

THE KEY TO PEACE IS OURS:
WOMEN'S PEACEBUILDING IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COLOMBIA

by

Katherine S. Paarlberg-Kvam

A Dissertation

Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

College of Arts & Sciences

Department of Latin American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino Studies

2016

ProQuest Number:10246927

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10246927

Published by ProQuest LLC (2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

THE KEY TO PEACE IS OURS:
WOMEN'S PEACEBUILDING IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COLOMBIA

by

Katherine S. Paarlberg-Kvam

Copyright 2016

La llave de la paz es nuestra.

- Slogan of Colombian civilian peace organizations

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a multi-method, feminist ethnography of three networks of women's peace organizations founded in Colombia in the mid-1990s: Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres (Women's Peaceful Route), the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y Por la Paz (Women's Social Movement Against War and for Peace), and the Red de Mujeres del Caribe Colombiano (Caribbean Colombian Women's Network). It investigates the role of women activists in the construction of peace in twenty-first century Colombia, combining a social movement studies framework with feminist, antimilitarist political economy. I employ several qualitative methodologies, including ethnographic observation, semistructured interviews, and archival research, to ask: what is the role of women's activism in the struggle for a lasting and sustainable peace in Colombia? How do women peace activists alter the nature of relations between the Colombian state and its people? In what ways has this activism challenged not only the material conditions of conflict that constrain women's lives, but the symbolic and gendered ground on which the project of war is constructed?

This study finds that women's peace activism arose from a feminist movement born into armed conflict, and have never had a safe space to operate. Since the 1990s the movement has been consolidating, forming national-level networks and gaining legitimacy and visibility on the world stage. Nonetheless, activists continue to face persistent challenges from within and without, notably the concentration of movement resources among urban elites and the exclusion of feminists of color who live in outlying regions. Despite this, I found that women peace activists are subverting many of the presumptions inherent to Colombia's conflict and its longevity. I identify four key personae on the stage of war and its discourse: confusion, victimhood, the body, and peace. I argue that each has played an important role in perpetuating

and strengthening the patriarchal, militarized capital accumulation at the heart of the conflict, and that the activists under study are appropriating and reinterpreting these personae in such a way as to destabilize the foundations of war in the country. I conclude that their organizing represents a potentially counterhegemonic, unifying social movement force that has the potential to play a transformative role in Colombia's postwar reality.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dissertations take a good deal of work, but only a fraction of it has been mine. This project has been made possible, and made better, by my committee chair, Dr. Susan Gauss. She has played midwife to my ideas, been the tamer of my tangents, and served as a patient voice of support through the years spent on this project. Susan, you are the model of what every young scholar dreams of in a faculty mentor. Thank you.

I owe a great debt as well to Dr. Fernando Leiva, Dr. Barbara Sutton, and Dr. Winifred Tate, all of whom sacrificed their time and energy to provide encouragement and invaluable feedback coming from their own particular fields of expertise. At the University at Albany (SUNY), my research has been funded by the Initiatives for Women, the Dissertation Research Fellowship program, and the Carson Carr Graduate Diversity Fellowship. Thanks to Librada Pimentel for always sharing her knowledge of everything university-related. The History Department at Skidmore College, notably Dr. Jordana Dym, offered me a space to write and a team of colleagues to inspire me. My students, both at Skidmore and at SUNY, have made me think in deeper and more creative ways about the struggle for justice in Latin America. The significant degree to which they are more attuned to this struggle than I was at their age bodes well for our global future.

The women in Colombia who devoted their time and energy to answering my questions will forever have my thanks. The activists at Ruta Pacífica in Popayán and Santander de Quilichao, at the Organización Femenina Popular in Bucaramanga and Barrancabermeja, and at the Red de Mujeres del Caribe in San Andrés and Bogotá were patient, forthcoming, and inspiring in our conversations. I hope that my contribution can in some small way support the tireless and incredible work to which you are devoting your lives.

And my work would have been impossible without my compañerxs at ECAP in Barrancabermeja: Pierre Shantz, Caldwell Manners, Hannah Redekop, Chris Knestrick, Julie Myers, and Milena Rincón Vidal, I thank you for opening my eyes and my heart to Colombia's realities, and for the crucial work you continue to do. I thank Brit Hanson for being my friend, and sometime caretaker, while we found ourselves in Barranca. In Bogotá and by email, Rafael Figueroa took time from his own work and activism to answer several important questions. Raquel Sanmiguel offered her seaside home in San Andrés, her generous spirit, and her friendship to me along the way.

Other scholars and journalists in Colombia offered me valuable feedback and important advice as I began this project. This is especially true of Dr. Doris Lamus Canavate of the Universidad Nacional in Bucaramanga. I also thank Dr. Mauricio Archila Neira, Dr. María Himelda Ramírez, and María Teresa Ronderos. I thank the archivists at CINEP, the UNAL's Fondo de Documentación Mujer y Género "Ofelia Uribe de Acosta," and the Centro de Memoria Histórica, especially William Guzmán, who was gracious with my many requests for resources. Stateside, Dr. Avi Chomsky generously offered feedback on early drafts of my project proposal. Eric Macias was my sounding board, *cervecero*, and linguistic consultant.

I have been inspired and accompanied by my dedicated colleagues in the department of Latin American, Caribbean, and Latino Studies at the University at Albany. Cory Fischer-Hoffman, Jackie Hayes, Eric Macias, Gabe Sanchez, Lissette Acosta Corniel, Kitty Pelerin, Karolina Babic, Luis Paredes, Caitlin Janiszewski, and Rafael Gomez have reveled with me in activist-scholarship, rocking the margins, and the occasional aguardiente just to get through it. *La lucha sigue*, my friends.

I am lucky to rely on the unending support of my family and friends. My parents, John and Marilyn, and my in-laws reliably stepped up to help with child care and financial and spiritual support. Amy Mori helped me carve out time to write. Jenny Blackwell, my compañera on the road to a feminist future, consistently tamed my self-doubt. My amazing child, Joey Jane, was my field companion in utero and my “best yittle buddy” during the writing process. I am happy to report that her cries of “*No, Mama, no dissertation!*” can now be satisfied.

Finally, this project would have been impossible to achieve without my best critic, staunchest ally, and closest friend. David’s encouragement, incisive questions, and no-tolerance policy for whining continuously held me upright while writing this dissertation. The hours and the effort he expended so that I could pursue my own passions are the gift of a lifetime. *Ahora te toca, Papi*. It’s your turn.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction: Más Allá de la Mesa.....	1
2. Ya No Se Puede Tapar: The Development of the Women’s Peace Movement.....	41
3. ¿Hacia Dónde? Women Peace Activists in the Twenty-First Century.....	105
4. <i>Confusion</i>	
Colombia’s Confusing Violence: Historiography and the Fog of War.....	181
Confusing Colombia’s Violence: Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres.....	210
5. <i>Victimhood</i>	
The Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011: State-Sponsored Subjectivity.....	227
Women’s Peace Activism: Subversive Subjectivities?.....	263
6. <i>The Body</i>	
Un Cuerpo Propio: Somatophobia and Armed Conflict.....	290
The Body Politic(ized): Colombian Women’s Embodied Resistance.....	319
7. <i>Peace</i>	
Otra Mirada de Paz: Peace, Pacification, and Women’s Participation.....	335
Las Pactantes de la Paz: Colombian Women’s Imaginaries of Peace.....	371
8. Conclusion: What Does It Mean to End a War?.....	390
Appendix A (Archives Consulted).....	399
References.....	400



Fig. 1: Map of Colombia, adapted from www.lahistoriaconmapas.com.

ACRONYMS USED

AEC	Agencia Española de la Cooperación
AFRODES	Asociación Nacional de Afrocolombianos Desplazados
ANC	Asamblea Nacional Constituyente
ANMUCIC	Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Negras, e Indígenas de Colombia
ASDI	Agencia Sueca del Desarrollo Internacional
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
CEDAW	The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIDH	Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos
CRIC	Consejo Regional Indígena de Cauca
CUT	Central Unitaria de Trabajadores
DEA	U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
ECAP	Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (1964 - 1989)
FARC-EP	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (1989 -)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEDEMUC	Federación de Mujeres Campesinas de Cundinamarca
FNGO	Feminist Non-Governmental Organization
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IMP	Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
MAQL	Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame
MNC	Mesa Nacional de Concertación de Mujeres
MSM	Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz
OFP	Organización Femenina Popular
PCN	Proceso de Comunidades Negras
PMSCs	Private Military Security Companies
RNM	Red Nacional de Mujeres
RMCC	Red de Mujeres del Caribe Colombiano
RUV	Registro Único de Víctimas
SM/SMO	Social Movement/Social Movement Organization
SUIPPCOL	Swiss Program for the Promotion of Peace in Colombia
TAN	Transnational Advocacy Network
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCC	Unión de Ciudadanas Colombianas
UN	United Nations
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women (now UN Women)
UP	Unión Patriótica
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USO	Unión Sindical Obrera
WIB	Women in Black
WPN	Women's Peace Network

CHAPTER 1

Más Allá de la Mesa

Stunned Silence

On September 23rd, 2015, two gray-haired, white-shirted Colombian men shook hands. The man on the left, his business shirt pressed and neatly tucked in, appeared perhaps to be the more reticent of the two. The man on the right, his guayabera wrinkled and his other hand in his pocket, smiled magnanimously, the corners of his eyes crinkling with age. He was Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, also known as Timochenko, Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The man on the left was President Juan Manuel Santos. The fact that these two men, their hands pressed together by a delighted Raúl Castro, were in a room together was remarkable; the idea that they should shake hands, however awkwardly, was unthinkable only a short time ago, representing as they do the opposing forces in a fifty-year armed conflict that has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Colombians. The world watched the two men shake hands in “stunned silence,” wrote Ernesto Londoño of the *New York Times*, and continued: “That a war that has been so deadly, so unspeakably cruel, could end through diplomacy, compromise and handshakes is astonishing” (Londoño, 2015a).

Six months later, some 1,400 miles away, a group of social movement activists in Cauca, Colombia received an email. It was the same week the Havana negotiators were scheduled to reach a peace accord. “The following sons of bitches are declared military targets, along with their families and collaborators,” the email announced. “You serve a peace process in which Santos, the traitor, is handing the country over to narcoterrorists. You have a week to leave Cauca before we kill you like rats” (El País, 2016, my translation). Among the recipients of the email were leaders of Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres in Popayán, a network of women’s and feminist

organizations dedicated to advancing a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. The threat was signed by the Águilas Negras, one of the most prominent neoparamilitary groups in Colombia, which since 2006 has threatened or displaced several other women's movement leaders in Colombia including member organizations of the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz and the Red de Mujeres del Caribe Colombiano.

The question of why there exists such a breach between the peace being negotiated in Havana and the so-called "post-conflict" as it is lived by social movement activists, and the question of why a group of women marching for peace would present such a threat to a group of well-funded, well-armed neoparamilitary fighters, point to the same reality: that Colombia remains the site of a protracted struggle by landed elites to defend their territory, their wealth, and their symbolic power against those whose contentious politics call into question the foundational supports of their social, political, and economic domination of the country.

Women are conspicuously absent in all press photographs of the historic September handshake in Havana. All members of the two negotiating teams at the table with the president and the comandante were men. If the hopes of the world are realized and peace accords are ratified in September of 2016, the heroes of the story as it will be told will be men. Men will occupy most of the space at press conferences and commemorations. Men will appear on magazine covers. But Colombian women, tireless and insistent, have been at the forefront of the movement to build the foundations of peace in Colombia. Colombian women laid the groundwork and paved the approach to the negotiating table where Santos and Timochenko sat down. If accords are ratified, Colombian women will be at the vanguard of the struggle to institutionalize the post-conflict future in Colombia's communities and halls of government. If the negotiations are ultimately unsuccessful, as has happened so many times before, Colombian

women will continue to press for their demands and advance an alternative vision for Colombian society and politics – one in which the structures that support neoparamilitarism and its allies are destabilized. It is a vision which goes far beyond a Cuban conference table.

This dissertation investigates the role of women activists in the construction of peace in twenty-first century Colombia. It analyzes the theory and praxis of three networks of women's peace organizations formed in the mid-1990s, combining a social movement studies framework with feminist, antimilitarist political economy, and asks: what is the role of women's activism in the struggle for a lasting and sustainable peace in Colombia? How do women peace activists alter the nature of relations between the Colombian State and its people? In what ways has this activism challenged not only the material conditions of conflict that constrain women's lives, but the symbolic and gendered ground on which the project of war is constructed? War is "a crucial site where meanings about gender are produced, reproduced, and circulated back into society," write Cooke and Wollocott (1993, p. ix); another scholar refers to war as "a feedback loop that strengthens and stabilizes gendered war roles" (J. Goldstein, 2001, p. 410). This "loop," cycling through Colombia's history, raises important questions about what is at stake. If war is built on a foundation of patriarchy, and patriarchy is fortified by years of cyclical, retributive violence, can one system be upended by weakening the other? Can women, by demanding the full rights of citizenship, throw a stick in the spokes of war?

In addition to being impelled by these broader questions, this is a study of social movement dynamics. I ask how the three networks – Ruta Pacífica, the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y Por la Paz (MSM), and the Red de Mujeres del Caribe Colombiano (RMCC) – make their actions readable to the public, the State, and the international community. How do women represent themselves and their identities as political subjects? What forms does

women's collective action take, and what do their repertoires of action symbolize? What cleavages and alliances have taken place between social movement organizations? Finally, where do women's peace networks stand as a counterhegemonic social movement voice contesting Colombia's neoliberal security state and the way it militarizes, marketizes, and endangers their lives?

Methods

I began studying women's movements in Latin America in the late 1990s, and first traveled to Colombia as an activist. Since 2010 I have engaged in solidarity work with multiple U.S.-based accompaniment organizations, most significantly the Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz, based in Barrancabermeja. It was through ECAP that I became acquainted with the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz, based in the Magdalena Medio. I then met the women of Ruta Pacífica in Cauca through Witness for Peace, and then I was introduced to the leaders of the Red de Mujeres del Caribe Colombiano through a mutual friend. The research was designed as a multi-method project, incorporating data from formal interviews, informal conversations, support interviews, and archival research.

I spent the summer and fall of 2013 conducting semistructured interviews (O'Reilly, 2009; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2007) with leaders and members of these three networks of activists, engaging in participant observation,¹ sharing meals, and chatting about their work. Four lengthy, in-depth formal interviews were conducted with leaders of Ruta Pacífica in Cauca, in addition to less formal conversations with several activists from member organizations. I

¹ I am reminded here of Harvard Anthropologist Kimberly Theidon's assertion, in her 2001 account of research experiences in Peru: "There is no 'observation' when people are at war and you arrive asking them about it. You are, whether you wish to be or not, a participant" (Theidon, 2001, p. 19).

recorded three in-depth interviews spanning several hours with leaders of the Red de Mujeres del Caribe, in addition to gathering less formal correspondence with a fourth leader of the network. I spoke at length with the coordinator of the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra, a conversation which was supported by less formal, unrecorded conversations with three activists from member organizations. All told, I transcribed eight formal interviews spanning approximately twelve hours in addition to notes gathered from the less formal conversations. Most of the interviews took place in the activists' offices, either one-on-one or in a room with other activists, though several also happened on buses or in restaurants, and one in a swimming pool on a hot day. Most of the women I interviewed are already well known in Colombia and agreed to be referenced here by name; a few of the women activists working in Colombia's rural areas, who are less well known, are referred to here simply as activists and identified by the networks to which they belong instead of by their names.

I conducted additional interviews with five academics and journalists in Colombia who publish on social and women's movements there in order to deepen my understanding of the context (Maxwell, 2004), and I researched in seven different archives (see Appendix A) about women in the armed conflict, Colombian political economy, and women's peacemaking. While in Colombia and after returning to the States, I transcribed the interviews and coded the data to reveal patterns, common themes, and moments of divergence. At a few points during the coding and writing processes, I contacted members of the networks to verify that my understanding of their responses to my questions was in line with their intended meaning (Kirsch, 2005).

This dissertation is designed as a qualitative, activist feminist ethnography. It is qualitative in that I seek to "study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005,

p. 3). My foregrounding of activists' experiences and interpretations of the armed conflict is also a key part of feminist research. Activist feminist research is grounded in the experiences and knowledges of women, shaped by feminist theories regarding gendered structures of power, and dedicated in an activist sense to furthering their struggle against subordination (Ramazanoğlu, 2002). Julie Shayne and Kristie Leissle (2014) define activist or social-justice scholarship as work that has an "explicit grounding in a commitment to social justice (...) justice in research, knowledge production, and pedagogy" (p. xix). It is designed explicitly to be in the service of the social movement under analysis.

The grounding of the research design in women's experiences is in line with the Marxist notion of standpoint theory, asserting that those on the underside of power can measure its dynamics more clearly. As Lukács wrote in 1968: "Material life structures but sets limits to the way any one of us understands society. The ruling class and the working class, given the power relation that binds them, must have radically different understandings of the world. The perspective from below, the standpoint of those in struggle against exploitation, is likely to give the more trustworthy view of the realities of capitalist society" (qtd. in Cockburn, 2012, p. 9). This notion was extended, importantly, by feminist scholars. Feminist standpoint theory asserts that a view of society from the perspective of women illuminates its structures and dynamics more clearly because women, like other subaltern sectors of society, learn the minutiae and inner workings of such dynamics as a matter of survival, while the superordinate sectors (in this case men) are relieved of that necessity and permitted to thrive without gaining that understanding. Feminists refer to this phenomenon as "double consciousness," alluding to the notion that women must be able to see the world from their own perspective as well as from the hegemonic male perspective. Women's standpoints, Nancy Hartsock argued, "make available a particular

and privileged vantage point on male supremacy, a vantage point that can ground a powerful critique of the phallographic institutions and ideology that constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy” (1985, p. 231, qtd. in Cockburn, 2015). Similarly, Sandra Harding wrote that “inquiry from a feminist perspective can provide understandings of nature and social life that are not possible from the perspective of men’s distinctive activity and experience” (1986, p. 142).

Later, Patricia Hill Collins (2004) and others argued for a more plural understanding of the feminist standpoint, calling attention to divisions of power and experience between women as well as between women and men. Black feminists and members of black women’s culture, she argued, have had to learn the inner workings of white womanhood in addition to white and black manhood, and as such operate from the position of “outsiders within” sociology. This positioning allows for the development of a privileged perspective. Feminists from the Global South (Shiva and Mies, 2004) have further developed this plurality, leading to a rich discourse in the global feminist community from which this research benefits.

I argue that Colombian women, particularly poor and racialized women, are best positioned to take the measurements not only of patriarchy, but also of militarism and capital accumulation, both of which rely on the gendered subordination of women to advance and maintain their domination. The development of their theories, rooted in the daily praxis of life in armed conflict, allows the creation of an oppositional consciousness (Sandoval, 1991) crucial to the construction of alternative imaginaries.

The best feminist research coming from the Global North is conscious of its own positionality and power dynamics (Mohanty, 2003), both in the process of gathering data and in the privilege of interpreting it. In this dissertation such dynamics are considered in three ways:

one, in the collecting and retelling of stories of violence; two, in an analysis of the role of privilege in the research relationship; and three, in the way the data is produced and presented.

Many of the women I interviewed were “direct victims” of the armed conflict; that is, they had been displaced, assaulted, threatened, and/or seen family members killed by armed groups. Though I asked every interviewee about her memories of the armed conflict in an attempt to retell the story of war from women’s perspectives (see Chapter 3), I made the conscious choice not to ask for the details of women’s memories of violence. I accepted what was offered, but did not seek to gather *testimonio* from my respondents. Myriad organizations in Colombia devoted to truth, reconciliation, and historical memory have gathered thousands of *testimonios* of trauma and suffering endured by women. I chose to rely on those sources rather than asking women to make the emotional sacrifice of retelling those events to a researcher who was in the field for a short amount of time and not prepared to invest in the kind of relationship that might support that kind of sacrifice. In my own writing, I have endeavored to tell the stories of the ways armed men have violated and traumatized women in a way that maintains the fine balance of giving an accurate picture of the breadth and depth of that violence without sensationalizing or fetishizing it. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois rightly point out that “...ethnographers risk contributing to a pornography of violence that reinforces negative perceptions of subordinated groups” (2004, p. 433); they also quote Pierre Bourdieu, who writes that the effects of violence on subordinate groups make it “difficult to talk about the dominated in an accurate and realistic way without seeming either to crush them or exalt them” (in Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004, p. 432).

The ability to either “crush or exalt” my research subjects is one among many unearned privileges of exteriority and whiteness that have sculpted my relationship to this work.

Assymetrical research – conducted by a person in a global metropole about people in the periphery – is fraught with power differentials. This is particularly true when one writes from a colonial center “toward” a colonized nation, as in the case of U.S.-based research on Latin America. John Beverley writes,

The new hegemony of metropolitan theoretical models amounts in Latin America to a kind of cultural neocolonialism, concerned with the brokering by the North American and European academy of knowledge from and about Latin America. In this transaction, the Latin American intellectual is relegated to the status of an *object* of theory – rather than its *subject* (2011, p. 62-63).

In this dissertation I have tried to be conscious, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, of this dynamic, and attempted to “step back” in terms of asserting my own intellectual authority. I endeavor to be less the broker of activists’ knowledge than a signpost pointing to its importance. But the power of coloniality was nonetheless evident in the field at various moments. One woman who was part of a Ruta Pacífica member organization took me aside one day, for instance, to ask if I knew of any organizations that might be able to sponsor an orphaned child in her care. We had never spoken before that moment, but she knew very clearly that by nature of my status as a U.S. citizen, I have access to global resources to which she does not. How can a researcher expect to have an honest relationship with a research subject inside of such a dynamic? I argue that such a relationship is impossible, and that impossibility must be reckoned with.

All of these methodological theories and bodies of literatures have informed this work; I turn now to the theoretical approaches I have combined to frame the project.

Conceptual Framework

This dissertation draws from and is rooted in the links between four bodies of literature and schools of thought: social movement theory, writings on gender and women’s movements in

Latin America, feminist studies of militarism and armed conflict, and political-economic analyses of the neoliberal state. I construct a theoretical framework – what I call feminist antimilitarist political economy – to study women’s peace networks’ contentious politics in the twenty-first century. I argue that the neoliberal project’s reliance not only on women’s intensified and precaritized work, but also on traditional assumptions of masculinity and femininity, is intertwined with a gendered militarizing project that both fuels and is fueled by the centering of capital accumulation as a national priority. I examine women’s peace networks (WPNs) from a social movement, political economy perspective that illuminates the ways in which a counterhegemonic movement is born. In what follows I will outline key concepts in each of these theoretical strands: social movement studies, gender and patriarchy, womanhood, militarism, the neoliberal project, and the neoliberal security state.

The Emergence of Social Movements. Not all grassroots groups of people pressing for change constitute social movements. Political process theorists like Sidney Tarrow define a social movement as people acting together in response to “changes in political opportunities and threats,” “using known repertoires of action,” drawing on cultural frames and connecting to or creating broad, dense networks of sustained collective action (Tarrow, 2011, p. 16). Charles Tilly asserts that a true social movement has three elements: (1) a set of collective claims articulated in a campaign directed at specific “target authorities”; (2) various elements or forms of protest from a collective action repertoire; and (3) WUNC displays, or an observable self-presentation of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (Tilly & Wood, 2013; see Chapter 4 for an analysis of WPNs’ WUNC displays). Though none of the three networks under study constitutes a social movement in and of itself, their combined efforts fit Tarrow’s and Tilly’s

definitions. Their two decades of sustained action and strategic collaboration reflect a growing effort in Colombia that is positioning itself to serve as a unifying mechanism for various social movement organizations (SMOs) pressing for an alternative reality in the country.

This dissertation also synthesizes political process theory with another strand in the social movements field. Women's and feminist movements in Latin America were key examples of what scholars in the 1990s called "new social movements," articulated from outside traditional political party structures or unions, and pressing for claims based not solely on class-based material needs, but on "identity": race, ethnicity, and gender, for instance. I join critics who argue that while gender might have been a "newly activated" political identity in some settings (Eckstein & Wickham-Crowley, 2015), gender as a key element of political action was not "new" as much as it was newly recognized and newly deployed in academic scholarship. I argue that women's identity contestations should not be seen as separate from "material" claims articulated by earlier, pre-Soviet-collapse SMs; rather, identity claims also have material aspects and ramifications (Nash, 2005). Material power derives in part from symbolic superordination, and social movements that contend with that symbolism represent forms of collective identity. Even some of the most Left social movement theory has failed to concede these interrelationships, insisting that Latin American women's movements in past decades were motivated by apolitical familial needs and concrete (read: not feminist) demands for the State to address shortages of material goods.

This dissertation assumes that "familial," "private," and "symbolic" demands are deeper than they first appear, and that a social movement perspective is nourished and clarified by an infusion of both political economy and feminist theory. Feminists must broaden or trouble theorists' definitions of social movements discussed above. Donatella Della Porta and Mario

Diani, for instance, assert that anything defined as a social movement must be “involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents” (2006, p. 20). This latter clause risks restricting feminist and other emancipatory movements, which aim to alter broad systems of power that do not always have clearly identifiable representatives, from being recognized as social movements. Indigenous movements in El Alto, Bolivia, might have been fighting gas exports and a French water company, but that was not all they were contesting (Lazar, 2008). And while antineoliberal protests might effectively target a particular IFI, there is no World Trade Organization for patriarchy. The approach, in other words, is overly aligned with a class-exclusive frame and insufficiently accommodating to the symbolic currents emphasized in new social movement theorizing.

Gender as a Field of Power; Patriarchy as a Form of Social Organization. My understanding of gender as a constitutive element of political processes, statecraft, and war is informed principally by the seminal work of Joan Wallach Scott, who asserts that gender is “a primary way of signifying relationships of power,” or “a primary field within which or by means of which power is articulated” (1986, p. 1069). I join those who recognize elements of gender power in many moments of statecraft, national processes, and social interactions, whether or not women are present and whether or not gender is an explicit theme. Scott’s “primary field,” within which opposing poles of identity are established and continuously referenced in order to legitimate (masculinize) or undermine (feminize) political actors, and “to express the relationship between ruler and ruled” (Scott, 1986, p. 1070), informs my analysis of Colombian political discourse. In the words of Carol Cohn, following Scott, “gender is not simply a set of ideas about male and female people... [it is] a way of categorizing, ordering, and symbolizing power, of

hierarchically structuring relationships among different categories of people” (2013, p. 3). In this way, as the decades of scholarship stemming from Scott’s publication have illuminated, gender is used as an instrumentalist structure to divide and control various groups of people, from women to men of color to colonized peoples to trans, queer, and gender nonconforming individuals.

Further, Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1989; Yuval-Davis, 1997) delineate the various symbolic roles women play in nationalist projects; these illuminate the significance of women’s activism in Colombia. Women’s roles are generally limited to (a) biological reproducers of national collectivities; (b) cultural reproducers and ethnic boundary-markers, or cultural border guards; (c) transmitters of cultures and traditions, or agents of cultural continuity; (d) symbols of nationalism and national difference (the mother country, the *Virgen de Guadalupe*) or “a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic/national categories” (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1994, p. 313) – e.g., as outposts that can be violated, as in wartime rape; and (d) physical participants in military, political, economic, or nationalist projects.

To convey the valuation of one set of gender ideas and the devaluation of the other, throughout this dissertation I refer to the structure and workings of patriarchy. I understand patriarchy as a form of organizing and structuring social, economic, and political life in such a way as to valorize and grant material benefits to “men as a group at the expense of women as a group” (Hennessy, 2000, p. 23). Patriarchy, as a system that is “male dominated, male identified, and male centered” (Johnson, 2005, p. 5), is both deeply connected to capitalist power structures and precedent to it; Marxist feminist Heidi Hartmann defined it as “a set of social relations which has a material base and in which there are hierarchical relations between men and solidarity

among them which enable them in turn to dominate women” (1979, p. 18). Moreover, patriarchy is, in Rosemary Hennessy’s words, “historically variant,” and subject to continuous reorganization to meet the needs of production (2000, p. 25).

My understanding of patriarchy and patriarchal structures in this research is a deeply intersectional one, though I generally refer to “patriarchy” rather than “heteropatriarchy,” “bourgeois patriarchy,” or “white supremacist patriarchy.” I endeavor to present patriarchy both as hegemonic (Gramsci, 1971) and as historically and geographically contingent, experienced by women in different ways in different moments and spaces: “a heterogeneous and contradictory set of dynamics and meanings: symbols, institutional arrangements, normative pacts, subjective identities” (Tinsman, 2008, p. 1368).

Patriarchy manifests itself in particular ways and at intersections with race, ethnicity, sexuality and gender identity, age, ability, class, coloniality, and global peripherality. They operate in a combined way that is, in Yuval-Davis’ (2006) words, constitutive rather than additive (see also McCall, 2005; Collins, 2000; Crenshaw, 1991; Combahee River Collective, 1983; Anzaldúa & Moraga, 1981). Because of intersecting power divisions, women in Colombia (as everywhere) experience the processes of marketization and militarization differently and sometimes more deeply based on their position in racial, regional, and other hierarchies.

Finally, gender power operates in Colombia not only as relates to the women activists themselves, but Colombia geopolitically; that is, femininity and feminization apply not only to the social and political interactions of women and men, but to the interactions between Colombia and its neighbors, State and civil society, State and guerrilla, and Colombia and the United States.

Women's Interests, Women's Organizing. The intersectional approach to gender also sculpts my understanding of what it means to be a woman. In short, because all women suffer from the effects of patriarchy, and suffer or benefit from other global processes differently, it is impossible to conceive of a singular interest that is universally held and prioritized by all groups and movements of women. Mohanty (2003) and others point out that when feminists in the Global North make “women” a category of analysis, we tend to depict women in the Global South as victimized, homogenous, dependent, and powerless. But women are not a unified category; we live our lives in particular times, spaces, and geopolitical realities. Other feminist scholars of color (Crenshaw, 1991; Anzaldúa & Moraga, 1981; Collins, 2000, *inter alia*) have offered trenchant critiques of white feminism's tendency toward the production of a totalizing scholarship that assumes a universal white female subject.

Though Western feminists are only recently beginning to interrogate the Westocentric nature of the way their scholarship has homogenized the experience of womanhood, feminists in the U.S. and Europe have long considered the question of what it means to be a woman. The various interpretations of “woman” by post-structural feminists, Marxist feminists, cultural feminists, and psychoanalytical led feminist scholars to differing positions on why and how women become involved in social movements, activism, or revolutions. Are women essentially more attentive to community needs? Are they naturally more “maternal”? What interests do they pursue when they become politically active?

Maxine Molyneux's (1985) conception of “practical” gender interests (wherein women mobilize based on concrete physical needs, oftentimes with a seeming acceptance of – or at least a coexistence with – dominant gender inequalities) vs. “strategic” gender interests (wherein women mobilize around issues that challenge, and might change, their gendered position in

society) is one on which many scholars and students have relied in their analyses (see especially Safa, 1990). The divide between “strategic” and “practical” gender interests, however, despite the fact that Molyneux was using them to describe *concurrent* struggles within the same movement, threatens to cement the divide between the private sphere (presumably the site of the practical) and the public (presumably the site of the strategic). Other scholars (Stephen, 1997 and others) have advocated for a focus on the way traditional “women’s work” (pursuit of “practical” interests in the “private” sphere) often *becomes* public, and as such is also strategic – whether it presents an explicit challenge to gendered hierarchies or not. As one of my students asked when I presented these binary categories, “why isn’t hunger a feminist issue if women are hungry?” The SGI/PGI trope was also criticized for relying on an exogenous definition of what “counts” as political and strategic, rather than observing the links between gender subordination and class subordination.² Because I see this binary as blurry, I avoid labeling women’s organizations as explicitly “feminine” or “feminist”; more often, I refer to them as women’s social movement organizations. This dynamic will be explored in Chapter 3.

Feminist Perspectives on Militarism and War. Feminist scholars understand militarism as a long social, political, economic, and cultural process that predates and builds up to the wars which are their climax. Sjoberg and Via define militarism as “an underlying system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures... the extension of war-related, war-preparatory, and war-based meanings and activities outside of ‘war proper’ and into social and political life more generally” (2010, p. 7). It involves the restructuring of political and economic priorities, and the

² For other critical analyses of Molyneux’s framework, see Jelin, E. (Ed.) 1990, *Women and Social Change in Latin America*. Trans. J.A. Zammit & M. Thomson. London, UK: Zed Books; and Fernandes, S. (2007). Barrio Women and Popular Politics in Chávez’s Venezuela. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49.3, 97-127.

sculpting of social relations and cultural symbols to serve the needs of the war machine. “To become militarized,” writes Cynthia Enloe, “is to adopt militaristic values (e.g., a belief in hierarchy, obedience, and the use of force) and priorities as one’s own, to see military solutions as particularly effective, to see the world as a dangerous place best approached with militaristic attitudes” (2007, p. 4).

This process is visible on the micro as well as the macro level, whether it has to do with parents dressing their infant children in camouflage, a growing market for bulletproof clothing (Sutton, 2013), or an expansion of military budgets. But militarism is a profoundly gendered schema (Enloe, 1993; Cooke & Woollacott, 1993; Goldstein, 2001; Cockburn, 2007; Sjoberg & Via, 2010; Cohn, 2013, *inter alia*). Militarism privileges masculinity, particularly a certain type of masculinity, and silences antimilitarist voices by associating them with “feminine” qualities – with weakness, ignorance, and naïveté. This is visible in myriad settings and scholarly accounts, one of the clearest being Carol Cohn’s 1987 “ethnography” of nuclear weapons strategy, in which she catalogued the phallicization of military hardware by defense intellectuals. The role of language and symbolism is powerful in Cohn’s account, and speaks to their potency in the global militarizing project. Symbols of militarism legitimate the gender binary, and ideas about masculinity and femininity legitimate militarism. Women have assigned roles in militarizing projects: the supporters, the military wives and mothers willing to sacrifice their men to the greater good, the care workers, the cleanup crew. Women are to be the Molly Pitchers, the Policarpa Salvarrietas, the Betsy Rosses, and to stand quietly while the figures of Lady Liberty and Mother Russia are modeled after our bodies. But the bodies of actual women play a very different role.

Cynthia Cockburn wrote in 2012 that in the age of globalized media, when we are regularly confronted with incidents of wartime rape around the world, a gender analysis of war and armed conflict is harder and harder to ignore (2012, p. 245). Wars and their protagonists victimize women in ways particular to their femininity, especially as relates to their bodies (examined in Chapter 6). Beyond simply cataloguing the ways that women suffer differently, however, I attempt to reveal the role played by gender in war – that is, not only femininity, but masculinity (Cohn, 2013; Enloe, 1998; El-Bushra, 2007). The actions of men in wars cannot be understood without investigating cultural ideas about masculinity, as María Emma Wills asserts in the case of Colombia when she says, “there is something at stake in the war that is never seen as at stake and that’s masculinity. The land is at stake, political inclusion is at stake, but it’s also masculinity that’s at stake and it’s not consciously on the table” (Moloney, 2013, p. 4).

Feminists who study armed conflict, along with (and likely inspired by) women peace activists within those conflicts, argue that violence is a gendered continuum of which war is only one node. Gender, argue Giles and Hyndman (2004, p. 43), connects different types of violence at different points on the continuum: national and international, public and private, and peacetime and wartime. In this dissertation I echo those voices that argue that the line between peace and war is so faint that, from the perspective of civilian women, it is nearly invisible.

The Neoliberal Project. I follow a Polanyian path to understanding the global neoliberal project as a method of marketizing society, and approach it as both a political-economic project and a socio-cultural one. Neoliberalism has been understood as “(1) a set of economic ideas; (2) a policy regime; (3) an “economic model”; and (4) the all-encompassing mode of experiencing the economic, political, and cultural existence under the current era of globalization” (Leiva,

2008, pp. 17-19). Leiva's third and fourth iterations of neoliberalism are critical in this dissertation.

As a post-Keynesian turn in economic thinking championed by economists trained at the University of Chicago in the 1960s and 1970s, neoliberalism is a set of economic policy prescriptions intended to open markets and "free" national economies from State intervention and protection of domestic needs.³ The model was implemented most visibly first in Pinochet's Chile, revealing a tendency for neoliberal implementation to take place alongside (and dependent upon) political repression (Klein, 2007). As a policy prescription, associated most closely with the Washington Consensus, the project prioritizes economic stabilization followed by business-friendly, export-oriented structural adjustment (Green, 2003). While in the Latin American context neoliberal economics have benefitted local elites and transnational direct investors, they have in large part spelled destruction for the livelihoods of the poor. In Wendy Brown's words, the model

is equated with a radically free market: maximized competition and free trade achieved through economic deregulation, elimination of tariffs, and a range of monetary and social policies favorable to business and indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long-term resource depletion, and environmental destruction (Brown, 2005, pp. 37-38).⁴

The model is directed at sculpting the economy, and even the State itself, in such a way as to facilitate and expand capital accumulation (Gambetti & Godoy-Anativia, 2013, p. 5), and is illuminated, presciently, by Karl Polanyi's 1944 analysis of economic liberalism in post-World War I Europe. Polanyi detailed the process of the marketization of social life, and posited that

³ The neoliberal understanding of the self, and its difference from classic liberalism, will be explained further in Chapter 6.

⁴ At the same time, subaltern Latin Americans, notably women, have been able to take advantage of the openings that neoliberal systems provide, linkages with transnational movements and legitimators being a key example (see Giles & Hyndman, 2004, p. 303). That activists have garnered benefits from neoliberalism does not diminish its material harms; it simply points to their resilience and strategic capacity.

such marketization took place when the boundaries of market logic were expanded to cover what had been converted into “fictitious commodities”: land, labor, and money. “Normally,” he wrote, “the economic order is merely a function of the social, in which it is contained” (1944, p. 71), but the marketizing project disembedded that order from its social web. That disembedding was only possible by marketizing the web itself: “A market economy can only exist in a market society... To include [land and labor] in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market” (ibid.). At the same time, as Nancy Fraser (2011) argues, Polanyi’s romanticizing of “society” as the safe, protected alternative to the market is problematic for women and colonized peoples, for whom society has not always been a haven. By incorporating a feminist and Latin Americanist perspective into a Polanyian analysis, I hope to address Fraser’s critique.

As Polanyi seems to have foreseen, neoliberalism is deeper and broader than an economic project. Margaret Thatcher admitted, “[e]conomics are the method, but the object is to change the soul” (qtd. in Harvey, 2005, p. 23). Neoliberalism involves the application of a market logic to all institutions and social relationships, whether or not they are inherently connected to the economy (Harvey, 2005; Brown, 2005). The creation of labor as a “market,” instead of a livelihood, meant in Polanyi’s words “to annihilate all organic forms of existence and to replace them by a different type of organization, an atomistic and individualistic one... this meant that the noncontractual organizations of kinship, neighborhood, profession, and creed were to be liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual and thus restrained his [sic] freedom” (1944, p. 163). Even resistance movements, contentious politics, and defenders and claimants of rights assume a neoliberal logic, seeking individual redress in the courts and the

marketplace, rather than collective emancipation in the halls of government and the streets.

There is, in sum, “no meaning outside the market” (Brown, 2005, p. 45).

The neoliberal project, like the militarizing one, is deeply gendered. This is true in two regards: one, in the Marxist feminist sense, the project shifts greater burdens onto the shoulders of women. As the State withdraws (refocuses) from its role in social reproduction (social welfare, education, healthcare), women disproportionately step in to fill the gaps, leading to second and third shifts that are low-paying or completely unremunerated. Neoliberal reforms lengthen and intensify women’s workdays, while making their livelihoods more informal, contingent, and precarious. At the same time, women’s labor is invisibilized, drawing on the private/public divide (think for instance of a woman who moves from a garment factory to doing in-home piecework, and what that means for her ability to improve her working conditions). But there is more to this dynamic than a disproportionate *effect* on women – the neoliberal project *depends upon* women, and certain conceptions of women and men and their labor. Without marshaling patriarchal concepts of gender, the State would be unable to offsource its responsibilities onto women, who appear in these cases to possess “a self-exploitation that sometimes seems limitless” (Fernandez P., 1996; see also Colón and Poggio, 2010).

I conceive of women’s peace networks as part of an array of social movement organizations in Latin America that resist, contest, or offer alternatives to neoliberalism’s socio-cultural model. David Harvey writes that “the commodification of everything can all too easily run amok and produce social incoherence” (2005, p. 80). This incoherence leads to what Polanyi called a double movement, “a reaction against a dislocation which attacked the fabric of society, and which would have destroyed the very organization of production that the market had called into being” (1944, p. 130). Polanyi’s writing was referring to fascism as a rising force in reaction

to the rending of the social fabric caused by the commodification of all life. His reference to fascist takeover as “a sham rebellion arranged with the tacit approval of the authorities who pretended to have been overwhelmed by force” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 238) illuminates, in the Colombian case, the role of paramilitarism in the neoliberal security state.

The neoliberal security state. Many scholars have examined the role of the neoliberal State, a role which some have uncritically reduced to a withdrawal from the provision of social services. Rather, the role of the State is to insure and enforce market “logic”: free trade, open markets, and inalienable rights to private property. Daniel Goldstein refers to the neoliberal State as “manager, actuary, and cop, maintaining this open field for transnational business by creating laws, enforcing policy reforms, and controlling dissent” (2010, p. 494; see also Taylor, 2009). This role is inherently contradictory in a model whose “pure” theory mandates that the State be noninterventionist. The State relies on “quasi-government institutions” (Harvey, 2005, p. 46) to handle its citizens and repress movements that endanger or obstruct capital accumulation. This repression is applied unevenly along class and racial lines, and is often, especially in the last two decades, narrated in the language of security.

Security is not a new discourse, but it is the most recent iteration of the elite desire to cement class power in and imperial power over Latin America: as Cold War anticommunism, then counterinsurgency, then counternarcotics, and now as counterterrorism. A critical feminist understanding of security is also essential for understanding the role of the modern neoliberal State and its relationship to its citizens. The marketization of social life both produces and relies on the militarization of society under the guise of securitization – a process in which a reductive, narrow understanding of what security means is placed at the top of our global list of social,

political, and economic goals (Pieterse, 2004). Goldstein attributes the global security project to “ruptures that the crises and contradictions of neoliberalism have engendered” (2010, p. 487), which “security” steps in to fill. In the realm of transnational investment, security is closely linked to “stability,” which benefits local elites and investors and requires militarized repression (Cohn, 2013; Klein, 2007). At the same time, the ability to protect oneself from repression and violence is privatized, outsourced to non-State actors (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007; Eichler, 2013) including paramilitary organizations and PMSCs (private military security companies) whose services are for hire. Militarism in general is “an intrinsic element” of neoliberal integration (Kirk & Okazawa-Rey, 2000, p. 2), and security as the militarized mode of *buen vivir* is neoliberal governmentality *par excellence*.

