: the descent happens *above* the E that appears in m. 1, such that it is not covered by $\hat{5}$. The threat of a cover tone is also suggested in m. 7 by the quick ascent from $\hat{2}$ up to $\hat{4}$. Inertia might have carried the line up to $\hat{5}$, but instead the line falls back to $\hat{2}$ in a prolongation of the supertonic.

Indeed, it is not until the second section of the refrain that the Motivic Agent appears. The first section ends on $\hat{1}$, after which the Motivic Agent pushes the melody upward to $\hat{5}$ (Example 4.62, mm. 9–16). As in the previous measures, an agent's presence is indicated by a contradiction of gravity when $\hat{5}$ moves up to $\hat{6}$. The presence of the Motivic Agent here is confirmed by the incomplete version of the $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ upper-neighbor motive (Example 4.63). This iteration of the motive is different than previous appearances. The motive sounds at the beginning of the phrase, and the phrase starts on the weaker first inversion of the tonic, rendering the harmonic context that supports this $\hat{5}$ less stable than its formal location might have indicated; that is, one might have expected the phrase to begin on a root-position tonic chord.



Example 4.63 – Introduction of incomplete $\hat{5}-\hat{6}-\hat{5}$ motive in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV (mm. 9–12)

Moreover, as my shallow middleground graph shows, the goal of the initial motion in this phrase is the reiteration of the Kopfton, $\hat{3}$, in m. 12 (Example 4.62). This interpretation is supported by the fact that $\hat{3}$ in m. 12 appears over the first root-position tonic chord of the phrase. Thus, $\hat{5}$, is not a focal point in the phrase, but rather a note whose goal is to lead to the Kopfton, a note with which the Gestural Agent has become associated.

The weakened position of the Motivic Agent is further confirmed by the way in which the *Kopfton* is approached. There is the potential to recognize a complete neighbor figure rather than the incomplete one that actually appears. The harmony that occurs in m. 10, however, renders the repeated \hat{S} that would have completed the motive a dissonance, instead supporting the following D# as a consonance (Example 4.63). The result is that \hat{G} is an incomplete neighbor to the initial \hat{S} in m. 9, and it passes through \hat{S} on the downbeat of m. 10 on its way to # \hat{A} . Had this # \hat{A} resolved to \hat{S} as its chromatic alteration suggests, the Motivic Agent might have been able to reestablish a covering \hat{S} as a prevalent note in the phrase. As my analysis in Example 4.62 shows, however, # \hat{A} is ultimately a passing tone on its way to \hat{S} , which gives in to gravity and magnetism when it resolves to the *Kopfton* in m. 12. Note also the tonicization of B major, as if recalling the way in which the Motivic Agent veered the first phrase of the third movement toward B minor (see the arrow in Example 4.62). This time, however, the passage remains firmly in the tonic.

After reaching $\hat{3}$ in m. 12, the passage traverses a second completely uncovered descent to the tonic from the *Kopfton* (Example 4.62). Scale-degree 5 again appears in m. 14 as though it may become a cover tone, but instead it leads to $\hat{2}$, and no cover tone materializes. Thus, at the beginning of the fourth movement, the threat from the Motivic Agent appears to have been neutralized. The Gestural Agent is able to complete several uncovered local descents from the


Kopfton to Î without being derailed by the Motivic Agent. Nevertheless, the Motivic Agent maintains its own identity, controlling separate passages from those under the control of the Gestural Agent.

4.5.3: The First Instance of S, the Retransition, and the Second Prf

The fact that the Gestural Agent retains its own identity is suggested by the S theme, where the Gestural Agent is more prominent. The transition effects a modulation to the dominant, such that the local scale degree on which S begins is \hat{S} (Examples 4.64 and 4.65).



Example 4.64 – Motivic Agent at the beginning of S, score excerpt



Example 4.65 – Motivic Agent at the beginning of S (foreground graph)

Local \hat{S} is emphasized via repetition, a category of intentionality that signals the presence of an agent at the beginning of S. The presence of the $\hat{S}-\hat{G}-\hat{S}$ upper-neighbor motive confirms the influence of the Motivic Agent on this passage. As my foreground graph of this section shows, a descent from B to F# occurs in mm. 46–51 (Example 4.65). As \hat{A} descends to \hat{S} , however, two significant unfoldings occur. An inner-voice \hat{G} leaps above the upper-voice \hat{A} . This \hat{G} descends to \hat{S} , a note that marks the beginning of a statement of the $\hat{S}-\hat{G}-\hat{S}$ motive (also marked in Example 4.64), one which occurs above the descent from $\hat{A}-\hat{S}$, providing a distraction from the more structural $\hat{A}-\hat{S}$ motion. As my middleground graph shows, the $\hat{S}-\hat{G}-\hat{S}$ motive is also present at a deeper level of structure, participating in the prolongation of large-scale \hat{S} (see B–C#–B, $\hat{S}-\hat{G}-\hat{S}$ in the key of E, in Example 4.60, mm. 46–79).

Although the Motivic Agent appears to gain strength during S, its position is suddenly usurped by the Gestural Agent during the retransition (Example 4.66). The retransition begins as




Example 4.66 – Retransition and beginning of P^{rf} in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959 (mm. 117–27)

though it is a codetta to the S theme, stating a pedal E in the bass. A Y-related gesture similar to that which began the fourth movement sounds above the pedal, indicating the presence of the Gestural Agent. The recurrence of the gesture (mm. 119, 121–25) also invokes the repetition category of intentionality. While that E may at first sound like a local tonic, the introduction of D\(\bar{\pi}\) in m. 124 transforms the E major chord back into the dominant of the home key.

Retrospectively, then, it is as if the Gestural Agent preemptively steals the home-key dominant from the Motivic Agent before it is able to gain a hold in the tonic. The return of the refrain reiterates the success of the Gestural Agent from the beginning of the movement, but as before, the two agents remain in states of opposition to one another, rather than working together. While the friction between the two agents that was felt in previous movements is heavily muted, the two agents lack a sense of unity. Moreover, while the Gestural Agent has achieved locally uncovered complete descents, it has not yet completed an uncovered *Urlinie* descent. At the end of S, the *Urlinie* is interrupted, and the return of the refrain at m. 126 marks a reinstatement of the *Kopfton*.

4.5.4: The Development

As the development begins at m. 142, one might have expected the Motivic Agent to make another appearance given the way in which the Gestural and Motivic Agents alternately dominated P^{rf} and S, respectively. Instead, the development is largely controlled by the Gestural Agent, something that is indicated by the presence of both X-related and Y-related gestures. For example, several forceful statements of X-related gestures occur in mm. 146ff. in the right hand of the piano (Example 4.67). Although the rhythmic profile of the gesture has been altered, the relation to Gesture X is readily apparent in the large descending leaps of the figures and the loud




Example 4.67 – Gestures in the Development of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV (mm. 145–49)

dynamic with which they are played. The presence of the Gestural Agent is also confirmed in these measures by a change of state. In mm. 142–45, the right hand of the piano plays triplets, while the left hand articulates a duple division of the beat. In the passage at mm. 146ff., the triple division of the beat is absent, and both hands confirm a duple division of the beat. Not only does this passage contain X-related gestures, but it also contains the theme from the refrain in the left hand of the piano, a theme that begins with Y-related gestures.

