LOVE, HATE, AND INSTITUTIONAL REPARATION: INCEPTION OF PSYCHOANALITIC THEORIES

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ABSTRACT

Love, Hate, and Institutional Reparation:
Inception of Psychoanalytic Theories

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The purpose of this research is to better understand the birth of psychoanalytic theories in the context of collaborative and adversarial relationships. From the 1920s, there were seminal papers revealing theoretical variances which impacted collegial relationships and vice versa. Melanie Klein's theoretical identity attracted attention as she transformed her observations of child play into a theory of the internal world. This study explores how in a milieu, where theoretical identities shifted, collaborators turned into adversaries and agreements became disagreements.

In taking up the inception of Kleinian theory, this study examines three relationships: the relationship between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, Mrs. Klein, Edward Glover, and Melitta Schmideberg, her daughter, and finally, the relationships between Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, and Wilfred Bion. Using hermeneutic textual analysis, this study is a critical examination of how historically, one theory's limitation became another theorist's opportunity and the implications this reality entailed. This research examines the *analytic lineage* that raised Kleinian analysis. The aggregated collection of Kleinian critiques review Kleinian theories from various analytic perspectives.

The research enquiry investigates how theoretical disagreements, in the history of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, impacted the development of new theories. The unreconciled collegial partnerships influenced reorganization of disciplinary cohorts and

theoretical subgroups, and impacted the institutional revolution of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, expressed by the institutionalization of three different theoretical groups. The British Psycho-Analytical Society's transformation—from mono-theoretical to multi-theoretical training structure—became a unique construct of confluence where the members' and the subgroups' identities continued to evolve. The result of this study supports the notion that institutional reparation is an idea of an analytic milieu where not only the relationship between analyst and patient, but also collegial relationships, can negotiate love, hate, and theoretical differences.

The implication of this study involves limited artifacts of direct correspondence between some of the protagonists, namely, Klein and her daughter Schmideberg, Glover and Schmideberg, and between Bion and Winnicott. To bypass this challenge, this hermeneutic exploration scrutinizes protagonists' citations, usage of analytic terminology, and footnotes. Further research is needed to develop plans and procedures contributing to a well-organized model for institutional reparation.

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"And those who were seen dancing were thought to be insane

By those who could not hear the music."

—*Frederick Nietzsche*

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The style used throughout this dissertation is in accordance with the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (6th Edition, 2009), and *Pacifica Graduate Institute's Dissertation Handbook* (2014-2015).

Chapter 1.
Introduction

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this phenomenological hermeneutic study is to examine historical debates and collaborations among psychoanalytic theorists who subsequently became adversaries. Through textual analysis, this investigation will explore the meaning of unreconciled ruptures and how these conflicts at times provoked the inception of new theories. What do we learn from the phenomenon that theorists, in a creative partnership of productive work, come to an antagonistic position and completely disregard the collaborative nature of their originally shared experiences? The analytic world is saturated with evidence of this phenomenon where collaborators became adversaries, for instance, Sigmund Freud-Alfred Adler, Sigmund Freud-Carl Jung, Sigmund Freud-Sandor Ferenczi, Melanie Klein-Edward Glover, and Melanie Klein-Donald Winnicott.

Introduction

The theoretical tension in the nascent field of early child analysis after 1926 deepened between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. Their publications attracted intense attention and criticism from their contemporaries. Was the analysis of prelatency age children possible without damaging the child? What do we learn from the process of psychoanalysts establishing authority in a new arena of "early analysis"? Although the stimulating milieu created by the Melanie Klein-Anna Freud controversy sets the stage for this study, the main interest of this work lies in the emblematic, advocate-adversary relationship between Melanie Klein, her daughter Melitta Schmideberg, and Edward Glover—who was the scientific secretary, only second to Ernest Jones, the President of the British Psycho-Analytic Society. Furthermore, the Klein-Winnicott-Bion theoretical

evolution will portray how a family of ancestry in child analysis ensued powerful influences on institutional organization of psychoanalytic training. The analytic interplay between these analytic groups will be examined from various angles: by exploring their clinical, theoretical, and personal affinities and subsequent differences that manifested between them in England from 1925. This study is devoted to the exploration of how these theorists became differentiated when they encountered theoretical, clinical, and personal differences. Using the hermeneutic textual analysis method, this study will scrutinize primary documentations and critiques published during this time.

The purpose of this work is not to elaborate further on Kleinian theories, but to understand the historical and relational circumstances where empirical concepts became a theory. The investigation will focus on the intricate context of theoretical disagreements leading to new thoughts. In the intimate world of psychoanalytic discoveries, pioneer theorists often break from traditions as they transform and individuate. Melanie Klein was one of these pioneers, even though she maintained for many years that she was a Freudian. There is an immense power in divergence which drives critical moments to reoccur in the history of psychoanalysis, specifically, leading to differences in the early history of child analysis. The moments of differences, in the theoretical genealogy of child analysis is the interest of this research. The author of this work argues that every theory has a line of ancestry, a family of other ideas in the epistemological reality, and consequently, theories bear the potential to provoke other new thoughts to emerge in the future.

The historical sparks of this dissertation reveal contemporary relevance. In the theoretical and clinical strains of modern times, depth psychologists develop their own

relationships to theoretical styles and clinical practice, invariably interfacing with collaborators and adversaries. In the examination of the Anna Freud-Melanie Klein dyad, the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg triad, and the Klein-Winnicott-Bion lineage, Kleinian object relations theory will amplify the reverberating dynamics observed throughout the historical circumstances. Investigating the history of early analysis, this dissertation hopes to unearth meaningful lessons applicable to a clinician's own development as an individual, theorist, and clinician while managing the demands of multifaceted roles, differences, theoretical identity.

Brief Literature Review

From 1912, over a decade prior to Melanie Klein's and Anna Freud's publications, Hug-Hellmuth began writing about her compelling psychoanalytic work of child analysis. In 1921, she published "On the Technique of Child Analysis," where she stated, "The peculiarity of the child-psyche, its special relationship to the outside world, necessitates a special technique for its analysis" (p. 287). She emphasized the "*curative* and educative work of analysis" for children and realized, "I consider it impossible for anyone to analyse properly his own child" (p. 306). Hug-Hellmuth was the first analyst in direct engagement with the child's psyche and therefore provided invaluable resources for other analysts, including Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. Hug-Hellmuth presented her paper at the Sixth International Psycho-Analytical Congress at The Hague on September 20th, 1920, where Melanie Klein and Anna Freud were among the many mainstream analysts present. Hug-Hellmuth's premature and unfortunate death interrupted her psychoanalytic career, yet provided captivating inspiration for her contemporaries to continue.

Anna Freud and Melanie Klein were passionate and dedicated women who forged a new professional occupational identity in the culture of the psychoanalytic community. Despite of their theoretical differences from the beginning, they shared essential confluences. Sayers (1991) stated, "Women analysts' use of their own and their patients' mothering experience has indeed advanced psychoanalysis a long way from its patriarchal beginning" (p. 261). Naturally, the Fathers of psychoanalysis witnessed their counterpart, the Mothers of psychoanalysis, emerging as their mothering manifested in treating the child's mind. There was a feminist aspect to the theoretical disputes, as Aguayo's (2000) research revealed:

> But beyond the patrons and advocates marshalling support for Klein and Anna Freud, a new historical circumstance occurred where two women occupied centre stage in a theoretical psychoanalytic dispute. Compared to other areas of science, this gender aspect was almost unique, where two women struggled over who had the best view of the unconscious mental life of the child. (p. 748)

Melanie Klein's and Anna Freud's theoretical disputes reflected their polar variances in treatment methods and techniques leading to the subsequent development of multiple perspectives in clinical practice. However, they had possessed invaluable tacit and implicit commonality: their main assumption was that children were psychoanalytically treatable which stood in contrast to Freud's theory of children being the bases for understanding and proving theories of adult psychopathology.

> Against the backdrop of a still male-dominated psychoanalytic movement after the Great War, the more authoritative roles occupied by Klein and Anna Freud represented a new kind of occupational hybrid, one that professionally legitimised

> women doing the work of mothering outside the home. The emergence of female authorities on the child's psychic development contributed to breaking down patriarchal assumptions about biologically mandated "separate spheres." (Aguayo, 2000, p. 748)

This study will explore in depth how the debate between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud led others to join, critique, and create new theoretical and clinical perspectives.

The tension between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud attracted the support of various analysts. Ernest Jones, Joan Riviere, and Edward Glover provided immense support for Klein. Anna Freud's ideas were encouraged by her father, Sigmund, and also garnered support from other Viennese analysts such as Siegfried Bernfeld and August Aichhorn. In this theoretical ambiance, this study will examine moments of clinical agreements such as when Klein, Glover, and Schmideberg all agreed that psychoanalytic understanding of prelatency age children by means of child analysis through play therapy was possible. Hermeneutic, textual analysis of primary sources will explicate the points of convergence and subsequent disagreements.

Against this general backdrop of the evolving differences between the London and Viennese schools, this study is devoted to the examination of the theoretical milieu where creative collaboration linked Klein, Glover, and Schmideberg together. Grosskurth (1995) revealed at an intimate party, celebrating the publication of Melanie Klein's book, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, in 1932:

> Glover designed a charming card with a drawing of a baby scrutinizing an enormous book, under which he wrote "Celebrating the First English Birthday of

> The Psycho-Analysis of Children by Melanie Klein, 14, XI, 32." The Certificate of Birth was duly witnessed by those present. (p. 195)

Glover's prevailing endorsement supported the birth of child analysis. In the book review of *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, Glover (1933a) praised Klein for her contributions: "I have again no hesitation in saying that it constitutes a landmark in analytical literature worthy to rank with some of Freud's own classical contributions" (p. 394). The recognition from Glover elevated Klein's already established status. Glover continued expressing his advocacy:

> But Melanie Klein certainly deserves the credit of grasping intuitively just how extensively this factor [ambivalence] operates in the earliest stages of childhood. And she has not been afraid either to work out the details or to construct fresh hypotheses when her observations seemed to clash with existing theory. This is perhaps one of the greatest of her services. (p. 400)

During this period, where there were so few members of any analytic society, opportunities for analytic treatment were limited to close colleagues, thus making the potential for analytic conflicts impossible to avoid. In 1934, Melitta began analytic treatment with Edward Glover (Spillius, 1955). Although we don't know who referred Schmideberg to Glover, Klein would certainly have supported her daughter's analytic treatment with Glover. Klein would have had every reason to believe that the analysis was going to have a good outcome, given Glover's advocacy of Klein's work.

As the Glover-Schmideberg pair confidently took off, Melanie Klein continued her battles, protecting and deepening her clinical and theoretical perspectives. A rather steadily polarized dyadic relationship already existed at this time between Melanie Klein

and Anna Freud. The disagreements between the two analysts were mutually evoking and stimulating, and their contrasting arguments provided significant insight to their own developing systems. This inquiry is interested in the influence of the allies that soon gathered around the theories of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, because their impact was essential in the development of psychoanalytical movements. Viner (1996) explained:

> The events of 1927 also served to expose and activate the networks of allies gained by Anna Freud and Melanie Klein since the mid 1920s, networks that would expand in the 1930s into the Kleinian and Freudian schools of analysis. (p. 6)

The British Psychoanalytical Society, under the leadership of Ernest Jones, needed an identity, as the Freudians were confidently dominating the psychoanalytic field in Vienna. Given the existing tension between the London and Viennese schools of child psychoanalysis, the powerful debates between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein mobilized allies who then helped to shape the identity of their respective psychoanalytic societies.

This was the beginning episode of a longer theoretical and clinical developmental arc. The deeply controversial theoretical perspectives about how to conceptualize and treat the child's mind in its total environmental context began to flourish. From Melanie Klein's elaboration of how children can be analyzed, through Anna Freud's response (e.g. The Ego and Mechanisms of Defense, 1937), and Winnicott's notion of the environmental influences, the gradual evolution of child analysis led to its full blossoming. By 1933, growing differences in the field of early child analysis and techniques between Klein, Glover, and Schmideberg became evident, parallel to Klein's

ongoing dispute with Anna Freud. How did Edward Glover's and Melitta Schmideberg's collaborative stance transform into adversarial positions?

This research investigates the dynamics of three analytic positions: (1) how the psychoanalytic training requirements interface with honoring one another's analytic work by colleagues or members of an analytic community, (2) entering into analysis with each other [which might strike us contemporaries as unprincipled, in the early 1900s this reality was common practice,] and (3) the transferential nature of master-disciple analytic dyad calling for deep analytic processing [as for without, unconscious tension in the dyad may propel discontent]. In February, 1942, Susan Isaacs raised a shrewd point:

> First of all, there are those difficulties arising from the very special course of the transferences and countertransferences among analysts and analysands in our members. We know that these transferences are more intense and troublesome, far harder to allow for in our judgements, than the influence of relationships such as teacher and pupil among other scientific workers (King & Steiner, 1991, p. 58).

Psychoanalysts' alliances have been historically impacted by the transference and countertransference phenomenon—both at personal and also at institutional levels. The textual analysis of this study is dedicated to understanding shifts and transformations of analytic relationships—advocates ending up adversaries—due not only to theoretical and clinical criticism, but also to the unsettled and unprocessed phenomena of transference and countertransference. King (1994) continued, "Unresolved transferences and countertransferences were therefore likely to influence the response of members, and make it difficult for a member to speak frankly or to oppose the analysts who had trained them" (p. 341).

This research analyzes the intricate nuances expressed in the secondary literature, published and critiqued through collaborators and antagonists, leading to "The Extraordinary Business Meetings" and "The Freud-Klein Controversies 1941-1945" (King et al., 1991). How do dependency, competition, prestige, rivalries, collaboration, and reputation manifest and play themselves out in analytic relationships? At the Extraordinary Business Meeting on March 11, 1942, Schmideberg openly attacked Kleinian analysts:

> No Doubt the Kleinians have an admirably organized co-operation and had the power to make or wreck many a Member's practice and reputation. They derived much glamour from Mrs. Klein's earlier work and claimed credit for all work ever done concerning the pre-genital phases, projection and introjection phenomena, notwithstanding the fact that much of this was actually the merit of Freud, Abraham, Ferenczi, and others. (King et al., 1991, p. 95)

Through the fiery arguments, the members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society reified their individual analytical identity. The practical manifestation of the object relations theory was evident as the analytical society and its members navigated through the labyrinth of their paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, splitting and integrating, weaving back-and-forth within the relational field. Furthermore, this complex process contributed to the evolution of the institution's own character and subsequent theoretical splits.

One would wonder whether or not it is a fantasy to imagine that collaborators may continue working through theoretical differences, having more *depressive-dialogues*, instead of becoming irreconcilable adversaries. Pearl King (1994) shared:

> The controversial issues concerning the differences of opinions about the validity of Melanie Klein's theory and technique did not arise suddenly. . . . In this paper, I describe briefly the socio-historical, administrative and institutional background out of which these scientific divergences evolved alongside other issues concerned with how long members should hold office in the British Psycho-Analytical Society and therefore be in a position to influence the scientific disagreements and training policy in the Society. (p. 335)

The author of the dissertation suspects that tension driven rivalry serves a very specific function in the larger context of the psycho-analytic society. This research study explores the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg and Klein-Winnicott-Bion triads and examines how these theorists lived out their object relations reality through their own professional and personal relationships. This research will scrutinize published documentations, specifically examining how the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg and Klein-Winnicott-Bion triads corresponded and evolved in their theoretical, personal, and clinical reality. Furthermore, this work hopes to illuminate how allies and antagonists coalesced around theories and the developing identity of The British Psycho-Analytical Society through critiques, debates, and disputes.

Among the innumerable disciples Klein worked with, Donald Winnicott and Wilfred Bion utilized Kleinian thoughts, which were later manifested in their evolving theoretical disparities. This research will extend the exploration of the Winnicott-Bion divergence on holding and containing. The Winnicott-Bion disagreements support the research enquiry of how theoretical differences promote new ways of thinking. Ogden

(2004) revealed one of the many ways of understanding the concept of holding and containing:

> Winnicott's holding and Bion's container-contained represent different analytic vertices from which to view the same analytic experience. Holding is concerned primarily with being and its relationship to time; the container-contained is centrally concerned with the processing (dreaming) of thoughts derived from lived emotional experience. Together they afford "stereoscopic" depth to the understanding of the emotional experiences that occur in the analytic setting. (p. 1362)

Ogden not only reflected on the different angles of these theoretical concepts, but prompted a perspective in the meaning making process perhaps inspired by Bion. Viewing an experience from diverse perspectives may contribute to "stereoscopic" understanding, which refers to clearer mental orientation of an experience.

Bion (1962/1984) elaborated on this thought in his book, *Learning from Experience*, and called it a "binocular vision." Processing and interpreting an idea may become richer by holding in mind broader frameworks of the concept, whether it is an analytic or theoretical situation. A lineage of theorists explored overlapping angles of this idea: "Bion believed that emotional truth had to be 'triangulated' from at least two vertices (points of view). Otherwise, the emotion or thought would become absolute" (Grotstein, 2009, p. 328). Historically, whereas Winnicott referenced more of the physical actuality of the holding, Bion took it on as a mental aspect of containing. This work explores how coinciding similarities and differences implicate theorists' collaboration.

Klein was unwaveringly convinced that children's symbolic presentations in play and art are the portal into the universe of the unconscious, the central point of interest in both object relations and depth psychological studies. The theory of child analysis itself was in its infancy in the late 1920s, and this research study is dedicated to amplify the echoing unconscious transference, projection, and countertransference phenomenon observed through the irreconcilable differences of "parenting-the-theory" of early child analysis.

Theories are birthed and raised by generations of theorists who were bound to specific relational, historical, cultural, political, and spiritual influences, and at the same time, governed by conscious and unconscious intentions at personal and institutional levels. Concerning the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg triad, this study hopes to provide relevant contributions for depth psychologists to consider, namely, psychoanalysts developing and defining their personal and institutional psychoanalytic identity, progressively dealing with clinical and theoretical controversies, recognizing their differences, and respecting diverse approaches to psychological healing.

Statement of the Research Problem

Against the backdrop of theoretical differences between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud starting in 1926, the differences between the London and Viennese school of child analysis was born. Ernest Jones (1927), the President of the British Psychoanalytical Society, expressed his recognition of differences rooted in Anna Freud's "mistrust of the extent to which the ego (and super-ego) of the young child is sufficiently developed to endure the analytic procedure" (p. 388). In addition to the opposing opinions about the pre-latency period, Holder and Slotkin (2005) explained, "Melanie Klein goes on to

dispute Anna Freud's conviction that the child analyst must occasionally intervene educationally because a child's superego does not yet possess the full autonomy and authority that it has adopted and introjected from his parents" (p. 88). Melanie Klein's empirical persuasion in contrast to Anna Freud's theoretical views set the context for further development of child analysis in the British Psycho-Analytical Society.

Melanie Klein's early supporters, Glover and Schmideberg, faced challenges as Klein transformed from a clinician to a theorist and her loyalty to Freudian thoughts became questioned. The research problem continues to unfold with the Klein-Winnicott and Winnicott-Bion theoretical collaboration and eventual divergence. Analysts' agreements on theoretical ideas were the key operational principle in their creative work. When theoretical differences and opposing models of thoughts appeared, theorists had alternative ideas of how to utilize the tension of their differences. Although the theoretical collaboration of the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg and Klein-Winnicott-Bion triads fostered the impetus of early analysis, their eventual splits are the focus of this research. This study explores how unreconciled conflicts led to schism in the analysts' personal relationships and at the same time, how theoretical divergence fertilized new thoughts to emerge and new theories to develop.

Research Question

Drawing from the rich historical circumstances of psychoanalysis, the proposed research study is attempting to find meaning of "Love, Hate, and Reparation" (Klein & Riviere, 1937). The research question is: How did theoretical disagreements, in the early history of psychoanalysis, impact the development of new theories? This research will explore historical contexts where collaborators disregarded their creative partnership in

the unfolding history of child analysis. Namely, how did the Melanie Klein-Anna Freud dialogue, the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg triad's unreconciled conflicts, and the Klein-Winnicott-Bion lineage impact theoretical developments and the identity of the British Psycho-Analytical Society? This dissertation draws from the traditions of depth psychology in the scope of object relations theory, asking and responding to a series of questions.

Researcher's Transference to the Topic

The author's transference to the topic is three-fold: (1) Melanie Klein's original discovery that a child's symbolic play is the royal road to the unconscious has been most influential in the researcher's daily work with children; (2) Klein's passionate and often strident conviction while withstanding the most aggressive critique is an appealing trait that the researcher wants to further investigate and use as a guide to withstand the criticism and ambivalence the researcher's child patients' parents hold against play therapy; and (3) the author highly regards Melanie Klein, the self-made lay-analyst, as she resembles the author's struggles and cultural journey. It is noted here that currently, the researcher is not a member of an analytic society and has no encumbering financial ties that bear on the outcome of this research.

Relevance of the Topic for Depth Psychology

The intimate world of theorist and theory—in the case of Klein, Glover, Schmideberg, Winnicott, and Bion—is a vigorous interplay of complementary, conscious and unconscious tendencies of the human psyche. This research study historicizes early analysis, the story that is embedded in hermeneutic symbolism, love, hate, gratitude, envy, guilt, and tension that perpetuates the expressions of unconscious phantasies. The

primary literature and secondary sources are trusted companions that will be guiding the author through the journey of the shifts, turns, and transformations of theories and theorists.

Moving into the depth psychological perspective of the advocate-adversary phenomenon, the inner metaphors of the study are representative of the research journey. The complex reality of Klein-Glover-Schmideberg relationship—rival clinicians, mother and daughter, powerful personalities, and competing theorists in psychoanalysis—is a symbolic revelation of sacrifice and creation. In Klein's (1975) own words,

> The internalization of the good parents and the identification with them underlie loyalty towards people and causes and the ability to make sacrifices for one's convictions. Loyalty towards what is loved or felt to be right implies that hostile impulses bound up with anxieties (which are never entirely eliminated) are turned towards those objects which endanger what is felt to be good. (p. 269)

In this sacrifice, there is a principle trait in conviction that births a genuinely new creation at the expense of loss. The protagonists of this study, Melanie Klein, Edward Glover, and Melitta Schmideberg, clearly experienced their gains as well as their losses.

Klein's deeply painful sacrificial process—losing her marriage, her daughter, her son, her reputation, and professional relationships—sheds light on her commitment to the empirical truth of her life as a mother, theorist, and clinician. The vision that possessed her entire inner universe is a noble journey of morality. Klein's comrades, Bion, Rosenfeld, and Segal (1961), remembered Klein:

> Melanie Klein remarked once that she had devoted her life to psycho-analysis, and then, to her interlocutor's surprise, added rather sadly that she sometimes felt

> regret that she had done so. It would not have been appropriate to answer by anything comforting, because only she knew what had been the price of her devotion, and no one knew better than she what her work was worth. For she had a deep conviction of its value and importance. Her sacrifices must have been great indeed. (p. 5)

From early on, being the first child psychoanalyst of the time in a male dominant profession, Klein's instinctual passion transcended traditional boundaries of her culture and times. Klein's bold defiance and contradictory personality were in service to withstand harsh criticism and endure immense waves of attacks.

> Her compassion and understanding of human nature were combined with ruthlessness when she felt that scientific integrity was tampered with. The single-mindedness in the pursuit of truth and the courage that is needed for it were, perhaps, her most outstanding characteristics. . . . Melanie Klein, by her discoveries and her personality, has produced turmoil and controversy in the psycho-analytic movement. But disturbance and discomfort are a small price to pay for the discharge of our indebtedness to anyone who reminds us of this. (p. 5)

In addition to the enormous complexities in Klein's clinical world, recognizing herself as a mother presented equally demanding challenges. Melitta started psychoanalysis with Edward Glover around 1933, marking the beginning of her strident rebellion against her mother. The depth psychological relevance of this shift will be explored as daughter-Schmideberg's attacks on mother-Klein were explicitly provocative in the British

Psychoanalytical Society's meetings, continuing throughout the "Extraordinary Business Meetings" 1942-1944.

The unbendable parallel dimension of Klein-Glover-Schmideberg is the philosophical question of theorists' identity formation in a theoretical community. While theorists negotiate genuine creative forces of their own powerful empirical reality, can they, at the same time, reconcile dissonant and opposing forces outside of their own analytic construct? There is a timeless invitation for this process, in Kleinian terms, "depressive position . . . can refer to the infantile experience of this developmental integration" (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 84). Although the reconciliation did not happen during the lifetime of Klein, the legacy of their triadic relationship is an eternal symbol of potential for emergence. The Winnicott and Bion theoretical affiliation and evolution hold similar tension provoking questions such as how Winnicott and Bion handled psychic regression in different ways (Vermote, 2014, Bion Conference). This research is a continual work of living the meaning of the multifaceted tension of object relations theory's reality. This study is a testimonial of unconscious metaphors patiently waiting to be recognized from infancy through various adult manifestations, such as theoretical allegiances reflected in the institutional realm.

Definition of Terms

Although alternative definitions may be found in psychoanalytical literature, the following definition of terms intends to provide historical and contextual references specifically relevant in this research.

Analytic-pair.

Through the theoretical development of Freud, Klein, Winnicott, and Bion, the term *analytic-pair* carries different connotations to each of these theorists. The analytic-pair consists of a variable infant and a variable mother in different theoretical configurations. Klein was interested in the baby-variable where the infant was projecting into the mother, Winnicott, in the mother-variable, stating, "There is no such thing as a baby without the mother" (Winnicott, 1952/1992, p. 99), and Bion, in the variability of both, the mother and the infant. In this work, the Kleinian implicit analytic-pair is used to distinguish an infant's inner-object relations from the Winnicottian emphasis on the external-object relational experiences. For Klein's implicit theory of the analytic-pair having the baby being the focus of change (independent variable), the mother is being the repository (dependent variable) who then via her intuitions and reverie attunes to the child (See Appendix B).

"Binocular vision" (Bion, 1962/1984).

Bion's concept of the "binocular vision" refers to the phenomenon where two views of the same reality are held in mind simultaneously. Historically, Bion first defined the idea of the "binocular vision" in his 1962 book, *Learning from Experience,* "the model is formed by the exercise of a capacity similar to that which is in evidence when the two eyes operate in binocular vision to correlate two views of the same object" (p.

86). Having the analyst contain multiple aspects in mind concurrently, makes it better possible to work with paradoxical situations. Multiple perspectives include but are not limited to his own and the patient's mind, the mind of the group, conscious and unconscious realities, or concrete and symbolic occurrences. "The use in psycho-analysis of conscious and unconscious in viewing a psycho-analytic object is analogous to the use of the two eyes in ocular observation of an object sensible to sight" (p. 86). Having a psychic phenomenon observed through two different vertices enables the individual to derive more comprehensive meaning from the experience, despite their potentially contradictory nature. "When functioning intra-psychically, binocular vision means learning from experience and self-observation" (Sandler, 2005, pp. 81-83).

Early analysis.

In the developing history of child analysis, three themes shaped its evolution. At first, the child was seen as the testing ground for adult theories insofar as the verbalizing latency aged child was able to symbolize his experiences. Freud deployed the "Little Hans" case to support the development of his theory of adult psychopathology as a historical reconstruction, for example the Oedipus complex. Next, Hermine Hug-Hellmuth deployed Freud's theories directly with children by means of structured play situations. For instance, she used three figures to depict an Oedipal configuration. Then, lastly, Klein treated barely verbalizing prelatency aged children directly by the added innovation of unstructured play as a form of free association. Play was a form of action language that she interpreted in the here and now, which has become known as the present unconscious (Sandler & Sandler, 1987). Melanie Klein believed that prelatency aged children were able to develop transference towards their analysts by projecting their

unconscious phantasies and the roles of the analyst were cast in the transference. She called child analysis "early analysis." Anna Freud believed that a preparatory or educational period was needed in the treatment of latency aged children, and she emphasized the needs for positive transference (Skelton, 2006, p. 81).

Container-contained and holding.

Historically, the concepts of the container-contained are Bionian terms. *Container* refers to an individual who receives unprocessed psychic materials (beta elements), and has the capacity (alpha function) to transform it (into alpha elements) and return it to its source (infant/child or any individual), who then has the variety of opportunities receiving it. Winnicott used the term *holding* to emphasize the environmental, "Primary Maternal Preoccupation" (1956/1992, p. 300). In Winnicott's theory, the baby (dependent variable) is the one impacted by the change or the nature of the mother (independent variable). As for Bion, the child and the mother both can take turns mutually evoking and being impacted by each other's variability; the analyst is the constant factor and functions as a container or controlled variable (See Appendix B). Ogden (2004) clarified, "Winnicott's holding is seen as an ontological concept that is primarily concerned with being and its relationship to time. . . . Bion's container-contained is centrally concerned with the processing (dreaming) of thoughts derived from lived emotional experience" (p. 1349).

Countertransference.

Freud and Klein thought that countertransference was personal interference in the analytic field. Paula Heimann and Bion viewed countertransference as an "instrument of research into the patient's unconscious" (Heimann, 1950, p. 82). Recall here that Paula

Heimann was also Bion's supervisor right at the time when Heimann wrote her paper on countertransference (Skelton, 2006, p. 56). The analyst, as a constant factor (controlled variable) in the analytic field, observes the variability in his patient and does not involve his own subjectivity. However, circumstances such as the analyst's activated emotional states, countertransference, may push the analyst towards becoming variable in the analytic encounter which then may have a destabilizing impact on the analytic relationship. Countertransference may impact the constant (controlled variable) or container's alpha function and the observing analysts can on occasion become the variably subjective analyst who is affected by his own emotional reactions. This circles back to Freud's idea, where countertransference is a personal interference. On the other hand, the constructive aspect of countertransference is apparent when the analyst recognizes his own variability (subjectivity through countertransference) and contains it by transforming the unconscious content to conscious recognition. This experience may provide invaluable information communication from the patient's unconscious.

Depressive position.

Klein first published her fully developed idea of the depressive position in 1935, in her essay, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-depressive States," and fully concluded the concept in her later 1940 paper, "Mourning and its Relation to the Manic-depressive States." Whereas the depressive-position reflects the work towards integration of love and hate, it involves deeply activating emotions such as mourning for the loss of the breast at weaning, ambivalence of accepting the whole object as both, good and bad, and the recognition that one can exist alone, separately from the mother (Likierman, 2001, pp. 114-115). Historically, the theory of the depressive position preceded the idea

of the paranoid-schizoid position, which Klein published in her 1946 paper, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms." Klein named her concepts "positions" instead of "stages or phases" in her 1935 paper which was a distinguishing characteristic from Freud's psychosexual stages—perceived by some of Klein's contemporaries as deviation from Freud. Later, in 1948, Klein reasoned her decision in her essay, "The Psychoanalysis of Children," as the positions "represent specific groupings of anxieties and defences which appear and re-appear" (Klein, 1948, p. xiii). Klein perceived her model not as a linear development between the positions, but as an ongoing, "overlapping, and fluctuating" process working through the constellations of ambivalence, anxiety, defences, and impulsive drives (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, pp. 449-450). The primary defense mechanism in the depressive position responds to the gradual realization of others as whole objects, and the feeling of loss as the self is perceived as separated and alone. While in the paranoid-schizoid position, the feeling of being destroyed causes the fear, the defense mechanism in the depressive position deals with the fear of destroying others which evokes manic defenses, repression, and reparation.

Edward Glover (January 13, 1888 – August 16, 1972).

Glover became a medical doctor at age 21 and with his brother, James Glover's encouragement, he developed an interest in reading Freud's psychoanalytic work. As Glover's career was beginning to develop, in 1920, he started analysis with Karl Abraham in Berlin, and became an enthusiastic Freudian. Glover became an associate member in 1921 and a full member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1922. After James Glover's death in 1926, Edward Glover took on various responsibilities and was elected to be the Scientific Secretary of the British Psycho-Analytical Society

working closely with Ernest Jones, who was the president. Among the many political issues of psychoanalysis at the time, Glover actively worked on the organization of analytic training and took issue with the idea of lay analysis. After Sigmund Freud's 1926 publishing of the "Question of Lay Analysis," the Society was discordant in how to value lay analysis within the hierarchical organization of the Society. Glover shared Jones belief that lay-analysts should work towards medical training as a prerequisite of analytic training (Robinson, 2011, p. 205). Without medical training, yet with genuine clinical practice, Klein became a member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society on October 2, 1927. Initially, Glover supported Klein's work in London while intending to unite Klein's theoretical advancements on child analysis with Freud's structural model. However, as Klein's identity as an independent theorist became evident, Glover perceived this as a heresy and distanced himself. Ironically, during this period Klein's daughter, Melitta Schmideberg began analysis with Glover. The antagonism of the Glover-Schmideberg pair towards Klein's work took on and climaxed at an institutional level during the Controversial Discussions. When the British Psycho-Analytical Society became a tripartite training institute, Glover resigned, as he no longer identified with the newly organized, tripartite training system.

Ernest Jones (January 1, 1879 – February 11, 1958).

As one of the most influential British psychoanalyst and neurologist, Ernest Jones was one of the original organizers of the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1919 and the president of the institute from 1919 to 1944. He was the co-founder of the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1911. With his exceptional abilities, Ernest Jones intelligently managed the political arena of psychoanalysis during the war. Under Jones's

keen navigation of the competitive relationships between the Berlin, Viennese, and British schools of psychoanalysis, the British Psycho-Analytical Society gained international recognition. As the Freud family were escaping from the Nazis, Ernest Jones supported them by securing emigration papers, and they arrived to London on June 6, 1938. Ernest Jones was Sigmund Freud's biographer, and *The Complete Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones 1908-1939* reveals the collegial symbiosis their relationship involved (Freud, Paskauskas, & Jones, 1995). Jones envisioned a new identity for the British Psycho-Analytical Society and supported Klein's work on child analysis in London from 1926. Klein's advancement in her clinical and theoretical evolution of child analysis benefitted Jones vision.

Internal objects.

Although Freud used the term *internal object*, Klein made the term become an essential pillar of her theory by developing how the internalization and mental representation of an external object exist in an individual's psychic reality. According to Kleinian object relations theory, through introjection and by working through the defences, internal objects contain the earliest emotional memory of the relationship with external objects. The inner representations or internal objects constellate and become parts of the self that are driving the individual to work through other relationships—when they become activated—by the means of early experiences. (Skelton, 2006, p. 241). As an infant is experiencing himself through the external object world that takes care of him while being in a helpless physical state, his earliest inner representations are part-objects that are frustrating, bad-part-objects and satisfying, good-part-objects. "Gradually with growth and development, the infant develops the capacity to see its mother as a whole

object that both satisfies and frustrate" (Clair, 2004, p. 9). Kleinian theory illustrates that internal objects, "when taken into the self, are thought to be experienced by the infant concretely as physically present within the body, causing pleasure (good internal part-object breast) or pain (bad internal part-object breast)" (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 41). The concept of the Kleinian internal object illuminates how an infant receives psychic energy using the body as an organizational base for early mental processes.

Melitta Schmideberg (January 17, 1904 – February 10, 1983).

Melitta Schmideberg is Melanie Klein's daughter who became a medical doctor and psychoanalyst. During her training in Berlin, Melitta met her husband, Walter Schmideberg, a personal friend of Sigmund Freud and also a psychoanalyst; they got married in 1924. In 1929 Melitta began psychoanalytic training with Karen Horney in Berlin. Melitta moved to London in 1928 and became a member of the British Psycho-Analytic Institute in 1933. Melitta initially supported her mother's work; however, from about 1933, Schmideberg began distancing herself from Klein. After being in analysis with Ella Sharpe, Melitta began analysis with Edward Glover, who also became critical of Klein's work from the early 1930s. Schmideberg eventually became a merciless critic of Klein's theories, and the vicious disagreements on theoretical differences culminated during the Controversial Discussions. Klein and Schmideberg never reconciled. Melitta became involved in the Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquents, where "in treating young delinquents, she became convinced that in offender therapy, psychoanalysis was a highly unsuitable weapon in treatment" (Melitta Schmideberg, 1983, p. 3). Schmideberg went to New York in 1945 and worked with juvenile delinquents until 1962 when she returned to London.

Middle Group – "Independents."

Initially, there was a "nonaligned" group of British analysts who were steeped in the traditions of Sigmund Freud and Klein. In the ensuing "pick and choose" atmosphere after the Controversial Discussions ended, these analysts felt that they were free to choose their theoretical and clinical allegiances. This is the group that became the Middle Group or Independents. In the rich historical milieu of psychoanalysis, the British Psycho-Analytical Society were influenced by the differences between the Viennese, Budapest, Berlin, and London cultures of analytical communities, the larger context of the political arena during WWI and WWII, the gender diversity of the male and female psyche, the ambivalence over lay analysis, namely, what constitute analytic training, the qualification of analysts, and should medical training be a prerequisite for analysts. The Freudian and Kleinian groups became so polarized from each other that the principle of compensation may have operated, when the Middle Group, or Independents, within the premises of the British Psycho-Analytical Society became relevant to brokering a compromise solution. In addition, this was the first time in 1944, where theoretical differences were housed under one roof. While initially this group were "defining themselves by what they were not," gradually, they organized themselves around key ideas incorporating elements from both of the other two theoretical groups, such as the maternal environment of provision, the importance of primary narcissism, and the techniques and theories of child analysis (Robinson, 2011, p. 215).

Paranoid-schizoid position.

In 1946, Klein published his paper, "Notes on some schizoid mechanisms," which formally explained the clinical and theoretical relevance of the paranoid-schizoid

position. This concept names, defines, and organizes, many of Klein's previously observed clinical experiences with children such as splitting of the ego and its object, projecting hate and love, idealizing the good and denying the bad parts of the object. The individual's achievement of differentiating "good" and "bad" parts of self and others in addition to securing a "good" internalized object are some of the prerequisites for integrative processes that happen in the depressive-position (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, pp. 63-81). In the two positions, defences aim at different targets and are organized differently: In the paranoid-schizoid position omnipotence against the feeling of annihilation calls for binary spitting, fragmentation, denial, idealization, projective identification, and introjection. Defences in the depressive position aim to defend against the feeling of loss and guilt about earlier persecutory phantasies by often returning to primitive defences in addition to manic and obsessional ideations (p. 307).

Projective identification.

Projective identification is a Kleinian term that Klein originally mentions in her 1946 paper, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms." Here, the term is not specifically defined, yet, Klein explains, "I have referred to the weakening and impoverishment of the ego resulting from excessive splitting and projective identification" (p. 107). However, the idea is placed in the context of "Splitting in Connection with Introjection and Projection," which was the title of the section in this paper. Later, in the 1952 version of this essay, Klein is more definitive: "I suggest for these processes the term 'projective identification'" (Melanie Klein Trust, 2014). Although projection involves the split off and expelling the intolerable parts of psyche, at the other end of the same concept, identification refers to becoming one with something. In this complex dichotomy,

projective identification serves a rather unconscious linking, connecting, or joining principle which was further developed by Bion. Likierman 2001 explained:

> The human infant never learns directly about his aggression. He only learns about it as tolerated by the mother. . . . Such thinking was revolutionary in clarifying the nature of maternal emotional provision, and highlighted the importance of the mother's mental resilience. (p. 161)

Projective identification may vary in the intensity and the function they serve. It can also be "an interpersonal as well as an intrapersonal process" (Spillius & O'Shaughnessy, 2012, p. 60).