While security as a neoliberal manifestation has been broadly theorized, “[t]here has been little reflection on the linkage between security and gender at the conceptual level,” writes Marcela Donadio (2015). The concept is masculinized (as masculinities are securitized), and even among feminist security studies there exist efforts to try to “improve” security operations by bringing in a broader “gender perspective,” rather than questioning security’s neoliberal womb and its gendered effects. In the early 1990s, the United Nations advanced a concept of “human security” (United Nations, 2009), aiming to tackle social and economic causes of conflict. Intersectional feminist scholars have broadened that to conceive of human security as a holistic concept that also challenges the gender binaries of global conflicts (Tripp, Ferree, & Ewig, 2013). In this dissertation I am critical of the security discourse especially in its transnational voice, which prescribes certain priorities for Colombia (and sells them the weapons and training to pursue those priorities) that benefit elites at the expense of women and the poor.

Theoretical Approach: Women's Social Movements Contesting Militarized

Neoliberal Patriarchy. “The crisis of capitalism, in all its permutations,” said Nancy Fraser in 2011, “*has* to be the backdrop of today’s feminist theorizing.” In contexts of armed conflict, in which war-for-profit has so constrained the lives of women and the poor, militarism must form part of that backdrop as well. The neoliberal project of capital accumulation relies on women’s unpaid labor and subordination to sustain itself, while it expands the boundaries of commodification, which over a palimpsest of patriarchy results in increased privation and male-dependence for women. Marketization, with its social dislocation and individuation, relies on militarism to keep its subaltern population in check (Harvey, 2005) and to protect foreign investments at the expense of the population. At the same time, neoliberal militarism is a cash cow, privatizing “security” and encouraging those with means to invest in their own protection while it strips the poor of their livelihoods. This neoliberal militarism not only benefits from patriarchal understandings of gender, in which men are the actors and women are the victims, the supporters, or the spoils, but intensifies those understandings by way of increased “private” violence, lowered mobility, and skyrocketing levels of rape and sexual torture. When victimized women turn to their government for aid, they find that the State has restructured itself in service to a domestic war and a foreign economy, and it has nothing for them but repression.

When the role of patriarchy is incorporated into an analysis of market and militarized domination, it becomes clear that a combination of material and symbolic claims is key. Women’s subordination is both concrete and conceptual; both recognition and redistribution are necessary goals. If a social movement can unite these strands of domination – patriarchy, marketization, and militarization – in its claims-making, and bring together the material and the symbolic in its repertoire of contention, there is real potential to frame various social movement

goals in a unifying way. The interactions of these goals are particularly evident in Colombia, to whose context I now turn.

Colombia's Stage

Colombia – as a former colony with a half-century of armed conflict punctuated by recent neoliberal reforms – is one of the most appropriate global theaters for an examination of a social movement response to militarism, marketization, and patriarchy. After giving a brief outline of the history of landed exclusion that forms the foundation of the conflict, this section will introduce the contours of the relationships between the three points on this triad as they occur in Colombia, and conclude by raising questions about social movement engagement with those relationships.

Armed conflict and the role of land. Colombia's colonial legacy of resource concentration in the hands of the white and mestizo elite was exacerbated by the internal armed conflict that coalesced in the late 1940s, responding to a moment of State weakness, rising capitalist relations, global Cold War pressures, and the long abuse of the landless by the landed. This coalescence erupted in 1948 with the assassination of Liberal party candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitán (an event discussed more deeply in Chapters 2 and 4), which intensified existing political violence across the country and became known as *La Violencia*. The partisan bloodshed of the era led campesinos to form self-defense groups, the most class-conscious of which consolidated into the FARC (Brittain, 2010). Other guerrilla organizations (the EPL, the ELN, and the M-19) formed shortly thereafter. Guerrillas, especially the FARC, made land reform a central element of their platform. Elites, driven by a desire to protect their control of the land they had accrued

during the violence, had organized sectors of the police forces into what would eventually, with help from the army, become right-wing paramilitary forces. The emergence of cocaine trafficking in the 1980s created new wealth and a new elite, who hid their drug profits in largely unproductive cattle-ranching estates (LeGrand, 2003). Paramilitaries were consolidated in the 1990s, as protectors of neoliberal megaprojects and this emerging narco-trafficking class, into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUC (Taussig, 2003). The AUC's violence against campesinos brought the conflict to new heights of barbarity with the collusion of the State's military, executive, and legislative arms (Kirk, 2009; Pécaut, 1999; *inter alia*).

As with many civil conflicts in Latin America, in Colombia land is key to understanding the violence. The creation of land as a “fictitious commodity” (Polanyi, 1944), and the concentration of that commodity, drove the conflict. With the subsequent drug boom, as Colombia transformed from a market society to a black market society, land's significance evolved from a simple indicator of a social justice deficit to a militarized asset for narco-trafficking and the protection of elite power (Meertens & Zambrano, 2010, p. 192). The conflict has aided in the concentration of territory, such that 0.4% of landowners now own 60% of rural land (Fellowship of Reconciliation, 2011; see also Richani, 2015). Even in the mid-90s when a land reform program showed potential for changes in the tenure system, a simultaneous counterreform gathered land into the hands of narco-traffickers and paramilitaries who violently cleared the land of its inhabitants and raised cattle as a front for their operations (Deere & León, 2001; Holmes, Gutiérrez, & Curtin, 2008).

Fifty years of conflict have displaced seven million Colombians (World Bulletin, 2016), more than fourteen percent of the population. The total area of land that has been seized or abandoned is larger than South Korea. The dynamics of land seizure and concentration are

profoundly racialized and gendered. Afro and indigenous communities' ties to land has a deep ethnocultural significance, and lives affected by conflict are changed in culturally specific ways. Racialized populations are dispossessed not only by armed conflict *per se*, but by State policies of "modernization," internal colonization, development, and coca eradication. A full two thirds of the indigenous Nasa community, for instance, has been displaced by combinations of these forces. As one indigenous woman reported, "Si no nos matan las balas, nos matan las políticas públicas" (OEA, 2006, p. 50; see also Tovar-Restrepo & Irazábal, 2014). Afro communities, for their part, are violently displaced from resource-rich lands to which they have long been relegated, but which became more lucrative for investors when markets were opened. These dynamics of race intersect with gender in clearly visible ways: most of the displaced are women, and many if not most of adult displaced women are heads-of-household. Activists I spoke with in Cauca reported that single women are generally displaced first, perhaps owing to fewer community ties and lower standing based on lack of connection to spouses and in-laws. Of displaced women who are heads-of-household, *ninety-six percent* are Afro or indigenous (OEA, 2006, p. 44). Displaced women are much more vulnerable to sexual violence, not to mention economic privation and the loss of their social capital. Once resettled, displaced women are often discriminated against *because* of their displacement (Mesa de Trabajo "Mujer y Conflicto Armado," 2005, pp. 82-83). Nonetheless, Donny Meertens reports that since the 1970s women have been only 11% of the beneficiaries of state land reforms (2013, p. 48; see Chapter 5 for a deeper analysis of this phenomenon), and continue to struggle for inclusion in programs that aim to address historically entrenched inequality in a country which, by some measures, has the seventh-most unequal economy on the globe (Sherman, 2015).

Marketization and Militarization. As a country embroiled in fifty years of armed conflict, Colombia is an obvious example of a militarized society. As one activist with Ruta Pacífica told me in 2013, “se va normalizando mucho el conflicto en ese país. Aquí todo el mundo cree que es normal.” But particularly since the 1990s, militarism has danced hand-in-hand with marketization across Colombia’s stage in ways that can shed light on the theoretical framework advanced above.

Neoliberal reforms in Colombia advanced more slowly than in neighboring countries due both to the power of the coffee sector and the violence of the armed conflict, which dissuaded potential investors from taking the risk. Moreover, the country was able to insulate itself from the debt crisis which brought its neighbors to the doors of the IFIs in the 1980s because of the wealth generated by the cocaine trade (Pécaut, 1999; Bushnell, 1993). Nonetheless, responding to regional trends and political opportunities,⁵ the Gaviria administration ushered in a range of radical neoliberal reforms between 1990 and 1994: pension privatization, tariff reduction, lowered restrictions on Colombian investment abroad and the total erasure of restrictions on FDI, deregulation of labor, allowing interest rates to rise, and the privatization of public banks, ports, and railroads (Urrutia, 1994).

Narcotraffickers did well as markets opened, taking advantage of new trade routes and traffickers’ ties to government representatives. The drug trade brought in at least \$3.5 billion in 2002, nearly the amount of revenue from oil exports and more than twice that of the coffee sector (Villar & Cottle, 2011:83). Paramilitaries, who protected the holdings of traffickers and other private capital, were key to the maintenance of the open economy and violently repressed those

⁵ In Colombia’s particular brand of shock therapy (Klein, 2007), neoliberal reforms were made possible in part by (a) violence against union organizers, which silenced labor opposition, and (b) the assassinations of presidential candidates in 1989 and 1990, which crystallized the cartel crisis in the eyes of many Colombians and made them more disposed to various structural changes (Urrutia, 1994).

social movements that challenged the State's economic model. Within a decade, FDI as a percentage of GDP had increased by a factor of twelve (Gwynne & Kay, 2004:105).

The Pastrana Administration (1998-2002) further neoliberalized the economy, accepting Colombia's first IMF loan with accompanying structural adjustment requirements in 1999 (IMF, 2011). Pastrana also deepened the process of militarization by signing Plan Colombia, a multi-billion dollar package of mostly military aid from the United States. The plan was aimed at decimating guerrilla forces, who represented the chief opposition to the neoliberal economic program (Petras, 2001). It also included a clause mandating further opening of the economy, and required Colombia to raise funds for the plan by privatizing public utilities (Stokes, 2005). From the U.S. perspective, the plan successfully combined national goals of anti-drug and counterterrorist policy, and in so doing extended the shelf life of the anti-communist complex and its arms market (Tate, 2015).

When talks between the Pastrana administration and the FARC-EP fell apart at the turn of the century, Colombia voters responded by electing a militant anti-guerrilla spokesman from Antioquia, Colombia's white center of power, named Álvaro Uribe. As a senator Uribe had been a key player in the neoliberal legislation of the early 90s (Bejarano, 2013, p. 339), and during his tenure as president social exclusion continued apace while society was further polarized. Paramilitaries continued their assault on the populace, an assault which correlated with increased exports and a rising GDP (Holmes, Gutiérrez, & Curtin, 2008, pp. 125,131). Ana María Bejarano writes that "Uribe represented a project of reassertion of the landed elites, an opportunity to reaffirm their right to rule over society" (2013, p. 335). Through his policies of Democratic Security, supported by Plan Colombia and then by global counterterrorism discourse after 2001, Uribe reduced the rates of kidnapping, guerrilla activity, and (apolitical) murder, but oversaw the

assassinations of at least 14,000 civilians and the displacement of 2.2 million more (Bejarano, 2013). This was accomplished in part by instituting a network of civilian informants, in what Daniel Goldstein called a “classic neoliberal form [which] expects citizens to take on the responsibility of defending the state without any expectation that the state will, in turn, assist them with their own local needs or protect their rights” (2010, p. 495). Instead, Uribe’s conflation of all dissent and social movement organizing with terrorism was “a legitimized campaign of State terror” (Villar & Cottle, 2011, p. 109; see also Roldán, 2010) which endangered the lives of all social movement activists, women among them (see Chapter 4 for a further exploration of this dynamic).

Several years into his presidency, Uribe pushed forward a high-profile, largely superficial demobilization of the AUC. Combined with the reduction in guerrilla forces achieved with U.S. military hardware and training, this began to improve Colombia’s global image, and foreign investment increased from a trickle to a flood. This investment has allowed the country to narrate itself as an economic miracle, a comeback story transforming from a failed state into an economic bonanza. But this miracle hides the displacement and violence, wrought by capital’s paramilitary and neoparamilitary allies, that are necessary for investors to profit. The passage of the Free Trade Agreement in 2011 under the Santos Administration accelerated this investment, chiefly in the agrofuel and extractive industries (petroleum, coal, gold, palm oil, and sugar cane, among others). Today an estimated 40% of Colombian territory is under concession or in contract negotiations with extractive multinationals (Oxfam, 2013), who see Colombia as a key economic ally in the context of the market threats presented by policies in neighboring Venezuela. Extractive multinationals have formed ties with neoparamilitaries to provide private protection for the companies’ operations, and activists who protest mining and palm operations

are displaced or assassinated. The push for palm plantations has been amplified by U.S. and European discourses of “sustainable development,” and favored as a crop-substitution technique by both Plan Colombia and USAID (Ballvé, 2009; 2012). But the palm oil boom, and the commodification of Colombia’s subsoil, are dependent on militarist projects to clear the land for extraction of resources and to repress the social forces that would endanger those investments. Chief among those repressed – both by Colombia’s marketizing project and its para/military enablers – are women.

Patriarchy and Marketization. The neoliberalization of Colombian society has mirrored similar processes in other Latin American countries: it has concentrated their labor in the informal sector, precaritized their livelihoods, made them more dependent on men for economic survival, decreased personal and financial autonomy, off sourced State responsibilities for social reproduction and care work onto women, increased the costs of education and healthcare, intensified women’s workdays, and entrenched patriarchal concepts of women’s roles. One key manifestation of these dynamics is the sabana outside Bogotá, which has been dedicated almost entirely to floriculture. Today, following the 2011 Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., more than two-thirds of floriculture’s estimated 100,000 workers are women – the abuse of whom subsidizes the industry. Women’s organizing rights are violently obstructed, their reproductive rights are made the business of their employers, and the toxicity of the environment – not to mention the physical toll and the hours worked – leaves their bodies stamped with indelible consequences (Cameron, 2014). One woman flower worker I spoke with in Facatativá a few days before Valentine’s Day in 2012 had just come off a twenty-seven hour shift. Women

activists from the networks under study also spoke of the effects on women of megaprojects like dams, which reduce or eliminate campesina women's traditional livelihoods.

But Colombia's context is distinct, of course, given the way the marketizing project is bound up with militarized enforcement to a degree not seen in other countries in the region. When megaprojects are protected by paramilitaries and attacked by guerrillas, women are placed at physical risk. Moreover, war and neoliberalization both rely on women to assume traditional roles and expand those roles without remuneration. The combination of the two processes amplifies this reliance. A community leader reported to the Mesa de Trabajo "Mujer y Conflicto Armado," for instance: "Por ejemplo las madres comunitarias... somos psicólogas, cocineras, amas de casa... eso es cosa dura" (2005, p. 91). When communities are displaced by the violence that clears the land for megaprojects, women are usually the first to go, according to one woman I interviewed who was displaced in 2004. This displacement also breaks down the social fabric, she said, which affects women first based on their assumed roles as social reproducers and care workers. Beyond being overworked, precaritized, reduced to dependency, and violently displaced, women suffer gruesome physical consequences of the militarizing project in Colombia.

Patriarchy and Militarism. There is little academic scholarship on the intersections between militarism and women's subordination in Colombia, though the data produced by NGOs, civil society organizations, and women's peace networks on the ground is extensive. In a workshop I attended with members of Ruta Pacífica in 2013, an organizer asked the twenty-five or so rural women who attended: "¿Qué entienden como conflicto armado?" Various women responded: "Balas, primeramente." "Una lucha constante." "Temor." "Lucha por territorio."

“Zozobra, intranquilidad, impotencia.” When asked what rights were affected by war, women answered: “La vida.” “La salud física y psicosocial.” “La libertad de expresión, de educación.” “La privacidad.” “La comunidad indígena tiene ciertas costumbres de familia que no se vuelve a encontrar.” “Desarrollo de personalidad.” “Los actores armados quieren que nos callemos.”


These responses point to the broad array of lived experiences of the gendering of armed conflict and the militarization of patriarchy. Many of these intersections are related to the role of women’s bodies; these linkages are detailed in Chapter 6. Here it suffices to give an indication of the range of the day-to-day intersections of the militarizing project with the subordination of women in Colombia, followed by a graphic that offers a few ways of understanding those intersections.

The armed conflict has exacerbated both public and “private” violence, including physical displacement, of which women and girls are the majority of victims. Rape and sexual torture are also rampant in all years of the armed conflict, and are committed by all armed groups, including guerrilla, paramilitary, State, and U.S. actors. The latter phenomenon serves to exemplify and deepen Colombia’s neocolonial relationship to the United States, as demonstrated in the case of 2007 report that U.S. Army soldiers raped a twelve-year-old girl, who with her family was displaced from her home due to threats to her life resulting from her accusation of the soldiers (Bradshaw-Smith, 2015). U.S. and Colombian military bases are also correlated with increased prostitution and ages of fertility in the zones where they operate. And in keeping with feminists’ assertions that violence is a continuum ranging from public to private, family violence has also increased during the conflict, as has, more recently, the incidence of acid attacks carried out on women (see Chapter 6).

While the majority (though certainly not the total) of rape cases in Colombia have been attributed to military and paramilitary actors, the guerrillas have been accused of carrying out forced sterilizations and abortions on female combatants. Paramilitaries are known for “recruiting” and forcing young women into sexual and domestic slavery. Drug traffickers are credited with popularizing the “narco-aesthetic,” or the plastic surgery associated with the glamour of the trafficking lifestyle. In its heyday the AUC was known for instituting curfews, dress codes, and other forms of social control for women and girls, and punishing transgressors with violence and death. These tendencies serve to reify the image of women as victims (see Chapter 5) and as mere allies and assistants to men (as all sides of the conflict have accused women of consorting with their opponents). On a more macro level, the concentration of funding in the military budget – especially when accompanied by neoliberal economic priorities – results in decreased resources in the areas of health and education, both of which affect women’s family lives. Maternal mortality is higher in conflict zones, owing no doubt both to this funding dynamic and to the decrease in physical mobility wrought by the militarization of territory. Women who live in areas devoted to coca cultivation are subject to negative health effects associated with fumigation – cancer, skin conditions, and birth defects among them. Moreover, the national centering of militarism as a key political and economic priority means that the discourse becomes hegemonic, leaving women’s concerns for their own well-being or political inclusion to be dismissed as peripheral, at best, or subversive, at worst.

Patriarchy and women’s subordination are not an effect of militarism. They are a cause. Gender reveals itself as a “linchpin not only of how war and militarism affect people but also of the very existence of the war system,” write Sjoberg and Via (2010, 11). The two systems

intertwine with marketization in a mutually supportive structure which forms the backdrop for women's resistance movements.



¹ Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989

² Gramsci, 1971

Fig. 2: How is Colombia's Conflict Gendered?

WPNs and Social Movement Brokerage in the Twenty-First Century. In a summary of the Colombian conflict, Catherine LeGrand comments that the 1990s saw the emergence of several new social movement actors. She writes, “One major question is whether the violence of the last 20 years has undermined social movements and made them impossible to sustain or, alternatively, whether it has generated new movements, *new kinds of concern and unity* essential to bringing the violence to an end” (2003, p. 189, my emphasis). If, as I posit here, Colombia’s conflict relies on multiple global processes of domination, what might be the effect of a social movement that addresses the interaction of these processes? What role can it play in uniting other social movement actors in the country?

Eduardo Silva (2009) raises important questions about the potential of one social movement to broker connections between others to create a united alternative political imaginary. He analyzes the role of indigenous subjectivity in Bolivia at the turn of this century, and the way indigenous movements were able to frame their antineoliberal struggle as one to which other SMOs could commit based on their similar grievances. In so doing, indigenous SMOs “transformed protest by individual movements – frequently localized – into a nationwide concentration of diverse social actors demanding change on a wide variety of connected issues” (Silva, 2009, p. 14), eventually leading to the previously unthinkable election of an indigenous, antineoliberal president in Bolivia and the mainstreaming of counterhegemonic discourse in that country. I approach this dissertation with an eye for the potential of the women’s peace movement to follow a similar course, and examine the degree to which they unite various social movement concerns under their umbrella, bringing other SMOs and social processes along with them. At the time of my fieldwork Colombian social movements were collaborating to organize one of the most broad-based national roadblocks in the country’s history, in response to the FTA

with the U.S. and the changes it brought along with it. This is a new era for social movement organizing in Colombia, and I argue that the women's peace movement plays a key role.

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of two parts. The first is an examination of women's peace networks as a social movement, engaging with questions of movement histories, political opportunities and threats, and current challenges. Chapter 2, "Ya No Se Puede Tapar: The Development of the Women's Peace Movement," offers a periodization of the Colombian feminist movement, arguing that its history is essential to understanding the current challenges faced and decisions made by the three networks under study. The chapter traces four "fulcrums" of political opportunity, and examines moments of aperture, threat, deradicalization, and institutionalization that have shaped the modern movement. The chapter also engages more deeply with social movement theory and the "cultural turn" in social movement studies. Chapter 3, "Hacia Dónde: Women Peace Activists in the Twenty-First Century," is a close examination of the key challenges faced by the networks today. It details the geographical contexts and the origins of each network, and foregrounds my interviewees' recollections of their own experiences as activists. It outlines the movement's struggle for political and economic autonomy, the centralization of funding resources in the major cities, the racial dynamics of Colombian regionalization, the relationship between WPNs and institutional feminism, and the legacy of war on women's organizing relationships.

The second piece of the dissertation is conceived as a set of four conceptual "characters" which I argue play key roles on Colombia's stage: confusion, victimhood, the body, and peace.⁶

⁶ Early in my research I was inspired by the structure of Escobar's *Territories of Difference* (2008), which allows readers to engage with the realities he describes by organizing the chapter into six themes which serve as conceptual

These characters are engaged by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic sides of the armed conflict and used differently for opposing ends. As such, each is presented as a dyad, with both the hegemonic and counterhegemonic significance of the concept theorized.

Chapter 4 examines the role of confusion in Colombian historiography and feminist resistance. The first section, “Colombia’s Confusing Violence: Historiography and the Fog of War,” examines the role of confusion in the way the conflict is narrated and maintained. The second half of the dyad, “Confusing Colombia’s Violence,” features the actions of Ruta Pacifica and argues that activists have marshaled confusion for their own purposes of feminist conflict transformation.

Chapter 5 arises from the political context of my fieldwork, at which time the Santos administration’s Victims’ Law was being contested, debated, and variously implemented on the ground. The chapter analyzes “victimhood” as a central character in the conflict, and is made up of two sides: “State-Sponsored Subjectivity,” which outlines the neoliberal and patriarchal way in which victimhood is imagined by the State in its legislation, and “Subversive Subjectivities,” which details the way WPNs have engaged with the law and with the neoliberal subjectivity offered to conflict victims by the State.

Chapter 6 delves into the role of the female body in conflict and conflict transformation, and was perhaps the most visceral portion of the writing process. The first half, “Un Cuerpo Propio: Somatophobia and Armed Conflict,” engages with the history of the female body: in Western enlightenment philosophy, in feminist thinking, and in Colombia’s conflict. It puts forth an embodied theory about the intersections between militarization, marketization, and patriarchy and their mutually-sustaining structure of support. The second half, “The Body Politic(ized):

lenses. Along with Mohanty’s (2003) concept of a “spiral” structure in which the same questions or major themes are revisited multiple times at different levels of the spiral, I credit Escobar’s writing with helping me organize this work.

Colombian Women's Embodied Resistance,” posits that the *power* of women's embodiment as articulated in the first half of the chapter provides it with the potential to upset the foundations of armed conflict in the country.

Chapter 7 engages what is, at this time, the most visible character in Colombia's conflict: peace. The first section, “Otra Mirada de Paz: Peace, Pacification, and Women's Participation,” traces the progress of the peace talks in Havana and analyzes the various and conflicting understandings currently operating in Colombian political discourse of what peace means and whom it serves. In the second section, “Las Pactantes de la Paz: Colombian Women's Imaginaries of Peace,” I attempt to characterize the kind of peace that the three networks under study have in mind. I argue that WPNs' peace is a holistic one aimed at three foundations of conflict – patriarchy, militarism, and marketization. I conclude the chapter by imagining some of the scenarios that the women's peace movement might face, and the ways it might evolve, when the talks in Havana result in a bilateral peace accord.

Finally, I conclude the dissertation by returning to the questions asked in the beginning of this chapter, summarizing the contributions of the research, and outlining three avenues for future research in Colombia's changing political context.

Contributions to the Field

This dissertation seeks to expand the body of literature on twenty-first century women's movements in Latin America, focus scholarly attention on the Colombian social movement panorama, and offer an innovative theoretical framework that might be applied to better understand the significance of other social movements elsewhere. “Studies of Colombian women in any era continue to be scarce,” writes Diana Gómez Correal (2011a, p. 15). An expansion of

academic knowledge about women's social movement organizing in this context can shed important light on

- (a) the nature of feminist and social movement organizing under a right-leaning "democratic deficit" government (Jaquette, 2009) surrounded by center-left neighbors;
- (b) the struggle of twenty-first century Latin American feminism to expand its centers of power to reflect the movement's intersectional and heterogeneous nature;
- (c) the potential of "holistic" women's movements to frame social discontent in a way that unites disparate strands of contentious politics into a broad-based push for structural change; and
- (d) the mutually supportive structures of patriarchy, neoliberalism, and militarism and how they affect women's lives and organizations. In scholarly literature on the gendered nature of Colombia's conflict, deep analyses of the role of the neoliberal project are nearly absent. On the other hand, political economy analyses of the conflict pay scant attention to gender as a constitutive element of militarism and marketization. A theoretical model that examines this triad, and social movements' resistance to it, could be fruitfully applied to other contexts as well.

Finally, this dissertation intends to point to the contributions of women's peace organizing in Colombia, the immeasurable bravery and resolve of the activists I was lucky to meet in the field, and the crucial importance of their work and their political imaginaries for the future of a peaceful Colombia. I begin my analysis by returning to the origins of the feminist and women's movements in the country.

Hay una legitimidad. Hay una realidad que ya no se puede tapar, y que no se puede negar.
– Yolanda Becerra, Organización Femenina Popular (Bucaramanga, 7 October 2013)

CHAPTER 2

Ya No Se Puede Tapar:

The Development of the Women's Peace Movement

Colombia is not an easy place to build a social movement. Its history of hegemonic partisan control, the colonial legacy of its seigniorial order, and the armed intransigence of its elite class make for a rough organizing terrain. Many social movements, alternative political parties, and counterhegemonic voices have been silenced in the last century, violently wiped out or forced into submission by back-room alliances between money and military might. But Colombia's women's movement in the twenty-first century is not only active; it is internationally visible and nationally legitimated. What is more, other civil society organizations are allying under feminism's umbrella, joining women's organizations' campaigns for peace, justice, and reparations from the armed conflict. How has the women's movement, forged in the fire, come to occupy this position? What can understanding its history tell us about the challenges faced by Ruta Pacífica, the Movimiento Social de Mujeres, and the Red de Mujeres del Caribe in the twenty-first century?

In this chapter I will trace that history, beginning in 1930 and moving through struggles for suffrage, La Violencia, the Frente Nacional, and what I argue are the four fulcrums of the modern-day Colombian feminist movement: the feminist Encuentro held in Bogotá in 1981, which ushered in an era of Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) prominence in Colombian feminism; the Constituent Assembly and the new constitution of 1991, and the period from 2000-2005, which saw dialogues between the Pastrana administration and the FARC-EP at El Caguán, the passage of the U.S.' Plan Colombia, and the Uribe administration's Justice and

Peace Law. I argue that today's negotiations between the FARC-EP and the Santos administration in Havana represent a fourth fulcrum. I will show that the history of Colombia's feminist movement is defined by a divisiveness imposed by its context: unlike feminism in other countries, Colombia's movement never had a safe space to develop. Born into conflict, it has always existed in a polarized field of battle; likewise, like Left movements, its members have always been targets of violence. This has resulted in a tendency toward dogmatic divisions and internal suspicion, particularly over issues of autonomy, something difficult (if not impossible) to achieve in the context of a civil war.⁷ It has produced a pantheon of women's and feminist organizations all over the country whose strategies and identities are diverse. But this diversity does not exist on a level field; rather, differences in material access between different organizations reveal that the disparities of power based on class and racial-ethnic identities which divide women in Colombia are also reflected in social movement organizing. While I argue that the movement's diversity (both of race and class, and of political strategy) is key to the survival of the women's peace movement, it remains true that resources and funding from NGOs are concentrated in the major cities to the exclusion of regional networks; this dynamic and its connections to racial discrimination will be addressed more deeply in the next chapter.

This overview⁸ is far from comprehensive; rather, it is intended to trace a general history of salient moments in the development of the movement.⁹ One aspect of this history that goes undertheorized here is the role of women in guerrilla organizations, both those which

⁷ See Chapter 3 for a deeper discussion of what autonomy means to the women's movement and the three networks under study.

⁸ My understanding of the history of the women's and feminist movement in Colombia owes a debt to the Fondo de Documentación Mujer y Género "Ofelia Uribe de Acosta" at the Universidad Nacional in Bogotá, which houses a wide-ranging collection of documents on the subject.

⁹ For more thorough accounts, see Diana Marcela Gómez Correal, *Dinámicas del movimiento feminista bogotano: Historias de cuarto, salón y calle, Historias de vida (1970-1991)* (2011); Doris Lamus Canavate, *De la subversión a la inclusión: movimientos de mujeres de la segunda ola en Colombia, 1975-2005* (2010); the work of María Emma Wills; and Magdala Velásquez Toro, Ed. (1995), *Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia*.

demobilized and formed alliances with civilian SMOs and those which remained (or returned to being) armed groups. The dynamics of the relationship between civilian women activists and former guerrillas, and their influences on one another, will be particularly relevant in coming years and is further addressed in Chapter 7. In this periodization I rely on primary and secondary accounts of the twentieth-century feminist movement in Colombia, and on information gleaned from my fieldwork and interviews with feminist activists, to attempt a broad periodization.

Feminist, Women's, and Feminine Movements

In this chapter I use the terms “feminist movement” and “women’s movement” interchangeably, or at least encompass the former within the latter. Colombia’s feminist movement is notable for the way the term “feminist” has been appropriated by what in other decades of Latin American scholarship would have been called “organizaciones femeninas” or the “women’s movement.” Activists with whom I spoke during fieldwork defined themselves variously as “feminista socialista,” “feminista popular,” “feminista antimilitarista,” “feminista zambo,” “feminista decolonial,” and “feminista anti-imperial.” And so in addition to their commitment to feminism, these activists are heirs to political movements concerned primarily with class, race, and coloniality – all of which presented challenges and alternatives to the so-called bourgeois, academic feminist movement of “históricas.” And so the difference between “feminist movement” and “women’s movement,” such a stark dividing line in other regional contexts¹⁰ and in early periods of feminist scholarship, fails to tell the whole story of Colombia’s women’s movement. The efforts of “women’s” or “feminine” organizations to broaden the class, racial, and regional boundaries of feminism have been constitutive in the formation of the

¹⁰ On the history of the hostility between feminist and women’s movements in Argentina, for instance, see Jo Fisher’s analysis of SACRA (Dore and Molyneux, 2000).

modern movement; as such, I argue that they were always an important part of the feminist movement, as contesting voices forcing the expansion of traditional power centers. As Jane Mainsbridge, writing about feminism in the United States, asserts, the movement “is neither an aggregation of organizations nor an aggregation of individual members but a discourse. It is a set of changing, contested aspirations and understandings that provide conscious goals, cognitive backing, and emotional support” (qtd. in Álvarez, 1999).

Born Subversive: The Early Feminist Movement (1930 – 1957)

1930 marked the beginning of what is known as the sixteen-year Liberal Republic in Colombia, as the Church-aligned Conservative party receded in the face of progressive forces, including those advancing women’s rights. In the previous decades, despite clamoring and organizing for change, women’s social and political rights (particularly those of the married, middle-class women who were the most visible leaders of the early feminist movement) remained relatively stagnant under Conservative hegemony. The Liberal presidency, along with the diminished ecclesial power that accompanied it, represented a political opening (Tarrow, 1996) for claims to citizenship, as well as for cultural expression that was formerly censored. Moreover, in the 1930s the zeitgeist of modernization, economic recovery, and industrial progress facilitated women’s organizing, allowing middle-class activists to gain traction for their goals by pointing out that women’s emancipation was a marker of a modern, progressive society (Velásquez, 1995, pp. 183;209; see also Thorp, 1984).

Amid this political and cultural aperture, the IV Congreso Internacional Femenino took place in Bogotá, building on the work of suffragists like Ofelia Uribe de Acosta (Solano, 2006,

ERA	POLITICAL CONTEXT	EVENTS IN WOMEN'S/FEMINIST MOVEMENT	TRENDS IN WOMEN'S/FEMINIST MOVEMENT
1930s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Liberal Republic (until 1946) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1930: IV Feminine Congress in Bogotá 1932: Married women can legally own property Rise of suffrage movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Suffrage blocked by two-party hegemony Popular women become more involved in wage work and unions
1940s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1946: Conservatives in power 1948: Gaitán assassinated 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rise in feminist action, forged in a partisan context Feminism seen as anti-clerical
1950s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1953: Rojas Pinilla dictatorship 1957: Frente Nacional 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1954: Rojas Pinilla bows to pressure; grants suffrage 1954: Organización Femenina Nacional 1955: Women's mobilization firehosed 1957: Women's first vote 1957: Unión de Ciudadanas Colombianas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Many women's organizations affiliated with the Church Increased women's participation in Leftist political parties
1960s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1965: ELN 1965: EPL 1966: FARC-EP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Second-wave feminism crystallizes; arises out of Leftist political parties (Socialist, Communist, Trotskyite, Marxist-Leninist) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feminist movement politicizes "private" issues Major fissures are between <i>doble militantes/partidistas</i> and <i>autonomistas</i>
1970s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> End of Frente Nacional 1970: M-19 Land struggles Rise in narco-trafficking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1972: Organización Femenina Popular 1974: Decreto 2820 (equal rights for women and men) 1974: UCC allies with López Michelson 1975: First feminist organizations 1977: Frente Amplio de Mujeres 1977: Combate Mujer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Women's organizations split from Leftist political parties Height of social movement organizing; surge of new organizations
1980s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1981: Muerte a Secuestradores Further rise in narco-trafficking National Security Doctrine 1984: Betancur-EPL talks fail 1985: M-19 attack on Palace of Justice 1985: Unión Patriótica 1989: Luis Carlos Galán assassinated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1981: CEDAW signed 1981: First feminist <i>Encuentro</i> of Latin America and the Caribbean held in Bogotá New popular women's organizations: ANMUCIC, FEDEMUC, ASODEMUC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feminism is largely middle-class and academic The UN Decade for Women sees a rise in feminist NGOs
1990s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recrudescence of paramilitary violence Militarization of society 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1991: Asamblea Nacional Constituyente 1991: Red Nacional de Mujeres New women's peace organizations 1994: Red de Mujeres del Caribe 1996: Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres 1996: Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Political Turn: feminism moves toward the State; professionalizes Feminism is pluralized Identity and difference recognition
2000s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1999-2000: Pastrana-FARC dialogues 2000: Plan Colombia 2002: Uribe elected 2003: Seguridad Democrática 2005-2006: Justicia y Paz/paramilitary "demobilization" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2001: United Nations prize given to Ruta Pacífica and OFP 2001: Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz 2002: Women's march on Bogotá 2002: Women's Emancipatory Constituent Process 2004: Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres Contra la Guerra, Bogotá 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Women organizers become military targets
2010s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2011: FTA with U.S. 2012: FARC-Santos talks open in Havana 2015: Peace accords announced 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2010: Encuentro de Mujeres y Pueblos de los Américas Contra la Militarización held in Bogotá 2011: State approaches Organización Femenina Popular about reparations 2013: Gender subcommission installed in Havana talks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Women's peace networks are treated in the press with increasing respect; gain some political legitimacy

Fig. 3: The Women's and Feminist Movement

pp. 68-69). The 1930 Congreso, in addition to offering a space for the consolidation of feminist concerns in the country, was a starting point for political advocacy in the Liberal government. The event was broadly accepted because it portrayed its attendees as a group of morally upstanding and feminine women devoted to the progress and improvement of Colombian society; the women, who were largely middle and upper class, focused their efforts on issues of public hygiene, child protection, and other concerns deemed acceptable topics for women's attention (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 297).

While its rhetoric was less than revolutionary by modern feminist standards, the 1930 Congreso was the opening salvo for an increasingly active women's movement, which saw married women granted the right to own property independently of their spouses in 1932 with the passage of Ley 28 (Velásquez, 1995, p. 195). In the following year the movement staged a push for suffrage, which ultimately failed, though a constitutional reform in 1936 granted universal suffrage to all men (ibid., p. 203). Despite the political opening presented in the 30s by the dominance of the Liberal Party, women's right to vote would go unrecognized for twenty years, blocked by the two-party hegemony that kept the male ruling classes in power. Conservative politicians blocked women's suffrage based on stated religious objections; Liberals, also aligned with the Church but to a lesser extent, were against it because women were seen as overly ecclesial and it was assumed that they would support the Conservative party. María Emma Wills explains that between 1920 and 1954,

Se puede afirmar que el país, a pesar de tener uno de los sistemas electorales más ininterrumpidos del continente, fue de las últimas naciones latinoamericanas en aprobar el sufragio femenino... [la razón] reside en los arreglos institucionales y las confrontaciones partidistas que caracterizan la vida política hasta la violencia, y que estructuraron a su vez las iniciativas feministas que se emprendieron durante este período (2011b, p. 2).

The struggle for suffrage continued through the 1940s, with another major legislative push under the Liberal Lleras Camargo administration in 1944. This opportunity spurred the

founding of the Unión Femenina de Colombia, made up of seventy-some women of the middle and upper classes and dedicated to furthering women's political participation, and the Alianza Femenina, a social-democratic, pro-suffrage organization. The mid-1940s also saw efforts by the feminist movement to push for suffrage in the press; Ofelia Uribe de Acosta began the *Hora Femenista* radio program on Radio Boyacá (as Boyacá province was something of a feminist stronghold at the time), and the feminist magazine *Agitación Femenina* (Velásquez, 1995, pp. 213-215).

Between 1944 and 1948, the social movement that arose around the presidential campaign of progressive Bogotá mayor Jorge Eliécer Gaitán (known as Gaitanismo) became a rallying point for feminist action – not necessarily because Gaitán himself was particularly explicit about women's rights, but because his generalized populist discourse of class-based empowerment and ending the domination of the oligarchy opened a door for suffragists to push their agenda. Liberals lost the presidency to Conservatives in 1946, ending the Liberal Republic and fueling violence between party members all over the country. When Gaitán was assassinated in 1948, feminists were significant participants in the outcry for justice; this rise in activity coincided with the IX Panamerican Conference in Bogotá, which resulted in the Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil and Political Rights to Women and the founding of the Organization of American States (Velásquez & Reyes, 1995, p. 234).

Gaitán's assassination touched off the urban riot known as the Bogotazo, which contributed to a gruesome expansion of the existing political violence in the countryside. The resulting civil war would be known as La Violencia, and would leave an estimated two hundred thousand dead by 1966. Roldán (2002) argues that La Violencia was about more than partisan loyalties, revealing deep tensions over the elites' treatment of the lower classes, fears of mass-

based insurrection, and the role of the State. Whatever the motivations behind the violence, which Roldán argues were various in different zones and sectors of the country, it is certain (and not accidental in a war intended to define the limits of power) that women suffered in gruesome ways that were particular to their femininity (Luna, 2000, *inter alia*). Armed men raped them at astonishing rates, and there were numerous reports of men cutting fetuses out of the bodies of pregnant women (see Chapter 6 for a theoretical exploration of such violence). Further, the years following creation of the Frente Nacional represented more of a shift in violence than an end to it. This explosive political context, in which loyalists of opposing parties were painted in hyperbolic terms with the consequences written in blood, meant that the burgeoning feminist movement was marked from the start as dangerous to the social order. Despite the fact that many suffragists were devout Catholics, not affiliated with the Left, who framed their push for suffrage as a quest to influence politics with women's maternal instincts and inherent moral superiority (Luna, 2004, p. 145), the movement on the whole was seen as subversive. Pope Pius XII, who occupied the Vatican during this era, was known even among Popes for being particularly antifeminist; his "Alerta al Feminismo" framed the global feminist movement as founded in communist thinking. The nascent Cold War, anticommunist bent in national and international discourse, especially virulent during La Violencia, meant that any feminist organizing in 1950s Colombia would have been seen as anticlerical (if not outright Marxist) in an era in which such ascriptions had real and violent consequences (Velásquez, 1995, pp. 219-232).

In June of 1953, Army Commander General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla led a military coup, supported by the majority of political parties in Colombia which were tired of partisan violence and eager for a quick exit. Prominent political voices, reflecting Colombians' pride in what they saw as the country's exceptionalism, asserted defensively that Rojas' coup was not the same as

other military coups in Latin America, and was the only available option under the circumstances (Oquist, 1980:186). Rojas, something of a populist (he was said to model himself after Juan and Eva Perón [Luna, 2004]), oversaw a reduction in violence for about six months after the coup. But by the end of 1953, the brief honeymoon was over; violence (of a less partisan and more socioeconomic nature than the first wave, according to Oquist [1980, p. 187]) returned and was met with military repression (Velásquez & Reyes, 1995, p. 248). The major political parties, affronted at being excluded, soon began to demand Rojas' overthrow.

It was in the midst of this strange conjuncture – Rojas' four years in power being the only time Colombia strayed from its official status as a constitutional democracy since the dissolution of Gran Colombia in 1829 – that the topic of women's political representation was again raised at the national level. Women seized the opportunity to lobby Rojas for suffrage, and this, combined with alleged pressure from his wife and daughters, finally forced the issue. Rojas granted women suffrage and the right to run for office in 1954. It was a testament to the power of partisan hegemony in Colombia that it took a rare and somewhat embarrassing military dictatorship, and the resulting disempowerment of party structures, for suffragists' organizing and lobbying efforts to have a chance to bear fruit (not to mention that Rojas himself was not subject to a popular vote and had nothing to lose from women's enfranchisement).

Suffragists responded by forming the Organización Femenina Nacional, a State-approved body dedicated to the protection of women's political rights which was framed as a Christian mission (Velásquez and Reyes, 1995, pp. 248-251). Though women's groups were united behind suffrage, once it was granted, they were divided over whether or not to demand further rights in the public sphere (Wills, 2011b, pp. 4-5). What is clear is that women were not reliably loyal to Rojas Pinilla after they were enfranchised, and no love was lost between them; on August 10th,

1955, women launched a massive street protest against the dictatorship, with 20,000 women singing the national anthem and carrying banners reading *Queremos Prensa Libre, Queremos Colombia Libre y Democrática*, and *Protestas de la Mujer Colombiana*. Rojas met the march with tanks and firehoses (Wills O. & Gómez C., 2006; Velásquez & Reyes, 1995, p. 255).