As I stated earlier, a false recapitulation marks the end of the development. This false recapitulation begins in F-sharp major (mm. 212–17), and ends with a turn toward the parallel minor (mm. 218–20). The choice of tonic, F#, and the turn toward the minor mode are significant. Recall that the second movement, which was largely under the control of the Motivic Agent, was also in F-sharp minor. The return of the refrain theme in the key of the second movement, then, may be seen as an attempt to revisit the outcome of that movement. As at the beginning of the fourth movement, the refrain theme in the false recapitulation is controlled by the Gestural Agent, which rises above local \hat{S} (C#) in an attempt to complete a descent. Had the entire parallel period from the beginning of the refrain theme materialized, the Gestural Agent might have been successful. Instead, however, the piece returns to the key of A major by

tonicizing the dominant at the end of the false recapitulation, marking a second interrupted descent of the piece's *Urlinie* (Example 4.68). As my analysis in Example 4.68 shows, I view the false recapitulation's tonicization of F# as subservient to a larger arpeggiation from III (m. 68) up to V (m. 220) in the home key of A major. As my middleground graph in Example 4.60 shows, this motion from III–V completes an arpeggiation of the tonic triad, I–III–V, from the beginning of the movement. The F# key area is thus interpreted as giving way to the structurally more important C# Stufe, prolonging III with an incomplete neighbor motion, $\frac{5-6}{3-4}$. While the Motivic Agent revisits the F# key area, it is still unsuccessful at completing an uncovered *Urlinie* descent.



Example 4.68 – False Recapitulation at end of Development in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV

4.5.5: The Recapitulation and Coda

As the true recapitulation begins at m. 221, there are signs that the Gestural Agent may be gaining ground over the Motivic Agent: P^{rf} recurs an octave higher than its two previous homekey statements (Examples 4.69–4.71). Its higher register places the local descent in the refrain



Example 4.69 – P^{rf} in 4th octave at beginning of Exposition (mm. 1–2)



Example 4.70 – P^{rf} in 5th octave at beginning of Recapitulation (mm. 221–24)




Example 4.71 – Beginning of Recapitulation's S with repeated E (Ŝ) in 5th octave (mm. 258–59)

above the location at which the repeated $\hat{5}$ will occur to mark the beginning of S (m. 258), as if it anticipates the position in which the Motivic Agent will appear. As I show in my middleground sketch, S is interpreted differently with respect to the way it interfaces with the *Urlinie* descent (Example 4.62). In the exposition, S, under the control of the Motivic Agent, had supported a prolongation of $\hat{2}$ with an upper-neighbor motion. In the recapitulation, S is not responsible for

any of the descent. Instead, it is preoccupied with motion from $\hat{5}$, ultimately rearticulating the *Kopfton* at m. 317. This emphasis on motion from $\hat{5}$ is still a sign of the Motivic Agent's influence, but the lack of large-scale $\hat{5}-\hat{6}-\hat{5}$ as in S in the exposition is a sign that the Motivic Agent's control over the passage is weakening.

The final descent, then, takes place entirely within the last iteration of the refrain—a section of music that is controlled by the Gestural Agent, and which has not yet articulated large-scale $\hat{2}$ or $\hat{1}$ in any of its previous statements. As I stated earlier, something unexpected happens in this statement of the refrain that has not happened before: the theme becomes fragmented (Example 4.72). This fragmentation evokes two categories of intentionality that support the




Example 4.72 – Fragmented P^{rf} at end of Recapitulation in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV (mm. 328–51)

presence of the Gestural Agent: change of state and unexpected event. Changes of state are present at both the level of the movement and at a local level. In the context of the entire movement, the rests that fragment the theme in this version of the refrain represent a change from previous iterations of the theme: no such rests have occurred before. At a more local level, each time the music restarts after a pause, some change has occurred: the fragment ending at m. 335 is succeeded by music in m. 337 that does not normally follow the music at m. 335; rather than progression, the fragment at m. 342 seems simply to extend the previous fragment, a notion given by the continuation of the F-major harmony from the previous fragment through the downbeat of m. 342; measure 344 seems to begin on the wrong harmony—instead one might have expected V given the German-sixth chord with which the previous fragment ended; and m. 349 marks the beginning of a lengthy insertion of material that has not traditionally been part of the theme, something that will be interpreted more below. In addition, each of the pauses (mm. 336, 341, 343, 348, 367) represent unexpected events that interrupt the flow of the music. The lack of a periodic recurrence of the pauses contributes to their unexpected character because one cannot develop a sense of pattern with respect to the frequency with which the pauses appear. The pauses indicate a sense of hesitant uncertainty on the part of the Gestural Agent, as if it is unsure of how to proceed given that its music has not yet supported structural $\hat{2}$ or $\hat{1}$. Indeed, the fragments are often interrupted as they lead toward phrase endings, which represent moments where structural 2 and 1 might have appeared, but something is wrong with the way in which these fragments approach the phrase ending. In the fragment at m. 335, for instance, the lowered version of $\hat{2}$ appears, rather than the diatonic version.


At m. 347, however, it appears as though the Gestural Agent has found the path that will lead it to an uncovered descent (Example 4.72). As if knowing that the descent is inevitable, the

Gestural Agent pauses to celebrate, inserting the material in mm. 349–66. In addition to invoking the change of state category of intentionality, this material also contains conflict. The changes of state are evident in the triplets that appear in the right hand and the faster tempo (*presto*) at which this material is played. Conflict can be heard between the right and left hands in terms of the beat divisions they imply. While the right hand's triplets divide the beat into threes, the left hand continues to suggest a duple division of the beat with its dotted-eighth-sixteenth rhythmic pattern. After this insertion, the Gestural Agent "picks up where it left off," so to speak, by restating the music that begins in the second half of m. 346, driving to the structural PAC, a cadence that is accomplished in two stages. The structural tonic is achieved in m. 368, after which a tonic pedal sounds in the bass. The soprano completes its descent to tonic in m. 370 over this tonic pedal (Example 4.73).

While the Gestural Agent has now achieved an uncovered descent, one problem still remains: the threat of further intervention from the Motivic Agent continues to be a possibility given that the two agents have so far acted separately. The solution to this problem appears at the



Example 4.73 – Structural cadence in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV (mm. 364–74)



Example 4.74 – Synthesis of Gestural and Motivic Agents at end of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 959/IV (mm. 375–82)

end of the coda (Example 4.74). As both Hatten and Fisk have noted, the end of the fourth movement makes clear reference to the beginning of the first movement. Here, however, a motion from $\hat{6}$ to $\hat{5}$ occurs in the inner voice of gestures that resemble those performed at the beginning of the first movement by the Gestural Agent. This is significant because the Gestural Agent's actions have appeared separately from the Motivic Agent's actions previously. Agency in this passage is suggested by a change of state and via repetition. The triplets that precede the gestures disappear when the gestures sound, and the rhythm of the gestures is repeated several times. Thus the two agents work in synthesis at the end of the movement, an occurrence that neutralizes the threat that the Motivic Agent will provide further disturbances because the agents no longer maintain the same degree of separation that they have previously.

4.6: Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have demonstrated how an agential analysis can be applied to a larger work. The goal of an agential analysis is to focus on the agents and the ways in which they interact, both with each other and with their environment. Narrative theory is employed to provide a frame of reference that unifies the actions of the agents within a cohesive trajectory, but describing the narrative itself in detail is not the focus of the analysis. As outlined in this

analysis, two agents were introduced in the first movement, and the presence of both agents continued throughout the second through fourth movements. I identified a sense of tension between the two agents in the first three movements. This tension was manifest in two ways: (1) by the Motivic Agent's continual distraction from the Gestural Agent's descents, often appearing in the form of cover tones; and (2) by the way in which the two agents controlled separate passages of music, often working toward differing goals. In the first and second movements the agents interacted directly with one another, often on the surface of the music. In the third movement, a sense of separation between the two agents existed: the Gestural Agent was most influential on the surface of the music, while the Motivic Agent was most influential at the middleground level. Still, the Gestural Agent's descents were covered by the Motivic Agent. The fourth movement resolves the tension between these two agents. The Gestural Agent is able to complete both local and large-scale uncovered descents, and at the end of the movement the sense of separation between the two agents is abolished when the two come together to create a unified passage. While I drew on observations from both Hatten and Fisk, especially with respect to the recurrence of particular gestures throughout the Piano Sonata, my reading differs significantly from theirs through its focus on the agents and its interpretation of the way in which the actions of the agents shape the music at both local and deeper levels of structure.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1: Summary