Bion distinguished normal projective identification—which mostly is concerned with unconscious, mostly nonverbal, give-and-take communication—from instances when projective identification becomes psychopathological (p. 230). Britton (1998) named two kinds of projective identifications: The first one is the "*Acquisitive projective identification:* 'I AM YOU' — that is, another person's identity or attributes are claimed for the self" (p. 6). The second one is the "*Attributive projective identification*: 'YOU ARE ME' — that is, an aspect of the self is attributed to another person. This may be *evocatory*, inducing change in the other, or *non-evocatory*, when no action is taken to give effect to it" (p.6). Donald Meltzer (1975), in collaboration with Esther Bick (1968), extensively wrote about adhesive identification:

> We began to think that we were now observing a new type of narcissistic identification and that we could no longer think of projective identification as being synonymous with narcissistic identification but had to think of identification as a broader term. . . . We decided to call this new form of

> narcissistic identification *adhesive identification*, some sort of identification process took place which we thought was very closely connected with mimicry and very closely connected with the kind of shallowness and externalization of values (p. 298)

Adhesive identification propels the person to be preoccupied dealing with external objects, perhaps due to the atypical development and organization of internal object relations. Children diagnosed with autism demonstrate a variance in the interpersonal aspects of projective processes in in their play. "D. Ribas (1992) emphasizes the absence of projection in infantile autism, he is in fact referring exclusively to adhesive identification, which, as he says, is a more primitive mechanism than projective identification" (Spillius & O'Shaughnessy, 2012, p. 223).

Theoretical variability (Appendix B).

Within the premises of the analytic-pair, through the early history of child analysis, theoreticians' focus evolved depending on how each theorist perceived concerns with either the child, the mother/environment, or both. Unveiling the differences between the theorists, namely, Klein, Winnicott, and Bion, there are three factors that this research takes into consideration: the Independent Variable (IV), which is the factor that changes or is controlled to change; the Dependent Variable (DV), which is the factor that is impacted by the change of the Independent Variable (the value of the Dependent Variable is caused by and depends on the value of the Independent Variable); and the Constant (C) also called the Controlled Variable, which remains constant. These principles are not absolute, nor are they rigidly separable, in addition, they do not necessarily follow the reproducible scientific experiential modalities. Theoretical variability is a metaphor.

However, the idea, theoretical variability, serves an approach to comparing how the various theorists' focus deepened their clinical work, while also illuminating the contrasting differences between their theoretical approaches. Klein puts the child as the independent variable, the one who changes and the mother acts accordingly. Historically, Winnicott puts the mother, the external environment, as the independent variable, and the child acting accordingly. Bion believes that both the mother and the child reciprocate being IV and DV respectively. In an analytic encounter, if the analyst acts upon the impact of his countertransference, he will be pushed towards becoming DV.

Unconscious phantasy.

Through her clinical observation with children, Klein expanded Freud's original term, as "unconscious phantasies underlie all mental processes and activities" (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 13). Children demonstrated primitive instinctual desires in their play, which confirmed their unconscious intentions: "'Unconscious phantasy' springs directly from the instincts and their polarity and from the conflicts between them" (Segal, 1981, p. 5). Klein explained the multiple functions of unconscious phantasies relating to bodily experiences, the internal world, and manifesting as defense. Susan Isaacs proposed to spell unconscious phantasy with a "ph" to distinguish it from conscious fantasy in her 1948 paper, "The Nature and Function of Phantasy." Klein and Isaacs emphasized the instinctual base of phantasy, which was critically discussed during the Controversial Discussions. (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, pp. 3-14).

Chapter 2.
Literature Review

The literature review is organized thematically as well as chronologically, as it traces the natural hermeneutic flow of the investigation. Although it searches for nuances in the textual shift of the literature, it reflects a depth psychological perspective on the history of early analysis from 1925. Predominantly, this inquiry is interested in analyzing how the literature dialogues with itself and how the literary interaction becomes reflective of the transformations of the analytic relationship between Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Edward Glover, Melitta Schmideberg, Donald Winnicott, and Wilfred Bion.

The literature review comprises six distinct areas: (1) disputes of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud over child analysis; (2) advocacy for child analysis in London between 1925-1933; (3) the formation of adversarial positions, Glover-Schmideberg collaboration, (4) reactions to Melanie Klein's theory and technique; (5) Kleinian object relations theory as an implicit theory of the analytic-pair, and (6) inseparable realities of theory and theorist; Kleinian object relations theory as it applies to the journey of the theory's birth-mother, Melanie Klein.

Early Disputes of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud over Child Analysis

The debate between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud about child analysis became a lodestone allowing analysts to align themselves around their respective points of view. In this milieu of differences between the London and Viennese schools, early psychoanalytic literature provides insight into the transformational phenomenon of how collaborators turn into adversaries; namely, how did the analytic triadic interplay between Melanie Klein, Edward Glover, and Melitta Schmideberg culminate in an impasse? The context of this dissertation begins to unfold with the dispute about child analysis between

Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. Freud (1926/1959) writes on the prospects of child analysis:

> Much that is of interest attaches to these child analyses; it is possible that in the future they will become still more important. From the point of view of theory, their value is beyond question. They give unambiguous information on problems which remain unsolved in the analyses of adults; and they thus protect the analyst from errors that might have momentous consequences for him. (p. 215)

The primary sources reveal that Klein believed that prelatency children can be analyzed and are shaped by their early psychical experiences. On the other hand, Anna Freud (1927) in her *Four Lectures on Child Analysis* expressed the view that only latency aged children were suitable for analysis. She thought that "a preparatory period" was needed in order to educate the child as to what psychoanalytic method entailed. Anna Freud believed that the transference neurosis did not exist in the prelatency child, as his or her relationship with his parents was still in an unformed, evolving state.

Whereas Klein assumed that the play technique revealed important aspect of the child's early mental life, Anna Freud thought that the child's play with toys was merely a method of developing positive attachment. Whereas Anna Freud critiqued Klein's assumption that the child's toy behavior reflected its early conflictual life, Melanie Klein (1927) then was offered an opportunity by Ernest Jones to present her original views in the "Symposium on Child Analysis." This article was an explicit response to Anna Freud's criticism. Melanie Klein believed that analysis started in the first session. Transference interpretations were immediate and made as a function of the child's personification of its internal conflicts as manifest in its play with toy figures. As a result

of her belief of the meaningful communication displayed by the child with its toy behavior, she concluded that prelatency analysis was indeed possible (pp. 443-444). In the milieu of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, Klein established herself as a major proponent of child analysis and helped to establish the focal identity of the British Society.

Aguayo (1997; 2000) has argued that the internal struggles of Anna Freud and Klein with respect to child analysis occurred within the cultural container of the development of the British Psychoanalytical Society. The dispute between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein regarding child analysis took on additional significance because of the institutional agenda of Ernest Jones. On the one hand, there were English analysts who supported Klein's work on child analysis and simultaneously translating Freud's work to English, namely Joan Riviere and Alix and James Strachey. As a result, Freud was in no position to alienate his translators. Unbeknown to Freud, Jones had also made a financial accommodation to Klein by sending his family to consult with Klein.

The increasingly tense theoretical differences between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud were also representative of the political undercurrents within the psychoanalytic movements of the late 1920s. Behind the scenes, Sigmund Freud's influence was a powerful promotional force for his daughter in Berlin and Vienna, while Ernest Jones's advocacy for Melanie Klein heated up his political agenda in London. From the Freud-Jones Correspondence (1925-1935), it is evident that the theoretical differences between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein drew personal matters into the psychoanalytic arena. This was especially obvious when Anna Freud publically critiqued Klein's work in her 1927

book. Jones, in his letter to Sigmund Freud on May 16, 1927, harshly criticized Anna Freud for her premature and untimely public forthcoming:

> It is a pain to me that I cannot agree with *some* of the tendencies in Anna's book, and I cannot help thinking that they must be due to some imperfectly analyzed resistances; in fact I think it is possible to prove this in detail. It is a pity she published the book so soon—her first lectures, but I hope she may prove as amenable as her father to further experience. (Freud, Paskauskas, & Jones, 1995, pp. 617-618)

Jones moved the discussion in the direction of the highly personal. Sigmund Freud took Jones provocations seriously, as Freud himself was the one who analyzed his daughter. In addition, due to Freud's illnesses, he grew more dependent on his daughter: "Anna was not only his trusted and indispensable nurse, but his intellectual heir" (Maddox, 2007, p. 191). This was the beginning phase of the Melanie Klein and Anna Freud adversarial relationship that could never become collaborative. The two female analysts' theoretical variations about how to treat the child's mind became among other things a personal matter, evolved into a more intense divergence as their separate collaborative groups formed and defined their respective analytic group identities.

In the longest letter that Jones (Freud, Paskauskas, & Jones,, 1995, p. 625) ever wrote to Freud, dated September 30, 1927, Jones elaborated on his advocacy for Klein and communicated that Freud was in no position to banish Klein as a theoretical heretic:

> There is a general confidence in her [Klein's] method and results, which several of us have been able to test at the closest quarters, and she makes the general impression of a sane, well-balanced, and thoroughly analysed person. We were

> somewhat astonished to learn with what little sympathy her work has been regarded on the Continent, but decided to give her work a fair hearing and form our own judgment about it. This has been so favourable that we have come to regard her extension of psycho-analysis into this new field as not only a valuable addition to our powers, but as opening up the most promising avenue to direct investigation of the earliest and deepest problems. Holding such an attitude, we could, as you will well understand, only regard any attempt made to close this avenue as unfortunate. (Freud, Paskauskas, & Jones, 1995, p. 628)

Jones validated Melanie Klein's character by saying she is a "thoroughly analysed person," whereas in his previous letter to Freud, Jones accused Anna Freud making choices due to "some imperfectly analyzed resistances." Melanie Klein's advancement in child analysis threatened Anna Freud's intentions to gain sole custody and authority in the field of child analysis. These two analysts' conflicting personalities and perspectives created analytic excitement about child analysis, which became controversial after the publication of the "Symposium on Child Analysis" in 1927. Now analysts with curiosity about child analysis could have their own clinical experiences with young children. Through their own work, analysts began to draw their own conclusions, endorsing, rejecting, and at times feeling ambivalent about either Klein's or Anna Freud's assumptions.

The letters between Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones (Sept. 1927-1928) also reflected institutional tensions between London and Vienna, which later, with the Freuds' arrival in London in June 1938, became more extreme. Klein's early career greatly depended on Jones's advocacy and prepared the ground for Klein's theoretical progression. At the

same time, this movement in the psychoanalytic community encouraged the gathering for Klein's disciplinary cohorts who sympathized with her ways of understanding the child's mind. Jones instrumental influence, organizational capacity, and keen sense of managing political conflicts uniquely qualified him to play an indispensable role in the evolution of early psychoanalytic movement.

Advocacy for Child Analysis in London, 1925-1933

Ernest Jones heard about Klein's work on child analysis through conversations with Alix Strachey, who had met Klein in Berlin. Klein had experienced difficulties getting her work published in Berlin: Sandor Rado and Franz Alexander had opposed the publication of her work after Karl Abraham's death on Christmas Day, 1925. Klein needed a new patron as her work with children developed and her observations manifested in practical theories. Ernest Jones invited Klein to England in 1925 to give a series of lectures, and she was received with great enthusiasm, especially from female lay-analysts such as Joan Riviere, who were very interested in the early development of children. Klein's shocking and utterly new perspective that young children are analyzable awoke interest and prepared the ground for her permanent residence in England after 1926.

Jones's personal interest in Klein's work was evident insofar as he sent his wife and two of his children into analysis with Klein. Ernest Jones intended the British Psychoanalytical Society to develop itself into a leading institute and the political atmosphere of having a new and brilliant child clinician favored this vision. When Melanie Klein published "Symposium on Child Analysis" in January, 1927, she received support from influential analysts, including Jones, Glover, Riviere, and Sharpe. Jones's

(1927) view on child analysis pointed to the differences between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. Jones candidly stated:

> But it is not hard to show that wherever a neurosis exists the conflict is essentially an internal one, and that fear of the external authority is mainly a rationalization of the fear of the super-ego, i.e. of the demand of the internal conscience. (p. 390)

Jones's advocacy for Klein's perspectives on child analysis set the scene for theorists to reflect on their own work adding a potentially new angle to their observation. Klein thought that she was being loyal to Freud's structural theory by speculating about the inception of the super-ego, debating its structuralization as the resolution of the child's Oedipus complex. Klein held a piece of a puzzle that completed Freud's idea about the super-ego. Jones added:

> Whether the analytic view can be extended from the adult to young children, and thus be converted into a harmonious generalization covering the whole field of neurosis from beginning to end, will be decided by experience and not argument; in my judgment, the evidence already accumulated justifies the hope that we shall experience this last triumph of psychoanalytic theory and practice. (p. 390)

Jones's emphasis of Klein's clinical experience with young children appeared now as a counterpoint to mainstream Freudian theory that had evolved mainly in work with adult patients.

In counterpoint to Freud's idea of the paternal origins of the superego, otherwise known as the resolution of the Oedipus complex, Klein's interest was at the inception of the maternally based superego. Klein perceived her idea of the super-ego as it develops out of the infant's conflict with the present, material, satisfying breast that became the

absent and frustrating bad breast. Klein thought that when the infant attacked the otherwise good source, the only emotional consequence could be persecution. Once the infant realized that it was attacking an otherwise good nourishing source, the inevitable consequence is guilt, as the infant enters the depressive position. At this point, both Jones and Glover thought that Klein's superego is an extension of Sigmund Freud's. Sigmund Freud in his publishing only cited Klein's work on three occasions. These citations were in the footnotes, where Klein's works were cited with respect. On the other hand, Freud in his letters occasionally expressed his disagreements:

> I should like to oppose Mrs. Klein on the following point: she presents the superego of children as being similarly independent as that of adults, while Anna seems to me right in stressing that the child's superego is still under the direct influence of his parents. (Freud, Paskauskas, & Jones, 1995, p. 620)

Officially, in his published materials, Sigmund Freud writes in favor of Klein's work, even if only in the footnotes of his work. However, in his letters, Freud is critical of Klein's idea of the superego.

Sharpe (1927) and Riviere (1927) supported Klein's ideas about the analysis of prelatency aged children. They defended Klein's work against the criticism of Anna Freud, and their curiosity was ignited in their ensuing debate. Anna Freud's criticism of Klein's work evoked Klein's (1927) response, which ignited curiosity from analysts to look beyond the existing currency of analytic possibilities. For instance, Ella Freeman Sharpe implicated the analyst's own psychological functioning in statements like this: "Rationalizations . . . are built upon the alarms of that very same infantile super-ego in the analyst that he has to deal with in the child before him" (p. 383). These women

circled back to the infantile part not only in the client, but also in the analyst. This was a precursor to a later widening discussions on the different perspectives on projective identification and countertransference by Heimann and Bion.

In Glover's (1927) advocacy for Klein's theory, he took up the corresponding ideas between a child and adult analysis:

> Concede the adult an inch and he will demand an ell. Moreover the manner in which he exacts his ell is quite clearly infantile, and there is no reason to suppose that children will drive an easier bargain. When an adult analysis begins to stagnate we are accustomed to ask ourselves not so much whether we have been too sparing of gratification, but whether we have unconsciously allowed the patient to convert the analytic situation into an infantile situation. (p. 387)

Further textual analysis unfolds the complexity of Glover advocating for Melanie Klein in 1927. Glover, who didn't have direct empirical experience of child analysis viewed Klein's work parallel to adults' analysis, "The adult plays with the association technique in much the same way as Melanie Klein's cases play with her toys" (p. 387). In this early phase of Klein's empirical work, Glover related to Klein's work as an impetus to further theorizing.

At the same time, Jones enlisted the eager Edward Glover as substantial theorist who played a key role in the evolution of the British Analytic Society's identity. Grosskurth (1995) revealed, "Next to Jones, Glover was the most powerful man in the British Society. It took a strong man to be second-in-command to Jones, who behind his back was referred to by members as 'Napoleon'" (p. 197). In this psychoanalytically social milieu, Glover's critiques, on every phase of Klein's papers, reveal significant

support and further developed ideas implicit in Klein's work. Glover, a Freud expert, also analyzed by Abraham, was a strong advocate for Klein's ideas and also thought that they were reconcilable with Freud's. Glover's intention was to join together Freud's libidinal system with Klein's understanding of aggression.

This study examines Glover's (1928) "Lectures on Techniques in Psycho-Analysis" and explores Glover's advocacy for Klein as he took her clinical observations on children and attempted to reconcile it with Freud's adult structural theory. Klein utilized many of the original Freudian terms—*phantasy, infantile neurosis, early pregenital* and *prelatency*—and looked for the precursor experiences of such familiar ideas as the Oedipus complex and super-ego in young children. In doing so, she simultaneously transformed the meaning of these terms. Freud had only discussed such phenomena in his treatment with adult patients. This study looks at Glover's articles: "Lay Analysis" (1927), "Ego Differentiation" (1930), and "Therapeutic Effect of Inexact" (1931) to analyze how Glover attempted to demonstrate the reconcilability between Freud and Klein's work. Glover (1933a) rounded out his endorsement of Klein's work by writing an extremely positive book review of *The Psychoanalysis of Children* (1932), which was his last supporting article before the tide turned.

Ernest Jones's multifaceted support of Melanie Klein's work of child analysis in 1927 propelled Klein to continue developing her theoretical innovations regarding the early life of children. Since Klein saw the prelatency child as manifesting early psychic conflicts, she then thought that unfilled aspects of Freud's structural theory could now be provided. As Freud discussed the structuralization of the super-ego and the resolution of the Oedipus complex in latency aged children, Klein now provided the prelatency

precursors to those very same experiences. In the book introduction, *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis 1921-1945* by Melanie Klein (1948, Jones recalled Klein's original work:

> Freud's investigation of the unconscious mind, which is essentially that of the young infant, had revealed unexpected aspects of childhood, but before Mrs. Klein there had been little attempt to confirm these discoveries by the direct study of childhood. To her, therefore, is due the credit of carrying psychoanalysis to where it principally belongs—the heart of the child. (p. 10)

The inception of the maternal super-ego and the maternal version of the Oedipus complex were conceptualized in the mother infant matrix. Klein found herself in a clinical situation with young children, where she heavily relied on Freudian terminology and conceptualizations. However, Freud's clinical context, where he established the meaning of Freudian terminology, was with adult patients. Gradually, Klein's observations and interpretations drew her own meaning to some of the Freudian terms, which began causing some reactions from Freudian analysts. Klein believed her work was complementary to Freud's structural theory and regarded herself at this time as a loyal Freudian.

Klein's only daughter, Melitta Schmideberg, graduated as a medical doctor in 1927 at Frederick William (Humboldt) University in Berlin. Joining Klein in 1928 in London, Schmideberg pursued training in psychoanalysis. Schmideberg became a member of the British Psychoanalytical Society by 1930 and initially advocated for her mother's work. Between 1930 and 1933, Schmideberg published three papers in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, "The Role of Psychotic Mechanisms in Cultural

Development" (1930), "A Contribution to the Psychology of Persecutory Ideas and Delusions" (1931), and "Some Unconscious Mechanisms in Pathological Sexuality and Their Relation to Normal Sexual Activity" (1933). In each, she made use of extensive references of Klein's work.

From 1934 on, while Schmideberg remained interested in child analysis, she scarcely cited Klein's work. Grosskurth (1995) elaborated, "Melitta was by now ostentatiously omitting references to her mother's work, but Klein quotes from 1931 and 1932 papers by Melitta and Glover to buttress her case" (p. 218). This study investigates this shift, where the frequency of the Kleinian citations became significantly reduced. Although other analysts at the same time cited Klein's work, this study investigates the traces in literature that evidences Schmideberg and Glover moving away from Klein's original ideas while examining the Kleinian ideas that shattered Schmideberg's and Glover's advocacy.

The Formation of Adversarial Positions: Glover-Schmideberg Collaboration

Klein's clinical explorations in "early analysis" with prelatency children, including her original techniques using toys and making interpretations, elicited great consideration among analysts, especially at the British Society. In the scope of depth psychology, how does Kleinian object relations theory help us contextualize the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg triad? Jones's powerful advocacy for Klein's empirical work from the mid-1920s—similarly to the earlier support Klein received from Ferenczi and Abraham—propelled Klein to develop confidence in her observation and formulate theories in early analysis.

Interestingly, Klein's psychoanalytic career was initiated within the premises of her own psychological treatment—most likely for depression—in 1914, when she began analysis with Sandor Ferenczi in Budapest, Hungary. In the preface of the first edition of *The Psychoanalysis of Children* (1932), Klein expressed her gratitude to her first analyst, Ferenczi:

> Ferenczi was the first to make me acquainted with Psycho-Analysis. He also made me understand its real essence and meaning. His strong and direct feeling for the unconscious and for symbolism, and the remarkable *rapport* he had with the minds of children, have had a lasting influence on my understanding of the psychology of the small child. He also drew my attention to my capacity for Child Analysis, in whose advancement he took a great personal interest, and encouraged me to devote myself to this field of psycho-analytic therapy, then still very little explored. . . . It is to him that I owe the beginnings of my work as an analyst. (p. 8)

It perhaps was not a coincidence that during one of the most critical times of Klein's life, she found the most propelling support. Klein's personality traits played a role in how she was able to utilize the driving force that Ferenczi evoked in her. Klein and Ferenczi shared mutual interest in understanding the child's mind, and Klein found Ferenczi's acknowledgment of her instinctual abilities rewarding. Klein later reflected on the benefit of the positive transference; however, "Melanie Klein sought a second analysis with Abraham because no negative transference had been taken up by Ferenczi" (Frank & Spillius, 2009, pp. 33-34).

Klein's 1932 publication, *The Psychoanalysis of Children*, was a precursor to her seminal paper, released in 1935, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States." This is a critical paper in the formation of adversarial positions because this is the first time Klein independently appears as a theorist of early child development. In her theory, Melanie Klein (1940) elaborated how through the "depressive position," integration and reconciliation of loss and mourning are necessary in order to accept the ideal and persecutory function in one object:

> When the child's belief and trust in his capacity to love, in his reparative powers and in the integration and security of his good inner world increase as a result of the constant and manifold proofs and counter-proofs gained by the testing of external reality, manic omnipotence decreases and the obsessional nature of the impulses towards reparation diminishes, which means in general that the infantile neurosis has passed. (p. 7)

While Klein is talking about resolution and integration in this seminal paper, she is evoking exactly the opposite emotions from her analytic peers. Klein's theoretical conviction ignited even more criticism, stimulated positive attention as well as provoked intense reaction.

This hermeneutic analysis studies and historicizes Klein's written work as she was becoming an independent figure in her own theoretical right. In 1932, she became a training analyst postulating an independent theory of early child development. Her theoretical alliance with Glover and Ernest Jones transformed from a dependent to a more independent state. This transformation led to a conflict with Glover, who began to see that Klein was not aiming at theoretical reconciliation with Freud. The reoccurring theme

in the formation of adversarial positions revolved around the main question, whether Klein's work with young children represented deviance from the mainstream Freudian work or as an evolution of it. For some analysts, Klein's developing theories were perceived as outside of the Freudian framework. For example, Spillius (2009), in her essay "Melitta and Her Mother," wrote:

> Glover appeared to admire Klein's work up until her depressive position paper, [A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States, 1935] which she gave orally in 1934 and 1935, and published in 1935. She had written many papers in the 1920s, but this one was clearly different: it was a statement of a new theory of mental development. Glover never explicitly recognized this except through his dislike of the paper. Melitta disliked it, too, as she stated in "After the Analysis . . ." (p. 1161)

Glover's paper, "Examination of the Kleinian System of Child Psychology" (1934/1945) regarded Klein's work as standing outside the Freudian mainstream, and therefore he labeled it a deviation. Glover presented this paper in 1934 at the 13th International Psychoanalytical Congress in Lucerne, but only published this work in 1945. Hermeneutic analysis yearned to shed light on Glover's position of Klein's work by reviewing the 1934 version of this paper, however speculative this remains. The author contacted the archivist of the British Psychoanalytical Society, but she could not locate the 1934 version of the paper.

However, other primary sources evidenced Glover's reaction to Klein's developing theories around 1934 and 1935. Glover, with the assistance of Marjorie Brierley, in his 1940 book, *Investigation of the Technique of Psycho-Analysis,* reflected

on various discussions in the Society about the summary report that Glover and Brierley conducted using a "Questionnaire method" (p. v). Glover acknowledged Klein's paper, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States" (1935) and reflected on the new trend:

> As has been noted, the publication of this paper marked the commencement of a new orientation in psycho-analysis in a section of the British Society. The trend of discussions at subsequent meetings and the content of various papers soon indicated that a school of thought was developing based exclusively on a new hypothesis of development. (Glover & Brierley, 1940, p. 162).

Although Glover acknowledged the developing trends of Mrs. Klein's contributions, particularly the idea of the depressive position, the commentaries along the way precisely reflect the developing antagonism between Klein and the Glover-Schmideberg pair. In the question of reassurance and interpretation, Glover promoted Schmideberg's advocacy for the idea of "reassurance" while Klein's interpretive perspectives are consistently challenged and criticized, even if at times indirectly:

> On January 18, 1933, Melitta Schmideberg read a short contribution entitled, "Some Notes on the Technique of Early Psycho-Analysis" . . . in which she discussed, among other things, the advisability of using reassurance at the beginning of the analysis of young children showing anxiety and in acute conditions. The discussion was rather critical of these views, Mrs. Klein and Miss Searl stressing that reassurance is unnecessary if proper interpretations are given in good time and that reassurance is often a handicap for later analysis. (p. 41)

Melitta was deeply convinced that easing the patient's initial anxiety by reassurance would prepare the ground for the patient to utilize the analyst's interpretations. While Melitta made her case against her mother, was she also pleading for acknowledgement and reassurance herself? Schmideberg's emphasis on the primacy of empathic attunement may perhaps reflect her own feelings of not being recognized by her mother. Also, Klein herself, although acknowledging that reassurance was important, may have turned a deaf ear to it at times, as is evident in her relationship with Melitta. Glover highlighted this in the comment: "Mrs. Klein agreed that the right type of reassurance is as important as the right type of interpretation and emphasized the importance of the analyst's own attitude toward the patient" (Glover & Brierley, 1940, p. 46). One may wonder how Klein actually expressed this to the patient.

Glover (Glover & Brierley, 1940) elaborated supportively on Schmideberg's presentation to the Society on February 7, 1934, about "Reassurance as a Means of Analytic Technique" (p. 44). A reader, unaware of the complex interpersonal dynamics of the Glover-Schmideberg-Klein triad, would miss the fact that the subject of this paper also underlay the actual relationships between the parties: the flourishing analytic, patient-analyst relationship between Schmideberg and Glover, and the already troublesome relationship between Schmideberg and Klein. Glover's support for Schmideberg perhaps created more distance for Schmideberg from Klein. Glover quoted Schmideberg:

> Further, "at times, *only the reassurance makes it possible* for the patient *to accept the interpretation"* (308). . . . "In my view the analyst's own attitude, mainly in regard to the following points, is an essential precondition for the working of

> interpretation. . . . The more the analyst is regarded as a real person, the stronger the love and hate emotions and the guilt and anxiety reactions will become." (p. 5)

Glover is providing secure reassurance of Schmideberg by his own public focus of attention on this matter, essentially underlining it, while simultaneously perhaps undermining Klein. Having Schmideberg grow up in the shadow of Klein, Schmideberg pursued her mother's phantasies. She completed medical school, which Klein herself had not, and then went on to pursue analytic training in London after joining her mother there in 1930.

A few years later, Glover became Schmideberg's analyst, and perhaps served as a real father figure, providing reassurance and recognition that Schmideberg could not get from her mother. Schmideberg continued craving Klein's recognition professionally, however. With Glover's influential support, Schmideberg's confidence heightened, but Klein did not reassure her daughter professionally, because Klein only saw her own theoretical truths. Glover augmented an essential observation applicable to this situation:

> While reassurance may increase belief in a good object . . . it does nothing to reduce the belief in bad objects. . . . The consensus of opinion seemed to be that the value of reassurance varied with different patients and different analytic situations, and that while it might be a useful adjunct to interpretation, it could never be in any sense a substitute for it. (Glover & Brierley, 1940, pp. 46-47)

In the historical evolution of psycho-analytic theories, when the fine balance between personal and collegial tension is neglected and not negotiated, antagonistic and adversarial traits become evident between theorists. When a new theoretical trend appears, such as Klein's innovative concepts, analysts' ambiguity towards a not yet fully

categorized, defined, and trusted theory becomes the focus of attention and polarized perspectives begin to emerge. Theorists often may not be aware that they perhaps as a defense mechanism, displace their individual unreconciled anxieties toward other theorists and project it onto their theories themselves by rigidly rejecting them.

Although Klein's novel ideas on child analysis were rooted in Freud's structural theories, when Klein went beyond the thresholds of the Freudian structural framework, her work was perceived to be a threat to classic Freudians. Hinshelwood (2006) evidenced Klein's clinical work impacting the development of her depressive position theory: "We see Klein's confidence develop as she diverged from the classical theories and technique. Her ideas were based on close attention to the detail of her clinical material, rather than attacking theoretical problems directly" (p. 28). Consequently, analysts perceived Klein's independent and original work with young children—often without having their own empirical work experience of early analysis in clinical setting—as a threat to the trusted Freudian analysis. In the minds of many analysts, loyalty to the established Freudian relationship network meant analysis started with the verbalizing latency age child. Consequently, the formation of adversarial positions against Kleinian theories of the prelatency playing child became necessary and evident.

Beginning in 1933, Schmideberg's personal as well as professional alignment with Klein, her mother, took a complete turn. Prior to 1933, Schmideberg endorsed her mother's analytic ideas and techniques, which were reflected in her published works. For instance, Schmideberg presented a paper, "A Contribution to the Psychology of Persecutory Ideas and Delusions," on June 3, 1931, to the British Psycho-Analytical Society, where she extensively integrated and cited Klein's work, "Nevertheless, I find

enough similarities to justify application of the Klein technique of child-analysis to psychotics and border-line cases" (p. 352). Schmideberg published more papers after 1934; however her work directly disagreed with Klein's position and references to Klein's work no longer appeared.

Previously, Schmideberg was analyzed by Ella Sharpe, but in 1934, she began analysis with Glover. According to Grosskurth (1995), Schmideberg expresses her anguished desire to be professionally recognized by her mother. During this time, Klein was certainly preoccupied with her career and with her own depression, as she began analysis with Sylvia Payne in 1934. On a parallel front, the analytic work between Glover and Schmideberg had a tremendous impact on Schmideberg. The analytic process between Glover and Schmideberg may have given opportunities for evaluative discussions of Klein's theoretical perspectives.

This is a pivotal juxtaposition, as Klein is beginning to gain authentic personal and professional identity, but Schmideberg does not get what she wants from Klein—personal and professional recognition—and Glover realizes he is not able to achieve his goal: reconciling Klein and Freud's theoretical perspectives. In analysis with Glover, Schmideberg may have recognized her unreconciled "neurotic dependence" on Klein and consequently, Schmideberg may have questioned her own unique professional individuality. Between 1932 and 1934, Schmideberg's attitude changed towards her mother, as Grosskurth (1995) elaborated:

> In the undated letter, probably written at the end of the summer of 1934, she [Schmideberg] categorically spelled out a declaration of independence. She realized that for the past few years she had been in a state of neurotic dependence

> on her mother, and now that she had decided to enter analysis with Edward Glover, Klein must face the fact that their relationship was going to change irrevocably; and that if a state of amicability was to be maintained, it could exist only if Klein recognized her not as an appendage but as a colleague on an equal footing. (p. 199)

Did Schmideberg feel that a repressed subjugation by her mother became liberated by the analytic work with Glover? Glover's and Schmideberg's alliance gradually became the expression of disavowal of Klein as a theorist, and for Schmideberg, Klein as a mother. In the letter Schmideberg wrote to Klein, she mercilessly reflected how she regretted the past:

> I already told you years ago that nothing causes a worse reaction in me than trying to force feelings into me—it is the surest way to kill all feelings. . . . I am now grown up and must be independent; I have my own life, my husband; I must be allowed to have interest, friends, feelings and thoughts which are different or even contrary to yours. . . . I hope you do not expect from my analysis that I shall again take an attitude towards you which is similar to the one I had until a few years ago. This was one of neurotic dependence. (p. 199)

Schmideberg's recognition of her past unconscious need of her mother's support and the unreconciled acknowledgement of what it means to be the daughter of Klein may have brought overwhelming veracity while in analysis with Glover. Having Schmideberg express that "nothing causes a worse reaction in me than trying to force feelings into me—it is the surest way to kill all feelings" exemplifies Schmideberg's deep suffering

from Klein's lack of recognition as a separate and independent individual who has her own genuine self.

Schmideberg's persecutory anxiety towards her mother may have been explained by Klein in her 1935 paper:

> Where the persecution-anxiety for the ego is in the ascendant, a full and stable identification with another object, in the sense of looking at it and understanding it as it really is, and a full capacity for love, are not possible. (p. 153)

Was Glover to Schmideberg the powerful super-ego father figure she never had, the man above her mother in professional power-hierarchy, or the libidinous external object she transferred her neurotic needs? In a footnote of Schmideberg's 1933 paper, she shared a personal communication that she had with Klein: "Melanie Klein has found that pregnancy is equated with the introjection of the penis: the child may assume the significance of the 'bad' penis, the dangerous excrement. (Personal communication)" (p. 248). Klein's increasing authority in the analytic field—her definite interpretations that she did not hold away even in her personal encounter with her daughter—may have threatened Schmideberg's personal and professional development, despite Schmideberg's credentials.

In 1933, Glover published a seminal essay, "The Relation of Perversion-Formation to the Development of Reality-Sense," which was a paper he presented on September 7, 1932, before the twelfth International Psycho-Analytical Congress at Wiesbaden. Glover's work in this paper evidences his deliberate purpose of reconciling Freud's and Klein's theoretical perspectives. Glover expresses his respect for the need for perversion because almost always, he says, the perversion is a cover for what he calls a

"psychotic pocket." Glover reiterated that without the perversion, the person would go crazy; that is, the person required the perversion to ensure his or her own psychic survival. Is this "psychotic pocket" possibly a mental state that precedes entering the depressive position? Later, post-Kleinian, John Steiner (1993) elaborated:

> Some function predominantly as a [psychic] retreat from paranoid-schizoid anxieties of fragmentation and persecution, while others are deployed primarily to deal with depressive affects such as guilt and despair. . . . Glover put forward the idea that perversion may protect the patient's reality sense and thus avoid psychotic manifestations (Glover, 1933, 1964) . . . Psychic retreats with a psychotic organization are no less likely to have perverse elements than the nonpsychotic ones, and this arises because movements towards integration are far from absent in psychotic patients. (pp. 99-100)

Glover's perspective on the function of the "psychotic pocket" sustained attention and was further explored by post-Kleinian theorists. Quite interestingly, Klein at this time is preoccupied with the depressive position and only later, in 1946, will turn to the paranoid-schizoid nature of the infantile psyche. During the early 1930s, Glover is both, collaborating with and deviating from Klein while expressing his independent thinking.

Whereas Glover's purpose was evident, this study investigates Jones's political position as the controversies began to formulate in 1934. What was Jones's position during this time, and how did he negotiate the development of adversarial positions against Klein? Jones reflected on this period just about fourteen years later. In Jones's introduction to Melanie Klein's book, *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis 1921-1945*

(1950), Jones termed Klein's critiques familiar and reflected on how Klein's work was perceived by other analysts:

> Indeed, some of them often remind me of the very same phrases that were applied to Freud's own work in its inception: words like "far-fetched", "one-sided", "arbitrary", have a familiar ring to me. . . . I find it a little odd that I should be criticizing her for a too faithful adherence to Freud's views, and odder still that certain Viennese analysts see in it a divergence from his views. (p. 12)

Scrutinizing an extensive list of Klein's critiques in the "Reactions to Melanie Klein's Theory and Technique" section, the evolution of adversarial relationships will explicate pivotal events between Klein, Glover, Schmideberg, and Winnicott. Furthermore, this study examines why Jones's 1948 introduction to Klein's first edition of her book, *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis 1921-1945*, was replaced by Roger Money-Kyrle's remarks in the later edition, titled *Love Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945*. Was Jones's introduction outdated, was this switch a political decision, or was it necessary, so Klein's evolving theories could be more adequately abridged?

The comparison of Jones's 1948 and Roger Money-Kyrle's 1975 introductions to the same book, 27 years apart, revealed possible motivations for the switch. In his introduction to Klein's 1948 book, Jones mapped out the larger historical context of psychoanalysis that reverberated in Klein's work and continued to evolve after the Controversial Discussion:

> The division in the British Society will, presently, I doubt not, be reproduced in all other psycho-analytical societies, and in the absence of colleagues with first-

> hand experience of Mrs. Klein's work she must expect adverse critics to be in the majority. (Jones, 1948, p. 9)

Jones gave an honorable account for Klein's discoveries with glorious validations, yet recognized, "The trouble was that she was pursuing them [new views and methods] with a novel rigour and consistent recklessness that evoked in some members of the Society at first uneasiness and gradually an intense opposition" (Klein, 1948 p. 9). The undercurrents between the analysts may have begun to settle after the Controversial Discussions, however, "Mrs. Klein is still experiencing much of the aftermath" (p. 10). Klein's book was published only about four years subsequent to the end of the Controversial Discussions, and as if anticipating another wave of reactions, Jones put forth great shields advocating for and protecting Klein's work.

Certainly, Roger Money-Kyrle's introduction to the same book in 1975 testifies to another psychoanalytical climate that surrounded Klein's work. The historical context of the book in 1975 reflects more on Klein's biographical facts and a more distant review of the implications that surrounded Klein's innovative discoveries after the Controversial Discussions. This introduction does not call for substantiation or protection; Klein's work bravely stands on its own merits. Roger Money-Kyrle's introduction reflects the psychoanalytic milieu of 1975: "It would be a mistake to regard her [Klein's] theory as a closed one. She herself added to it almost to the end of her life. And no one knows what future modification or addition may be required" (p. xi). As if entering the contemporary Kleinian era, there is an invitation for reexamination, reconsideration, and possibly extensions that can build upon Klein's psychoanalytic initiations.

Comparing the two introductions to Klein's work, it is evident that Jones's tone in 1948 was fit for the time, just as much as Money-Kyrle's in 1975. On the one hand, Jones was writing in 1948 *as if* the Controversial Discussions were still happening and Mrs. Klein needed staunch defense. On the other hand, Money-Kyrle, in 1975, was writing in defense of Klein's posthumous image, as she had been and would continuously be critiqued as "dogmatic" even by her own followers, such as Bion (1977 p. 12). This hermeneutic exploration provided literary examples testifying that psychoanalytic theories are inseparable from their living historical contexts. As the historical situations around a theory evolve, reflective positions, interpretive approaches, and analytic truths have to be re-considered. "As in physics, so in psychology ultimate truth is perhaps of infinite complexity, to be approached only by an infinite series of approximations" (Money-Kyrle, in Klein, 1975, p. xi). Linking the points of similarities and differences in historical context—1948 and then 1975—this study researches how Klein's emerging theory evoked recognition and opposition in the British Psychoanalytical Society and how these dynamics are reflected in the literature and in the evolving theories.

This section would not be complete without reflecting on two articles from Schmideberg where implicit references to her relationship to her mother and to Kleinian theory are observable. In the first one, "After Analysis" (1938), Schmideberg explores what analysis serves to patients and how it is perceived from the patient's perspective. Schmideberg stated, "These fantasies of what a person will be like after he has been analyzed . . . are replicas of the child's ideas of what it is like to be grown up" (1938/2009, p. 1). They are, as we saw earlier in Schmideberg's letter to Klein, her own concerns as well. Then, Schmideberg continued, "The patient clings so much to these

fantasies of future omnipotence because they offer compensation for the helplessness of childhood or the misery of neurosis" (p. 124).