Rojas' dictatorship ended two years later, when he was deposed in 1957 by military junta. Colombia's brief experiment with military rule was over, and Colombian women, who had been granted the right to vote three years earlier, finally exercised it in a plebiscite to confirm the country's political future. Though the right to vote galvanized women activists and consolidated their campaigns, the fact that women's first votes took place amid partisan violence meant that the new voters, particularly women who lived in the rural sector, were under a great deal of pressure from local party forces. Their votes and their political activity carried the threat of physical violence from the opposing party (Meertens, 2005). Leon Zamosc (2001) also writes that society was eager for peace after the years of La Violencia; many were reluctant to give credence to dissenting voices for fear of fomenting further violence. It was in this charged atmosphere that the Unión de Ciudadanas Colombianas formed in Medellín, dedicated to preparing Colombian women for "su nuevo rol de sujeto de derechos y deberes" and to the formation of women's political consciousness (Turizo, qtd. in Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 297). The UCC was the heritage of the suffrage movement, akin to the League of Women Voters in the United States, and represented a bridge between early feminisms and those of the more radical 1960s and 1970s (Luna and Villareal, 2011, p. 161; Velásquez & Reyes, 1995, p. 257).

Leaving the Left (1957 – 1981)

The years following Rojas' regime saw the institution of the Frente Nacional and the violent repression of Left politics. This era of Colombian feminism developed within repressed

political organizations, and was shaped by them. By the time it emerged as an autonomous force, it was radical and deeply attuned to issues of class.

The coup that deposed General Rojas Pinilla was the design of a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives, which assumed power after the brief junta in the form of the Frente Nacional: a sixteen-year power-sharing agreement between the two traditional parties stipulating that all political offices be divided evenly between them, with the presidency being rotated every four years between the two (Oquist, 1980, *inter alia*). The Frente, installed by gun-shy former political hegemony anxiously reasserting themselves after an embarrassing lapse in power, codified the exclusion of third parties. The Liberals and Conservatives were guaranteed power without having to fight for it, and all other political actors were guaranteed oblivion.

It was in this context, during which two-party rule was reinstated, Left parties ostracized, and elections no longer serving as avenues for exercising political rights (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 296) that a new wave of feminism was born in Colombia. The movement's first initiatives arose out of the excluded Left political parties: the Socialists, the Communists, and particularly the Trotskyites. This was in keeping with trends and events elsewhere in Latin America (Gómez, 2011a; see also González-Rivera & Kampwirth, 2010 and Jaquette, 2009); the example of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 touched off a period of passionate Left organizing, a zeitgeist fueled by the global events of 1968 and, later, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Moreover, as Colombian scholar of feminism Doris Lamus Canavate (2010, p. 31) points out, most countries in the region were undergoing a period of modernization and development, following a model in which investment in infrastructure was to be accompanied by the secularization of various institutions, including the educational system. As an opportunistic force, feminism's push for women's inclusion was part of this wave, and was strengthened by the modernization and

development discourse,¹¹ even as the State's commitments to secularization and democratization were revealed to be, at best, ambivalent (Molyneux, 2000, pp. 42;50; Henderson, 2001, pp. 260-1).

Colombian feminism's emergence from Left party institutions (despite the fact that the parties in question were essentially locked out of national-level politics at the time) meant that the early years of this era were marked by *doble militancia*, with feminist activists simultaneously devoting their efforts to party organizing and to feminist initiatives (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 297; Luna & Villareal, 2011, p. 157). But as time went on, many feminists became frustrated with the Left's exclusion of feminist issues and their insistence that class-based projects would lead to women's emancipation without a need to focus on gender divisions. The Communist party in particular was notorious for silencing its feminist voices (even decades later, activists I spoke with referred to the party as "Machista-Leninista").¹² Tarrow (2011, p. 222), using the example of women in the U.S. Civil Rights movement, argues that when women are excluded from a male-dominated social movement, the experience can radicalize them and make them, in time, stronger leaders of social movement organizations than the male leaders who originally excluded them; in this sense, the machismo of the party structures likely contributed to the strength of the Colombian feminist movement (and its counterparts elsewhere in the region). After turning away from partisan politics, the direction of feminism at this time

¹¹ Importantly, even as middle-class mestiza feminist organizations were able to discursively align their goals with the interests of a modernizing states, women who were on the underside of class and racial power structures had differing experiences of modernization. Poor and campesina women found themselves further dispossessed by the same modernizing project, which linked the construction of the modern State to increased consumerism and personal debt incurred by poor Colombians who were forced, for example, to modernize their dress at cost (Henderson, 2001, pp. 256-7). The linkages between modernization and anti-indigenous policies have been well documented, and are evident in Colombian efforts to incorporate the indigenous, by force, into individualized capitalist production (see Rubbo, 1975).

¹² For deeper analyses of the relationship between feminism and Marxism, see Hartmann, 1979 and Arruzza, 2013, among others.

tended toward the exclusion of those women who chose to maintain their allegiance to the institutional Left (Gómez, 2011a; Wills & Gómez, 2006, pp. 295-297).

As it established itself as an autonomous social and political voice, 1960s and 70s feminism in Colombia was defined by the context of civil war. The exclusionary hegemony of the Frente contributed to the rise of Left guerrilla movements which had originated during La Violencia; the founding of the FARC-EP in 1964 represented the most notorious challenge to that hegemony, and the response of the elites in the form of the “self-defense forces” which would become the paramilitaries was horrific for women’s activism. In the international arena, the ongoing Cold War promoted the idea of the “enemy within,” which set up any progressive activism to be seen as a threat to the State. And so the movement in Colombia formed in the crucible of “economic crisis, radicalization of society, and a rise in social and guerrilla” movements, at the same time that State power was reaffirming itself as repressive (Villareal, 1994, p. 182).

During the 1960s, and into the 70s, feminist activists focused on the discourse of violence in society and what they saw as the cultural dispositions that made it possible – in particular, the widespread abuse of women’s bodies in both private and public settings (Wills & Sánchez, 2011, p. 29). Along with radical feminist organizations abroad, women’s activist discourse illuminated “private” issues of sexuality, domestic violence, and reproductive rights (Holland & Gómez, 2013; Gómez, 2011a); the mantra of “the personal is political” was reflected in Colombia as it was in the United States. But in Colombia, due undoubtedly to the legacy of the Catholic Church, feminist organizing often took a distinctly maternal tone (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 319; Luna, 2000). When they made demands of armed actors, feminists’ claims were often framed in terms of a politicized maternity, applying socially accepted “maternal” duties and priorities to the

sphere of the armed conflict. This maternalism is in keeping with concurrent trends in other Latin American feminist movements, which have been well documented (Chaney, 1980; Jelin, 1990; Guzmán, 1994; Craske, 1999; González-Rivera & Kampwirth, 2001, *inter alia*).

Another way in which regional trends were reflected in Colombia is that most feminist and women's organizations formed initially under the cover of a male-led progressive organization, either a progressive arm of the Church, a labor union, a political party, or a neighborhood organization. In most countries, write Sternbach et. al. (1992), this alliance was

...essential to the viability of the feminist project. In countries ruled by exclusionary and repressive regimes (hardly disposed to grant concessions to movements pursuing progressive change of any kind) feminists could find political space only within the larger opposition struggle. Many early feminist groups functioned clandestinely; some were formed as 'front' groups for the left-wing opposition; others avoided the term 'feminist,' forming 'women's associations' and taking refuge in the age-old belief that anything women do is 'by nature' apolitical and therefore less threatening to 'national security' (p. 400).

What distinguishes the Colombian context, of course, is that this repression, and the strategic alliances women made to be able to organize in the face of it, occurred under what was widely recognized as a democratically elected government – meaning, perhaps, that they had less access to international solidarity than feminists in countries with overtly dictatorial regimes.

One example of a social movement organization that arose from this context is the Organización Femenina Popular, formed in 1972. It formed within the progressive Catholic diocese in Barrancabermeja, a city at the front lines of armed conflict where the lives, livelihoods, and relationships of working class women were often the collateral damage of militarization.¹³ In response, the OFP began as a homemakers' club with an emphasis on teaching women skills to improve self-sufficiency, including first aid, dressmaking, and nutrition, but also consciousness-raising workshops (Mesa de Trabajo Mujer y Conflicto

¹³ Barranca's history as an oil city meant that until the 1950s, the majority of residents were men. Isacson (2001) asserts that many of the city's women came to Barranca to work in the sex trade. This gendered geography undoubtedly left a mark on the city's modern-day gender relations.

Armado, 2005a, pp. 10-11; Madariaga, 2009, pp. 400-401). The OFP organized regional soup kitchens and bakeries, put on employment workshops and youth empowerment programs, and provided educational scholarships to local youth, as well as social and legal assistance for victims of the armed conflict and domestic violence. In later years its critique of armed conflict would become more focused, and it would ally with explicitly feminist SMOs. The OFP's political trajectory recalls Molyneux's (1985) conception of "practical" gender interests (wherein women mobilize based on concrete physical needs) vs. "strategic" gender interests (wherein women mobilize around issues that might change their position in society), but is one among many proofs that this binary is reductive. Particularly in the context of war, pursuing "practical" gender interests – including those that arise out of women's position in the class structure – has "strategic" benefits as well.¹⁴ Other feminist theorists have written extensively about the way women (particularly women in the popular sector) often mobilize around the physical needs of their communities (see Temma Kaplan [1997] on "female consciousness," or the way that women reorient their "private" roles and "politicize" them by making demands of the state and other institutions *based on* their traditional roles in the gender division of labor, without necessarily challenging them directly; or Dore and Molyneux's [2000] analysis of "maternal citizenship" or "civic maternalism"). These frameworks, however, run the risk of (a) casting motherhood and womanhood as isomorphic identities, and (b) implying that women's community labor is somehow prepolitical or prefeminist. On the contrary, the OFP's work concentrated in its early years on women's subordination to structures of class, which had natural political ramifications; power structures based on gender divisions would become a more explicit focus of the organization as it became more autonomous.

¹⁴ For other critical analyses of Molyneux's framework, see Jelin, E. (Ed.) 1990, *Women and Social Change in Latin America*. Trans. J.A. Zammit and M. Thomson. London, UK: Zed Books; and Fernandes, S. (2007). Barrio Women and Popular Politics in Chávez's Venezuela. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49.3, 97-127.

National Coordinator Yolanda Becerra, during our 2013 conversation, recalled her upbringing in the progressive Church. Her dedication to the rights and empowerment of women came after the social, class-oriented outlook cultivated in her by that experience: “fue el segundo paso que hice,” she said, “un compromiso para las mujeres, la realidad de mujeres, para los derechos humanos de las mujeres.” Along with other SMOs formed in the 1970s, the OFP’s social critiques became increasingly politicized over time. In the OFP’s case, this politicization arose in part out of the local context; the city is home to ECOPETROL, the State-run oil company, and many of its residents are oil workers. The OFP became identified with the struggles of those workers to resist political repression, especially as women from Left organizations joined the OFP. Moreover, the city was dominated in the 1970s and 80s by the FARC and particularly the ELN, and the OFP was forced to interact with the latter. These interactions ranged in character, but would have made an apolitical posture nearly impossible to maintain (Madariaga, 2009, pp. 399,409). This politicization, and growing emphasis on feminist concerns, would lead to a departure from the diocese in 1988, an experience Becerra compared to children growing up and leaving home. But the organization’s relationship to the Church endured: “Logramos ní una ruptura con la Diócesis, con la Iglesia, sino como un grado de madurez, como construimos una relación de iguales, de reconocimiento, de apoyo,” Becerra explained.

Nonetheless, even as it gained autonomy and a political voice, the Colombian women’s movement’s representation in the political system was blocked by the two-party hegemony of the Frente Nacional, which kept feminism from being represented just as it excluded the Left (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 298). As a result of the limitation of political channels, 1970s feminism in Colombia emerged in a close alliance with (and later with a tendency toward imitation of) the

institutional Left. As Holland and Gómez (2013) point out, the Left has been marked, especially in the 1960s and 70s, by its allegiance to hierarchical leadership, vertical decisionmaking structure, and the idea of the universal subject – in other words, as inattentive to difference within its ranks. 1970s feminism, too, was insufficiently attuned to the realities and the demands of women of color and the popular classes (Solano, 2013; Lozano, 2010).

In 1974, the Frente Nacional came to an end and Alfonso López Michelsen, of the Liberal party, was elected President. Though to a certain extent the two-party power-sharing of the Frente continued in practice (Holland and Gómez, 2013), the *de jure* end of third-party exclusion presented political opportunities, and the few years that followed would see several new developments accompanied by a surge in feminist organizing. In December of 1974, the Senate passed Decreto 2820, affording equal rights to men and women. The Unión de Ciudadanas Colombianas quickly formed an alliance with President Lopez Michelson, due to the convergence of their goals in Decree 2820 (this alliance, combined with the 1981 signing of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW, known in Colombia as Ley 051], would lead to an increasing bureaucratization of the feminist movement in subsequent years).

The first feminist organizations of the this wave formed in Cali, Medellín, and Bogotá in 1975, and several more emerged between 1975 and 1978 as more groups of women cut ties with the Left parties (Luna & Villareal, 2011, p. 157). Sonia Álvarez, et. al. (1992) write that the Latin American Left in the 1970s distinguished between “good” and “bad” feminisms; “good” feminism was that which was willing to subsume a gender struggle under a rubric of class struggle, while “bad” feminism focused on issues like sexuality and reproductive rights, and was painted as bourgeois and imperialist. The response of feminist groups was an official split from

the Left parties, but rarely an ideological departure. “The prototypical early Latin American feminist... was a former radical student militant or *guerrillera* and hardly a self-obsessed bourgeois ‘lady,’ as many of the Left would have us believe” (Álvarez, Sternbach, et. al., 1992, p. 400). The womb of the Left birthed a feminist movement that was radical, class-oriented, and focused on issues of production as well as reproduction. Women’s organizations on the Caribbean coast, in particular, were heavily involved in land struggles and occupations, with the leadership of organizations like Mujeres del Perrenque and Combate Mujer, which conducted campaigns in poor neighborhoods and tobacco factories (Solano, 2006). The movement was inherently suspicious of the State, which it perceived “como un conjunto de aparatos ideológicos y represivos siempre sesgado a favor del capital” and a natural ally of patriarchy (Wills, 2011b, p. 8). This suspicion, combined with feminists’ negative experiences with the Left, led them to prioritize a horizontal decisionmaking structure, concentrating on “un trabajo en red que buscaba generar una acción coordinadora a partir de vínculos horizontales entre las asociadas” (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 320).

But several historians of the movement assert that this horizontal structure was challenged by the movement’s radicalism, and the armed conflict’s production of mistrust; Wills asserts that women’s absolutist logic made it difficult to negotiate and form alliances across organizational lines, even within the feminist movement itself: “Movimientos sociales, incluido los feministas, operan inspirados por ‘verdades absolutas,’ discursos no negociables”; divergent currents of feminism were transformed into “enemistades irreconciliables” (2011b, p. 10). This absolutist disposition would contribute to the acerbic nature of what was to become the major dividing line between feminists in the 1980s: that between autonomistas and partidistas, or party loyalists and independent feminists (Luna & Villareal, 2011; Wills, 2011b; Lamus, 2010).

New(ly Recognized) Social Movements

By the early 1980s, some Latin Americanist scholars began to shine a light on what they called the “New Social Movement” (NSM) in the region. It was a movement not necessarily oriented around the axis of class and relations of production, but protagonized by what were called “difference” actors (Bahamón, 1995, pp. 14-15): sectors of society subordinated to the structures of gender, sexuality, regional, and racial-ethnic power. The origins of NSMs were traced to the late 1960s, when purely class-oriented movements of workers had lost momentum in the face of the growing power of corporations and the media (Tilly and Wood, 2013, p. 70), or the “deepening, broadening, and increased irreversibility of the forms of domination and deprivation in late capitalism” (Canel, 1997, p. 193).¹⁵ This scholarship would come to a head in the 1990s, during the “cultural turn” in social movement studies. The academic world focused on social movements based on issues of identity, often in addition to rather than instead of class, whose aim was to change cultural meanings and identity formulations, not to take State power as their predecessors had attempted (see Tarrow, 2011, p. 25 and Vanden, 2007). New Social Movement theory

...emphasize[d] the cultural nature of the new movements and view[ed] them as struggles for control over the production of meaning and the constitution of new collective identities. It stresse[d] the expressive aspects of SMs and place[d] them exclusively in the terrain of civil society, as opposed to the state. This approach also emphasize[d] discontinuity by highlighting the differences between the new movements and traditional collective actors (Canel, 1997, pp. 189-90).

But identity-based or culturally-oriented social movements were not “new,” as Tilly and Wood (2013, p. 71) point out; rather, they had been invisible because they failed to fit into researchers’ erstwhile binary, Statist political rubric – in other words, it was the viewfinder that had changed, not the view. Other scholars (e.g. Cohen, 1985) have critiqued the “new” in New Social

¹⁵ The decline of class-based social movements would become even more evident by the end of the decade, with the fall of the Soviet Union and its symbolic and material place in the global Socialist current.

Movements, in addition to advocating for a blended approach that also incorporates Resource Mobilization Theory, which focuses on political opportunity structures and the economic, political, and cultural resources available to activists. Furthermore, critics have rightly argued, the “cultural” activism of so-called NSMs is not exclusive to identity-based movements, but exists on some level within all social movement organizations (SMOs). “In Latin America today,” write Álvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar (1998),

...all social movements enact a cultural politics. (...) In their continuous struggles against the dominant projects of nation building, development, and repression, popular actors mobilize collectively on the grounds of very different sets of meanings and stakes. For all social movements, then, collective identities and strategies are inevitably bound up with culture (p. 6).

In Colombia, various social movement actors in the 1980s were insisting on alternative sets of cultural-political meanings: indigenous SMOs, Afro-Colombian communities, feminist organizations, and peace advocates. All four sets of organizations, particularly the latter two, would channel some of their strategies, their efforts, and their membership into today’s women’s peace movement, and the 1980s represented a key moment in its development. The 1980s would bring several changes to Colombian women’s movements, relating to the changing geopolitical context, new economic policies, and the rise of paramilitary forces. The rise in violence following the failed negotiations under the Betancur administration was fueled by the expansion of narco-empires and the accompanying concentration of national wealth; the State saw its legitimacy wane in the face of cartel dominance, increased guerrilla activity, and the unchecked paramilitary response (Uribe, M.T., 1995, p. 286; see also Richani, 2013). But the 80s also represented “una época de movilización de las mujeres; de recreación de su identidad colectiva como sujetos del cambio social, en un tiempo sigando por la confrontación, búsqueda y construcción de formas democráticas para el Estado y la sociedad... [el feminismo] se expresó

primero entre las mujeres de sectores medios, intelectuales y universitarias, como múltiples y simultáneas tomas de conciencia” (Luna & Villareal, 2011, pp. 154-5). Feminist activism became more consolidated and, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, more professionalized and bureaucratic.

The 1981 Encuentro Feminista/Fracturista de Latinoamérica y el Caribe

This trend of bureaucratization began with what was one of the most important moments for movement consolidation: the first Feminist Encuentro of Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Bogotá in July of 1981. The event brought some two hundred feminists from fifty organizations on the continent (Sternbach, et. al., 1992; see also Navarro, 1982). Its proceedings and video recordings can offer insight into the modern-day feminist movement in Colombia, its relationships with feminist organizations abroad, and the foci, fissures, and divergences of those years which continue to sound their echoes in today’s movement dynamics – notably the division between autonomist feminists and party loyalists, and the exclusion of the popular classes from leadership of the movement. This section will also analyze the rise of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) during the UN Decade for Women from 1976-1985, and the formation of networks of women activists who came together to take advantage of new international support for feminist projects. NGO involvement, while presenting unparalleled opportunities for feminist activists, can also risk deradicalizing the movement and deepening the divisions within it, as I will explain below.

In 1980, Latin American feminists announced the upcoming Encuentro to attendees of the United Nations conference in Copenhagen, and word quickly spread to middle-class, white, and academic feminists throughout Latin America (Sternbach, et. al. 1992, p. 405). While some

sources (Barrig, 1998; Colectivo Cine Mujer, 1991; Álvarez, et. al., 2003) claim that organizing efforts originated with the women's auxiliary of the Trotskyite party, which financed the Encuentro independently by selling used clothing, others (Sternbach, et. al, 1992; Navarro, 1982) attribute the efforts more broadly to various groups of middle-class women in Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá, some affiliated with party structures and some with independent women's organizations. The preparations for the event are remembered as acrimonious, particularly the debate over who would be allowed to attend and what type of presence the political parties would have. Feminists from Bogotá and Medellín were open to the presence of party representatives only as at-large individuals, while those from Cali maintained that attendees could represent the parties in an official capacity. The disagreement resulted in the cancellation and rescheduling of the event, which was originally planned for December of 1980 (Sternbach et al., 1992, pp. 405-408; Barrig, 1998, p. 15). This debate over political autonomy – though more pronounced in Colombia's polarized context – is representative of many (if not all) feminist movements in Latin America. Sonia Álvarez, et. al. write that autonomy is

(...) considered by many to be the cornerstone of feminist identity in Latin America and the Caribbean. If feminist movements in the region have been characterized by a desire to forge alliances with diverse sectors of society (especially other women) with the goal of eradicating gender-based oppression, at the same time the ideal of autonomy has been invoked to avoid co-optation by actors such as political parties, the state, funding agencies, and even other social movements (2003, p. 542).

Feminists finally gathered in Bogotá in July to address the agreed-upon themes of feminism and political struggle, women and work, sexuality and daily life, and women, communication, and culture. Feminist networks in the region often formed initially at summits and conferences (Della Porta, et. al., 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 168), and this certainly holds true in Colombia's case. But while the event presented an important opportunity to form networks and alliances with feminist organizations across Latin America and the Caribbean (one

wall held a huge map for attendees to share information about feminist organizations in their countries), *popular* women's organizations were largely absent from the Encuentro. Sternbach, et. al. (1992) attribute this absence to the prohibitive entry fee charged to attendees. This class exclusion had a racial-ethnic component, as well; footage of the event shows a majority of white and light-skinned mestiza women (Colectivo Cine Mujer, 1991). But for the women who were able to attend, the event provided an opportunity to collaborate and strengthen ties across national boundaries, to discuss common challenges, and to move from activist praxis to feminist theory and political strategy. Chilean feminist scholar Julieta Kirkwood, who attended the Encuentro, described it as “[l]a posibilidad de una primera vez, una primera apertura al mundo desde el feminismo latinoamericano” (Sánchez, 1995, p. 384).

But this aperture was marked by division, as women separated between party loyalists, moderates, and radical feminists. The latter group, vocal about issues of sexuality, were ostracized by the more moderate or reformist attendees (ibid, p. 385); moreover, the exclusion of a group of party loyalists from entering cast a cloud of suspicion over the event, as organizers were accused of applying a “feministómetro” to decide who “counted” as feminist (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 300; see also Álvarez, et. al, 2003, and Gómez, 2011a). This soured later discussions of the role of socialism and whether gendered oppression could be understood and overcome within a framework of class struggle (Sternbach, et. al., 1992, pp. 408-9; Lamus, 2010, pp. 105-8). Footage of the event shows one woman, attending from Spain, opining “¡La mujer es una clase!” with an immediate and heated response from Latin American delegates (Colectivo Cine Mujer, 1991).

On the one hand, as Sternbach, et. al. (1992) point out, the opportunity to discuss contentious issues and movement strategy was an important opportunity for Latin American

feminists. It allowed them to isolate the issue of autonomy, to hear opposing arguments, and even to diffuse disagreements over the issue collectively before they had the opportunity to destroy alliances later on. The Encuentros, which have continued into the twenty-first century, “served as springboards for the development of a common Latin American feminist political language and as staging grounds for often contentious political battles over what would constitute the most efficacious strategies for achieving gender equality in dependent, capitalist, and patriarchal states” (ibid., p. 396).¹⁶ On the other hand, on a stage like Colombia’s, conflicts over party loyalty carried a more dangerous tone than in the rest of the region. Though the debate was region-wide, the consequences carried a different weight in a country wracked by partisan violence and suspicion. This was especially true after peace talks failed with the government in 1984, when demobilized FARC fighters entered the political realm and formed the Unión Patriótica (UP) party. UP party affiliates, many of whom were women, won several elections as the party attracted more civilian social movement activists (Tate, 2007). This growing synthesis of alternative movements threatened local power structures, and paramilitaries, allied both with traffickers and politicians, assassinated several thousand UP members in what party activists call a political genocide. During this paradoxical time, in which social movement activists finally found a party that might provide them an avenue to institutionalization, and simultaneously faced political massacre for daring to associate (even loosely) with demobilized fighters, the divisions between women’s organizations over questions of autonomy come into focus. To be autonomous from party structures would have been seen as an important survival mechanism by activists attempting to extricate themselves from political affiliations that would make them targets of

¹⁶ One of the most lasting legacies of the Bogotá Encuentro (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) was the founding of November 25 as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, in honor of the Dominican Mirabal sisters, killed by Trujillo’s forces on that date in 1960. November 25 is an important mobilizing focus for Colombian women’s organizations.

violence (though by becoming autonomous, women's organizations also lost any protection that the parties could have offered them, as well as the opportunity to attach their activism to the very progressive stated gender aims of the UP). The demobilization of the M-19 guerrillas in 1989, whose numbers had included several high-profile women leaders (Tate, 2007, p. 54), would have provided further opportunities for party alliances.

It was due to this context that the disagreements between autonomistas and partidistas in Colombian feminism, more than in other countries, became dogmatic; “se viven (...) más como traiciones que como parte consustancial de un proceso de construcción de identidad colectiva” (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 301). For years afterward, according to María Emma Wills of Colombia's Historical Memory Commission, feminists suffered from a felt need to prove their authenticity to one another. Denouncements for operating “in bad faith” led some women to be excluded from later Encuentros as well.

This sense of suspicion was a reaction to the national context. The Colombian State throughout the 1980s was instituting the National Security Doctrine, carrying out repressive attacks based on its anti-Communist stance. Wills (2011b, p. 9) writes that “[f]ueron épocas (...) de paranoias ‘focalizadas...’ de los aparatos de seguridad del Estado hacia cualquier expresión de disenso y de los ‘civiles’ de izquierda frente a un Estado represor.” Women in Caribbean social movement organizations, in particular, suffered State harassment, detentions, and paramilitary violence; by the next decade, paramilitary massacres would be the “nueva modalidad de guerra” (Solano, 2006, p. 91). Overall, the armed conflict during the 1980s was involving a broader and broader sector of civil society; the binary framework of conflict (see Chapter 5) meant that tensions that already existed between one organization and another, or social movements and the State, were now framed in terms of confrontations between supposed proxies of various armed

groups (Uribe, 1995, p. 293). And so the suspicion present in feminist organizing, though perhaps a natural reaction to what were real dangers of infiltration,¹⁷ presented – and continues to present – a formidable challenge to the organization of networks and alliances among and between women’s movements. The confrontation between autonomists and party loyalists, writes Doris Lamus, “marcaría muy profundamente las relaciones personales, las alianzas/divisiones y las propuestas conjuntas del movimiento en adelante” (2010, p. 106).

The Rise of NGOs: Taming the Feminist Movement

A final key aspect of the 1981 Encuentro is that it presented the opportunity to raise the feminist agenda in the region with the help of a new actor on the Latin American stage: the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) (Sánchez, 1995, p. 386). Though the definition of an NGO is a nebulous one, by the 1990s it had come to refer to any citizen organization not run by the State. The definition also implies a paid staff and a level of external funding, either from the State itself or international organizations (the United Nations or the World Bank), foundations, or foreign governments. By the mid-80s and early 90s, Feminist NGOs (FNGOs) in countries emerging from dictatorships were a key response by civil society to a new opportunity for influence (Álvarez, 1999). The collaboration and strategy-sharing that took place at the 1981 Encuentro (as well as subsequent Encuentros) likely inspired Colombian women to take advantage of the role of FNGOs in their country, as well. NGOs had been on the rise in Colombia since the end of the 1970s, emerging with the support of institutions like the Church and the United Nations to represent society to the State (Bahamón, 1995). But the neoliberal policy project of the 1980s and the concurrent withdrawal of the welfare state created a need for intervention which civil

¹⁷ Two events of this period also contributed to the polar interpretation of conflict: the seizure of the Palace of Justice by the M-19 guerrilla group, and the attempt the same year by the FARC-EP to enter the political arena by founding the Unión Patriótica party, whose members were hunted down and assassinated throughout the mid-1980s.

society attempted to meet with new NGOs; this trend would accelerate even more in the 1990s, when the human effects of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) necessitated humanitarian action within a neoliberal framework. And so while even during the 1980s there was an average of over one hundred new International NGOs (INGOs) in Latin America per year (Tilly & Wood, 2013, p. 7), by the end of the 1990s, the region would have more NGOs than anywhere else in the world (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 92).

In Colombia's case, Álvarez (1999) asserts that up until the late 1990s, feminism expressed itself *less* through NGOs than is the case in other Latin American countries, due to the historically centralized, repressive State and its relative absence from rural life. Rather, feminist activism tended to be dominated by small, volunteer-based organizations (188). But the preponderance of NGOs was given a boost by legislation in 1986 promoting political and economic decentralization, and an even bigger boost by language in the 1991 Constitution emphasizing the role of civil society (see below). The U.S. "War on Drugs" also funneled funds to NGOs in Colombia. When Plan Colombia was put in operation at the turn of the century, a portion of its funds was dedicated to social and economic development and channeled through NGOs (see Tate, 2007 and Bouvier, 2009); at the same time, the European Union passed a complementary aid package dedicated almost entirely to NGO projects. As of 2002, one organizing body of NGOs reported more than 5,000 organizations active in the country, with nearly 20% of them receiving some financing, direct or indirect, from Plan Colombia (Fletcher, 2003).

In addition to the external push for NGO activity, Bahamón (1995) outlines five domestic factors leading to the proliferation of NGOs: private enterprises wanting to promote their own projects; political parties channeling their auxiliary organizations; academics and professionals

working on social projects (e.g. the Colombian Commission of Jurists); progressive elements of the Church; and activists (like feminists) who separate from political parties. She goes on to delineate four types of Feminist NGOs in Colombia: FNGOs that operate as part of a broader, traditionally male-led social movement; FNGOs with academic roots; FNGOs of autonomous feminists; and FNGOs made up of women militants who left the Leftist parties (pp. 57-8).¹⁸

Historically, the founding of NGOs corresponds with the founding of international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank (the term was coined alongside the founding of the UN [Davies, 2014]), which facilitate models of governance and offer funding to organizations willing to contribute to that model. Sidney Tarrow (2011, p. 246) calls the UN a “coral reef” of global activism – a central point to attract, feed, and enable linkages between social movement actors all over the world. Indeed, the UN’s role in shaping international feminism would be difficult to overstate: “Any chronology of the international feminist movement reads like a litany of UN meetings,” write Keck and Sikkink (qtd. in Álvarez, 1997, p. 3). 1976 was the beginning of the UN Decade for Women, which concluded with the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985. The conference, attended by nearly two thousand delegates of more than 150 countries, also hosted a parallel event attended by twelve to fourteen thousand NGO representatives; these numbers offer some insight into the rise of global NGOs at the time. Women who attended these UN events were exposed to a host of new skills and alliances; this was perhaps even truer for Colombian women who attended the Fourth World

¹⁸ A deeper discussion of the relationship between the three networks under study and the NGO community will begin in the next chapter, and take place also in Chapter 8. Of the three networks I examine in this dissertation, none consistently define themselves as NGOs, though the Organización Femenina Popular (the driving force behind Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra) does do so. However, all three are embedded in the world of NGOs, particularly when it comes to international funding. For example, Ruta Pacífica is funded in part by SUIPPCOL, the Swiss Program for the Promotion of Peace in Colombia, itself an NGO, and collaborates with or is housed by NGOs. The Red de Mujeres del Caribe counts on financing from several European organizations, and many of its member organizations (and, I suspect, of the other two networks as well) receive funding and “asesoria” (advice) and direction from NGOs (Jiménez, 2013). As such, the discussion of the risks and benefits of NGOization is of direct relevance to them in ways that will be outlined later in the dissertation.

Conference on Women ten years later in Beijing. Conferences like these “made new scripts available to Latin American feminists, especially to the more professionalized, policy-oriented sectors of an increasingly heterogeneous, polycentric movement field” (Álvarez, 1997, p. 4). In Colombia, NGOs provided avenues to political participation for sectors of society whose direct links to politics had been limited or nonexistent (Tate, 2007); they also provided crucial social services and performed immeasurably important work in defending and advocating for human rights.

But the increasing influence of NGOs, feminist and otherwise, in Latin America has an underside, and that underside is fourfold: (1) it can result in what Nancy Fraser (quoting Eisenstein, 2005) calls a “dangerous liaison” with marketizing projects, and as such can legitimate neoliberal governance; (2) it can deradicalize the feminist movement and temper its rhetoric and its mission; (3) it fosters dependence on external (international foundations and donor governments) and internal (State institutions) funders and legitimators, to the detriment of feminism’s autonomy; and (4) it can deepen and exacerbate class-racial differences within and among SMOs. I explain these three dangers below.

As Sonia Álvarez, who represented the Ford Foundation among Latin American feminists in the 1990s, wrote (1999), FNGOs are often market-driven, promoting a brand of marketized “emancipation” aimed primarily at incorporating poor women into the workforce, rather than changing structures of gender subordination. Álvarez’s warning previews Fraser’s critique of mistakes made by Second-Wave feminism in the U.S. and Europe, where, she writes, “the cultural changes jump-started by the second wave, salutary in themselves, have served to legitimate a structural transformation of capitalist society that runs directly counter to feminist visions of a just society” (Fraser, 2009, p. 99). When attempting to carve out space for

themselves in the world of policy advocacy, activists (feminist and otherwise) risk acquiescing to – and even internalizing – the demands that such a world makes on its participants: to fit into a market-oriented, male-dominated space (Álvarez, 1997, p. 5).

In addition to ignoring the injustices that women continue to face (or face even more deeply) even when entering the workforce, FNGOs have a tendency to focus on the effects of patriarchy, rather than patriarchy itself. Álvarez goes on to assert that FNGOs have treated violence against women, for example, as an abnormal pathology, not a logical expression of gender power (Álvarez, 1997, p. 196). This is due not necessarily to any malevolence on the part of NGOs or their funders, but to the model of intervention; project-based, short-term, results-oriented social action is good at addressing the symptoms of a system like patriarchy, even while, it can be argued, the marketization with which they ally is expanding the problem. But radical, grassroots feminism is better at attacking the roots.

Nonetheless, funding in the 1990s was much more difficult to come by for more radical projects, and FNGOs in Latin America censored their own rhetoric in order to maintain a functioning relationship with the State (Álvarez, 1999, pp. 197-8). This muzzling of more transformative demands in favor of more small-scale, technical projects, even when it is a strategic benefit in the short term, can be a threat to social movements' emancipatory potential. In Colombia, veteran feminist leader Beatriz Quintero writes that the 1980s and 90s saw the professionalization of the feminist movement,¹⁹ but also set new limits on its ability to dream:

En 1980 las feministas, por lo menos las de Medellín, concebían un mundo absolutamente distinto... Hoy, veinte años después, para encaminarse hacia exigencias menos heroicas pero mucho más realizables el movimiento se ha conservadurizado e institucionalizado. Al hacerlo, las feministas pierden esa capacidad casi poética de soñar e inventar mundos paralelos. En la

¹⁹ For a comparative study of feminist professionalization, see Matear, A. (1997), "Desde la Protesta a la Propuesta": the Institutionalization of the Women's Movement in Chile. In Dore, E. (Ed.), *Gender Politics in Latin America: Debates in Theory and Practice*. New York: Monthly Review.

medida que la viabilidad se ha convertido en criterio para definir lo que es exigible” (qtd. in Wills, 2011b, p. 16).

This dynamic is visible elsewhere, as well; in Brazil, for example, James Petras (1997) recounts a meeting between rural NGOs and the women’s caucus of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), in which NGO representatives insisted that MST feminists remove issues of class from their platform and focus strictly on what might be called non-intersectional gender concerns (for another case of the effects of NGOs and the neoliberal turn on women’s social movements, see Schild, 1998). Petras further argues that such deradicalizing transformations of social movements into NGOs and NGO project executors are no accident. Rather, the proliferation of NGOs provides a convenient method for the U.S., Europe, and the World Bank to pacify antineoliberal social movement organizing: a way for global capital’s left hand (NGO-sponsored self-help and community programs) to comfort the poor, while its right hand (the unfettered market) is destroying their livelihoods (Petras, 1997). In short, while the proliferation of NGOs and FNGOs certainly represented a marker of feminism’s increasing political space in Colombia, their effects on the movement were taming. Brazilian anthropologist Lins Ribeiro summarizes: “NGOs can indeed be an effective fragmented, decentered, political subject in a postmodern world, but the cost of flexibility, pragmatism, and fragmentation may well be reformism – their capability to promote radical change may weaken” (in Álvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998, p. 17).

Thirdly, the shuttling and delegation of community projects and gender reforms to NGOs dependent on outside funding or their own State presents limits to feminist autonomy. The choices made by funders (as to which on-the-ground actors are deemed worthy of funding) can also exacerbate power differentials, with more educated, technically capable organizations garnering most of the funding and leaving more popular women’s organizations without

necessary resources, thereby “privatizing” the feminist movement (Lamus, 2010, p. 184; Álvarez, 1998, p. 7. Álvarez, 1999, p. 188 cites an interview with an activist who refers to many Colombian FNGOS as “nepotistic”).²⁰ In Colombia, an estimated 40-50% of NGO funding, as of the late 1990s, came from or through the State (Barrig, 1997). FNGOs, on the other hand, tended to be internationally financed, with 80-90% of their budgets coming from approximately 50 (largely European) States and supporting organizations. The question of autonomy, so long a source of dissension among Colombian feminists, would be given new energy by the NGOization of civil society, which would be the salient divergence at the 1996 Feminist Encuentro in Chile (Álvarez, 1999, p. 199).

Finally, the transition from being an SMO to an NGO involves, in addition to foreign linkages and funding dynamics, internal remuneration; a paid staff (Tate, 2007). The professionalization of women’s organizations into NGOs resulted in a challenge to previous value systems: would professional knowledge be valued over experiential knowledge? Would an activist have to speak French, German, Swedish, or English to be an efficient manager of global funding requests? Staff hierarchies sprung up where none had existed; moreover, on the inter-organizational scale, the more professionalized NGOs garnered more attention and funding, which in many (though not all) cases resulted in financing for organizations led by educated, mestiza feminists and oblivion for organizations led by grassroots women of Afro and indigenous descent. The way these dynamics affected the three networks under study will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

As Tate (2007) points out, Colombia has thousands of NGOs; any generalization about their approaches to activism is bound to be proven incomplete (see also Fisher, 1997). The

²⁰ Tate (2007) undertakes a thorough and illuminating analysis of the role of NGOs in the Colombian human rights movement; many of the questions she poses, too numerous to do justice to here, are relevant to the feminist movement.

heterogeneity of NGOS – even of FNGOS – in Colombia is evidenced by the fact that all three women’s peace networks under study are defined in some way as NGOs, while the centralized feminist organizations with whom they both collaborate and contend are also defined as NGOs. Moreover, political power is fluid; the NGO project is an ongoing one, and internal efforts to insist on radicalism and autonomy deserve scholarly attention. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the door which NGOization opened for Colombian activists was a narrow one, and they had to conform to a certain shape to fit through it. That conformity carried a price.

In sum, the decade following the 1981 Encuentro saw the feminist movement in Colombia carve out a social and political space for itself. Its numbers, along with its visibility and its alliances with legitimating organizations, increased. But its growth, like the economic growth of Colombia itself, exacerbated existing divisions. The movement was not only fractured based on political and strategic differences, but also bifurcated by class, regional, and ethno-racial inequality (Sánchez, 1995, pp. 386-7). While the popular sector and the indigenous movement founded several influential women’s organizations in the 1980s (e.g. ANMUCIC, the Association of Campesina, Afro-Colombian, and Indigenous Women; FEDEMUC, the Federation of Campesina Women of Cundinamarca; and ASODEMUC, the Association of Women for Peace and the Defense of Human Rights of the Colombian Woman) (Luna and Villareal, 2011, p. 164), they had yet to be counted as partners by the middle-class, mestiza-led feminist movement that was the driving force behind the Encuentro.²¹ These differences and power dynamics would be an important challenge for the movement in later decades.

²¹ The racist exclusion in Latin American feminism, de facto or de jure, would be the salient issue at the next feminist Encuentro in Lima, Peru in 1983 (Álvarez, et. al., 2003).

The 1991 Asamblea Nacional Constituyente and the Political Turn: Women's Peace

Networks Emerge

The 1990s would see significant changes in the Colombian feminist movement, sparked by a strategic collaboration around the crafting of a new constitution. By the end of the decade, this conjuncture resulted in a broader, more visible feminist and women's movement which had become professional and bureaucratic. While the opportunities and resources for feminist organizing had become more available, the centralization and bureaucratization of the movement excluded more radical feminist goals. It was in this context – with the availability of funding giving rise to new efforts, but simultaneously limiting their capacity for radical intervention – that the three networks under study were born.

The year 1991 presented a key political opportunity for women in Colombia, with a constituent assembly that produced Colombia's new constitution. Jane Jaquette (2009) writes that constitutional reforms were a key locus of action for Latin American feminist movements in the period following the transition to democracy in countries with military governments, defining new conceptions of rights and using litigation to ensure the enforcement of the law. This tendency is reflected in Colombia as well, which, though it was not emerging from dictatorship, was attempting to redefine its concept of political rights in response to new realities of conflict.

Though few women were elected as official representatives to Colombia's constitutional assembly, women organized diverse forms of intervention in the constitutional process, from roundtables with the elected constituents to media campaigns to a silent presence at the Assembly sessions (Tamayo, 1998, p. 4). The result was a constitution with more explicit rights for women than the country had ever seen. Networks of women's and feminist organizations began to multiply rapidly, not simply because of the rights contained in the constitution, but as

result of the connections forged among activists who participated, visibly or otherwise, in the constitutional process (Wills and Gómez, 2006, p. 11). Feminism during this era became more cooperative with the State, in what has been called the movement's "political turn." But the 1990s also ushered in the crudest, most abhorrent period of paramilitary violence, which both presented women's organizations with significant risks and inspired the creation of feminist networks devoted explicitly to ending the armed conflict. By the end of the decade, all three networks under study – Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres, Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz, and Red de Mujeres del Caribe – would be established and on their way to becoming highly visible social movement actors. But the decade began with constitutional reforms, and rather than simply being the beneficiaries of the new constitution, Colombian feminist activism played an important role in its formation.

The spark of the public's desire for a reformed constitution would be lit by the political assassination of Luís Carlos Galán, a prominent Liberal candidate for the presidency. Galán, a vocal opponent of the increasingly powerful drug cartels, was shot in broad daylight by cartel assassins. His death was followed in 1990 by similar assassinations of two more presidential candidates. The events marked somewhat of a turning point in the conflict, which during the 1990s was to become a more crowded stage. The rising power of cartels, the increasing presence and influence of narcodollars, and the brazen killings by paramilitary forces (almost entirely funded by drug profits) would make both political candidacy and social movement organizing more dangerous (Rojas, 2004, p. 7). But Galán's assassination served to focus society's attention on the power of cartels, and became a mobilizing factor – particularly for the student movement. Riding the wave of a growing public discussion that had taken place throughout the 1980s, students maintained that Colombia's existing constitution, formalized in 1886, was inadequate

for addressing the modern-day nature of the armed conflict, with all of its non-State and para-State actors. Federal elections in 1990 included six referenda on the ballot, and students called for a seventh: the creation of a constitutional assembly. The paper they circulated, advocating for such a vote, came to be known as the *Séptima Papeleta* (Villareal, 1995, p. 331; Bahamón, 1995, p. 85; Quintero, 2005, pp. 2-3).