In this dissertation I sought to explore three broad questions: (1) How do virtual agents emerge in music? (2) What is the relationship between agency and narrative? and (3) Can virtual agents influence music at levels deeper than the surface? To approach the first question I relied on the common belief from Action Theory that an entity only rises to the status of an agent when it performs an intentional act. To that end, I outlined six categories of intentionality—gesture, contradiction of musical forces, change of state, unexpected event, repetition/restatement, and conflict—that allowed me to identify locations at which an agent could be seen as influencing the music. I argued that these locations were the result of an agent's action, but that the agent itself remained "behind the scenes," rather than becoming a character within the music. In my investigation of the second question, I found that agency and narrative are intimately connected. An agential analysis relies on narrative to create a frame that organizes one's findings into a cohesive trajectory. With respect to the third question, I found that musical agents can influence large-scale harmonic and melodic motions, especially when an agent becomes associated with a particular motive on the surface of the music. While Chapters Two and Three largely served to introduce my approach to agential analysis by exploring each of the questions above, Chapter Four aimed to synthesize the concepts from Chapters Two and Three by demonstrating one way to approach an agential analysis of Schubert's Piano Sonata D. 959. In the course of my research several opportunities for future projects in musical agency became clear. Rather than marvel at


the pieces of the metaphorical agency puzzle I have gathered together, let me instead, by way of conclusion, note some of the many pieces that are still strewn about.

5.2: Avenues for Further Research

5.2.1: Potential Versus Realized Agency

It may be worthwhile to differentiate between the agency proposed in an agential analysis, and the agency that is presented in performance. Indeed, my dissertation was concerned with positing instances of metaphorical agency, and as such it did not consider the performer as agent. One way to bridge this gap may be to look at an agential analysis as suggesting locations of potential agency, and to argue that performers may realize this potential to varying degrees in their interpretations of the music. An interesting study may be to compare one's agential analysis of a given work to multiple performances of that piece, noting the ways in which various performers realize the potential for agency on a spectrum from strong to weak perceptibility. In such an analysis, it may be that the performer takes on the role of the virtual agent whose actions influence the course of the music—the performer becomes the agent "behind the scenes."

Consider the opening of Schubert's Piano Sonata D. 960. A graph of the musical forces that are active at the beginning of piece is given in Example 5.1. In the inertia, magnetism, and rhythmic gravity rows, rightward pointing arrows indicate that a force propels the music forward, while leftward pointing arrows indicate that a force contradicts the forward momentum of the music. Rhythmic gravity, a force I chose not to investigate in my dissertation, is the tendency of a strong beat to pull weaker beats toward it. In the excerpt from Schubert's Piano Sonata, the effects of rhythmic gravity are most apparent when two eighth notes on beat four of a given measure lead to the downbeat of the next measure, such as occurs between mm. 2–3. In the



Example 5.1 – Musical forces in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 960/I (mm. 1–5)

melodic gravity column, I have created an arbitrary measurement of the strength of melodic gravity as the melody gains further distance from the stable tonic platform. The numbers increase by 1 each time the melody ascends by a diatonic scale step. Scale degree 2, then, feels the effect of melodic gravity at a factor of 1. While this system needs further refinement in the future—for instance, how might chromaticism be reflected, or how might semi-stable platforms such as the dominant be recognized?—it will serve my purposes in this excerpt where the melody has a narrow range and it exhibits no chromaticism. The dashed line in mm. 1 and 4 indicates retention of a degree of melodic gravity.

Much of the music's forward momentum at the beginning of this piece can be attributed to the presence of the musical forces. The graph demonstrates this phenomenon with its abundance of rightward-pointing arrows and decrescendos, which appear above much of the passage. In m. 2, for example, melodic gravity, rhythmic gravity, and inertia can all be understood as contributing to the impetus that drives the music forward. I have circled two locations, however, at which the musical forces provide a weak explanation for the forward

momentum of the music: at the seam between the first and second chords of the work, and at the leap from Bb4 to Eb5 in mm. 4–5.

At least two explanations may account for motion at the beginning of the work: the presence of a virtual agent, or the effect of rhythmic gravity. The presence of an agent at the beginning of the movement may be suggested by the repetition category of intentionality: the chord on the anacrusis is repeated on beat one of m. 1. Rhythmic gravity may account for motion only if the anacrusis sounds like a weak beat; that is, since no meter has yet been established, it is up to the performer to make the anacrusis sound weak, perhaps by giving more accent to the downbeat, or by more quickly establishing a consistent tempo once the piece is under way. One way to explore the degree to which agency is realized at the beginning of the movement is by measuring microtiming—the amount of time that elapses between the first and second chords—and by comparing that timing to the average tempo of the remainder of the excerpt.¹

These measurements are given in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. Table 5.1 analyzes the amount of *rubato* in seconds (s) between the anacrusis and the downbeat of m. 1 in eleven different performances of Schubert's Piano Sonata.² Column 1 indicates the performer's name,

¹ Several scholars have already begun to use microtiming to analyze the expressive effect of a performance or performances of music. See: Matthew W. Butterfield, "The Power of Anacrusis: Engendered Feeling in Groove-Based Musics," *Music Theory Online* 12/4 (December 2006); Mitchell S. Ohriner, "Grouping Hierarchy and Trajectories of Pacing in Performances of Chopin's Mazurka," *Music Theory Online* 18/1 (April 2012); Alan Dodson, "Expressive Asynchrony in a Recording of Chopin's Prelude No. 6 in B Minor by Vladimir de Pachmann," *Music Theory Spectrum* 33/1 (2011): 59–64.

² The eleven performers and their recordings are: Alfred Brendel, *Schubert Piano Sonatas D. 784, D. 840 'Relique"*, *D. 894, D. 959, D.* 960 (Philips 475 7191), 2005; Christoph Eschenbach, *Schwanengesang, Sonate D. 960* (Harmonia Mundi 902139), 2012; Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Schubert: Wanderer Fantasy, Sonata For Piano in B\(\) Major D. 960* (Hänssler Classic 98326); Jénö Jandó, *Schubert: Piano Sonatas D. 960 & 958* (Naxos 8550475), recorded 1991. Paul Lewis, *Schubert: Les Dernières Sonates* (Harmonia Mundi 901800), 2003; Radu Lupu, *Schubert: Piano Sonatas D. 960 & D. 664* (Decca 440295), recorded 1991; Gerhard Oppitz, *Schubert: Piano Works Vol. 3* (Hänssler Classic 98298), 2009; Hans Palsson, *Schubert: 4 Imppromptus, D. 899 – Sonata No. 21 in B-Flat Major, D. 960* (Chamber Sound 8688442), 2011; Sviatoslav Richter, *From the Archives: Sviatoslav Richter Plays Schubert, et al.* (Preiser Records 95003), recorded 1957; Carol Rosenberger, *Schubert Sonata in B\(\)*, *Impromptus* (Delos 3018), 1992. Artur Schnabel, *Piano Sonatas D. 850, D. 959, D.* 960 (EMI Classics 64259), recorded 1939; Eduard Stan, *Piano Recital: Bach, Busoni, Schubert,* Chopin (Hänssler Classic 94.023), 2001; Mitsuko Uchida, *Schubert: Piano Sonata D. 960; 3 Klavierstücke* D. 946 (Philips 456572), 1998.