Schmideberg's recognition of her own "neurotic dependence" to her mother impacted Schmideberg's future approach not only to Klein's theoretical approach, but also her relationship to her. In Schmideberg's second article, "My Experience of Psychotherapy" (1974), she briefly reflects on the battles that led to Glover's and her decisions regards to the Controversial Discussions which ultimately explains her reasoning of what psychoanalysis meant to her in 1974:

> Psychiatry and psychotherapy of today can probably be compared to that of medicine of several hundreds of years ago, containing a weird mixture of common sense, practical experience and the oddest superstitions, medications, and manipulations, some of which may do more harm than good. (p. 126)

Schmideberg's 1974 voice echoes intense struggles and reverberating uncertainties about the analytic work. In addition, her bitterly confusing countenance of what "psychiatry and psychotherapy of today" is yet another exposure of her unresolved neurotic traits.

Between 1934 and 1939, Klein's intense clinical work manifested in theoretical resolutions which then, when published, continued to be the focus of censorship by other analysts. Klein's influential force continued rocking the cradle of child analysis. By 1939, the clinical and theoretical ground gained by Melanie Klein met active criticism and opposition on the part of the Freud family when they immigrated to London. Discussions became active debates during the Controversial Discussions 1941-1945.

Reactions to Melanie Klein's Theory and Technique

Theorists from various schools of thought provide great contribution to the comprehensive examination of the Kleinian system. This research section investigates the reactions and criticisms to Kleinian thoughts in the spirit of Theodore Roosevelt's speech that he delivered on April 23, 1910 at the Sorbonne in Paris, titled "Citizenship in a Republic":

> It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat. (Roosevelt, Paris, April 23, 1910, Excerpt from the speech "Citizenship in a Republic," delivered in Sorbonne, Paris, France)

Klein was a citizen of many cultural, analytic, and hierarchical contexts throughout her life, and while facing her experiences, she was on no occasion lacking in devotion. Kleinian literature reflects deep motivation for communicating what was true for Klein and her enthusiasm was not sparing in criticism of others.

The powerful dialogues that the published literature reflects are the reverberating voices of theorists who, face to face, interacted at conferences and parties, presenting

their own work while also listening to their contemporaries' discussions. Clifford Yorke was a leading British psychoanalyst working in close collaboration with Anna Freud in London. While keeping the Freudian traditions, Yorke observed Klein's theoretical evolution. In his 1971 paper, "Some Suggestions for a Critique of Kleinian Psychology" Yorke summarized—in an in-house Anna Freud journal, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*—theoretical perspectives that are distinctively deviant from the Freudian school of thought. In Yorke's second paper, "Freud or Klein: Conflict or Compromise" (1994), he elaborated on what in effect was the resolution of the Controversial Discussions:

> The differences between Freud and Klein run deeper than the dating of development or the fluctuating fortunes of the first year of life. The ramifications of the basic Kleinian concepts touch on almost every aspect of theory and theory-building and influence almost every aspect of technique. Fifty years ago, when a serious effort was made to examine these differences, the gulf was found to be unbridgeable. Although for the committed student some divergencies were clarified, the battle was fought from entrenched positions, and the most tangible and (to date) enduring legacy of those heated and sometimes intemperate debates was the transformation of the Society into an organisation that could accommodate the irreconcilable and still carry on business as a functioning unit. (p. 376)

The differences that had been discussed in conferences and in papers now became open animosities that had to be further evaluated in the British Society. For some, Klein's theory was an innovation, while for others it was heresy. In this conflict-ridden society,

the heated differences of viewpoints culminated in what has come to be known as the *Freud-Klein Controversies 1941-1945* (King et al., 1991).

Which side held the most compelling and overarching theory of infant development? Which theoretical group, Klein or Freud, would have the right to determine how psychoanalytic training was to be conducted for the candidates? Was there to be one indivisible theory for everyone or would plurality of perspectives be institutionalized? These forces interfaced during the Extraordinary Business Meetings. Pearl King's introduction points to the catalyst, the source, and root of the formation of these adversarial positions:

> Was her [Klein's] work a continuation of psychoanalysis, the main lines of which had been first formulated by Sigmund Freud, or were her contributions based on such different assumptions that she could be considered as diverging from Freud's basic hypotheses enough for it to be said that she was founding another school of psychoanalysis, rather as Carl Jung had earlier? (King et al., 1991, p. 1)

The Extraordinary Business Meetings provided the framework and "container" where the inevitable resolutions became realized. "Many of the resolutions embodied anxiety concerning the discrepancy between Melanie Klein's approach to psychoanalysis and what they referred to as 'Freudian psychoanalysis'" (King et al., p. 34). Given the tradition established by Sigmund Freud, where he decided which theories were considered *deviations*, such as Jung's, the tradition had been established that there could be only one correct psychoanalytic theory. However, the evolving dynamics of the analytic world challenged Sigmund Freud's unquestioned authority in the field.

It is hard to imagine that these ongoing tensions and spiteful arguments between Klein, Anna Freud, and their respective allies would result in a radical outcome such as the three-tiered training system. The conclusive "Gentlemen's Agreement" became established by the inability to come to any overarching uniform settlement on theory. This process then perpetuated the members' ongoing anxiety at an institutional level about the truth of theoretical insights. This was an agreement that institutionalized that the groups agreed to disagree, yet would continue to function under one governing entity. Grosskurth refers to this event as the "Ladies' Agreement" (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 334). Given this radical outcome, Glover would have no part in such theoretical pluralism.

On January 24, 1944, Glover sent a letter to Dr. Payne resigning from the Training Committee and Society, "I wish my resignation to take effect from the 25th January" (King et al., 1991, p. 853). Among the various reasons, Glover hopelessly stated:

> Only the Viennese Freudians and a few isolated members will continue to maintain that the Klein views are non-analytical; and these will be out-voted by a combination of the Klein group with whatever younger groups are interested less in the present controversies than in the future administration of the Society, so the outcome is a foregone conclusion. (p. 852)

Glover's resignation is also a testimonial to the Society's inevitably transformed identity. The historical analysis of this study examines how Klein's influence upon the members of the British Psychoanalytical Society impacted their theoretical vision. Glover elaborated, "In my opinion the only reason the Society has for being apprehensive about the future is that it is now in effect committed to the Klein deviation from Freudian

psychoanalysis" (King et al., p. 893). Glover perhaps perceived his personal and professional identity to be in jeopardy, as he did not foresee how his practical role and function in the Society could advance:

> On the next day, January 25, 1944, Klein vigilantly informed her group:
>
> I'm writing to tell you of an important piece of news. Dr. Glover has resigned his membership of the Society. . . . The immediate cause for his resignation was the fact that the majority of the Training Committee, not consulting me at all in this matter, had united against him and expressed their distrust of his partisanship. . . . [Melanie Klein Archives, The Wellcome Institute, London.] (King et al., 1991, pp. 667-668)

Klein's expression, "partisanship" unfolded the longstanding, multi-layered disputes with Glover. Being a loyal Freudian, Glover's resignation also indicated that he could not imagine how a multi-theoretical Society would function, as his work all along was to protect and preserve Freudian psychoanalysis.

Ernest Jones's political role and support for Klein was imperative in the unfolding evolution of psychoanalytic theories. Klein's conviction, in the face of adverse criticisms, displayed her capacity to rise above horrendous adversarial accusations; one should not forget the immense substantiation Jones provided for Klein. Jones (1946), in his Valedictory Address to the Society, proclaimed:

> My sense of conviction, however, lies deeper. It is attached to a belief in the ultimate power of truth, and it is this that enables me to advocate with some confidence a greater tolerance towards diversities or even divergencies than is sometimes exhibited. (p. 12)

Jones encountered the veracity of Klein's developing theory at various levels in the 1920's. As a visionary leader, he invited Klein to London and supported her. As an analyst, Jones's intuitive curiosity led him to new terrains; and as a father and husband, he had first-hand experience because Klein treated his children and his wife. Jones, in his letter to Freud on May 16, 1927, explicitly credits Freud for Klein's analysis with his children, "The changes already brought about are already so striking and so important as to fill me with thankfulness towards the one who made them possible, namely yourself" (Freud, Paskauskas, & Jones, 1995, p. 617). Peculiar as it may seem, reading this narrative, one may perceive that Freud had analyzed Jones's children, but the reader must be reminded that Jones is referring to Klein's analysis of his children and his wife, something Jones never told Freud.

As this dissertation analyzes the larger context of the complex analytic encounter, this specimen strikingly unpacks how the theoretical and political influences interfaced in the development of child analysis. In 1927, Klein was beginning her career in London, and she thought of herself as a loyal Freudian. It is not a surprise that Jones took the opportunity to express his appreciation to the original source, Freud, without mentioning Klein's innovative and revolutionary contributions to the minds of Jones own children. Jones considered Klein a loyal Freudian as well.

In about a decade after moving to London, Klein gained confidence in child analysis and her publications on her clinical work attracted as much support as reactions as criticisms. Ultimately, the gathering of disciplinary cohorts, both for and against Klein, necessitated the Controversial Discussions. Clifford Yorke (1994), a leading Freudian analyst, concluded:

> For the British Society, the conclusion seems to me clear: politically, on matters of organization and procedure, compromise is not only possible but necessary for mutual survival; but scientifically, where basic principles are at stake and irreconcilable viewpoints in conflict, it is best to acknowledge the fact and spell out differences with care and precision. (p. 383)

This context clearly poses an analytical and also political stance in which anxiety and deep seated instinctual drives surfaced. The key word is "compromise," which involves negotiations of primitive defense mechanisms in highly conflictual situations. It is of interest to explore how the literature reflects reactions to Kleinian theories prior, during, right after, and over five decade post-Controversial Discussions.

Spillius (1988a) observed, "Indeed, some of Klein's most important concepts have been very little altered or developed by her followers even though the concepts are in constant use" (p. 2). Making a distinguishing remark of Kleinian literature, Spillius used the word "expounding," meaning to illustrate Kleinian theories differentiating from the theoretical movement of "extending" which would imply that theoretical modifications took place (p. 2). In Volume 1, "Mainly Theory," Spillius stated that Kleinian theories have not much changed, in Volume 2, "Mainly Practice," she referenced theorists such as Bion, Betty Joseph, and Hanna Segal, among others, who continued the conceptualization of Kleinian techniques as "New ideas about it have developed from increasingly close scrutiny of the therapeutic process" (p. 1). Indeed, as if dealing with a living organism, psychoanalytic theories become alive through psychoanalytic practice and the analyst's presence, techniques, and methods continue nurturing this trend.

Depressive position at an institutional level.

The paradigm shift to a tripartite training system in the Society explicated the differences, and secured an ongoing ambivalent atmosphere between the subgroups where analysts could continue working out confusions. The British Psycho-Analytical Society became a container for developing theories. While in the tension of this process, The Society evolved to become a container for divergence, differences, and splitting. This process can be characteristics of the depressive position when one of the intended results is the reconciliation of divergent perspectives. Holding the animosity that is inherent in love and hate, analysts were living the reality of psychoanalytic theories. How does a theory become influential, to the point that it becomes a dominant paradigm? And how is the paradigm received by the listeners? Jones's example of giving credit to Freud for Klein's work amplifies that in addition to the analyst's clinical and personal experience in analysis, the advocacy of Freud's theory perhaps determined how new perspectives were rendered right or wrong, good or bad. In this context, the criticisms and conflictual positions challenging Klein's child analysis theory were necessarily inevitable.

It had to be assessed whether Klein's work was an extension, deviation, or a completely new theory from Freudian analysis. The complex reality and authenticity of Klein's theory could not have been realized at an institutional level without the Controversial Discussions. The British Psycho-Analytical Society could not have constituted the institution's new tripartite identity without the members' passionate vehemence in the discussions of Klein's "unconscious phantasmatic world of the

newborn infant—that is, according to her, the primordial birthright of each individual" (Steiner, 2000, p. 33). Embracing the controversies, in 1991 King reflected:

> In conclusion, I would suggest that the problems faced by the British Society are by no means unique, and I suspect that they have been the experience of most psychoanalytic groups at some period. . . . One reason why the outcome of these events has been in many ways successful, and the British Society has managed to work together as one institution, is in some measure due to the personal characteristics and devotion of some of the key people in the early years of the drama. (King et al., p. 930)

While the Controversial Discussions addressed the members' elevated emotional states about their theoretical and clinical convictions, "Central is the realization of hateful feelings and phantasies about the loved object . . . Maturation is thus closely linked to loss and mourning" (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 84). The members, as separate individuals, found their respective identity while they belonged to one organization. Analysts continued the process of integration that is key to survival whether it regards the life instincts of the infant or the disciplinary cohort nursing a theory.

Through the adversarial arguments, the Society as a whole achieved continuing functionality, while also mirroring an individual's achievement emerging from the depressive position. "The term is also loosely used to refer to 'depressive position functioning', meaning that the individual can take personal responsibility and perceive him-/herself and the other as separate" (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 84). In a way, the Controversial Discussions reflect an emotional process at an institutional level similar to what an individual may experience in the Kleinian depressive position. During the

course of the Controversial Discussions, the groupings known as “Kleinest,” Freudian, and “Non-aligned,” became constituted as groups. In the wake of the institutionalization of the tripartite training system, individuals within the group would then start the process of self-differentiation.

Having the Society’s subgroups negotiating the primary defense mechanisms—anxiety, ambivalence, and instinctual drives—led to the gradual realization of the each subgroup’s definite identity. The outcome allowed differentiation and also an adjudicated relationship between the subgroups of the Society. The subgroups, perhaps, can be perceived as inner objects, or parts of the whole object (the Society), working towards integration. Klein observed the depressive position phenomenon in the infant, and this research argues that the philosophical essence of the depressive position is observable at an institutional level as well.

Ken Robinson (2011), in his paper “A Brief History of the British Psychoanalytical Society,” highlights the perspective of British Freudians who became independent in the 1940s. Robinson’s article raises an important question for further analysis, namely, the Independent or Middle Group’s so called *individuality*, “defining themselves by what they were not” (p. 215). What function did this group come to serve in addition to its malleable theoretical position? While the analytic containment of Freudian and Kleinian theories on child analysis became actualized by the training groups, the presence of the Independent Group “ensured equal representation on the committees of the Institute and Society to prevent any one group from become too powerful” (p. 218). This would have carried some hope that they could mediate between the extreme positions that were represented by Klein and Anna Freud. The inception of

Kleinian child analysis galvanized new trajectories that began to emerge. Klein's revolution was the locus for other theorists to unfold and develop their own observations. Among the many analysts who found fertile ground in Kleinian work were Winnicott and Bion, despite of their own eventual *departure* from the original source.

Not fully aware of the analytic politics of the time, Winnicott was stimulated while being absorbed in the mainstream psychoanalytic currents. Winnicott, in his 1962/1965 paper "A Personal View of the Kleinian Contribution" acknowledged:

> It was during this period that my own psycho-analytic growth was making root and stem, and it might interest you therefore to hear from me something of the soil in which I had become planted. . . . So I came to psycho-analysis ignorant of personality clashes between the various analysts, and only too pleased to get effective help for the difficulties that were mine. (Winnicott & Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1965/2007, pp. 171-172)

Winnicott's clear recognition of having been planted and having set roots in Kleinian soil is a testimony to the fundamental assumptions inherent in his analytic work. One may wonder about Winnicott's conscious and unconscious phantasies in regard to the analytic training support he received from Klein.

Being under Klein's supervision from 1935 to 1941, Winnicott (1965/2007) stated, "This was difficult for me, because overnight I had changed from being a pioneer into being a student with a pioneer teacher" (p. 173). Being a pediatrician, Winnicott brought medical perspectives, and perhaps validity, to Klein's existing analytic approach. Winnicott's work with Klein resulted in his recognition that

> the human individual cannot accept the destructive and aggressive ideas in his or her own nature without experience of reparation, and for this reason the continued presence of the love object is necessary at this stage since only in this way is there opportunity for reparation. This is Klein's most important contribution, in my opinion, and I think it ranks with Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex. (p. 176)

Winnicott attributed important contributions to Klein however, he recognized their dire differences pointing to Klein's overemphasis of projections, the infant's exaggerated aggressive tendencies towards the breast, and Klein's neglect of the real mother. Winnicott gradually developed his own analytic identity and felt:

> I do not claim to be able to hand out the Klein view in a way that she would herself approve of. I believe my views began to separate out from hers, and in any case I found she had not included me in as a Kleinian. (pp. 176-177)

Winnicott's wording—"my views began to separate out from hers"—implies a very intimate relational origin that reflects Winnicott's individuation from his own nurturing source. Winnicott lived through with Klein what Klein lived through with Freud; namely, that differences develop overtime, theorists used same or similar language terminology attaching different referential context, and by a new context, the meaning of the term is redefined.

Winnicott's different views were also the result of profound theoretical differences. While the Kleinian infant's inner phantasy may have been reflecting the external, World War II atmosphere, Winnicott actually experienced it in his living reality. Aguayo (2002) noted, "With the tragic break-up of intact families in a country at total

war, Winnicott oversaw 285 children and noticed a diversity of normal versus pathological adjustments to new environments" (p. 1141). The differences between Klein and Winnicott compressed how an adversarial relationship reflected schisms and divisions within the British Society. The divergence between Klein and Winnicott also symbolizes how during the war, psychoanalysis and political history coincided and consequently became echoed in the history of psychoanalysis. This notion leads the researcher to wonder how the critiques of Klein's system would be answered.

Theoretical opponents of Kleinian theory.

In contrast to advocacy, this research evaluates critical theoretical implications from complementary angles. In a way, this section is an interview with some of the theoretical adversaries of Kleinian theories. Whereas this work explores how criticisms reveal different theoretical assumptions, it also affirms the boundaries of Kleinian object relations. Through the lenses of Klein's critiques, larger questions—such as the confluence of interpretation in psychoanalytic theories and how theories become authenticated—are considered. This section reconnoiters aggregated criticisms that Klein received for her theoretical approach, clinical practice, and personal attitude. Questions, such as how much projection is there in interpretation or does aggressive play have roots in the death-instincts, stimulate analytic contemplations.

It is hardly predictable how a thought will be realized until the interpretive lenses—the position and the thought system of the interpreter—the receiver's psychological organization, and the relationship between the interpreter and receiver are evaluated. Kernberg (1969), from the ego-psychological approach expressed his evaluative stance through his critique of Kleinian theory and technique. On one hand,

Kernberg sympathized with early object relational ideas, the "early defensive operations," "aggression in early development," "regressive features and the activation of early defensive operations in the opening phase of psychoanalysis," and psychoanalytic techniques applied treating young children (p. 327). On the other hand, among the various theoretical incongruities from his ego-psychological stance, Kernberg listed his disagreements with Kleinian theories of the following concepts:

> An inborn death instinct, and the concept of such death instinct as being the crucial determinant of anxiety, are rejected . . . an innate knowledge of the genitals of both sexes and of sexual intercourse is rejected on the basis of lack of evidence . . . oedipal and pre-oedipal conflicts, into the first few months of life, appears unjustifiable . . . the neglect of environmental factors in Kleinian writing, . . . lack of consideration of structural differentiation within both ego and superego formation . . . How "internal objects" are integrated into ego and superego, how later developments differ from earlier ones. . . . The lack of differentiation of normal from pathological development is criticized . . . . The vagueness and ambiguity of Kleinian terminology is criticized as a major stumbling-block preventing clarification of Kleinian theory itself. (pp. 325-326)

Despite the many areas of difference and disagreement, Kernberg's systematic and comprehensive literature portrays how ego-psychology and Kleinian theory can coexist. It appears that Klein's innovative clinical observations impacted further development in mainstream psychoanalysis; however, many of Klein's reasoning were received as speculative and imaginative, lacking analytic evidence (for example, Klein's elaboration of the oedipal complexity in the first few months of life). "Kernberg also feels that

Klein's formulations inadequately consider the structural development within ego and superego" (Bacal & Newman, 1990, p. 86). Kernberg's contribution in many aspects mark boundaries of Kleinian concepts, as he outlines how the Freudian structural organization is obscure and from his standpoint, inaccurate in the Kleinian positions.

Kernberg (1969) further elaborated on how Klein's "lack of differentiation of normal from pathological development" impacts the diagnosis and treatment of neurotic, borderline, and psychotic organization of personalities (p. 326). Particularly, as the interpretive stance in clinical work involves a larger context of understanding in the meaning making process, Kernberg cautions how interpretation can be problematic, and stated:

> The neglect of character analysis in Kleinian technique is in my opinion an important shortcoming and a result of the under-emphasis of structural development of the ego. The issue of premature, "deep" interpretations in the early analytic hours is also related to the problem of neglect of the diagnosis of character defences in the analytic situation. (p. 332)

Klein's intuitive and process oriented "here-and-now" position is not fully compatible with Kernberg's perspective of drawing from all developmental levels. The manner in which an interpretation is made and is received can give invaluable information about the analytic-pair's transferential and countertransferential reality as well as the analyst's sensitivity, in addition to his theoretical orientation. Ego-psychological and Kleinian psychoanalytic approaches differ on how transference situations are understood, therefore Klein's "primitive defence mechanisms as the paramount determinants of the transference led Kleinian analysts to early, deep transference interpretations," while "ego-

psychologists emphasize later developments within the ego, structuring of ego and superego defences derived from all developmental levels, and conflict-free ego functions reflected in the capacity for self-observation and cooperation with the analyst" (Kernberg, 1969, p. 321).

In a well-established framework, interpretation contributes to the patient's meaning making process experience. Klein believed that both positive and negative transference interpretations were necessary. Klein (1961) explained:

> Views among analysts differ about the point in the transference at which the material should be interpreted. Whereas I believe that there should be no session without any transference interpretation, my experience has shown that it is not always at the beginning of the interpretation that the transference should be gone into. (p. 22)

Transference interpretation brings the attention onto the analytic-pair's "here-and-now" work, which according to Klein, contains all the necessary material there is to focus on. Julia Segal (2004) elaborated on Klein's insistence on how all sessions need to include transference interpretations. Segal explains, "In these interpretations she traced the patient's emotions towards the analyst, always referring them back to the original object" (p. 68). As a technique, the effect of transference interpretation, not limited to verbal delivery. It is largely dependent on the constellation of complex variables within the analytic-pair. Paradoxically, on one hand a well-timed, gentle, authentic, and understanding interpretation can trigger a patient's negative emotional reaction, on the other hand, a lousy, impulsive reflection can be received with the patient's greatest gratitude. The analytic relationship and how the patient is receiving and responding to a

specific transference interpretation factors into the success of the meaning making process of analysis. One may ask if in a solid and confidently collaborative analytic relationship, ultimately, the patient can learn to make self-reflective transference interpretations. Furthermore, transference interpretation may be used as a form of stimulation where analyst and patient mutually engage in a creative meaning making endeavor.

Exploring the criticisms of Kleinian theoretical concepts, practice, and techniques, this study distinguishes perspectives that are illustrated by opposing theorists from the Freudian, Independent, and ego-psychologist school of thoughts. Given the hermeneutic nature of the research method of this study, the following example is reflective of the challenge that analysts, theorists, and researchers all share—namely, the delicate confluence of theory and practice while recognizing personal biases. During the heated debate of the Controversial Discussion in 1943, Marjorie Brierley, later committed to the Independent subgroup, published a short essay titled, "Theory, Practice and Public Relations" where she stated:

> If we wish to further the science of psycho-analysis, to increase our knowledge of mental life so as continually to widen the range of its potential application, we must recognize that the development and advance of sound theory is as important as the maintenance and extension of sound practice. We cannot afford to give one aim preference over the other but must pursue them concurrently. (p. 119)

Brierley makes an important point about the close encounter of theory and practice, as theory and practice intimately inform one another. How do the analyst's beliefs about objective truths and subjective experiences weigh in his theoretical position and clinical

practice? After clarifying the current state of affairs, Brierley's paper, in a way exemplifies the crossroad where modernism and postmodernism interface. Brierley instigates questions such as how in the analytic work purpose and play manifest and are understood; how determinism, as opposed to chance become apparent; and in what ways a patient's history, versus the moment of the here and now, becomes relevant.

Brierley (1943) emphasized the importance of scientific theory as "an explanation based upon adequate evidence which indicates the relationships existing among the data it covers" (p. 119). After establishing this position, rooted in the Freudian scientific perspective, Brierley criticizes Klein's more intuitive, and to her mind unfounded stance. As Grosskurth (1995) puts it, "Melanie Klein was an embodiment of her later theories: the world is not an objective reality, but a phantasmagoria peopled with our own fears and desires" (p. 62). Taking "a critical attitude towards all the phenomena of subjective experience," Brierley thus confidently leaned towards the Freudian scientific tradition (1943, p. 123). Brierley continued:

> We cannot repeat experiments with any degree of precision, and intensive examination offers no immunity from error due to individual bias. An important method of checking error due to subjective bias that we can use is the comparative method. What we can do and should do more continuously is to compare our own clinical findings with those of other analysts. We should also make a habit of checking theory, old and new, by our own experience. Such comparative methods as these offer the most hope of controlling errors due to individual subjective bias. (p. 119)

Brierley's fundamental efforts to establish validity in the field of psycho-analytical practice resulted in her criticism of Klein. Despite being in agreement with many of Klein's concepts, Brierley attributed Klein's shortcomings to Klein's vague reasoning of theoretical concepts especially about the "internal objects." Although Klein gathered clinical materials for her own understanding about the development of internal objects, it took time for theorists to become familiar with the meaning of Klein's work, in particular the inner object phenomena. It is not a surprise that Brierley (1939) expressed her confusion about conceptualizing the inner object phenomena:

> One comes across a distaste for the "solid" nature of internal object terminology and a preference for thinking in the more "fluid" concepts of instinctual energy and affects that suggest painful anal reverberations. . . . The intention of this note is simply to indicate a few of the more general reasons for the "intrinsic" difficulties of theory relating to "internalized objects." (p. 245)

Klein's clinical themes, namely, play as symbolic expression of unconscious phantasies and venturing into the infant's preverbal mental states, involved situations where scientific objectivity had been clearly a challenge then, as well as now. However, Brierley's struggle for evidencing practical validity is a fact, and although a valid criticism, these do not lend themselves to empirical validation. Joan Riviere (1952/2002) authenticated Kleinian achievements:

> It is for the first time, therefore, through the work of Melanie Klein, following on Freud's discovery of the unconscious mind and its pre-eminence in childhood, that this world of phenomena, the mind of human beings in their first year or two

> with all its significance for their subsequent development, becomes open to scientific study. (p. 36)

As mentioned earlier, Glover's 1934 version of his printed 1945 paper, "Examination of the Kleinian System of Child Psychology," could not be located. By 1945, when the paper did get published, compared to 1934, the psychoanalytical arena, as well as Glover's political influence within it, were immensely transformed. One may only speculate how the 1945 essay may reflect this revolution. Glover divided Klein's theories into two phases: "The first of these ended, for all practical purposes, with the appearance of her book, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, in 1932, and the second began with the publication of her paper on depression in 1934" (Glover, 1945, p. 78, citations omitted). Coincidentally, these two phases also mirror Glover's attitude towards Klein. Namely, Glover advocated for Klein during the first phase of her work, and then became her pronounced antagonist a few years prior to Klein's second phase. In this paper, there are only very faint traces of Glover's one-time advocacy; dramatically, Glover's criticism of Klein's book, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (1932) is intensely harsh and unforgiving. Glover's loyalty to the Freudian source is strictly maintained in 1945:

> At a first reading one is apt to become confused by the fact that although the author [Klein] gives an adequate list of references to the work of Freud, Abraham, Ferenczi, Jones and others, it is not always easy to indicate the point at which she gives their ideas her own particular twist. . . . Nevertheless the manner in which accepted Freudian views are interspersed with purely Kleinian hypotheses would lead the casual reader to imagine that the Kleinian conclusions arrived at are merely a logical extension of the more familiar Freudian premises. Throughout

> the book it is essential to distinguish clearly what is accepted Freudian teaching and what is specifically a Kleinian accretion to it. . . . Melanie Klein's theories as to the onset of the Oedipus complex, the mechanisms that activate it and the unconscious fantasies that precede the activation remain purely hypothetical and incapable of direct confirmation. Indeed it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Melanie Klein's "discovery" of the first year Oedipus complex was little more than a "hunch" based on the conviction that as infants undoubtedly possess some genital libido, there must be an Oedipus situation at an early stage. (Glover, 1945, pp. 80-81).

It is interesting to note that although Freudian theory itself craves scientific validity, and these criticisms might well have been made against it by other more "hard" sciences, these criticisms can be perceived as a defense mechanism. Just 12 years prior to this paper, Glover wrote a very supportive and reassuring book review, encouraging Klein to pursue her clinical work in child analysis. The hermeneutic approach of this investigation finds Glover's conflicting and paradoxical perspectives meaningful in the research for how collaborators turn into adversaries. Glover's collaborative stance is evident in 1933:

> As far as the Oedipus situation is concerned, I see no reason to suppose that Melanie Klein's observations about the early onset in her own cases are inaccurate. . . . Concerning the early formation of the super-ego practically identical arguments are applicable. Here again I have the impression that Mrs. Klein has established a principle of considerable importance. To Freud himself, and later to Jones and Abraham, is due the credit of first describing the fundamental conception of ambivalence in comprehensive terms. But Melanie

> Klein certainly deserves the credit of grasping intuitively just how extensively this factor operates in the earliest stages of childhood. And she has not been afraid either to work out the details or to construct fresh hypotheses when her observations seemed to clash with existing theory. This is perhaps one of the greatest of her services. (Glover, 1933a, pp. 123-124)

Contrasting Glover's 1945 reaction to Klein's theories, to Glover's book review of *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* in 1933—where he praised and commended Klein for her contributions—a serious change in Glover's reflective attitude is apparent. Glover's initial advocacy completely turned around and became an antagonistic and oppositional discontent. Glover without hesitation revealed that his companion in the formulating antagonism was Melitta Schmideberg, "Criticisms for the most part were advanced by myself and by Melitta Schmideberg" (Glover, 1945, p. 86). Certainly, Glover's gradual but confirming realization from 1934 on about Klein's theoretical independence from Freudian theories perhaps caused a serious disillusionment, and Glover managed his disenchantment with more aggressive attacks on Klein: "When the Klein group are taxed with major deviations from Freudian theory they select quotations from Freud's writings that appear to lend support to their views" (Glover, 1945, p. 106). Perhaps, Glover's own independence from the British Psycho-Analytical Society, from which Glover resigned in 1944, allowed him to look back and evaluate his own true beliefs without having to adhere to a particular political agenda.

The enquiry, to what degree was Klein Freudian and divergent from Freud's theory, continues to surface. Likierman (2001) elaborated on the development of Melanie Klein's early career and the impact of Klein's presence as a theorist, "The psychoanalytic

framework which has thus far been solidly Freudian, now becomes destabilized by shifts in the deeper strata of Klein's awareness" (p. 65). This marked the beginning of a new phase in Klein's career, where she adamantly worked on integrating her clinical insights thinking of herself as Freudian. In the midst of Klein's passionate discoveries and developing theoretical identity, she encountered the harshest criticisms.

There are two streams to follow: (1) the critiques attacking Klein's divergence from Sigmund Freud's theories, and (2) arguments against Klein's own genuine developing techniques and theories. Although Klein's clinical work attracted other analysts' interest, Klein as a theorist ignited harsh and lasting arguments. For instance, to what extent did Klein attribute importance to the reality of destructive instincts? In Klein's theory of development, "Klein adopts Freud's ideas about the life and death instincts but she disagrees with the idea that no fear of death exists in the unconscious" (Spillius, & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 300). The collective measures of the destructive instinct is one drive Melanie Klein acknowledged within infancy. Klein (1932) explained her clinical observations of young children's aggressive play as follows: "We know . . . that the destructive instinct is directed against the organism itself and must therefore be regarded by the ego as a danger. In my view it is this danger which is felt by the individual as anxiety" (p. 183). Klein (1946) attributed young children's aggressive and persecutory expressions in their play to their experience of the "anxiety of being annihilated by a destructive force within" (p. 103). Klein's direct clinical observations allowed her to experience the aggressive, violent, and vicious projections children displayed. For Klein, this experience was a living reality, the truth, and not some theoretical abstraction.

The Kleinian infant works towards integration while dealing with disintegration. Klein's (1946) clinical descriptions of children's violent play portray the immensely powerful force of the death-instinct, "I hold that anxiety arises from the operation of the Death Instinct within the organism, is felt as fear of annihilation (death) and takes the form of fear of persecution" (p. 103). In Klein's perspective, the death instinct is a fertile ground for envy, driving destructive introjections and projections. Criticism of the Kleinian envy concept, which encompass the death instinct, has shaken up controversies, specifically, how early can the infant experience envy and should envy be interpreted (Spillius, & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 301) (p. 179).

Walter Joffe's 1969 paper, "A Critical Review of the Status of the Envy Concept," at first, brings the concept of envy in a multi-contextual perspective as he believed envy is not a "unitary phenomenon" (p. 536). After contrasting how various theorists, including, Freud, Abraham, and Klein, thought of envy, Joffe concluded:

> The concept of envy as a primary inborn instinctual drive is completely rejected. It is seen rather as a complicated attitude which occurs as part of normal development and which is closely related to such other attitudes as possessiveness. It is linked with aggression and destructiveness, but the aggressive component and the fantasies linked with it can be drawn from all phases of development, and is not only oral in nature. Rather than being seen as a primary drive, it can be seen as a secondary motivating force which may have positive and adaptive consequences in ongoing development, or may lead to the most malignant pathology. (p. 542)

In essence, Joffe questioned how Klein came to her conclusions. Also, Joffe pointed out that Klein neglected to delve into the potential positive outcome of envy and its developmental progression. Although many of Joffe's findings contain valid observations, his approach takes envy out of the Kleinian system and does not examine it relative to the context in which it was created. In order for criticism to be most meaningful, one needs to have an objective perspective which takes the context into consideration. Joffe's oppositional view lacks this more integrative aspect. To Joffe's points, further research is needed on how envy may result in potential positive outcome through the reorganization of subjective structure (Lacan) or through the developmental phases.

The debates about Klein's theory played a significant role in revealing how her contemporaries systematized their observations, integrated their findings, and utilized their interpretations. After the Controversial Discussions, Paula Heimann and Klein disagreed on the idea of countertransference. Heimann (1950) in her essay, "On Counter-Transference," stated:

> For this purpose of this paper I am using the term 'counter-transference' to cover all the feelings which the analyst experiences towards his patient. . . . My thesis is that the analyst's emotional response to his patient within the analytic situation represents one of the most important tools for his work. The analyst's counter-transference is an instrument of research into the patient's unconscious. (p. 82)

In this paper, Heimann refrained from quoting or mentioning Klein's work. The word *projects* appears once, and the word *projection* is not mentioned. Heimann's self-assured confident tone and Klein's absence from this paper inherently affirms Klein's disapproval

of countertransference idea. To Melanie Klein, countertransference signified merely a personal disturbance in the analytic process; however, Paula Heimann showed that the analyst's affective response to his patient could be a key to the unconscious of the latter. In 1955 Heimann left the Kleinian Group and joined the Independents, which was a deeply hurtful personal experience for Klein at many levels.

Klein used very direct techniques for interpretations and her clinical work with children demonstrated a systematically unique approach to healing. Winnicott said, "For Melanie Klein child analysis was exactly like adult analysis" (Winnicott, & Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1965/2007, p. 173). Winnicott was cognizant of Klein's deep kinship to Freudian roots, with which he himself sympathized. Winnicott's recalled the supervision with Klein as "a very rich analytic world opened up for me, and the material of my cases confirmed the theories" (pp. 174-175).

> While acknowledging the collaborative aspects of their relationship, Winnicott (1962) also captured the reality of the evolving differences between Klein and himself: She has gone deeper and deeper into the mental mechanisms of her patients and then has applied her concepts to the growing baby. I think it is here that she has made mistakes because deeper in psychology does not always mean earlier. (p. 177)

Here Winnicott refers to the role of the real mother, who "with good-enough mothering," contributes to the development of the ego that can then use projection and introjection to relate to objects (p. 177). It appears that Winnicott was as passionate about his clinical perspectives on the relation of ego development and the environmental provision as Klein was about her own discoveries. Winnicott sternly elaborated:

> Also, she [Klein] paid lip-service to environmental provision, but would never fully acknowledge that along with the dependence of early infancy is truly a period in which it is not possible to describe an infant without describing the mother whom the infant has not yet become able to separate from a self. Klein claimed to have paid full attention to the environmental factor, but it is my opinion that she was temperamentally incapable of this. (p. 177)

This intense statement brings a sudden shift from Winnicott's perception of Klein's theoretical stance to Klein's very personal abilities. Winnicott's own personal experience of being Klein's supervisee allowed him to be aware of this complexity. This move appears to bring Winnicott's personal experience in view of Klein's resistance to his own theory which Winnicott expressed in 1962 after Klein's death in 1960.

The profound critiques of Klein evoke a counterfactual question: what if Klein tried to integrate Winnicott's and others' theories into her own? Klein, then, would have not been so driven to develop, protect, and defend her own ideas so intensely. Klein eventually came to understand herself through the eyes of these critical others; she began accepting that her theory was authentically her own—became able to partially disengaged herself from the Freudian totality—and saw herself as a genuine, independent thinker. This work will continue exploring how criticisms impacted the development of Kleinian theories as other theories "separated out" from mainstream works.

Savoring a Bionian aroma, French psychoanalyst Alain Vainer (2011), in his essay "The Object between Mother and Child" stated, "Meaning is not at first produced by the child, and it returns to the child only if the mother is able to provide it" (In Kirshner, 2011, p. 114). Klein would have agreed with this; however, this is not what she

actually did. Melanie Klein's (1930) interpretive stance, when she said, "I explained: 'The station is mummy; Dick is going into mummy'" (p. 29) was criticized by Lacan. Vanier explained:

> "She [Klein] slams the symbolism into him with complete brutality," Lacan commented (1953-1954, p. 81). . . . In speaking to Dick, she presumed a knowledge in his place, a knowledge that supported her theory. She assumed Dick to be a subject. . . . It is not an interpretation, because that would require the existence of what Klein's (1930) speech was only trying to create. (In Kirshner, 2011, p. 114)

Lacan brings up an important point, as he perceived Klein's method as projecting her own theoretical assumptions into the analytic work with Dick. Lacan felt that Klein imposingly placed the analyst's intuitive reflections into the transferential field. While an adult patient may consider a more conscious response to Klein's intuitive interpretation, a child's mind, without a fully developed evaluative function, perhaps picks up the creative interpretation and views the suggestion as a truth. This place is a huge responsibility on the analyst, he must first be certain of his interpretations, and second, he must share them in a way that the patient can constructively assimilate them.

Adam Rosen-Carole's (2011) take on the same topic is that "a major point of contention between Klein and Lacan is that Klein insists that her technique affords *access* to Dick's unconscious, while Lacan insists that Klein *produces* what she claims to find or facilitate" (p. 6). It is indeed a delicate dialogue between the analytic-pair to know what resonates, what the source of a feeling is, what is defended, and what does not feel true. In these variances in perspectives, perhaps, meaning can be derived and become

meaningful only over time. That is if one is seeking meaning, as for "Lacan is interested in the process of enunciation more than its intentional aim" (p. 134). There is a delicate difference between Lacan's and Klein's intentions in analytic listening. Whereas Lacan emphasizes "dissolving the bonds of meaning in order to liberate our attention," Klein wants to depict the content:

> Lacan is interested, for instance, in what Klein's speech will have given rise to more than what Dick's behavior or statements supposedly mean within the context of her favored schemes of intelligibility (e.g., the Oedipus myth). In contrast, Klein is interested in the *content* of signification, in what various objects, processes, or relations are identified with in Dick's psychic economy, and especially his phantasy life. (p. 134)

As if the Kleinian here-and-now becomes the Lacanian "from-here-on" analytic experience. However, Lacan is not only concerned Klein communicating meaning, "Lacan is concerned with the *effect* of Klein's interpretive performance more than with their veracity" (p. 134). Through the unfolding interactions, the analytic-pair approves or discards the validity of an interpretive statement. They either capture and release, or remember and forget the explicitly implicit symbolism that are all present at the same time.