Women's organizations had, for several years prior to the mobilization, been advocating for constitutional amendments enshrining women's rights into law. A coalition of eighteen women's groups had presented a proposal to that end in 1988, also addressing ideological and religious pluralism, natural resource protection, and the recognition of ethnic and cultural minorities (Villareal, 1995, p. 319; see also Lamus, 2010 for more detail on the efforts that led to constitutional reforms). When the *Séptima Papeleta* was circulated, these organizations joined the push for reforms, founding Bogotá-based networks including *Mujeres por la Constituyente*, *Mujeres por la Reforma Constitucional*, and *Mujeres por una Constitucionalidad* (Tamayo, 1998, p. 3; Solano, 2006, p. 140). Wills and Gómez (2006) write that it was due to this particular political conjuncture that feminist organizations were able to rally and set aside some of their internal political differences (and their desire to remain apolitical) in order to influence the constitutional process (299); similar to the struggle for suffrage, the opportunity to gain broader political rights was enough to rally women's groups with distinct causes behind one banner, at least for the moment of that particular struggle. The result of this momentary unification was increased visibility for women's organizing, which, although for many Colombians it had little effect on feminism's credibility, served as a consolidating locus for the movement (Bahamon, 1995, pp. 86-92).

The *Séptima Papeleta* campaign was successful, and a referendum on constitutional

reform appeared on the 1990 ballot. It received more than five million votes (Uribe, M.L., 1995, p. 355), resulting in the creation of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (ANC). Immediately, feminist organizations created and submitted countless proposals, advocating for abortion law, separation of Church and State, inclusive language, and protection from partner violence, among other feminist issues. In addition, they organized in myriad other ways, hosting assemblies, publishing newspaper articles, and coordinating working groups, public hearings, and Encuentros in various cities to consolidate proposals and priorities: “para elaborar, de abajo hacia arriba, la agenda a defender ante la asamblea” (Wills & Gómez, 2006, p. 300).

Historians and members of the feminist movement in Colombia agree: the activities of feminist organizations in the push for the ANC played a key role in re/shaping the form of women’s political participation in the country. It marked a new stage in women’s political position, and reactivated the political participation of the women’s movement after the previous decade of choosing to avoid State interactions (Villareal, 1995, pp. 319-20). But now that the creation of the ANC had been agreed upon, women’s organizations were faced with another important question: who was going to represent women and women’s organizations on the Assembly? After the earlier tensions between partidistas and autonomistas, Lamus (2010, p. 116) calls the question of feminist representation on the ANC the “second rupture” in the feminist movement, as it required activists to decide which interests, and which candidates, would best represent their needs.

Candidates to the ANC were organized in lists, to be elected collectively. Of 119 candidate lists, eight were headed by women, including a list put forward by women’s NGOs; one list, that of the Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres, was made up entirely of women. A full fifty percent of the lists included no women at all, while thirty-one included one or two women.

Those lists which included a plurality of women candidates included those put forward by Afro-Colombian SMOs and the M-19, which had abandoned its status as a guerrilla army to join the political process a few years earlier (Villareal, 1995, p. 335). Additionally, the “Lista por la Vida,” made up of representatives of Leftist party organizations, had the support of unionists and many Caribbean, indigenous, and popular-sector women, and was headed by Yusmidia Solano Suárez, who would later lead the Red de Mujeres del Caribe. This fissure – over whether women’s interests would best be represented by the list put forward by feminists, or by Left organizations and headed by a feminist *militante* – was the newest manifestation of the decades-old debate over autonomy and the role of class in women’s subordination. Lamus (2010, pp. 116-118) frames the Lista por la Vida in terms of Colombia’s political structure, in which social movements outside the Statist rubric are deemed subversive; “acting like a political party,” as the Lista attempted to do, was a strategic decision. Other feminists argued that parties were, in essence, patriarchy’s game, and would never succeed in changing politics in women’s favor.

Regional considerations also represented a major push during the Assembly process, which would be an important precedent for the soon-to-be Red de Mujeres del Caribe. The Caribbean region had several (male) representatives elected to the Assembly, including the sociologist Orlando Fals Borda, a vocal advocate for the regionalization of the Caribbean.²² These representatives attempted to lobby for increased regional autonomy for the Caribbean, with limited results (Solano, 2006, pp. 133-4; see the following chapter for more on regionalization and women’s organizing).

Ultimately, four women were elected to the Assembly, representing 5.7% of the total. The four included two representatives of the Liberal party, one Conservative, and Aída Abella

²² See Fals B., O. (1996). *Región e historia. Elementos sobre ordenamiento y equilibrio regional en Colombia* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo), and (2000), *Acción y espacio. Autonomías en la nueva república* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo).

representing the Unión Patriótica. None of the four were directly connected with the feminist movement (Bahamón, 1995, p. 100; Quintero, 2005, p. 6). Nonetheless, during the process of organizing the Assembly, feminist candidates presented a number of issues that became visible, legitimate aspects of the national conversation (abortion, domestic labor, violence against women, social reproduction) in ways that they had not been before (Villareal, 1995, pp. 336-7). Moreover, despite the defeat of not having a feminist candidate elected to the ANC, women's organizations did not stop pushing for their needs to be addressed by the new constitution; they immediately turned their attention to lobbying the candidates who *had* been elected (ibid., p. 337). In May of 1991, women came together to coordinate the lobbying process, and formed the Bogotá-based Red Nacional Mujer y Constituyente, which counted 90 member groups around the country. This network would become the Red Nacional de Mujeres, which is today one of the most vocal networks of feminists and has included, at one time or another, all three networks under study. The Red Nacional (whose delegates were largely white and mestiza women [Cine Mujer, 1991]) hosted roundtables with women's representatives educating the elected delegates, reached out to the press, circulated petitions, submitted proposals for consideration, and had a silent presence at the Assembly itself, protesting women's near-absence from the official decisionmaking body (Tamayo, 1995, pp. 4-5; see also Quintero, 2005, p. 7 for a comprehensive list of proposals put forth by the RNM and other women's groups).

By and large, the Assembly “faltó el entusiasmo y el activismo de las organizaciones de mujeres que presentaron su proyecto de reforma en las audiencias públicas convocadas (...) La reforma fue un ejercicio histórico, pero le hizo falta la mirada de las mujeres colombianas” (Galvis, 2011, p. 16). But though the new constitution certainly lacked many of the gains feminists had been pushing for (an abortion law was voted on in the ANC, but defeated forty to

twenty-five [Tamayo, 1995, p. 4]), the resulting document was one of the most progressive Constitutions in Latin America. Articles of particular interest included Article 13 (women's equality with men before the law), Article 40 (women's right to political participation), Article 42 (equality of rights and responsibilities within the family, and women's protection from domestic violence), and Article 43 (women's freedom from discrimination, public assistance for pregnant women, and support for women heads-of-household). In addition, the constitution enshrined important rights for the recognition of ethnic minorities, which would be deepened in 1993 with Ley 70, which codified the territorial and cultural rights of Afrocolombians.²³

It also saw some gains for regional goals in the Caribbean, including the chance to establish administrative planning regions (Solano, 2006, pp. 135-9).²⁴ As such, the new constitution was an important tool, referent, and legitimator for feminist concerns. But its execution and enforcement in day-to-day life was partial, with the role of the State in guaranteeing the rights it contained remaining unclear. Colombian academic and human rights activist Ligia Galvís Ortiz recently reflected on the document: "La Constitución consagró la igualdad de derechos entre hombres y mujeres, pero el camino para su participación como actora de la política quedó entreabierto y el Estado no ha tenido prisa para dictar las medidas concerniente para eliminar los obstáculos que las amarran a las tareas domésticas y a sus miedos ancestrales" (Galvís, 2011, pp. 21-22). And the victory of the new constitution came amid a darkening cloud. Even as Colombia ratified the most progressive constitution on the continent, its armed conflict deepened. This meant that armed groups who did not participate in the

²³ For more on the effects of Ley 70 on Afrocolombian livelihoods and social movement strategies, see Wade, 2012; Asher, 2009; and Escobar, 2008.

²⁴ Two other important moments of opportunity at this time included the constitution's ending of the Concordat, which codified the close relationship between the State and the Catholic Church, and the Convention of Belém do Pará, adopted in 1994, which provides an important instrument for combating violence against women in private and public settings.

Constitutional Assembly, as the former M-19 had done, became nothing short of armies of war, fed by narcodollars and State corruption. The pluralization of social movements that would occur as a result of the constitution faced two major obstacles: first was the proliferation of violent threats. Social movements of all stripes consistently struggled against being associated to one pole of the conflict or another; in war, neutrality was a nearly impossible position to maintain. The appropriation of feminist agendas by one armed actor or another, without their permission, put feminists in danger of being targets by the opposing armed group. The second obstacle was the tunnel vision that the country developed for the war; in other words, with a crisis monopolizing the public debate, there was little attention or funding available for social movement processes (Wills & Gómez, 2006, pp. 300-301).

In this difficult context, networks of feminist organizations – already on the rise since the 1981 Encuentro – multiplied rapidly. In a context of constant threats, forming networks between smaller organizations was an important protective mechanism, as networks offer increased visibility, solidarity, and access to international partners. The existence of new organizations also visibilized the pre-existing movement. Feminist historians (Wills & Gómez, 2006, among others) attribute this expansion both to the existence of the constitution as a tool of accountability politics (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 16-25), but to the connections forged between activists during the Assembly process. Nonetheless, not all feminist voices remember the era as one of movement strengthening. Yusmidia Solano, whom I interviewed in 2013, recalled the post-1991 years this way.

Yo creo que permitió un salto gigante en cuanto que hay allí quedaron varios artículos reconocidos sobre derechos de las mujeres. O sea, que se avanzó porque ya del nivel constitucional se hablaba de la igualdad, se hablaba de los derechos de la mujer, y se posibilitó que al reglamentar esos artículos constitucionales sacaron la ley contra la violencia hacia las mujeres y todo, digamos. Que empieza allí todo un periodo de reglamentación de derechos al nivel del Estado. Pero también con el riesgo de que, como en su forma de

Dirección Nacional de Equidad para Mujeres, entonces el Estado fue contando con muchas feministas, muchísimas, y casi que el movimiento queda debilitado, muy pegado a la financiación internacional y a los programas del Estado. Entonces, yo creo que el movimiento se debilitó muchísimo. Digamos que todos hemos caído en la trampa de volverlo muy institucionalista, y eso se va a perder mucha fuerza del movimiento como tal, digamos, y sea ONGizado, en toda forma de una ONG, que son financiadas, y entonces de alguna manera las agendas están determinadas, por un lado por las agencias internacionales; por el otro lado, por el Estado.

Solano's comments reflect the major challenges for the feminist movement's political turn in the 1990s: NGOization, dependence, and how to manage the movement's relationship with the State. Beatriz Quintero recalls: if during the 1980s the feminist movement saw the State as an enemy, "a partir de los 90, el objetivo (de una parte de los movimientos feministas) dejó de ser la destrucción del Estado y se convirtió más bien en un propósito de colaborar en la construcción de un andamiaje institucional fuerte, tanto en su eficacia como en su carácter democrático" (qtd. in Wills, 2011b, p. 15). This strategic collaboration had consequences. Despite the political pluralization of feminisms (which began at this time to be discussed in the plural), the bureaucratization of the feminist movement which results from the increased routes to politics available to women encouraged a certain homogenization of the movement's public face. The movement was represented in Bogotá by "femocrats" (Wills & Gómez, 2006, pp. 301-302), who, as Solano hints at above, were forced to compete with one another for funding and political access. Moreover, though there was an increased number women in government since 1991, feminists felt that they often failed to represent what they saw as women's interests or the women's movement. Wills and Gómez write, for example, that the creation of a national council for women (La Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer) meant a *lower* profile for the women's movement than before, because it painted women's issues as having been addressed even while the council failed to communicate with the feminist movement (2006, p. 315).

Because of the need for funding, the feminist movement was also increasingly responsive to global currents and the priorities of the United Nations, INGOs, and Northern foundations (Álvarez, 1997, p. 6; Wills & Gómez, 2006). The agenda of these international bodies was focused at the time on the rights of “difference” actors, which both included feminists and forced them to reconsider the differences within their ranks. Afrocolombian women in particular gained political visibility (Escobar, 2008:202), and along with indigenous women were called upon to play a more visible role in the feminist movement – though perhaps because it was tied to an exogenous rather than a purely organic impetus, that role tended to err on the side of tokenism (see the following chapter for ways in which this dynamic played out among the networks under study). The influence of the United Nations was particularly strong in the 1990s as Colombian feminists prepared for the IV World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995 (Wills, 2000; Barrig, 1998).

All of these currents – the global emphasis on cultural difference and good governance, the new constitutional opportunities, new connections between women’s organizations, and the arrival of the increasingly brutal armed conflict on women’s doorsteps – gave rise to a wave of new women’s organizations (some, though not all, self-defined as feminist) explicitly devoted to the resolution of the armed conflict through a negotiated, non-military solution. Wills (2011b, p. 13) explains: “Si en Chile, Argentina, o Brasil las mujeres (...) se lanzaron a protestar contra las dictaduras militares, en Colombia lo hacen contra la guerra.”

On the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women in 1994, the organization Mujeres de Orocomay, formed in 1991 in Santa Marta on the Caribbean coast, founded the Red de Mujeres del Caribe. The network credits its origins to the opportunities presented by the rights enshrined in the new constitution, and to the concurrent efforts for the

regionalization of the Caribbean region taking place during the Assembly process (Red de Mujeres del Caribe, 2009). It formed with three objectives: to contribute to the push for regional autonomy; to incorporate the needs of Caribbean women into the movement for autonomy; and to channel regional concerns into the IV World Conference of Women, to be taking place in Beijing the following year. Regionalization continued to be the network's major focus until the end of the 1990s, when the violence of the armed conflict pushed the activists into explicit peace organizing. It was at that time that the Red formed linkages with Bogotá-based feminist networks; nonetheless, it has maintained a distinctly peripheral identity, and its relationship with *capitaleña* feminist organizations has fluctuated and not always been smooth. Today the Red's activism includes currents of socialist feminism, postcolonial feminism, and what founder Yusmidia Solano termed *zambo* feminism, identifying with indigenous and Afro women's organizing.

Two years later, a group of women calling themselves the Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres launched its first mobilization in Mutatá, Antioquia, in what Cynthia Cockburn (2007, p. 22) calls "the first time Colombia, in all its history, had seen women in such numbers taking a political initiative in the absence of men." The emergence of Ruta Pacífica resulted from a split in the Red Nacional de Mujeres (Lamus, 2010, p. 243), which, after having come together to intervene in the constitutional process, found its member organizations divided over post-constitution political strategy. The network's leadership advocated furthering and institutionalizing the legal gains that women's activism had enshrined in the new constitution – a strategy that necessitated working, to some extent, with the State. But several member groups, who had more of a presence in the regions of the country where women were beset by the rise in paramilitary and other forms of escalating violence, preferred to focus their advocacy efforts on

pushing for a negotiated solution to the conflict, rather than on the recognition of specific rights. Some organizations also resisted working with the State in any way, arguing that to do so would be to legitimate “un gobierno que perciben autoritario, paramilitar, y neoliberal” (Madariaga, 2009, p. 410). This kind of division took place in nearly every Colombian social movement at the time of the paramilitary apex, and combined with personal and political differences, it resulted in the birth of Ruta Pacífica as an independent network (Lamus, personal conversation, 10/12/15). Today Ruta counts more than three hundred member organizations in eight of Colombia’s departments, with each regional office housed in another local organization. Each regional office responds to the coordination of the main office in Bogotá, but also maintains an independent agenda connected to its local context. As such, each regional office is demographically distinct; the regional office in Popayán, Cauca, where I conducted my fieldwork, is staffed largely by academic feminists and students from various class backgrounds. Most, though not all, of the regional staff is mestiza, though the Cauca chapter’s member organizations comprise a majority of Afro and indigenous women. Ruta defines itself as explicitly feminist, pacifist, and antimilitarist; its leaders have made a “theoretically grounded choice” (Cockburn, 2007) to mobilize without the collaboration of men. This decision, as well as its pacifism and policy of active neutrality, has at times put them at odds with other women’s networks in the country, notably the OFP. Ruta’s workshops and mass mobilizations focus on symbolism and the power of language; they both employ and create feminist theory.

The same year, the Organización Femenina Popular, founded in Barrancabermeja in 1972, began to collaborate more closely with other women’s organizations and national networks based in Bogotá. This formed the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra and por la Paz (MSM), a strategic unification of social movement organizations which was driven primarily by

the OFP. In terms of its relationship to feminism, the OFP adhered to what founder Yolanda Becerra called its “own line” of feminism, which sometimes diverged from the radical feminist movement centered in Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín. OFP was founded in alliance with the popular movement, the progressive Church, and the labor movement. The MSM consolidated on a national level in the year 2000, where it collaborated with other networks including Ruta Pacífica. At its height the network counted forty-some member organizations, and was very active in staging highly visible, large-scale mobilizations in the capital. As of my fieldwork in 2013, the network’s activism was on hiatus due to a crisis of financing.

These three networks, newly founded in the aftermath of constitutional organizing, would become more active and more visible during the next period of feminist activism in Colombia: the era of failed peace negotiations, Plan Colombia, and paramilitary demobilizations.

Negotiations, Militarization, and Demobilization: 1998 – 2005

Three important events marked the next era of aperture and mobilization for the Colombian feminist movement. The first was the peace talks between the Pastrana administration and the FARC-EP at El Caguán, which began in 1999 and finally broke down in 2002. The negotiations were seen as an opportunity for advancing women’s agendas, and resulted in the creation of additional networks between women’s organizations. The talks’ breakdown resulted in widespread frustration among social movements, amidst which women’s organizations were among the few that remained active in the immediate aftermath of the breakdown (Rojas, 2004, p. viii). The second event was the institution in 2000 of the U.S.’ Plan Colombia, with its militarization both on the ground and in national budget priorities, its effects on the concentration of wealth, and its support of impunity for the armed forces (Tate, 2014;

Isacson, 2010). Thirdly, after popular dissatisfaction with the Pastrana approach to negotiations, the newly elected administration of Álvaro Uribe reverted to a zero-tolerance, military policy on guerrilla activity. Uribe's approach to conflict "resolution" included the 2005 Law of Justice and Peace and its accompanying demobilization effort, during which the State claimed that several thousand paramilitaries laid down their weapons. This process, widely criticized for offering impunity to armed groups, saw an eruption of political intervention by various social movements. This was particularly true of the three networks under study, all of which organized events that served to focus national attention on women as visible actors in the conflict and its resolution. All of these events happened within a neoliberalization of the Colombian economy, which took out its first IMF loan in 1999 (International Monetary Fund, 2011) and would sign a Free Trade Agreement with the United States by 2011. By the end of this period, women's organizations in Colombia had settled firmly into a stance of political *incidencia*, or direct advocacy with State institutions; they had also become more explicit about the need to find a negotiated, rather than a military, solution to conflict. The links between violence against women and violence in wartime became more strongly articulated as related points on a continuum of violence, and feminist organizations began to frame war and patriarchy as mutually-sustaining aspects of the same structures of power. Women's organizations, particularly in the *regiones*, focused on the effects of the economic model – particularly the actions of foreign investors and the extractive industry – on local lives and livelihoods. In Bogotá, several massive marches organized by women's peace networks, drew the attention of national and international media. Not coincidentally, this era also saw armed groups declare women peace activists to be military targets, and the latter were systematically threatened and attacked by paramilitaries. By 2002, women activists represented 17% of political assassinations (Rojas, 2004, p. vii). The era of

being protected by traditional views of women as outside of conflict, if it had ever truly existed at all, was over.

El Caguán. After the heightened violence of the 1990s, public opinion (in some sectors, at least) was disposed toward conflict resolution. A number of civil society efforts and public mobilizations in 1998 and 1999, in which women's organizations played key roles (Rojas, 2004:14), demonstrated public support of a negotiated solution to the conflict, and likely made it easier for both the State and the FARC-EP to agree to talks. In 1999, President Andrés Pastrana announced the beginning of a dialogue – slightly short of formal negotiations – with the guerrilla organization. The talks were to take place in El Caguán, also known as the despeje, or demilitarized zone. Rojas (2004) writes that the talks set an important precedent, in that there was a formalized channel for civil society to participate in the talks; one activist with whom she spoke opined that the late 1990s represented the peak of the peace movement in the country, due to organizing around the negotiations.

From the beginning, intervening in the negotiations was a clear goal of the women's movement. The Red Nacional de Mujeres, the CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, the country's largest labor organization), and several other organizations sent a letter to the FARC-EP, requesting that they hold a special hearing for women to address issues of economic growth and employment, in hopes that the message would travel through the FARC to the negotiations. The guerrillas agreed, and members of those organizations drew up a set of objectives to be presented. The hearing took place in June of 2000, and included six hundred women in addition to the FARC-EP representatives. (Red Nacional de Mujeres, 2001, pp. 1-3). In addition, ten percent of the official participants in the dialogues were women. These included Mariana Paez,

who represented the FARC-EP, and Ana Teresa Bernal, a leader in the peace movement who was elected to participate formally in certain aspects of the talks. Both women were instrumental in organizing the RNM hearing. This marked an important shift in the way dialogues were usually conducted, though the role of the organization that Bernal represented was largely a formality and Paez represented the guerrillas' agenda more than bringing a specific gender perspective (Rojas, 2004, pp. 17-19).

The talks between Pastrana and the FARC-EP, and the lengthy process of organizing and preparing for the women's hearing, became a rallying and consolidating point for both the peace and women's movements. Women's demands, and the role of gender in women's wartime suffering, gained visibility and credibility. Wills and Gómez write that the moment "fue sentido como una ventana de oportunidad para la consecución de cambios del orden estructural"; several new networks of women's SMOs, including the influential Initiative de Mujeres por la Paz, began as a result of activism around the peace talks (2006, pp. 306-313). Both the Organización Femenina Popular and Ruta Pacífica were awarded the Premio Milenium de la Mujer by the United Nations' UNIFEM (Carvajal, 2001; Vanguardia Liberal, 2003). But the dialogues themselves had challenges from the outset: civil society's inclusion was largely a formality, and there was no ceasefire for either side during the negotiations (see Rojas, 2004 for a detailed description of the talks' processes and protagonists). Pastrana formally ended the talks in February of 2002, and though civil society protested vigorously, they were defeated. The general public, fed up with what they saw as the inability of a negotiated solution to bring the conflict to its resolution and angry at reports of guerrillas using the demilitarized zone to refortify their forces, began to show more support for a military solution. The global counterterrorism

discourse, pushed by the post-9/11 United States, made a military solution all the more attractive because it was fundable and in keeping with the geopolitical zeitgeist of the time.

The peace movement faltered after the talks ended. Demoralized and exhausted, with physical threats making mobilization more difficult, it retreated into what many activists with whom I spoke remember as a period of hibernation. But the talks' failure offered the opposite impetus to the women's movement. The increased visibility of gender issues during the dialogues, as well as the experience of having a woman included as an official representative of civil society, was an important motivator for women's peace organizations (Moser, Acosta, and Vásquez, 2006, p. 27). In addition, the UN's approval in October of 2000 of Security Council Resolution 1325, which emphasizes women's role in peacebuilding and encourages States and IGOs (Inter-Governmental Organizations) to include women and a gender perspective in all peace negotiations, introduced an important lobbying tool. Rather than hibernating, the women's and feminist movement took to the streets, demanding that all parties recommit to a negotiated settlement and a peace agenda. Activists today credit feminist peace activists with reinvigorating the broader peace movement.

The Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz, based in the Magdalena Medio, had consolidated nationally in 2000. It was formed by five SMOs and social movement networks: the Organización Femenina Popular (OFP), the Red Nacional de Mujeres (RNM), Ruta Pacífica, the Mesa Nacional de Concertación de Mujeres (which had formed in 2000), and the Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz (IMP, formed in 2001). This new coalition of networks organized a march on Bogotá to be held on June 25th, 2002, four months after the end of the FARC-Pastrana dialogues. It was intended to highlight women's demands, the effects of war on their lives, and the potential for peace offered by women's initiatives, under the slogan

“las mujeres paz haremos.” Organizers expected twenty thousand participants. Reports indicate that between thirty-five and forty thousand showed up (Lamus, 2010; Solano, 2007; Bouvier, 2009). Yusmidia Solano (in Lamus, 2010, pp. 264-266) writes that it was the confluence of a number of factors that led the march to be so well attended. These included the fact that diverging strands of the women’s movement had grown closer to one another: the *movimiento femenino* had developed a feminist conscience, and the *movimiento feminista* was becoming more sensitized to the realities of women in the popular sector; these strands identified the need to unify at this particular moment. Society at large, moreover, was fed up with Colombia’s “legalistic fetishism” – its focus on passing legislation that was inadequately enforced – and social movements were seen as the alternative. Finally, Solano writes, international solidarity organizations, INGOs, and human rights organizations had helped women to marshal the material resources needed to stage the mobilization.

The same year, the IMP organized twelve regional and national women’s Encuentros, inviting women from various sectors to collaborate and discuss a common agenda. These Encuentros resulted in six hundred proposals from women all over the country. These were narrowed down to sixty proposals, which went on to be discussed at what was to be the first of several annual Women’s Emancipatory Constituent events, also held in 2002 (Solano, 2007, p. 183). During the televised event, the women who attended organized the proposals into twelve agenda items. These were grouped under five ways in which women were excluded: legal exclusion and exclusion from security; economic exclusion; sociocultural exclusion; territorial and environmental exclusion; and exclusion from political and public life. The resulting document, a “pact for peace,” was the result of the work of nearly a thousand women (Solano, 2007).

Justice and Peace. The period from 2003-2005 represented the third major rallying point of this era for feminist and women's peace networks, as the Uribe administration took up the task of "demobilizing" the paramilitary forces of the AUC. Though this demobilization was largely a farce, women's interventions marked another step in their increasingly visible political advocacy and insistence that Colombia adhere to S/RES/1325. Deepening fissures in the movement at this time, however, meant that the alliance of five organizations that had come together to stage the 2002 mobilization would part ways, leaving the MSM with only three major organizations participating.

In 2003, the Uribe administration signed the Santa Fé de Ralito agreement, laying out a course for the negotiation with and demobilization of the AUC by 2005. In 2004, the second agreement was signed, setting up a two-hundred-some square mile area for negotiations and demobilization to be carried out. During this period leading up to the eventual passage of the 2005 Law of Justice and Peace that resulted in an official demobilization of the AUC, women's peace networks intervened heavily in the political process, lobbying for a gender perspective to be included in the negotiations. Solano (2007) recalls:

With the installation of the safe haven in Santa Fé de Ralito for the paramilitary forces... we were able to intercede in negotiations and propose the establishment of the 'National Advocacy Panel for the Right to Life, Truth, Justice and Reparation with a Gender Perspective'. This allowed us to monitor and denounce any irregularities in the peace negotiations as well as to lobby with Mujeres en Alianza for a draft law on justice and peace (186).

Furthermore, in August of 2004, the five-member MSM held a National Encuentro of Women Against War, which focused on holding the Uribe administration accountable to S/RES/1325 and including women in the nascent paramilitary negotiations. Colombian women were joined by international representatives from Women in Black, the global feminist network of organizations against militarization (Solano, 2007). UNIFEM had opened an office in Colombia earlier that

year with the goal of strengthening women's participation in the peace process; this likely was an important resource for the network. The 2004 Encuentro saw a split in the five-member alliance, with the Mesa de Concertación and the Red Nacional de Mujeres leaving the group. The split was caused by a disagreement over two issues, by now familiar to readers: what position to afford a class struggle in the feminist agenda, and how to approach their relationship to the State and understand "opposition to war." The RNM and IMP advocated for a role in the writing of the new law, while other organizations preferred to avoid the appearance of legitimizing the State by collaborating with the legislative process. Moreover, leaders of the OFP felt that the group of five should emphasize their opposition to the Uribe administration in particular, focusing on the State's complicity in the armed conflict rather than on armed actors writ large. Ruta Pacífica and the IMP, on the other hand, stressed that the alliance should oppose all wars as a matter of principle, and assume a posture of pacifism and active neutrality. The subtext to this disagreement, of course, is how to approach the idea of a "just war," and more specifically, how to approach guerrilla organizations. More than one activist working outside of the feminist movement in Colombia informed me of the OFP's communications with the ELN, while another group was said to have some level of ties to the FARC-EP. The complexity of these relationships is rarely given its due in policy or the press, however; "connections to" a guerrilla organization can mean anything from permitting communication with the armed actors in a municipality where they are the de facto State to attempting to lobby the guerrillas for a local-level peace agreement instead of going through the State. As Adam Isacson wrote in 2001 about social reality in Barrancabermeja, home of the OFP, "Abandoned by the Colombian government, most residents of Barranca's guerrilla-controlled neighborhoods developed a live-and-let live approach, allowing the leftist groups to operate in the open, paying 'taxes' on demand, and

providing assistance when asked or forced to do so.” True autonomy in the midst of such conflict is difficult, if not nearly impossible, to achieve. Nevertheless, as Wills and Gómez (2006) write, the context of war and the existence of armed poles “lleva en momentos críticos de discusión política a serias polarizaciones, a extrapolaciones peligrosas, resurgimiento de sectarismos y sentimientos de paranoia que pueden bloquear los avances hechos por las iniciativas” of women’s groups (313). These differences in approach forced the alliance to ask whether their collaboration, formed for a specific purpose and to stage a particular event, were still relevant. In my 2013 conversation with Doris Lamus Canavate, we discussed the effect of NGOs and foreign funders on alliances between feminist networks; the availability of funding, she explained, means that Colombian organizations will ally strategically to procure resources, meaning that these alliances are temporary projects rather than organically-formed networks. As such, the five-member network came together for a time, accomplished impressive goals, and was quickly reduced. The three remaining member networks, however, continued to engage in advocacy and contentious politics for nearly another decade (see the next chapter for more on MSM’s story).

Outside of the Encuentro, Ruta Pacífica joined peace organizations like the Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris to demand a place in the negotiations for the peace movement, and pressed for transparency in the process (Vanguardia Liberal, 2004). Women’s advocacy eventually led to the introduction of clauses in the in-progress legislation with an eye toward victims’ reparations, with limited results; nonetheless, Solano writes, it was better than the original. Finally, in 2005, Uribe signed Law 975, also known as the Justice and Peace law, a final agreement for paramilitary demobilization conceived in a framework of transitional justice (see the chapter on Victims for a more recent look at this concept). The law granted much-reduced sentences to

paramilitary fighters in exchange for their agreement to inform the public about the killings for which they were responsible, and a promise to never engage in paramilitary activity again.

Civil society responded to the law with widespread scorn, arguing that it essentially granted amnesty to paramilitaries and failed to ensure adequate reparations to their victims. As Meertens and Zambrano (2010) write:

...[C]ivil society groups have queried the practical reach of ‘justice’ and ‘truth’ under the Justice and Peace Law. The key questions raised include whether the paramilitary leaders must confess all their crimes, and what happens to victims’ and society’s right to truth when these leaders are extradited to the US on drug-trafficking charges. For women, the critical areas of concern have been the almost complete lack of confessions of both sexual violence crimes and violent seizures of land (p. 195).

Most victims of violence who sought truth, justice, and reparations under the law were women (ibid.), making the process’ failures all the more relevant to feminist activists. Emerging accusations of “parapolitics,” or members of Congress having ties to the paramilitaries, made the law all the more toothless. Within a few years of the law’s passage, reports emerged that 25-35% of Congress was linked to the AUC (see Hollman Morris’ scathing 2010 film *Impunity* for more details on the so-called demobilization process). The courts did not hand down a single sentence to a paramilitary fighter until five years later, at which time two men were sentenced to jail time (Isacson, 2010). As of 2014, this number had increased to nineteen men, out of more than 31,000 who participated in the demobilization (Rojas, R., 2014). Regardless, during the process women peace networks were persistent in their advocacy.²⁵ During negotiations with the AUC, ten women from MSM spoke in front of the House of Representatives, demanding justice for twenty-five people disappeared from Barrancabermeja during its 1998 paramilitary massacre.

²⁵ The AUC negotiations and their aftermath marked a moment of tension between WPNs; the IMP chose to participate in the negotiations, seeing them as an imperfect but important step, while other networks, including Ruta Pacífica and the OFP, refused to give credence to the process or its resulting institutions (Ramirez P., 2009). The RNM, which at the time included the RMCC, did not have a unified position, but did participate in talks with the FARC-EP at El Caguán a few years prior.

The same year, they organized an International summit of Women Against War, with 320 attendees from fifteen countries. (El Tiempo, 2004a and 2004b). Finally, in 2010, the network hosted a summit on the effects of militarization on women's lives. Three thousand activists convened in Barrancabermeja for two days of speakers, roundtables, panels, and group discussion (Movimiento Social de Mujeres, 2010).

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the women's peace movement had consolidated, professionalized, and gained visibility and legitimacy; feminist networks had come together and moved apart as the circumstances required. The movement as a whole had honed an incisive critique of armed conflict, militarization, and the patriarchy sustaining it. It was poised to address the next challenge: another round of State peace talks with the FARC-EP.

Todas a la Mesa: 2012 - 2016

On September 4, 2012, after two weeks of rumors and leaked insinuations, President Juan Manuel Santos and Timoleón Jiménez of the FARC-EP held separate press events to formally announce the start of peace talks. The announcement of peace talks, and the twists and turns those talks have taken since they commenced, represent the fourth fulcrum of contentious politics for the Colombian women's peace movement. Though I will undertake a deeper analysis of the talks in Chapter 8, in this section I will highlight a few of the actions taken by women's networks as they have fought for a place at the negotiating table. I argue that the talks represent an axis for social movement organizing, particularly by women's peace networks. Moreover, women's efforts have resulted in significant, if insufficient, advancements in women's representation at the table in both the FARC and government negotiating teams, and increased

attention to women's particular concerns during the demobilization and disarmament process is likely.

Following Santos' announcement the Colombian Right, led by former president Uribe, reacted swiftly and sternly, but polls showed that more than seventy percent of the country supported the negotiations (WOLA, 2015a). But before Santos had even stepped up to the microphone, his office had received a letter signed by women's peace networks demanding a place in the upcoming talks. The letter, signed by representatives of the RNM and the IMP, among others, applauded the creation of the talks and urged the administration to focus on sexual violence and the other ways women have been affected by the armed conflict, and highlighted women's contributions to peacemaking. "Therefore," the letter asserted, "we expect to see women government representatives at the negotiation table. Likewise, we expect the government to insist that the guerrillas also do this" (Red Nacional de Mujeres, et. al., 2012; see also Berents, 2012).²⁶ Women peace networks' cry of "¡Qué vergüenza la guerra – todos y todas a la mesa!" echoed at the highest levels. In October of 2012, the FARC-EP responded to popular pressure by adding a woman to its negotiating team, in the person of Dutch citizen Tanja Nijmeijer (alias Alexandra), who had joined the guerrilla organization ten years earlier. Nijmeijer, who is fluent in Spanish, English, and Dutch (in addition to speaking some German, French, and Italian), added a layer of international credibility to the FARC-EP's delegation; however, her selection at the time as the sole female negotiator on either delegation was deeply problematic. Not only was her initial role conceived of as a translator (meaning that her contributions would be limited to repeating men's words), but as a foreigner, Nijmeijer had not experienced the other side of

²⁶ Other social movement organizations' reaction was swift as well, with the CRIC (the Consejo Regional Indígena de Cauca) and ONIC (the Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia) issuing a peace proposal and decrying the lack of indigenous representation in the process.

conflict; Colombian women, whether civilian or guerrilla, remained initially absent from the table.

The parties gathered in Havana for the first time on November 19, 2012, with a commitment to focus on six policy areas: agrarian reform, the political participation of FARC ex-combatants, illicit drugs, reparation for victims, the end of conflict and DDR (demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration), and implementation of the agreements. Civil society continued to demand a place at the table, and the State responded by hosting four parallel roundtables for civil society between November of 2012 and January of 2014 (WOLA, 2014). Civil society sent a set of peace proposals to both teams of negotiators in December of 2012, and in April of 2013, Colombia's Universidad Nacional and the UN Development Program hosted a public forum in Bogotá on the subject of the second negotiating item, political participation for ex-combatants. More than twelve hundred participants presented around four hundred proposals to the negotiating teams, focusing on topics like electoral reform, the security of opposition party members, and women's participation in politics. Six months later, women's and feminist networks organized a summit (La Cumbre Nacional de Mujeres y Paz) to insist upon their inclusion in the now year-old peace talks. The summit counted more than five hundred members of women's and feminist SMOs, along with representatives of indigenous and environmental organizations, Afro-Colombian networks, LGBT organizations, churches, labor unions, and others (Ruíz-Navarro, 2013). This was one of several moments within the last few years in which progressive civil society united under the umbrella of women's organizing; since the failure of the FARC-Pastrana talks in 2002, this vanguard position has been an increasingly common one for the women's movement. The summit was also a key factor in two significant concessions by the State, which occurred in November 2013 and September of 2014. Until that point, the

government's negotiating team had been entirely male; the FARC-EP's inclusion of Nijmeijer was followed by the appointment of several female guerrillas to its team, which now comprises more than 50% women, though none of them sit at the actual negotiating table with the five-member team of plenipotentiaries (in 2015 the FARC-EP would also invite Miss Universe to the negotiating team, an offer she would politely decline). But the State representatives remained entirely male. As Virginia Bouvier explained in a November 2013 article in *Foreign Policy*, "The government strategy thus far in the talks has been to cultivate the support of potential spoilers by granting representatives of the business, military, and police sectors coveted seats at the peace table. But the Colombians most affected... have been largely excluded." In other words, the State was protecting its authority by ceding moderate power to those sectors already empowered enough to constitute a threat, to the exclusion of the disempowered (emulating the historical model of the Frente Nacional). But in late November, after a year of pressure from civil society and feminist organizations to honor S/RES/1325, Santos named two women to the government's negotiating team. María Paulina Rivera is the Interior Ministry's director for human rights, and was appointed to the principal five-member team. The second woman, Nigieria Rentería Lozano, is the High Commissioner for Women's Equity and was appointed to the team of alternates (WOLA, 2014). Santos charged Rentería with monitoring the table with an eye toward maintaining a focus on gender equity (Bouvier, 2013). The appointment of Rivera and Rentería, while a significant step in the government's response to the pressure of the RNM and other feminist advocacy networks, did not translate into an automatic representation of feminist concerns. "Even if officially included," wrote critics, female negotiators "appear to be representing the parties to the conflict more than a gendered perspective of the impact of violence on Colombian women, with strategies to end the impunity for sexual violence

committed by their forces, or with proposals to counter the historical exclusion women have suffered” (Sanchez & Line, 2012).

The negotiators’ second move in response to pressure by SMOs came in September of 2014, when they created a gender subcommittee dedicated to incorporating the perspective of women in the negotiations and resulting agreements (WOLA, 2015a). The teams also invited a delegation to Havana composed of civil society leaders, including Marina Gallego, the National Coordinator of Ruta Pacífica, to testify about the effects of the armed conflict. A few days later, the second delegation of victims arrived in Havana, composed of nine women and three men.

The influence of women’s and feminist lobbying on both negotiating teams at the Havana dialogues is clear; even if the parties were simply protecting themselves by attempting to avoid criticism by the UN or other international bodies, the appointment of women and inclusion of an even occasional gender perspectives represents progress (over the past quarter-century women have made up less than 3% of global signatories to peace accords, and those women have all been from West Africa – no Latin American woman has ever signed an accord [The Guardian, 2012]). Increased attention by the negotiators to civil society voices also reflects the increasingly legitimated, organized, and visible advocacy by SMOs all over the country, allying under the umbrella of women’s peace initiatives. As Sanchez and Line explain in a 2012 editorial in the *Christian Science Monitor*,

[W]omen have been at the forefront of peace and justice initiatives in Colombia. (...) Women have led the struggle for land restitution and for the rights to truth, justice, and reparations for victims. Women have placed the issue of more than 32,000 forced disappearances on the national and international agenda. Women teachers defend their students from forced recruitment by armed groups. Women have recovered and buried the bodies and found ways for victims to survive in the midst of conflict. Their participation in the peace process is not a demand to be considered, it is a right they have earned.

Moreover, no matter what the outcome of the accords, will be produced, the process of intervening in the negotiations represents an important moment for social movement organizing.

As a woman activist from the organization Congreso de los Pueblos asserted in a 2013 meeting in Bucaramanga, Santander during my fieldwork, “Lo que está pasando en la Habana ha inspirado un esfuerzo del pueblo. Ha aglutinado su construcción.” The questions that remain for the women’s peace movement to consider are familiar ones, present at every fulcrum of action since 1930: how will they support and influence the State and the FARC-EP during the post-accords process without sacrificing their autonomy? To what extent will they collaborate with State authorities, and how will they continue to intervene in the political process when women appointed to State positions fail to adequately represent feminist perspectives?

Feminisms in the Plural: Strategies for Survival

Perhaps the defining characteristic of Colombia’s women’s movement is its plurality (Ramirez P., 2009). Its members represent all regions of Colombia and include various class allegiances, racial-ethnic identities, and chosen political directions. Many organizations identify themselves as feminist, while some choose not to; many are allied in some way with the Church, labor unions, or political parties, while others strive for autonomy. Many choose to cooperate on some level with State efforts and programs, while others have a policy of non-cooperation with what they see as a patriarchal and deradicalizing institution. Most organizations strike a balance between these poles. The fact that such a diverse group of organizations has a history of coming together and splitting apart only to collaborate and divide themselves again should be read not only as a reflection of Colombia’s polarized and suspicious political context, but also, I argue, as one of the movement’s strengths. Colombian sociologist Norma Villareal Méndez explains:

El movimiento social de mujeres se define como un conjunto diverso de mujeres y organizaciones que desde distintos espacios y enfoques están reclamando reconocimiento, derechos y plena participación en decisiones tanto en aspectos ligados a la transformación de su propia condición y posición social, como en temas del funcionamiento y desarrollo de la

sociedad... En algunas épocas se ha construido una dinámica colectiva a partir de temas y estrategias comunes. En otras, las movilizaciones y reclamos han tenido dinámicas distintas (Villareal, 1997, p. 364, qtd. in Madariaga, 2009).