Table 5.1 – Timing statistics, first chord to second chord in Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 960/I

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Performer | First chord time (s) | Second chord time (s) | Elapsed time (s) | Approx. tempo of excerpt (bpm) | Avg. time between notes (s) | Amount of rubato (s) |
| Uchida | 8.87 | 9.93 | 1.06 | 89 | 0.67 | 0.39 |
| Oppitz | 2.2 | 3.33 | 1.13 | 76 | 0.79 | 0.34 |
| Stan | 2.62 | 3.56 | 0.94 | 94 | 0.64 | 0.3 |
| Lupu | 0.78 | 1.62 | 0.84 | 99 | 0.61 | 0.23 |
| Rosenberger | 1.84 | 2.72 | 0.88 | 88 | 0.68 | 0.2 |
| Eschenbach | 1.93 | 2.92 | 0.99 | 75 | 0.8 | 0.19 |
| Richter | 0.69 | 1.85 | 1.16 | 61 | 0.98 | 0.18 |
| Hatzopoulos | 3.59 | 4.38 | 0.79 | 97 | 0.62 | 0.17 |
| Rubinstein | 1.09 | 1.89 | 0.8 | 94 | 0.64 | 0.16 |
| Palsson | 1.04 | 1.91 | 0.87 | 83 | 0.72 | 0.15 |
| Jando | 0.58 | 1.49 | 0.91 | 73 | 0.82 | 0.09 |
| Lewis | 2.29 | 3.03 | 0.74 | 85 | 0.71 | 0.03 |




Figure 5.1 – Graph of information in Table 5.1

while columns 2 and 3 display the timing in the recording where the first and second chords, respectively, begin. Column 4 subtracts column 2 from column 3 to determine how much time elapses between the first and second chords. Column 5 is an approximation of the average tempo of the excerpt, determined by listening to the excerpt five times and tapping the beat on a metronome, accounting for any further instances of *rubato* in the excerpt. The average was calculated by dropping the highest and lowest readings as outliers, then calculating the mean of the remaining three *tempi*. Column 6 determines the average amount of time between notes in the excerpt by dividing 60 by column 5 (beats per minute). Finally, column 7 produces the amount of *rubato* from the first chord to the second chord by subtracting column 6 from column 4. It is interesting to note that all performers in this study played the second chord of the piece slightly behind the beat that they ultimately established. For convenience, the amount of *rubato* column is displayed in graph form in Figure 5.1. The performer who takes the most time between the first and second notes is given at the bottom of the graph, while the performer who takes the least amount of time between the first and second notes is given at the top of the graph.

In general, the performers listed at the top of the graph display a weaker sense of agency than the performers listed toward the bottom of the graph. This is largely because the amount of time between the first and second chords in the performances at the top of the graph more closely approximates the eventual tempo these performers established, and thus the sense of a weak beat being pulled toward a strong beat is more quickly ascertained. That is, a sense that rhythmic gravity accounts for motion at the beginning of the piece is more quickly established. In Table 5.1, I have shaded those performances that sound as though they exhibit the weakest sense of agency, and thus where a sense of rhythmic gravity sounds stronger. Jando appears to be an outlier: to me, his performance sounds more agential than those performances with comparably

low amounts of *rubato*. The reason may be that Jando's performance is among the slowest of the performances I analyzed, and he consistently seems to be playing behind the beat, even after the opening, which may influence my sense that it takes effort on the part of an agent to move the music forward. Other factors beyond *rubato*, then, likely deserve further investigation. Indeed, at this early stage of research, some of the points I have articulated are necessarily rudimentary and undeveloped: a more detailed rubric for measuring performative agency is a logical next step.

Similar results are obtained at the leap in mm. 4–5 from B\(4\) to E\(5\). Table 5.2 displays the same data as in Table 5.1, and Figure 5.2 displays the amount of *rubato* from the B\(4\) to the E\(5\) in graphic form. As in Figure 5.1, the performer who takes the most time between notes is listed at the bottom of the graph and the performer who takes the least amount of time between notes is listed at the top of the graph. Those listed toward the top of the graph tend to exhibit a weaker sense of agency than those listed toward the bottom of the graph. In Table 5.2, I have shaded those performers who I believe sound like they exhibit the weakest sense of agency. In general those performers who take more time between the B\(4\) and the E\(5\) give the sense that they require more energy to reach the E\(5\)—it is as if the performer bends low in order to spring upward for the leap, and those performers who take more time between B\(4\) and E\(5\) bend lower than those who take less time.

While in the case of the first chord to the second chord a weak explanation for motion can be attributed to the musical forces, in the case of the leap from mm. 4–5 no such musical forces explanation exists. In cases like this, where the realized agency is weaker than the potential agency, a different agential reading may arise, one in which the agent who was

³ As I noted above, since this portion of the dissertation is a projection of possible avenues for future investigation, some of these assertions are necessarily of a preliminary nature.

Table 5.2 – Timing statistics, B\(4\) to E\(5\) in mm. 4–5 of Schubert, Piano Sonata D. 960/I

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|-------------|--|-------------------------------|------------------|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Performer | B _b : b. 4, m. 4 time (s) | Eb: b. 1, m. 5 time (s) | Elapsed time (s) | Approx. tempo of excerpt (bpm) | Avg. time between notes (s) | Amount of rubato (s) |
| Stan | 12 | 13.94 | 1.94 | 94 | 0.64 | 1.3 |
| Eschenbach | 14.3 | 15.66 | 1.36 | 75 | 0.8 | 0.56 |
| Uchida | 20.1 | 21.22 | 1.12 | 89 | 0.67 | 0.45 |
| Jando | 13.12 | 14.22 | 1.1 | 73 | 0.82 | 0.28 |
| Richter | 16.32 | 17.56 | 1.24 | 61 | 0.98 | 0.26 |
| Oppitz | 14.97 | 16.01 | 1.04 | 76 | 0.79 | 0.25 |
| Rosenberger | 12.7 | 13.58 | 0.88 | 88 | 0.68 | 0.2 |
| Palsson | 12.51 | 13.4 | 0.89 | 83 | 0.72 | 0.17 |
| Lewis | 13.46 | 14.27 | 0.81 | 85 | 0.71 | 0.1 |
| Lupu | 10.61 | 11.31 | 0.7 | 99 | 0.61 | 0.09 |
| Hatzopoulos | 13.39 | 14.1 | 0.71 | 97 | 0.62 | 0.09 |
| Rubinstein | 11.47 | 12.12 | 0.65 | 94 | 0.64 | 0.01 |




Figure 5.2 – Graph of information in Table 5.2

posited to perform the action may have been distracted or pre-occupied by other events. Moreover, other parameters, such as dynamic change or the amount of pedal applied to the passage may influence a listener's interpretation, and it would be useful to investigate such parameters further when accounting for differences between realized and potential agency.

5.2.2: Edward Klorman and Multiple Agency

To focus the scope of this dissertation I examined only piano music, which had the effect of limiting the number of performers and timbres involved in the music I analyzed. Having applied my methodology to several piano works, however, a logical next step is to investigate how the type of agential analysis I espouse here interacts with music in which more than one performer and more than one timbre is involved. As I noted in Chapter One, Edward Klorman dicusses what he calls "multiple agency" in his dissertation, positing the term as an alternative for a kind of conversational quality often found in eighteenth-century chamber music. Part of the goal of Klorman's dissertation is to examine how multiple timbres might express agency; that is, do the instrumentalists suggest independent agents? Do they work together? Do they group into some collective agency such as melody and accompaniment? Such questions are also relevant when one applies the categories of intentionality in an analysis of a passage with multiple instrumentalists.

Example 5.2 is part of an analysis taken from Klorman's dissertation. In this passage, Klorman explores the independence of the violin and viola lines. A cadence in F Major occurs before the excerpt begins, and at m. 83 the violin and viola are musing on the cadential idea. At m. 84, the violin introduces an Ab, rather than the expected Ab, and Klorman argues that the



Example 5.2 – Edward Klorman's analysis of Mozart, Duo in B_b Major for Violin and Viola K. 424 (mm. 83–89)⁴

viola drops out because of this unexpected shift of mode. Klorman notes that the violin continues to sound Ab through m. 87, where it invites the viola back in to modulate to Db major. Since the violin is the instrument that introduces the foreign note, Klorman concludes that in this passage it is the violin-as-agent who instigates the modulation.