Californian psychoanalyst Jeanne Wolff Bernstein noted that Lacan was favoring Winnicott's transitional object idea over Klein's concept of good and bad object relations. Lacan's focus was more nuanced, reflective, and allowed more fluidity in interpretation versus Klein's whether inflexible and unbending approach which was, from the Lacanian perspective more polarized. Bernstein elaborated:

> Unlike Klein, who hypothesized the mother's good and bad breasts as the object of the infant's idealized or persecutory fantasies (based on real experiences of plentitude or deprivation), Winnicott emphasized the infant's separate imaginary creation of transitional objects to have access to reality. Lacan found this Winnicottian conception much more in line with his way of thinking than Klein's good and bad internal objects, because it highlighted the infant's production of fantasy rather than the relationship to the good and bad objects. (In Kirshner, 2011, p. 120)

Lacan resonated much more with Winnicott because of the mother's role as a mirror. The mother's reflective and interactive nature highlights the transitional dynamics which are parts of language and symbolism. As for the developing child, Winnicott puts the symbolic capacity in the transitional space, however, Klein exclusively situates it within the child.

Lacan criticized Klein's interpretive method and technique; for Lacan, language has a very special function. One may wonder if Klein's placement of meaning within the child rather than in the space between, may be the reason Lacan perceived Klein to be so encroaching. Understanding Lacan's response to Kleinian thoughts, one needs to realize and think in Lacanian terms, such as "the unconscious is structured like a language . . . 'Symbolic' means having to do with language. . . . Meaning is not a property of language but the product of speech" (Skelton, 2006, pp. 276-277). The Klein and Lacan dialogue needs further study, as other essential topics of Lacan's criticisms of Klein were not exhausted in this section. More elaboration is needed on Lacan's reproach of Klein promoting the mother and neglecting the father's role, Lacan's preference of not working

with developmental phases like Klein does, and the debate about the Oedipus phenomenon.

Historical perspectives are in large part the product of time and culture, and are not exclusively dependent on facts, as "all human systems are symbolic and subject to the rules of language, and the deconstructive realization that there is no way of positioning oneself as an observer outside the closed circle of textuality" (Richter, 2007, p. 1321). The theoretical evolution of Kleinian object relations needs to be viewed against the larger backdrop of psychoanalytic movements. Klein's work and criticisms of her theories are part of a larger interactive system and need to be understood in this light. Keeping in mind the hermeneutic method of interpretation when examining Klein's interpretive stance is pivotal.

Although Klein gained more authority in early analysis from the early 1930s, by 1937 in London, critiques of her had become more explicit as well, especially those made by Viennese analysts. At this time, the theoretical differences between the Viennese and London schools reflected the geographical divide. Ernest Jones, in correspondence with Sigmund Freud, realized the growing differences between the London and Viennese psychoanalytic schools, and "in 1934 Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones decided to hold an exchange of lectures in Vienna and in London" (Geissmann-Chambon & Geissmann, 1998, p. 174). A sequence of events began to develop where the lectures provoked and promoted critical analyses of psychoanalytic theories. In 1935, Jones presented "Early Female Sexuality" in Vienna.

The same year in London, Robert Waelder, an Austrian psychoanalyst who trained with Anna Freud and Hermann Nunberg in Vienna, presented his article, "The

Problem of the Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy" (Waelder, 1937). Waelder in 1937, expressively criticizing Kleinian thoughts and concepts for lacking biological references:

> If we wish to classify the writings of Melanie Klein and the other authors whom we are considering, we should say that at any rate their standpoint is diametrically opposed to the sociological view, that is to say, it is biological. But this is not quite correct, for we find, contrary to expectation, that the facts of psychic reality described by Melanie Klein are not of a biological nature or covered by biological laws. One could say that we are dealing with a kind of quasi-biology which has no biology in it! (p. 428)

Imagine Waelder presenting his critical perspectives to an already polarized London audience. As a Freudian diplomat from Vienna, Waelder's detailed standpoints validated the lingering assumption that Klein's theoretical discoveries, although genuine, are largely incompatible with the Freudian system. Waelder's presence in London politically validated Glover's and his followers' perspectives in the psychoanalytic arena.

Klein was not only criticized for her lack of scientific underpinning, but also for the fact that her theories were not rooted in biology or medicine. Furthermore, Waelder questioned Klein's perspective on the early fantasy life of the infant. Waelder felt that her focus on phantasy was neglecting the actual reality of the child's experience, and also noted that in her work, "later levels of defensive operations seem to be seriously neglected" (Kernberg, 1969, pp. 317-319). In addition, Waelder (1937) criticized the Kleinian notion of the superego:

> But what can be meant by speaking of a super-ego at a still earlier period, in the first months of life? We have no evidence that any function of self-objectivation, without which there can certainly be no super-ego phenomena, appears so early. All that we know of mental development contradicts such a notion. (p. 426)

Waelder's notion of the superego undoubtedly reflects his Freudian sensibility, which situates the formation superego at the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Klein believed that the superego started to form at the beginning of the infant's life. This is another instance where the basic assumptions of the Freudian and Kleinian theories are in opposition. The Kleinian superego is a priori, existing in the infant from the beginning of life, whereas the Freudian aspect of the superego is a posteriori, requiring the real external source for its development. Waelder took this difference as an opportunity to propose his own six stages of superego development, from latency through an antecedent phase towards integration:

> A powerful inner code is formed, in which the separate commands and prohibitions are combined and the world is divided into good and bad. From that time on, part of the child's psyche is the ally of those who educate it and is in harmony with the demands of the outside world. (p. 427)

Here, Waelder clearly expresses his intellectual allegiance with Anna Freud and sees how the superego in part uses the defense mechanism of the identification with the aggressor. Klein, however, said that the aggressor is in within; it is implicit in the death instinct. How the external object factors into the equation is that the child's real and imagined damage is internally experienced. This aggression is a defense against persecutory and depressive anxiety, which is the result of the prior splitting into good

and bad objects. The infant eventually experiences the object as the other and separate from himself, thus beginning a process of reparation and reconciliation with these inner objects. As a result, the child becomes able to see that one object can be both good and bad, and so heals the inner object world. In Klein's view, this integration of good and bad parts within the same object and the relationship between them is the ultimate goal of the work, although this an ongoing, lifelong process that is never truly complete. Klein's successors, such as Bion, took on and further developed these concepts.

The Kleinian cohort found it peculiar that many of the theorists who criticized Klein's theories of early psychic development did not directly work with children. In response to Waelder's presentation in London, Geissmann-Chambon and Geissmann (1998) reported that

> Joan Riviere then went to Vienna in May 1936 to give her paper on 'The Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy' (1936). As we have seen, this latter was a paper defending Kleinian theories, and the notion of reparation in particular. This paper, which was didactic in intent, appears today to be a veritable lecture on the state of Kleinian thought at that time, on the "innovative work of Melanie Klein." (p. 174)

Riviere's paper was an attempt to set the record straight and explicate Klein's position. The similarities in the titles of the two papers is striking—Waelder's 1935 talk (published in 1937) "The Problem of the Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy," and Riviere's (1936) paper "The Genesis of Psychical Conflict in Earliest Infancy"—and points to the direct conflict that was going on between Vienna and London. It is interesting to note that although Waelder's name is mentioned in passing in the footnotes,

he is not listed in the references, and Riviere only indirectly engages his paper. In this ongoing dialog, Riviere herself was a diplomat in Vienna, who perhaps sought reconciliation. Being allied to Klein and acting in this representative capacity, Riviere sought to breech the superegoic defenses of Vienna and give a voice to Klein in foreign territory.

One of the most harshly criticized and highly contested areas of Kleinian analysis is interpretation in terms of unconscious phantasy. The meanings Klein attributed to her own terminology, such as to the idea of the *internal objects* concept, provoked immense challenges among theorists. Brierley (1939) clearly illustrated in describing the "Terminological Difficulties and Related Problems" (p. 66) in regard to internal object:

> Melanie Klein's work does suffer from the general lack of precise definition. Melitta Schmideberg considered this source of difficulty in detail. Alix Strachey (1941) pointed out that the word 'internal' is used to mean (1) 'mental', (2) 'imaginary', and (3) 'imagined as being actually inside (the body)'. Hence, we must ask Melanie Klein to which type of 'internal object' she is referring in any given instance. We must be sure that we do understand the exact meaning that Melanie Klein herself intends to convey and not some other meaning. (p. 66)

Whereas Brierley's ambitious inquiries indicated the theoretical milieu that Klein's work was birthed in, at the same time, it forced Klein to hear, consider, and answer her critics. This served to further explicate and enrich her theory, and Klein's disciplinary cohort also took on the challenge to clarify ambiguities around the innovative theoretical approaches that took time to realize and appreciate. Many of Klein's child cases reflect on Klein's systematic observations of children's unconscious phantasies, where she

believed that inner objects ruled their play expressions. Conceptual understanding of this new terminology, internal objects, involved a systematic recognition of clinical and perhaps personal experiences, and most importantly, the clinical experience of working with young children.

Klein's notion of unconscious phantasy lies at the heart of her theory, and thus it is not surprising that it was also at the heart of the Controversial Discussions. Klein connected these internal phantasies with the infant's bodily functions, and believed that there is a "mental corollary to every bodily sensation" (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 31) in the infant. "A somatic sensation tugs along with it a mental experience that is interpreted as a relationship with an object that wishes to cause that sensation and is loved or hated by the subject" (pp. 31-32). Because the infant is dependent and unable to control outside forces, represented most often by the mother, these anxieties are played out and expressed in the form of these unconscious phantasies. Klein was convinced that by providing an interpretation of these unconscious phantasies, and "what the child might be frightened of," the child's anxiety might be relieved. Spillius and Hinshelwood noted:

> Some of Klein's interpretations were met with considerable skepticism at the time and still are to this day, but she nevertheless possessed an intuitive flair for understanding imaginatively what the child might be experiencing and the confidence to put her ideas into words to the child. (p. 36)

Interpretation, whether in the Kleinian world or in hermeneutic research, depends on the standpoint and experience of the interpreter. By voicing one's ideas, one is able to enter into a dialogue with the other and thus to bring about greater consciousness and possibly understanding. Whereas dialogues may turn into arguments that can be harsh, critical,

and anxiety provoking, theoretical nuances become distinct insights. The points of view then are refined and defined, and ultimately mature in the process of arguments; so, even though uncomfortable, they serve a very necessary purpose. A couple of illustrations of such criticisms illuminate the paradoxical nature of such arguments.

Roazen (2001) explicated Glover's perspective on Jones's management, and highlighted how in the 1930s, the traditional Freudian, the feminine, and the mother phantasy-centric orientations interfaced:

> But Glover felt that when it came to Klein Jones had been "a bloody foo" in losing his disciplinary hold of "those damned homosexual women." There was no heat behind Glover's words. Kleinianism can be viewed as a movement of feminine protest, Glover explained, since it emphasized the significance of the mother and breast envy, and downplayed Freud's concentration on the father and castration anxiety. (p. 264)

Although Glover thought of Jones as a "good President of the Society," Glover agreed, Roazen explained, that "Freud's was 'a man-made psychology,' and 'intelligent women ended up violently opposing him'" (p. 264). Incidentally, this is reflective of the reciprocal analytic relation between Klein and Glover; however it is not exclusive, as among the women analysts—Klein and Schmideberg, Klein and Heimann, Klein and Brierley—deeper dynamics also became evident. What became a reality from the 1920s on is that for the first time in psychoanalytic history, the clinical observations of men and women also reflected their societal role. In the natural course of psychoanalytic evolution, men and women analysts worked through, with more or less success, negotiating and reconciling their inherently unique approach to the human psyche. The

paradoxical relationship between unconscious phantasy and conscious reality in the hermeneutic, meaning making process continues to unfold in the following example.

Sometimes what is seen in the eyes of the critic as a scathing indictment, in fact become a badge of honor. Grotstein (2009) demonstrated this while providing a historical context:

> David Rapaport (1959) once stated: "Melanie Klein's psychology is not an ego psychology but an id mythology" (p. 11). Although he meant this to be a dismissive and sarcastic criticism, he had no idea how right he really was and what high praise he was bestowing on Klein. It took a long time for classical Freudians to appreciate the critical importance of the Kleinian emphasis on unconscious phantasy. (pp. 7-8)

At times, what criticisms intend to achieve rebounds and the message may adhere a remarkably different connotation from its original intention. The undercurrents around "ego psychology and id mythology" did ebb and flow then, as today, every so often, analysts from various theoretical traditions question how unconscious phantasy contributes to psychological truths. These implications depend on the systematic meaning making process in the various psychoanalytic movements and traditions.

The two examples, Roazen (2001) and Grotstein (2009), not only show criticisms, but at the same time, actually serve to illuminate important differences between Kleinian and Freudian thoughts. Klein, the *receiver,* may have been catalyzed by these criticism, marshalling protective defenses of her theories—many thought them to be her more true children. Klein's instinct and intuitions perhaps fueled her passion for analytic experiences and led her to deepen and clarify her thoughts and theories. While Klein was

not able to satisfy the mother's role for Melitta, certainly, with immense pride, she was able to protect, defend, and raise her "child theories" in both senses of the word, as they did not resist her authority. It is ironic that this resistance came from her critics instead, one of which was her biological child.

Melitta Schmideberg's (1938/2009) paper, "After the Analysis …" explicitly criticized Kleinian theory, and the disillusioning expectations that patients and analysts themselves carry about the process itself. According to Schmideberg, neither patient nor analyst can live up to the high expectations, "that after being 'fully analyzed' he will never have any more difficulties or disappointments in life, and never under any circumstances experience guilt or anxiety" (p. 1127). Thus, Schmideberg concludes that analysis is ultimately disappointing for both, as each makes unrealistic demands on the other which they are unable to live up to:

> Often the patient's hopes and expectations from the treatment are repeated . . . The patient is really demanding compensation for all his past and present sufferings, . . . The intensity and persistence with which these demands are repeated leave one in no doubt as to the strength of the underlying reproaches against the analyst. Such demands like all querulous demands are largely a defense against guilt. The patient feels guilty for not getting better. He feels that the analyst demands a standard of health which he can as little live up to as to the moral standards set by his parents. (p. 1130)

Knowing the Klein-Schmideberg history, one may wonder whether these demands are not reflecting Schmideberg's own unrealized hopes and demands and her subsequent ambivalence and aggression towards her mother. These were heightened in her case

because in the beginning parent and analyst were one and the same person. Did Schmideberg perhaps feel objectified and exploited, which she compensated for by initially idealizing and supporting her mother, and later becoming her critic and antagonist.

About a month after Melitta read her paper to the British Society, "On March 19, 1937, Joan Riviere wrote to James Strachey: 'Melitta read a really shocking paper on Wednesday personally attacking 'Mrs. Klein and her followers' and simply saying we were all bad analysts—indescribable" (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 229). Schmideberg was thirty-four years old in 1937, and as an eloquent writer in English, which Klein was not. Schmideberg's attack was in vengeance, attempting to annihilate her mother's analytic authority. Of course it was not about the English language, but the analytic content Schmideberg presented that lacked clinical value compared to Klein. Schmideberg's desperate struggle to establish her credibility within the analytic community under the looming and oppressive shadow of her mother perhaps led her to this unparalleled display of fury.

Many of Klein's seminal publications occurred during the prolific period between 1935 and 1940: "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States" (1935), "Weaning" (1936), "Love, Guilt, and Reparation" (1937), and "Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States" (1940). This was a critical time for the development of Kleinian criticisms as well, which, as seen before, instigated the London Viennese dialogue. Looking at some of the events retrospectively, Klein expressed her standpoints on Glover's attacks during the Controversial Discussions:

> In the summer of 1934 I read to the Congress at Lucerne my paper 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', which as Dr. Glover stated in his speech of May 13 was for him the parting of the ways. He said that his disagreement with me arose over those concepts – but he has never made it clear whether this disagreement implies that he has also changed the views he held about my work before that time or to what extent he has changed his earlier views. (King et al., 1991, p. 203)

Klein made an important point here, insofar as Glover's change—from collaborator to adversary—reflected his two polar different views at different times. Evidently, sequence of personal and theoretical events contributed to his dichotomy. The dissonant perspectives that are observable in his 1945 paper, as compared to his 1933 book review, reflect two polar opposite intentions. As seen earlier, Glover's review of the book *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* in 1933 reflects positive and supportive stances, in contrast to his 1945 paper, "Examination of the Kleinian System of Child Psychology," where he is mercilessly critical of Klein's theories and also techniques.

The phenomenon that collaborators turn into adversaries occurred concurrently during the time Klein's innovative ideas and their criticism emerged, as they are inseparable realities. When collaborators and adversaries resist a productive dialogue, which would involve mutual consideration of the differing perspectives, the opportunity for reparation is missed, and while seeking analytic truths, counterattacks may activate primitive emotional defenses. It is hardly possible to differentiate whether Schmideberg was really attacking her mother or her mother's theories. The Schmideberg-Klein multifaceted relationship demonstrated the inherent reality of the analytic-pair's

experience literally and figuratively through the Kleinian object relations theory. The emblematic struggle of the Klein-Schmideberg analytic-pair is a universal phenomenon, as it augments the deeply strenuous process of integration that occurs within the depressive position. This process, while the goal of analysis, is difficult and not always realized or achievable, as was the case between Klein and Schmideberg themselves. Finding one's identity while being an individual and also part of an analytic-pair involves consistent negotiation of dependence and independence, which is an ongoing dynamic.

Kleinian Object Relations Theory as an Implicit Theory of the Analytic-Pair

Kleinian object relations theory is also a philosophical perspective, as it cradled the implicit theory of the bipersonal field. The epicenter of Klein's theoretical conflicts with Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, and Winnicott is also the foundation of her theory. With Jones's advocacy, Klein found her ally, which mirrored a parallel situation in the Glover-Schmideberg coalition. The deeper meaning of Klein's work with young children took time to be realized in the psychoanalytical community. However, Klein was less concerned with the understanding of how her evolving theory was received by the members of the British Psycho-Analytic Society, and more involved with finding her own truth in her clinical work.

Although Klein was very innovative and understood the intricacies of the infant's relationship to his mother, she remained less aware of how her evolving theory was perceived and then conceptualized differently by British Freudians. This made for misunderstanding between the different factions that crystalized during the time of the Controversial Discussions. For example, whereas British Independent Marjorie Brierley found Klein's clinical data quite compelling, she took issue with how Klein

conceptualized her findings. This would become a much more polarized issue when Donald Winnicott actively started writing about the maternal environment of provision. Klein was disenchanted with what she perceived to be theories that would rival her own.

This is where the conceptual differences of early analysis became highly relevant, as often theoretical divergences become the nuclei of new schools. Klein thought that the subjective infant experience of the mother was the important part of analysis. Winnicott agreed with Klein, but was aware that the qualities that the mother brings to the situation need to be taken into account. Winnicott (1971/2005) said:

> In individual emotional development the precursor of the mirror is the mother's face. . . . What does the baby see when he or she looks at the mother's face? I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herself. In other words the mother is looking at the baby and *what she looks like is related to what she sees there*. . . . I can make my point by going straight over to the case of the baby whose mother reflects her own mood or, worse still, the rigidity of her own defences. In such a case what does the baby see? (p. 151)

Klein's theory is implicitly bipersonal, but she did not draw the implications of it in any formal theoretical way. Winnicott learned from Klein and extended her infant theory to the maternal environment; however Klein did not want to do anything with this concept. Following the trend of Freud, who could not tolerate differences with other theorists, Klein refused to accept Winnicott's environmental elaborations on her theory. This resulted in Winnicott's eventual independence from the Kleinian school that exclusievely focused on the child. Winnicott was one of the first to explicate the two-person nature of Klein's theory of the infant's relationship to the mother, the explication of the theory with

which Klein was not enamored. Winnicott (1958) observed the impact of the child being together and alone in the presence of the mother:

> Although many types of experience go to the establishment of the capacity to be alone, there is one that is basic, and without a sufficiency of it the capacity to be alone does not come about; this experience is that of being alone, as an infant and small child, in the presence of mother. Thus the basis of the capacity to be alone is a paradox; it is the experience of being alone while someone else is present. . . . It is only when alone (that is to say, in the presence of someone) that the infant can discover his own personal life. (pp. 30, 33)

Winnicott recognized that the child's inner reality does not develop without the external object, the real, "good-enough" mother. Winnicott emphasized the mother's power in mirroring the child's emotions, which brings the reverberating projection and introjection cycle, along with the transitional phenomena—the sacred space between phantasy and reality—into the concept of the analytic-pair, "the whole intermediate territory between 'inner psychic reality' and 'the external world as perceived by two persons in common', that is to say, over the whole cultural field" (Winnicott, 1953, p. 93). Although Winnicott perceived the child's struggles with distinguishing what was inner, outer, and in between, in addition to evaluating what was real and what was not real, Klein built on the child's unconscious phantasies and the inner object phenomena.

Kleinian concepts through Klein's child cases.

Klein was passionately driven for extending Freud's topographic (conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious) theory working with "real" children. Freud's limitation of not fully developing his theory on the infant-part in the adult's psychological structure

gave Klein an immense opportunity. Initially, Klein took on Freud's psychosexual model and her early papers explicating libidinal configurations in children's play expressions:

> Klein saw genital, oedipal sexuality in every nook and cranny of the child's world. Letters and numbers have sexual meaning (strokes and circles in the construction of the figures representing penis and vagina). Arithmetic (division as violent coitus, for example), history (fantasies of early sexual activities and battles), and geography (interior of mother's body) draw upon sexual interests. Music represents the sounds of parental intercourse. Speech itself symbolizes sexual activity (the penis as tongue moving within the mouth as vagina). (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 122)

Klein saw the precursor of what Freud called infantile sexuality, except she thought she saw it in "real" infants. Melanie Klein's unique approach, her techniques and methods, for discovering the child's mind are promptly revealed through her analytic case materials. Kleinian child analysis advanced by using play techniques as free associations to access the unconscious mind, interpreting play expressions, working with positive and negative transferences, utilizing the concrete notion of inner objects, and recognizing early anxiety due to fear of loss of a love object.

Historically, Klein took on Freud's notion of psychosexual stages; however, by 1935—when Klein understood that her conceptualizations were understood as deviations by the Viennese Freudian group—Klein named her concepts as "positions" instead of "stages or phases" in her 1935 paper, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States." At this point on, she no longer sought reconciliations with the Viennese Freudians. Drawing from her clinical observations and experiences, Klein's

highly intuitive clinical work with young children gradually resulted in interpretations that were discrepant from Freudian views. One example of Klein's elaboration of Freudian thinking was that according to her observations, she wondered if it could be said that the superego "starts to form at the beginning of life." Observations and subsequent child cases confirmed her sense of the inception of the superego at earlier ages than posited by Freud. This was perceived by others as divergence from Freud.

Another example for divergence is the oedipal preoccupation that Klein placed around the time of weaning, unlike Freud, who thought of the oedipal phase between the ages of 3 and 5. When in the 1920 Klein gathered clinical materials that she thought were further elaborations of Freudian theories, she didn't realize that her work was becoming the foundation of her later theories. "Klein's conceptualization of the superego develops and changes in parallel to her developing theories" (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, pp. 147, 151). In the middle phase of her career, Klein used Freudian language and terminology, but gave it slightly different meaning. The following example gives an illustration of the altered meaning of the Freudian language, rendering a different clinical phenomenology. For instance, Klein emphasized the superego's preoccupation with persecutory anxiety during the later period of her work, as her focus shifted from the drive to a more interpersonal model:

> The attempts to save the loved object, to repair and restore it, attempts which in the state of depression are coupled with despair, since the ego doubts its capacity to achieve this restoration, are determining factors for all sublimations and the whole of the ego-development. (Klein, 1935, p. 151)

The function of the external parent transformed from gratifying the child's drive to a separated object, to gratifying the child's desire to develop and maintain an intimately emotional relationship with a real person. In normal development, "The ego then responds to demands from the superego to repress aggressive and libidinal impulses" (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 156).

The child's realization and acceptance of the "real" external object with whom reparation can take place in the depressive position is not only a developmental milestone, but also illustrates how Kleinian theory is an implicit theory of the analytic-pair. In Klein's 1936 essay, "Weaning," which appears in her book *Love, Guilt, and Reparation* (1936/1984), she describes a critical moment when the infant holds onto the established inner representation of the external object, the real mother, to overcome the frustration associated with weaning from the breast:

> We must remember that at the critical time of weaning the child, as it were, loses his "good" object, that is, he loses what he loves most. Anything which makes the loss of an external good object less painful and diminishes the fear of being punished, will help the child to preserve the belief in his good object within. At the same time it will prepare the way for the child to keep up, in spite of the frustration, a happy relation to his real mother and to establish pleasurable relations with people other than his parents. (pp. 296-297)

The Kleinian analytic-pair operates through the domains of real and represented object worlds. The analytic-pair carries on the emotional memory that was essential during the inner object development process. These object-relational aspects of compensations and

defences are inner guides as the child continues negotiating relationships in his life involving love, hate, fear, envy, guilt, and reparation.

The following case studies reveal clinical relevance observing Klein's focus on the inner world of the child, symbolization, phantasies, projections, and introjections, without explicitly involving the real mother or father. Klein analyzed Rita, Klein's youngest patient of 2 ¾ years old, "between March and October 1923," at Rita's home (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 25). Through Rita's case, Klein realized that the traditional talking cure did not work with such a young child efficiently:

> While she had already observed play ideas with her son, with Rita she was drawn to a method that was suitable for children; games and especially play-acting or "enactment", instead of verbal associations alone, represented the main possibilities of communication. (Frank & Spillius, 2009, p. 134)

Although Klein realized that the home environment interfered with treatment, she also recognized the essential points of what Rita wanted to communicate to Klein while using her own toys at her home during treatment (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 25). Only later, in Inge's analysis from 1923 to 1926, does Klein recognize "the significance of toys as a regular component rather than an incidental factor (Rita) in the child analytic setting" (Frank & Spillius, 2009, p. 159). Petot and Trollope (1990) concluded that "this analysis marks the true beginning of Kleinian psychoanalysis as we know it" (p. 10).

Klein's description of Peter's unconscious phantasies in her article "Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children" (1927) dramatically described the unfathomable truth of children's unconscious phantasies in their play presentations:

> At last, the dread of punishment becomes so strong that the two children determine to kill the mother, and he [Peter] executes the little doll. They then cut and eat the body. But the father appears to help the mother, and is killed too in a very cruel manner and also cut up and eaten. Now the two children seem to be happy. They can do what they like. But after a very short time great anxiety sets in, and it appears that the killed parents are again alive and come back. (Klein & Riviere, 1937/1984, p. 178)

Klein's intuitive sensitivity picked up on Peter's guilt as he expected to be punished for his "naughtiness." The bodily, self-inflicting psychobiological aspect of sadistic punishments, "kill them, cook them, castrate them, and so on" are reflective of the child's fear of what might be done to him (p. 179). Consequently, Peter's need to replay the act again and again expressed his deep desire to relive, re-experience, and repeat the anxieties associated with his inner objects. However, having him once destroyed them, he realized they were also needed objects and wanted repair and restore them. The compulsion to repeat is to perpetuate the dilemma of how to reconcile the internal object anxieties in the reoccurring transference situation that occurs between the analytic-pairs.

There is a fine distinctive quality between the introjected superego and the child's own capacity to fantasize and bear the anxiety and guilt. While the implicit analytic-pair is in the transference work, the child's inner representations are constantly, consciously and unconsciously, re-configured. Klein and Riviere (1937/1984) clarifies an essential point:

> As we know, the parents are the source of the super-ego, in that their commands, prohibitions, and so on become absorbed by the child itself. But this superego is

> not identical with the parents; it is partly formed upon the child's own sadistic phantasies. . . . The feeling of guilt, repressed too, is no less burdensome; thus the child repeats over and over a variety of actions, expressing both his desires and his wish to be punished. (p. 179)

The child's introjection of the "real" external object through the emotional negotiations gradually gives voice to the superego, but it is also reflective of the child's capacity and aptitude to deal with anxiety. Klein was cognizant that the child's intentions expressed through play were often anchored in repressed unconscious materials, although they surfaced in unconscious play behavior.

In Klein's 1952 paper, "The Origins of Transference," which she presented a year earlier at the Amsterdam Congress, she elaborated, "It is my experience that in unravelling the details of the transference it is essential to think in terms of *total situations* transferred from the past into the present, as well as of emotions, defences, and object-relations" (p. 436). The term *total situations* suggests not only that a complex psychic system historically exists within the child, but also that the child will transfer this operating system to the analyst. Most children demand response from their environment and "The attention to the immediate 'here-and-now' was necessitated by the children's acting out" (Frank & Spillius, 2009, p. 226), which was also an opportunity for Klein to better understand the negative transference in the *total situation*. In the later phase of Klein's work, she says that as long as there is unsettling dissonance between the inner internal object world and the external world which the person relates to, the person will continue replaying the confusion.

Betty Joseph (1985) expands this idea in her essay "Transference: The Total Situation," where she validates Klein's idea but adds that in the countertransferences, *total situations* reveal past unconscious coping mechanisms in present time. "I have thus tried to discuss how the way in which our patients communicate their problems to us is frequently beyond their individual associations and beyond their words, and can often only be gauged by means of the countertransference" (p. 454). It comes to mind that exploring the *total situations* through countertransference, the analyst can have an overview of the child's unconscious phantasy as the symbolic correspondent of the child's emotional relational history with the real parent. Furthermore, as the analyst analyses the countertransference material, she inadvertently interacts with the child's inner objects activating the analyst's internal representations. Thus, analytic-pairing continues to contribute to future *total situations*.

Klein had definite aptitude for communicating theoretical interpretations, even to very young clients. This technique, while pioneering, also attracted criticism. Klein's interpretation of the child's inner ambivalence, especially initially, brought forth the Freudian psychosexual stages in the meaning-making process, offering another example of how terminology is used slightly differently by different theorists. Previously, I mentioned how Klein took over Freud's terminology and gave it different meaning. Similarly, Betty Joseph (1985) used the same term as Klein and expanded the meaning through the phenomenon of countertransference. Klein meant that the *total situation* was projective identification as the communication of unconscious phantasy projected into the analyst—it is much more internally driven in Klein's definition—whereas for Joseph the total transference situation is an expansive use of the communication between the

analytic-pair, from unconscious to unconscious, including the countertransference. Using the same terminology, these two analysts conceptualized the total transference situation with slightly different meaning.

Melanie Klein recognized the dire necessity for children to express their inner reality not as much in language but symbolically in their act of play. Klein derived the meaning of play as it served young children by interpreting the unconscious phantasy themes. Klein's own theoretical development allowed realization of symbolic expressions of primitive emotional states in the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Klein's interpretations of the child's play-behavior were literary representations of the child's psychic organization, considering internal object relations, unconscious phantasies, and life and death instincts. Klein's implicit theory of the analytic-pair emphasized the child's changing inner world:

> Her focus is on the emotional ramifications of aggressive urges. She believes that children are made enormously anxious by their urge to attack their objects, that they fear their own potential for destruction and that they fear retaliation from their objects for damage done in reality or in phantasy. (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 246).

The implicit analytic-pair in Kleinian theory is used to distinguish an infant's inner-object relations from the Winnicottian emphasis on the external-object relational experiences. Kleinian thoughts are difficult to examine when taken out of their inherent context. This hermeneutic exploration will continue bringing forth the notion of how the meaning of an analytic term was conceptualized by different theorists focusing on various aspects of a

phenomenon. The discussions show the debates over what is considered to be an extension and what was perceived as a deviation.

Counterfactual thinking.

Counterfactual thinking, such as what if collaborators continue to be collaborators instead of becoming antagonists, brings complementary perspectives to this research. How would it have been if Klein had drawn from Winnicott's "Primary Maternal Preoccupation" (Winnicott, 1956/1992, pp. 300-305)? Had Klein incorporated Winnicott's concern with the real mother, she would have developed an explicit two-person theory—where the infant with his phantasy and the mother with her capacity for reverie would have been mutually symbolizing the emotional relationship. Because Klein did not consider Winnicott's idea of the primary maternal preoccupation, she became a one-person theorist with an implicit two-person model.

Winnicott's 1951 essay "Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena" takes Klein's implicit one-person model to a step further by evidencing how the function of the real mother is critical in symbolization, in the development of inner objects, and therefore object relations. Winnicott (1951/1992) said:

> It is interesting to compare the transitional object concept with Melanie Klein's concept of the internal object. The transitional object is *not an internal object* (which is a mental concept)—it is a possession. Yet it is not (for the infant) an external object either. . . . The infant can employ a transitional object when the internal object is alive and real and good enough (not too persecutory). But this internal object depends for its qualities on the existence and aliveness and

> behaviour of the external object (breast, mother figure, general environmental care). (p. 237)

It would be another 10 years after Winnicott's transitional object paper before another Kleinian, Wilfred Bion (1962/1984), evolved an explicit two-person model, the concept of the container-contained, in his book, *Learning from Experience.*

Continuing with counterfactual history, in regard to Paula Heimann's idea about the countertransference phenomenon—Klein rejected her perspective—but what would have happened if Klein had accepted it? What if from 1949, when Heimann read her essay, "On Countertransference," at the 1949 IPA Congress in Zürich, to 1955, when Heimann left the Kleinian Group and joined the Independent Group, Klein and Heimann had agreed on the relevance of how countertransference may be informative in analytic work? If Klein had drawn from the positive and negative aspects of countertransference, she would have integrated and also differentiated projective identification and counter-transference. However, Klein remained in a Freudian position about countertransference, which places transference as a projective process in early development.

Hinshelwood's (2008) research stated Klein's notes of "Intended Contribution" for the discussion at the 1953 IPA Congress in London:

> In addition to all this, there is a point I wish to stress—the particular processes of the schizophrenic of splitting his own ego and the analysis of projective identification, a term I coined to denote the tendency to split parts of the self and to put them into the other person, stir in the analyst very strong countertransference feelings of a negative kind. (Remarks on Countertransferenc.e) (p. 101)

What if Klein's and Heimann's differences on countertransference resulted in Klein's recognition of its importance? Klein would have then understood that Heimann's understanding of countertransference, as a "receiving set," could potentially be the result of the implicit two-person nature of projective identification. Heimann (1950) expressed, "But my impression is that it has not been stressed that it [countertransference] is a *relationship* between two persons" (p. 82). As the Heimann-Bion version of countertransference phenomenon is a two-person theory, had Klein accepted it, Kleinian object relations theory would have become an explicit two-person model sooner than it did in 1962 when Bion published "Learning from Experience."

Counterfactual thinking transforms one real historical event into one of many possibilities. Bringing contrasting scenarios to Klein's theory, such as the work of Winnicott, Heimann, and Bion, the inherently dialectical nature of object relations is apparent. The lineage of theorists reveals how differently each theorist organized psychic understanding of the projection-introjection processes in the child-mother dyad. By evaluating the development of theoretical splits using counterfactual thinking, relevant elements become amplified, such as the reasons and causes why schism that happened was the necessary outcome in contrast to the many other feasible possibilities. Counterfactual thinking makes it is easier to identify essential, theoretical pivotal points and how these theoretical nuances became differentiated.

If it is not always true that collaborators inevitably end up in an adversarial relationship, what examples are there in the history of psychoanalysis to testify to the development of new theories from long-term creative partnerships? John Rickman was a British psychoanalyst, an influential character in Bion's development as an analyst and

theorist. Rickman was analyzed by Ferenczi and also later, from 1934 to 1940, by Klein. Perhaps, his personal analytic experience with Klein propelled him later on for introducing Bion to have analysis with Klein. (It is interesting to consider that Melanie Klein and had a very young child when she was in analysis with Sandor Ferenczi, and also, that Bion had a young child when he began analysis with Klein.) Prior to that phase, between 1937 and 1939, Bion was in analysis with Rickman, which marked the foundation of their lifelong creative partnership:

> Rickman possessed essential capacities that Bion would later conceptualize as central to the process of container/contained and which must have been of the utmost importance to the young Bion's attempts to discover the words he needed to describe and begin to partially recover from the traumatic war experiences from which he then still suffered. (Levine, 2011, p. 88)

Bion found Rickman's personality and theoretical approach receptive, validating, and inspirational to further his own, already genuine creativity. Furthermore, a series of 27 letters that Bion wrote to John Rickman between January 29, 1939 and June 17, 1951, reveal that on many levels, the Rickman-Bion collaborative position continued to flourish until it arbitrary ended with Rickman's death on July 1, 1951 (Conci, 2011). Bion's multidimensional partnership with John Rickman affirms their mutually rewarding experience in recognizing and validating each other's analytic perspectives.

The irony of Rickman and Bion's collaboration is that they were able to cross boundaries and through this process, this analytic-pair did not end up in an adversarial relationship. In fact, in this affiliation, Bion was restlessly pursuing Rickman's involvement while Rickman explicitly recognized Bion's innovative approach:

> I am going to stress the difference between Bion's work and other people's because, perhaps out of modesty, he may not let it be sufficiently apparent that a pioneer is different from those who have not broken new ground. . . . By Bion's application of the essentials of Freud's technique of research to groups a new phase of development in group psychology is beginning. (Rickman, 1957/2003 pp. 233-234)

What Rickman may have intuitively experienced with Bion was Bion's capacity to pay attention to various levels of psychic experiences at the same time. Namely, as Bion later explicated, the individual, the pair, and the group with each of its respective separate mindset while engaged at the conscious and most definitely, according to Bion, at a systematically unconscious level. The relationship with Rickman validated and enhanced Bion's authenticity and genuine approach to group treatment.

Whereas Rickman embraced and supported Bion's individual development, Klein was helpful to Bion in articulating a point of view in a larger context. Ultimately, Klein was the catalyst for Bion, as she was interested in having Bion extend the conceptual reach and the legitimacy of the Kleinian Group in London. The Rickman-Bion collaborative stance endured the challenges that their mainstream contemporaries could not tolerate. This work scrutinizes relationships of analytic-pairs who consequently ended up in adversarial state of affairs after crossing boundaries—whether from analysis to theoretic partnership or editor analysts' collaboration. In the case of Rickman and Bion, their continuing creative affinity resulted in a genuine and authentic relationship that was rare in the history of psychoanalysis.

In the history of psychoanalysis, conflictual theoretical and personal situations—symmetrical and asymmetrical—were often the engine for groundbreaking theoretical advancements. The Anna Freud and Melanie Klein controversies resulted in the Society's tripartite division. However, The British Psycho-Analytical Society was able to contain this schism within its own institutional realms instead of becoming three completely independent organizations. These first-generation analysts in the 1940s were not going to start their own institutional groups, as Steiner (2000) stated:

> Notwithstanding the fact that psychoanalysts in Britain are organized into three different groups, over the past fifty years or so succeeding generations have continued to discuss with one another, to criticize one another, and to absorb each other's points of view, all more or less willingly or more or less consciously, and all living under the same roof at the British Psycho-Analytical Society. (p. 217)

The events that transpired within the British Psycho-Analytic Society essentially mirror what happens inside of the individual. When good and bad objects are contained within the same person, a negation must occur in some fashion in order for the person to function, instead of devolving into a paranoid-schizoid state. One may wonder who served the ego and superego functions at the institutional level, while the controversies ensued in an ongoing dynamic. The tripartite system created a feedback loop, where each group had a chance to perceive and in turn be perceived by the others. The inevitable interactions fueled additional controversies and reflections, and eventually new theories were derived, becoming fodder for the next cycle. After the controversies, having analysts working under one organization, it was necessary for them to manage the residuals of the historical conflicts and for each to develop his or her own theoretical

identity and find ways to cope with the anxieties that other, theoretical advancements induced. Bion's theories are a case in point.

Bion witnessed Winnicott's treatment at the hands of Klein, who only paid "lip-service" to his theories (Winnicott & Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1965/2007, p. 177). Winnicott realized the lack of fit between himself and Klein, and essentially found his identity fittingly with the Independents. Bion, however, took a different route. He stayed with the Kleinian group and due to his enduring character, took on the function of advancing Kleinian theory. Instead of directly opposing the source (Klein), who was famous for not being open to others' contributions if they were not in alignment with her own vision, Bion chose to use Kleinian concepts indirectly while adding his own spin to them. This enabled Bion to "play well with others" instead of taking his *toys* and going somewhere else to play as Winnicott had done.