The movement's ability to define itself as *feminista con apellido* is another key strength. Women activists from the popular classes, the *regiones*, and the racial and ethnic peripheries of the country have broadened the boundaries of feminism in ways that make it a richer, more radical, and more enduring discourse. Rather than representing a move from “practical” to “strategic” interests, the appropriation of the feminist label by non-traditional actors insists that undoing women's subordination to structures of class, race, and colonialism, and the ways they intersect with structures of gender, is a *feminist* interest. This broadening process is ongoing, and continues to obstruct and dissolve some of the movement's collaborative efforts. But shifting strategic alliances and the absence of a unified political voice, I argue, allow the networks to come together to take advantage of moments of political opportunity, but to withdraw again in order to represent the diversity of feminist interests and identities in the country. The movement's malleability has given it a level of agility and flexibility in the face of ever-changing threats and opportunities, and has contributed to its longevity despite the entrenched power structures in Colombia that have succeeded in dissolving other Left movements. “This is a country where opposition and social movements have been wiped out,” I once heard a labor organizer from the Pólo Democrático party comment (Bejarano, 2012). But the women's peace movement survives, owing undoubtedly to the strength and courage of its members – but also to its dynamism.

Conclusion

The trajectory of the women's peace movement in Colombia, born out of the disparate strands of the Church, the Left, labor unions, and feminism, has been one of persistent banging

on a closed door. From the partisan hegemony of the twentieth century that blocked the political expression of any opposition movement, to the crudescence of violence that marked women activists as military targets, to the rise of NGOs and the professionalization of feminism, the movement has refused to be excluded or threatened into silence. The four fulcrums of feminist organizing in the last forty years – the 1981 Encuentro, the 1991 constitution, the changes in conflict wrought between 1999 and 2005, and today’s peace talks in Havana – have marked a period of increased organization, visibility, and legitimacy for the movement, which, in Becerra’s words, “ya no se puede tapar.” Progressive social movement organizations, whose efforts fell off after 2002, have followed in the footsteps of the women’s peace movement, joining feminist alliances and women’s initiatives for peace. Topics formerly considered radical, such as domestic violence and women’s control over their sexuality, are now widely supported and addressed by non-“feminist” movements (Madariaga, 2009, p. 396). To discuss the gendered nature of armed conflict no longer marks one as a marginal political actor; on the contrary, the issue has begun to be incorporated at the highest levels of government. The women’s peace movement has led the country in creating a space for those on the underside of power to collaborate, strategize, and create counterdiscourses to challenge hegemony – what Nancy Fraser (1997) calls a “subaltern counterpublic.” As they continue to demand a place at the table, several challenges will continue to face the women’s peace movement: the growing power of the neoliberal economic model embodied in the 2011 Free Trade Agreement with the United States, continued militarization of the country, and the decision of how to intervene in the Santos administration’s other peace efforts. Finally, Wills (2011; 2000) asserts that the movement continues to face the question of how the effects of State and para-State terror have influenced the internal workings of their organizations: their ability to form alliances and trust one another.

One more question I pose to the movement is whether this “culture of fear” (Restrepo Rhodes, 2016; Corradi, Fagen, & Garretón, 1992, p. 4) is still the driving force behind disagreements and fissures between women’s peace organizations, or if it is sometimes cited as a distraction from other tensions: centralization of power and influence, concentration of movement resources, and divisions of region, race, and class in the women’s peace movement. Such concerns, along with a modern-day look at the activities of all three networks under study, will be addressed in the next chapter.

Nosotras no podemos perder el ‘norte.’ Siempre tenemos que tener claro hacia dónde es que queremos ir.

– *Norma Carmona, 10/15/13*

Chapter 3

¿Hacia Dónde?

Women Peace Activists in the Twenty-First Century

Introduction

“[H]istories of Third World women’s engagement with feminism are in short supply,” wrote Chandra Mohanty in 2003 (p. 46). She went on to argue for “careful, politically focused, local analyses” of the activism of women in developing countries, beyond the existing literature that focused on them merely as recipients of global change. In this chapter I begin a conversation about the political engagement of the three women’s peace networks under study in Colombia. I will expand on the previous chapter’s discussion of the challenges that are the legacies of the Colombian feminist movement: the struggle for organizational autonomy; the concentration of resources and NGO support in the major cities, to the exclusion of regional organizations; the tokenization of Afro and indigenous women that accompanied the international agenda’s focus on “difference” actors in the 1990s; activists’ relationships to institutional feminism; and the effects of war on women’s organizing. I begin with an introduction to the individual women who generously consented to an interview and feature their voices to tell the stories of their involvement with feminist peace activism. I then analyze the ways in which each network grapples with the challenges listed above, and conclude by taking a measure of the activists’ accomplishments to date.

Several trends characterize the development of the three networks under study. For the leaders of all three networks whom I interviewed, the focus on peacemaking was not their initial step into a life of activism. Several women began as party militants, organizers of class-based movements, or community workers in ecclesial social programs (the exception to this trend was the younger generation of activists I spoke with, whose activism came by way of university training and/or volunteering in neighborhood organizations).²⁷ But in the 1980s and 90s, as the blood of the armed conflict seeped into their communities and homes, women activists all over the country turned their focus to ending the war, and brought with them a focus on conflict's gender-differentiated effects. As Patricia Madariaga explains, “[e]l rechazo de la guerra... ha ocupado un lugar creciente entre las prioridades de los movimientos de mujeres, que señalan a la guerra como uno de los principales escenarios de la violación de derechos de las mujeres” (2009, pp. 394-5). As I will demonstrate, the power these three networks' interventions into the national conversation about conflict transformation is in their conception of the mutually constitutive power structures – war, patriarchy, poverty, racism, and the marketization of social life – that constrict their lives. As a 2005 report by the Mesa de Trabajo *Mujer y Conflicto Armado* in Bogotá explains,

[L]os motivos de la resistencia son los elementos que las dinamizan: los hijos, Dios, la vida, pero también el sentimiento de valía, el respeto y la dignidad para consigo y con sus familias, comunidades o grupos. Las tres razones que en las diferentes experiencias han marcado la vida de las mujeres y frente a las cuales se han generado resistencias son: la discriminación, la guerra, y la pobreza (2005b, p. 75).

²⁷ These activist origins are in keeping with the trends evident elsewhere in Latin America, in which women come to political participation by way of what might be called the “big three” – unions, parties, and the Church (Maier and Lebon, 2010, *inter alia*). The rise of the neoliberal model in the 1990s weakened union participation across the continent, and this combined with paramilitary and State violence against union organizers means that women approach activism via unions less often among younger generations. Similarly, the model of women joining Left parties and being pushed out was also a common one in Colombia and Latin America in general (Maier and Lebon, 2010), but as “new” social movements outside the parties have proliferated, many younger women have skipped over the step of party militancy. Moreover, as the percentage of women in universities and the prevalence of gender studies and similar programs have risen, so too has the academic avenue to feminist activism.

The women I interviewed both reflected and broadened this list of motivators, and represent a diverse array of approaches to feminist activism. The stories they shared with me, and the origins of their organizations, are the subject of the next section.

Origins

The previous chapter explained the founding of all three networks under study: Red de Mujeres del Caribe in 1994, Ruta Pacífica in 1996, and Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz in 1996 (and at the national level in 2000). This section will offer a deeper description of those origins, explain the regional contexts of their inception, and introduce women activists in their own voices. In relying on my interviewees' spoken responses to guide this part of the narrative, I hope to engage in what Hirsch and Smith (2002) call "feminist modes of listening": that is, taking interviewees' stories on their own terms and presenting them with minimal interpretation. Many feminists of color and from the post-colonial world have offered trenchant and invaluable critiques to white, Western/Northern feminist writers about the act of representing "our" subjects; we suffer from a tendency to homogenize both "third world women" and their experience of patriarchy (Spivak, 1988; Mohanty, 2003), casting the former as essentially different from ourselves, and the latter as essentially the same. Similarly, there is a tendency to narrate subaltern women's lives as best understood via their experiences of victimization; as objects, not subjects, of global processes, who have "needs" and "problems" but rarely "choices" (Mohanty, 2003, p. 30). In centering women peace activists' own words, I hope to accommodate for the fact that the "truth" of their experiences is at its core inaccessible to me as a writer who is not only removed from their realities, but who benefits materially from the conditions against which they are struggling (Spivak, 1989).

These methods are in keeping with both Said's (1978) adjuration to encourage self-representation on the part of the "other," and with applied feminist research as a school of thought (Harding & Norberg, 2005). Feminist ethnography in particular encourages scholars to foreground research subjects' narration of their own lives (Buch & Staller, 2007); as such, in this section I present long-form quotes with minimal editing of speech patterns. At the same time, the bulk of decisive power remains with me as the framer of the questions to which the women responded. I also selected which responses to use and not use in order to support the narrative I am constructing, and I coded the interviews according to my own invented schema. Women's self-representation, inasmuch as it exists in the following pages, is bounded.

I have also elected to include descriptions from several interviewees of their own memories and family memories of armed conflict. Few accounts do this, as María Emma Wills and Gonzalo Sánchez point out: "Aún cuando muchas [mujeres] son víctimas sobrevivientes, son pocos los relatos que les otorgan a ellas un lugar central y que hacen un esfuerzo por comprender la orilla particular desde la que hablan y rememoran" (2011a, p. 55). At the current conjuncture, in which Colombia's war is said to be over and peace on the horizon, this inclusion is important. In post-conflict societies, memories of war are politicized to assist in the formation of new nation-states (Ashplant, Roper, & Dawson, 2006), and the ways in which conflict is narrated, mourned, and commemorated play a key role. Moreover, women's and feminist voices – even those that have garnered respect during times of conflict – are generally muted or silenced during reconstruction, as masculinist societies attempt to return to "normal" (Shayne, 2004; Jacobson, 2013; McKay, 1998). But the counter-memories of history, notably of war and trauma, narrated by women (Hirsch & Smith, 2002) are deeply significant to our understanding of political pasts

and presents, and important tools in expanding and upsetting hegemonic historical narratives of war.

Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz, Magdalena Medio. As discussed briefly in Chapter 3, the Movimiento Social de Mujeres arose as an effort of the Organización Femenina Popular based in Barrancabermeja. Having come together as a regional effort in 1996, it consolidated nationally in 2000 with four other prominent women's peace organizations: Ruta Pacífica, the Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz, the Red Nacional de Mujeres (which at the time included the Red de Mujeres del Caribe), and the Mesa Nacional de Concertación. The MSM's political positions have been influenced by, and are best understood via an analysis of, the history of the OFP, which has been its driving force. The OFP has three traits which distinguish it among women's SMOs: (1) its rooted relationships in the local community, and that fact that it arose from a class identity more than a gender identity (Ramirez P., 2009), mean that it routinely works alongside men; (2) its relationship to the State is historically one of profound mistrust; and (3) it does not define itself as pacifist.

The OFP's origins in the Catholic Church, and as an ally of the USO (the oil workers' syndicate) in Barrancabermeja,²⁸ led to an indelible community consciousness. The organization's efforts during the crudest years of armed conflict to protect civilians, particularly through the creation of Casas de la Mujer in the 1980s, facilitated new social relations and political initiatives in the community and cemented the organization's ties to other local SMOs

²⁸ The positions taken by the OFP in its alliance with the USO were part of what led to its separation from the Church, which at the time was internally divided between proponents and opponents of Liberation Theology. Because of that tension, the OFP's political interventions took on a particularly combustible character and resulted in growing autonomy from the local parish, despite the latter's progressivism (Madariaga, 2009, p. 400). Perhaps because it had allegiances to both the Church and the Left, the OFP early on was able to be critical of both sides; in particular, its members have always been critical of the machismo of the Left.

(Mesa Mujer y Conflicto Armado, 2005, pp. 10-11). Luna and Villareal (2011, pp. 166-7) explain about the OFP and other SMOs, “En zonas, barrios o regiones en donde no ha llegado aún la acción del estado, las mujeres han conformado estructuras de base o han utilizado las existentes para gestar programas de autoayuda o desarrollo comunitario.” Included in these efforts were several “recuperations” of land to house the poor and displaced in the 1980s, efforts supported by guerrilla organizations (Madariaga, 2009, p. 403).²⁹ Furthermore, because the Magdalena Medio was home to the USO³⁰ and other social movements, and also to significant outposts of the FARC and the ELN, the State came to see the region as a whole as an enemy.

Similar to the way Colombians in the southern state of Putumayo have been stigmatized as *a priori* criminals fed by drug money, and excluded from the full rights of citizenship (Tate, 2015, pp. 111,133), the State’s relationship to Barrancabermeja has been one of suspicion and enmity (Madariaga, 2009, p. 409; see also Gill, L., 2016). This enmity came to define the OFP’s relationship to the Colombian government, and resulted in a reluctance to collaborate with State agencies. This reluctance, along with the OFP’s commitment to working alongside the men in their communities, mark the organization as distinct from many other women’s organizations in Colombia (ibid). Another distinction is the OFP’s approach to war and peace; unlike many other women’s organizations in the country, it does not define itself as explicitly pacifist, though, and does not have a universal policy of non-cooperation with armed actors. One OFP coordinator commented in 2007, “[Ruta Pacífica] son pacifistas; nosotras no. La no violencia activa quiere decir que nosotras no atacamos, pero que si nos atacan nos defendemos. Nosotras no ponemos la

²⁹ According to activists on the ground, most SMOs in Barrancabermeja during this period were “aligned” with either the FARC or the ELN, and the OFP was not immune to that dynamic. The ELN had a significant outpost in Barranca for nearly thirty years, and its relationship to SMOs in the region varied between direct collaboration, double militancy, competition, and coerced cooperation (Madariaga, 2009, p. 409). Patricia Ramirez Parra (2009) asserts that as compared to other WPN, the OFP has a different way of characterizing guerrilla groups; this distinction arises in part from Barranca’s reality in the 70s and 80s.

³⁰ Chernick asserts that the USO had a “conflictive but close” relationship with the EPL in the 1990s (2003, p. 196).

otra mejilla, como las pacifistas” (Madariaga, 2009, p. 411). All three of the aforementioned distinctions (working with men, enmity with the State, and approach to conflict) would shape the OFP’s relationships with other networks involved in the MSM.

Like many Latin American women’s organizations rooted in the popular sector, the OFP’s relationship with institutional feminism has varied from collaborative to combative, but has always included some degree of tension. Other women’s SMOs in Colombia have criticized it on the grounds that its focus has generally been on what Molyneux (1985) called “practical gender interests”: providing meals, education, and housing for women and other community members, rather than offering explicit critiques of traditional feminine roles like motherhood. Conversely, the OFP has critiqued institutional feminism for being “demasiado abstracto y alejado de las necesidades reales de las mujeres populares” (Madariaga, 2009, p. 410). This critique reflects Nelly Richard’s assertion that “Las condiciones materiales de explotación, miseria y opresión de las que se vale el patriarcado para redoblar su eficacia en tramar la desigualdad en América Latina nos exigiría (...) más acción que discurso, más compromiso político que sospecha filosófica, más denuncia testimonial que arabescos deconstructivos” (1996, p. 735).

But Patricia Madariaga contends that the OFP destabilizes such binary categories of “practical” and “strategic” interests, given the way the women’s “practical” activism has transformed the ways in which participants interpret their femininity and relationships with men. The OFP’s transcendence of the practical/strategic binary says as much about the reductiveness of the categories as it does about the organization itself. Its trajectory from meeting the practical needs of women (from job training to helping to pay for the funerals of family members killed by paramilitaries [Manrique, 2003]) to offering explicit critiques of the structures that *create* those

needs reflects broader trends in Latin American women's movements (see Kaplan, 1997, p. 186; Safa, 1990; Molyneux, 1998). As one of Colombia's strongest SMOs, the OFP is of particular interest to scholars of feminism and social movements due to its simultaneous focus on issues of gender, class, and regional identity. This focus would be inherited by the Movimiento Social de Mujeres in the early twenty-first century.

The context for the coming together of the MSM in the late 1990s was the paramilitary assault on Barrancabermeja and the Magdalena Medio. Barrancabermeja, and the region in general, have a history of being seen as Leftist and ungovernable, but also deeply strategic given the centralization of the country's oil infrastructure there (Isacson, 2001). This combination has put the city in various crosshairs, with the heavy presence of the ELN in the late 1970s, the FARC in the 1990s, narcotraffickers, black market gasoline smugglers, the State, and the State's paramilitary arm. In 1998, the AUC "se iba cerrando el círculo sobre los municipios cercanos a Barrancabermeja" (Madariaga, 2009, p. 404), and the result was a flood of IDPs into the city. Nor was paramilitary violence restricted to the surrounding towns; the May 1998 massacre in a Barrancabermeja park is still marked by local residents, who memorialize the thirty-two residents who were killed and disappeared when the AUC showed up at a fundraiser for a youth dance troupe. But it was in late 2000 that the crosshairs centered on the OFP, when the

paramilitares tomaron el control definitivo de las comunas de la ciudad partiendo de los barrios del sur-oriente. La presencia de la [OFP]... convirtió a las casas de la mujer en albergues, centros de operaciones y, por supuesto, objetivos militares... Muchos de los componentes de la actual identidad de la [OFP] se forjaron en esos primeros años de la década de 2000. La resistencia a la guerra se convirtió en eje del movimiento regional de mujeres... (Madariaga, 2009, p. 405).

During this era the OFP suffered direct paramilitary violence, including threats, the murder of activists' family members, and the assassination of three OFP members. Despite this – or perhaps because of it – activists with the OFP worked to consolidate MSM nationally that same

year, and immediately became one of the most outspoken national networks on the armed conflict. The five-member network, which represented more than forty member organizations, represents what Tilly and Wood call social movements characterized not by a top-down nor a bottom-up dynamic, but a “middle ground of negotiation,” in which “people respond to opportunities and threats generated by top-down processes, employing bottom-up networks to create new relations with centers of power” (2013, p. 102). The crudescence of the paramilitary assault on women activists (who by this time were allying with human rights organizations to make expressly political claims that threatened the hegemony of the armed right [Madariaga, 2009]), combined with the heightened international focus on Colombia due to increased U.S. funding, gave these five networks a strategic purpose in collaborating on a national level. Though the presence of all five organizations in the network was short-lived (it would be reduced to three within a few years), its accomplishments speak to the strategic moment in which it existed.

The paramilitarization of the Magdalena Medio, and the AUC’s declaration of women activists as military targets, pushed the network to consolidate and act quickly. In addition to the massive march in Bogotá staged by the MSM in 2002, the network also intervened in national politics, demanding a place in the 2004 negotiations with the AUC and speaking in front of Congress about the 1998 massacre in Barrancabermeja (El Tiempo, 2004a, 2004b; Voz, 2004). In 2002 the network staged the massive women’s march on Bogotá (discussed in Chapter 3) which has been its best-known accomplishment. Only two years later the network held a National Encuentro of Women Against War, which focused their critiques on the Uribe Administration. It was attended by 320 women from fifteen countries (El Colombiano, 2004). In 2010, the MSM organized the Encuentro Internacional de Mujeres y Pueblos contra la

Militarización, held in Barrancabermeja, in response to the government's 2009 agreement with the United States that the latter would fortify upwards of nine Colombian military bases. The Encuentro involved, in addition to a summit, fourteen "humanitarian missions" to conflict zones around the country and a march on a U.S. military base (Organización Femenina Popular, 2012). These mass, occasional street mobilizations are a common social movement strategy, giving participants "an encouraging sense of solidarity," but they are also very expensive in terms of finances and effort expended (Cockburn, 2012, p. 246).

Beginning in 2012, the MSM organized a series of "cortes de mujeres," public hearings designed as a space for women's victimization in wartime to be made visible in the context of the peace accords being pursued in Havana. The cortes were conceived as a contribution to collective memory, in addition to a space for strategizing about ways to counter and heal from victimization. The MSM attempted, as well, to document the testimonies of women; each event had a woman assume the role of the judge and pronounce a verdict at the end of the session (Organización Femenina Popular, 2012). The act of women victims of conflict passing judgment on their victimizers in public hearings was deeply symbolic; unfortunately, before more than two cortes could be realized, the MSM found itself in a funding crisis.

When I spoke with a representative of the MSM in 2013, she agreed that both the cortes and the street demonstrations are expensive, but also highlighted the achievements of the network thus far in opening a space for the collaboration of various disparate SMOs:

...lograbamos, digamos, unir la region Caribe, todo el Macizo, y varios expresiones sociales como las negritudes, las indígenas, los procesos populares, campesinos... yo creo que ayudó muchísimo a fortalecer los procesos. Ayudó mucho a dinamizar, ayudó en reencontrarnos, pero desafortunadamente, desde el año pasado, hicimos las Cortes de Mujeres regionales – hicimos dos; no pudimos hacer más. No hemos podido, digamos, mantener esa dinámica que traíamos. Porque la movilización vale mucha plata, realmente.

It is as a result of these prohibitive expenses and the funding dynamics inherent in a centralized organizing model that the MSM is currently on hiatus. Activists in the Magdalena Medio indicated a difficulty in coming by financial support that does not flow through Bogotá. Because the MSM, especially the OFP, is a regional, community-rooted organization, it was difficult for them to gain access to that support. Though when I first met them in 2010 they rented a small office in Bogotá with a handful of staffmembers, they were unable to sustain that expense. Though this funding crisis will be more deeply examined in Chapter 7, it is worthwhile to note here that the MSM can be considered analogous to what one activist interviewed by Sonia Álvarez (2011) referred to as “the orphans of the UN”: social movement networks that sprung up in a global zeitgeist of large-scale international summits and NGO funding, but who were more or less forgotten when that moment gave way to other international priorities (see also Lebon, 2010, p. 13).

Stories of Conflict and Activism. I met Yolanda Becerra Vega, National Director of the OFP and coordinator of MSM, in Bucaramanga, about a two-hour drive from Barrancabermeja where she was born and raised. She had moved to Bucaramanga six years earlier under threat from neoparamilitary organizations, and continues to coordinate the movement from a smaller facility than the house in Barrancabermeja where OFP is based. Becerra and I spoke in a small front office, while in the adjacent room women and men baked loaves of bread made with soy protein, one of the organization’s health and job training projects.

Yolanda Becerra was raised in Barrancabermeja in the cradle of the local parish. Significantly, while many of the activists I interviewed cited their mothers, grandmothers, or

other female antecedents as their inspiration to activism, Becerra spoke of the influence of her father on her commitment to her community:

Mi familia era una familia muy sensible. Entonces, mi papá, sobre todo, mi casa siempre estuvo abierta a los demás. Hubo un momento en que mi casa fue una escuela. Porque no había donde poner la escuela, y mi papá prestó la casa para la escuela. Sólo teníamos casa en la noche. Porque del día, estaba – todo era ocupado por los niños. Y funcionó dos años la escuela, mi papá le prestó a unos sacerdotes de la Iglesia Católica, que impulsaban las escuelas rurales. Y ahí funcionó la escuela. Entonces, mi casa siempre fue un espacio público.

Becerra's involvement with the Church would continue to be a formative part of her development as an activist. Her experiences are shared by other OFP leaders; Jackeline Rojas, OFP's legal representative, also joined OFP through her work in the parish youth group. The parish was progressive, and housed an office of the Pastoral Social, the social justice organism of the diocese.³¹ Becerra cited her involvement with the Church as essential to her formation:

Entré a estudiar en un colegio de sacerdotes que eran los del Pastoral Social, de la Diócesis de Barrancabermeja. Era un colegio creado por ellos, y la comunidad. Y, pues, un colegio distinto. O sea, a nosotros nos formaron para la vida, nos formaron para aprender no sólo uno más uno, sino que nos formaron con una sensibilidad social, más integral, con una mirada política de la vida, con una opción por los más desfavorecidos, con una capacidad de análisis, y de ponerle contexto a lo que pasaba. Y después que terminé el bachillerato, yo allí estaba en el movimiento estudiantil, en el movimiento juvenil. Entré a trabajar como secretaria de la Parróquia, de una de las Parróquias, del sector nororiental de Barrancabermeja. Y a los dos años, entré a trabajar con la Diócesis de Barrancabermeja, Pastoral Social.

The Church served a key role here in providing an avenue to *concientización* that was not based in class-oriented movements. Because the latter were targeted by the State and paramilitary forces, Church-based organizing was one safe space for women activists. Becerra went on to

³¹ For detailed accounts of the role of the Catholic Church in Colombian social organizing, see Levine and Wilde, 1977; Levine, 1981; Wilde, 1984; and Medhurst, 1984. Unlike the Church in El Salvador under Archbishop Romero, or in Chile during the Pinochet regime, the Colombian Church did not eagerly take to radical social action even after the 1968 Bishops' Conference in Medellín; in fact, the Colombian Church published a dissent (Hanratty and Meditz, 1988). Nonetheless, various individual progressive priests, following the example of ELN fighter Fr. Camilo Torres Restrepo who was killed in 1966, have headed or protected popular organizing for social change. The trend in Colombia has been that these efforts take place at the local level and are not supported by the bishops, who have traditionally been allied with the Conservative Party and the oligarchy. Nonetheless, the Church-based social organizations that have existed – Acción Comunal, Caritas, and the various offices of the Pastoral Social like the one Becerra speaks about here – have nurtured collective action in a relatively safe space.

explain that over time, she became more attuned to the way gender structures affected the lives of women, outside the framework of class. “Fuí desarrollandome,” she said; “fuí creciendo, digamos, políticamente, fuí creciendo socialmente, fuí creciendo en mi compromiso y terminé siendo coordinadora y directora de la OFP.”

Becerra’s move from Barrancabermeja to Bucaramanga was “la última opción que me dejaron los armados, los paramilitares,” after nine years of harrassment, assassination of her colleagues, disappearances, threats, and attempts on her life during the paramilitary assault on the city. She relocated in order to protect her family, and accepted a protection detail provided by the State (this protection is further analyzed in Chapter 5). Today, though the activism of the MSM remains on hiatus, the OFP continues to be active throughout the Magdalena Medio in providing job training and legal training, running popular education programs for women and youth, connecting women to healthcare and mental health providers, publishing data on violence against women, and running community kitchens and bakeries.

Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres, Popayán. Ruta Pacífica in Popayán, Cauca is one of eight regional offices around the country, coordinated by the office in Bogotá. It is housed in the offices of the ecofeminist organization Comunitar. This network of women’s and peace organizations is made up of around 300 member organizations and defines itself as explicitly feminist, pacifist, and antimilitarist. The activists with whom I spoke in Cauca work in a regional context with unique challenges. Popayán itself is a conservative seat of traditional and clerical power, where public support for feminist activism is not widespread. For several decades Cauca has found itself in multiple crossfires: the FARC-EP, along with several other former and current guerrilla organizations, has had a long presence in the region. The FARC-EP became more

highly concentrated there around 1990, when it fought with the ELN for control of the local coca economy. In response the paramilitaries became more active, staging massacres across the department, the most famous of which was the 2001 Naya massacre. Today Cauca has the highest levels of internal displacement, and persecution of advocates for the displaced, in the country (Oxfam, 2013; IDMC, 2011).




Fig. 4: Ruta Pacífica Structure.

The department continues to suffer attacks by the guerrillas (Semana, 2013), by neoparamilitary organizations or “Bacrim,” and continuous assaults by the armed forces (Ávila, 2009). It holds highly coveted natural resources, most notably minerals. Mining megaprojects have multiplied in recent years, with a reported 56% of the department’s territory under concession negotiations with mining companies (Espinosa Moreno, 2012). Finally, the department is home to a historical current of popular resistance, especially by the indigenous Nasa communities, which has made it a thorn in the side of traditional power brokers. One activist I interviewed commented that Popayán is governed by “los con apellido y tierra” who have been able to maintain the colonial city as a bubble in the midst of surrounding violence. But though Popayán imagines itself as outside of the armed conflict, she continued, it serves as a strategic location for maintaining it.

The activists from the Popayán chapter of Ruta Pacífica gather in a two-story house on the

northern edge of Popayán's central business district, a nondescript white building with a double-locked door into which a small security window has been cut. When I first met with members of the organization in 2012, they were renting a different office further to the south. They left the first office after it was robbed four times. Their computers were stolen, they reported, but more expensive items were left behind, making the activists suspect that the thefts were politically motivated. When I returned to Popayán in 2013 the women welcomed me into their new office, allowing me to conduct formal interviews, observe their meetings, talk with them over dinner, and travel to a weekend workshop in Santander de Quilichao, about two hours north of Popayán, with activists from surrounding municipalities in Cauca.

During my time in Ruta's office, I observed a busy and relatively informal scene, with women coming and going throughout the day and gathering together at conference tables and in small offices on the second floor. At night they were careful to leave together, with Alejandra Miller, the Regional Coordinator, giving the women rides home after Colombia's early sunset. The women and their work are known to the neighborhood, and this was made clear one evening as I left the office with the activists after dark and stepped into Popayán's narrow colonial streets. We were confronted by a man whom the women described as a local addict, who was aggressive with them (and with me), asking for money and referencing their activism. Miller dispensed with the conversation quickly, and said to the women afterward, "no se puede mostrar el miedo." By performing a femininity in disaccord with the hegemonic understanding of women as a vulnerable class of potential victims, Miller refused to play into the man's script. The veiled threat he made by referencing their political involvement was a power play which the women refused to concede. It was one of many momentary acts of resistance that together have made up Ruta Pacífica's two decades of insisting on an alternative story for Colombian women.

Stories of Conflict and Activism. At the time of our interview, Alejandra Miller Restrepo was an economics professor in her early forties with a bright smile and a deep, infectious laugh. She moved to Popayán in the 1990s from Cali, where she grew up and studied at the Universidad del Valle. Having married a demobilized M-19 fighter at a young age, she came to Popayán when he was transferred there to work. In 2016, three years after our conversations, Miller assumed the position of Secretaria de Gobierno, Participación, y Gestión Social in Cauca's departmental cabinet.

When I spoke to Miller about her childhood influences, she recalled two memories that motivated her to work for feminism and for conflict transformation. Like many of the activists with whom I spoke, she cited her mother as a guiding influence on her political formation, explaining that although her mother never recognized herself as a feminist, she was a self-taught intellectual and a free thinker. "Me inculcaba mucho," she remembered, "de 'tu no naciste para hacer oficios tradicionales. Hay que estudiar; tu función aquí es estudiar. No lavar platos'... llegué al feminismo, pues, más fácilmente." Miller also spoke of an uncle, close to her in age, who was loosely connected to the insurgency and was killed by the Armed Forces. It was reflecting on his death during an era in which armed struggle was seen as the natural response to "todos los males" that brought her to the cause of pacifism. When the M-19 demobilized in 1989,

... entramos en otra lógica, que eso no era el camino, eso no era la vida, definitivamente, por allí no vamos a llegar a nada. Y me puse meter, entonces, en el tema de la paz. Hasta llegar, digamos, al pacifismo. Sí. Es una trayectoria – casi un giro. Claro que es un giro grande. De pasar de creer en la lucha armada, que eso era una opción, a después entender que eso no era, pero después a saltar al pacifismo, claro. Es todo un tránsito.

Miller was one of a number of activists with whom I spoke who arrived at a commitment to pacifism over years of experience with other alternatives – and not, as dominant wisdom about the nature of women's organizing would imply, because of a more peaceful nature attributed to

women (Yuval-Davis, 2004, p. 185). In Colombia, women have been committed to all approaches and all sides of the armed conflict; perhaps, though, it is only when they enter the role of peacemakers that they are visible in the limited viewfinder of traditional gendered understandings.

When she relocated to Popayán, Miller began teaching at the Universidad del Cauca, where she met another professor named Socorro Corrales. Corrales is currently the coordinator of Comunitar, the ecofeminist organization that houses Ruta Pacífica's Popayán office. Through her, Miller became involved in the nascent network in 1999. "Empecé ya a conocer la Ruta," she remembered, "y empecé a vincularme, a participar en resistir, y bueno, ya allí era. Ya quedé. Me enganché en el 2000. Hace 13 años, ya por siempre. Es la puesta de la vida."

María Andrea Campo Ayala was a young law student at the time of our 2013 interviews, and a passionate spokesperson for Ruta Pacífica. Born in Popayán to teenaged parents, she was raised by her grandparents in a military family. She named her grandmother as a formative political influence, explaining that she was from Santander, where women are historically "bravas" and politically active. When asked about memories of her childhood, she recalled her involvement in a guerrilla incursion when she was ten years old:

Mi abuelo tiene unas fincas, y ellos las vacunaban. Por ejemplo, las guerrillas le cobraron vacunas por mantener la finca. Y en una de esas idas y venidas de la finca, pasó una toma, que fue la toma de Cajibío, en el '98. Yo tenía como 10 años. Y en esa toma, a mí me sacaron en un carro... Lo que veía era al tipo encamouflado al lado. Disparaba, y yo estoy como sorda por dos semanas. Pero ni siquiera eso, ni otras cosas me hicieron entender en donde estaba yo. Lo que ha configurado en el departamento de la Cauca en Colombia han sido unas prácticas que parecen – que por el tiempo, pareciera ser aceptadas de manera tan cotidiana que no te parecen raras. Entonces, escuchar el helicóptero, escuchando radios o las sirenas [se presenta como normal].

Later, Campo joined a group of Franciscan high school students working to build houses for Cauca's poor and displaced. After finishing one such dwelling, Campo recalled that the new inhabitant, who had been displaced by armed conflict thirty years earlier, gave her a bouquet of

flowers. “¿Usted sabe lo que me dió?” the woman asked. “Usted lo que me dió fue un lugar digno donde morirme.” This conversation stayed with Campo, and she remembered asking herself “si yo iba a seguir construyendo lugares dignos para las mujeres donde morirse, o ¿me iba a dedicar a buscar lugares dignos donde vivir?” A few years later, after meeting Socorro Corrales through the mother of a friend, Campo became involved in Ruta Pacífica, where she now serves as legal adviser.

Reflecting on her transition to feminism, Campo recounted the way that her activism began by advocating for the needs of poor women in her community, and expanded to see her own reality, which she had accepted as privileged, in a different light. Though she had a place to sleep at night, the power dynamics of Colombian society restricted her life in ways that it took time to recognize. She recalled again the story of the displaced woman whose home she had helped to build. She recalled asking herself whether it was enough to build places for women to die: “¿o me iba a dedicar a buscar lugares dignos donde vivir? – ¡asumiendo que yo tuviera uno!” Her trajectory of activism had begun with a focus on the needs of those traditionally understood as “victims” (see Chapter 5) of armed conflict, and expanded to a place from which she could see the broader continuum of violence that encompassed both poverty, patriarchy, and war. Though Campo recounted her story in terms of the immediate stimuli that pushed her personal decision to ally herself with feminist activism, that story took place in a broader context: the crudescence of paramilitary violence, the increasing visibility of women as agents of peace and targets of war, and the opening of the Colombian economy to global markets, with its negative effects on popular livelihoods and the resulting creation of more community and social welfare organizations.

Alejandra Coll Agudelo, known as Alejita in the Popayán office, was a lawyer in her late twenties when we met. Raised by her conservative family in Cali, she came to Popayán to study law at the Universidad del Cauca, earning her law degree and then traveling to Europe to earn an MA in Gender Studies, where she interned through the United Nations. Having returned to Popayán in 2012, she joined Ruta Pacífica's legal team and led the weekend workshop I attended in Santander de Quilichao. Asked about her childhood memories of armed conflict, Coll recalled the life of her grandmother, who fled to Cali after losing her spouse and being displaced by guerrilla violence in the Antioquian region of the Magdalena Medio. After her grandfather was killed, Coll explained that her grandmother

...tuviera que estar sola en esa época en la región donde mi abuela se crió. Las mujeres tenían muchísimos hijos. Mi abuela tuvo 13. Entonces, ella tenía que andar – y tenían que moverse, con todos esos niños, y entonces ella siempre estaba contándonos como cada vez que la guerrilla venía, tenía que moverse con sus hijos e hijas, porque los campesinos, pues, especialmente en la zona, estaban en el campo, trabajando, y ella estaba sola en casa con todos esos muchachos, y tenía que salir con todos sus hijos.

Once in Popayán, Coll recalled that Alejandra Miller “recruited” her into Ruta Pacífica when she was just fifteen years old and about to begin her university career. She became involved through a friend in the Grupo de Educación Género y Desarrollo, a research collective led by Miller and Corrales. As she grew more involved, she recalled, the women in the organization provided the support she was not receiving elsewhere, and became like a family. When I asked whether her family approved of her work with Ruta, she laughed, “No. No, no, no, no. Absolutamente no. No les gusta. Porque – bueno, primero, aquí en Colombia hay una estigmatización grande. Porque una es una feminista, porque es una mujer amargada, que no va a tener familia, en el peor de los casos lesbiana, y eso aquí en Colombia es un problema para las familias conservadoras, como la mía.” Despite this dynamic, she described her political trajectory fondly, describing her younger self ruefully as the organization's pet and reflecting on the many conversations she had with

older activists about the meaning of feminism. “Creo que yo, en la Ruta, me doy una conciencia política, pero también mi conciencia personal, como de que significa para mí ser mujer... Mi conciencia política nació aquí,” she explained. “En la Ruta.”

Since its originary mobilization in Mutatá in 1996, Ruta Pacífica has grown in visibility, influence, and organization. They have organized several more rutas to various parts of the country; these and other mobilizations put on by the network are further analyzed in Chapter 5. Ruta Pacífica in Cauca also organizes workshops called *espirales*, in which women from member organizations are educated about their rights under the law (El Nuevo Liberal, 2015).

In 2013, the network released its Truth and Memory Commission report, an extensive collection of data and oral histories from women survivors of armed conflict all around the country. Carlos Martín Beristain, the Spanish medical doctor and psychologist who coordinated the REMHI historical memory report in 1990s Guatemala and advised truth commissions in Paraguay, Peru, and Ecuador, served as advisor (the Truth and Memory Commission report is more thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 5). Ruta Pacífica was very active in pressing for an increased presence of women at the peace talks in Havana (Marina Gallego, Ruta’s National Coordinator, traveled to Havana to speak before the negotiating teams), as well as organizing community forums held parallel to the negotiations. Finally, in late 2014 they were awarded the National Peace Prize, chosen from 128 finalists by a committee of media outlets, IGOs, and NGOs (El Tiempo, 2014b).

Red de Mujeres del Caribe Colombiano. Since its founding in 1994, the Red de Mujeres del Caribe has focused on efforts to gain increased autonomy for the regions along the Caribbean coast and in the archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia. Aside from the Chocó

and other areas along the Pacific coast (Cauca and Valle de Cauca), the Caribbean region is home to Colombia's highest concentration of Afro-Colombians, who make up between 10 and 25% of the national population depending how the number is counted (Wade, 2012:4). In order to better understand the inception and development of the RMC, it is important to consider the historical relationship in Colombia between region and race, and between racism and regional discrimination, two challenges to which the work of the RMC responds. A brief examination of these relationships is worth making.

Region and Race in Colombia. As Nancy Appelbaum (2003) asserts, scholarship on Colombia tends to focus on the way its divided geography (three distinct mountain ranges and various impassable jungle and riverine regions) shaped the country's political history and truncated its state formation (see for example Oquist, 1980). This narrative is common among political histories of Colombia, and is often accompanied by a statement about the way the country's racial-ethnic diversity is separated by geographic region. Today, Colombia is known for its "cultural topography" (Wade, 1995), in which each region is known according to its ascribed race, and racial identity is literally grounded in questions of territory. Specifically, the Pacific coast, particularly the black-majority department of the Chocó, is known as the blackest region, and is the foil for the Andean cities, particularly in Antioquia and the coffee-growing region, which are known as the whitest. The Caribbean coast, by contrast, is known as black, but not as black (phenotypically or culturally) as the Pacific. The eastern plains and the Orinoco and Amazon basins are known as indigenous and cattle-ranching territory. This racial order, though fuzzy, processual, and never strictly adhered to, nevertheless inflects all aspects of regional

relations, and is reflected in a national discourse about the country that tends to deny blackness (Wade, 1995; Appelbaum, 2003; Leal & Arias, 2007).

Appelbaum insists, however, that this racing of space/spacing of race is not a *result* of Colombia's topography, but constitutive of it; in other words, state formation *created* the country's divided regions and racialized them (Appelbaum, 2003). She locates this project in the post-independence era's narrative of mestizaje and modernization, which painted Colombia as a mixed-race nation. This meant that Afro-Colombians and the indigenous were either excluded as premodern outliers of that narrative, or subsumed into the national mixture. But though it adhered to a modernizing narrative of a progressive nation, which required a certain homogenization as a legitimating part of that global process, Colombia was never racially unified. Racial stratification was always stark. In the 1800s, "nation-builders" and *costumbrista* writers began to refer to Colombia as a "nation of regions" in order to comprehend and explain that reality. "Their racialized discourse of regional differentiation served to mediate between the evident heterogeneity of the republic and the presumed homogeneity of an ideal nation," she writes (Appelbaum, 2003, pp. 206-7). This regional division was deepened by local elites, who amplified the rhetoric in order to delineate their territories of influence. As a result, each region became associated with its own racial type, and the nation formed into blocks with each Andean city in control of "subordinate towns" (*ibid.*, p. 208).

But the narrative of a nation of regions was not simply a way to *explain* racial heterogeneity; it also served to excuse racial hierarchies. Writes Peter Wade, "[t]he attempt to present the nation as a unified homogenous whole conflicts directly with the maintenance of hierarchies of class and culture – and their frequent corollaries, region and race – that is wanted by those who are located in the higher echelons of those hierarchies" (2000, p. 5). What this

history of Colombia tells us is that region and race are bound up together, and through a specific historical process, region became a more palatable stand-in for talking about racial difference (think of the U.S. narrative of “separate but equal” populations during segregation). The hierarchy of race was both concretized and explained away by the hierarchy of regions. Wade (1995) asserts that race in Colombia always has a regional dimension in which race is not only *assigned* to space; it is *constituted* by space. This is reflected in the fact that Afro and indigenous Colombians are often no longer considered to be part of those racial-ethnic groups once they relocate to the city, for example, since their racialization is rooted in ties to peripheral territory. “Race relations are regional relations,” Wade explains. “Spatial structures can be seen as the outcome of and the medium for social relations that have a discourse of race” (1995, p. 54).

What is of interest for the study of the three women’s peace networks analyzed here is the way racial topographies affect the peripherality of Colombians on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Ruta Pacífica in Cauca finds itself in one of the regions commonly narrated as “black” (though less black than the Chocó, which serves as a racial foil for every other department). The Red de Mujeres del Caribe represents the eight Caribbean departments, and the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra, though conceived as a national process, was centered in the Magdalena Medio, part of the inland Caribbean region as well. The Caribbean coast “had a significant concentration of slaves” (Wade, 1995, p. 55) who were encouraged to mix with the indigenous population to a greater extent than elsewhere. Afro and indigenous heritage is dominant in the region, though its racial character is relative: it is “black” relative to the Andes, but “not-so-black” relative to the Pacific coast. The word “Costeño,” usually used to describe Caribbean Colombians, is a way of distinguishing not-so-black from black (Wade, 1995, p. 64).