How do the categories of intentionality interact with this passage? Three categories of intentionality support the presence of an agent or agents: Change of State, Unexpected Event, and Repetition. Changes of state occur in m. 84, where the Ab creates a change of mode, at m. 85 where the dynamic shifts to *pianissimo* and the viola ceases to play, and at m. 87, where the expressive *dolce* marking takes effect and the viola reenters the piece. The unexpected event category of intentionality is evoked by the change of mode, and the Ab that is present in mm. 85–87 signals the repetition category of intentionality. As I have suggested previously, the categories alone are neutral; that is, they do not verify Klorman's analysis that the violin and viola each posit separate agents, nor do they deny his claims. Rather, one must look to other signals, such as the association of a particular motive or gesture with an agent, to identify more

⁴ See Edward Klorman, "Multiple Agency in Mozart's Chamber Music," Ph.D. diss., CUNY Graduate Center, 2013), 132.

specifically *which* agent is present. In this case, one must decide whether the presence of the Ab in the violin part is enough to argue that two separate agents exist here: one who influences the violin line and one who influences the viola line. Several questions may complicate this issue:

(1) Why should the viola agent be so surprised by a change of mode at this location in the form (the end of the exposition) that it should cease to play? A change to the minor mode to begin the development in a major mode sonata form is common; (2) Could it be the case that one agent controls both violin and viola in this case, and that this single agent orchestrated both the Ab and the silent viola line? (3) Why should the violin agent wish to modulate to Db major in the first place, a key that is distantly-related to the tonic, Bb Major?

Such questions may be generalizable to any situation in which one posits a causal relationship between two agents' actions, as Klorman suggests in his analysis, but they are made all the more apparent when the implication is that one performer *causes* another performer to do something. Answering these questions, and indeed determining just how many agents are present in multi-performer situations, is only possible in an analysis of the entire piece where the analyst tracks the continued presence of agents from the beginning, something that is outside the scope of my dissertation. Nevertheless, I will argue, like Klorman, that it is important to consider agential readings of a single piece beyond those that associate virtual agents with a single timbre, although such associations may also prove fruitful. As with the agential analyses I presented above, I believe it is still important in multi-performer situations to begin by locating places at which agency is suggested by the categories of intentionality before making assertions about the kinds of agents that are present in a given piece.

5.2.3: Agency and Post Tonality

In addition to focusing solely on piano music, I also chose to approach only tonal music as a way to constrain this initial investigation, but there is no reason that my agential methodology cannot be applied to post-tonal music, perhaps with some modification. Indeed, the gesture, conflict, change of state, repetition/restatement, and unexpected event categories of intentionality require little reformulation in the context of atonal music, though of course one would need to account for differences in compositional approach beyond the lack of a tonic. ⁵ The contradiction of musical forces, however, is based on a theory developed around tonal music. Therefore, in order to employ that category of intentionality, one that was often integral in my analyses of tonal music, the theory of musical forces would need to be adjusted to accommodate atonal music, something that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. One way to approach atonal music within the context of my methodology may be in a pairing with transformational analysis, something that seems to share much common ground with agency. While it may not be immediately obvious how transformational theory and agential analyses are related, I believe the two are intimately connected via the notion of the "transformational attitude." Indeed, much has been made of David Lewin's famous remark that rather than considering his Figure 0.1—a diagram in which two points, s and t, are connected via a directed arrow labeled i—as an observed measurement of space, one should ask the more active question "I am at s; what characteristic transformation do I perform in order to arrive at t?"6

⁵ A composition may establish a tonal center via means other than harmony such as repetition or register. A composition may also develop a unique set of expectations that require consideration in the context of the categories of intentionality.

⁶ David Lewin, *Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), xxxi.

Numerous scholars have written about Lewin's "transformational attitude" in articles, dissertations, and reviews of Lewin's books. In a survey of nine such publications, the most commonly referenced concept in attempts to explain the transformational attitude was "action." Table 5.3 provides a summary of the concepts that authors tend to engage in their definitions. Column headings indicate a particular concept, while row headings list the authors involved in my study. In the bottom row of the table, I provide two statistics in the form X/Y, where X is the total number of authors that mention the concept in their explanation, and Y is the total number of authors who emphasize the concept as somehow being central to their definition. Cells with grey backgrounds indicate that an author emphasized a particular concept.

The most popular concept addressed in definitions of the transformational attitude is the idea of action. Indeed, all authors included this concept to some degree in their definitions, with three authors emphasizing its importance. Steve Rings, for example, argues that "one may see the transformational arrows as goads to a first-person experience of various gestural 'actions' in a musical passage, actions that move entities or configurations along, or that transform them into other, related entities or configurations." Like Lewin, Rings invites his readers to envision themselves as a musical object that moves from one point to another via some gesture. In his dissertation, Rings acknowledges that the meaning of such a metaphorical conception of music can be elusive, and in an attempt to clarify the nature of the metaphor, Rings discusses two ways in which one might understand it: as a concrete representation of an existing physical gesture, or as an intended mental representation that has no real-world analogue. While I find Rings's discussion intriguing, I am compelled to question its practical application in transformational analyses. To exemplify the concrete metaphorical interpretation of the transformational attitude,

⁷ Steven Rings, *Tonality and Transformation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 24.

⁸ Steven Rings, "Tonality and Transformation," (PhD diss., Yale University, 2006), 45-6.

Table 5.3 - Concepts present in definitions of the transformational attitude

| | | | | | | • | | | | |
|---------------|--------|----------------------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------|
| | | | | | 0 | Concepts | | | | |
| | Action | Action Contrast with | Contrast | Discovery | Flexibility | Intuition | Multiplicity | Participation | Phenomenology | Process |
| | | Cartesianism/ | with | | | | | | | |
| | | Observation | GIS | | | | | | | |
| | Y | Y | Ā | | | | | Ā | Ā | Y |
| | Y | | Ā | Ā | | Ā | Y | | | Y |
| | Y | Ā | | | A | Y | Y | | | |
| | Y | | | | | | Y | | | |
| | Y | Y | | | | | Y | Ā | Ā | |
| Klumpenhouwer | Y | Y | Ā | | | | | Ā | Y | |
| | Y | Y | Ā | | | | | Ā | | Y |
| | Y | Y | A | | | | Y | Ā | Ā | Ā |
| | Y | Y | Y | Y | | Y | Y | Y | | |
| Totals:1 | 9/3 | 7/2 | 6/1 | 2/0 | 1/0 | 3/1 | 6/3 | 0/9 | 4/1 | 4/0 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |

* To qualify as "mentioned," a term must be explicitly addressed rather than implied in the definition.

The terms in Hook's discussion appear to be impoverished in this chart because Hook is less interested in defining the transformational attitude than in suggesting that an interrogation of it is not useful.

Totals are given in the form x/y where x is the total number of authors out of a possible nine that mention the term, and y is the total number of authors that emphasize the term in their definition (shown in grey in each column).

Rings notes that brass players are used to thinking of a half step as something one does to affect change in a given note. How does one map this way of thinking onto the transformational attitude, where one envisions oneself at a point wanting to move to another point? In Rings's scenario, the brass player closes a valve, which causes the note to move up a half step. It does not cause the brass player to move up a half step. Although one may write "the brass players move from A to A-sharp" in an analysis, presumably one does not mean that the players physically change location. Rather, it is the notes that change location, and not the brass players themselves. Rings's second interpretation of the transformational attitude, which describes it as a mental metaphor that has no real-world analogue, is equally problematic. It is difficult, on the one hand, to invite readers to imagine themselves at one location asking "how do I get to the next location," and on the other hand, to inhibit them from employing an analogue of physical movement. How is one to imagine moving from one location to another via a gesture that does not exist in the physical world? Although Rings makes an admirable attempt to address some of the problematic issues surrounding the transformational attitude, his discussion leaves many questions unanswered.