Bion's *binocular vision* (1961, p. 8) is not only an example of an innovative use of the notion of how Kleinian object relations theory is an implicit theory of the analytic-pair and also of a group, but also shows how he was able to manage his relationships within the Kleinian group and not suffer the same fate as Winnicott. Around 1946, Bion began analysis with Klein, and by then, Bion had experience working with groups and also with individuals. Thus it was only natural for Bion to utilize Klein's ideas with both. When Bion began analysis with Klein:

> He insisted that it was to be on the condition that he was his own person when it came to thinking and reacting. She agreed to his terms—probably because she was so anxious to have him as a patient. (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 427)

Bion's way may have forced Klein to face her own challenges with "binocular vision" (Bion, 1962/1984). He disagreed with her literal interpretation that an infant "evacuated" unwanted parts into another body, and saw this instead as metaphorical (p. 427). This was difficult for Klein, yet she was able to compromise because of Bion's strength and ability to hold his ground, instead of yielding to Klein who at times had intrusive need for recognition. Was Bion at all concerned about his own sanity while in analysis with Klein? Bion already had direct wartime experience, and he may have had reminiscence of his own response to extreme mental stressors. Perhaps because Bion was an independent thinker inspired by Klein, he did not seek to merge Freudian and Kleinian thoughts. Instead, he was able to manage his own creative clinical work within the containment of the Kleinian cohort. This was not true for Edward Glover, who had an agenda that became irreconcilable with Klein's purpose.

Edward Glover's decision to resign from the Society on January 24, 1944 illuminates obscured intentions, one of which was that Glover wanted to maintain a one-theory, loyal Freudian position, both personally and also at an institutional level. This decision may have marked the bounds of his theoretical evolution. Had Glover stayed at the institute, he may have further developed his idea of the "psychotic pockets" that he initially wrote about in 1933, when he published a seminal essay, "The Relation of Perversion-Formation to the Development of Reality-Sense." In this paper, Glover summarized that without perversion the person may become psychotic:

> During the analysis of a schizoid state to the superficial layers of which was attached an active homosexual perversion, one of my patients was subjected to a severe heterosexual love trauma. . . . Less obvious at first was the fact that these

> ceremonials acted as a protection against anxieties liable to induce schizophrenic systems. In other words, *they assisted in maintaining the patient's reality-sense to some degree*. (Glover, 1933b, p. 491)

This observation was considered advanced in the analytic field, and stimulated thoughts in others. However, for Glover, his political position became more relevant under the circumstances, and he began shifting focus to criminal delinquency. Schmideberg would later follow Glover and dedicate her work emphasizing on delinquent behavior.

Bion later picked up this torch in his theoretical explorations of psychosis. In his 1967 work, *Second Thoughts,* Bion may have actually satisfied Glover's fantasy to join Freud and Klein, as he connected psychotic features of splitting and projective identification:

> One concomitant of the hatred of reality that Freud remarked is the psychotic infant's phantasies of sadistic attacks on the breast . . . the psychotic splits his objects, and contemporaneously all that part of his personality, which would make him aware of the reality he hates, into exceedingly minute fragments, for it is this that contributes materially to the psychotic's feelings that he cannot restore his objects or his ego. (Sandler, 2005, p. 599)

Bion's ego strength allowed him to venture into this territory, given his experiences in the war and his subsequent interactions with his comrades. Bion was truly working out of his experience, which is a hallmark of Klein's own way of working. Glover, on the other hand, was working as a loyal Freudian theorist, who was guided by truth found in theory rather than in his own lived experience. Had Glover stayed the member of the Society, he would have an opportunity to collaborate with Rosenfeld and Bion on the

"psychotic pockets" of the personality as it appears that these theorists shared this interest.

The topic of psychosis attracted various theorists' attention from Freud, Glover, and Klein, to Rosenfeld, and Bion. From the 1930s psychoanalytic theorists touched and collaborated on the idea of paranoid-schizoid position, psychotic states, and splits. From the mid 1940s onward, Bion and Rosenfeld were both preoccupied with the mysteries of psychosis and schizophrenia. "Rosenfeld affirmed the importance of recognizing the psychotic transference and working through it by means of interpretation" whereas Bion "looked for evidence of the meaning of the patient's communication but also of his own counter-transference reaction" (Rosenfeld, 1987, p. 206). Through the exploration of psychotic states, counterfactual thinking reveals that the theoretical realities often are not exhausted by one theorist. Undiscovered perspectives, concealed parts, and evolving elements are always waiting to be researched, organized, and integrated. What stays concealed will most likely be captured by the next generation of theorists. Aguayo shared, "Any good analytic theory, within its own premises, carries its own evolution" (personal communication, November 19, 2014). Although a system potentially "will carry within it the seeds of its own destruction" (Marx, 1850), it is also true that these are the very conflicts that were and are necessary to distinguish the one-person theory from the bipersonal dynamic.

As the history of early analysis unfolds, the lineage of theorists and theories becomes apparent where none of the theories are exclusive or absolute; theories exist in a fluid confluence and interaction with each other. In the heart of any relational premises, the impactful reciprocal force of projective identification and

countertransference attest to how Kleinian object relations theory is an implicit theory of analytic-pairs.

> To summarize: the most important points in Klein's archival notes on projective identification are that she thinks *both good and bad aspects of the self are projected into the object, and that identification by both projections and introjection is essential in analysis and in all relationships* (Spillius, 2007, p. 111).

Theorists, as observed in this research thus so far, collaborated, split, and continued functioning within adversarial premises while gathering into their respectful disciplinary cohorts and developing their theoretical identities.

Identity: The individual, the analytic-pair, and the institution.

With Anna Freud's conviction of the environmental factor, Winnicott's explication of the mother's role, and Heimann's explanation of the countertransference dynamics, it became clear that Klein's theoretical distinction were powerful enough to stand on their own, and at the same time, they were separate enough to coexist with Kleinian thoughts. This dynamics then, circles back to the notion of the institution's and its members' identity, which inevitably became negotiated through the Controversial Discussions and continued to sustain itself decades later. While working together—as analyst-analysand, supervisor-supervisee or as colleagues—the creative partnership that anteceded splits held inherent elements for the potential destruction of creative collaboration.

> Alongside this arrangement for the training was an unwritten "gentlemen's agreement" that there should be representatives of all three "groups" on the main

> committees of the Society, i.e., the Council, the Training Committee, and other policy-making bodies. This agreement still holds in the British Society, and I think it is one reason why they have been able to work together, for no one group could be eliminated by another group. (King et al., 1991, p. 907)

How do analysts maintain their individual identity while facing historical tendencies of splits as theoretical and personal differences often lead to polarization? In addition, how do institutes deal with pluralism in today's psychoanalytic culture, as it appears that one institute with various training groups is an infrequent phenomenon? From one-person psychology to large group experiences, the analytic encounter with patients and colleagues provides enormous variables for transference and countertransference experiences.

On another landscape, the historical aspects of the Kleinian theoretical movement also shook up psychoanalytical traditions themselves, challenged obsolete paradigms, and confronted community norms in the psychoanalytic culture. Ferro (1999) reflected on the magnitude of the interdisciplinary influence of the Kleinian model:

> The continual interchange between Klein and her pupils, and among her pupils themselves (as though a fabric were being woven by many hands), constituted a genuine conceptual revolution in the panorama of psychoanalysis. It affected not only clinical practice but also numerous other disciplines, ranging from aesthetics (Segal), to political philosophy (Money-Kyrle), group (Bion), politics and war (Fornari), and social and institutional life (Elliot Jaques, Menzies-Lyth, and Salzberger-Wittemberg). (p. 10)

The shifting attitude, from the Freudian authority to a multiperspectival way to consider clinical data, evidently brought on significant change in the psychoanalytical community, in both London and Vienna. Societal change, almost without exception involves the controversial reorganization of group structure where a group member's personal belief of what he considers clinically true may challenge the loyalty to traditionally accepted trends. The Controversial Discussions was one of these historical events that led to reorganization of the identity of disciplinary cohorts and continuous reformation of psychoanalytic theories. This mirrored the postmodern turn in society at large at the time.

Although the Controversial Discussions resolved the overt differences between the Freud and Klein groups, a group of covert variances evolved between the Kleinian group and the Independents as the consequence of the controversy. Winnicott's perspective of the mother-infant, bipersonal relationship may have been taken up by Bion in his work on groups. This study examines how Bion's (1961) *Experiences in Groups and Other Papers* used Klein's recognition of primitive infantile mechanisms to understand the regressive nature of group phenomena.

> The adult must establish contact with the emotional life of the group in which he lives; this task would appear to be as formidable to the adult as the relationship with the breast appears to be to the infant, and the failure to meet the demands of this task is revealed in his regression. The belief that a group exists, as distinct from an aggregate of individuals, is an essential part of this regression, as are also the characteristics with which the supposed group is endowed by the individual. (Bion, 1961, pp. 141-142)

The individual loses his distinctiveness when this regression happens. He gives his identity, and merges into the group, thus leaving the door open for the paranoid schizoid experiences to engulf him. The result is often intense, irrational, and unconscious splitting coupled with other primitive defense mechanisms found in infants. Bion's inevitable truth about regression is a common reality that plays out on many levels, from the individual, through the analytic-pair, to the social structure of an institution, and into society at large.

Group dynamics can be used to understand aspects of how the Klein cohort functioned as a group within the British Society. Although Klein herself showed tremendous organizational acumen in her evolving study groups during the Controversial Discussions, she remained somewhat naïve about how she herself was perceived as a member of a group. Klein perhaps wanted a mono-theoretical institute, so her victory was substantial, but partial through the Discussion.

This study provides a unique contribution from a new angle, namely, how evolutionary thoughts—how young children are analyzable—impact the social context of a group. Specifically, this dissertation observes how Klein's early career impacted the British Psycho-Analytic Society, and elucidates the challenges that are often inevitable when an analyst deals with theoretical differences. The researcher hypothesizes that what is valid in the analytic field between an analyst and analysand is frequently also applicable universally in a larger context of the analytic society, as theorists are working together in the same analytic institute.

This study bears contemporary relevance, as this phenomenon crosses temporalities and geographic boundaries. Jon Mills's extensive research, published in his

books—*Other Banalities: Melanie Klein Revisited* (2006) and *Conundrums: A Critique of Contemporary Psychoanalysis* (2012)—provide ample examples of present-day pertinence regarding the historical Kleinian movements. Mills (2012) elaborated on how an analyst was challenged in managing the profound trials he would go through in seeking personal and institutional identity in the postmodern psychoanalytic era:

> But despite of the current climate that favors plurality, heterogeneity, and tolerance for difference within psychoanalytic work, there is also a cryptic favoritism that each analyst has with his or her professed, self-identified school(s) of thought that stand in opposition to other schools whose theoretical orientations differ from one's own. And there are many legitimate reasons for such preferences and identifications. But these attitudes can quickly inform prejudices that are acted out in arenas governed by psychoanalytic politics. (p. 134)

Managing the self while being part of a group is not a new idea. While negotiating external circumstances, the individual's internal object relational world—referential equivalence to the external situation—becomes activated. Successful negotiation always requires advanced awareness of the individual's own deeply unconscious tendencies.

The Bionian "binocular vision" implies a simultaneous, dynamic consideration of multiple realities between the individual and the group (Bion, 1962/1984). By knowing one's own personal object relational tendencies, and then seeing through and holding in perspective the mind of the group, leads the individual to potentially experience the meaning of the Bionian binocular vision. Grotstein (2007) explained:

> The P-S⇄D formula represented another change in Kleinian thinking. Until Bion's reformulation, Kleinians tended to pathologize the paranoid-schizoid

> position and privileged the attainment of the depressive position. Bion saw them both from the vertex of binocular vision—that is, dialectically. (p. 308)

The dual aspect of the binocular vision is linking the two identities—individual and group—to the simultaneous, reversible perspectives, the foreground-background and paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. While in the paranoid-schizoid position, the individual is highly dominated by some internal dynamics; in the depressive position, there is an expressed concern for others. Thus, while paranoid-schizoid position in this respect relates to the individual, the depressive position links the individual to the other, which in this research is illustrated by the analytic-pair. In this conjunction, potentially contradictory processes interact, such as the individual's internal defense mechanism, which at a group level manifest in the basic assumption mentality. Having the analyst hold two potentially conflicting point of views in his mind may be introjected by the patient who then can have a more successful negotiation between paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions, good and bad, and love and hate.

Bion brought the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions into a dialogue. With simply pointing the arrows at both positions, (P-S⇄D) not only the bidirectional exchange between the positions became apparent, but also from a static state, the positions gained a dynamic, lifelong momentum. Bion extended this interchange from infancy to adulthood, and having done so, the paranoid-schizoid position became less of a pathology and more of a phenomenon that demonstrated how the mental apparatus responded to overwhelming stress and compensated by activating primitive defense mechanisms.

> That is to say, the individual's capacity for learning depends throughout life on his ability to tolerate the paranoid-schizoid position, the depressive-position, and the dynamic and continuing interaction between the two. The Positions are not to be regarded simply as features of infancy, and the transition from paranoid-schizoid to depressive position as something that is achieved once for all during infancy, but as a continuously active process once its mechanism has been successfully established in the early months. (Bion, 1992/2005, pp. 199-200)

According to Bion, the person's differentiation and identity formation involves continuously enduring the unfolding paradoxical interplay of the conscious and unconscious processes between the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. The "binocular vision" is an ongoing, multilayered process in the transference feedback loop between the individual and a pair or a group (Bion, 1962/1984). The definition and redefinition of self-identity parts continuously become reconfigured and reorganized through projections, introjections, and revaluations. In Bionian terms, this "binocular vision," is necessary when one seeks personal growth, integration of experiences, and transiting in and out of the depressive-position (Bion, 1962/1984). As the individual is part of the mind of the group, the group is also represented in the individual's mind.

In the heart of object relations theory is the negotiation of identities between the individual and the group. Zooming back and forth between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, the individual's defense mechanisms become activated and the individual⇄group relational model becomes apparent. In this complex process, compensatory mechanisms and relational templates are shaped by early attunement systems while being a part and apart in the dialectical process. The individual's psychic

organization, the analytic-pair's distinctive relational model (colleagues), and the analytic institute's unique identity intimately interface and powerfully impact one another. Whereas early experiences are recorded by the "system unconscious," current experiences constantly shape the internal object relational world. Present, here-and-now experiences potentially lead to integration, assimilation, fragmentations, and new ways to relate to emotional encounters in the future.

Mills (2006) reflected on his own troubles while designing and creating his book, *Other Banalities: Melanie Klein Revisited.* Mills's personal experiences amplified the Kleinian reality of ambivalence as it manifested in his attempts at collaborating with others in the various Kleinian cohorts. He explored the meaning of rejection by stepping outside of the boundaries of a tradition. Reconnoitering the dialectical reality existing between Classical Kleinian and Contemporary Kleinian theorists today, Mills discovered:

> And yet there are other banalities, such as the politics of Kleinianism. It may be said that group loyalties surrounding a particular identification with any school of thought often mirror, perhaps unconsciously, an element of theory exemplified within that school. Contemporary Kleinians are no exception. In fact, there was controversy in regard to this volume from its inception. (p. 3)

As Mills shared how he decided to reconstruct his original idea for the book, due to the obstacles he encountered, he did not conceal his disappointments. Mills framed his experiences by recontextualizing them as a reaction to the postmodern politics: "we are nevertheless witnessing a firm allegiance to preserving the insights of the old school by revisiting Freud's and Klein's indelible mark on our discipline" (p. 3). As Mills's invitations to "several recognized contemporary Kleinians" to collaborate in writing were

rejected, he experienced directly that "most Kleinian writers pride themselves on offering theoretical contributions that are heavily focused on clinical materials; and deviations from this format are often frowned upon" (p. 4).

Mills surmised that Hanna Segal rejected participating because she did not know or trust Mills. He contextualized this by saying that Segal did not want to take another chance after her substantial support for Phyllis Grosskurth backfired, resulting in a betrayal of trust in the material that Segal gave Grosskurth access to. Seemingly understandable, yet in a critical tone, Mills (2006) concluded:

> The need to defend our heroes and safeguard them against future exploitation reflects the need to remain attached to our idealization, to the point that any indication that potentially threatens them, whether in reality or fantasy, is seen as an unforgivable act of dissension. One author was so offended by the title of this book that he pulled his essay at the last minute because I refused to change it. These attitudes nicely echo the splitting and paranoia that Klein herself illuminated as being elemental to human nature. (p. 4)

Klein's deeply instinctual discoveries are reflective of human nature itself and because of that, it goes beyond the analytic-pair's encounter. The rudimentary and primal emotions of fear, love, hate, envy, guilt, and shame are always operational whether we are conscious or unconscious of them. Furthermore, in the political arena, these are the instinctual forces that determine the destiny of analytic relationships, collaborative or adversarial. These dynamics are ubiquitous and also play out between colleagues, whether or not they are adversaries. They also occur on various levels between groups: institutional, disciplinary, societal, and cultural. How can the Kleinian idea of reparation

perhaps be taken into consideration in guiding institutional politics where theories and clinical practice can foster analytic education with traditions and innovations being equally valued?

Although the British Psycho-Analytic Society in London reorganized itself into a three-tiered institute—containing the controversies to a large degree—this is an infrequent tendency when schism occurs in a modern-day analytic institute. Kirsner (2000), in his conclusion, "The Trouble with Psychoanalytic Institutes" (p. 232), talked about as institutes carrying significant history and traditions within their structural framework. While negotiating the challenges of keeping and breaking psychoanalytic traditions, the institutional organization of analysts' training in the present day are greatly determined by the organization's ability to consider its own unconscious "group-mind" tendencies.

How institutions believe the human mind needs to be educated in this ever-evolving dynamic society must also be taken into account. Training analysts and candidates are vulnerable as they subject themselves to the institution's organizational "superego," at the same time they inevitably introject the norms that the educational structure represents. Needless to mention that, as in transference situations, the Kleinian paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions appear to be frequent realities in the candidates' training experience. However, it is in the reparation process that one may gain deeper recognition of the unknown. Kirsner, in a footnote, quoted Bion:

> Freud talks about "paramnesia" as being an invention which is intended to fill the space where a fact ought to be. . . . We can produce a fine structure of theory in the hope that it will block up the hole for ever [sic] so that we shall never need to

> learn anything more about ourselves either as people or organizations. I suggest that we cannot be sure that these theories which are so convenient and which make us —both as individuals and as a group—feel better because they appear to make an inroad into the enormous area of ignorance, are therefore final. (Bion, 1980, p. 30). (Kirsner, 2000, p. 285)

Bion reiterated that theoretical reasoning, scientific knowledge, and fancying authority by the possession of such highly valued instruments—whether personally or at an institutional level—paradoxically, can lead to mindlessness. Bion suggests that although psychoanalytic education is necessary, theories and knowledge are secondary to the analyst's being and presence in the room. The necessity to know necessitates unknowing according to Bion, which then evokes the need for consistent curiosity and this motivation determines the analysts' analytic attitude.

Kenneth Eisold (1994), in his article, "The Intolerance of Diversity in Psychoanalytic Institutes," elaborated on essential points of how tension in the culture of psychoanalysis, both historically and in modern times, leads to schism: "Intolerance of diversity, at one end of the spectrum and schism at the other are seen as social defences against often unrecognized forms of anxiety associated with the practice of psychoanalysis" (p. 785). Members of an analytic institute find themselves in a culture where their professional life depends on their successful "belonging" to this professional community that requires them to comply with the boundaries of the institution's very specific culture. The institution's philosophy, administrative principles, and training traditions all define the identity of the organization. According to Eisold, these boundaries may become limitations when intolerance to diversity is present:

> The social defence of intolerance—which ultimately leads to splitting—is, in effect, the final common pathway in which defences against the contradictions of the analyst's identity, the internal tensions of analytic institutions and the marginality of psychoanalytic culture in relation to the world join together to proffer an illusory security of sectarian life. (p. 797)

As psychoanalytic training is a particular education, it is truly a discovering journey of the individual's own particular understanding of psychic reality. While engaged in this educational process called analytic training, Eisold revealed that this "dual function" may put the candidate in a compromising situation: "On the one hand, of course, it is simply an analysis. On the other hand, it is the analyst's passport to acceptance and certification, his means of proving himself ready and adequate to the task of analysing others" (p. 791). Living in the post-Kleinian era, one may wonder how today's disciplinary cohorts resemble the historical tendencies of dealing with hardly bearable differences and diversities. "The historical corollary of this intolerance is the remarkable history of schism in psychoanalytic institutes, testifying to the difficulty of containing, much less accepting, theoretical differences within existing organisations" (Eisold, 1994, p. 785).

Eisold (1994) further elaborated on the delicate problem of power distribution in psychoanalytic institutes. The multi-layered dynamics that are inherently present in power differentials involving leadership, decision-making, along with often competing and conflicting interests at various levels and between individuals activate potent primary emotions. They are often unconscious, reactive, and persecutory in nature, and are thus not easily reconciled. This is the context that institutions face when seeking reparation.

Eisold (1994) revealed how power negotiations among analysts—already organized in a hierarchical construction—impacts an institute's professional identity:

> For opportunities to supervise and teach, for referrals, for continuing professional self-esteem, as well as financial security, analysts are dependent upon maintaining their standing in their professional communities. Public deviance from established practices and beliefs is risky. During training, obviously, candidates are closely scrutinised and evaluated; . . . These are crucial factors in the life of any professional community, and it is easy to see how the existence of factions influencing such decisions and altering the balance of power will arouse the most powerful anxieties and stimulate the most extreme defences. (p. 791)

Eisold's extensive work explored how analysts' training, supervision, analytic affiliations, and theoretical identity hinge on the identity of their institute and how this identity is communicated through education and then introjected by the candidates. Being a student candidate of an analytic institute is very different from being a student of a university. An analyst's professional life depends on how functionally, he is able to "secure a place in the network of his colleagues" (Eisold, 1994, p. 791). Analytic consciousness requires—at individual, collegial, and institutional levels—that the individual remain his own person while also being part of a group. It is not a coincidence that this is specifically what Bion requested from Klein prior to beginning analysis with her, as previously mentioned (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 427). As if a double agent, this double identity may reflect how an analyst may efficiently function while being part of the analytic-pair—simultaneously being attentive to the patient, to his own processes, and to the unfolding complexity of the transference situation.

Coline Covington (2005) asks a pertinent question: *Why We Can't Get Along*? Exploring the roots of disputes and arguments between theorists and within analytic institutes, Covington revealed that historical splits and residues of antagonism are one heritage from the Freudian era that is embedded in today's institutional life. Do analysts today manage theoretical disagreements differently from Sigmund Freud, or Melanie Klein? What Klein achieved through her theory is to decompose the authority over the human mind, despite of her own craving for that same authority. Covington pointed out that conflicts were not strictly theoretical in origin, but rooted in the internal psychological construct of the human mind. Taking a route that perhaps is less obvious for an analyst who is completely involved in developing his career, Covington explicitly emphasized "that narcissism is an innate psychological response to otherness, inevitably leading to conflict" (p. 37). She concluded:

> If we look at the history of psychoanalysis, we can see very clearly that the schisms that occurred amongst our founding fathers (and mothers) were not rooted in differing theoretical beliefs but were the result largely of narcissistic clashes that could not brook conflict. . . . We must be prepared to listen to our colleagues, to debate our differences, to acknowledge our histories, our hurts, our mistakes and failures if we are to achieve any form of ecumenical strength. Perhaps then this patient, called the analytic profession, will learn how to heal its own internal splits. (p. 39)

The fear and threat of uncertainty in the profession of psychoanalysis is broad and deep. Analysts expect their patients—who are mostly unaware of such analytic history—to subject themselves to the analyst's guidance and interpretations in order to become "fully

analyzed." Covington's patient, "the analytic profession" at present is deeply entrenched in the paranoid-schizoid position. It calls for reparative measures, for during its hundred year history, the anxiety and distress of this unique patient was seriously challenged to develop trusting and healthy inner object relations. Yet, the "patient" without an analyst is like Bion's leaderless group (Foresti, 2011). The question remains, who could facilitate this integrative process, so that the good and bad objects would no longer be a threat, but could give an opportunity for more conscious existence. Without remediation, perhaps playful interventions leading to the "the analytic profession's" unconscious phantasies, institutional organizations may continue to carry on and unconsciously project their own internal conflicts onto the next generation of analysts.

Canadian born psychoanalyst Elliott Jaques (1955/1985) applied psychoanalysis to social structure, and later to institutional organizations; he was a founding member of the Tavistock Institute in London and collaborated with Bion on group projects. Jaques was in analysis and then in supervision with Klein, and also helped with Klein's book, *Narrative of a Child Analysis* (1961). Jaques had firsthand experience with Klein personally and also with her theories. Expressing her appreciation, Klein said, "I am much indebted to Dr. Elliott Jaques for taking the great trouble to go carefully through the whole manuscript. He has made a number of helpful suggestions as well as some comments which I found very stimulating" (1961, Acknowledgement). In the Foreword to this book, Jaques reflected on his collaborative experience with Klein:

> Indeed, in the hospital, a few days before her death, she was still going through the proofs and index of the book. She wanted to leave as faithful an account as she could of both her practical and theoretical work. In this, I think, she

> succeeded. The book is a living thing. . . . This, her last work, is a fitting monument of her creativity. (Klein, 1961, Foreword)

The research interest that Jaques got involved in throughout his life involved social organizations, psychoanalytic studies, and the meaning of leadership in institutional systems. Jaques discovered, "the unconscious or implicit functions of an institution are specifically determined by the particular individuals associated in the institution, occupying roles within a structure and operating the culture" (Jaques, (1955/1985, p. 479). Jaques' multidisciplinary career involved extensive work in numerous organizational modalities through various cultural domains. Jaques' research conclusions are profoundly important to this study because his confident message about what leads to structural change in organizations is convincing. In discussing the dynamics of social change, and their relationship to institutions, Jaques wrote:

> Change occurs where the phantasy social relations within an institution no longer serve to reinforce individual defences against psychotic anxiety. . . . changes in social relationships and procedures call for restructuring of relationships at the phantasy level, with a consequent demand upon individuals to accept and tolerate changes in their existing pattern of defences against psychotic anxiety. Effective social change is likely to require analysis of the common anxieties and unconscious collusions underlying the social defences determining phantasy social relationships. (p. 498).

Jaques alludes to the difficulty of tracking change, due to the multifaceted invisible reciprocal exchanges causing conflicts that are at play an organization. So, if this subtle, almost inevitably automatic communication takes precedence in institutional settings,

what mechanisms would lead members to recognize their own tendencies? Jaques argues that the human mind, when it becomes a committed member of a group, will use the group to project into its unconscious phantasies. The title of Jaques' (1955) paper, "Social Systems as Defence against Persecutory and Depressive Anxiety," is a clear demonstration of the reality where unconscious phantasies can strike throughout the most refined organizations. Jaques' elaboration brings into focus that group participation is inseparable from unconscious psychological communication, particularly when an individual's intention is to convince others about theoretical truths. As theoretical truths are embedded deeply within the psychoanalytical movements, they are even more firmly defended. This dynamic came to presence more so once the disciplinary cohorts, the tripartite divisions in the British Psychoanalytic Society, coalesced.

The question remains, how can analysts evolve and elaborate their own theories, while simultaneously remaining sensitive to how their evolving theories are perceived by other groups. In this instance, the conflict between Klein and Anna Freud rooted itself in their mutual insensitivities to how their evolving theoretical perspectives were perceived by each other. The individual differences between Klein and Anna Freud in 1927 were elevated to the level of group differences by the time of the Controversial Discussion beginning in 1941. What made Klein stand out as a theorist, at the same time, also restricted her capacity to be receptive to how her work was perceived by the Freudians, despite of her own identification with Freudians.

With this in mind, this research takes a moment to explore and discuss how theoretical confluences being left out and realized. Pichone-Riviere (2009) reflected, "Spiral process aims essentially at addressing the temporal development of the analytic

process, its coming and going, repetitions, elaboration, alteration between regression and progression, the dialectic history and temporality" (Baranger, Baranger, Fiorini, & International Psycho-Analytical Association, 2009, p. 52). Klein developed her recognition of the depressive position in the mid-1930s, and only later, in 1946, did she conclude the paranoid-schizoid position. Likierman (2001) clarified:

> When viewed together, the Kleinian positions invite us to impose a linear developmental order on them, . . . Klein herself did not regard psychic growth as a move from a negative paranoid-schizoid position to a depressive position which is a purely positive phenomenon. (p. 115)

Klein grasped incomplete parts in her own theory and worked towards adding to it and completing what she believed to be true according to her clinical experiences. Her own growth and evolution is reflected in how Kleinian object relations theory, became formulated parts by parts into a whole paradigm and continues to evolve present time. As if Klein's keen observations evoked more turmoil in hope of release:

> In its original formulation, the depressive phenomenon was set out as both developmentally progressive and positive and, simultaneously, as a dangerous crisis point which sets in motion ambivalence, a catastrophic sense of loss and also, psychotic anxieties and defences, all of which need to be overcome. (p. 115)

Such intense focus on the inner psychic universe did not leave much room for Klein to consider what other theorists found to be true. In addition, Klein did not factor in what other analysts thought about her work.

It is crucial to note that Klein's focus on the infant's inner reality was excluding the mother's impact on the child, and this "exclusion" was picked up by Klein's disciples

Winnicott and Bion. This work wishes to capture analysts' theoretical confluence, as "a progressive-regressive slide between the two positions has thus been understood to be constantly operating even on the micro-level of everyday psychical experience" (Likierman, 2001, p. 116). This reality cycles back to the notion of Pichone-Riviere's "spiral process," where unresolved inherent pieces that are potentially meaningful in the analytic reality will be picked up by other theorists over time, whether theorists are collaborating or standing in adversarial positions.

Theories, just like theorists, inherently feed off of one another. Object relations theory explicates the philosophical question of how a seed of an idea is concealed in another theory. Madeleine and Willy Baranger's (2009) idea of the "bipersonal field" is one example of how the analytic situation always have multiple variables:

> We thought then and we still think now that neither the analyst nor the analysand, once involved in the analytic situation and in the process, can be taken in isolation: they have to be approached as one functioning with the other. The analytic situation itself has to be understood as a structured whole whose dynamic derives from the interaction of its parts and from the effect of the analytic situation on both, in reciprocal causation. (p. 53)

The Barangers' idea elucidates that adversarial positions are not taken up in isolation, but as a result of "reciprocal causation." What the history of object relations theory reveals is that there is no inner object model without the implicit theory of the analytic-pair or bipersonal, group phenomenon. Aguayo, in his lecture, discussed Ronald Britton's idea of historical perspectives on container and contained: "For Klein the baby is the variable and the mother is constant, for Winnicott, the baby is constant and the mother is variable,

and for Bion, the baby and the mother are both variables" (Bion Conference 2014, Lecture discussions; Britton 2007, unpublished paper, The Baby and the Bathwater). Taking up the idea of how object relations theory is an implicit theory of the analytic-pair brings to sight the paradox that Klein did not see it that way. It took up the work of Klein's progenies, Winnicott, Heimann, and Bion, to *join* the analytic-pair in their theoretical rights.

Analytic training has been and continues to be a contentious theme. In the 1920s, "the new profession [psychoanalysis] had absorbed huge numbers of new recruits following the First World War and the question of what qualified a person to practise psychoanalysis was a major questions" (Hinshelwood, 2004, p. 6). To what degree was Klein's unbending mindset the result of her temperament and to what extent was it the consequences of her indoctrinating life experiences and analytic training? From Klein's own training and personal evolution as a theorist to the Kleinian school of object relations theory, the challenges between how theoretical traditions are utilized by training institutes continue to be an issue in contemporary times. Kirsner (2000) unfolded the multidimensional struggles of analytic training by interviewing approximately 150 analysts in four major U.S. institutes:

> Qualifying as a psychoanalyst increasingly required obsessional devotion to the trappings of analysis (five times a week on the couch, and so on) and surviving the ordeal of local, and often wider, psychoanalytic politics. The training became the transmission of dogmas and received truths in the seductive illusion of knowledge rather than a method based on ambiguity, unknowing and uncertainty. Orthodoxy was rewarded as psychoanalysts became more devotional. (p. 9)

At one time Klein's disciple, Bion (1961), wondered, do we learn from experience, do we learn from history, "What we learn from history is that we do not learn from history" (p. 89). This study attempts to find contexts that contribute to divergence to take on both, experience and history. From Sigmund Freud to the analytic training practice of modern times, the moral responsibility is equally relevant in not only acquiring theoretical intelligence, but also in clinical applications of techniques and methods, and in adequately negotiating the relational field with clients, as well as with colleagues.

Inseparable Realities of Theory and Theorist

While researching the historical circumstances of early psychoanalysis, the theoreticians' intricately personal psychological factors inevitably emerged and became prominent. On one hand, all theories reflected conscious choices a theorist, made including deciding what to pay attention to, choosing evaluative lenses, determining what to include or exclude, and how to describe or interpret a phenomenon. On the other hand, the unconscious forces that were lurking under the theorist's consciousness also provided powerful guiding echoes, mostly without the theorist's conscious approval. Melanie Klein was no exception to this reality: "Whether we consider all of this in terms of ego or primary object, of inside or outside, it was projective identification and envy that prevailed—and spared no one in their path. Melanie was forced to live out the proof of her own theories" (Kristeva, 2001, p. 207).

Theories appeared to be resonating the unique truth to their respected founding theorists similarly to having Michelangelo seeing the angels in the marble before he chipped away the stone. Having a theorist become aware of his own conscious and unconscious predicaments contributed to more efficient understanding of a theorist's

affinity towards a specific system of thoughts and emotions. The personal lived experience of the theorist thus played out in what a theorist believes to be accurate and true. The focus on how the "good and bad breasts" were at first part objects, and only later were potentially integrated, is a case in point. Klein, as a woman and mother, was able to uniquely bring the complexities involved to light:

> The object of all these phantasies is, to begin with, the breast of the mother. It may seem curious that the tiny child's interest should be limited to a part of a person rather than to the whole but one must bear in mind first of all that the child has an extremely underdeveloped capacity for perception physical and mental, and then . . . . the tiny child is only concerned with his immediate gratifications. (Klein, 1936, p. 290)

Klein, as a mother and individual struggling with depression, was keenly aware of the wide range of emotional vagaries of the child. From this truly personal position—where loss and melancholy so pervaded her life, especially in her depressive episodes, and were profoundly permeated her life even in good times—Klein intuitively attuned to the suffering of the child. Klein's embodied experience allowed identification with the child's ambivalence in the loss of the ideal object.

Theories contain elements of what a theorist felt was personally compelling or explanatory and the careful consideration of these powerful elements in Melanie Klein's life called for understanding. This research would not be complete without contemplating how Klein—in her early career as a lay analyst—became adamantly committed to her clinical observations and clinically astute in her developing concepts as she stubbornly unearthed the truth of the child's psyche.

> Being a good clinician is not the same as being a good theoretician, but being good at identifying with what one observes in order to follow what is going on in something other than oneself and then describing it constitutes an intermediary level of conceptualization. (Stonebridge & Phillips, 1998, p. 29)

First, Klein was a mother, then a clinician, and at last became a leading theorist. One of the many ironies in Klein's psychobiography is that her chronological evolution, mother-clinician-theorist, may be overturned from today's perspective when value is attributed to her contributions.

Through the personal tragedies Melanie Klein encountered—losing her sister Sidonie, who died at age four; her brother Emmanuel, "the best friend I ever had" (Grosskurth 1995, p. 39); her mother, Libussa, who died in 1914; Klein's son, Hans, who died in 1924; and Klein's analyst, Abraham, who died in 1925—the feelings of suffering, loss, and depression were Klein's frequent companions throughout her life. Certainly, depression played a significant role in Klein's creative work: "the centrality of the depressive position, allowed her to sublimate her suffering so that she not only came to terms with her own grief but achieved the insight that grief could be a stepping-stone to maturity and development" (Grosskurth 1995, p. 216).

Klein, as a devoted Freudian, was convinced that she was extending Freud's theory; however, what emerged were new ways of looking at the mind of the child. Klein may have been immensely empowered by her own realization around 1933—while at the same time perhaps felt threatened of the possible exclusion of the Freudian community—when she realized that she is more *Kleinian* than Freudian. This must have been an unfathomable experience for her, as the consequences were unforeseeable. A relevant

question guides this section of the research: "Under what conditions do people change or give up beliefs to which they are most deeply committed?" (Westman, 2011, p. xv). While examining how Klein's personal history related to her theoretical advancement, the powerful nature of Klein's theoretical concepts of projections and interpretations were considered. Steiner (2000) explained:

> Cohen and Nagel focus their attention on the personal attitudes of the researchers concerned . . . one can observe two types of interpretive model, and that these antagonize, blend, or coexist with each other . . . . The first model tends to find an explanation to observable phenomena by means of *hidden devices*; the second seems to relate *to observable data* . . . . Perhaps the most interesting part of their argument is their claim that in order to explain the way in which these two different methods of interpreting reality develop and hybridize in time, one needs also to refer to the more personal factors in the lives of the researchers, the scientists, and the theoreticians concerned. (p. 207)

Klein used her own psychic apparatus to utilize the interpretive models so she could become able to encompass the child's experience. Klein's analytic listening, her motivation and desire to understand through her own clinical experiences, was as passionate as it was innovative. Early on in Klein's life, these skills were the way for her to survive, stay competent with family members, and become acknowledged in her family. As her own object relations theory reflects, the early relational templates became her ways to handle situations as an adult, whether a mother, analyst, or theorist. Klein's direct interactions with children, coupled with her keenly intuitive predisposition—her

internal attentiveness to the positive and negative transferential domains—met with the external, historical opportunity that she built upon and utilized to succeed.

One of the *hidden devices* that she used to explain observable phenomena was the concept of *unconscious phantasy*. When the young child is introjecting what the superego-parent consciously or unconsciously desires, the young child barely has a choice, but to begin to confirm some of these demands, at least partially—the only possible way for a child to be. Klein believed that unconscious phantasy, rooted in the death instinct, was at the heart of the child's experience:

> This view of the matter makes it also less puzzling to understand why the child should form such monstrous and phantastic images of his parents. For he perceives his anxiety arising from his aggressive instincts as fear of an external object, both because he has made that object their outward goal, and because he has projected them on to it so that they seem to be initiated against himself from that quarter. (1933, p. 250)

This section continues to examine how Kleinian theory applied to Klein's own life, namely as a mother and also as an analyst and theorist. The following topics are discussed in Section A: how as a mother, Klein's own evolution began with her relationship to her own mother, Libussa; then how Klein's observations of her own children catalyzed Klein's ambitions to become a lay-analyst and then a theorist; and how as an analyst, Klein worked through her own experiences of loss and depression. Section B explores the meaning of Klein's transformation from clinician to theorist and how, while gaining ground as a theorist, she understood the Glover-Schmideberg alliance as it

shifted from a position of advocacy to an adversarial position, ultimately adding to the many losses of her life.

Conci (2011) stated, “The connection between a psychoanalyst’s life and his work is a very interesting and relatively new field of study” (p. 85). The researcher of this study intended to integrate the rich and stimulating historical points to this work considering the changing opinions and biases that occur over time. The author realized the risk that there may not be interpretation without projection; therefore, she used the best speculative tone offering what is convincing interpretation.

Klein’s personal journey through mother-daughter relationships.