All three networks, particularly RMC and MSM, who do not have offices in the capital, are denied the relative power afforded to the Andean cities. The cities are narrated as the centers of national politics, as Wade asserts when he writes that “[t]he people of the interior tend to arrogate to themselves the privilege of original presence, consigning the peripheries to a derivative status defined in terms of absences – of wealth, progress, and whiteness” (1995, p. 64).

Narrating the regions as racially different and needing intervention is a dynamic reflected (and even amplified) in the NGO-driven discourse of the 1990s, which focused on difference actors and multiculturalism (Leal & Arias, 2007). Given Wade’s assertion that the hegemonic notion of “progress” for the regions has historically been both (a) driven by capital accumulation, and (b) associated with the parallel processes of (i) racial whitening and (ii) territorial integration via policies of colonization and migration, development discourse for Colombia’s periphery is fraught with power dynamics (Wade, 1995, pp. 59-60). This fact plays a key role in the Caribbean’s push for regional autonomy, as we will see below.

A comparative look at Afro communities in the Pacific region, which are organized into strong social movements about which there have been several important pieces of writing, can shed light on the dynamics that affect the Caribbean as well. In 1991, Colombia’s new constitution replaced the 1886 version’s conception of a “white republic” (Appelbaum, 2003, p. 214) with the definition of the country as a “multi-ethnic, pluricultural nation.” This element of the constitution was fought for by well-organized communities of indigenous activists, and as a political opportunity, it activated black communities on the Pacific coast. Two years later, after advocacy by Caribbean regionalist Orlando Fals Borda (Asher, 2009, pp. 35-6), the passage of Ley 70 guaranteed collective territorial and cultural rights to Afro communities, in a process that

has been called the ethnicization of black communities (Escobar, 2008, p. 52). The Afro-Colombian identity began to emerge collectively in the 1980s, owing to the opening of the global market, and became a more active, contentious identifier after the 1991 constitution. At this time, black communities began to contest the way decisions about the Pacific region – specifically related to its development – have always been made exogenously with little regard for the communities that live there. This is in part due to the clientelistic food chain of local bosses, who report to regional bosses, who make decisions far away from the people they affect (Grueso, Rosero, & Escobar, 2008, p. 439). Development and resistance to it in the Pacific region are intensely bound up with natural resources and biodiversity, to the extent that black identity in Colombia has been constructed as “territory plus culture” (Grueso, Rosero, & Escobar, 2008, p. 441; see also Asher, 2009 and Escobar, 2008). State development is aimed at preparing the region for large-scale capital projects; an example of this would be the current port construction in Buenaventura. As a response to these exogenous threats to local communities, and with the help of Liberation Theology priests, black activists began a process of regionalization: defining the Pacific region as a self-contained “region-territory” (Escobar, 2008, p. 62) in order to organize collectively for political autonomy and defense against armed state and paramilitary expansion intended to prepare the region for mining and logging investment (Asher, 2009, p. 37; Grueso, Rosero, & Escobar, 2008, p. 440).

The case of the Pacific and the construction of Afro-Colombian identity there reveal several important facts. One, as Appelbaum insists, is that the meanings of race are contested “at a local level” (2003, p. 215). That is, Caribbean blackness is different than Pacific blackness, and there are variations within each. Two is that it is simply impossible to discuss race in Colombia without simultaneously discussing geography and region. The legacy of the nationalizing project,

which continues today as development, is to use regions and regional discrimination as referents for unspoken racial categories. This phenomenon was strengthened in the 1980s and 90s with the rising influence of the international community and its discourse of multiculturalism. Today, “race” is not the way race is generally discussed in Colombia, meaning that fights for regionalization have a racial-justice character, even if it is an implicit one. But they are as likely to be narrated in a regionally encoded way. An example of such a dynamic appears below in my conversation with Yusmidia Solano Suarez of the RMCC.

The Red de Mujeres. The Red de Mujeres was born out of efforts to make the Caribbean region more autonomous from the central state, endowed with increased power over the allocation of its resources and the planning of its own development projects. This goal is carefully theorized in the writing of Caribbean women activists, especially Yusmidia Solano, who defines regionalization as

[E]l proceso que permite pasar de región geográfica a una región socialmente construida, que incluye una creciente integración de las partes que la conforman, un grado elevado de identidad regional y un claro compromiso con la aplicación de un proyecto de desarrollo que se asume con características particulares, como resultado de una historia y de una cultura específica (2006, qtd. in Jiménez G., 2013, p. 20).

Regionalization, in other words, is the intentional construction of an identity collective committed to its own development, on its own terms, with its own realities in mind. It is a model of development with an endogenous protagonism, not one that follows a homogenizing, uniform model (Jiménez G., 2013). It carries with it an understanding of administrative autonomy from the central State, and centralizes local residents as decisionmakers, not simply “participants” (see Bhatnagar & Williams, 1992).

In the Colombian Caribbean, the struggle for regional autonomy is a long one, dating back at least to the efforts of SIPUR (the Sistema de Planificación Urbano Regional para el

desarrollo integral de la región de la costa) in the 1970s, and the four Foros de la Costa Atlántica in the 1980s that were held to consolidate the movement (Solano, 2006). It was a cause championed in part by the sociologist Orlando Fals Borda, whose work on regionalization and popular education continue to be a major influence for the network.

The dynamics of regional and racial discrimination combine with the features of the armed conflict to present particular challenges for social movement organizing in the Caribbean and other peripheral regions: Afro-Colombians are discriminated against, with lower life expectancies, lower health indicators, and a higher incidence of displacement and victimization than the national population (ibid, p. 5). War has taken a heavy toll on the Caribbean region, with more than fifty percent of mass killings since 1980 taking place in the Caribbean region despite the fact that its inhabitants represent only about a third of the national population, a proportion ever-decreasing with displaced Caribbean residents moving to the capital (Castro, 2015; DANE, 2015). After the arrival of all the major guerrilla organizations to the mountainous areas of the region in the 1970s (Sánchez, 2011, p. 30), paramilitary terror soon followed. Certain areas have become known as hotspots for paramilitary violence; the Magdalena Medio, home to the OFP, was the first “application of the paramilitary model” (Sánchez, 2011, p. 31); Montería, Córdoba had one of the highest concentrations of recruitment of young women by the AUC (OEA, 2006, p. 35); Montes de María, in Bolívar and Sucre, was the site of abominable violence (Sánchez, 2011, p. 76). But the Caribbean is also home to some of the fiercest social movements in the country, notably among women. The Atlantic coast was home to various women leaders of class and gender struggles in the early-to-mid twentieth century, and the tradition of social movement organizing in the region, especially in La Guajira, is said to draw on the matriarchal indigenous roots of the Wayuu (Solano, 2006).

By the end of the 1990s the RMC had joined the national push for a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. Today it combines the two goals of conflict transformation and regional autonomy, seeking a peace that includes increased protagonism for the Caribbean. It has organized five regionalization congresses, focusing on the integration of human rights, ethnic identity, and a gender perspective into the regionalization struggle. It has also lobbied the Colombian Congress, organized local exchanges for Caribbean SMOs, and created pro-regionalization committees. The network joined with national initiatives in 2001, when the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT, Colombia's labor council) organized a conference in Sweden promoting a negotiated solution to the Colombian conflict. Yusmidia Solano attended the conference along with twenty-one other representatives of Colombia's women's peace organizations, and it was there that the Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz (IMP) was formed. Solano served on the IMP's political and methodological commission, and represented the RMC on the national network. Though it is no longer a member of either the RNM or the IMP, the Red de Mujeres del Caribe continues its dual push for improving the lives of women and seeking a peace that includes increased regional autonomy. According to one RMC activist whom I interviewed, "Eso es nuestro propósito como organización: llegar a [la regionalización] a través de la fortalecimiento de las mujeres, de potencializar sus capacidades organizativas, de lucha, de intervención social. Esa es nuestro medio."

In 2013 I traveled to the island of San Andrés to interview members of the Red de Mujeres del Caribe. Home to some 75,000 people, the archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia is home to Colombia's population of raizales: Afrodescendant, largely Baptist Caribbeans who speak both English and an English creole. Until the 1960s, raizales were the majority of island residents; since that time the Colombian government has encouraged a policy

of colonization, and the percentage of Spanish-speakers from the mainland has increased. Raizales now make up as little as 35% of the population (Wade, 2012). San Andrés covers about ten square miles, with the northeastern tip of the island dominated by resort hotels and shopping facilities. Local SMOs made up of raizales protest the tourist development project as part of the “Colombianization” of the island (Wade, 2012, pp. 4-5). One island resident commented to me in 2013 that most islanders see tourism as “para degradación,” with the few jobs that are offered restricted to the service sector, with no chance of advancement. Many suspect that the fee that visitors pay upon arrival does not go into the island’s budget. The land itself on the north end of the island, where resorts and hotels are concentrated, was constructed as part of the tourist project. It sits on a manmade promontory built above the water as a tax-free tourist zone, a model of neoliberal political economy – a space created for profit, with no roots in the local landscape. This stands in direct contrast to Solano’s definition above of the kind of development that takes place by a regionalized collective: that model of development takes place on an inhabited landscape where lived histories are taken into account. This model of development takes place on thin air. The neoliberal development of the island, including the tourist boom, is a significant source of residents’ discontent. The fact that the development model has been instituted by force with the support of armed groups taints it all the more.

Residents of San Andrés and Providencia did not see, to the same extent as the rest of the Caribbean region, the armed conflict being carried out on their doorsteps,³² but they have suffered its effects: internal displacement, the concentration of national resources in the military budget and the defunding of social programs; and increased activity by so-called “bandas criminales” or paramilitary successor groups, which in recent years was met with a violent

³² The Caribbean region as a whole, however, continues to suffer direct neoparamilitary violence. See Latin America Working Group, *No Relief in Sight: Report from the Caribbean Coast of Colombia*, May 2011 (www.lawg.org).

crackdown by local police. Furthermore, due to its geography, San Andrés has served as a hub for trafficking between Colombia and Central America. The violence that has accompanied the passage of narcotics has had grave effects, particularly for women. Yusmidia Solano commented during our 2013 interview that the fight for women's rights, particularly for freedom from domestic violence, had come late to the region due to a cultural model of the powerful "matrona," who held a great deal of domestic power but none in the public sphere. But the region also has a history of matriarchal societies; this gave rise to movements against domestic violence in the 1980s. But as Solano explained, "el narcotráfico llega, y hace retroceder todos [los] avances. Porque enfrentamos de nuevo una división social del trabajo en cual ellos se dedican al tráfico, y a ser hombres aventureros, mafiosos, y las mujeres se vuelven dependiente de esos recursos, y empieza de nuevo, empiezan a tratarlas como objetos sexuales. Entonces, es una problemática de un retroceso de los avances que las mujeres habían logrado" (for more on the dynamics of the drug trade and women's subjectivity, see Chapter 6. Similar questions could be asked of San Andres' booming tourist industry, which has space for island residents [particularly women] primarily as members of the service sector and providers of "local color"). The spike in internal displacement during the 1990s also affected local organizing, as women's SMOs were forced to attend to the thousands of new IDPs.

Since the turn of the 21st century, the tourist trade and the 2013 decision by the International Court of Justice at The Hague that deprived Colombia of 100,000 square kilometers of maritime territory (*El Tiempo*, 2013) have had troubling effects on economic autonomy. In earlier years, the local economy was based almost entirely on subsistence fishing. The forcible ending of that trade due to the loss of territorial waters is having troubling effects on local society, reported local residents; though the State has offered transition subsidies, these have

been criticized for cultivating dependence and deteriorating the culture of the island, which was based on fishing and a respect for natural resources. The alternative to fishing is the tourist trade, which is inaccessible to many island residents, and the result is increasing poverty and food insecurity. Women's organizations and other SMOs on the island face the challenge of caring for a dispossessed population whose needs are, at best, on the government's back burner; at worst, they are part of a capital-driven expansionist project that carries few potential benefits for the area's residents.

Nor are all the network's organizing challenges local. Island residents spoke of the struggles for activists whose work is centered in the country's periphery. The centralization of Colombia's resources, priorities, and political power means that even the media on the island reports almost exclusively what is happening in the major cities, and what is reported about *las regiones* comes from an urban perspective. As one resident I spoke with explained, "Aquí todo es Medellín, Cali, Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Bogotá, luego Cali, luego Bogotá, luego Medellín." The RMCC's work originated in and continues to be rooted in struggles for regionalization, and that priority was reflected in my conversations with activists about the challenges of working on the margins. An organizer with the Corporación Miss Nancy Land, a member organization of the RMCC, described the island's relationship with the capital this way:

No discuten nada [de San Andrés en Bogotá]. Solamente recursos y dinero y todo, cosas que se tiende en primer mundo y todo lo demás. Pero no hay un ejercicio de introspección de cómo está el país, qué necesita, y cómo la capacidad instalada que tienen ellos, por ser ciudad capital, puede apoyar a las regiones. Sino lo que ellos están pensando es cómo ellos colonizan el resto del país. O sea, cómo ellos vienen y hacen sus proyectos y tienen un lugar donde puedan – esa es la nueva visión. Antes nos tenían olvidados, pero era como la explotación de recursos inclusive más participativa.³³ Pues, también nos están viendo como un territorio de

³³ Wade concurs with this analysis when he writes that "the regions associated with black and indigenous peoples are marginalized in terms of socio-economic development and political power. Thus racial inequality becomes entwined with overall processes of national development and the mechanisms that disadvantage these peoples appear as matters of 'underdevelopment,' distance from the centers of wealth, lack of influence in politics, and so

oportunidades para desarrollarse profesionalmente, pero sin entenderse realmente lo que ocurre en los territorios.

The lives of several women activists who come from this context are the subject of the next section.

Stories of Conflict and Activism. Yusmidia Solano Suarez is a professor at the Caribbean campus of the Universidad Nacional, where she coordinates the MA program in Caribbean Studies. Her own research in gender and social processes in Colombia's Caribbean islands parallels her lifelong identity as an activist working for regional autonomy and Caribbean women's movements. She told me a story of transitions, in which her life's work would shift from Left militancy to a focus on regional autonomy, pacifism, and increased political autonomy. I was put in contact with Dr. Solano by a mutual friend, and she invited me into her office for an interview, which was followed by later conversations outside of the university.

Born in Carmen de Bolívar outside of Cartagena, Solano has spent the majority of her life living along the Caribbean coast. Her "postmemories" (Hirsch, 2001) of armed conflict originated with stories her mother told her about La Violencia. She recalled, "me contaba que cuando agararon a Gaitán, eso, la persecución de los Liberales y a los campesinos que seleccionaron todo eso, entonces que había que dormir debajo de las camas, y llegaba gente que sacaban a los otros de las casas y los mataban, y que eso fue un periodo muy difícil. O sea, ella mostraba la perspectiva de una angustia muy grande, del padecimiento, que esa fue época terrible, de guerra civil, casi. Entonces, claro, yo tengo esa memoria y esos recuerdos." After her mother was killed in a car accident when Solano was a child, her father left for Venezuela and she and her siblings raised themselves. "Yo fui una niña muy independiente, autónoma," she

on. This masks the fact that these mechanisms continue to marginalize not just certain regions, but certain categories of people" (2012, p. 3).

remembered, and these characteristics would contribute to her participation in the student movement. Beginning in high school with a traveling theater group depicting the life of storied ELN fighter Camilo Torres Restrepo, then joining the student council and socialist work committees, Solano became increasingly active during the 1970s. She was active in the Partido Socialista Revolucionario, which put forward the first Leftist female presidential candidate; later she coordinated a women's SMO called Combate Mujer in Ovejas and Montería, which organized women tobacco workers and hosted workshops on women's rights. After finishing high school, Solano trained and began working in the health services in Sucre, where she quickly joined and then led the health workers' union. After being fired for organizing a strike, she moved to Bogotá in 1980 and began working with women's organizations in the capital, where she earned a Masters Degree and would spend the next decade. It was in Bogotá that she became active in the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente of 1991 (see Chapter 3). Reminiscing about the decade she spent in the capital, Solano recalled that Colombia's centralized power structure had cultural reflections, as well. The way she narrated her memories of exclusion was reflective of the regionalization of race discussed above. "Sentí discriminación en Bogotá," she told me, "por el hecho de ser costeña. Mi forma de hablar, me decían que no sabía hablar, que aprendiera pronunciar bien, y que, digamos – [interviewer: *racismo, digamos.*] Sí. Regional. Exactamente. Que existe mucho en Colombia que los Bogotanos se creen, pues, que son la tela de Sudamerica, se dice en Bogotá. Entonces, sí, sentí ese tipo de discriminación regional, con una procedencia regional." Contrary to what my intervention in our conversation implied here, discrimination in Colombia is not simply about race and racism, though it is about that. Racism, as Colombian historian Oscar Armario points out, adapts and structures itself in accordance with specific geographies, taking different forms (Leal & Arias, 2007). In affirming my use of the word

“racism,” but not using it herself, Solano was translating for a non-native speaker of Colombian racial geography – a geography in which, says Peter Wade, “race is often spoken of in a locative voice” (1995, p. 54).

These feelings of exclusion from Bogotá’s Andean, mestizo narrative stayed with Solano when she returned to the Caribbean. After the ANC ended she settled in Santa Marta and began teaching at the university, where her organizing efforts took root, and would remain, in Caribbean communities. But this was only one of two shifts in focus that she experienced at that time. Once in Santa Marta, she said, “dejé la militancia política.” She began to focus on organizing groups of women, outside the framework of the Left parties. When I asked her about her experiences in the political Left, she reminisced fondly about her organizing experiences, but also recounted discrimination from the male-led party structure.

Sentía la discriminación y al interior del partido. Hacemos debates porque ya, digamos, el partido al que yo pertencí – pertencí a la IV Internacional, una organización Trotskista que tenía la liberación de la mujer y el feminismo dentro de sus principios. Y hicimos una resolución internacional sobre la revolución de la mujer, y eso nos servía a nosotras para tener discusiones ... [sentí discriminación] por ser mujer en el partido todo el tiempo.

Cynthia Cockburn (2012, p. 253) writes that while the decision to leave the organized political Left is difficult for many women, it is also a common move, particularly for feminists, who feel that their male comrades “allow their positionality as males in relation to patriarchal power to prevent them from acknowledging the part played by phallocracy in militarism, to impede them from joining the struggle to support the system of male supremacy.” Nonetheless, many women’s organizations throughout Latin America have originated in Leftist parties, a legacy which contributes to their political formation and strategy in later years (Stephen, 1997; Stoltz C., 1991).

Once Solano’s activism reached beyond the organized Left and she became involved in networks of women’s peace movements, her view of the armed conflict would shift, as well.

Similar to what Alejandra Miller of Ruta Pacífica remembered about her political trajectory, Solano reported a journey toward pacifism – but that she did not begin there. “Siempre digo,” she said,

a partir de la influencia de mi militancia política, tenía claro que el protagonismo de los procesos de cambio social tenía que hacerse por la propia gente. Y que no era una vanguardia armada que debía suplantarla. Entonces, digamos, siempre fuimos críticos a esa posibilidad de que fuera el grupo armado estilo foco guerrillero, como se hizo en Cuba, y un fracaso en Bolivia, que iba a tener resultado. Entonces, siempre participamos interviniendo con los sectores sociales. Como prioridad. Y digamos que no veíamos posible que fuera las vidas violentas, las que fueron a permitir un cambio en Colombia. Sin embargo, en ese momento no me declaraba pacifista. Fue mucho tiempo después ya con la militancia en IMP y todo un trabajo de lectura y de debate en el movimiento de mujeres sobre la no-violencia que yo gano la concepción de que la no-violencia es un camino, y que la vía armada no es la vida.

In 1994 Solano would help to found the Red de Mujeres del Caribe, conceived as a space of articulation for eight sectors of women: campesinas, “populares,” Afrodescendants, the indigenous, youth, victims of armed conflict, academics, and government employees. The network was envisioned with a focus on territory and the human rights of women, regardless of age or ethnicity, with the aim of transforming the conditions of poverty and inequality in which the majority of Caribbean residents, particularly women, were forced to live. Since that time the RMC has helped to coordinate several significant events, including the Women’s Emancipatory Constituent of 2002, which produced the Women’s Agenda for Peace, the 2004 march on Bogotá hosted by the MSM, and the 2003 Ruta to Putumayo organized by Ruta Pacífica. It has served as a member of both the Red Nacional de Mujeres and the Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz, coordinating regional and national-level mobilizations and campaigns (Jiménez, 2013). As of 2013 it was made up of 144 active member organizations throughout the eight Caribbean departments.

One of these organizations, the Corporación Miss Nancy Land, is based in San Andrés and organizes workshops, trainings, and programs for women and youth. I met with Silvia

Torres, legal representative for the organization, who at the time was also working as a research assistant at the National University. Torres identifies herself as Afro-Colombian and isleña; her family immigrated to the island in the 1970s. She cited her grandmother as a defining influence in her political formation, relating her grandmother's strong presence to the matriarchal history of the Caribbean region. Torres first began organizing her community as a teenager, where she saw her peers turn to narco-trafficking and violence in the context of war. She was affected deeply by, she said, “todo que se devele [la violencia], y todo lo que ocurrió con los jóvenes. Muchos amigos de la infancia murieron, por el tema de la violencia, o la pelea; un sobrino mío lo asesinaron. Me marcó muchísimo.”

Torres went on to work with a youth empowerment program hosted by the church office of the Pastoral Social that worked with youth, pregnant teenagers, and addicts, finally training as a social psychologist. Miss Nancy Land formed in 2008 with roots in a neighborhood group of women students who had been meeting every Saturday to discuss the challenges they faced. The organization counted, as of 2013, twenty-seven Afro and raizal women as members.

I met Norma Carmona in Bogotá, where she serves on the Red de Mujeres del Caribe's political commission and represents the network in its collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior. A longtime ally of the network and friend of Barranquilla-based RMC Coordinator Audes Jimenez, she has been involved in an official capacity since 2010, when Jimenez requested her help with a presentation about the work of Fals Borda at an event hosted by the Red de Mujeres. After assisting with another project chronicling the experiences of Caribbean Colombian women, Carmona was asked to represent the network formally in Bogotá, and she accepted. She invited me to her home one afternoon in 2013, where we spent several hours discussing her work, looking through files, and drinking fresh-squeezed orange juice. She was

raised in San Jacinto, south of Cartagena, and travels there often to visit relatives. When we spoke about her memories of conflict, she asserted that San Jacinto was peaceful until the guerrilla forces arrived; once that happened, their presence drew the fire of the paramilitary forces. The town was subject to two *tomas* by the guerrillas, she remembered, and as a result of the charging of *vacunas* and incidences of kidnapping, many of the local residents left. The result was that the area became known as a coca zone, and broadly painted as sympathetic to the FARC-EP. This conflation between local residents and the guerrilla helped to pave the way for the February, 2000 massacre in nearby El Salado, in which paramilitaries tortured, raped, and killed more than thirty people while the army retreated to a neighboring town (see also Rohter, 2000). Carmona and I also discussed the network's funding sources; this is analyzed below.

Autonomy: an Elusive and Constant Goal

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, questions of autonomy in Colombian feminist organizations are persistent and broad. Though the concept and the struggle for it are referenced throughout the existing literature on Colombian (and Latin American) women's organizations, its meaning is cloudy. Before I examine the struggle for various kinds of autonomy as discussed in my interviews with activists, it is worthwhile to examine the concept more closely. I will explain the rise in scholarship on autonomy and offer a four-part definition before summarizing the way each women's peace network under study engages with the concept in its press.

As an organizing goal, autonomy entered the spotlight with the rise of "new" social movements in the 1980s and 90s. These movements were characterized as having arisen independently of the traditional political party channels, and were headed by actors that had generally been unrepresented by parties and unions (women, Afrodescendants, and the

indigenous, for example). So in terms of social movement studies, “autonomy” generally refers to independence (of origin and of action) from political parties and the State. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the “new” in “new social movements” is contested, and the newness of the struggle for autonomy should be contested as well. Judith Adler Hellman (1992) argues, moreover, that the “obsession” with autonomy is located more with researchers than activists; we make a fetish of it, she writes, because we see politically-motivated and party-aligned activism as inherently corrupt – rather than one among many strategic choices made by social movements.

For women’s and feminist movements, the definition of “autonomy” is more complex. I argue that the meaning of autonomy evinced by the discourse of feminist activism in Latin America is *polysemic, spectral, relational, and processual*. First, it is polysemic and multidirectional owing to the parallel threats women activists face from the patriarchal State, patriarchal elements of civil society and the Left, and patriarchy in their intimate and social relationships. With regard to their relationships to the State, feminist movements in postcolonial countries have to be especially vigilant, write Ray and Korteweg, because postcolonial States build legitimacy precisely by disciplining and subordinating women (1999, p. 63). This leads to a restriction of women’s avenues for political action, with only State- or party-sponsored organizations being permitted. For this reason, feminist movements in the Global South are weakened as States institutionalize (*ibid.*). But the State is not the only actor who has a history of silencing women activists; the Latin American Left’s tendency to either ignore or co-opt women’s organizing (Ray & Korteweg, 1999; Maier & Lebon, 2010), the tendency of the Church is to restrict or repress it, and other social movements which historically fail to foreground feminist concerns all present threats. Feminists see independence within relationships

to parties, States, and civil society *through the lens* of women's struggle for independence within relationship to men, because both are infused by patriarchy (Maier & Lebon, 2010, p. 30).

Second, autonomy exists on a spectrum and is a matter of degrees. It is coalitional, referring not to total independence from the actors listed above, but to freedom of movement and decisionmaking *within* a movement's alliances. An autonomous movement is one, in other words, that enjoys *alliances among equals*. This is seen in the definition offered at the 11th Congress of the IV International in 1979, which asserted that an autonomous feminist movement is one that

is organized and led by women (...) takes up the fight for women's rights and needs as its first priority, refusing to subordinate to the decisions or policy needs of any political tendency or any other social group; that it is willing to carry through the fight by whatever means *and together with whatever forces* prove necessary (Colle, 2012, my emphasis).

Various feminists advocate for different positions on this scale, from the *autonomistas* who maintain separate, women-only spaces (McFadden, 2007) to the *doble militantes* who operate within political parties. Autonomist feminists in Latin America, among them several prominent Colombia-based feminists like Ochy Curiel and Yuderkys Espinosa, assert that these spaces are critical because of the constant attempts by political forces to partialize the feminist vision of total social and political transformation. Autonomists accuse political systems and their institutionalized "gender technocracies" of being clientelistic, "trafficking in influence," and based in personal interest (Encuentro Feminista Autónomo, 2009).

Third, autonomy is relational. Because so many feminist organizations arose out of the Left, unions, or the Church, and because so many of them have funding relationships abroad without which they would cease to exist, autonomy must be envisioned as something that takes place in relationship, not outside of it. Feminist philosophers have similarly critiqued the concept of autonomy as masculinist, rooted in individualistic self-sufficiency doctrines not accessible to

women who live under patriarchal structures. They advocate for a new definition of relational autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000), emphasizing “the ability to achieve autonomy within a world in which individuals are socially constructed and shaped by their relationships with others” (Goodmark, 2009, p. 24). Some scholars advocate for replacing the word “autonomy” with “agency,” which they argue acknowledges this relationality and the impossibility of absolute autonomy (ibid.; Christman, 1995). This might be particularly apt for the Colombian case, where, as Wills and Gómez (2006, p. 315) ask:

¿En Colombia, en medio de la confrontación armada y la polarización social, con una historia política clientelista, de militancias fervorosas y divisiones tajantes que han permeado desde su inicio a las corrientes feministas y a organizaciones de mujeres, puede realmente existir autonomía absoluta de este campo?

Finally, autonomy is processual. It is not a state of being but an imaginary, a constantly-unfolding referent to be striven for. Attendees at the Encuentro Feminista Autónomo in Mexico City in 2009 defined autonomy as a utopia, “una postura ante al mundo más que un legajo unívoco de preceptos” (Encuentro Feminista Autónomo, 2009). This is key for all three WPNs under study, each of which maintains temporary or long-term relationships with potentially compromising actors – the State, the Church, foreign funders, national-level networks who act in concert with those funders, and, at certain points in their history, the armed Left.

Ruta Pacífica’s most common mention of autonomy is in its statement that “nos declaremos pacifistas, antimilitaristas y constructoras de una ética de la no violencia en la que la justicia, la paz, la equidad, la autonomía, la libertad y el reconocimiento de la otredad son principios fundamentales.” The word is used in four discernable ways in the organization’s publications and in my field interviews: (1) when activists discuss individual women who have “ganado en autoestima y autonomía” (Camilo I., 2004, p. 9) by joining the movement; (2) when communities’ autonomy is threatened by the presence of armed groups (i.e., they are forced to

ally – or are perceived as allying – with one or another); (3) when women do not have autonomy over their bodily integrity in war zones; and (4) when women do not have autonomy over their reproductive capacities. Ruta clearly has a holistic understanding of autonomy, ranging from the individual to the community level – and implies that one is connected to, and must be seen through the lens of, the other. The MSM seems to have used the word less often, at least in its public materials. It asserted that “autonomía y civilidad” were the drivers of its movement, and that women should focus their actions on “la vida, la autonomía, la soberanía de nuestros cuerpos y territorios, por la salida política del conflicto social y armado...” (Movimiento Social de Mujeres, 2009), but a more comprehensive description of autonomy was not undertaken. RMC’s use of the concept is perhaps the most defined, and like Ruta Pacífica’s, is holistic, encompassing individual and organizing goals. But the emphasis is on Caribbean autonomy from Andean political structures: “la autonomía y el desarrollo socio-económico de la region Caribe.” The network also references autonomy as a goal for black communities (Mujeres del Caribe, 2014). RMC activists I spoke with indicated that their push for regional autonomy was linked to their push for women’s autonomy in society; as Ruta Pacífica’s conception indicates that organizational autonomy must be seen through the lens of women’s autonomy, the RMC’s conception implies that women’s autonomy and regional autonomy are also two parts of a whole.

These holistic understandings of autonomy reveal that women activists’ struggles for freedom of action and decisionmaking power within their organizational relationships, informed by a struggle for women’s autonomy at the individual level, are an expression of the activists’ quest for freedom from multiple, intersecting forms and levels of subjugation. The activists I spoke with from the three networks under study were engaged in conversations about five kinds of actors with whom they have ongoing relationships in which they seek to maintain agency and

freedom of decisionmaking: (1) NGOs and other funding bodies; (2) national networks of women activists, even those with whom they have had close relationships; (3) armed groups; (4) the State, and to a certain extent the Church; and (5) Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) in which they participate.

(1) Autonomy vis-à-vis funders. Beyond the questions of autonomy from political parties, less salient in today's feminist movement than they were in the decades described in the previous chapter, remains the question of autonomy from funders. Radical feminist groups throughout Latin America have cast a wary glance at feminist NGOs, whether they are international or locally based with international ties. Perhaps the best-known example of such wariness comes from the Bolivian performance group Mujeres Creando, made up of Aymara and mestiza women. In one famous performance in El Alto, the women portrayed FNGO employees as blonde, UN-blue-faced women playing with an inflatable globe until it lost its bounce; figures of indigenous women were handled by the employees and then cast aside in a pile of coins (Schiwy, 2007, *inter alia*). The performance reflects Chandra Mohanty's assertion that "funds offered by NGOs exacerbate class differences among women and the exploitation of women by women... global power relations are seen as representing patronizing and exploitative relations that prolong those formed through colonialism" (2003, p. 281). Even more incisive is James Petras' statement that NGOs' effects include "dividing communities into warring fiefdoms fighting to get a piece of the action. Each 'grass roots activist' corner[s] a new segment of the poor (women, young people from minorities, etc.) to set up a new NGO and take the pilgrimage to Amsterdam, Stockholm, etc. to 'market' their project, activity, constituency and finance their center - and their careers" (1999).

Aid that comes by way of foreign governments can be equally destabilizing. One activist commented to me that funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) tends to be invested where the Colombian State has a historically minimal presence and the FARC-EP serves as the local government. The aid money elevates some social movement leaders over others (by facilitating domestic and international air travel, etc.), dividing SMOs and destabilizing the FARC's social base – but in the process, creating dependency on foreign funding and disempowering local civil society. But perhaps the most salient critique of international and NGO funding voiced by women activists during my fieldwork was a temporal one: funders simply lack the attention span necessary to see a community-rooted, organically developed social movement process through. NGOs' insistence on demonstrable, data-based outcomes in a short timespan meant that Colombian SMOs in the 1990s found themselves struggling to produce results, rather than focusing on their organizational needs. In our 2013 conversation, MSM founder Yolanda Becerra associated this funding dynamic with what she saw as a broad cultural tendency toward instant material gratification; it was a tendency she contrasted with the work of her own organization, which she described as a solid, slow, steady process.

A ser líder social, a ser dirigente popular, es muy difícil. ¿Cierto? Porque el momento es de lo fácil, de lo rápido, de lo inmediato, de lo que no cueste; no se piensa en procesos. La corporación tampoco piensa en procesos. Financian proyectos. Puntual. Es eso, que muestra un resultado inmediato. Y no de procesos, no de escuelas de formación, no de construcciones de valores, no de construcción de seres humanos, que no se hace en diez años – es un *proceso*. Entonces, es también – todo se vuelve igual. Compra usted hoy un aparato, y mañana no sirve, por cierta razón. Todo es desechable, aún lo político vuelve desechable. La vida vuelve desechable. Los procesos, todo se vuelve desechable.

Donna Murdock's 2008 study of feminist development organizations in Medellín corroborates this dynamic of funding being funneled to short-term projects rather than longer-term processes. NGO funding, she writes, led local feminist organizations to shift their focus from the goals of

women's empowerment, and toward "demonstrable impact (or more bang for the development buck), garnered through short-term projects, large-scale workshops and forums, and more overt participation in the policy arena" (p. 3). The model of using SMOs and then throwing them away was reflected in my conversations with other women activists, notably in the context of discussing the relationship between regional women's organizations and "centralized" organizations based in Bogotá, Medellín, or Cali, who act in concert (though not always in total harmony) with international funding agencies. When overlaid with Colombia's dynamic of resources and power being concentrated in the major cities, the tendency of funding agencies to take temporary advantage of regional SMOs seemed to trickle down to relationships between SMOs themselves. According to Yusmidia Solano,

[h]ay mucha necesidad de utilizar a los grupos regionales solo de relleno y para cumplir con los requisitos de las agencias internacionales. Y no se tiene autonomía, y no se tiene capacidad de decisión, y entonces utilizan mucho a los grupos locales y regionales.

This threat to autonomy, presented not only by foreign funders but by partner organizations in the cities, led several of the activists with whom I spoke to stress autonomy *within* civil society as a priority for their networks.

(2) Autonomy vis-à-vis other activists. In a field of SMOs divided by foreign resource allocation, in which some are excluded while others are chosen to be nurtured and empowered, regional SMOs like the Organización Femenina Popular and the Red de Mujeres del Caribe are forced to operate with caution when they form alliances. Though both have engaged in alliances with national networks (MSM, in OFP's case, and the IMP and RNM, among others, in the RMC's case), leaders of both organizations reported that they are currently focusing on alliances with other organizations within their own regions. Speaking of movement dynamics in the 1990s, Yolanda Becerra commented:

La ONGización hizo que, de alguna manera, se centralizaran en el capital, y hablaran a nombre de los procesos y a nombre de los movimientos y a nombre de las organizaciones. ¿Cierto? Y eso de alguna manera hizo que tanto, también, las organizaciones regionales, muchas no pudieran surgir o no pudieran fortalecerse, que habían otros que capitalizaban eso. La Organización Femenina Popular en eso, pues, fue muy capaz y muy astuta y muy estratégica en que no delegó su voz, no delegó su proceso a nadie. ¿Cierto? Que no ha sido fácil. Porque – y eso fueron tan parte de las rupturas, o sea, en el sentido de lo nacional, pues, se hablaron de organizaciones nacionales, pero no representaban las organizaciones regionales. O sea, allí hay un divorcio entre lo nacional y lo regional.

Yusmidia Solano, of the RMCC, also spoke about the centralization of social movement resources in the major cities, to the exclusion of regional SMOs. This process was one factor in the RMCC's decision to sever itself from national-level networks (additional factors will be explained later in the chapter). At the time of our interview, the RMCC was abiding by a decision it had made more than a decade earlier to abstain from belonging to networks like the IMP or RNM. In the RMCC's case, activists identified the threat to their autonomy that came from working with national-level networks as one based on an asymmetry of experience based on race and region.

“Un reto fundamental son las regiones,” admitted a community organizer at a social movement roundtable in Bucaramanga in 2013. She went on to say that tensions between national-level and regional organizing present the biggest challenge to unifying Colombian social movements. There is a chasm of difference between daily life in the capital and in regional municipalities, which manifests itself in poverty rates, access to utilities, and presence of the State (Mesa de Trabajo, 2005b, pp. 89-90). As discussed above, las regiones have been the object, not the subject, of Colombia's historical narrative; Bogotá's policy on the outlying territories has waffled between ignorance, neglect, and colonization. Since the dawn of the neoliberal project, spaces like the Pacific coast, the San Andrés archipelago, and the Caribbean region in general have been subject to development projects orchestrated, managed, permitted, or

protected by a State that has sought to construct regions into manageable chunks of territory, according to a map and a framework imagined almost entirely exogenously of those territories themselves (Escobar, 2008, p. 62). This history of colonization, Andeanization, and imposed development is the context for the regionalism embodied by the RMCC. Importantly, though, the division between center and region also replicates itself at the level of feminist movement organizing.³⁴ It is imbued not only with distinctions of place and race, but class, as Wills Obregón (2011b, p. 18) admits: “El campo feminista colombiano parece estar fisurado no tanto en términos de ‘con la guerra o contra ella,’ como en términos de clase.” Women from different class sectors live patriarchy in distinct ways, as Madariaga (2009) writes: La forma como se vive el sexismo y las estrategias que se desarrollan frente a él son de naturalezas claramente distintas, así como el lugar que cada mujer ocupa en las relaciones de poder intra y inter-organizativas” (p. 393).

These fissures come into play, for example, in the distinctions between the OFP and the feminist organizations centered in Bogotá; Madariaga (ibid.) writes that the OFP has tended to see the agenda of academic feminists as overly abstract and ignorant of local particularities; it defines its membership as “mujeres populares santandereanas” (p. 411) whose values clash with those of Andean, middle-class organizations in the major cities. Members of Ruta Pacífica in Cauca also spoke of feeling separated from the capital, a separation which influences the way the eight regional offices work together, as Alejandra Coll explained:

La diversidad es una constante en todas las [oficinas] regionales. Te voy a decir que cada regional de la Ruta es un mundo distinto. En Colombia, porque las distancias son largas, no porque el país sea grande, sino porque las carreteras son malas, no tenemos mucha relación entre las regiones. Es muy distinta de ser en Bogotá. Es muy distinta de ser en *Cali*, que está al lado [de Popayán]. Porque las distancias – y también somos encerradas, culturalmente

³⁴ Doris Lamus described the relationship between State and NGO as one that creates “mendicantes,” civil society actors who are forced to operate in a top-down power structure, and noted that centralized feminist movements replicate this dynamic in their relationships with local organizations (personal communication, October 7, 2013).

hablando. Entonces, las regiones son radicalmente distintas, hablamos distinto, nos vestimos distinto, comemos distinto. Estamos en el mismo país, pero creo que pasa en todos los países un poco. Pero en Colombia se ve muy marcado. Igual ha pasado en la Ruta. Entonces, las chicas de la Ruta de Santander tienen unas cosas... de todas regionales, somos la más simbólicas. Las que tienen lo más lenguaje simbólico. Y las más bulliciosas; hacemos ruido. Porque esta zona es muy complicada. Porque aquí es bajo el fuego todo el tiempo. En las otras partes del país también, pero no con la constancia que pasa aquí. Aquí, todos los días, pasa algo.

These divisions within and between feminist SMOs mean that the concentration of resources in the capital – due both to Colombia’s historical politics of place and to the exacerbating effects on those politics wrought by the NGO ‘boom’ – presents a major challenge to regional networks and organizations seeking funding and support. This challenge is behind the RMC’s efforts to establish closer ties to organizations in the Caribbean, as Norma Carmona made clear:

Estamos tratando a también abrir la Red a otros espacios, sobre todo porque la parte de la financiación es muy difícil. Pues, las organizaciones que están en Bogotá tienen muchas ventajas, en cambio las de las regiones no. Y eso se da también por algo contra que venimos luchando, que es la centralización. ¿Verdad? Que hace que todo se concentra en Bogotá, y las regiones no tienen una propia economía, desde ningún punto de vista, desde lo presupuestal, ni desde lo político, ni desde el manejo de sus recursos. Entonces, esa es una de las cosas que también venimos empujando.

The coloniality of resource concentration in Colombia unfortunately replicates itself between – and even within – feminist organizations. As Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (2000) assert, “there is no such thing as a feminism free of asymmetrical power relations.” Women’s SMOs and peace networks based in *las regiones* contend with this double challenge: the need to gain access to financial and organizational resources that are concentrated in Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín, and the desire to remain autonomous in terms of their own decision-making strategies.

Yolanda Becerra linked the OFP’s insistence on maintaining its own autonomy not only to its community roots and particular localized experience, as Solano did, but to its members’ identities as women. She counterposed a collective understanding of womanhood with an NGO identity, citing collectivity as a defense against the atomization of the NGO model.

Nosotros tenemos una apuesta que somos mujeres. Es el requisito, ser mujer, y ser mujer que quiera construir colectivamente, quiera construir, entendiendo que la mujer no es sola, que la mujer tiene un espacio social, que se llama familia, que se llama novio, que se llama marido, que se llama hijos, que se llama amante, que se llama – y en ese contexto, tenemos que transformar la realidad. Entonces, y es un trabajo de cotidianidad. Y de trabajo de base. O sea, nosotras sabemos que somos – jurídicamente, hay una forma de ser y es que es ONG. Pero en la práctica, no somos una ONG. Porque nosotras no nos sentimos como que vamos a apoyar o vamos a ayudar. Nosotras sentimos que estamos haciendo para nosotras mismas. Lo organizamos para nosotras, la formamos para nosotras, somos mujeres. Y mujeres que estamos con otros y otras.

(3) Autonomy vis-à-vis armed groups. As shown in Chapter 3, women’s organizations in Colombia have always existed in a polarized field. The onset of paramilitary violence in the 1980s presented severe limitations to their autonomy, particularly in the regions where the AUC was most active: “Las mujeres del Magdalena Medio muestran cómo el control económico, político y militar de los paramilitares en la región, genera serios límites a su seguridad, autonomía y posibilidades de participación” (Mesa de Trabajo, 2005a, p. 6). While guerrilla organizations certainly also present limits to organizational autonomy, Yolanda Becerra explained that State persecution of guerrillas offered civil society some degree of protection which she did not feel with respect to the paramilitaries, who were supported by the State.