One might question whether the criticisms I have leveled at Rings can also be leveled against my own conception of musical agency. I believe, however, that there is a third option Rings has not considered. Rings seems to assume that musical actions either map completely onto physical actions or that they do not map at all onto physical actions. As I have previously stated, I believe that there is a middleground between these two options wherein only some aspects of the action may find an analog in the physical world; in other words, wherein the mapping is partial rather than complete. Indeed, my conception of agency as a metaphorical


⁹ Ibid., 47.

interpretation of music requires that each action I identify contains only a partial mapping onto a physical analog rather than a complete mapping. If the mapping were complete, the interpretation would no longer be a metaphor.


Agential analyses may have much to add to the way in which transformational analyses proceed. Like I suggested in this dissertation, transformations may be viewed as the actions that an agent performs to create the music one hears. It is not so much that the transformation "takes us" from s to t in Lewin's diagram, but rather an agent performs an action that causes the music to move from s to t. Such a formulation avoids a problem of perspective: if one imagines oneself at s performing an operation to get to t, one must already know where t is, but this implication is not present in Lewin's formalization. An agent who moves the music, however, may already know the locations of both s and t. The presence of a consistent type of transformation, then, may be a specialized kind of gesture that is worthy of future attention in analyses.

This notion has already begun to be explored by authors such as John Roeder in his analysis of Bartók's Scherzo Op. 14, No. 2. The piece involves motions between several augmented triads (Example 5.3). In his analysis, Roeder suggests several ways to animate various transformational interpretations of the piece. One such interpretation involves a mouse that moves along a parquet floor in an attempt to steal cheese from a mouse trap. Roeder essentially identifies five different transformations. The first is used to generate two notes of the augmented triad given a referential pitch, a transformation he calls 4-wiggle since transposition up by 4 semitones and down by 4 semitones from a single pitch will yield an augmented triad, as though one wiggles side-to-side by 4 semitones from a referential pitch center (Example 5.4). ¹⁰

¹⁰ John Roeder, "Constructing Transformational Signification: Gesture and Agency in Bartók's Scherzo Op. 14, No. 2, mm. 1–32," *Music Theory Online* 15/1 (March 2009): 8.1.



Example 5.3 – Augmented triads and octave-leap gesture in Bartók, Scherzo Op. 14, No. 2 (mm. 1–8)



Example 5.4 – John Roeder's 4-wiggle transformation, based on the first note of Example 5.3

Next, he identifies four different MOVE transformations that generate motion from one triad to the next. Each MOVE transformation involves transposition up or down seven semitones from various referential pitches. ¹¹ As I have posited here, he eventually calls each of these transformations gestures. In his animation, the 4-wiggle transformation translates to the mouse peering from side to side, while the MOVE transformation involves the mouse traversing a square on the parquet floor. ¹²

Given the methodology I have presented here, one might question why both the 4-wiggle and the MOVES are associated with a single agent, the mouse. A reasonable answer may be that since both transformations deal with the same sonic event—an augmented triad—it is the actual

¹¹ Ibid., 8.2.

¹² Ibid., see Animations 4–5.

triad that binds the gestures to the agent. So far, then, the agential methodology presented in this dissertation supports Roeder's reading. A problem arises, however, when one considers the goal of the mouse's motions, the cheese in the mouse trap. Roeder notes that "strictly speaking the bait and trap are not part of the transformational network." The cheese at first represents the pitch-class B_b (m. 4) which is stated emphatically with an octave leap in m. 4. In m. 8 this same articulation occurs, this time with an octave leap between F#s (Example 5.3). Indeed, the leap gains the status of a gesture because it is repeatedly articulated in the same way—with a *staccatissimo* attack on the higher note and a staccato on the lower note—and with the same metrical profile, with the higher note on a downbeat and the lower note on beat two. Despite the change in pitch-class, the cheese remains associated with this octave leap.

It may perhaps be better to consider the octave-leap gesture as signifying the incursion of a second agent, an interpretation that is supported when one considers the other categories of intentionality that indicate the presence of an agent in mm. 4 and 8: unexpected event, change of state, and contradiction of inertia (Example 5.5). The change of state category of intentionality is evoked by the lack of augmented triads in mm. 4 and 8, sonorities that are present in mm. 1–3 and 5–7. Moreover, in both mm. 1–3 and 5–7 an intervallic pattern of -4,-4,+1 is established that



Example 5.5 – Categories of intentionality in Bartók, Scherzo Op 14, No. 2

suggests inertia may be responsible for the forward momentum of the passage. This pattern is broken in mm. 4 and 8 by the octave leap, creating an unexpected event. The unexpected event interrupts the flow of the pattern, perhaps suggesting the incursion of an agent as when the Motivic Agent interrupted the Gestural Agent at the beginning of my analysis of Schubert's Piano Sonata D. 959. Introducing a second agent, then, may better account for the interaction between mm. 1–3 and 4 as well as 5–7 and 8. Alternatively, given that a pattern is in control of mm. 1–3 and 5–7, it may also be possible to argue that no agent is necessary to explain those measures. Roeder's convincing transformational analysis, however, also provides a satisfying agential explanation for these measures.

Further analysis of this piece is outside the scope of this dissertation, but as I have begun to suggest here, the methodology developed in this dissertation has the potential to offer rich insights into atonal music. Ultimately I view agential analysis as a flexible approach to music, one that interfaces well with a variety of methodologies, and that can encourage newly creative interpretations of even the most familiar works. Agential analyses have much to offer both the performer and listener alike, and it is my hope that this dissertation has demonstrated that such an analytical pursuit is worthwhile.

APPENDIX A

SCORE FOR BEETHOVEN, BAGATELLE OP. 126, NO. 2








APPENDIX B

COMPARISON OF SCHMALFELDT'S NARRATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE

| Unit | Schmalfeldt | Alternative |
|---------------|--|--|
| 1 (mm. 1-16) | Basic idea (mm. 1-4) and contrasting | Tempesta (mm. 1-4) and |
| | idea (mm. 5-8) introduced. | Oppositional (mm. 5-8) Agents |
| | Contrasting idea steals basic | introduced in an argument. |
| | idea's $\hat{5}$ – $\hat{6}$ – $\hat{5}$ motive, cadences in | Oppositional Agent creates two |
| | new key of B, major. | problematic metrically weak |
| | - | cadences (mm. 8 and 16) |
| 2 (mm. 17-26) | Rivalry between the two agents | While the argument continues |
| | begins at m. 17. Basic idea is in a | between the two agents, a third agent, |
| | weakened state, and contrasting idea | the Cadential Agent, appears in mm. |
| | reaches over basic idea (m. 19) taking | 23-26 to create a metrically strong |
| | the upper hand. | cadence, but in the key of the mediant |
| | | rather than in the home key. |
| 3 (mm. 27-41) | This <i>cantabile</i> section represents a | The Cadential Agent attempts to |
| | loss of control on the part of the | create a periodic structure with |
| | contrasting idea when it arrives on | metrically strong cadences, but it |
| | V/IV in m. 41 one measure early. | becomes distracted as the argument |
| | | between the <i>Tempesta</i> and |
| | | Oppositional Agents continues in m. |
| | | 42. |
| 4 (mm. 42-57) | The basic idea gradually reassembles | The <i>Tempesta</i> gesture attempts to |
| | its forces, stealing the chromatic turn | rearticulate its point from the first |
| | figure from the contrasting idea in | reprise, but its point becomes lost, |
| | mm. 54-57. | signaled by the changes in the |
| | | arpeggiated gesture. |
| 5 (mm. 58-77) | The basic idea continues to take over | The <i>Tempesta</i> Agent loses control of |
| | the turn figure. The slowest rhythmic | its argument; its gesture is played in |
| | pattern from the <i>cantabile</i> is forced | retrograde. It rushes to close the piece |
| | upon the continuous sixteenth-note | before the Oppositional Agent can |
| | motion from the basic idea. | articulate its point, but the cadence it |
| | | creates is metrically weak. |
| 6 (mm. 78-89) | Neither agent wins. Instead a | The Cadential Agent intervenes to |
| | dialectic has been played out in | create a more satisfactory sense of |
| | which a synthesis has been reached. | closure. It is as if the Cadential Agent |
| | | is tired of hearing the argument, and |
| | | thus it emphatically closes the piece. |