Learning how Melanie Klein early on became “Mrs. Klein” through her groundbreaking contributions to the English theory of object relations illustrated what it was like birthing and raising child analysis, the framework of Kleinian object relations theory. From the perspective of our contemporary era, however, the following inquiry also became relevant: how do we deconstruct this female icon to understand her original sources of influence? The neurotic interdependence of three generations of women, Libussa, Melanie, and Melitta, circuitously lives in the Kleinian concepts and theories, as Grosskurth (1995) revealed:

> From the moment Libussa moved to Krappitz, she assumed command of the household, filling a void created by Melanie’s increasing irritability, depressive exhaustion, and despondency. . . . In the two and a half years they lived in Krappitz, Melanie seems to have been away almost as much as she was at home. . . . During these absences Libussa bombarded Melanie with letters about the impeccable way the household was being managed, and with advice on the

> smallest details of her life, as though she were trying to reinforce the dependency of her neurasthenic daughter, even at a distance. (pp. 50-51)

One can only imagine what psychological impact this had on Klein, who had a need for support due to her depressive condition and at the same time may have resented the fact that she needed it. In her ambivalence, as she could not consistently attend to her own children, did she perhaps instead invest her motherly instinct into her theories? This may have been the utmost necessary endeavor for Klein. Klein was later able to be the authority with her theories, something she was denied for the most part as a mother.

The relationship between Libussa and Klein resembled an intricate reality in which the analytic-pair had not worked through their unconscious desire for authority and in response the dependency that resulted from it. As an adult woman, Melanie was infantilized by Libussa's manipulative control, as the innumerable letters Melanie received in her absence from Libussa revealed:

> What is all this nonsense about my great maternal love and sacrifice? . . . Do not allow homesickness and longing for your children to get hold of you! You know that Arthur, your children, and your home are in good hands—so you can rest assured as far as that is concerned. (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 50)

Libussa's well-meaning intentions may have been unconsciously introjected by Klein as an overbearing authority that she could not resist—but without the engulfing warmth of Libussa. Klein, although loved by Libussa, was not recognized as a mature, independent woman, as that may have threatened Libussa's neurotic authority. Did Klein, in response to the engulfing authority of her mother, direct the defense mechanism to Melitta by adopting a more rigidly authoritative stance with Melitta? If so, Klein may have

established a constant desire to the object, Klein herself, which perhaps unconsciously, she kept unreachable. Applying the Kleinian theory of internal object development to Klein's own relationship with her mother Libussa, it appears that "shadow of the ego falls upon the object" (Grotstein, 1982a, p. 47). The shadow of Libussa's ego—the unresolved omnipotence that Libussa needed in order to survive—gave the impression of Melanie Klein's inner representation of her mother figure, having Melanie being Libussa's object. This amalgamated inner object relations, then, contributed not only to the development of the complex dynamics between Klein and her mother, and Klein and her daughter, but also to Klein's relational paradigm with others in the psychoanalytic community.

The historical overview of the research problem unfolds by observing the context in which Melanie Klein realized what was to be gained by means of psychoanalysis. In 1914, Klein gave birth to her third child, Erich, and the same year, Libussa died. Klein began her analysis with Ferenczi. "It is probable that it was personal reasons (to improve her health) that drove her to undertake this treatment, at a time when she was feeling particularly vulnerable and depressed after her mother's death" (Geissmann-Chambon & Geissmann, 1998, p. 112). Ferenczi seemed to recognize that Klein had an innate gift for making psychological observations about children. While Klein was in treatment for depression—which perhaps was inflamed by Libussa's death and Klein's feeling alone taking care of her infant without Libussa's help—Klein began developing intense interest in psychoanalysis, particularly child analysis. Grosskurth noted that Klein in her autobiography explained Ferenczi's inspirational impact on her lifework:

> During this analysis with Ferenczi, he drew my attention to my great gift for understanding children and my interest in them, and he very much encouraged my

> idea of devoting myself to analysis, particularly child analysis. I had, of course, three children of my own at the time. . . . I had not found . . . that education . . . could cover the whole understanding of the personality and therefore have the influence that one might wish it to have. I had always the feeling that behind was something with which I could not come to grips. (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 74)

Ferenczi's empathetic and inspiring disposition allowed Klein's dormant talents to awaken. In addition, Ferenczi's already established, prominent relationship with Freud elevated his psychoanalytic credibility, which was perhaps an attractive trait for Klein. Through the analysis with Ferenczi, the supportive father figure whom Klein never until then had, she then began to make innovative observations about her own children. Klein said of her analysis: "I had very strong positive transference and I feel that one should not underrate the effect of that" (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 72).

Klein's authentic motherly experiences with her own children eventually led to her becoming a lay-analyst, a profession in which she developed the general idea that the child's unconscious phantasies played a role in the child's own neurosis. This pointed Klein to her confirming belief that the child's symbolic play is the royal road to the unconscious: "The play-technique provides us with a rich abundance of material and gives us access to the deepest strata of the mind" (1927, p. 151). Klein's maternal role, despite her struggles with depression, provided opportunities where her intuitive abilities engaged her and led her to analytic ideas. In 1919, she presented her first paper, "The Development of a Child," at a meeting of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society. The paper contained details from her analysis of her son Erich, although in later versions, his identity was disguised (Geissmann-Chambon & Geissmann, 1998, p. 117).

Klein most definitely have had a clear understanding of how the *whole external mother object* ought to be present for a child. Realization of her inability to be completely present for Melitta and Hans, Klein may have compensated for her possible guilt by paying exclusive attention to her children from an analytic stance as opposed to a motherly emotional perspective. If this is true, then, Klein's analytic mannerism with her own children can be attributed to her unconscious efforts to protect her children, as well as herself, from her own potentially negative, instinctually provocative, and persecutory emotions that were caused by her severe depression. Melanie Klein was deeply familiar with the implications of depression that is characterized by experiencing loss and feeling painfully alone, short-tempered, and irritable.

Klein's own depression, which led to her limited availability for her children, was a factor in her impaired relationship with her daughter Melitta, which was no doubt further impaired by her son Hans's death in a mountain-climbing accident in 1934. Klein responded to Melitta's later attacks and betrayal by being indifferent. "Should one conclude for all that, as some have done, that Melanie Klein treated her children more like an analyst than a mother" (Geissmann-Chambon & Geissmann, 1998, p. 117). Klein's distance from Melitta, both as a child and later on as a professional, created the conditions for Melitta's subsequent actions. In the preface to the first edition of Klein's 1932 book, *Psychoanalysis of Children,* Klein expressed her appreciation to both Glover and Melitta for their contributions:

> My thanks are next due to Dr. Edward Glover for the warm and unfailing interest he has shown in my work, and for the way in which he has assisted me by his sympathetic criticism. He has been of special service in pointing out the respects

> in which my conclusions agree with the already existing and accepted theories of Psycho-Analysis. . . . Last but not least, let me very heartily thank my daughter, Dr. Melitta Schmideberg, for the devoted and valuable help which she has given me in the preparation of this book. Melanie Klein, London, July, 1932. (p. 10)

Shortly after 1932, the relationship between Klein and the Glover-Schmideberg pair transformed into a hostile persecutory liaison—for obvious reasons, these appreciative comments were omitted from the preface to the third edition in 1948. As previously mentioned, when Klein first appeared in public as an independent thinker, she became the subject of attention and criticism at the same time. Suddenly, it became the questions of Klein's own internally and her peers' externally perceived theoretical identity. Who was right? Klein, who thought of herself as Freudian, or her responders, who thought she was implementing a groundbreaking psychoanalytic system?

Melanie found great support in her disciplinary cohort; however, her daughter, Melitta Schmideberg, had different plans. Melitta was elected to become a member of the British Society on October 18, 1933, upon presenting her paper, "The Play-Analysis of a Three-Year-Old-Girl." Schmideberg's debut to the Institute included a not very discreet stab at Klein's theoretical position. Schmideberg did not use Kleinian theories to reason her clinical work in Vivian's case, who came to Schmideberg, "at the age of two years and eleven months, for symptoms of hysterical vomiting, difficulties in eating, constipation, and fear of noises, musical bands, trains" (Schmideberg, 1934, p. 245). Naturally, Klein took her daughter's theoretical independence in a deeply personal manner. Kristeva (2001) reflected on this clashing event:

> The war between the two women [Klein and Schmideberg] was made public in October 1933, when Melitta Schmideberg was elected a member of the British Institute: in her membership paper, "The Play-Analysis of a Three-Year-Old-Girl," she attributed the digestive difficulties of her patient Viviane not to "constitutional factors" (as Melanie Klein's theory would have it) but to the attitude of a mother who had subjected her to an excessively strict toilet training. (p. 204)

It is perhaps not a coincidence that in Melitta's conceptualization of this case, she was convinced that "Although Vivian was always saying how good *her* mother was, she was never really satisfied with anything the mother gave her" (Schmideberg, 1934, p. 248). Was Schmideberg identifying with Viviane's experience?

Having Schmideberg tracking on the trails of her own mother's psychoanalytic work—which Klein already imprinted considerable landmarks by 1933—Schmideberg had very little chance to add her own independent analytic views. As this limitation for Schmideberg became increasingly difficult and stressful, she may have unconsciously rebelled against it. Schmideberg craved her freedom from her neurotic dependence on her mother. Perhaps for this reason, Schmideberg had a hard time conceptualizing Vivian's case without implicating Vivian's mother. One may wonder if Klein directly felt accused. As an analyst, Schmideberg was perhaps overly sensitive and receptive to the mother's part in Vivian's case, whether it was true or not. However, drawing the environmental variable in the equation was not a forgivable trend at this time, especially since it came from Klein's own daughter. Schmideberg (1934) concluded:

> Her [Viviane's] mistrust of her mother was due to envy, arising from oral-sadistic sources. At the same time it was a projection of her own sadistic attitude: *she* made a shew of love for the mother while feeling hatred, *she* wanted to hurt her mother, to give her the bad things and keep the good for herself. She could only expect a like attitude in return. Similarly *her reproach against her mother for having failed to give her a penis* or having *robbed her of it,* turned out largely to be a *projection of her own sadism* and a *defence against* her own *sense of guilt*. (p. 248)

In the mutually negative transference situation, Schmideberg used one Kleinian citation listed in the reference section that could not be tracked in the text. As Schmideberg's conclusive reasoning of the case revealed the mother's role in Vivian's pathology, the reader may have been baffled by how Schmideberg's understanding may have paralleled her own relationship to her mother. The analyst's own psychic lenses are always part of a case conceptualization. Given that Schmideberg incriminates are one and the same person in the case narrative. Schmideberg tried to take into account the environmental factor while conceptualizing Vivian's case; however, this idea was not well received in her debut to the Society, mostly due to the trend of the time—Klein's intense focus on the inner world of the child. This event was the first time Klein faced the environmental provision, and as it came from her own daughter, this provision indirectly involved Klein as an intimate part of the psychic, transferential equation. Evidently Klein's own defenses may have become activated. As it turns out, for the rest of Klein's career, she refused to factor the environment into her theories.

As Schmideberg became a member of the Institute, she continued to struggle with finding herself personally and theoretically while being in the shadow of her mother. Unsettling as it may seem, Schmideberg's conclusions of Vivian's case decreased her popularity in the British Society, despite Glover's apparent validation and endorsement. Schmideberg (1971) remembered the heart-wrenching events:

> In 'The Therapeutic Results of Inexact Interpretations' [Glover, 1927] (1) he considered the possibility that analytic interpretations work through suggestion, thereby attacking some very sacred cows [Did she refer to the Kleinians?]—and expressed doubts as to whether therapeutic results were necessarily due to deeper insights. Mrs. Klein did not like his paper. . . . I myself became the next object of controversy. I had finished my analytic training at the London Institute and had been elected Member of the British Psycho-Analytic Society. For a few years I had been rather popular. I had a reputation for getting good clinical results, my articles were regarded as valuable contributions, I was asked to lecture and was made at rather an early age a Training Analyst. But soon matters became uneasy. I was criticized because I paid more attention to the patients' actual environment and reality situation and regarded reassurance and a measure of advice as legitimate parts of analytic therapy. (2) But I always felt that the main objection was that I had ceased to toe the Kleinian line (Freud by now was regarded as rather outdated). (Schmideberg, 1971, p. 63)

What possibilities were there for Schmideberg, as her phantasy to be seen by her mother slowly faded? She certainly had been deeply disappointed because her unique ideas were not deemed competent enough by her mother. Schmideberg's independent thinking

caused the perception that she was disloyal and deviant from Klein's ideas, which had devaluing and demoralizing consequences.

Melitta's unattained desire for recognition, the nonexistent acknowledgment of her mother, and feeling stuck in Klein's shadow led her to rely on Glover analytically, professionally, and perhaps personally:

> Melitta was to side with her analyst [Glover] and to show the same acrimony toward her mother. It is difficult—impossible?—to understand the reasons for such undying hate, which led Melitta to break off all contact with her mother, to the extent that she did not even attend her funeral. (Geissmann-Chambon & Geissmann, 1998, p. 117)

Glover became the good object, which Schmideberg internalized, and they were able to collaborate for many years to come. However, the internalized good object did not help Schmideberg move toward the depressive position, where she would have had an opportunity to integrate her *bad-object relations*. In the Glover-Schmideberg pair, there was a deeply disguised psychoanalytic constellation of unprocessed primitive defences coupled with envy, but without gratitude. "Glover was far too attached to his analysand—and perhaps saw her as an opportunity to replace his own daughter (who suffered from Down's syndrome) with a true accomplice" (Kristeva, 2001, p. 205).

Ultimately, Klein's transformation, from clinician to theorist in the 1930s, laid the foundation for her legacy. At the same time, as Schmideberg's aggressive rage echoed through the Society's meetings: "Melitta incurred the disapproval of many members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, including even some of the Independents, who themselves were hardly blind followers of Melanie" (Kristeva, 2001, p. 205). The

psychoanalytic narrative, Klein's personal journey as a theorist, is inseparable from her theor, as Kristeva explains: "Melanie was forced to live out the proof of her own theories" (p. 207).

Klein-Schmideberg split, leading advocates to become adversaries.

The undercurrents between Klein and Libussa impacted Klein's inner psychological landscape and consequently her relationship with her daughter. Klein may have introjected Libussa's domineering ways, which never had a chance to be mediated and tempered by another authority figure who could stand up to Libussa. This generational pattern perhaps trickled down to Klein's relationship with Melitta as more often personal and theoretical disagreements arose between them. Klein may have displaced her domineering control—Klein's inner Libussa figure—onto Melitta. In Schmideberg's shift from idealizing to disregarding Klein as a mother and a theorist, it appears that Schmideberg had challenges in successfully conquering the depressive position. Schmideberg struggled with resolving the ambivalence that was rooted in her mother, grandmother, and her own multi-generational lineage of neurotic needs.

One question is how Klein herself contributed to this dynamic, as she was very withholding of her own acknowledgment of Melitta as a clinician and theorist. Did Klein, by introjecting Libussa's overreaching authority, reenact the dynamics with her own daughter Melitta—failing to recognize Melitta, as Libussa failed to recognize Klein, despite all her loving? Graham (2009) stated, "The pattern of intrusiveness that Melanie

Klein had experienced from her mother seems to have been repeated with her own daughter" (p. 258).

In the context of mother/lay-analyst and daughter/doctor rivalry, the Klein-Schmideberg split presented powerful lessons. It is ironic that the pioneer authority of child analysis was perceived by her daughter as a failed mother. Schmideberg felt discontented with her mother due to a combination of her lack of mothering as well as Klein's professional annihilation of Schmideberg's theoretical ideas. Graham (2009) elaborated on the stormy events that took place during Schmideberg's developmental years that contributed to her object relational history:

> During much of Melitta's childhood and adolescence, her mother had left her for shorter and longer periods of weeks and months at a time initially in the care of her dominant grandmother, of whom Melitta was not found, or with servants or at boarding school. (p. 257)

Klein's "authority" in the field of child analysis gave little room for her to satisfy her daughter's personal need and desire for love early on. Consequently, Klein was not attuned enough to consider and accept Schmideberg's ideas, and would not recognize her professional separateness and identity. Schmideberg's 1948 book, *Children in Need*, is a representation of what Schmideberg never had:

> We have learned that in order to bring up children well, it is not enough to have high moral principles and an excellent character: those taking the parent's place should have great sympathy, a well-balanced personality and wide interests. . . . The child should get at least as much credit for his achievement as blame for his faults. (pp. 96, 98-99)

The title of Schmideberg's book, *Children in Need* (1948), evidences her affinity for helping neglected children. This metaphorical representation of Schmideberg's own relationship with her inner object, the "neglected child," leads to a better understanding of Schmideberg's inner object formation and organizations. Schmideberg's relational experiences with Klein—the initial idealization of her mother, the unfulfilled desire for recognition, the later professional rivalry—clearly demonstrate the struggles one may experience in the paranoid-schizoid position.

Schmideberg's sensitive attention to *Children in Need* (1948) leads the reader into the psyche of a person who compassionately identifies with neglected children. This study has explored the transference of neurosis and its manifestation between Klein and Schmideberg by dissecting the literature reflective of the complex predicaments of these multigenerational mother-daughter rivalries. Although Glover took on a dual position with Klein and Schmideberg, originally husbanding Klein's work and subsequently carrying the paternal function for Schmideberg, he personified the catalyst that liberated Schmideberg from her neurotic dependence on her mother. Glover essentially served the same function for Schmideberg that Ferenczi served for Klein. Although the outcome of this liberation was an opportunity to enter the depressive position for integration, Klein and Schmideberg never reconciled.

As the rough, unresolved emotional relationship between Schmideberg and Klein gradually deteriorated, from the time Schmideberg began analysis with Glover, Klein began experiencing some of the worst attacks from her daughter. Hanna Segal (2006) shared how she remembered Klein's thoughts on Schmideberg's analysis with Glover:

> Then she [Schmideberg] went into analysis with Glover who was also enthusiastic about Klein to begin with and they made a sort of total alliance against her. Klein was convinced that Glover actually had an affair with Melitta, though she never voiced it except to me and perhaps to other intimate friends. (Segal, 2006, p. 7)

If this is true, the Schmideberg-Glover analytic couple had a common interest: protecting their secret, which may have resulted in the activation of primitive defences surrounding their unconscious guilt. Paul Roazen (2000), in his book *Oedipus in Britain*, shared, "it has been hinted that there might have been an 'affair' between Glover and Melitta, one bit of so-called evidence being that someone recalled seeing Glover and Melitta openly holding hands at an international congress" (p. 53). Roazen's character sketch of Melitta is unsettling, as he remembered Melitta's entitled antagonistic authority during his own interview with her; in addition, Roazen elaborated, "In Payne's view Melitta was a 'devil,' and Payne thought that Glover had 'taken over' some of Melitta's aggression" (p. 57). Despite Glover's influential political position—which was beneficial for Schmideberg—he was unable to influence and control Klein's theoretical advancement. Having been rendered impotent by Klein, Glover may have developed unconscious envy for her success, which then perhaps permeated Glover's analytic relationship with Schmideberg. These dynamics may have created a fatal constellation for the relationship between Schmideberg and Klein.

The Klein-Schmideberg-Glover triad formed a unique, unconscious system wherein each protagonist activated personal, unresolved object relational residues in one another. On the theoretical front, Glover was disappointed with Klein's independence from Freud. Around 1933 Glover began to realize that he was going to fail at joining

Klein's theories with Freud's; his unconscious envy may have been activated for the steadily advancing Klein. It appears that the Kleinian definition of envy perfectly fits these relational dynamics:

> The angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable, often accompanied by an impulse to take it away or spoil it. . . . She [Klein] sees envy as a manifestation of primary destructiveness, to some extent constitutionally based, and worsened by adversity. The attack on the good object leads to confusion between good and bad, and hence difficulties with depressive position integration. (Spillius & Hinshelwood, 2011, p. 166)

The multilayered theoretical and personal relationships between Klein, Schmideberg, and Glover completely demonstrate the reality of how the primitive destructive force of envy can become activated in adversarial situations. It is ironic how Klein became involved in living through her own theory.

Through the exploration of the larger historical context—in which the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg relational dynamic was embedded—this study examined how the evolving identity of individuals and analytic dyads impact theoretical conflicts. There are specific reasons why the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg triad has been a center of this study: (1) each protagonist went through a powerful personal transformation that impacted his or her professional identity, (2) each protagonist was a members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, (3) each protagonist struggled in one way or another with the professional inequality of power, and (4) each protagonist had specific opinions about child analysis. Klein's creative and genuine approach to early development was perceived as heresy by Glover and Schmideberg, both of whom originally advocated for her as a

clinician. However, perhaps because they did not understand the meanings of her work, or saw it as a deviation from the orthodox Freudian analysis, they refused to credit her as an authority in early analysis or recognize her as a theorist with a valid theory.

Due to the constellation of these factors, whether implicitly or explicitly, each protagonist wanted something from the other two. Glover wanted Klein's theory to merge with Sigmund Freud's and began analyzing Schmideberg, sealing their camaraderie just when Klein independently appeared as a theorist the first time. Klein provided opportunities to her daughter that she herself did not have, such as medical school, and most likely expected Melitta's appreciation for her sacrifice; at the same time, Klein hoped for Glover's undivided devotion to her theory. Graham (2009) expounded, "It must be emphasized that it would not be in any way appropriate to judge the value of Melanie Klein's views on child development and child psychopathology on the basis of her behaviour towards her own children" (p. 259). As for Schmideberg, she wanted her mother's gratitude professionally and Glover's analytic support personally. This dissertation attempted to seek out causes and reasons that led collaborators to split into adversarial relationships during the early days of Klein's career.

Chapter 3.
Methodology and Procedures

The research method for this dissertation is hermeneutic textual analysis utilizing Klein's, Glover's, Schmideberg's, and their contemporaries' seminal papers, biographical recollections, letters, and archival records as a way to evoke the historical circumstances. Palmer (1969) validated, "Only with the passage of time can we grasp 'what is that the text says'; only gradually does its true historical significance emerge and begin to address the present" (p. 185).

Historically, hermeneutic researchers brought unique intentionality to the research process: Schleiermacher (1768-1834) recognized "hermeneutics as art of understanding," and at the same time he acknowledged that there is a possibility for misunderstanding that he strived to avoid (Gerrish & Sorrentino, 2005); Dilthey (1833-1911) thought of the hermeneutic process as a lived experience where the author's text transports his lived reality to the reader; Heidegger's (1889-1976) hermeneutics approach is regarded as interpretive phenomenology equaling "being there" to a "self-awakening of existence"; Gadamer (1900-2002) found that experiencing the meaning of the text is the truth; for him, understanding corresponded to interpretation, as we cannot separate ourselves from the meaning of the text, unlike Hirsch, who believed that the writer and the reader engage in a dialectical process so understanding can emerge (Grondin, 2005). Ricoeur's philosophy of hermeneutic understanding synthetized the metaphoric text symbols. He was looking for the implicit hidden meaning within the explicit meaning of the text. Ricoeur believed that understanding comes from exercising doubt in the linguistic presentation (Palmer, 1969, pp. 44-45). The multiple realities in these fine hermeneutic perspectives provide intriguing struggles that the author of this dissertation utilizes.

Enticed by the narratives, this textual analysis explores historical scripts in their original context, applying the hermeneutic circle involving the researcher's fluid and intimate relationship with the living text to extract authentic insights.

The protagonists' original scripts—Klein's, Glover's, Schmideberg's, Winnicott's and Bion's—sensitively personify their relational dynamics. Consequently, the literature reflects the transformation of their symbiotic discourses in both the professional and personal realms. The researcher's goal is to understand the relational revolution as well as evolution of the protagonists by dialoging with the scripts. Palmer (1969) placed the researcher's purpose in perspective, "When any truly great work of art or literature is encountered, it transforms one's understanding; it is a fresh way of seeing life" (p. 233). The subsequent literary procedures are used sensitively to induce meaning: observing protagonists' reciprocal citations, tracking footnotes, comparing and contrasting textual agreements and disagreements, analyzing preferred and absent references, interpreting theoretical criticisms, evaluating the disregarding silence of one another's work, and recognizing the unconscious intentions of the scripts. When there is a sense of a sudden shift in the text, the researcher looks back to recognize what caused the buildup of tension and then look ahead for the impact of the consequences.

Encountering the historical participants' roles, motivations, and actions through the primary and secondary resources aims at the dialectical essence of the hermeneutic relationship. Seeking to understand the evolution of the historical tension between collaborators and adversaries, the researcher converses with the protagonists' echoing voices through the manuscripts. However, while the written language is a vessel for communication, it should not be an obstacle in deriving psychological meaning; therefore

the researcher has to both simultaneously use and also disregard linguistic attitude, because "written language lacks the primordial 'expressiveness' of the spoken word" (Palmer, 1969, p. 15). The manuscripts' conscious content and hidden unconscious intentions will be evoked while investigating the local temporal linguistic milieu that surrounded the birth of early analysis.

Procedure: Hermeneutic and Kleinian Interpretation

This hermeneutic analysis searches for meaningful tendencies in the *action of the texts*, "Hermeneutics becomes psychological, the art of determining or reconstructing a mental process, a process which is no longer seen as essentially linguistic at all" (Palmer, 1969, p. 94). The radical splits and shifts in the texts evidence the transformations in Klein's, Glover's, Schmideberg's, and Winnicott's lived clinical and theoretical experience, which also impacted a larger context—the British Analytical Society. The scripts are enthusiastic and highly charged with hermeneutic potential. They become the researcher's living companions as they resurrect the protagonists by personifying their messages. Gadamer (2013) offered insight for the researcher: "it is universally true of texts that only in the process of understanding them is the dead trace of meaning transformed back into living meaning" (p. 163). The hermeneutic researcher is watchful of the behavior of the text—its mannerism, range of acts, moods, patterns, and attitudes—by keeping it alive, the texts' continuous existence provides opportunities for understandings the historical relevance for future generations.

Using the hermeneutic method to interpret the development of Kleinian system of understanding inherently stimulates a dialogue with historical biases. The inception of child analysis was birthed in a rich historical context. As time creates a distance, the

author of this dissertation is obliged to recognize prejudicial preconceptions as she closes the time gap retrospectively while also moving forward in the meaning-making process. The analyst's, as well as the researcher's myriad biases always present an analytic as well as a hermeneutic dilemma. Namely, how does transference-countertransference impact interpretation? Gadamer's (2013) inquiry of historicism is mindful of the contextual interpretation that is embedded in the hermeneutic process:

> How can a text be protected against misunderstanding from the start? . . . All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text. But this openness always includes our situating the other meaning in relation to the whole of our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it. . . . The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meaning. (pp. 280-281)

In other words, the author of this dissertation wants to create a dialectic experience with the historical participants. If they were alive today, how would they recognize the historical biases that surrounded the concepts and ideas of early analysis?

Compatibility of Hermeneutic Method and Kleinian Approach

The researcher posits an intimate reciprocity between the hermeneutic research method and the process by which the Kleinian object relations' approach became defined. There appears to be a commensal relationship between individuals in collaboration and their participation in the evolution of the identity of the British Analytical Society that functioned as a container of evolving theories. When collaborating theorists became antagonists, their various contributions played into the tripartite restructuring of the Society's identity. From the hermeneutic perspective, Palmer (1969) elaborated:

> The sense of the whole determines the function and the meaning of the parts. And meaning is something historical; it is a relationship of whole to parts seen by us from a given standpoint, at a given time, for a given combination of parts. It is not something above or outside history but a part of a hermeneutical circle always historically defined. Meaning and meaningfulness, then, are contextual; they are part of the situation. (p. 118)

The theoretical splits had to be reconciled in order to allow a new institutional identity to form. However, the new definition of the whole Society, in 1944, provided a character with which certain members could not identify. Glover was one of those members, an individual part, who no longer was able to find his own professional identity in any way compatible with the newly evolved definition of the Society.

Historical importance and significance now reveal a dynamic circularity, a playful moving back and forth in a dialogue excavating the dialectical impact of the part-whole relationship. For instance, counterfactual history is a variation of the hermeneutic approach, insofar as it conjectures with possibilities that have not been realized. Such an idea is that how the Society was able to negotiate three different theoretical perspectives under one roof, which was only one of the many possible outcome. Although it is true that the parts continuously shape the identity of the whole, it is also true that in this dynamic process, the whole at times will no longer contain the professional identity of an individual member. This was the reason why Glover resigned; after the tripartite division, The Society did not represent Glover's professional identity.

Kleinian object relations is similar to hermeneutic approach insofar as it derives meaning from an asymmetrical part-whole relationship where the fluid variables

continuously change the part (individual/child), the whole (parent/container/Society), and the relationship between part and whole (paranoid-schizoid/depressive positions, and restructuring). Melanie Klein's selection of analytic case materials will be used as artifacts holding concomitant intents at multiple levels: (1) the hermeneutic relevance of the cases; (2) Klein's definite aptitude for communicating theoretical interpretations; (3) timelessness in hermeneutics as well as object relations theory, namely historical relevance in contemporary analysis and the infant-part in the adult's psychological structure; and (4) the psychological acts of the text as it brings forth the *otherness* beyond the linguistic potentials of the words.

There is a corresponding reality between Klein's interpretation of child cases and the meaning-making hermeneutic process—specifically, Klein's personal history potentiating the realization of symbolic expressions of primitive emotional states. Melanie Klein brought to consciousness the meaning of play as it served young children. Similarly, the hermeneutic researcher involves herself in the playful act of excavating the unconscious meaning of the literary representations while being mindful looking beyond the words.

The author's reason for choosing the hermeneutic method is due to the notable point that Kleinian object relations theory, as an interpretive system, inherently encompasses the partial to holistic process of meanings-making, which mirrors the hermeneutic circle where meaning is essentially hidden in the part-whole relationship configuration of the text. In both, the hermeneutics and Kleinian object relations approaches, there is a striving towards integrated thinking, an attempt at interpretation in a systematic and orderly manner. Palmer reflected on Ricoeur's language, the

psychoanalyst who attempts to decipher meaning from a dream or a child's play is invariably involved in dealing with "equivocal symbols" that is symbols that have no fixed meaning. This goes straight to the heart of the hermeneutic enterprise, which deals with texts that have multiple meanings (Palmer, 1969, pp. 43-44). The text's historical context and the reader's contemporary context present an intricate juxtaposition. This is why the ethical responsibility of the researcher is critical.

> Since we understand always from within our own horizon, which is part of the hermeneutical circle, there can be no nonpositional understanding of anything. We understand by constant reference to our experience. The methodological task of the interpreter, then, is not that of immersing himself totally in his object (which would be impossible, anyway) but rather that of finding viable modes of interaction of his own horizon with that of the text. (Palmer, 1969, p. 121)

The ethical and moral commitment of the hermeneutical interpretive method bears significant responsibilities. As the individual is part of the society and accountable to the whole, interpretation of the living experience—the subjective and objective realities—is recognized to emerge from a time-bound context. Historical circumstances, cultural differences, and analytic traditions will be honored as the hermeneutic process cultivates the meaning of the lived experience.

Chapter 4.
Summary and Discussion of Findings

This research examined the inception of Kleinian object relations theory, namely, Klein's confrontations of the primitive mental states of the young child's mind, in a way that no analyst had done prior to her. Furthermore, this work investigated the larger context where Klein's pioneering work impacted psychoanalytic movements: "To her innovative thought and her talent were added an indefatigable tenacity and an unparalleled ability to guide her friends, to divide her adversaries, and to regulate envies and gratitudes—the signs of a powerful woman" (Kristeva, 2001, p. 213). In historicizing the development of early psychoanalytical theories—Freud, Klein, Winnicott, and Bion—it appears that theoretical divergence and convergence were unavoidable necessities for new thoughts to emerge. Klein's theoretical evolution began with her clinical observations that she developed into theoretical concepts; over time, Kleinian object relations theory became a dominant paradigm, which then was shaped by criticisms and further expanded by Bion and other contemporary Kleinians.

The hermeneutic method of this research viewed the inquiry as a historical dialogue that is comfortable with ambiguity and embraces the equivocal nature of the language in the literature while constantly integrating meaning. The Kleinian notion of moving from part to whole object development is also a philosophical position "linked to Klein's theory of the life and death instincts, . . . her theories of the development from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position within which there is a move from part-object to whole-object functioning" (Melanie Klein Trust, 2015, Internal objects). As universal truths may exist, but perhaps are unknowable to the human mind, possibilities are revealed by the dialectical and complementary nature of partial realities. For instance,

the dialogue, how drive and relational models can coexist without "model mixing," continuous to be a stimulating topic to present day. Fundamentally, human existence encompasses multiple truths on which theorists base their analytical work:

> It is neither useful nor appropriate to question whether either psychoanalytic model is "right" or "wrong." Each is complex, elegant, and resilient enough to account for all phenomena. . . . Each model establishes a different natural order; each can explain everything. Each model swallows up the other. (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 404)

Through critical discussions, this work continues analyzing the historical circumstances—how disciplinary cohorts perpetuated their theoretical paradigms—enabling some theories to endure and others to fall away. "Hence Klein's approach is simultaneously a drive theory and an object relations theory, though her 'drives' are becoming increasingly psychological rather than biological, and the role of anxiety in affecting their expression becomes increasingly important as her work develops" (Spillius, 2007, p. 27). This study investigated how the limitations of Klein's theoretical ideas became apparent, and then over time, how these limitations transformed or remained theoretical restrictions. Theoretical concepts each contain systematically congruent yet only partial truths, and not the whole truth, which motivates future hermeneutic dialogues about unexplored theoretical prospects, such as methods and techniques applicable for institutional reparation.

In this summary section, there are four thematically organized discussions that assess the findings by comparing, contrasting, and analyzing the conclusions. In a unique way, each of the four sections will respond to the research question: How did theoretical

disagreements, in the early history of psychoanalysis, impact the development of new theories? The following brief introduction to the discussions previews how the themes relate to the central question:

a. In the first segment, "Collaborators and Adversaries at the Inception of Psychoanalytical Theories," the scene is set for protagonists to reveal their theoretical and political intentions. The historical phenomenon—that during the inception of Kleinian psychoanalytical theory, collaborators turned into adversaries—prompted changes in personal relationships, reorganization of disciplinary cohorts, and impacted the institutional structure of the British Psycho-Analytical Society.

b. "The Individual, the Disciplinary Cohort, and the Institution" section gives a brief historical overview illuminating the dialectical nature of the Kleinian analytic encounter. This research argues that the notion of the analytic-pair is implicit within the Kleinian paradigm, despite Klein's intense focus on the inner universe of the child while historically excluding Winnicott's environmental provision. The "there and then in the here and now" idea briefly depicts the historical reality of Klein's lived experience as a mother, analyst, and theorist. While theories are shaped by the journey of the theoretician, as a living organism, theories also embrace their own histories through their embedded traditions, rituals, formalities, and protocols. This exploration illuminates the dramatic psychological reality that is continuously an undercurrent in theoretical developments.

c. Discussions of love, hate, and institutional reparation depict an aggregate summary sharing how the theoretical identity of the individual, the analytic-pair, and the institution interface impacting relationships with colleagues. In addition, elaborations on

the idea of institutional reparation explicate what this study concluded from the history of early analysis. Elucidating intricate lessons that may be utilized for institutional reparation, the researcher is hopeful that future *controversial* business meetings perhaps would not lead to unrepairable splits despite provocative arguments. Reactions to Kleinian techniques and theories paint a sharp silhouette of the premises and limitations of Klein's brilliance. This study realized the indivisible coexistence of theories and their criticisms. Although reactions and critical attitudes may have left scars on the history of early analysis, like a resilient child, the new generation of theorists will perhaps evaluate their own primitive defense mechanisms while facing challenges in the process of reappraising and raising innovative psychoanalytic theories.

d. Through the final conclusive discussion of this research, key aspects of the presented literature summarize the findings, keeping the researcher's interpretive stance rooted in humility. Just as the unconscious intentions surface throughout a child's play, this work gently and playfully closes the hermeneutic circle, holding and containing the protagonists' persecutory anxiety, aggression, and unsettled envy, so interpretations can be attained. Gardiner (1999) encapsulated the dynamic function of the interpreter in hermeneutic interpretation:

> The hermeneutic approach stresses the creative interpretation of words and texts and the active role played by the knower. The goal is not objective explanation or neutral description, but rather a sympathetic engagement with the author of a text, utterance or action and the wider socio-cultural context within which these phenomena occur. (p. 65)

This work intends to be a creative contribution to depth psychology by deepening the meaning and recognition of the interdependence between the personal and institutional unconscious phenomena. Alford (1989) stated, "if Kleinian psychoanalytic theory is correct, then it must have profound social and political implications, because it is an account of human nature as fundamental and wide-ranging as the accounts with which Hobbs, Locke, Rousseau, Marx, and Freud began" (p. 197). By no means is this work complete; and the implications of this study highlight the challenges and discuss the limitations. Although this study identified the necessity of a well balanced and confident educational, training, and business model for analytic practice, this investigation did not focus on how this could be accomplished. Recommendations for future studies reflect on directions and possible organizations as theories, techniques, and application methods mutually define one another.

Collaborators and Adversaries at the Inception of Kleinian Theories

The theoretical differences between theorists—Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Edward Glover, Melitta Schmideberg, and Donald Winnicott—were hardly separable from their personal confrontations. In her creative work, Klein initially thought of herself as a loyal Freudian, the true daughter of Freud; however, some theorists perceived her as a heretic. Gradually, her pioneering discoveries constituted a genuine and unique system standing outside of the classic Freudian bonds. "After 1935, with the two papers on the depressive position (1935, 1940), the paper on the paranoid-schizoid position (1946), and *Envy and Gratitude* (1957), she developed a new theory of her own" (Spillius, 2007, p. 26). Between 1935 and 1940, as analysts took on some of Klein's innovative ideas, Klein started realizing and had no choice but to face and accept that her role was authentic and

independent from the Freudian currents of the psychoanalytic stream. Along her journey, Klein's collaborators and adversaries were an integral part of her developing awareness and definition of her theoretical identity.

Just as particular methods—such as Kleinian interpretation and technique—are corollaries of Kleinian theory, this research found that an analyst's personal style, attitude, and temperament are inseparable from the analyst's psychoanalytic belief system. Essentially, this unconscious system (Freud calls it *System Unconscious*) has roots in the unconscious mechanisms that are developed early on in life; however, the interplay between theory and method "does not seem to have caught her [Klein's] imagination; she left it to her colleagues to point out that many of the qualities of the System Unconscious are worked into her concept of unconscious phantasy" (Spillius, 2007, p. 32).

Klein's monumental contribution was exposing the harsh terrain of the child's inner invisible universe that the child will have to learn to traverse and navigate during his or her entire life. An analyst's natural clinical affinity to trek these inner terrains of a theory—whether a Freudian, Kleinian, Winnicottian, or Bionian—comes down to the analyst's own psychic organization of navigating apparatus. The most important question is how this analyst makes meaning of a clinical journey. What system does he use to understand and process new experiences—such as Winnicott's environmental provision or Heimann's countertransference idea—that do not fit in the established paradigm or landscape? Harold Searles (1973) wrote about the *therapeutic symbiosis*, which is not only between analysts and analysands, but also between colleagues and theorists, whether

in collaborative or adversarial relationships. According to Searles, the mutually progressive process of healing, discovering, and creating is always bidirectional:

> In the context of the transference relationship, is in a sense mutual, in that the analyst too, having participated with the patient in the therapeutic symbiosis, emerges with a renewed individuality which has been enriched and deepened by this experience. (p. 250)

What would it take for the analyst to step outside of his established system and be open-minded to considering new ways of looking at a phenomenon? Most attempts to venture out of a psychoanalytic tradition are historically risky at many levels. Klein took on this difficult and precarious challenge, perhaps not realizing what she might compromise.

In the early psychoanalytic community, an analyst's hierarchical authority, such as Freud's and Glover's, may have been equated of "knowing the truth." Eventually, new ways and ideas in the old tradition inevitably caused arguments. Having a medical background presumed credibility among analysts, which particularly raised questions as Klein started out as a lay-analyst without medical training. At first, Melanie Klein's work was considered a movement away from the medical model. Having Klein's initial clinical observations as a lay-analyst compete with those of her contemporary male medical authorities—specifically, Freud's classical scientific, medical approach—presented intense challenges, but also opportunities.