La guerrilla tuvo presencia muchos años en Barranca; de hecho, el ELN nació en Magdalena Medio, en San Vicente. Pero hay una cosa que cambiaba, y es que la guerrilla *sí* la perseguía el Estado. Había una política contrainsurgente, ¿cierto? (...) De alguna manera, la sociedad civil nos sentíamos protegidos por el Estado, porque el Estado *sí* tenía una política contrainsurgente. Con los paramilitares, el Estado *no tenía* una política contra los paramilitares. El Estado apolitaba y apoyaba y convivía con los paramilitares. Entonces, allí nadie nos protegía.

But it has also been essential for the networks under study to be vigilant and intentional about their relationships with armed groups, especially on the Left, else they risk being subsumed and spoken for by guerrilla organizations and lose their autonomy over their own operations – not to mention their political credibility, their security, and their lives. Though the OFP was accustomed to coexisting with the ELN, Becerra asserted that in later years, when the guerrilla

“se pierde sus horizontes,” the activists did not shy away from denouncing the armed left.

“Muchas veces,” she said, “tuvimos que hacer denuncias, de hechos que la guerrilla hacía contra la sociedad civil, y contra los jóvenes en los últimos años. Cuando tuvimos que denunciar a la guerrilla, la denunciábamos.”

It is possible that the OFP’s established relationship with the ELN may have made their denunciations more effective, or helped them maintain their safety; on the other hand, that alliance (no matter how circumstantial or momentary) would have put them in more danger both from paramilitaries and from the FARC. The OFP’s posture of equal-opportunity denunciation as a strategy of autonomy stands in contrast to the strategy of Ruta Pacífica, which, as a pacifist organization, went out of its way to avoid collaboration of any kind with armed groups, even those whose political goals may have, at certain moments, aligned with their own. Alejandra Miller credited the relative security of Ruta activists, who have suffered less direct paramilitary and State persecution than women from the OFP, to this strategy of non-alignment – despite the fact that Ruta recognizes the guerrilla as a political actor, giving them more credibility than the paramilitaries. Nonetheless, Ruta’s pacifism garnered a certain level of respect – or at least a safe distance – from the government. Miller explained,

Nosotras nos hemos logrado parar en una posición desde el pacifismo, muy importante... Entonces, a nosotras, la guerrilla no ha podido decir que somos aliadas ni al ejército ni a la policía ni al gobierno ni – y el gobierno no ha podido decir nunca que somos aliadas de la guerrilla, de los paramili – nada, sí? Creo que la postura pacifista clara que hemos tenido de denunciar, de decir que lo que pasa con las mujeres en la guerra, pero siempre en la postura pacifista, nos ha permitido que no nos puedan – lo que te decía – aún en los ocho años de Uribe, donde Uribe estaba señalando todo el mundo creo que a nosotras no ha podido. No ha podido, y no ha podido es porque lo ponemos por escrito, lo decimos, lo hablamos. No estamos de acuerdo, somos pacifistas, y no estamos de acuerdo con la guerra. Entonces, creo que eso, pues, ayudó mucho. (...) Digamos que nosotras, yo creo que nosotras en la Ruta, pues, ha sido afortunadas, pero no es un tema de suerte. Es un tema que ha sido por la postura política.³⁵

³⁵ This relative immunity from threats would end abruptly for Miller when she assumed a position in the government in 2016. She and Ruta Pacífica were both threatened by the Águilas Negras on March 28th, 2016, when they received

Furthermore, Miller (despite being married to a former guerrilla who she said has always respected her own personal autonomy and leadership) spoke without fondness of Leftist armed groups, joking about men from the “ejército Machista-Leninista” acting like “el Che en la plaza y el Pinochet en la casa.” Neither the guerrilla nor the paramilitary nor the State had women’s best interests at heart, she asserted: “A las mujeres nos vean iguales.”

(4) Autonomy vis-à-vis State and Church. At several moments in recent history – during the ANC process in 1991, during the so-called Justice and Peace process in 2005, and in the context of today’s peace talks in Havana – women’s peace networks have confronted the opportunities and threats to autonomy presented by the possibility of collaborating with State agencies. Relationships between States and social movements are complicated everywhere, but this is perhaps particularly true for both women’s movements globally, due to the patriarchal nature of State formations, and for Latin American SMOs. Elizabeth Maier (2010, p. 30) writes that “Latin American and Caribbean governments’ frequent use of a patronage system to control social organizations and political parties, along with their co-optation of leaders, close ties to national oligarchies, and the presumed corruption of a significant part of the political class, had historically defined the state as an untrustworthy adversary for most social movements.” And Nikki Craske (1999) reminds us, “State bureaucracies can offer key resources for the advancement of women... These resources, however, can also act to co-opt potential opposition activities” (p. 85). Ruta Pacífica’s Cauca chapter, for example, has had opportunities to collaborate with the Secretariat of Women for Cauca, who at the time of our conversations had been appointed only four months earlier, in part because of Ruta Pacífica’s activism. While I was

an email stating, among other things, that as so-called servants of “Castro-Chavismo,” “tienen el tiempo contado... los vamos a matar como ratas. Por un nuevo país” (Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, 2016).

in the activists' office, women were visibly excited to receive a telephone call from the Secretariat. When I asked Alejandra Coll Agudelo about their relationship, she described the government official (who has a degree in Gender Studies) positively, but explained that though the women were excited about the political opportunity presented by the appointment of a sympathetic official, they tended to tread carefully in their relationships with public functionaries, keeping their broader goals in mind:

Uy, [colaboramos] mucho. Creo que hemos colaborado en muchos sentidos. Hemos tratado de ser estratégicas con esta relación; es muy de Alejandra, que es muy estratégica. Tratamos de tener una relación armónica con el Estado, pero sin perder la posibilidad de ser críticas cuando sea necesario. Entonces, por ejemplo, de vez en cuando hacemos convenios para hacer campañas, y decimos, 'okay, tienes una obligación de hacer una campaña, nosotras la diseñamos, ustedes paguen. Pero eso no nos quita el derecho a que en algún momento, si hay algún problema con la política pública, vamos y lo decimos – es que tenemos una relación cordial y constante, pero somos muy independientes en este sentido. Por ejemplo, ahorita tenemos alianzas con el alcaldía, con la gobernación, pero cosas muy puntuales. Y capacitamos a los funcionarios también. Lo último que yo hice en Popayán antes de irme [a Europa] fue eso. Los cogimos a los funcionarios y los juntamos, porque casi no conocen las leyes que tienen que ver con mujeres. Entonces, lo que dice la Ruta fue – yo creo que Alejandra también es muy estratégica en eso, porque ya en vez de pelear, como, 'ah, Ustedes no conocen la ley, y deberían,' lo que hace ella es 'okay, no la conocen, vamos, y les capacitamos.' Y donde vemos que hay negligencia, okay, disciplinario, un proceso disciplinario. Pero de general, Alejandra, las instrucciones que nos ha dado es un poco, como tratar de compartir. Y por eso estamos dos abogadas pendientes de que hay, en las normas, beneficioso para las mujeres. Lo mostramos para que la gente lo conozca.

Miller's 2016 appointment to the departmental government will likely increase the network's collaboration with local elected officials. Representatives of the Red de Mujeres del Caribe, on the other hand, recalled a less effective period of attempted collaboration with the government under previous administrations. Yusmidia Solano commented that past collaborations between the feminist movement and the State, particularly in the post-1991 period, have resulted in a weakening of the movement and an increased dependence on the State and its directives. In the first years of the next decade, although various feminist organizations united under the *Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz* to intervene in and monitor the paramilitary demobilization process under

the framework of the Justice and Peace law, Solano opined that the State once again was exercising too much control over the activists. And here the age-old rupture between feminists over the issue of autonomy opened again, with the RMCC deciding to withdraw from the IMP entirely. Her recollection illuminates the way various divisions between women's organizations can manifest themselves at the same time: not only the split between State collaborators and autonomists, but also the divide of influence and funding between center and region.

[La desmovilización] fue uno de los puntos por los cuales nosotras terminamos haciendo la estructura [del IMP] – digamos, al principio fuimos partícipes de que se presentara una postura de iniciativas para la paz para hacer seguimiento al proceso de negociación con los paramilitares. Pero luego, entonces, cuando Patricia Buriticá, que era la dirigente de IMP, entra a ser parte de la Comisión Nacional de la Reparación, la CNRR, entonces empezamos a ver que eso tenía muchos problemas, y que el Estado controlaba muchos organismos y que no se tenía autonomía e independencia. Claro veía la necesidad de retirar, y eso fue el punto de discusión de la asamblea donde decidimos que no podíamos seguir en una organización que tenía tanta dirigencia, que no tenía democracia en su interior. Porque nosotros pensamos cambiando el rumbo de IMP, y lanzamos de candidata de dirección a [RMCC coordinator] Audes Jimenez. Y entonces, como teníamos la mitad de las delegadas de la Asamblea, entonces quedamos en un parte y ellas tenían la otra mitad. Decidimos entre las dos disolver IMP, pero nos hicieron trampa, porque después que resolvimos disolver IMP, ellas retomaron a IMP y hicieron una refundación, y se quedaron con los recursos, y se quedaron con la financiación internacional y todo.³⁶

Collaborating with the State carries different risks for women's organizations outside the traditional centers of power, and regional SMOs have treaded carefully. At the time of my field research the OFP was in a process of negotiation with the State, under the rubric of the 2011 Victims' Law, to receive reparations for its past persecution (see Chapter 5 for an analysis of this process), and the RMCC was participating in a process with the Ministry of the Interior intended, from their vantage point, to move toward increased regional autonomy for the Caribbean. All three networks under study, evidently, are willing to engage in State relationships when they

³⁶ María Ibarra Mello (2011) asserts that Ruta Pacífica and the OFP agreed with the RMCC that the AUC was not a political actor and did not deserve that designation; this was part of what led to the departure of some of the organizations involved in the MSM.

encounter political opportunities; in current years, perhaps learning from past experiences, they are doing so cautiously.

Collaborating with Church organizations presents similar risks and opportunities; relationships with the Church can offer legitimacy, an international audience, and funding and institutional support. The only one of the three networks under study that has a significant relationship with the Church is the MSM, by way of its formation in the OFP (though Ruta Pacífica representatives in Cauca spoke briefly about interacting with Church officials, and mentioned that they avoid discussing the issue of abortion in order to maintain their relationships with Catholic women's organizations). But the OFP's relationship is a close one, particularly with the Pastoral Social office in the Magdalena Medio. Becerra explained that after the OFP's official departure from the Church in 1988, there were difficult moments, which she compared to the pain of having a child grow up and leave the house (asserting that her relationship with the Church was unshakeable even though it had changed). Karen Kampwirth (2010, p. 120) writes that the feminist movement presents, of all civil society movements and organizations, the greatest threat to the power of the Catholic Church. Becerra confirmed that the OFP's turn toward feminism was a significant obstacle to the continuation of its operation under the Church's roof, but over time, she said, "creo que logramos también ní una ruptura con la Diócesis, con la Iglesia, si no, como un grado de madurez, como construimos una relación de iguales, de reconocimiento, de apoyo... en Barranca, en el Magdalena Medio, hay un buen matrimonio con la Iglesia. Es una iglesia especial, digamos, es una iglesia con compromiso, una iglesia con una lectura de la realidad."

(5) Autonomy vis-à-vis Transnational Advocacy Networks. Finally, two of the networks under study are active in Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), defined by Keck and Sikkink (1998) as “networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation” (1). The advent of TANs represents one among several opportunities in the neoliberal era for women’s and feminist organizations in the Global South to attach themselves to global discourses and achieve new legal rights, gain access to new international channels to make demands, and take advantage of new, transnational opportunities for collective action (Dore & Molyneux, 2000; Jaquette, 2009; Lamus Canavate, 2010).

Both Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra and Ruta Pacífica participate in TANs, which serves to increase their visibility on the international scale, offers some measure of protection from persecution, and facilitates an exchange of information and services (Mejía, 2011, p. 39). The OFP, MSM’s organizing body, is a member of the Paris-based Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos (FIDH), owing to the OFP’s longstanding status as a military target (ibid, p. 41). When MSM formed in the Magdalena Medio in 1996, both the OFP and the MSM began an alliance with Women in Black (Mujeres de Negro), an international network of feminist antimilitarists begun by Israeli women in the 1980s to protest Israeli abuses of Palestinian human rights. Women in Black is known for holding regular vigils attended by women wearing black and standing silently with signs protesting war (I participated in one such vigil in Jerusalem in 2005). Then in 2001, when Ruta Pacífica and the Organización Femenina Popular won UNIFEM’s Millennium Peace Prize for Women and gained the international visibility that came along with it, the networks allied to represent the Colombian chapter of Women in Black. Most of their ties to the international network happen by way of the Madrid

and Barcelona chapters (Cockburn, 2007, p. 44). Through this relationship, Spanish women have held vigils focusing public attention on the armed conflict in Colombia, and lobbied the Spanish government to take Colombian interests into account in its foreign policy; they have also assisted Ruta and MSM by publishing information about threats to their security, and supporting national conferences and mobilizations hosted by the organizations. Moreover, though WIB is not an NGO and does not provide funding,³⁷ their advocacy in Spain has led to government grants being funneled to Colombia (ibid). On a less material level, the organizations' membership in a TAN gives them a channel by which to connect their local struggles with global issues and global discourses. In theory, it facilitates a broadening of the targets of social movement organizing; as collaborations between claimants of rights on a regional, national, and international scale increase, the objects of their claims also move from local to regional to national to international (Tilly & Wood, 2013, p. 114). This broadening allows for the amplification of local issues because they connect to globally recognized challenges or crises. Moreover, collaboration with TANs allows local SMOs to make use of the "boomerang effect" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), in which international bodies are informed of their struggles and, in turn, can apply pressure to the Colombian State. At the time of my fieldwork, in its capacity as part of WIB, Ruta Pacífica was still holding weekly silent vigils of its own in Colombia's major cities (this did not include, to my knowledge, Popayán). But the influence of WIB did not seem to extend to Ruta's decisionmaking processes; nor did the activists speak about claims-making on an international scale. This is in keeping with patterns uncovered elsewhere by Tilly and Wood (2013, p. 122), where they assert that data "show us a late 20th century European world in which most social movement claim making continue to occur within state boundaries."

³⁷ The sources I encountered disagreed on this point; Mejía (2011, p. 43) asserted that WIB had provided funding for the OFP as one of its member organizations. It is unclear whether that funding came in the form of direct aid, or an in-kind donation of labor or services.

When I asked Alejandra Miller about the effects of Ruta's participation in WIB, she spoke positively about the relationship and other ties to international organizations, including UN Women. International networks and organizations, she said, have offered a great deal of support "con algunas cosas, o algún aporte en alguna movilización, pero cosas más puntuales" (rather than a constant funding stream, for instance). Ruta's international relationships are particularly important during times of threats; Miller mentioned an incident the previous year in which several women's organizations were threatened in pamphlets published by neoparamilitary organizations, one of which mentioned the network's national coordinator, Marina Gallego, by name. International organizations responded by publishing pronouncements against the threats, calling important global attention to the insecurity of women activists in Colombia.

Despite the existence of these relationships, however, and the benefits they may carry, they can also bring threats to organizational autonomy. Chandra Mohanty (1988, p. 62) warns that transnational organizing (which at the time of her writing had yet to fully enter the NGO era) can fall prey to a dynamic in which there is an agreed-upon, finite list of "feminist" issues around which all affiliates, despite their local needs and realities, are expected to organize. Global asymmetries of power can be replicated in transnational feminist solidarity networks (Rodrigues B., 2015), and the agency in such alliances tends to remain in the global centers of power:

"Much of the leadership of global civil society organizations appears to be self-appointed and nonaccountable to their members, many of whom are passive and confine their activism to signatures to petitions circulated via e-mail... between [large group] episodes activity is carried on by a core group of NGOs... it is possible that participants and demonstrations are handed a political platform and an agenda that has been finalized elsewhere. This is hardly either democratic or even political" (N. Chandhoke, qtd. in Tilly & Wood, 2013, p. 123).

In keeping with Chandhoke's critiques, Janet Conway (2016) asserts that feminism on the transnational level is "nearly silent on the issue of decoloniality," and that in the 1990s, when

transnational organizing reached its peak, its campaigns were “race-blind.” If this is the case, then many of the more radical and perhaps most important critiques of popular and decolonial feminisms risk being unrepresented by TANs. I submit, however, that rather than sitting back and waiting for direction from on high “between episodes,” TAN member organizations like Ruta Pacífica are episodically capitalizing on global opportunities amidst continuous localized action. Local organizing continues to happen in between major TAN campaigns; when a large-scale campaign takes place, Ruta is able to link its ongoing work to the more globally visible event. Rather than being passive receptors of an exogenous agenda, as Chandhoke warns, local activists are strategic opportunists who attach their goals to floating agendas. Perhaps, too, the grassroots nature of a TAN like WIB makes it less likely than other TANs to dictate an agenda. My observations indicated that Ruta’s membership in WIB affected the way it presented itself internationally more than it affected the network’s day-to-day organizing; that is, their priorities were not overdetermined by the relationship.

Strategic Alliances: Risky, but Rewarding

Despite the dangers of co-optation, deradicalization, division, and dependence incurred when women activists risk their organizational autonomy in alliances with NGOs and other international funders, other women’s networks, armed groups, State, Church, and TANs, the rewards of such alliances – should they be realized – are significant. For example, feminist organizations in the Global South have strategically and shrewdly been able to appropriate NGO resources to build their own projects (Álvarez, 2009). Rather than operating in a straitjacket of the globally sanctioned practices handed down from above, grant recipients have negotiated their relationships with funders in a way that has contributed, in varying degrees, to their own political

capacity. Within the NGO framework, all three networks under study are endeavoring to do this, cautiously operating in the world of State and international funding while attempting to maintain an independence of purpose.

When I discussed international funding with the RMCC's Yusmidia Solano, she reported that the network has always received funding from international bodies. Chief among them was ASDI, the Swedish Agency for International Development, which was one of IMP's key funders, and AEC, the Spanish Agency for Cooperation, which has funded the RNM's more recent activities (inter-governmental bodies like the UN have not offered funding). When I asked Solano about how these funding relationships affected the network's independence, she replied:

Yo creo que es relativo. O sea, hay bastante autonomía, pero de alguna manera la agencias internacionales imponen un ritmo, un tiempo, exigen un tipo de manejo administrativo, que no todas las organizaciones de la red están en las condiciones de tenerlo, de seguirlo. Y por otro lado, que, digamos, los productos también se tiene que adecuar, o sea, hay que presentar informes – que el dinero se utilizó bien, y sí, desde éste punto de vista... Entonces, digamos que sí, hay unas ciertas limitaciones. En el caso de nosotras, hemos escogido, como, las temáticas. Pero yo creo que es que sí, en algún momento las agencias imponen las cosas que tienen que resultar de la financiación.

The network's strategy for dealing with this imposition, Solano said, was that its work was rooted in women's organizations of the popular sector. Working-class organizations "tienen su propia dinámica," she said, and the network's commitment has been to strengthen local processes more than it has been to attach itself to broad international goals. Even as it accepts foreign funding, the RMCC has forged new links with other Colombian organizations devoted specifically to the eight departments of the Caribbean region. In 2013, the RMCC agreed to collaborate with the Ministry of the Interior in hosting workshops intended to strengthen and equip women's social movements, women's cooperatives, and women members of SMOs. They organized 33 24-hour sets of workshops, one in each of Colombia's departments and in Bogotá. The training model is comparable to the espirales hosted by Ruta Pacífica, with the distinction

that the RMCC's workshops are organized alongside a State agency. This means that the RMCC was faced with negotiating the balance between the risks of State collaboration (co-optation, deradicalization, and having its work simply used to bolster the Ministry's reputation) and the significant benefits of having the resources to organize nearly eight hundred hours of trainings for women activists all over the country, providing an opportunity to consolidate the movement on a national scale. Norma Carmona spoke of this delicate balance when I interviewed her in 2013, making it clear that the network was treading carefully:

[Hablando] del proyecto del ministerio, les decíamos eso a las compañeras el martes en el taller, que nosotras no podemos perder el 'norte.' Si? Siempre tenemos que tener claro hacia donde es que queremos ir, verdad? Porque cual ha sido – de acuerdo con las experiencias y los conocimientos que uno tiene, las entidades gubernamentales tienen siempre el propósito es de cumplir con el requisito, verdad? Entonces, y de eso no se escapa el Ministerio ni la oficina esta con la que está trabajando. Entonces, ¿que le interesa al ministerio y a esa oficina cumplir, que hicieron tantas talleres?

But the potential benefits to the network were significant, not only in terms of access to State resources, but of pursuing their broader goals. Carmona explained that the challenge the RMCC undertook in this collaboration was to encourage and foster the participation of women in the construction of public policy, so that they can present the particular concerns of both women and Colombia's regions. The network is preparing the women in its member organizations, she said, for real participation – not only being present, but participating in creating policies alongside the State. So while collaboration risks cooptation, it is also a powerful tool in changing the nature of the relationship between a patriarchal State and women's SMOs.

In the Magdalena Medio the MSM's pursuit of autonomy is a complicated one, since the network's activities are currently on hold. Whether the alliances that were made by and within the network contributed to its funding crisis are fodder for further analysis, but it is clear that the process of forging organizational autonomy, while pursuing strategic alliances, was important to

the network while it was active. As Yolanda Beccera explained in 2013, “Nosotros tenemos claro que las organizaciones, si no nos pensamos en el tema de la autonomía política, pues, vamos a desaparecer. Y en ese sentido, venimos haciendo todo un proceso, que no es fácil.” As for the MSM’s organizing body, the OFP, at the time of my fieldwork they were engaged not only in a strategic collaboration with the State, but also a process of development with Ecopetrol, the State-owned oil company based in Barrancabermeja. It began when the OFP petitioned Ecopetrol to include a gender component in its development project, and the company agreed. It was considered probable during my fieldwork that the OFP would be taking charge of that portion of the project. While this put the OFP at odds with other local SMOs whose leaders were reluctant to lend legitimacy to either the oil company or the extractivist economic model that they saw as the root of various social, economic, and political ills, the cooperation was also expected to bring significant funding to the OFP. This is at a time when the OFP, like the MSM, was facing a funding crisis. Activists reported even as early as 2013 that the government’s move toward peace with the FARC-EP meant that funding from Amnesty International and European NGOs was drying up. The activists, then, are being forced to reassess their strategies for autonomy, and forge alliances with entities they might have avoided in less desperate times. Becerra’s comments on strategic shifts echo Norma Carmona’s statements above, and shed light on the challenges of Colombian social movements at the current moment: the waning of the NGO era, the possibility of an end to formal conflict, and a desperate need to find firm footing in a shifting reality.

Yo creo que [los años recientes] han marcado unas etapas importantes en el fortalecimiento y en la construcción de la OFP. La OFP ha tenido claro que los momentos políticos cambian. Y que eso es sí, cambiar de metodología y de estrategias. No cambiar las apuestas. O sea, uno no puede ser un día una cosa, y el otro día otra cosa. La organización tiene claro sus objetivos, tiene claro su apuesta, su papel en la sociedad, su compromiso, por la defensa de los derechos humanos de las mujeres. Pero sí, en cada momento que ha sido necesario, ha

cambiado su estrategia, y ha cambiado su metodología. Y hoy está en ese proceso. Hoy está en un periodo de reconstrucción, donde viene cambiando su forma de hacer las cosas. No a donde llegar, no su objetivo ni su apuesta, pero sí su forma de hacer las cosas. Ha cambiado.

Alejandra Coll of Ruta Pacífica also spoke of striking a balance between autonomy and strategic collaboration, in this case with NGOs and international funders. She cited the network's national coordination as a key manager of these strategic relationships, describing the central office as an enabler and protector of the local projects with regard to acquiring funding:

Se negocian mucho los términos antes de – es decir, yo no siento que – yo, por lo menos, no me he sentido condicionada en los proyectos que yo he manejado. Y han sido proyectos difíciles a veces, [pero] nunca me he sentido condicionada. Es decir, a veces uno se siente que quisiera poder hacer más, pero de hecho la cooperación de la Ruta es muy estratégica en cuanto a la cooperación que busca. Mira, la cooperación es – bueno, en ese momento fue española, pero ya no; lo que son los suecos, Oxfam, que son organizaciones muy abiertas que permiten un rango de acción. No es cómo si estuviéramos financiadas por – no sé, algo que tenga – el USAID, por ejemplo. No, no. Y creo que en esa también la coordinación nacional es muy estratégica, ¿no? En términos de buscar cooperación que se afín con las intereses. Y creo que también cuando se presentan los proyectos, es muy clara con la apuesta política. ‘Esto es lo que queremos hacer con el proyecto,’ desde el principio, cuando nos postulamos. Entonces, cuando no es tan claro allá del principio, lo que hace la organización es decir, ‘no nos interesa,’ y ya. O ‘apoyamos en esas condiciones.’ Yo nunca en los diez, doce años que he estado aquí, he visto que me digan, ‘oye, [es] financiado, no quiere que lo hace [esto].’

Finally, points out Álvarez, amidst the fraught dynamic of funder and recipient, FNGOs have contributed significantly to global feminist discourse and the strengthening of the global movement. “Many NGOs,” she writes,

... have been important producers of feminist knowledge. Some of the larger and better-resourced feminist organizations boast research departments that rival those of many university Women's Studies programmes in the region. They churn out scores of position papers, monographs and edited collections... NGOs have been central to sustaining movement fields, then, is as disseminators of feminist discourses. Though much of their knowledge production is explicitly aimed at influencing the policy process and is distributed widely to legislators, government bureaucrats and other public officials, a good deal is also self-consciously directed at ‘the movement’, and is often tapped and redeployed to a variety of ends by feminists active in other civil society organizations and social and political institutions (2011, pp. 177-8).

This is certainly true of Ruta Pacífica, whose theoretical publications on alternative symbolism, symbolic language, and the role of the body in conflict and peacemaking – not to mention its

own autobiographical histories or the incredible contribution of its 2013 Truth and Memory Commission report – are projects that link theory with praxis, deepening the significance of the movement’s mobilizations and helping to ground global feminism in women’s localized experiences. The MSM is also a producer of knowledge in this regard, though to a lesser extent; the RMC’s multiple publications not only on its own history, but on the integration of feminist concerns with the need for Caribbean regionalization, represent important contributions. Managing relationships with funders and collaborators remains a complicated endeavor, but the three networks under study have been able to use those relationships to produce knowledge as well as action. Whether they all have equal access to those relationships, however, is another question.

Negotiating Internal Divisions of Power

In addition to the asymmetries of power and access experienced between networks of women’s peace organizations analyzed above, the three networks under study are also faced with engaging these asymmetries as they are replicated, intentionally or by circumstance, within their own networks. Olga Amparo Sánchez (1995, p. 387) affirms that the Colombian women’s movement is diverse – “pluriclasista, pluriétnico y pluralista” – but few if any scholars have asked how that diversity plays out in the daily mobilization of the movement: where power is located and how it is shared. Each of the three networks under study represents more than two hundred smaller organizations. Even within the three regions (Cauca, the Magdalena Medio, and the Caribbean), there is significant racial-ethnic, class, and educational diversity among the women who make up the networks’ member organizations. Even as they endeavor to empower, connect, and mobilize local activists, there are unavoidable manifestations of intersecting power

structures within each.³⁸ How each network engaged those structures during my conversations with their leaders is the subject of this section.

Most of the women organizers of Ruta Pacífica in Popayán, as of 2013, were university-educated, though several were first-generation graduates from the popular classes. The majority of them were mestiza, in addition to at least one indigenous woman. When I asked Alejandra Miller whether this diversity (and any power dynamics it might carry with it) is discussed explicitly within the organization, she responded:

En algún momento, es un debate, pero es un debate del feminismo. Creo que no es un debate de la Ruta, pero del movimiento de mujeres en general, el movimiento de las intelectuales, de las feministas intelectuales versus las mujeres populares. Yo creo que eso lo hemos logrado, pues, manejar. A veces hay preguntas, yo creo que sí. Hay algunas preguntas, porque quienes han coordinado tienen procesos intelectuales. Pero eso no es en toda la Ruta. En el Chocó, por ejemplo, es una mujer popular que coordina. En Putumayo también. En Bolívar también. En Santander, es una mujer intelectual, profesora universitaria. Entonces las coordinación – digamos que cada región tiene, como, su dinámica. No es que todas las coordinadoras de la Ruta sean mujeres intelectuales, no, son mujeres populares, mujeres populares que se han formado también. Claro, que tienen visión política, que se han formado, que hay algunas que han pasado por la universidad, sí, pero son mujeres populares.

No matter who the women are who coordinate each regional office of the network, it is also true that there is more diversity among the women from member organizations. Within the Cauca chapter, there is a much larger percentage of indigenous women of various ethnicities (Yanacona, Misak, and Nasa, for instance) and Afro women. My conversation with another activist in the Popayán office, who is mestiza, touched on the challenge of organizing trainings and workshops that meet the needs of various groups of women.

Mira que yo te puedo decir que sí, hemos tenido – nunca habido una distinción radical, como decir que son peleas, nunca. Pero sí, de pronto hemos tenido el reto de adecuar, por ejemplo, un taller para que en el mismo taller esté una indígena, o indígenas de varias étnias, una mujer Afro, una mestiza, y con distintos niveles educativos. Que aunque eso no ha presentado problemas, claro que eso nos ha dado, porque a veces pasa que alguna dice, ‘pero es que yo quiero que mi tema esté allí, yo quiero que mi tema esté allí.’ Pero creo que Alejandra [Miller] es muy buena en tratar de mantener el equilibrio y no ha dejado que eso –

³⁸ For a focused look at the role of Afro-Colombian women in social movements writ large, see Lamus, 2012.

porque esa zona es muy diversa, aquí donde estamos. Entonces, sabíamos que esto iba a pasar. Entonces, siempre se crean talleres especiales con las indígenas, y momentos donde estamos todas juntas. Igual, el día de la movilización, [firmly] somos una sola. Salimos igual. No importa la piel o nada.

The speaker credited the lack of explicit conflict within the organization over issues of race and ethnicity to the Miller's leadership style, and admitted that tensions do arise on occasion. What was emphasized in this conversation, it is worth noting, was the organization's ability to "smooth over" its internal differences and unite under one banner – not necessarily to interrogate and transform those differences.

El trabajo de Alejandra ha sido maravilloso en ese sentido, de mantener. De vez en cuando se presentan dificultades, claro, en todas partes. No te voy a decir que es perfecto, no. También [con las] mujeres Afros se presentan problemas porque sienten que las reivindicaciones se quedan atrás. Pero Alejandra es muy buena en lograr armonizar las cosas... yo pienso que [la armonización] funciona más en las regiones que en Bogotá.

The day after this conversation, I accompanied the Cauca chapter of Ruta Pacífica on a weekend *Espiral*³⁹ retreat to the municipality Santander de Quilichao. The dynamics of maintaining racial harmony expressed in the above conversation were made clear at the workshop, to which the network was kind enough not only to invite me, but also offered me transportation, meals, and lodging while refusing to accept a monetary contribution. While the content of the workshop is discussed more deeply in Chapter 5, it is sufficient here to say that the form of the training made clear the differences between women's experience of womanhood based on intersections of race and class, and evinced, at times, a form of benevolent paternalism deeply rooted in Colombian power structures. One woman from the popular sector who attended the workshop, for example, was called upon several times by the university-educated workshop leaders to answer a question; each time she froze, encouraged by her peers but lacking the confidence to offer a response.

³⁹ Ruta Pacífica members ascribed several meanings to the symbol of the *espiral*, prominent among them the idea that peace begins with small actions and radiates outward, growing broader and broader with every rotation. Armed conflict is also conceived of as a spiral; one upsets the other. Attendees at the workshop drew a chalk spiral on the floor and decorated it with candles and flower petals to serve as a reminder of that symbolism.

Several of the preparatory documents for the workshop had been sent by email, to which not all of the attendees had access.

Moreover, while several of the Afro and indigenous women attempted to move the conversation to issues particular to their racialized experiences, the discourse of the workshop as it was laid out was that of a “mainstreamed,” mestiza feminist movement. Traditional feminist issues of the so-called second wave were stressed; a video shown at the beginning of the weekend, for instance, identified the similar housekeeping routines of rich and poor women in an attempt to argue that all women are oppressed on the basis of gender. The idea of women oppressing other women on the basis of race and ethnicity was largely uninterrogated; when the mestiza workshop leaders discussed the issue of labor abuses, the imagined perpetrator was framed as male, for example. In the conversation that followed, however, indigenous speakers referred to the perpetrator as “la jefa.” When the conversation later turned to differences between women’s experiences, the leaders of the workshop were quick to emphasize commonalities. One Afro woman admitted that sometimes, this kind of workshop was led by women who were unaware of the realities attendees faced in their home communities; during the legal training, an indigenous woman pointed out that indigenous territories and resguardos had their own sets of laws which were not being discussed. When a mestiza workshop leader commented that “a veces, no sólo te discriminan por género, pero por étnia,” one Afro woman called out, “Uy, ¡más!” The workshop leader responded that although the women came from different regions, they had many things in common. Another Afro woman answered insistently, “Sí, pero tenemos contextos distintos.”

Though none of these anecdotes is proof of any deep internal division in the network, they indicate some level of disconnect between the priorities of the network chapter’s organizing

agenda, as reflected in this workshop, and the differing experiences of the Afro and indigenous women who make up its membership. The depth of this disconnect, what it represents for the network, and whether it is being addressed by the network's organizers are questions that are impossible to measure from the outside. Furthermore, I engage in an analysis of these interactions cautiously, acknowledging that my cultural background encourages the questioning of authority figures at events like this, while some of the women attendees may not have felt comfortable speaking up even if they disagreed with what was being presented. Interestingly, Alejandra Miller was described by the younger activists in the office as "la mamá de todas"; this dynamic of teaching, of smoothing over potential disagreements, seemed to trickle down into the relationship between the leaders of the regional network and its members. Colombia is a cultural context in which lighter skin and a higher degree confer authority, and the espiral workshop I attended was not immune to that reality. The power dynamics that were evident call for Mohanty's (2003) ajection that the category of 'woman' in the feminist movement does not always represent all women's experiences, but at the same time, the Afro and indigenous women who participate in the Ruta are strategic activists, not blind participants. In a conversation with an indigenous woman who attended the espiral representing the CRIC, Cauca's indigenous council, I asked her whether she felt that Ruta was meeting her needs as an indigenous woman. She answered quickly that she was not looking to Ruta Pacífica to meet those needs; the nationwide organization of indigenous and campesina women, ANMUCIC, was designed for that purpose. It was clear that she saw her participation in multiple networks of women as a way to serve multiple needs arising from her membership in multiple identity groups. Similarly, many of the Afro women present were also active in the PCN, the network of Afro-Colombian SMOs. So while Ruta Pacífica itself may not have represented the diversity of women's experiences and

needs in the discourse presented during this brief workshop, the pantheon of women's SMOs in the country shows that solutions to those needs are being sought out in a variety of ways.

Divisions of power based on race and region within the feminist movement were a much more prominent part of my discussions with activists from the Red de Mujeres del Caribe, where most of the regional leaders of the network are women who come from the popular sector. When I asked RMC activists how they endeavored to avoid the dynamic they pointed out, in which the SMOs in the major cities tokenized regional organizations to attract funding, without abandoning a paternalistic relationship, they spoke of the network's model of leadership. Yusmidia Solano explained:

Pues, siempre se ha buscado que haya una coordinación colegiada. Es decir que la dirección no se centraliza por una persona. Por eso precisamente, yo siendo fundadora de la red y Audes siendo asesora política todo el tiempo hemos decidido que hay que construir liderazgo colectivo, que tiene que ser a partir de una fortaleza y empoderamiento de las otras mujeres, que las líderes, le digo, lideresas, se formen, se capaciten, y tengan condiciones para dirigir el proyecto ante la ausencia de nuestra.

The leadership of the network rotated between the eight Caribbean departments, Solano said, although she admitted that this rotation sometimes faltered because women's organizations in one department or another lacked the organizational capacity or infrastructure to assume the position; in those cases, leadership would return to one of the more established organizations that had already held the chair. (Members of Ruta Pacífica also spoke about the rotation of leadership; Miller admitted that “[Tengo] mucho tiempo coordinando la Ruta, y pues, no ha habido mecanismo de elección definida, o reelección de – no. Eso en el movimiento es una pregunta pendiente.” Whether her new duties in the departmental government will necessitate a solution to that question has yet to be seen.)

Norma Carmona also discussed the RMC's leadership model, saying that the network's engagement with the work of Orlando Fals Borda meant that their operations were influenced by

his model of popular education and Participatory Action Research (IAP, in the Spanish acronym). She explained:

Uno de los elementos que se han utilizados dentro de ese proceso es romper, un poco, como ese esquema donde las profesionales quedan como coordinadoras, como gestoras, y aca abajo en las bases, las que son provisionales, y que creemos que no tienen la capacidad y el conocimiento. Siempre estamos en ese proceso de la construcción colectiva del conocimiento a partir de la experiencia de cada una, de su entorno, de su práctica cotidiana.

Modeling this kind of dynamic takes work, Carmona admitted, but

Nos estamos en la práctica asumiendo el compromiso que en teoría tenemos. El liderazgo tiene que ser de todas... “Una cosa que reconocemos es la diferencia, la diversidad dentro de igualdad. “Hay una concepción de liderazgo de que el líder es el que asume todo y el líder ordena, y los demás *escuchan*. Nosotras tenemos que asumir un liderazgo muy diferente.

Part of that leadership involves organizers pulling back and relinquishing authority. Speaking about the project she worked on to systematize and record the experiences of women in the Caribbean region, Carmona stressed that the regional women’s organizations needed to be involved in the process, not only as sources of testimony. If these women felt that they didn’t “fit” into the process as it was taking place, that was the organizers’ problem, not the women themselves. “Habían unas experiencias que no encajan dentro de lo que habíamos hablado, lo que habíamos definido. Pero allí teníamos entonces unas dificultades, y era que ya se les habían involucrado esas organizaciones dentro del proceso. ¿Cierto? Y decir en ese momento, ‘no, que ustedes no encajan...’ no era problema de ellas, era problema de las coordinadoras, que no tuvieron la visión [to prepare a more open framework].”

Feminism, Feminisms

Finally, the three networks under study continue to engage with the tension that occasionally arises over whether and how women activists relate to feminism, reflecting what Sternbach, et. al. (1992, p. 424) refer to as “one of the most critical issues facing Latin American

feminists: how to promote and advance a more ideological, theoretical, and cultural critique of dependent capitalist patriarchy while maintaining vital links... with poor and working-class women organizing around survival struggles.” While the above description adheres to the binary understanding of “practical” versus “strategic” gender interests advanced by Molyneux (1985), I argue that the work of the three networks under study, and the knowledge production taking place alongside their contentious mobilizations, shows that “an ideological and theoretical critique” is not an opposing category to “poor and working-class women.” While Mohanty (2003) admits that “[t]he term ‘feminism’ is itself questioned by many Third World women” because of Eurocentrism, cultural imperialism, and lack of interrogation of internal divisions of power, “[n]evertheless, Third World women have always engaged with feminism, even if the label has been rejected in a number of instances” (pp. 49-50; see also Mignolo, 2000 on postmodern feminists being trapped in a white epistemology).

The three networks under study have engaged with feminism in various ways, often accepting the label even as they grapple with Northern feminism’s historic racial and imperial myopia. Alejandra Miller of Ruta Pacífica identified the challenge in her own organizing, and stated that a certain flexibility was required when defining the network’s brand of feminism:

Las comunidades indígenas que se interpreta el feminismo como un discurso occidental. Del norte, del occidente, de la Ilustración, de la modernidad. Y que no es, a veces, según ellas, compatible con sus procesos culturales. Entonces, es también difícil ser feminista en ese territorio. Es difícil, pero creo que nos encontramos las metodologías para volver el feminismo que respeta esa diversidad, que no es dogmático, que se funda como de los principios del feminismo, pero que respeta ciertas cosas.

Nonetheless, Miller commented that tensions between women activists who call themselves feminist and those who do not continue to be present in Ruta’s difficult relationships with other organizations. These tensions have been a source of fissures and divergences between women’s peace networks, which, as discussed, have come together and separated again several times since

their formation. In her 2012 analysis of women in peace movements, Cynthia Cockburn states that while SMOs may diverge in their analyses of the problem they face, its roots, and the resulting strategy to overcome it, they can still agree on the goals and the political imaginary they are trying to achieve (p. 241). This leads to the shifting, strategic alliances discussed in the previous chapter – what have been called “provisional” as opposed to “stable” alliances (Arango-Vargas, 2013). The three networks under study routinely collaborate with one another to organize events on November 25th, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, for example; they have also collaborated on campaigns surrounding the current negotiations in Havana. And they maintain cordial relationships between campaigns, communicating regularly, according to Doris Lamus (2010).

The activists with whom I spoke have particular relationships to feminism, though they all claim the term in their own ways. Yolanda Beccera, for instance:

Yo, a veces, durante el proceso, me negué a ser feminista, por muchas cosas. Porque creo que, pues, hay distintas corrientes feministas. Y yo las admiro a muchas cosas que se han logrado, que han logrado tanto por su radicalidad, por su compromiso, por su capacidad, digamos, de romper con las estructuras... Pero me resiste porque también hay cosas que yo no lograba, nunca logré entender o compartir. Pero alguien me decía, en una reflexión o discusión política de había de mujeres, que ‘ustedes son más feminista, a veces, que las mismas feministas.’

The Red de Mujeres del Caribe has an equally hands-on relationship with feminism, and is also part of a process of theoretical production intended to amplify, relocate, and decolonize the term. Norma Carmona reported a relationship to feminism similar to Becerra’s when she said, “yo siempre tuve esto, preparado, con el movimiento feminista clásico, ¿verdad? [Pero] radical, porque yo miro desde otra óptica. Yo pienso que no es la lucha en contra del hombre, sino la lucha por una igualdad en todos los espacios... entonces, pues, yo en algún momento me alejé.”

Members of RMC network affiliates, according to Silvia Torres, often grapple with the network's proclaimed feminism. Members of Miss Nancy Land saw the term as elitist, she remembered, and spent significant time discussing feminism before deciding to participate in the RMCC (Torres rolled her eyes, laughing that she was tired of discussing the topic). This simultaneous distance from "mainstream" feminism, due to its rootedness in the particular experiences of white women in the imperial North, and intimacy with its political goals arising from women's gendered experiences of war and alterity have led RMCC activists to engage theoretically with feminist discourse in new ways (see Chapter 5 for more on this). Solano explained:

Ya hemos empezado a denominarnos como feminismo negro, feminismo indígena, o feminismo Zambo, como ellas quieren, pero del punto teórico es muy cercana al feminismo decolonial... Sí, es una nueva cosa. [Y] no tenemos posibilidades de dedicarnos a un feminismo académico. Yo tampoco partía a partir de una definición propia por mi origen, porque mi procedencia, de que mi madre era campesina, mi padre era obrero, y sí, porque mi militancia política y luego por el feminismo socialista, todo eso me he ubicado siempre en una postura en que no puedo concebir hacer un feminismo que no haga intervención directa con los sectores populares.