APPENDIX C

DETAILED INTENTIONALITY GRAPH OF BEETHOVEN, BAGATELLE OP. 126, NO. 2




| Gesture | | | | | Return of arpeggiated gesture. |
|----------------------|---|-----------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| Unexpected event | Abrupt change of topos from tempesta to something less well defined. | | | | Sudden return of <i>tempesta topos.</i> |
| Contradict forces | Overall ascending contour contradicts gravity and magnetism. A kind of pattern is established in mm. 5—6 that is broken in m. 7, suggesting the intervention of an agent. | d magnetism. A kind of patt | em is established | in mm. 5–6 that is broken in m. | As before, the arpeggiated gesture contradicts gravity and magnetism. |
| Conflict | | | | | |
| Rep/restate | | | | | Repetition of the arpeggiated gesture, restatement of basic idea from antecedent, followed by partial restatement of contrasting idea. |
| Change state | Change of topic from tempetra to something less well-defined; highlighted by a change of dynamic from forts to piano (piano marking in m. 4) | | | | Return of tempesta topos and forte dynamic. |
| | | | | | |

| Gesture | Arpeggiated gesture from m. 9 concludes on downbeat of m. 10 | |
|----------------------|--|--|
| Unexpected | | Return of the less well defined topical area is locally surprising. |
| Contradict forces | (continued from previous system) | As before, an overall ascending contour contradicts gravity and magnetism, and a pattern is established in mm. 13–14 that is broken in m. 15, suggesting the intervention of an agent. |
| Conflict | | |
| Rep/restate | (continued from previous system) | |
| Change state | | Change of topos and dymamic from forts to piano |
| | | |





| | | | | | | 29 |
|---|--|--|----------|-------------|---|------------------------------|
| | | | | | Change of texture: melody and accompaniment. Singing style topos strongly established | Cantabile. |
| The cadential gesture. Defined by: syncopated rhythm highlighted by leap, and descending stepwise motion toward a downbeat following the leap, the second note of which is embellished via a chordal skip of a third. | | | | | | ending steps (circled notes) |
| The cadential gesture. Defined by: synco highlighted by leap, and descending step downbeat following the leap, the second embellished via a chordal skip of a third | Cadential gesture is lighter in figuration than one might have expected | The chorale-style passage has a generally ascending contour that contradicts gravity and magnetism | | | A lighter figuration occurs here than the preceding chorale- style texture | Syncopation/Descending steps |
| | | The chorale-style pass: contour that contradict | | | Change of texture: now chorale-style rather than continuous eighth notes | |
| Gesture | Unexpected event | Contradict forces | Conflict | Rep/restate | Change state | |




| | Silence is unexpected: instead might have expected a PAC in C minor | | | | | 42 |
|---------|---|---|----------|----------------------------------|---|--------|
| | | | | | | 41 |
| | | | | | | 40 |
| | | | | | Schmalfeldt has noted that a contraction occurs here such that the restatement of this phrase is missing a measure | |
| | | As before the F5 in the melody is a reaching over from the D5 in m. | | | | cresc |
| | | | | (continued from previous system) | | 37 |
| Gesture | Unexpected event | Contradict forces | Conflict | Rep/restate | Change state | MH1 HI |

| Gesture | The arpeggiated gesture returns. Note that the metric profile of the left hand, where the gesture ends on beat two, is absent. | |
|----------------------|---|-----|
| Unexpected event | Return of <i>tempesta</i> topic is unexpected. The arpeggiated gestures are separated by rests, and the rests are also unexpected. | |
| Contradict forces | Not only are the arpeggiated gestures contradicting gravity and magnetism, but there is an overall ascent in register (to m. 58). It is also as though a pattern is beginning to be established that never really takes shape, indicating a contradiction of inertia. | ing |
| Conflict | | |
| Rep/restate | The arpeggiated gestures are repeated. | |
| Change state | Change of topic: return to tempexta | |
| • | 43 45 49 49 | |
| | | |
| | | * |









| Gesture | The gesture has been significantly altered to become a retrograde version with respect to its original statement: (1) It has lost the rhythmic profile where it begins on a weak beat and ends on weak beat and ends on a strong beat. Instead, it begins on a strong beat and ends on weak beat (reverse of original statement); (2) It now begins with the large leap rather than ending with it, and ends with the three-note chordal skip rather than beginning with it (also reverse of original statement). |
|----------------------|---|
| Unexpected event | |
| Contradict forces | (continued from previous system) |
| Conflict | |
| Rep/restate | |
| Change state | |
| | 666 HE = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = |

| Gesture | (continued from previous system) | |
|----------------------|---|--|
| Unexpected event | The cadence sounds unexpected because it occurs in such a metrically weak position and without a slowing of rhythm. | |
| Contradict forces | | |
| Conflict | Metrical conflict: a "subliminal dissonance" in Krebsian terms. A triple division of the beat begins where a duple division had previously occurred | |
| Rep/restate | Repeat mm. 70-74 | |
| Change state | Change to triple beat division | |
| | 74 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 | |





APPENDIX D

SCORE FOR MENDELSSOHN, SONG WITHOUT WORDS OP. 30, NO. 6





APPENDIX E

DETAILED INTENTIONALITY GRAPH OF MENDELSSOHN, SONG WITHOUT WORDS OP. 30, NO. 6

| Gesture | | | The "Gondolier's Call." Characteristics that define this gesture are: short length, always spans the third 7 - 2 , both notes occur on relatively strong beats. | |
|-------------------|--|-----------------------|---|--------|
| Unexpected event | | | The Gondolier's Call leaves two notes unresolved: 7 and 2 | 12 |
| Contradict forces | Movement from A-C# contradicts gravity and magnetism | ntradicts gravity and | The Gondolier's Call pushes past the tonic, which exerts magnetism over the $E_{\#}$ | |
| Conflict | | | | |
| Rep/restate | | | | |
| Change state | | | Dynamic change from piano to forte | |
| Alleg | llegretto tranquillo. | | 4, | |
| 9.00. | | | ga. | dim. * |

| | Leap from C; up to A. Perhaps would have expected C# to descend given musical forces, or else to keep repeating given inertia. | Leap from C‡-A contradicts gravity; leap passes by F‡5 contradicting the tonic's magnetism | Hyperbeat 1 implied during hyperbeat 3 (see § 3.2.2) | | | |
|---------|--|--|--|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| | | | | C# | | |
| | | ity and magnetism | | Emphatically repeated pitch C# | | bile * %20. |
| | | Movement from A-C‡ contradicts gravity and magnetism | | E | | p cantabile |
| Gesture | Unexpected | Contradict forces | Conflict | Rep/restate | Change state | HIM |

| Gesture | | The space between the two notes has been shortened. The second note now comes on beat 2 rather than beat 1. The call is now consonant with the bass, and it creates a HC | s has been shortened. The t 2 rather than beat 1. The bass, and it creates a HC | |
|----------------------|--|--|---|---|
| Unexpected event | | The Gondolier's Call leaves two notes unresolved: 7 and $\hat{\mathbf{Z}}$ | o notes unresolved: 7 and 2 | |
| Contradict forces | A-C# contradicts gravity and magnetism | The Gondolier's Call pushes past the tonic, which exerts magnetism over the E# | | A-C‡ contradicts gravity and magnetism |
| Conflict | | | | |
| Rep/restate | | Restate Gondolier's Call | Restate opening theme | |
| Change state | | Storzando accent markings and crescendo leading to the Gondolier's Call | | |
| | | | | |
| | | %a. | | |