Klein poured imagination into psychoanalysis; she undeniably saw through the intuitive understanding of the child's unconscious experiences, phantasies, and intentions. Klein's theoretical and clinical demeanors reflected confidence in her beliefs. She was self-assured and convinced that her clinical observations, interpretations, and conclusions

were unquestionably a true reality. Her rigid frame of mind hardly gave opportunity for other theorists to contribute innovatively. Klein's rigid and perhaps inconsiderate ways with colleagues triggered splits and perhaps caused her adversarial relationships with Glover, Schmideberg, Winnicott, and Heimann.

At the inception of Kleinian theories, collaborators and adversaries either gravitated towards Kleinian child analysis, a powerful trend of the time, or skeptically turned away from it. Klein's stubborn predisposition was on one hand a necessity for her theory to gain ground, and on the other hand caused limitations in her theory. Her rejection of other analysts' thoughts provided space for them to come forth, pick up, and utilize what she had left out. Paula Heimann and Donald Winnicott were two contributors who were initially very dedicated Kleinian theorists. However, when Heimann's new perspectives on countertransference were rejected by Klein, Heimann left the Kleinian group in 1955. Winnicott had a similar experience; when Klein did not integrate Winnicott's environmental provisions, he realized that his theoretical identity better settled with the Independents.

As analysts became involved with a more accepted collective idea of child analysis, they began coagulating into peer groups. It could not have been possible for Klein, Winnicott, or Bion to theorize by themselves, and the confluence among theorists over a period of time helped form the disciplinary allies who coalesced into their respective subgroups. Ludwik Fleck (1981) elaborated on the importance of the analytic cohort:

> If we define "thought collective" as a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction, we will find by implication that it

> also provides the special "carrier" for the historical development of any field of thought, as well as for the given stock of knowledge and level of culture. (p. 39)

The formulation of Klein's disciplinary cohorts was a natural process—included in the first generation were Susan Isaac, Joan Riviere, Ella Sharpe, and Paula Heimann (who left the group in 1955.) This original group, while nurturing early analysis, also began to recognize their social obligations such as collaboration, protection, trust, respect, and contribution. Outside of these premises were analysts who were antagonistic, criticizing, and rejecting Klein's "phantasmagoria" (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 62). These two antagonistic forces were the valves in the heart of early analysis stimulating the psychoanalytic movement from the 1930s onward.

This research found that in the process of reifying differences between theorists, the function of the disciplinary cohorts was imperative. As they attuned to each other's views, responded to criticisms supportively, and defined theoretical reasoning, they transformed ideas into concepts, and then concepts into theories. Fleck (1981), describing the role of disciplinary cohorts in general, revealed:

> Every individual belongs to several thought collectives at once. As a research worker he is part of that community with which he works. He may give rise to ideas and developments, often unconsciously, which soon become independent and frequently turn against their originator. . . . The individual can be examined from the viewpoint of the collective just as well as, conversely, the collective can be considered from that of the individual. (p. 45)

Despite Ernest Jones's advocacy for Kleinian theories, in the highly intense adversarial situation from 1935 onward, Klein's, Glover's, and Schmideberg's unconcealed

projections, primitive defenses, and mistuned identifications were reflected in their presentations, conferences, business meeting, and most definitely in their published literature. The powerful forces of transference and countertransference material became activated, and the already ambiguous collegial relationships between these theorists worsened.

As the variances between the Freudian and Kleinian theorists became evident over time, the groups organized themselves into institutionalizing the differences (See Appendix A). Consequently, this movement resulted in institutional anxiety and ambivalence in the developing identity of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, which then impacted the members' understandings of theoretical approaches, techniques, and methods in clinical work. In the book *Psychoanalytic Pioneers* (Alexander, Eisenstein, & Grotjahn, 1995), Edward Glover acknowledged the various emotional undercurrents between the analysts and recalled:

> As for the more impersonal factors activated by psychoanalytic preoccupations, in principle these are of the same nature as the resistance manifested by patients in analysis. . . . These factors can be divided into anxiety reactions, guilt reactions, and ambivalent reactions, then subdivided, according to their manifestations, into positive and negative (reaction) forms. (1995, p. 543).

During the Controversial Discussions, the institutional atmosphere became ready for a shift from a mono-theoretical to multi-theoretical training structure in the British Society. Edward Glover, a devoted and loyal Freudian, symbolized the struggles that perhaps are emblematic to all Freudians who experienced the historical transformation of not only the

British Society, but the psychoanalytic culture at large, from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous analytic community and institute.

This investigation depicted the strenuous challenges that this theoretical revolution comprised. The philosophical shift meant more than what was on the surface. The unescapable reality became actualized and the multi-perspective training system turned out to be possible in 1944, housed by the British Society under one roof, just twenty-five years after its birth. This new paradigm was a partial victory and a partial compromise for the Kleinian group. This organizational structure set forth unavoidable circumstances where the differences had to be confronted. In this milieu, the subgroups' internal perception of their ideals and attitudes was often at odds with how they were perceived by other subgroups.

This advancement provided opportunities for a wider audience receiving Kleinian training, at the same time, members of all three groups had to get along in order for the Institute to operate efficiently. In addition, the collegial transference between the theoretical subgroups often did not mirror the sensitivity of the analyst-patient encounter. Glover (1995) admitted that he could not foresee how the institute would prosper with its newly reorganized system:

> It is chastening to record the trend of my own speculations at that time regarding the future of psychoanalytic movement in Britain. Although I hoped that the standard positions of the Freudian subgroup would maintain strength, I feared that the Klein subgroup would prevail. In my opinion, the middle subgroup was a timid and unproductive formation that would probably lose influence. (pp. 540-541)

Evidently, Glover could not see the role of the Independents after so many years of holding and protecting his Freudian traditions. Perhaps, this blind spot was due to Glover's strict political agenda, which may not have necessarily been rooted in his intuitive observations of the psychoanalytic phenomena. Glover's traditional Freudian ways were no longer suitable to the institution's new tripartite character. Glover was not open to assess and reevaluate his ways, nor was he willing to negotiate his own analytical identity.

One of the many reasons Glover resigned was that he was particularly dissatisfied with the Training Committee's methods of operation. Years later, Glover openly reevaluated the original assumptions that he had after his 1944 resignation, and admittedly confessed:

> I had underestimated the British love of compromise and trimming and had overestimated the solidarity and political acumen of subgroups. Reviewing the situation in 1961, after the lapse of twelve years, it would appear that, whereas the Freudian and Kleinian subgroups are gradually dwindling, the middle groupers—for whom the expedient term "Independents" is now suggested—have greatly increased their strength and have also acquired strategic administrative power. (1995, p. 541).

In addition to Glover's extraordinary loyalty to Freudian theories, his founding devotion to the early days of the Institute's management was perhaps a difficult sentiment to give up. Glover's inherently dedicated style of maintaining the Freudian traditions is perhaps an unconscious expression of his inner psychic organizational style that he introjected early on from his strict and disciplined Presbyterian parents. When Glover gradually

realized that Klein is not interested in reconciling with Freud—although she perceived herself as Freudian—Glover may have become increasingly frustrated that he had no impact on Klein after years of supporting her. One may wonder if Glover shared Schmideberg's feeling of being rejected by Klein, with Glover imbuing the rejection with a "battle of the sexes" flavor, as Klein was a female analyst in a male-dominated profession. Looking beyond the obvious, Glover recounted:

> On the surface, the issues were regarded as purely scientific, but on examining the bones of contention, it is not difficult to single out the factor that, more than any other, has caused friction in the British Society: it can best be described as a quasi-scientific manifestation of the battle of the sexes. In its most sublimated form, it consisted of criticism of Freud's views on the mental development of women. (pp. 542-543)

Glover's urge and deep desire to initially possess "Mother-Klein's" theory and somewhat take control over it by integrating it with 'Father-Freud's" may have activated and ignited his envy. Witnessing Klein's advancement, from lay-analyst to becoming a dominant power of her Kleinian group, Glover may have experienced unconscious envious impulses that were unbearably wounding for him. As Klein discovered the hostile destructive forces of envy in the love-hate relationship, it is ironic that Melitta ended up in analysis with Glover "in order to deal with her dependence on her mother" (Roazen, 2000, p. 56). Perhaps Glover's displacing his own primitive envious emotions while treating Melitta's dependence on her mother constellated the perfect analytic disaster. Did Glover or Melitta have any chance for gratitude, the antidote of envy?

Although Glover's resignation was indicative of his loyal position to Freud, how was Ernest Jones dealing with the political upheavals? According to Glover, initially, Jones's powerful leadership was present at many levels:

> All in all, the British Psycho-Analytical Society was held together by the dialectic skill of Ernest Jones, who was quite clearly master of the situation and determined to retain full control. . . . Needless to add, the policies of the society in both internal and external affairs were at first exclusively, and later for the greatest part, determined by Jones. In fact, he operated as a leading superego of the group, holding it together by *force majeure.* (Glover, 1995, pp. 537-538)

The political agenda in the psychoanalytic movement of the time required Jones to be sensitive to creative and innovative theoretical approaches, and at the same time, carefully manage the psychoanalytic propaganda. Jones's enthusiastic support of Melanie Klein from 1925 onwards was purposeful and deliberate. One of Jones's characteristic maneuvers was evident at the Business Meeting on June 10, 1942, where Klein wanted to respond to Glover's earlier accusation, but "Jones refused to let her [Klein] speak, on the grounds that 'it would not be a good time to go further into the matter at present'" (King et al., 1991, p. 195).

This highly competitive atmosphere was a critical time for Klein, as the destiny of her theoretical baby, child analysis, was determined within the allied and adversarial relational premises of the British Society. It is an essential value to observe and learn from how Jones managed his role during the theoretical turmoil. Jones's powerful leadership has historical significance, because he was successful in paying attention to a multilayered relational dimension: the individual, collegial-pairs, and groups—all while

also dealing with the multicultural and political circumstances of the war. Jones had many talents—in business, psychoanalysis, marketing, politics, and group management. As a visionary philosopher, Jones not only utilized these assets, but creatively contributed by mediating extremely stressful and demanding circumstances between collaborators and adversaries.

This research discussed how one theorist's limitations gave leverage for other theorists' to develop new theoretical models. Freud was a prime example of having restrictions while also being a revolutionary pioneer: Freud himself had unbending confines when it came to his "progeny's" desires to integrate new insights into his already established system. Donald Meltzer (1981) explained:

> Freud could not, therefore, even though he evolved a concept of superego and spoke of internalization, come to a concept of an *internal world*. . . . He could think of emotionality only in a Darwinian way as a relic of primitive forms of communication. He therefore, as it were, confused the *experience* of emotion with the communication of emotion; . . . the limitations of Freud's neurophysiological model of the mind forms a jumping-off place for Melanie Klein's work. (p. 179)

Continuing this thought, Klein's rigid boundaries rejected Winnicott's ideas of the environmental influence on the child's development. Winnicott took matters into his own hands and gained ground in developing his own aspects about the analytic encounter. Having Bion witness Klein's rejection of Winnicott's theoretical points, Bion, like a careful middle child, learned from his observations and took the opportunity to carefully, and wisely develop his own perspectives (Aguayo, September 2014, personal communication). Bion used abstract and metaphoric ways to symbolize his thoughts.

Bion never outwardly went against Kleinian concepts. However, especially in his later work, Bion extended and developed innovative aspects of Kleinian perspectives. Spillius (2007) shared an example of this movement, "Bion's second main contribution to the understanding of projective identification has been the distinction he makes between normal and pathological projective identification" (p. 115). No doubt, even though Klein resisted many of the innovative attempts of others, she would be ultimately satisfied by seeing how, from the inception of Kleinian theory, the evolution of thought continued with the work of contemporary Kleinian theoreticians.

Through textual analysis, this investigation explored the meaning of unreconciled ruptures and how these conflicts provoked the inception of new theories. Klein would not be Klein without Freud, and similarly Winnicott without Klein, and Bion without his forebears. Although the arguments during the inception of Kleinian theories first started with theoretical disagreements, one may wonder if this is also true today. Jon Mills's experience may be emblematic, as researchers try to find their ways and identities in today's contemporary analytic movements. Future studies may investigate how the collaborator-adversary relationships in contemporary Kleinian theoretical affiliations compare with those among their classical counterparts.

There are incalculable reasons why anxiety can develop between colleagues and training candidates. In analytic institutes, colleagues and candidates not only compete for possible hierarchical status, but also are dependent on receiving a qualifying documentation that their life's financial status may depend on. It takes skill and experience to handle this sharp double-edged sword, while feeling vulnerable in the double bind. Relationships between colleagues may resemble the emotional dimensions

of the analytic encounter, as in the transferential field emotions have powerful communicative functions. Sensitive to institutional politics, Eisold (2003) stated:

> In our clinical work, we take into account such factors as the patient's transferences, defenses against anxiety, and narcissistic vulnerabilities, as well as the analyst's theoretical and personal preconceptions. Politically, however, we seldom seem to take much at all into account. It never ceases to amaze me that analysts who can be so sensitive and nuanced in their appreciation of the communicative difficulties with patients so often fail spectacularly in talking among themselves. (p. 301)

Is Eisold suggesting that analysts would benefit from practicing analytic sensibility in all aspect of their relationships? The rather unbalanced position, either idealizing or devaluing analytic approaches, has been observed in the history of analytic theories, as Freud's pioneering authority did not promote cross-fertilization of analytic aspects.

This research realized the sacrifice, loss, and tragic consequences that, more or less, Freud, Klein, Glover, Schmideberg, Winnicott, and Heimann lived through. Without reparation, mediation, or working through the differences, not only the theorists suffered, but the "patient, called the analytic profession" (Covington, 2005, p. 39) and the theories of child analysis were also impacted. Prior to the Controversial Discussions, the Freudian and Kleinian groups experienced continuous arguments and could not function efficiently under the larger container of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, as if stuck in the paranoid-schizoid position. Then, as the disciplinary cohorts engaged in *depressive discussions*, they entered the depressive position. One should not be fooled by the phantasy of the integrative process being a tidy and neat affair with a happy ending.

Although progressive in nature, the lived experience is actually quite difficult and painful, often hurtful, and may leave many casualties along the way. The history of the Controversial Discussions (King et al., 1991) perhaps accurately testifies to the painful emotional reality of the depressive position: working through the loss of the ideal, separation, self-definition, and finding peace in realizing that although one can be one's own independent person, one is also, at the same time, part of a community.

The Individual, the Disciplinary Cohort, and the Institution

One of the focal points of this investigation was concerned with the reverberating theoretical dialogues about the development of the child's psychic interior as it interfaces and is impacted by the external objects. Just as Kleinian object relations theory cannot be isolated from its influences—Freud, Winnicott, Bion, and many other theorists who partook in its development—the mind of the child cannot be separated from its community. In this section, a discussion summarizes the findings about how the lineage of theoretical ancestors were feeding, nurturing, and raising the understanding of the child's psychic reality.

Klein's clinical child cases exemplified her innovative theoretical approach and how in a dialectic context, Kleinian theory is an implicit theory of analytic-pairs. Winnicott and Bion explicated thoughts on how healing happens within, but not without the involvement of the external reality. This inspired contemporary analysts to reassess the correlational implications of drive and relational theoretical approaches. "Thus, for instance, when Klein speaks of phantasy, she purposefully ignores external reality in order to focus illumination on internal reality; yet one is inconceivable without the

other—there is no internal reality without external reality and vice versa" (Grotstein, 1982b, p. 530).

Klein's own psychic organization—her history of losses, depression, and rejections—echoed deep recognition of a child's suffering and ambivalence. Having Klein clinically relate to such experiences allowed her to understand the primitive and primordial origin of emotions such as fear, anxiety, love, hate, envy, guilt, and reparation. Her intuitive abilities enabled Klein to utilize toys so she could gain access to the child's unconscious emotional world through play actions. The use of transference and projective identification were instrumental in Klein's work with children. Klein understood how a child takes control of the object:

> Together with these harmful excrements, expelled in hatred, split off parts of the ego are also projected onto the mother or, as I would rather call it, into the mother. These excrements and bad parts of the self are meant not only to injure the object but also to control it and take possession of it. Insofar as the mother comes to contain the bad parts of the self, she is not felt to be a separate individual but is felt to be the bad self. (1946, p. 102)

This communicative aspect of projection and introjection—as a metaphoric language—brought into light the innermost turbulent emotional reality of the child. Whereas reactions from living objects shaped the child's own emotional relation to the object, toys were passive receivers; therefore children could safely manipulate them. Klein realized that the child felt free in his or her symbolic expressions playing with toys, which was equivalent to an adult's free association and dream work. By Klein's innovative techniques of using toys, she defined a new aspect of communication with children.

Through Klein's child cases, Klein's own evolving theoretical development is observable. Klein's patients, among the many children, Rita, Peter, and Dick were influential playmates, allowing Klein to visit their inner universe and by doing so, inadvertently teaching Klein about the landscape of primitive emotional states. For instance, Klein's conceptualization of the external object in conjunction with the internalized superego and its introjected relation to the ego evolved throughout her career. Hanna Segal (1979) shared the function that play serves for children:

> Klein's stroke of genius lay in noticing that the child's natural mode of expressing himself was play, and that play could therefore be used as a means of communication with the child. Play for the child is not "just play". It is also work. It is not only a way of exploring and mastering the external world but also, through expressing and working through phantasies, a means of exploring and mastering anxieties. In his play the child dramatizes his phantasies, and in doing so elaborates and works through his conflicts. (p. 36)

Klein's clinical observations constantly shaped her analytic understanding and interpretations of both positive and negative transferences, the role of the unconscious phantasy, and her understanding of the child's expressive symbolization of his inner objects. Klein's developing theories were confirmed, defined, and concluded as the content of the child's early anxiety related to the fear of the good object loss and the consequent feeling of annihilation.

In the Kleinian play technique there is a shift from the traditional way language is utilized. Klein equated the child's expressions of play behavior as symbolic language that signified the inner psychic universe: "I discussed the very considerable analogy which

exists between the means of representation used in play and in dreams and the importance of wish-fulfilment in both forms of mental activity" (1929b, p. 193). From adult to child analysis, Klein applied metaphoric communication with the child through play as a medium, allowing the child to shed off his defenses and restrictions. At the same time, Klein used Freudian terms to interpret her clinical observations of the child's play, for which she received criticism from other analysts. Child analysis was birthed in the context of the analytic family, ascribing new definitions and meaning to a new theoretical framework. Fleck (1981) reflected on how scientific knowledge is socially conditioned with the intimate gathering of the disciplinary cohort:

> Cognition is the most socially-conditioned activity of man, and knowledge is the paramount social creation. The very structure of language presents a compelling philosophy characteristic of that community, and even a single word can represent a complex theory. To whom do these philosophies and theories belong? (p. 42)

The Kleinian analytic child had a family of eager and motivated analysts who tended their discoveries and protected their ideas for the sake of the developing group identity. In this deeply complex but at the same time creative analytic inter-play, Klein attributed new meaning to language terms that were already defined in the Freudian system. Due to Klein's unique and genuine approach, on one hand were analysts who sympathized and collaborated with Klein, and perceived her methods with the greatest curiosity; on the other hand, this same approach evoked rage and antagonism on the part of her adversaries.

With respect to Klein's theoretical innovations, her resistance to explicate the analytic-pair does not mean that the analytic-pair did not inherently exist. Klein's clinical

child cases epitomized that the concepts of unconscious phantasy, symbol formation, inner objects, and projective identification cannot become realized in the infant's inner psychic system without external objects. "Kleinian analysis is too object-oriented and not sufficiently self-oriented, except for the self in relationship to an object" (Grotstein, 1982b, p. 530). The analytic-pair is the result of the transferential phenomenon, predominantly because the child's inner emotional relational patterns are amalgamated by the reciprocated exchanges with the external object. The infant's recognition of his own aggressive and persecutory drives may begin with his capacity for clarity and distinction of seeing himself through the mother, who is able to mirror the infant's emotions, instead of projecting her own emotions into the infant. It appears that there is a constant action, reaction, and interaction, as if comparable to Newton's third law of motion—where for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The analytic-pair is referential to one another and the compensatory, or defensive states of both participants factor in the transferential situation.

Kleinian object relations theory illuminates a specific psychic organization that reflected a temporal reality where the past is in the present, the unconscious is in the conscious, and the external is in the internal. However, not every theorist utilized these notions the same way. The idea of "theoretical variability" (See Appendix B) illuminated the contrasting differences between theorists' emphasis on the child, the mother/environment, or both. This research took into account the theorists' own variability, which impacted how they differentiated their analytic focus due to their own development.

The “theoretical variability” is used as an educational tool to better understand the variations in theorists’ concerns—namely, Klein’s of the child, Winnicott’s of the mother, and Bion’s exclusive interests in both. There is never one story between the patient and analyst. The researcher of this work argues that theorists’ “theoretical variability” is the consequence of the simultaneous, multiple trajectory development that factors in the inner, outer, and reciprocal psychic influences of the child, which each theorist drew from differently. Grotstein (1982b) expressed, “Kohut has called attention to the separate development of the self and of object relations. This paradigm of a dual track should help reconcile many of the difficulties Kleinians and Freudians are having in comprehension of each other’s theories” (p. 531). Grotstein’s “dual track” idea validates that the Freudian and Kleinian theories of development and psychic organization take place simultaneously; they are coinciding, and not contradictory.

As previously mentioned, concepts—whether, Freudian, Kleinian, Winnicottian, or Bionian—are part of a particular theoretical system with compatible overlap. The veracity of these ideas needs to be considered, compared, and contrasted systematically. This research observed the “theoretical variability” among the researchers and concluded that while in confluence with one another, each theorist’s focus depicted a particular scene from a larger analytic context—with Klein the child, Winnicott the mother, and Bion both—in order to get deeper into a specific psychic experience. Theorists’ arguments were viewed as efforts to point out—at times in an unforgiving and critical manner—what was missing or dissonant in each other’s reasoning and illustrative terminology and interpretations defined by their system. For example, Brierley (1937) stated, “We must interpret affects intelligently, but we can only do this in so far as we

make direct contact with them by 'empathy'. . . . To my mind, empathy, true telepathy, is indispensable to sound analysis" (p. 264). Klein was not as interested in the analyst's empathetic attunement, as in his interpretive stance.

Theorists' personal affiliations were influential and often governing factors in their theoretical disputes. Brierley (1951) "pointed out that theory has two aspects, subjective or personal, and objective and impersonal," which according to her is relevant to consider when one looks at the "'reference' of the ensuing generalizations" (p. 15). This study examined how the meanings of innovative ideas were extracted—i.e. Klein using toys to access the unconscious mind of the child—while also, the research took into consideration that an idea's interpretation was dependent on and determined by the various psychoanalytic contexts. "To understand current problems and to see them in any true perspective, it is desirable in the first instance to understand where they have come from, that is, to study them in the light of their historical development" (Brierley, 1951, p. 15). In addition, this hermeneutic analysis evidenced that the historical and clinical variables are dynamic as they insinuate an ever-evolving transformation of the analytic truth.

The reality of the multiple trajectory development involves various levels of simultaneous processes that are optimized by "binocular vision" (Bion, 1962/1984). While the ego negotiates the inner and outer forces, some processes become conscious and others stay unconscious. At the same time, love and hate become consoled and recognized as opposing powers originated in deeply unconscious sources. Grotstein's mediation of Kleinian and Freudian thoughts revealed that "a dual-track conception may help rectify many of the differences between Kleinian and Freudian ideas whereby

different points of emphasis can be held to be true on different tracks simultaneously" (Grotstein, 1982b, p. 531). Klein drew close attention to the child's psyche and found deeper meanings of anxiety manifesting in love, hate, guilt, and reparation. Winnicott's external object revealed the "good enough mother's" critical responsibility holding the child outside of the womb. Bion's shift—from focusing on the mother's and child's insulated inner reality to the analytic-pair's joined, back and forth dynamic processes—explicated the bidirectional function of container-contained, communicative aspect of projective identification, and the alliance between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions.

Klein's, Winnicott's, and Bion's progressive organizations of object relational reality painted monumental pictures on the history of psychoanalysis. Only together—while also working through their own deeply emotional realities—they complete the psychoanalytic mural. As if an artist, Bion's psychoanalytic theories revealed another dimension. Chagall's quote reflected, "I am out to introduce a psychic shock into my painting, one that is always motivated by pictorial reasoning: that is to say, a fourth dimension" (Walther, Metzger, & Chagall, 2000, p. 70). Stirring awake the tensions that are caused by the "psychic shock" and envious splits, one may wonder if reparation is the endgame of psychoanalysis. Perhaps, there is no *final phantasy,* but only the here and now process. As Chagall illustrated, in the heart of the matter, "All colors are the friends of their neighbors and the lovers of their opposites." The concepts of these theorists are unique and are also complementary, just like the colors that are "the lovers of their opposites." This study understood that theories and theorists cannot exist without one another in the ancestry of theoretical lineage.

The counterfactual approach to historical events discussed why one event became actualized out of many possibilities. The idea of counter to the factual conditions on one hand, illuminated potential collaborations that ended up in schism, and on the other hand, it revealed theoretical opportunities theorists picked up from their colleagues who resisted them. Counterfactual thinking, in a way, connected the past to the present as it disclosed hidden perspectives that became realized at various times in the history of psychoanalysis. Had Glover's resignation from the British Society manifested in an unremitting creative outcome, he possibly would have collaborated with Rosenfeld and Bion on psychotic features of the personality. However, Glover did not pursue such aspirations; he perhaps lived out defenses that one may experience in the paranoid-schizoid position. This study observed Glover's unconscious destructive and persecutory forces in response to his envy of Klein's progress. His denial of his own failure to join Kleinian and Freudian concepts, along with the splitting and fragmentation caused by perhaps unconsciously instigating and supporting Schmideberg's vicious attacks, were forms of defense mechanisms that culminated in his resignation from the Society. This research found that if Klein and her supporters, specifically, Joan Riviere, were not so resilient and convinced of her intuitive observations and did not resist other theorists' ideas, most likely, Kleinian theory would not have survived the inexorable criticisms. If Winnicott did not gain independence from the "good-enough" mother, Mrs. Klein, his theory would not have explicated the differentiation from the environment. If Bion had been more confrontational, assertively forcing his thoughts into the Kleinian context, he would have found himself in conflict with his own essence.

Bion's remarkable management of staying within close proximity to Kleinian theory, while at the same time contributing in his own authentic ways that expanded Klein's work, evidenced his clever application of his own theory of "binocular vision" (Bion, 1962/1984). Grotstein (2009) summarized, "Thus, Bion's innovations can be considered to be 'variations, extensions, modifications, and innovations on a theme by Klein'" (p. 302). Functioning in such a fine threshold of collaboration and antagonism was a challenging maneuver for many theorists throughout the history of psychoanalysis. However, having Bion witness Winnicott's expulsion and rejection from Klein, as if being the agreeable middle sibling of the family, Bion learned from Winnicott's lesson. Bion's diplomatic and independent traits reverberated in his theoretical curiosity. Grotstein (2009) reflected on his experience, "Bion beautifully epitomized it to me in an analytic session when he said the following: 'Don't listen to me. Listen to *yourself listening to me*!' . . . 'Let your own inner truth find you'" (p. 316). As if uniting the external Winnicottian object with the Kleinian inner object, Bion linked and held in mind multiple factors of the transference situation. Yet, ultimately, for Bion the truth was unknowable; however, the closest one may come to it is through one's inner objects experiencing, translating, and interpreting the meaning of O. This work explored and concluded that the challenges of depicting psychological meaning and differentiating multiple truths become exponentially demanding when the individual is part of a group, especially when the individual has a vested interest and is dependent on the group.

Since its inception and through the evolution of early analysis, the analytic lineage of theorists, Klein, Winnicott, and Bion, each in their own special way, had a powerful impact on how psychoanalytic treatment is institutionally organized, carried out

by the analytic groups, and received by individual patients. Klein's work and personal struggles were significant and influential in how analytic education became conducted after 1944. This study found that theorists' theoretical confluence—between the individual's, the groups', and the institution's developing identities—contributed to the group-mind of the Institution. The provocative historical controversies led to innovative ways to look at analytic encounters. Bion's "binocular vision" (1962/1984) provided more precise depth perception of how the same phenomenon may be experienced differently by an individual, a group, or an institution at the same time.

As theorists were part of their disciplinary cohort, they were part of a group where collegial relationships often activated primitive defense mechanisms, as was observed in the case of Schmideberg during the Controversial Discussions. The inception of a theory circles back to the first generation of theoretical parents, who themselves were raised in a particularly Freudian analytic culture. The first-generation analysts internalized a strong Freudian influence, which then became less piercing and more of a choice, as the tripartite structure became institutionalized. Each theorist, Klein, Winnicott, and Bion, expanded, transformed, and negotiated, his or her own authentic qualities with the Freudian theoretical tradition. During the Controversial Discussions in general, theorists' individual personality and political power was reflected in their negotiating and managing attitude. Grosskurth (1995) summarized:

> It is disturbing to accept that highly intelligent, well-educated people could succumb to the hysteria that swept through the British Society for some years. But one must realize that all human beings, even psychoanalysts, are subject to the same pressures; when engulfed in groups, they exhibit envy, anger, and

> competitiveness, whether the group be a trade union or a synod of bishops. (p. 362)

When a theorist's individual identity interfered with the group's identity, or in case of Glover, the institution's newly formed identity, unavoidable conflicts manifested, with grave consequences. The intimate angles of inseparable realities of theories and theorists explicated why analysts found healing in their preferred theoretical orientation. Klein's own emotional history led her to be certain that "the here-and-now elements of the transference are the most important for our analytic work past and present unconscious" (Sandler & Sandler, 1987, p. 340). Klein's very own object relations theory ironically reverberated in Klein and her daughter's tragic story, their lived experience. Melanie Klein lived and endured paradoxical realities, essentially living her life through her own discoveries, both literally and metaphorically.

This research analyzed the inception of Kleinian psychoanalytical concepts from various angles, including the aspect of their historical origin, theorists' inherent affinity towards a theoretical orientation, as well as how theories gained their clinical relevance. This historical investigation exemplified how the protagonists' primary literature revealed the contextualization of early analysis. Examining the impetus of the Kleinian evolution, Petot explained, "we know how knowledge of the origins, even the initial glimmerings of an idea, can shed light on the structure of the theory to which, at a certain moment in time, it gives birth" (Petot & Trollope, 1990, p. viii). As theories and theorists are inseparable realities, a particular theory is an inherent potential of a theorist, which leads to personal theoretical identity not always being congruent with group identity.

Melanie Klein became an icon in the history of psychoanalysis and this research investigation attempted to situate Klein's analytic image back into her original sources of influence. In all dimensions of Klein's presence, what stands out is deeply within her. As a female analyst, she drew from her female self, the breast, and utilized the most intimate psychological manifestations equal to Freud's phallic images. Klein's intuitive recognition of the child's emotional suffering most likely struck a chord with her own object relational history as emotional pain, grief, loss, and lack of recognition were a familiar patterns in her innermost psychic reality.

The multigenerational neurotic dependence among Libussa, Klein, and Schmideberg brought relevance to how each woman in her own context dealt with challenges impacting her relationships. Although Klein was dependent on Libussa's presence with her children—especially through the treatments of her depression—the ramifications of Klein's dependence may have stayed unconscious. Klein perhaps had phantasies about her own daughter, Schmideberg, depending on her, as for a while Schmideberg did follow her mother's footsteps and advocated for her. Klein's authoritative parenting represented Libussa's ways. Schmideberg responded differently to Klein's commanding traits than Klein did to Libussa. Whereas Klein displaced her desire for recognition from her mother to her theoretical advancement, Schmideberg could not find recognition from either her mother or from her theoretical achievements. Schmideberg's devastation after presenting "The Play-Analysis of a Three-Year-Old-Girl" on October 18, 1933, as a debut to the Society exemplifies this. Although Schmideberg's conclusions were supported by Glover, they were not recognized genuinely by the rest of the community. Schmideberg's conclusions did not follow strict

Kleinian concepts, as they drew in the environmental variable of the mother, which was an unpardonable move. This negative reflection of the mother in Viviane's case may have been the first time Klein saw herself in the mirror of her daughter. Klein's facing her own guilt—the possibility that she herself may have unconsciously contributed to disturbing the development of her own daughter through her absences—was intolerable. This may have led to her unconsciously rejecting any idea of environmental provision or countertransferential theories. The Klein-Schmideberg conflict was deeply personal. The unavoidable multigenerational neurotic patterns resulted in unreconciled battles involving unconscious defense patterns that constellated in the unfortunate outcome of both being stuck and operating from the paranoid-schizoid position.

Glover's support for Schmideberg was a double-edged sword. Theoretically, on one hand, Glover's own envy of Klein was soothed by possessing her daughter, and on the other hand, Schmideberg was able to replace her dependency on her mother, to Glover, a father figure who had established political influence in the British Society. By 1940, the Glover-Schmideberg coalition—however carefully staying apart from the Freudian cohort—was openly against expressing criticism and attacking Klein's work. Primary literatures evidenced how the antagonism between the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg triad was fortified. One of these texts is Glover and Brierley's book, *An Investigation of the Technique of Psycho-Analysis* (1940), where the hidden implications of Kleinian concepts were in deep disguise. The intertwined implicit and explicit influences mixed the personal with the theoretical aspects of antagonism. Grosskurth (1995) revealed Jones's opinion of the turmoil:

> "The progress of our work is at stake, in my opinion, essentially because of the disturbances to it brought about ceaseless attacks of a *personal* nature. If they proceeded from scientific differences only they would not show qualities of personal animosity that they actually do." As he [Jones] saw it, Melitta and Glover were not interested in scientific truth: "their essential motives are personal." (pp. 298-299)

It was hardly possible to separate and differentiate the theoretical disagreements from personal altercation and intricacies. The growing differences culminated during the Controversial Discussions, resulting in the tripartite institutional structure where theoretical differences—perhaps personal ones as well—could be continuously discussed in a more contained and emotionally safer analytic environment.

This study explored how in this intimately interdependent psychoanalytical paradigm, Klein as an individual, a mother, a colleague, an analyst, and a theorist evolved, differentiated, and gained power while compensating for the loss she suffered in the gains. As the individual's history is part of the individual's "here-and-now" demeanor, it can be said that the present is also potentiating the future. "There is some disagreement over when and how explicit linking with the past should be done" (Spillius, 2007, p. 56). Analysts consensually agree that one way or another, the past is being expressed in the present. The speculations and debates continue about how and in what manner this should be explicated and interpreted, so that it could be beneficial for the client.

The "there-and-then in the here-and-now" phenomenon is not limited to analyst-patient relationship, but was also observed throughout this study between colleagues and

amongst disciplinary groups. An individual's analytic reality inherently holds the "there-and-then in the here-and-now," which is reflective of the object relational patterns of personal history. The continuous growth of any individual calls for *depressive discussions* as they encounter the overarching negotiation back and forth between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Although Klein died in on September 22, 1960, her theory continues to live and evolve. "Melitta, unreconciled to the end, gave a lecture in London that day, wearing flamboyant red boots" while others "stood silent, tears streaming down their faces while Rosalyn Tureck, a recent and affectionate friend, played the Andante from Bach's Sonata in D Minor" (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 461). Melitta's absence from her mother's funeral was symbolic. Perhaps, Melitta was paying back Klein's absence from her life by being absent from her mother's death. How would Klein interpret the behaviour of this rebellious child? One may only wonder, if Klein were alive today, would she endorse the evolution of her theories? Perhaps, if Klein is truly Kleinian, she would not see it as deviation, but as a powerful extension of her own thoughts.

The historical analysis of a dominant paradigm, Kleinian object relations theory, revealed significant events—from the inception of Klein's observations, through weathering criticisms, to the influential authority of the Kleinian group—that shaped the Kleinian paradigm and gave it a definitive power. From Klein's personal reasons that evoked the necessity of her observations, through the implications that exposed analysts' concealed intentions, this work evidenced that discussions and at times, arguments have indispensable relevance in the meaning making process. This research emphasized the significance of looking deeper, beyond the clinical prominence of an idea to critically

evaluate the fine nuances of the historical context, so the creative potential of a theoretical idea can be adequately valued.

In the reality of psychoanalytic history, theorists had a personal affinity to a specific angle and context for their systematic observations. This research investigation observed applicable lessons that are relevant to contemporary psychoanalytic attitudes. An analyst's emotional history is an inherent gravitational force pulling the analyst towards understanding and working within the premises of a specific theoretical orientation, because it potentially can respond to personal matters. Rooted in the view of this intimate symbiosis of theories and theorists, Klein may have healed her own internal child and Winnicott his mother, and Bion's war traumas perhaps evoked an unconscious phantasy to desire peace. In the case of Schmideberg, she may have been acting out an intense symbiotic relationship and was healing the "delinquent" part-object of herself in her treatment of delinquent criminals. The Klein-Glover-Schmideberg triad's emblematic struggles emphasized and were a reminder of the moral responsibilities of the analyst to continuously work on his blind spots. As "good-enough" analysis may have prevented the Klein-Glover-Schmideberg relational tragedy, it would have also left fewer scars on the Kleinian theoretical traditions that challenge contemporary institutes today.

Eisold (1994), Covington (2005), Mills (2006), and Kirsner (2000) revealed the challenges and struggles in contemporary institutes, but they also consistently pointed out the dissonance between overt sensitivity of the analyst-patient relational field and consistent neglect of interpersonal relationships between colleagues and theoretical groups. Bion's work, but more so his approach to issues, provided valuable guidance linking the individual and group to perceive one another more collaboratively. Bion's

deeper postulation, perhaps his true essence, revealed a concern that lands beyond psychoanalysis; Bion was interested in the mysteries of human existence:

> Comparing my own personal experience with the history of psycho-analysis, and even the history of human thought that I have tried to sketch out roughly, it does seem to be rather ridiculous that one finds oneself in a position of being supposed to be in that line of succession, instead of just one of the units in it. It is still more ridiculous that one is expected to participate in a sort of competition for precedence as to who is top. Top of what? . . . I find it very difficult to see how this could possibly be relevant against the background of the struggle of the human being to emerge from barbarism and a purely animal existence, to something one could call a civilized society. (1992/2005, p. 377).

Bion's horrific war experiences, his observations of antagonism over dominance, facing theoretical adversities, and having the experience of being a leader himself all contributed to his unpretentious and enduring strength that managed adverse physical and psychological circumstances. Bion wondered how an individual could maintain his individual position, no matter what powers, influence, or leverage this person may experience or encounter in a group. Although the "binocular vision" (1962/1984) can be helpful for an analyst, it is also an analytic position that can be augmented at an institutional level. Institutional training may help develop this inherently "binocular vision" in candidates and disciplinary cohorts through analytic training.

Love, Hate, and Institutional Reparation

Love, hate, and institutional reparation" involves essential discussions about the indispensable role of Klein's and Kleinian object relations theories' history in the

Society's tripartite organization. Considering the Kleinian paradigm, it does not come as a surprise that the theory was a lived reality throughout the disputes and controversies. The aggressive and persecutory impulses of unconscious phantasy and primitive defense mechanisms were profoundly activated throughout the arguments between collaborators and adversaries, which reflected the developmental course of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. They brought forth destructive forces of envy and consequently, the love-hate relationship became redefined by guilt, and sometimes gratitude, for example between the loyal members of Klein's disciplinary cohort. This research investigated the historical movements where psychoanalytic theories were practically lived experiences of love, hate, and institutional reparation.