| Gesture | | | | |
|-------------------|--------|--|---|-------|
| Unexpected | | Leap from C‡ up to A. Perhaps would have expected C‡ to descend given gravity and magnetism, or else to repeat given inertia | Leap from C# to F#. May have expected line to continue descending following gravity, inertia, and magnetism | |
| Contradict forces | | Leap from C‡ to A contradicts gravity; in addition, the leap passes by F‡5 contradicting that tonic's magnetism. | | |
| Conflict | | | | |
| Rep/restate | | | | |
| Change state | | | | |
| | %a. ** | 4.5° | | * %9. |


| Gesture | |
|--|---|
| Unexpected event | |
| Contradict forces | A lengthy ascending passage that contradicts gravity. Inertia keeps the passage ascending, and as Hatten has noted, inertia requires an agent to continue the motion (continues onto next system) |
| Conflict | |
| Rep/restate | |
| Change state | |
| () 21 21 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 | * Q.a. * Q.a. * Q.a. |

| Gesture | | | The Gondolier's Call is harmonized in thirds, returns to original metric profile. Second note of call receives strong emphasis |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| Unexpected event | Slowi and th | Slowing of harmonic rhythm here (III lasts two bars), and the °7 harmony are unexpected given that a pattern of V^7 s alternating with tonics was established | Slowing of harmonic rhythm here (III lasts two bars), and the ${}^{\circ}7$ harmony are unexpected given that a pattern of ${}^{\circ}7$ s alternating with tonics was established |
| Contradict forces | (lengthy ascending passage continues from previous system) | from previous system) | |
| Conflict | | | |
| Rep/restate | | | Restatement of Gondolier's Call |
| Change state | Incres is alte | asingly loud dynamic level attained; in mm. 26 ff. ered. In mm. 22 ff., each measure ascended by a s | Increasingly loud dynamic level attained; in mm. 26 ff. the melodic sequence that was established in mm. 22 ff. is altered. In mm. 22 ff., each measure ascended by a step, but in mm. 26-27 the melody gets "stuck" on C\$ |



| Gesture | | | | | |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|--|---|---|
| Unexpected event | (continued from previous system) | | The trill on C#6 suddenly sounds. No trills have come before it, and it is the longest and highest note in the piece so far. Note how it sneaks in pianissimo, grows in dynamic, then fades. Also unexpected at this point is the lack of a return of opening material | nds. No trills have come and highest note in the ks in pianissimo, grows in xpected at this point is material | |
| Contradict forces | | | | | |
| Conflict | | | | | |
| Rep/restate | | | | | |
| Change state | (continued from previous system) | Return to pianissimo | | | |
| | dim. | did did | 9.00. | | 25.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00 |

| | Leap from C‡-A is unexpected. Given that this is a restatement of the consequent from the beginning of the piece, the added C‡6 is also unexpected | Leap from C‡-A contradicts gravity; leap passes by F‡5 contradicting the tonic's magnetism | | uent from opening | | \$30°. |
|---------|--|--|----------|--|--------------|--|
| | L L C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C | L S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S | | Emphatically repeated pitch C#. Restatement of consequent from opening | | |
| | | gravity and magnetism | | mphatically repeated pitch C | | %. %. %. %. %. %. %. %. %. %. %. %. %. % |
| | | Movement from A-C♯ contradicts gravity and magnetism | | 田 | | 36 miles |
| Gesture | Unexpected event | Contradict forces | Conflict | Rep/restate | Change state | |




| Gesture | Burstein argues that the Gondolier's Call is now "truncated." Instead of leaping a third from 7 to 2, the call steps from 7 to 1 | (same as mm. 46-7) |
|----------------------|--|--------------------|
| Unexpected event | The leap up to $E\sharp 5$ is unexpected, and its delayed resolution to tonic is also unexpected | (same as mm. 46-7) |
| Contradict forces | Leap up to E# (from C#4) contradicts gravity, inertia, and magnetism. Then, the leap from E#5 to C#6 contradicts gravity and magnetism because it moves past the tonic | (same as mm. 46-7) |
| Conflict | Syncopation creates metric conflict | |
| Rep/restate | Restated Gondolier's Call, now truncated | (same as mm. 46-7) |
| Change state | | |
| | 46 tr. dim. 420. 220. | Sec. dim. * |

| Gesture | (continued from previous system) | | | |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|--|---------------------|--|
| Unexpected event | (continued from previous system) | Continual leap up to C#6 is unexpected | nexpected. | |
| Contradict forces | | Leap up to C♯6 contradicts gravity and magnetism | avity and magnetism | |
| Conflict | | | | |
| Rep/restate | (continued from previous system) | Repetition of m. 51 | | |
| Change state | | Dynamic softens | | |
| | 51 %% %% | dim. | | |


APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF NARRATIVE IN MENDELSSOHN, SONG WITHOUT WORDS OP. 30, NO. 6






mm. 22–25. Gondolier begins an ascent that **contradicts musical forces**. Goal of passage is the Call **Gesture**, indicating that the passage is under the control of the Gondolier. Further, the passage begins with the notes involved in the Call Gesture, and in a similar manner to the way in which the Gondolier began the antecedent phrase (see box above).



mm. 26-30: The goal of the ascending motion is the Call Gesture, wh emphatically sounds in the fifth octave at its loudest dynamic yet.




Agent with its dominance of the fifth octave. As in the analogous place in the A section (m. 17), the Gondolier attempts a third descent from the Kopfton in the fifth octave (see the circled note above), but the Covering Agent sounds C‡6 above the Gondolier's position.

new, higher, register attained by the Covering Agent serves to confirm its

that rises above the register in which the previous Call sounded. This

registral dominance over the Gondolier. The Covering Agent has taken


the place of the antecedent phrase we might have expected instead.




mm. 43-end: The Gondolier descends to F#4 (m. 43) for the structural close of the work, signifying its failure to establish a third descent in the fifth octave. The coda (mm. 44-end) confirms the failure of the Gondolier to establish itself in the fifth octave: (1) rather than ascending from F#4 to A4 as in mm. 1-6 of the piece, a line descends from F#4 to A3 (mm. 43-47); (2) as Poundie Burstein has noted, the Call Gesture is "shortened" such that 7 no longer leaps to 2, but instead resolves to 1. Moreover, this resolution is delayed by a descending arpeggiation from C#6, as if the Covering Agent asserts its presence even here in the coda.

APPENDIX G

SUMMARY OF NARRATIVE IN SCHUBERT, PIANO SONATA D. 959





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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

John Peterson, a native of Milton, Ontario, Canada, earned a Bachelor of Music Theory and Composition (honors with distinction) from the University of Western Ontario in 2008. He was awarded a graduate assistantship in music theory at the University of Colorado at Boulder and received his Master of Music Theory degree in 2011. While at the University of Colorado at Boulder, John was the instructor of record for freshman aural skills classes and the webmaster for freshman and sophomore aural skills lab websites. He was awarded the Robert Fink Scholarship in Music Theory. John began his doctoral studies in music theory at Florida State University in 2011, where he was awarded a prestigious Legacy Fellowship. He also served as a graduate teaching assistant, and as an instructor of record taught the core theory sequence as well as music theory for non-music majors. During his time Florida State University, John was nominated for an Outstanding Graduate Teaching Award, and he twice co-organized the annual conference, Music Theory Forum. In the fall of 2014, John joined the faculty at James Madison University as a lecturer of music theory, where he teaches the core theory sequence as well as upper-division undergraduate courses in music theory. John has presented his research at national and regional conferences, including the Society for Music Theory, Music Theory Southeast, the Texas Society for Music Theory, and the Rocky Mountain Society for Music Theory. John's current research interests include musical agency, music and meaning, Schenkerian analysis, and the music of Franz Schubert.