Klein played an indispensable role in the British Society's restructuring through deeply moving emotional compromises. Although Kleinian theory triumphed, it did not become a single dominating theoretical domain, which perhaps was Klein's fantasy. The necessary role of the Independents expounded the historical paradigm shift and has continued evolving in the contemporary Kleinian era. Driven by a naturally simple dichotomy of love and hate, the enormous complexity extended from the individual's own inner realization of his theoretical identity to an alliance to the larger context of the institutional organization. Klein explained, "My psycho-analytic work has convinced me that when in the baby's mind the conflicts between love and hate arise, and the fears of losing the loved one become active, a very important step is made in development" (Klein & Riviere, 1937, p. 65). Klein may have understood this developmental step through her own fear of failing to triumph her theory that she loved the most, perhaps as much as one may love a child. Subsequently, Klein learned to fight for her cause, and

with her collaborators, they created a psychoanalytic family where child analysis could be parented and raised.

In the Kleinian literature, the idea of reparation occurs for the first time in Klein's paper (1929b) "Infantile Anxiety-situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse," where Klein analyzes the meaning of "The Empty Space" richly illustrated by Karin Michaelis about a painter Ruth Kjar. Klein (1929a) concluded:

> At a later stage of development the content of the dread changes from that of an attacking mother to the dread that the real, loving mother may be lost and that the girl will be left solitary and forsaken. . . . It is obvious that the desire to make reparation, to make good the injury psychologically done to the mother and also to restore herself was at the bottom of the compelling urge to paint these portraits of her relatives. (pp. 442-443)

The idea of reparation—from the fears of being attacked, which was consistently present during the Controversial Discussion, to the compromise in order to save the love-object—happened, not necessarily by filling the empty space, but by preserving the institutional system so it might sustain providing for its members. It is necessary to mention that the external circumstances during and right after WWII were not favorable for subgroups to walk down the street and open their own independent institute.

It is essential to find meaning in how Glover's relationships changed parallel to Klein's shifting identity as she evolved from a clinician to a determined analyst and then unwavering theorist. Glover's retrospective testimonials untangled historical assumptions and evidenced his intentions (Glover, 1995, pp. 534-545). Glover's relation to Klein as an analyst was very different than Glover's relation to Klein as a theorist. Gradually, as

Klein gained more ground on her theoretical advancement, it became evident that after publishing *Psychoanalysis of Children* in 1932, Glover withdrew his political support.

Klein (1937) wrote her seminal paper, "Love, Guilt, and Reparation" (Klein, & Riviere, 1937/1984) seven years prior to the end of the Controversial Discussions. Before the battle began, Klein had an explicit recognition of how the inner world in conflict becomes antagonistic with the outside world. Moreover, she explained the delicate consequences of projection and introjection, concluding that depending on how the external circumstances unfold, the inner object world would tend to repair what it perceived to be damaged and destroyed by its own persecutory instincts. This study observed how this concealed yet explicit Kleinian reality is not limited to the infant's developing world, but was also evidenced at an institutional level where the "inner objects," or subgroups of the Institute work through their own persecutory dispositions only to reach a developmental phase where the desire for reparation would arise.

The deeply intimate and personal aspects of theorists' theoretical alliances and antagonisms illuminated that a theorist's "political intention," emotional resilience, and unconscious phantasy played a powerful role in the formation of collaborative and adversarial positions. For instance, Jones wanted a competent identity for the British Society, Glover wanted to unite Freudian and Kleinian concepts, Schmideberg wished for personal and professional recognition from Klein. Glover contested that "Melanie Klein was something of a matriarch who gave the impression that those who were not with her were against her" (Glover, 1995, p. 543). This statement verifies another aspect of object relational reality, namely, that Glover and Klein were consistently at odds in their theoretical identities. This kept their split alive.

In the lack of considering new thoughts, there is an automatic rejection of new possibilities, an exclusion of curiosity. Thomas Kuhn (1996) elaborated on paradigm shifts and explained that the presentation of a new theory does not necessarily invalidate the old paradigm; it only re-contextualizes it. Kuhn argued, "Philosophers of science have repeatedly demonstrated that more than one theoretical construction can always be placed upon a given collection of data" (p. 76). In the early history of child analysis, theorists strived for finding the one true dominating paradigm. In this process, they often disregarded some perspectives because they did not fit their system of thoughts. At times, when a concept was not accepted in one system, theorists may have developed the marginalized aspect into a systematically coherent theory. An example of this was Paula Heimann's idea of countertransference, the unconscious-to-unconscious communication.

Why did Klein not take on Winnicott's environmental provision, and why did Klein discard Heimann's countertransference idea? Why did Glover and Schmideberg change their minds despising Klein's theoretical relevance? Eisold (2003) brings forth an applicable point, namely, that "the politics of exclusion is fueled by anxiety and stiffened by defenses, to be sure, but politics is politics; something real is usually at stake" (p. 309). What was at stake for Klein rejecting Winnicott and Heimann? In order for Klein to agree, she would have to consider abandoning her most passionate part of herself, her theoretical inner child. Klein was not up for such a quest. The section on the multi-generational neurotic dependence explicated how the mother's dependency, Libussa's authority and control over Klein, and then Melitta's failed demands for her mother's recognition resulted in unstable inner object symbolization of the *mother.* Therefore, Klein, as a theoretical mother, perceived criticism as a threat and could not negotiate the

fear of annihilation. This research maintains that Klein's innermost essence as the protective authority of her *child theory,* literally and metaphorically, was at stake when rejecting Winnicott's and Heimann's ideas.

What was at stake for the Glover-Schmideberg pair rejecting Klein? Klein's professional advancement evoked envy and the Glover-Schmideberg pair found support in one another. They joined forces and precisely complemented each other's primitive defense mechanisms against envy. "For Klein, hate is most frequently encountered as a paranoid fear of aggression, which she sees as one's own hatred projected into the world" (Alford, 2006, p. 67). It is a terrifying ambivalence to be afraid of destroying all we love. Ironically, Klein again lived out the truth of her own discoveries, as she realized that envy is a fundamental emotion:

> She stated that envy is envy for the mother's breast, with its nourishing mental (the breast can transform a state of distress into a state of happiness) and physical properties. Envy for the breast is caused by the gratification obtained because the breast seems to be the holder of infinite wealth, . . . envy is born in a part-object relationship and is purely destructive. (Geissmann-Chambon & Geissmann, 1998, p. 214)

Having Glover and Schmideberg perceiving Klein as the holder of "infinite wealth," their antagonism may have rooted in the defense against envy of not being able to possess it. For different reasons, Glover and Schmideberg became disillusioned of their ideal Klein—Glover for his failed fantasy of joining Klein and Freud and Schmideberg for feeling consistently overruled by Klein emotionally and professionally. The intolerable pain of not being able to share or own Klein's "infinite wealth" left Glover and

Schmideberg the unconscious phantasy to try to destroy it. Meltzer (1981) pointed to the dominating impact of inner reality on relationships:

> It is in the internal world of [object] relationships that meaning is generated and deployed to relationships in the outside world. . . . It is in this congruence of internal objects that brings people together and it is living in different worlds that drive them apart so that they cannot communicate with one another. (pp. 180, 184)

This enquiry revealed that when a theorist's innermost object relational essence is at stake, the Kleinian analytic reality of envy in the love-hate relationships becomes activated. Reparation requires a shift of perspectives where inner object relations can be reassessed, reorganized, and re-integrated.

Through the development of psychoanalytic theories, this research examined historical debates and found deep roots of love and hate among the protagonists. Whether these emotional dynamics became explicit, or operated unconsciously, they naturally contributed to group formations that eventually led to institutional organization. Harold Blum (1981) reflected on the Freudian traditions emphasizing the essential superego function of the "analytic group." Blum stated that analytic education needed to foster the individual's motivation to discover his own analytic insights, because "autonomous analytic identity" is an inherent factor in an individual's analytic attitude:

> Analysis is a lonely and isolated profession, and the individual analyst needs the analytic group. The group analytic superego should function to reinforce the individual superego support of insight and insistence on integrity rather than the devaluation of analytic ideals and the obstruction of truth and insight into the self

> and others—into what psychoanalysis has revealed concerning "human nature." (p. 545)

The theoretical confidence that a disciplinary cohort represents also reveals how the members of that group will perceive the idealization or "the devaluation of analytic ideals," similarly to the child unconsciously introjecting the parental superego. Klein's pioneering role in theoretical contributions and her often criticized personal attitude are vital forces and provided a fertile ground for this research. From being an observant mother and lay-analyst, Klein became a fearless leader of her Kleinian Group, which came with an assertive attitude and authority.

The history of Kleinian analysis led this research towards better understanding of what it takes to institutionalize a dominant theory and the meaning of reparation not only between the analytic-pair, but at an institutional level. Institutions carry on the responsibility of training analysts, instilling an analytic attitude that carries out theoretical perspectives. Like the ego development in a young child, the disciplinary cohort replicates the progress within the container of an institute. Joan Riviere (1936), one of Klein's loyal collaborators from early on, commended Klein for her contribution:

> It is the wealth of phantasy-life dealing with wishes and aims to do good to the object for its sake, for its happiness and well-being, found by Melanie Klein and her followers in tiny children, that provides the best evidence for our views. This material brings into our theoretical discussions the huge topic of the attempts at reparation, and their great importance for ego-development. The significance of the phantasies of reparation is perhaps the most essential aspect of Klein's work. (p. 408)

This investigation observed the reciprocity in how institutional politics influenced theoretical developments and how early analysis impacted institutional organization. Namely, psychoanalytic history revealed that there are specific circumstances that foster clinical observations becoming a dominating theory. Klein's inherent ability to see beyond the obvious presentations of children was the impetus for her theory. When Klein framed her discoveries, she provided evidence for her clinical enquiry and established the foundation for her legacy. From the inception of an idea, through its transformational processes, it has to endure criticism and needs the support of a disciplinary cohort whose members then will propagate it.

This research examined and critically evaluated the historical phenomenon of theorists in a creative partnership of productive work, coming to an antagonistic position and completely disregarding the collaborative nature of their originally shared experiences. Table 1 is an aggregate summary that organizes the inherent causes as well as the essential effects of this investigation evidenced by the hermeneutic analysis of primary and secondary literatures.

The systematic view in Table 1 reflects and summarizes the research findings. It includes significant factors that potentiated "Collaborators Turning into Adversaries in the Inception of New Theory" and then how "Institutional Reparation" mediated the individual and group differences. The inherent causes of transformation from collaborators to adversaries appeared to be rooted in three domains: (a) the theorist's belief system which is partially learned through clinical training and partially inherent; (b) personal inclinations that are mostly based on the analyst's inner authentic object relational history; and (c) the analyst's devotion, or idealization of a particular system

causing rigid attitudes and undervaluing of new perspectives. The gradual development of an antagonistic position—from the individual to groups—revealed integral effects: (a) it changed the institutional infrastructure; (b) it potentiated formation of new theoretical groups; and (c) it called for more efficient, patient population specific (child versus adult) or analytic-pair oriented (transference focused) techniques and methods.

Table 1.

The Cause and Effect of Collaborators Turning into Adversaries

Collaborators Turning into Adversaries in the Inception of New Theory	
Inherent Cause	**Inherent Effect**
• Theorist's belief system (clinical truth) • Theorist's personal inclination • Theorist's undervaluing new perspectives	• Formation of new theoretical groups • More efficient, patient population specific techniques and methods • Change in institutional infrastructure
Institutional Reparation	
Members (Individual)	**Organization (Group)**
• Adaptable theoretical identity • Analyst's alliance with analytic cohort	• Institution's support of authenticity • Analytic cohort - Institution identity

In response to the evolving cause and effect issues between collaborators and adversaries, by 1944, the Institution's reorganization of training and analytic education became necessary. What did this institutional reparation entail? Although reparation perhaps insinuates compensation for the damage one may have suffered, institutional reparation in 1944 was about establishing parameters for more efficient operating principles. The Kleinian, Freudian, and Independent groups continued functioning in the ensuing negotiation of analytic truths. Looking at this historical event retrospectively, the three disciplinary cohorts were part of one family with evolving theoretical systems able to continue the *depressive discussions*. With the benefit of hindsight however, this research argues that fundamentally the groups negotiated their own emotional defenses that became activated by considering the possibility of multiple analytic truths.

The complex historical circumstances ensued a tripartite-in-one institution allowing continuous *depressive discussions* bringing forth opportunities for institutional reparation. Blum (1981) expanded on the role of the superego in the analyst's genuine individual development:

> The continued working through of infantile or pathological strictures and standards, values and ideals, is inevitable in analytic work, and if it is evaded, the stage is set for professional as well as personal problems. An unresolved transference split, for example, between protective and punitive educators, may be the forerunner of later divisive tendencies in the analytic group. The analyst should become "his own person," and this developmental liberation is probably a never-ending inner struggle throughout the life cycle. Analytic identity and ideals are subject to regression and progression, to internal and external pressures. (p. 546)

Blum's perspective is relevant in the Klein-Winnicott-Bion dialogues. While Bion witnessed Winnicott's rejection by Klein, Bion stipulated a more subtle and careful expansion of Kleinian thoughts. Each analyst's individual construct reflected their theoretical principles which defined their analytic identity also illustrated by having Winnicott being in supervision with Klein and Bion in analysis with her. How were these two men "mothered" differently by Klein?

Winnicott may have perceived Klein's "mothering" educational stance as "punitive" instead of "protective" and gained independence from the disciplinary mother figure when she rejected his environmental provision concept:

> Melanie Klein was initially happy to have Winnicott as a disciple, but when he began to develop ideas of his own about the nature of infantile anxieties, ideas that he himself saw as extensions of Klein's theories, though she did not, she rejected him and forbad her trainees to go to his lectures. He found this extremely painful. (Graham, 2009, p. 255)

Whereas Winnicott pursued theoretical collaboration with Klein and eventually became rejected, Bion was in an analytic transferential situation with Klein. Bion initially made a deal with the "mothering" analyst, insisting "that he was his own person when it came to thinking and reacting" (Grosskurth, 1995, p. 427). Bion's boundaries with Klein were evident when "On one occasion, after a Scientific Meeting, Klein was found weeping in the hall because Bion had failed to give acknowledgement to her" (p. 427). Blum (1981) summarized, "Analytic exploration requires freedom of curiosity, choice, and direction without childish concern for approval or disapproval, or irrational conflict over submission, defiance, or reliance on authority" (p. 546). The two men, Winnicott and Bion, were mothered differently, as they also had different intentions in the analytic encounter with Klein.

Reactions to Kleinian techniques and theories explicated that Klein's theories were criticized for her personal, theoretical, and clinical dimensions. Parallel to Klein's theoretical advancement, the critiques conglomerated around the topics of the role of phantasy in character development, her interpretation techniques, Klein's projection in infant analysis, and the dichotomy of the ego and superego. Within the interdependent existence of theory and its criticism, theorists had a chance to shape and reevaluate their own limitations. Historically, at times this became extremely unsettling, as concepts with

tremendous value are relative to the system that they are perceived by. What appeared to be a fact is that interdisciplinary correspondences to Kleinian discoveries were evident. The limitation of this investigation calls for future studies on how interdisciplinary literature can utilize Kleinian theories.

The reactions to Kleinian techniques and theories are multidimensional. Whereas some responses were constructive, practical, and creative, others expressed critiques that contained oppositional elements and were harsher, more evocative, and more accusative in nature. This research aggregated these responses to be categorized into theoretical, clinical, and personal, perhaps emotional reactions. This research argues that the lack of sufficient clinical supervision may have contributed to the interference of personalistic factors (e.g. too much power concentrated in one person) before 1923. In the early history of psychoanalysis, supervision and analysis may have been undifferentiated from one another prior to the 1923 programmatic statement of the Berlin model of analytic training. That model posited three factors, personal training analysis, clinical supervision, and didactic courses. The pioneer generation of analysts—Freud, Jones, Glover, and Klein—who themselves were not supervised may have realized that this distinction was necessary (refer to Appendix C).

In the coagulation of analytic cohorts, three analytic attitudes exposed invaluable influences of how theories and theorists amalgamated, which also influenced analysts' reactions to theoretical realities. At first, to become an analyst in the 1920s was in fashion and esteemed. However, one needed to satisfy the psychoanalytic training requirements that obligated candidates to interface with colleagues and members of an analytic community, which was hardly possible to do without idealizing one another's analytic

work. Second, in the early 1900s, entering into analysis with colleagues was common practice, analyzing family members and children or spouses of colleagues was promoted, and in addition, engaging in editorial and translating activities was an acceptable approach. The analytic milieu appeared to be in an undifferentiated state, perhaps similar to the analysts, who lived within it. Lastly, the transferential nature of master-disciple analytic dyad's was not adequately explored and consequently, unconscious tension in the transference and countertransference situation often resulted devaluating remarks, disappointment, and discontent. Balsam (2009) summarized this complex reality following Schmideberg's disenchantment with psychoanalysis and candidly with her Mother, Klein:

> The early analysts freely involved and analyzed family members, analyzed their own and each other's children, and wrote and translated papers in collaboration with each other. Those were the days before awareness dawned about the deleterious impact of such arrangements on the evolution of identity. (p. 1169)

Nowadays, with the better understanding of the impact of transference and countertransference reality, theoretical collaboration, theoretical divergence, analytic training, supervision, and personal analysis necessitated more defined boundaries. The analytic situation involves the opportunity for processing and working through not only the individual's own unconscious drives, but also the unconscious aspects that become activated more through the relational aspect of the analytic encounter.

At the inception of early analysis, while various schools of thoughts began to emerge, the psychoanalytic literature of Kleinian techniques and theories evoked contrasting ideas, complementary influences, and explicated implications of Kleinian

object relations theory. The themes that theorists criticized the most were essential trigger points that were informing and guiding understanding in the evolution of psychoanalytic theories. The process of comparing and contrasting views through literary criticisms promoted better understanding of how organization and reorganization of theoretical links within its historical context took place. Oppositions, incongruities, disagreements, and accusations have played an inherently significant role in psychoanalytic interpretation. This dissertation found that the historical context in which Klein's theories and critiques were produced provided better understanding of the broader discourse on the early psychoanalytical culture where Kleinian object relations theory was born.

Conclusions and Research Implications

Understanding the historical context of Kleinian object relations theory's development has contemporary relevance. Through the hermeneutic literature analysis, this research investigated how disagreements between Klein and Anna Freud, Glover-Schmideberg and Klein, and Winnicott and Klein, whether theoretical or personal, powerfully influenced and shaped the history of psychoanalysis and the development of new theories. As if in an epic psychoanalytic saga, Kleinian object relations theory is embedded in a symbolic and metaphoric play, prophesying contemporary movements. Wilfred Bion, at one time Klein's analysand, took on some of Klein's theories and deducted figurative and more abstract meaning while also being able to successfully manage psychoanalytic politics. This research concluded that theoretical divergence, splits, and schisms between theorists were inevitable and subsequently impacted institutional organization. Thus, it is practical and useful to focus attention on the roots of

theoretical and personal differences, as they may also cause ruptures in present-day analytic practice.

Klein's concept of reparation is a process where the individual becomes capable of joining the inner split of love and hate. Initially, primitive and aggressive emotions in unconscious phantasy threaten to destroy the love object. This process evokes unconscious guilt, due to the persecutory phantasies against the love-object. When the feeling of guilt is implicitly recognized, instead of fragmenting, the individual attempts to restore or restitute the loved object. The feeling of guilt, remorse, or regret is reached at a specific moment of development or growth throughout the lifespan. It is at the point where the individual becomes capable to sense and witness—through his inner awareness of reverberating consciousness—his own persecutory tendencies, when he gains clear recognition of them along with a sense of responsibility. While reparation at an individual level requires various factors to constellate, this research concluded that at the institutional level, this complex process begins with the analytic-pairs' and cohorts' recognition of an institution's "good-enough" parenting. When analytic institutes provide confident and dedicated education and training support for candidates—free from financially exploitive, rigid, and dogmatic tendencies—in spite of the rigorous challenges, candidates may successfully conquer the depressive-position.

Klein's enduring discoveries established a new thinking system that required the re-definition of classical Freudian terms. In this process, Klein faced intense rejection and antagonism where she stood on both sides of the equation; Klein was being left out and also, she left others out. Historically, it took Klein herself to realize that she was deviating from classical Freudian theories. As Klein gradually diverged from Freudian

thoughts due to her own genuine theoretical understanding of clinical reality, Freud became disenchanted with Klein's ideas. The same phenomenon happened between Winnicott and Klein, and Heimann and Klein. Antagonisms inevitably had personal flavors, even when they began solely with theoretical differences.

The Schmideberg-Glover and Klein split differed from other splits, however. Glover's personal disillusionment with Klein began with his realization that his own political aspirations would go unmet as Klein became a theorist, instead of just a clinician. Klein's continuing independence threatened Glover's attempts to unite Freudian and Kleinian thoughts, exacerbating his own personal rage against Klein. Glover's subsequent allegiance to Schmideberg and her analytic perspectives led to a completely antagonistic and adversarial situation. The personal flavor of the Glover-Schmideberg and Klein antagonism was evident. Glover's (1949/1956) retrospective bittersweet account reflected, "Under the transference conditions existing during training-analysis, it is difficult to prevent a teacher's error becoming a student's cult," perhaps reflecting on Klein's intuitive, or according to Glover, rather subjective approach to psychoanalysis (p. 352). Furthermore, Glover was convinced:

> What psycho-analysis needs in the future is what it has always sorely needed, an accession of scientific workers, . . . whose interest in research or in the formulations of new theories is disciplined by scientific controls rather than regulated by "intuitions", which are often little more than subjective reactions. (p. 363)

Glover's starvation for scientific evidence in psychoanalytic framework defines not only his approach to psychoanalysis, but also his securely fixated loyalty to Freudian roots.

This research has shown that historically, splits most often began with theoretical disagreements and divergence, which later, in some cases, manifested in personal schisms as well. Some contemporary literature revealed that in today's psychoanalytic milieu, a theorist's affiliation with a specific theoretical identity determines prospective support or rejection. Taking psychoanalytic theories and utilizing them not only with patients but also among colleagues is a necessary action. As part of analytic training, reparation procedures, techniques, and modalities, thus appear to be invaluable essentials.

An example of the process where analysts inevitably engaged in a dialectical theoretical relationship with perhaps the unconscious intention of reparation was when the London and Viennese schools began their exchange lectures. As previously mentioned, Joan Riviere responded to Robert Waelder's presentation, hosting a loyal Kleinian scheme, with reparation being the unspoken goal. Reparation occurs when the infant has in some way injured the internal object and thus feels guilty. Although in the infant, reparation occurs largely on a psychic level because the child does not have the power to act on the external world, in the organism of the psychoanalytic community, this process was attempted by Riviere and subsequently by others. As the infant seeks to reverse this perceived or actual damage or injury, so too did many of the various theorists, seeking a negotiation between the ego of their own positions and superego of the various theoretical stances. Whereas the dialogues created anxiety, they also confirmed differences, and led to deepening of the theorists theoretical identities. This was the way that Kleinian theory was birthed: "Fear, hate and envy are so feared that steps are taken to destroy awareness of all feelings, although that is indistinguishable from taking life itself" (Bion, 1962/1984, p. 10). Theorist and theory shape one another.

Where Bion found his home in Klein was in her fearless confidence in the destructive instinct, the death drive that Bion actually experienced during his military service in World War I. Klein thought of the destructive forces of the infant as it is stimulated by the "death drive," and Bion expanded this thought later on speculating that human destructiveness is inherent in the mind.

Analyzing the primary literature in its temporal context brought forth new understandings. Viewing the texts as phenomenological interviews, each group of texts evoked a hermeneutic understanding of the various themes: (a) collaborators and adversaries represent the Kleinian love hate relationships; (b) the identity of the individual, analytic-pair, disciplinary cohorts, and institute interplay in the advancement of theoretical understanding; and (c) reparation is an inherent capacity of an established system that will only potentiate the manifestation of reparation when the specific factors become aligned. The criticisms offered interpretive stands where Klein's innovative explanations were contrasted with other theoretical aspects. This instigated further contemplations on unconscious phantasy, inner object development, and primitive defense mechanisms in the transferential field. The development of identities endures corresponding qualities, whether the subject is a developing child, an adult patient, an analyst, or an organization. The aggregate new understandings then answered the research question: Theoretical disagreements, in the early history of psychoanalysis, not only impacted the development of new theories, but were necessary and shaped the understanding of clinical reality.

The hermeneutic research design suited the inquiry and the methodology carried out the purpose of the research, which was to find meaning in collaborators turning into

adversaries. Hermeneutic and Kleinian methods are reflective of part-whole relationships and nonlinear psychological developments. They naturally coincide with bearing in mind a frame of reference in the meaning making process. The hermeneutic methodology of this research intended to bridge the historical contexts in which psychoanalytic theories were born. Loewenberg (2007) elaborated on this unique reality:

> There is a congruence of hermeneutic method between cultural history and psychoanalysis which includes a recognition of the subjectivity and self-reflexivity of interpretation; a quest for the latent meanings of manifest artifacts, symbols, and conduct; a recognition of the centrality of emotions in the structuring of motivation and action; . . . an empathic method of understanding that includes the ability to engage with the cultural, social, and historical assumptions and background of the analysand or the subject. (p. 33)

Attempting to understand past historical developments from present time required the researcher to hold in mind and consider multiple perspectives such as the cultural context of past time and the conflicting intentions of protagonists, in addition to how implicit and unconscious meaning were transmitted through the literature. The researcher argues that object relational patterns observed in the "here-and-now" transferential process potentiate future tendencies.

Saint Augustine stated that present time exists in three forms: present of the past, present of the present, and present of the future, because neither the past nor the future exists without the present (Augustine, 1961). Saint Augustine's philosophical argument—only present time exists—validated the "there-and-then in the here-and-now" temporal aspect of the Kleinian analytic phenomenon. Klein believed that the play

presentations of the child symbolized inner object relational representations of the "here-and-now" transferential situation as well as historical events. Furthermore, the understanding of this phenomena calls for sensitive interpretive stance not limited to the analyst-analysand relationship. Spillius (1988b) beautifully explicated a relevant point: "Premature links with the past, like premature links with bodily expressions of unconscious phantasy, are likely to lead to talking about emotional reality instead of experiencing it" (p. 15).

Recognizing the "there-and-then in the here-and-now," namely, how pivotal events in psychoanalytical history shaped theorists' identity and analytic perspectives (i.e. Glover's positive support and negative criticisms only 12 years apart) is crucial in how theorists today consider analytic challenges and manage collegial issues. The intricate complexity of the early history of Kleinian child analysis reflected how from the inception of thoughts, ideas turned into theoretical concepts, gathered disciplinary cohorts, and became a dominant paradigm.

One of the conclusive responses to the question of how clinical observations become the dominating paradigm, is that there must be a series of linked observations corresponding to one another, which must then fit into an organized system, and that is the answer to part of a larger context. This creates a new authentic perspective about something truly obvious, such as a child's play. For these reasons, exploring a theoretical concept out of its context requires delicate administration and reevaluation of the meaning making process. The inception and developmental obstacles a theory goes through in order to become a leading model also determines the boundaries and limitations of that theory. The history of early analysis resembles the development of a

child himself with its wounds and promises. This study is a contribution to depth psychological explorations recognizing the untamed forces of the human unconscious. Ernest Jones's (1957) retrospective insights evoke lasting thoughts of analysts' moral accountability in the psychoanalytic profession:

> Still graver is the consideration that man's destructive powers have been so fortified by the recently acquired knowledge of new weapons that it is now within his reach to achieve devastation beside which the efforts of an Attila, a Timurlane or a Genghis Khan are but the puny gestures of an infant. . . . *The control man has secured over nature has far outrun his control over himself.* . . . Man's chief enemy and danger is his own unruly nature and the dark forces pent up within him. (p. 441)

Limitations

Guided by several Kleinian analysts, the literature that was analyzed in this research comprised a wide-ranging and comprehensive selection. However, the literature that was utilized is limited to the fraction of the literature from the immensely broad field of published psychoanalytic materials. Whereas the presented literature produced very rich historical evidence, there were essential questions in this study that were left for speculations. For example, the researcher could not locate Glover's essay "Examination of the Kleinian System of Child Psychology," which he presented in 1934 at the 13th International Psychoanalytical Congress in Lucerne. It would have been relevant to compare this version of the paper to the one that was actually published in 1945. The absence of the 1934 version of this paper ignites curiosity, as this was the critical time for Klein beginning to establish herself as a theoretician, and which was not a favorable

outcome was for Glover. Similarly, incomplete resources of direct personal correspondence between Klein and her daughter Schmideberg, Glover, and Schmideberg, and between Bion and Winnicott, leave questions unanswered. To overcome this obstacle, this hermeneutic exploration scrutinized protagonists' citations, usage of analytic terminology, and footnotes.

In the meaning making conundrum, the psychobiographical section of the research inevitably evoked the researcher's projections and inherently included the subjectivity of the researcher. With this in mind, the limitations of this study recognize the researcher's lack of personal experience of analytic training prior to this research. Being an outsider to direct analytic experience may be a possible limitation, but may perhaps be a possible benefit, one reason being that no personal gain or loss was at stake while conducting the research and forming conclusions. The researcher factored herself into the boundaries of this investigation, taking into account that an analyst with first hand direct encounter with analytic training and being a member of an analytic institute might have different perspectives, leading to diverse conclusions.

Although this work revealed significant perspectives, the generalizability of findings would necessitate further investigations and perhaps personal experiences in the analytic field. The implications of this examination considers that generalization of the conclusions relies on the investigated text and the researcher's position, which although thorough, was incomplete and leaves room for future explorations.

Further Research

Further research is needed in the analytic field to realize how financial drives impact institutional organizations, how application of theoretical models set boundaries

in analytic training, and how contemporary theoretical identities interface. In a highly competitive analytic field, more efficient business and educational organization plans can ensure that institutional reparation can be remedial, not only between analysts and patients, but also between colleagues and theoretically divergent subgroups. The turbulent history of early analysis is a reminder of the tremendous work ahead:

> This "depressive position" is so painful that to escape it he tends to deny either that his destroyed good objects are good or that they have been injured. . . . But so far as he can tolerate depressive feelings, they give rise to reparative impulses and to a capacity for unselfish concern and protective love. (Klein, Heimann, & Money-Kyrle, 1955/1985, p. xiii)

Further research is also needed to develop plans and procedures contributing to a well-organized model for institutional reparation. Whereas this dissertation focused on reparation at the institutional level, in future studies this concept could be taken into other organizations or could possibly be applied to other societal groups. Future studies may specifically explicate "Reparation Modalities," drawing from Covington's (2005) idea of "The Institution as Patient," potentially considering ongoing dialogues focusing on personal, theoretical, and clinical differences among analysts. In the spirit of both Winnicott and Bion, having neutral, trained facilitators who are equipped with binocular vision and who can hold the transitional space might lead to discussions "less controversial," while decreasing anxiety caused by fear about rejections and exclusions from disciplinary groups or failure to complete institutional requirements.

As the unconscious is truly unknowable directly, this study hopes to ignite curiosity in theorists to become consistently able to see the benefit of playfulness,

maintain their analytic sensitivity towards change, and develop binocular flexibility for critical evaluation of new thoughts. Future studies may explicate how analysts can learn to manage *depressive discussions* leading to progressively more meaningful decisions. In addition, more research is needed on how by reducing the fear of differences, respectful arguments among colleagues can be more theoretical in nature instead of personal, so that reparation can naturally unfold.

The consistently evolving theoretical advancements in psychoanalysis invite creative ways of looking at treating the developing mind of the child. One may ponder in future research how, in light of cultural globalization and technological advancement, the child's mind today presents itself as compared to that of the child Melanie Klein first used toys to play with during WWI and WWII. In future studies, the researcher is eager to shed light on how Kleinian theories can be extended, considering how the psyche of a child is impacted by technological advancement in the 21st century. With Nietzsche's inspiration, "One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil," this researcher continues her passionate research through playful encounters with the child's mind that are inherently present in any human interaction (McGuire, 1974, [Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, quoted by Jung to Freud, 1912]).

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Appendix A: Key Differences Among Theorists

	Collaborative Similarities	**Apparent Collaborative Similarities**	**Differences and Divergence**
Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein	**Countertransference** S. Freud and Klein both thought countertransferences was personal interference	**Transference** S. Freud: past to present- Freud's unconscious is the past unconscious Klein: unconscious is the present unconscious inside to outside now (projection) **Death-Instinct** S. Freud and Klein both used this concept	**Superego** S. Freud: paternal Klein : maternal **Death-Instinct** S. Freud: biological drive Klein: fear of death exists in the unconscious, manifesting in destructiveness **Guilt** S. Freud: develops after the resolution of the Oedipus/superego Klein: in infancy associated with weaning
Anna Freud and Melanie Klein	Children can be analyzed	**How to do analysis:** Anna Freud and Melanie Klein both kept the analytic frame seeing children several times per week	**How to do analysis:** Anna Freud: Preparatory/educational period needed in the treatment of latency children (positive transference emphasized) Toys: used to develop positive rapport Melanie Klein: Analysis of prelatency age involves immediate analysis of positive and negative transference Toys: used as a tool to reveal unconscious phantasies and projections

Melanie Klein and Edward Glover	Both, latency and prelatency aged children can be analyzed	**Freudian Roots:** Both thought that Klein's and Freud's work can be synthetized	**Political:** Glover perceived Klein as a significant deviation from Freud after 1935
Melanie Klein and Melitta Schmideberg	Klein supported Melitta's education in medical school and in analytic training Melitta supported her mother's work	**Personal Conflict:** Klein and Schmideberg both experienced an irreconcilable separation individuation crisis	**Split:** Schmideberg: did not feel recognized by Klein and became an outspoken opponent of Klein's work
Melanie Klein and Paula Heimann	**Object Relations Theory:** Klein: analyzed Heimann for 16 years Heimann: was an outstanding advocate for Klein during the Controversial Discussions	**Transference, Projection, Introjection:** Klein and Heimann both agreed on Klein's analytic innovations	**Counter-transference** Klein saw it as personal interference while Heimann also saw it as unconscious to unconscious communication Klein: did not recognized Heimann's advance
Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott	**In supervision with Klein** Winnicott was analyzed by Joan Riviere They agreed there is an infant part in an adult Agreed on the depressive position and manic defenses	**Object Relations Theory:** Klein agreed with Winnicott but did not utilize maternal provision in her theory	**Developmental Phases:** Klein: paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions Winnicott: undifferentiated unity, transition, relative independence They argued about the instinctual bases of envy (i.e. death instinct) Disagreed on the role of the mother
Donald Winnicott and Wilfred Bion	**Klein's impact:** Whereas Winnicott was supervised, Bion was analyzed by Klein Winnicott and Bion agreed on the environmental impact	**External Environment** Winnicott: officially understood mother is a variable Bion: baby and mother are both variables	**"Holding and Containing"** Winnicott: more like physical holding Bion: emotional containment; alpha function, beta elements

Melanie Klein and Wilfred Bion	**Klein's impact:** Bion: analyzed by Klein & chose Klein as training analyst at British Psycho-Analytical Society	**Klein:** positive inner mother object **Bion:** negative inner mother object	**Klein:** interested in personal growth **Bion:** interested in groups and the society at large

Appendix B: Theoretical Variability: Key Differences Among Theorists

Theoretical Variability, is an educational tool to better understand the variations in theorists' concerns and the historical evolution of how theories are conceptualized

	Mother	Child	Analyst	Explanation
Klein	DV	IV	C	Klein puts the child as the variable, the one who changes and the mother acts accordingly
Winnicott	IV	DV	C	Winnicott puts the mother, the external environment, as the variable and the child acting accordingly
Bion	When Mother is IV When Mother is DV	The Child is DV The Child is IV	C	Bion believes, both the mother and the child reciprocate being IV and DV
Independent Variable (IV)	The factor that changes or is controlled to change.			
Dependent Variable (DV)	The factor that is impacted by the change of the independent variable. The value of the dependent variable is caused by and depends on the value of the independent variable.			
Constant (C) or Controlled Variable	Remains constant. (In an analytic encounter, if the analyst acts upon the impact of his countertransference, he will be pushed towards becoming DV.			

Appendix C: Analysts and Analysands

Theorists	Analyzed by	Supervised by	Worked Together
Melanie Klein (1882-1960)	Sandor Ferenczi 1914 Karl Abraham	Brief supervision with Karl Abraham followed by entering analysis with him	Joan Riviere Susan Isaac Betty Joseph Hanna Segal Herbert Rosenfeld Elliott Jaques Wilfred Bion Donald Meltzer
Anna Freud (1895-1982)	Sigmund Freud 1918-1921 and 1924	Sigmund Freud	Kate Friedlander Dorothy Burlingham Willi Hoffer
Ernest Jones (1879-1958)	Sandor Ferenczi	Jones relationship with Freud perhaps included informal and indirect case discussion	Sigmund Freud Edward Glover Melanie Klein Joan Riviere
Ernest Jones's Family Wife and children	Melanie Klein	N/A	N/A
Edward Glover (1888-1972) Freudian	Karl Abraham	No formal supervision was verified	James Glover Melitta Schmideberg
Melitta Schmideberg (1904-1983)	Ella Sharpe Edward Glover	It is a question who supervised Schmideberg for her Viviane's case in 1933	Edward Glover
Paula Heimann (1899-1982) Kleinian till 1955 From 1955 Independent	Melanie Klein	In Berlin Training Analyst: Theodor Reik Supervising Analysts: Karen Horney Hanns Sachs	Susan Isaac Joan Riviere

Marjorie Brierley (1893-1984) Independent	John Carl Flügel Edward Glover	No formal supervision was verified	Edward Glover James Strachey
Susan Isaac (1885-1948) Kleinian	In Berlin: Otto Rank, John Carl Flügel In London: Joan Riviere	Melanie Klein James Strachey	Melanie Klein
Donald Winnicott (1896-1971) Independent	James Strachey Joan Riviere 1935-1940 Winnicott wanted analysis with Klein but she resisted as she needed Winnicott to treat her son, Erich	Melanie Klein 1935-1941 (Winnicott insisted that Klein did not supervise Winnicott's analysis with Erich, Klein's son)	Masud Khan
Wilfred Bion (1897-1979) Kleinian	John Rickman Melanie Klein	Paula Heimann Sylvia Payne	John Rickman Hanna Segal
John Rickman (1891-1951)	Sigmund Freud 1919-1922 Sandor Ferenczi 1928 Melanie Klein 1934-1940	No formal supervision was verified	Wilfred Bion Pearl King
Betty Joseph (1917-2013) Kleinian	Michael Balint 1940 Paula Heimann 1951-1954	Melanie Klein	Hanna Segal Melanie Klein Joseph Sandler (Freudian)
Joan Riviere (1883-1962) Kleinian	In 1916 Ernest Jones In 1922 Sigmund Freud	Ernest Jones	Alix Strachey Melanie Klein
Hanna Segal (1918-2011) Kleinian	David Matthew Melanie Klein	Paula Heimann Joan Riviere Melanie Klein Esther Bick	Melanie Klein Betty Joseph Herbert Rosenfeld

Sylvia Payne (1880-1976) Independent	James Glover Hanns Sachs	No formal supervision was verified	
Ella Freeman Sharpe (1875-1947) Initially Kleinian Then, Independent	James Glover Ernest Jones	No formal supervision was verified	
Donald Meltzer (1922-2004)	Melanie Klein	Hanna Segal Herbert Rosenfeld Esther Bick	Esther Bick
Alix Strachey (1892-1973) Independent	1920-1922 Sigmund Freud 1924 Karl Abraham in 1926 Edward Glover Sylvia Payne	No formal supervision was verified	Joan Riviere Melanie Klein
Esther Bick (1901-1983) Kleinian	Charlotte Buhler in Vienna Michael Balint Melanie Klein	Melanie Klein	Melanie Klein Donald Meltzer
John Bowlby (1907-1990) Independent	Joan Riviere	Melanie Klein	
Elliott Jaques (1917-2003)	Melanie Klein 1946-1954		Melanie Klein Hanna Segal