The engagement of these women's networks – operating as they do outside the Colombian centers of power, not to mention the global metropole – with feminist discourse should expand the global understanding of the feminist current. Colombian women from the regiones are grappling with, not ignoring, feminism's blind spots. But rather than dismissing it as an imperial import, they are forging a bricolage of emancipatory currents – feminist, anti-imperialist, decolonial, of color, and deeply attuned to the lived realities of women on the world's margins – and insisting that those realities be at the center, not the periphery, of feminist action. Sonia Álvarez's discussion of the "expanding feminist pueblo" encapsulates the deep global significance of this kind of engagement:

The very women whom the hegemonic feminism of the so-called Second Wave viewed as 'others'... have translated and radically transformed some of its core tenets and fashioned other feminisms, 'feminismos con apellidos' that are deeply entwined, and sometimes contentiously entangled, with national and global struggles against all forms of inequality and for social, sexual and racial justice. These diverse feminisms... have produced effervescent movement currents that proffer trenchant critiques of enduring inequalities among women, as well as between women and men of diverse racial and social groups, thereby expanding the scope and reach of feminist messages and revitalizing women's cultural and policy interventions across the region (2009, p. 182).

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the challenges, external and internal, felt by the Colombian women's movement in previous decades have not disappeared. The struggle to maintain autonomy in a crowded field of potential threats, while simultaneously attempting to create political influence and seek financial support, is a paradox that continues to plague the operations of today's women's peace networks. The ways in which they are addressing this challenge in the modern day are cautious, strategic, and measured. Secondly, women's networks continue to grapple with internal divisions of power that trickle into movement organizing from the divided society in which they operate. All three networks under study engage those divisions at distinct levels; for some, that engagement is closer to their daily mobilization than for others. Internal divisions are also reflected in each network's engagement with institutional feminism, a discourse which has been broadened both by their praxis and their theoretical production.

As indicated in Chapter 2, much of the historiography of the Colombian feminist movement asserts that the internal divisions and fissures it has experienced over the last four decades are a consequence of living and mobilizing in the context of war. Wills and Gómez write that "...el gran reto que tienen hoy las iniciativas femeninas y feministas que se enfrentan a un alto en el camino para reflexionar sobre las consecuencias de vivir en un país en guerra, en el cual el enemigo es construido desde diferentes lugares, en dinámicas que llevan a 'paranoias' no

concientes y que inducen a discursos, sectarismos, y extrapolaciones peligrosas” (2006, p. 319).

Similarly, Maruja Barrig (1998, p. 18) refers to Colombian women as “muy peleonas,” attributing this natural contentiousness to feminists’ experience in clandestine Left political parties, where they developed an inherent suspicion of outsiders. This widely accepted perspective was both echoed and contested in my interviews with feminist activists in Colombia, and I believe it needs to be viewed with a critical eye.

The MSM’s Yolanda Becerra spoke at length about what she saw as the lack of a united national social movement in Colombia, and she attributed this atomization to the armed conflict.

Hay *expresiones* sociales. Hay *grupos* importantes. Hay iniciativas, hay propuestas, pero movimientos sociales, hace mucho rato fueron acabados. Por eso, fuimos tan fracturados, que por eso digamos se hablan de espacios nacionales, pero cada uno pensando por su lado. O sea, no hay una propuesta del *país*, desde los movimientos sociales, porque no los hay. Hay propuestas de *personas*. Hay propuestas de grupos. Hay propuestas de, digamos, de iniciativas. Pero no hay una propuesta del país desde lo alternativo. Porque la misma guerra también nos dividió. O sea, hay unos liderazgos muy individuales, no hay liderazgos nacionales, no hay liderazgos colectivos, ¿cierto? Prima los intereses individuales por encima de lo colectivo. Y para poder tener una propuesta, el país tiene que primar los intereses colectivos por encima de los individuales.

Yusmidia Solano of the RMCC addressed this question as well, returning to the conversation about the network’s rupture from Ruta Pacífica, the IMP and, before that, the RNM. She too blamed the armed conflict:

La guerra deja esa. Las rupturas precisamente de los tejidos sociales. Deja roto las confianzas políticas. Entonces, durante mucho tiempo, lo pasabamos remendando hasta que llega un momento este todo sea una colche, llega un momento en que ya no puede pegar. Y eso ha pasado con los movimientos sociales, no solo de mujeres. Con todos. Y ese es resultado del conflicto.

Earlier in our conversation, Solano had attributed the RNM’s split from national networks of feminists to regional and racial tokenism during the 1990s (she also spoke, above, of disagreements about how to relate to the State).

Alejandra Miller of Ruta Pacífica admitted that forming alliances is never easy in any country, during peace or wartime. But Colombians, she stated, do suffer from a “paranoia colectiva” that filters into their relationships. However, she went on to also attribute collaborative difficulties to the political diversity within Colombian feminisms – and not exclusively due to the suspicion born of war. Miller’s point speaks to the complexity of movement diversity in Colombia – a complexity which I argue that Wills’ assertion of paranoia fails to reflect. It is undeniable that the experiences of living in a polarized society, where betrayal by a movement ally can result in blood, must necessarily weaken the social fabric, making activists less likely to trust one another. At the same time, however, Colombian academic feminists’ repeated referrals to paranoia and suspicion serve to occlude important issues of racialized power, regional representation, and class divisions within the feminist movement. Even Barrig’s assertion above that activists are “peleonas” is followed, in her own text, by interviews with activists who attribute movement fissures to the centralization of resources in the major cities (1998, p. 19). While my interviewees agreed, when asked, with Wills’ assertion of war-born paranoia, the content of our conversations also revealed the racist legacy of colonialism and the role of external influences in concentrating resources unfairly. I submit that attributing all the movement’s fissures to an inherent suspiciousness on the part of activists serves to absolve the centralized feminist movement of responsibility for addressing regional, racial-ethnic, and class divides among women. When an underfunded organization from las regiones is tokenized by a national NGO in Bogotá and decides to cut ties, it is easier to dismiss the departure as paranoid than to reflect on the consequences of living in a country bifurcated by material divisions between races, classes, and regions. As Nathalie Lebon admits of the Latin American feminist movement overall, “[M]uch work remains to be done for a full

acknowledgement of *privilege* on the part of middle- and upper-class women of mostly European or mixed descent, both in society and in movement-wide forums” (2010, p. 13; emphasis in the original).

Nonetheless, though the movement has far to go, the footprint it has left on Colombian state and society is deep. Though sufficient representation of feminist concerns (and representation of feminists themselves) at the State level remains out of reach (Wills & Gómez, 2006), the work of the women’s peace movement is remarkable: whether in the form of a massive street mobilization, a legal training, a soup kitchen, the collection of crucial data, innovative theoretical production, or a simple handshake between an exhausted president and a graying revolutionary which would have been impossible to achieve without decades of tireless activism by Colombian women. As Alejandra Miller reflected in 2013,

Yo creo que la Ruta ha logrado posicionarse como una actora política en el tema de la paz y las mujeres en este país. Ahorita estamos viendo ese reconocimiento. Por diecisiete años, estamos diciendo, ‘solución política, y participación de las mujeres, y las mujeres y el tema de la paz.’ Y hoy se llega la posibilidad de esa negociación [en Habana], y nos vemos allí, como en el centro de discusión. Somos consultadas, somos invitadas, somos respetadas, nos llaman, nos preguntan. Creo que es el reconocimiento es un poco de los que estamos cosechando, después de 17 años de movilización, de incidencia, de producción, de una cantidad de cosas. Yo siento que hoy es el momento de la Ruta.

But perhaps the most tangible, and the most moving, results of this work are in the changes visible among women themselves: their self-perception, their daily relationships, their social and political subjectivity, and sphere of their public participation (Mesa de Trabajo, 2005b, p. 112). “¡Sólo el hecho de que las mujeres hablen en público!” Alejandra Coll exclaimed when I asked about the effects of mobilizing. “Eso ya es una cosa que nosotras nunca se nos ocurrió, que para muchas, fue la primera vez. Al final ellas se acercan y se dice, ‘es la primera vez que hablo en público en mi vida.’ A veces estás haciendo tanto que no te das cuenta de los efectos. No tenemos mucho tiempo de sentar y pensar.”

Later in our conversation I asked Coll about what she saw as the successes of her work with Ruta Pacífica. She paused a moment, and then responded:

Mira. Yo no sé si la Ruta ha cambiado el país. No sé si sus acciones, en algún momento, han tenido repercusión. Es muy difícil de medir, y yo te digo, no tenemos la capacidad de medirlo. Pero es que yo estoy *segura*, y te puedo decir, que hemos cambiado vidas de personas. Y en contextos pequeños, siento que por momentos, logramos crear conciencias del tema, para que la gente sepa lo que está pasando. Pero es muy difícil medir el impacto nacional. Hay momentos donde creemos, por ejemplo el momento donde hay diez mil mujeres en Bogotá que están llenando la Plaza de Bolívar, decimos, ‘sí, tenemos influencia.’ Es algo que nosotras queremos creer. Pero es imposible medir.

A clearer picture of the place of women’s mobilizing in the current historical conjuncture will only emerge by viewing it from multiple vantage points, examining the way activists and their discourse intervene at various sites of the production of the armed conflict and its various scaffolds. In the remainder of this dissertation, I will visit four of these sites of production, which I argue act as characters in the conflict and its potential transformation. I will examine questions and discourses of Confusion, Victimhood, the Body, and Peace, looking for ways in which women’s peace networks’ engagement alters the roles these constructs play on Colombia’s stage. Whether the transformations wrought by women’s activism occur in the personal lives of movement participants, as Coll indicates above, or whether moments of which she speaks will have broad and lasting repercussions, it is certain that we should look for evidence of change in unexpected sites of language and symbolism. As Joan Scott reminds us, “If significations of gender and power construct one another, how do things change? The answer is that change may be initiated in many places” (1986, p. 1073).

I will begin with an analysis of confusion, a useful lens for understanding and rethinking the history – and potential transformation – of the armed conflict.

The *banalization* of violence [makes] violence appear as if it had always existed... This makes it more difficult to determine what is novel in the current situation and thus to make sense of what is actually taking place. Such confusion is common to all parts of Colombia (Pécaut, 1999:162).

Chapter 4

Colombia's Confusing Violence:

Historiography and the Fog of War

In his oft-cited history of Colombia, David Bushnell begins by saying: “Colombia is today the least studied of all the major Latin American countries, and probably the least understood” (1993, p. vii). Students of Colombian historiography will be familiar with this kind of introduction, which seems to appear again and again from both inside and outside of Colombia as an entrée into complex explanations of the country's armed conflict. Alongside the idea of Colombia as a “paradox,” because of its allegedly stable economy and political system in the face of violence, the trope of confusion, in which complex and shifting relationships between conflict actors are portrayed as difficult or impossible to understand, is perhaps the most persistent thread that runs through narratives of Colombian history (Dennis, 2006, p. 91). Historians and political economists frame their interventions as attempts to “make sense of” or map out Colombia's violence (LeGrand, 2003; Oquist, 1980; Payne, 1968; Bejarano, 2003), which is presented as being so full of nebulous alliances and shifting motives (Jenny Pearce [1990] refers to the country as a “labyrinth”) that it takes a team of academics to lay it out in comprehensible terms. Journalistic accounts parrot this notion that the conflict is incomprehensible – “Colombia's Baffling Reality,” announces a typical headline (Smith, 2006).

This chapter examines the character of confusion in Colombian historiography: the role it plays in understanding Colombia's history and present-day economy; why it is so persistently

cited in analyses of the armed conflict; and further, how it is appropriated by women's peace networks, notably Ruta Pacífica, to transform their relationship to the conflict, the State, and their own subjectivity. I aim to answer these questions: Is Colombia's armed conflict inherently confusing, or is confusion imposed as a tool in pursuit of an end? What purpose does the trope of confusion serve? Who uses it and perpetuates it? Why? How do women peace activists appropriate that trope, and what does their appropriation mean for the armed conflict?

I argue here that confusion is used strategically by domestic and international elites to conserve and concentrate wealth and power, and to prevent popular social movement actors from making changes to Colombia's longstanding colonial power structure. This strategy has been seen at all points in the armed conflict, from 1946 to the present day. It is a trope accepted as the "common sense" (Gramsci, 1971) interpretation of the conflict in that it is echoed by domestic and international media and repeated uncritically by many scholars and historiographers. The result is that the ubiquitous "confusion" narrative of the country's armed conflict benefits, hides, and assists the maintenance of dominance and subordination, assisting in the concentration of wealth, privation of the poor, and obstruction of class-based reforms and conflict transformation efforts. I will trace the role of confusion in the early years of the armed conflict, through *La Violencia* of 1946-1958 and the shifts toward the modern-day conflict in the decades that followed. In today's conflict, as I will demonstrate, national and international accounts of violence by the U.S. government, Colombian authorities, and journalists confuse the identities of conflict actors, conflating various actors with one another in an attempt to create a binary field of power where none exists. Finally, I argue that confusion has the capacity to play a key role in conflict transformation when used as a tool by women peace activists, who both literally confuse potential aggressors with creative nonviolence and symbolically confuse the logic of war itself.

Is Colombia's Conflict Confusing?

As so many historiographers have pointed out, the armed conflict in Colombia has distinct features among Latin American guerrilla wars. Unlike, for example, the late twentieth century conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador, and pre-revolutionary Nicaragua, or even in Chiapas in the 1990s, Colombia's conflict is fought by multiple Leftist insurgent groups. The oldest and largest is the FARC (now FARC-EP), founded in 1964, but the field is also occupied by the ELN and the EPL, founded in 1965; the M-19, founded in 1970 and demobilized in 1989; and the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL), founded in 1984 and demobilized in 1991. The fact that many of these organizations continue to operate long after the "end" of the Cold War, with its fictive communist/anticommunist binary, makes them more difficult to "read" inside a hegemonic framework. Furthermore, the links between AUC paramilitaries and the Colombian government were never as explicit as those between, for example, death squads in El Salvador or Peru and the national government; this allowed the AUC to operate in a way that protected the interests of government elites without implicating them directly. Thirdly, the country's daunting levels of organized crime, which – though never apolitical – maintains a distance from and shifting allegiances to political goals, further complicate the field of conflict. The infusion of drug money into such a panorama turned ideologues into opportunists, and made the various "sides" of conflict more difficult to classify. Finally, Colombia's armed conflict is ongoing. Civil wars have a tendency to become (that is, submitted to being made) more legible after the mortar shells are silent.

That said, this chapter is intended to expose confusion as something other than a natural feature of Colombia's war arising from its complexity. I engage a concept of confusion and claims of confusion to explain the way systems of power are contested or maintained; confusion

is, I argue, an epistemological project. It is used not only to tell true stories about the war, but to produce criminality for some and impunity for others; to obscure realities whose exposure would threaten elite power structures; and, in the end, to allow the conflict and its benefits to be perpetuated.

I'm inspired in part by a 2009 ethnography of an environmentally degraded neighborhood outside Buenos Aires, Argentina, by sociologists Javier Auyero and Débora Swistun. They write: "although confusion and uncertainty are common human experiences, they rarely play a role in social-scientific analyses and ethnographic descriptions" (p. 93). I find it helpful to conceive of confusion as another character in Colombian life, with its own set of shifting alliances and motives, and follow Wendy Woolford's (2006) claim that ethnographic studies must pick apart what is "common sense," even (or especially) when common-sense statements are contradictory, uncertain, or even misleading. As I will further examine below, armed conflict is complex, in Colombia as elsewhere; this complexity is a natural feature of war, though it is seldom narrated that way. I use "complexity" to refer to the actually-occurring, intricate and shifting web of motives and alliances in the armed conflict, and "confusion" to refer to the intentional obfuscation of the identities of perpetrators and victims, and of motives, carried out by armed actors and politicians. As Auyero and Swistun conclude, there is a difference between a *lack* of understanding and clarity and a deliberate *mis*understanding or blurring. "Confusion and doubt are indeed socially constructed," they write. "But the construction of mystification is hardly a cooperative creation" (Auyero and Swistun, 2009, p. 107). The mystification taking place in Colombia is echoed in the international press, and given credence in scholarly accounts that frame their efforts as attempts to address the conflict's (uninterrogated) confusion.

“The classification of violence” in Colombia, writes Winifred Tate, is “a highly contested process” (2007, p. 32). Confusion is a tool, marshaled as part of that contestation – and, as I will argue, reappropriated by women activists and used for conflict transformation. I will begin by tracing the role of confusion during La Violencia, one of many complex periods in Colombian history, and one during which violent actors used confusion to enable violence and obscure their actions and the motivations behind them.

An Amorphous, Shapeless, and Contradictory Mass: Confusion in La Violencia

The civil conflict that engulfed Colombia between 1948 and 1958 seems to have resulted in as many historiographical interpretations of it as there are scholars of Colombian history. There are so many accounts of the reasons behind and dynamics of the period, in fact, that it has launched an entire field of scholarship known as “violontology.” As Gonzalo Sánchez writes: “in its very ambiguity ‘the Violence’ as a term points out the complexity of the period being inaugurated” (1992, p. 79). Perhaps this “ambiguity” is due to the fact that Gaitanismo, the popular force that rose up around Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, failed to align with the two-party system of the time: it was pro-labor, but not unionist; Gaitán was Liberal, but the Liberals called him a Fascist; Conservatives called him a Communist, but the Communists worked to undermine him; Gaitán was a reformist, but his followers were radicals. At the time, this confusion about the nature of Gaitanismo presented a threat to power. The political establishment responded to the threat of an uprising by marshaling partisan enmity to control the unrest in the countryside, insisting on “maintaining the country’s new social conflicts within the old vertical party divisions” (Sánchez, 1992, p. 80) and essentially obstructing the specter of a unified underclass.

Confusion would come to define the next decade, beginning with the very moment that set

off La Violencia: Gaitán's assassination. The man believed to have killed him, Juan Roa Sierra, seemed to have been working alone; to this day, he remains essentially an unknown (one account calls him "a drifter whose motivations remain obscure" [University of Wisconsin Press, 1986]). Roa was accused of collaborating with various parties, but no alliances were proven. This confusion allowed both political parties to shield themselves from the fury of the popular movement, and instead turn peasants against one another.

Party affiliation in midcentury Colombia was both hereditary and vitriolic, and the fact that the Catholic Church was aligned with the Conservative party only added to the religious, even millennialist character of inter-party conflict (Oquist, 1980; Fals, 1969; Molano, 1992). Traditional Liberal anticlericalism had come to a head after 1861, when many priests were effectively exiled from Colombia (Taussig, 1980). Liberals were subsequently labeled as "moral filth... Communists, Jews, Protestants, and Masons" (Tate, 2007, p. 37); one twentieth-century priest admonished his congregation that "parricide, infanticide, theft, crime, adultery, incest, etc., are lesser evils than to be liberal, especially as far as women are concerned" (Bushnell, 1993, p. 167). On another occasion, Conservative President Laureano Gomez, who would be the force behind the crackdown on Gaitanismo, charged the Liberal party with allowing the "basilisk" of communism to grow, referring to the party as "an amorphous, shapeless, and contradictory mass" (Sánchez, 1992:85). "Our *basilisco* walks with feet of confusion and naïveté," he said (Kirk, R., 2009, p. 27).

The party leaders fueled and marshaled this enmity, with the Left attempting to direct it into a revolutionary movement and the Right cracking down on any such hopes. But many historians (Roldán, 2002 and others) argue that the fighting was about much more than party loyalty, and was deeply bound up with questions of land, traditional power hierarchies, and the

expansion of the capitalist model. Presenting the conflict as a party contest confuses the complex reality, writes Daniel Pécaut, “makes it possible to disregard all other factors involved, including socio-economic interests, and also serves to obscure the subordination of the working class and peasantry to the elites” (1999, p. 161).

Over the next ten years, the death toll from the fighting reached into the hundreds of thousands, with campesinos making up the majority of the dead. Nazih Richani (2013, p. 23) describes the fighting as a “sectarian fight that was exacerbated by personal vendettas and parochial interests”; all sides, it seemed, had something to gain or lose. Though political power was secure in the hands of the regional party bosses or gamonales (Chernick, 2003), ranchers and hacendados also gained land (and political influence) as a direct result of the violence (ibid.:24). Roldán (2002) argues that Conservative landowners collaborated with self-defense groups to protect their holdings, but that the violence they brought with them often resulted in the armed groups ending up with the land themselves. Though the benefits of engaging in violence (including wealth to be gathered or protected and scores to be settled) were certainly clear from the perspective of the fighters, anthropologist Michael Taussig writes that this purported frenzy of partisan hatred was referred to at the time as a “mística” (2003, p. 12) – an inexplicable, unshakeable, almost cultish fervor that overtook the population (President Gómez referred to the violence, presumably that which took place against Liberals, as a “purifying fire” [Velásquez, 1995, p. 240]). This narrative, too, had a purpose: “the idea of barbarity,” writes Pécaut, “was employed to acquit the elites of the vital role they played in the violence” (1999, p. 161).

Armed Conflict, Armed Confusion

Following the power-sharing agreement between Liberals and Conservatives that resulted in the formation of the Frente Nacional in 1958, the violence was “stabilized” – but the Frente excluded third-party participation, and outside political actors lost any hope for engagement and inclusion in the political process as it existed. Subsequent decades saw the people’s response: a rise in Leftist guerrilla activity, led by what would soon become the FARC and later the FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo)⁴⁰, and a violent, right-wing crackdown on peasant republics and guerrilla activity by existing paramilitary and self-defense groups, who were often tacitly or directly supported by government officials. Marc Chernick (2003) writes that paramilitaries “were not only formed to fight the guerrillas; they were also used [by hacendados] to displace rural peasants and small-scale farmers from their lands in order to absorb the lands and create even larger estates” (197). The paramilitaries (and their State support) were effectively legalized by the passage of Law 48 in 1968, which took place during the early years of the narcotics trade. This would add another layer of complexity to the conflict.

The Colombian economy has long been situated as a key player in various contraband flows. As the marijuana trade declined and the demand for cocaine in the U.S. increased through the 1970s, criminal organizations congregated to establish the infrastructure necessary to benefit from the trade (Henderson, 2012). The nouveau riche class that emerged from the influx of drug money soon coalesced into a reliable source of funding for emerging paramilitary groups. At the

⁴⁰ Brittain (2010) and others point out that because of its deep roots in the Colombian Communist Party (PCC), the FARC and its antecedents remained outside the tug-of-war between the hegemonic Liberal and Conservative parties (and even set up safe havens from those parties’ violence). Though there were also bands of guerrillas affiliated with the Liberals, these were not organized in a dogmatic, class-conscious way, and were known to carry out attacks on PCC-oriented self-defense groups (which had arisen in response to the terror of Laureano Gómez’s presidency, and would become FARC guerrillas). The fact that right-wing paramilitaries later adopted the label of “self-defense forces” which had previously denoted Left-wing proto-guerrilla bands does not help clarify historiographical confusion about armed actors.

same time, the cartels' allegiances were difficult to predict with certainty. Escobar's Medellín cartel was famous for offering protection to the poor, even as drug money financed paramilitaries who protected the rich. Widespread rumors that the cartel funded the seizure of the Palace of Justice in 1985, carried out by the M-19 guerrillas, represent one among several incidents which confuse observers looking for a binary set of always-oppositional players in the armed conflict.

Paramilitaries, who during the 1970s had consisted largely of anti-communist, anti-guerrilla death squads, began to assume their modern form with the creation of MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores) in the early 1980s. By the 1990s, they would be represented by a single body and claim to be political actors (Tate, 2007, p. 50). Throughout the late 1980s and for most of the 1990s, these paramilitary forces dominated wide swathes of inner cities and towns in northern and central Colombia. Since 1985, more than 30% of displacements have been linked to paramilitaries and their sponsors; by the end of the 1990s, paramilitary violence accounted for the vast majority of casualties in the armed conflict (Chernick, 2003, pp. 193-9). Financed by cattle ranchers and large landowners who bought (or otherwise acquired) territory as a way to launder narco-dollars, the paramilitaries' presence was accompanied by a sense of confusion and mystery. In the silence after an assassination or a massacre, Taussig writes, "Nobody knows what to do... what before was a silent attack across a rural landscape bleached by fear is now movement spinning on itself like a child's top, emitting clouds of dust and confusion" (2003, p. 22).

This confusion, in addition to serving as cover for violent crime, was also a mechanism for civilian survival. After threats and instances of violence, to be able to identify the perpetrator would be to mark oneself as a target; confusion, in this case, became a shield. In his 2003 account of a paramilitary takeover, Taussig writes, "knowing what not to know becomes not only

an art of survival, but the basis of social reality” (p. 130). The paramilitaries themselves nourished this sense of uncertainty, so that it was (and often remains) unclear who exactly they were, whether and how they were linked to the armed forces, or whether they were simply a well-organized arm of the criminal underworld (Taussig, 2003, p. 112). Many of the testimonial accounts in Ruta Pacífica’s 2013 Truth and Memory Commission (see chapter 6) echo this trend, as the report’s executive summary explains:

Una constante que atraviesa sus relatos es la perplejidad, la incomprensión, la amenidad de las mujeres con respeto al conflicto. En las narraciones de las mujeres en raros casos se observa una clara identificación de los actores armados perpetradores de violencia. La confusión es bastante común en los relatos (Ruta Pacífica, 2013a, p. 19).

The nebulous identities of perpetrators of crimes coexist with sometimes nebulous connections between those perpetrators which make it even more difficult to classify “good” and “bad” sides of the armed conflict. But rather than mapping or tracing these connections and parsing the motivations that underlie them, Colombia’s elite class and its international allies suffer from a tendency to benefit from confusion, both materially and symbolically. My own fieldwork, for instance, indicated that the anonymity of perpetrators of crimes continues to be a challenge for social movements. While I was living in Barrancabermeja and attending meetings of the local roundtable of social movement organizations in the Magdalena Medio (including agrarian organizations, labor unions, Afro-Colombian networks, LGBT rights advocates, teachers’ unions, and others), activists were receiving repeated threats from an unidentified source calling itself the “Anti-Restitution Army” (referring to the land restitution efforts of the Santos Administration being encouraged by social movements; see the chapter on Victims for more details). An investigation conducted by the police had revealed the likelihood that the threats came from *within* the social movement roundtable; this destabilized the roundtable, which had already lost many of its members to threats over the course of the prior decade. A day-long

conference held by the roundtable in Bucaramanga was eclipsed by discussions of the internal threat, which took half of the day and took the place of several planned topics of discussion about the activists' future campaigns. Attendees complained that the State, while it had agreed to offer protection to the activists, was not going far enough to pursue the source of the letters. As a result, the confusion surrounding the identity of the perpetrator obstructed the efficacy and collaborative efforts of the region's social movements.

Confused Identities on the Ground

The authorship of crimes is persistently unclear not only in the cities and towns where they are committed, but also in the national conversation about the armed conflict. The Uribe administration, in particular, conflated civilians and armed actors (see *El Espectador*, 2013), and the nomenclature used for armed groups muddled their roles and the connections between them. This has occurred in six distinct moments in recent history: in the invention of the “narcoguerrilla”; during paramilitary demobilization; in the chilling False Positives scandal; in State discourse about paramilitary successor groups; in the conflation of social movements with guerrillas; and in the criminalization of campesino livelihoods.

(1) The conjuring of the “narcoguerrilla.” The terms “narcoguerrilla” and “narcoterrorist,” common in right-wing Colombian and hawkish U.S. accounts of Colombia, comprise the first example of this muddling. “Narcoguerrilla” was a term coined by Reagan’s ambassador to Colombia (Kirk, R., 2003, p. 227), and soon became popular with members of the Betancur administration. In the 1980s, the notion was used to fuel fears of insurgent takeovers in Central America (Tate, 2015, p. 47), and continues to be used today by prominent Republicans

speaking about the FARC-EP (Noriega, 2015). As Mary Roldán writes, the term casts a wide net: “Narcotics trafficking, political dissidence, leftist insurgency, criminality, and civil disobedience are indiscriminately lumped together under the convenient denomination of (...) the ‘narcoguerrilla’” (2002, pp. 283-4). Left-wing groups, especially the FARC-EP, are painted as having fattened themselves on illicit coca profits. But James Brittain (2010) and Alfredo Molano (2000) assert that the guerrillas’ protection of peasant coca farmers arose from their Marxist-Leninist ideology, rather than from a direct relation to coca profits; in other words, that the FARC-EP support the class that produces coca as a survival strategy, while not necessarily supporting the coca itself (Brittain, 2010, p. 92). Even when the FARC-EP began to benefit significantly from the availability of drug money accrued through taxation, the guerrillas refrained from international trafficking (Tate, 2015, p. 51). The use of the term “narcoguerrilla,” which was reintroduced during the Clinton administration (Villar and Cottle, 2011, p. 13), serves two purposes: it conflates leftist armed groups with narcotics trafficking, allowing the U.S.’ counterinsurgency and counternarcotics strategies to be linked; and it shields the paramilitaries, which have historically (especially after the demise of the major cartels) been much more deeply connected to narcotics trafficking (Lee, 1991; Brittain, 2010; Crandall, 2008; Holmes, Gutiérrez, & Curtin, 2008; Tate, 2015), from State and foreign intervention. As the Colombian weekly *Semana* observed when the term first came into use,

[E]l gobierno de Reagan lo que ha hecho es utilizar elementos fragmentarios, uniéndolos hábilmente para configurar un panorama de droga y comunismo aliados, que sin duda alguna produce grandes beneficios propagandísticos y que se ha constituido en la semilla de la misma conexión a nivel nacional, denominada la "narcoguerrilla" (*Semana*, 1984).

The term was adopted by Colombian military officers “to delegitimize the insurgency’s claims to an ideological commitment to uplifting Colombia’s marginalized classes and achieving eventual political recognition” (Tate, 2015, p. 48), and to justify militarization of the country under a

counterinsurgency framework. Nor was civil society immune; Tate writes about strategic decisions by NGOs in the 1990s to adopt anti-guerrilla positions, which “serve[d] the government’s interest in presenting a confusing panorama of violence in which it appears as simply another victim” (2007, p. 154).

(2) Paramilitary demobilization. The high-profile “demobilization” of paramilitary groups under the rubric of the Uribe administration’s Justice and Peace law presented further stories of confusion. Women critics derided the law as the ley de incertidumbre, or law of uncertainty. In the words of the Mesa de Trabajo Mujer y Conflicto Armado (2005b), the law

...da el marco jurídico para el proceso de negociación pero deja sin verdad a las víctimas, sin la seguridad de la no repetición y sin la mínima certidumbre de la justicia. No hay claridad acerca de las obligaciones, colectivas e individuales, que adquieren los guerreros... las condiciones de ‘reincorporación a la civilidad’... no son claras.

The same report, along with other accounts by critical voices in Colombia, claims that the public ceremonies of demobilization for alleged paramilitaries included a number of youth who were never involved in paramilitary activity at all; rather, their presence inflated the government’s numbers as it claimed to have disbanded and reintegrated the core of paramilitary membership in the country. The presence of live fake paramilitaries was accompanied by the presence of dead fake guerrillas (see below).

(3) The False Positives scandal. Perhaps the most flesh-and-blood example of the use of confusion in Colombia’s modern-day conflict is the False Positives scandal, in which members of the Armed Forces recruited thousands of young men and women to the army, killed them, dressed their bodies in guerrilla fatigues, and presented them as combat deaths in order to meet quotas and receive bonuses in the fight against the guerrillas. Official numbers put the dead near

five thousand, most of them killed between 2006 and 2008. In 2007, while current president Santos was Minister of Defense, approximately forty percent of armed group members reported killed by the army were in fact civilians dressed as combatants, according to the Prosecutor General (Alsema, 2012a; for reports that the killings have continued until today, see Alsema, 2015). The killings gave rise to the women's organization Madres de Soacha, who pressed for justice for their disappeared children. As a result, about eight hundred members of the military have been sentenced; most of these have been low-ranking officers, however, and many have been absolved based on confusion over the victims' political alliances. With prosecutors unable to prove that the bodies were those of civilians, it was assumed that they were armed actors – or, at least, that their identities were unclear (Alsema, 2012b). This absolution was made easier by the fact that many of the victims were homeless or otherwise on the periphery of society; nonetheless, on the ground the confusion was clearly a farce, with many of the bodies dressed in nearly new, clean fatigues and boots that didn't fit (Power, 2011; see also Human Rights Watch, 2015). Military carelessness notwithstanding, in the court system the tool of confusion was able to excuse many of the killings. Even when the perpetrators were brought to justice, it was no consolation to the dead civilians, whose conflation with armed actors was made possible by confusion's ubiquity as an excuse for violence.

(4) Paramilitary successor groups. The post-2005 term *bacrim*, or “criminal bands,” is one more among several examples of a shifting nomenclature of violence. Its portrayal of these armed actors as organically generated, apolitical bandits severs any linkage between these post-demobilization criminal organizations and their paramilitary predecessors – indeed, even the word “predecessors” implies that the two groups are separate, rather than acknowledging that many paramilitaries simply never demobilized in the first place (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

The *bacrim* today are often painted in the press as new actors without clear ties or alliances: one article in the *Washington Post* referred to them as “shadowy hitmen” (Forero, 2012b). This isolation of neoparamilitary groups from the AUC (and, by extension, from the Uribe administration and other government officials involved in parapolitics) confuses the authorship of crimes in the country.

(5) Conflating social movements with guerrillas. While the *bacrim*’s connections to armed groups are severed in the public discourse, other organizations are conflated with them. This trend was most pronounced during Uribe’s presidency, but has continued to be especially visible in armed actors’ threats directed against women’s and other social movement leaders.

During Uribe’s tenure, opposition social movements, including women’s and feminist groups, church leaders, human rights defenders, and labor activists, were targeted as having ties to, or being sympathizers with, the armed guerrilla movement (Isacson, 2010; Stokes, 2005). The administration was behind the most public of these accusations, with a 2003 public relations campaign aimed at questioning the good faith of human rights NGOs.⁴² Examples include the assertion by Uribe’s Interior Minister that NGOs constituted unarmed apparatuses of subversion (Semana, 2002), or Uribe’s 2003 statement that

Mientras para el Gobierno y la Fuerza Pública los derechos humanos son un compromiso de todos los días, para otros sectores los derechos humanos son una bandera política (...) Observo organizaciones respetables de derechos humanos, que tienen todo el espacio en Colombia y tienen que gozar de toda la protección de nuestras instituciones. Y observo también escritores y politiqueros que finalmente le sirven al terrorismo y que se escudan cobardemente en la bandera de los derechos humanos (...) Cada vez que en Colombia aparece una política de seguridad para derrotar el terrorismo, cuando los terroristas empiezan a sentirse débiles, inmediatamente envían a sus voceros a que hablen de derechos humanos

⁴² Uribe distinguished between “serious” NGOs and NGOs whom he claimed used human rights claims as covers for guerrilla complicity; in practice, this meant that international NGOs with global visibility (e.g. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or WOLA) were beyond his reproach, while smaller, local, Colombian NGOs made better targets. In this era it behooved these smaller groups to ally with INGOs for protection.

(Semana, 2003).⁴³

Later in 2003, the administration began formal investigations and audits of more than a thousand NGOs. In response to an outcry from State Departments in the U.S. and Europe, Uribe's foreign minister adjured foreign governments to consider "the fairness of the president's words in order to avoid more confusion that could do more damage" to Colombia's international support (Center for International Policy, 2003).

Accusations of guerrilla complicity reverberated beyond the mouthpieces of the administration. In the generally polarized, anti-terrorist zeitgeist of the time, Uribe's public statements gave credence to accusations made by armed groups or other conservative political actors. These accusations or *señalamientos* were repeated in the national press, and even occasionally in the international press. In our 2013 interview, Ruta Pacífica member Alejandra Coll Agudelo recalled what it was like to be an activist during Uribe's tenure as president:

En los últimos 10 años, años que han sido los años mas duros en Colombia, porque tuvimos un régimen presidencial muy duro, en donde se promovió la criminalización de la labor nuestra para los derechos humanos. Cualquier persona que estuviera medianamente en contra de la política de seguridad, inmediatamente era estigmatizada y callada. Fueron años muy duros.

This conflation of human rights advocacy and guerrilla criminality resulted not only in a blow to social movements' reputations, but in government surveillance, and threats, attacks, and assassinations by paramilitary successor groups, incidences of which continue today despite the change in administration. In February of 2012, the central office of Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres in Bogotá received a letter. "Quit fucking with the land issue," the letter read, "because anyone who keeps it up will be assassinated, no matter how protected they are. We give you thirty days to

⁴³ In his post-presidency, Uribe has continued to conflate opposition voices with guerrillas. A recent example was his claim that Hollman Morris, director of the television station Canal Capital, was a "servile instrument of the FARC" after the station critiqued his administration (El Tiempo, 2014b).

abandon the city.” The threat was signed by the neoparamilitary group Águilas Negras (Women in Black, 2012). Not three months later, Ruta Pacífica reported another death threat, this time delivered by email: “We won’t be responsible for what’s going to happen to the leaders of these organizations, their directors, and their collaborators... we’re going to start exterminating them one by one, with no mercy. We won’t allow them to hurt the president’s policies... they will be declared military objectives” (Asociación de Cabildos, 2012). In the same year, Yolanda Becerra, organizer with the Movimiento Social de la Guerra and the Organización Femenina Popular in the Magdalena Medio, received a voicemail saying, “Hello, motherfucking bitch. Keep holding your meetings and stirring up all the old ladies... and you’ll see what will happen to you” (Colectivo de Abogados, 2012). During our 2013 interview, Becerra recounted her years of paramilitary and neoparamilitary persecution:

Yo, durante el '98, hasta el 2007 que viví en Barrancabermeja, pasé por muchísimas cosas, y la OFP pasó por muchas cosas, y el equipo pasó por muchas cosas – del asesinato de compañeros, o desapariciones, amenazas, persecución, intimidación, atentados. Yo tuve un atentado en el río. Varias veces me dejaron panfletos, de sacaban panfletos continuamente, señalándome que fui de todo grupos guerrilleros, se le ocurrió al paramilitares... Yo fui declarada objetivo militar. Fui declarada – la OFP fue declarado objetivo militar, por parte de los paramilitares. Y sabíamos, para nosotras, los paramilitares siempre fueron una estrategia de guerra del Estado. O sea, paramilitares, no porque nació un día, que se ocurrió a alguien que fue tan malo, no. Una estrategia del Estado en donde el Estado permitió, financió, acogió; vivió, también, de eso, del parte de la guerra. Entonces, para nosotras, era el mismo Estado que nos perseguía, que nos asesinó, que nos destruyó, destruyeron una sede – completamente, una casa de la mujer – una noche llegaron los hombres, las botaron en los carros y las llevaron. Entonces, todo esto viví, pero [el momento más grave fue que] en el 2007 entraron unos hombres en mi apartamento, me torturaron, me amenazaron, durante 48 horas.

The conflation of social movement actors with guerrillas, initiated by the Uribe Administration and carried out in violent ways by neoparamilitary groups, both was enabled by and bolstered the narrative of conflict as confusing. Even under President Santos, this conflation enables the public to dismiss communities’ contentions and demands, as in the case of the anti-police protest in

Cauca in 2015. When residents kicked the police out of the hamlet of El Mango, their arguments that police forces did no good in the community were eclipsed by official claims that the protests were led by guerrillas in civilian clothes (Goodman, 2015).

(6) The criminalization of campesino livelihoods: the case of gold mining. In addition to social movement activists, the actions of rural Colombian civilians have also been conflated with guerrilla activity by government spokespeople, members of the business sector, and paramilitary successor organizations. This is especially evident in the case of what are called artisanal miners, or small-scale, informal gold mining communities on the Pacific coast and in the mountain range of the Middle Magdalena region. With increasing global attention to gold profits, subsistence mining – along with the claims to mineral-rich land made by those who have historically survived on it – is a thorn in the side of potential investors, foreign and domestic. The FARC-EP's involvement with and taxation of local gold profits has led the state and the international press to focus on gold as the new cocaine (Bloomberg, 2011; see also Deutsche Welle, 2012), and subsequently, on artisanal miners as the new guerrilla accomplices. But a reported five million *campesinos*, particularly Afro-Colombians, make their living in small-scale gold mining, and have done so since before the armed conflict began. More recently, farmers and fishermen displaced from their land (either by armed groups or by neoliberal reforms that hindered the viability of small-scale agriculture) have taken up the practice as well. Artisanal mining uses very little large equipment, and is not making anyone rich (though it may make them sick; its unhealthy practices, including the unregulated use of mercury and cyanide, have been well documented). With the onset of the mining boom, artisanal miners have been targeted on three fronts: first, the federal mining code in 2001 required that small-scale miners operate by

the same rules as wealthy multinationals, despite the chasm of difference in resources available to the two. This led to the criminalization of small-scale miners, as the law changed under their feet; secondly, small-scale miners' activities and profits are watched and taxed by armed groups on both sides; and third is this conflation with guerrilla groups (Santos claimed in 2011 that unregulated mining was "in large part controlled by illegal armed groups" [Alsema, 2011]), which is accompanied by persecution from military and neoparamilitary actors and forced displacement from their lucrative lands.⁴⁴ Here the motive for spinning the narrative of confusion is clear: in the case of mining, conflating artisanal (informal) producers with (illegal) guerrillas and criminals covers the tracks of mining corporations, national and multinational, as they take over the resources abandoned when miners are pushed off their lands. As in previous years, when coal giants like Glencore and Drummond were widely reported to have paid AUC paramilitaries to displace Colombians living on potential mining sites (Moor & van de Sandt, 2014; Ramírez, 2005), gold mining conglomerates like AngloGold Ashanti, B2 Gold, and Greystar are currently facing accusations of "contracting" neoparamilitary forces who clear gold-rich territory of informal mining communities (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2011, *inter alia*). Commenting on displacement in the mountains of southern Bolívar, the Mesa Mujer y Conflicto Armado asserts that "la apropiación de estas riquezas es excusa para las nuevas acciones armadas del Bloque Central Bolívar [a neoparamilitary group] contra la población minera que allí vive y trabaja, a la que pretendan desplazar por la fuerza" (2005, p. 17). AngloGold has also been accused of collaborating with the military to harass community organizers on gold-rich lands (Colombia Support Network, 2010).⁴⁵

⁴⁴ For an in-depth report on artisanal miners and their place in the current panorama, see Peace Brigades International (November 2011), *Mining in Colombia: At What Cost?* PBIColombia.net.

⁴⁵ I was in the region in question in 2010 and met with the miners' federation, members of whom reported being harassed, intimidated, and beaten up by members of the military, who set up an outpost in the village shortly after

The broad conflation of small-scale gold miners with guerrillas assists in the displacement of the local population to the benefit of foreign investors (Fox News Latino, 2011). These investors are arriving in greater and greater numbers to play their part on Colombia's stage.

The New Mística: Extractive Fever

Today, Colombia faces new conflicts over land and resources, as the reduction in guerrilla violence has ushered in a new era of multinational investment, particularly in the mining, oil, and agrofuel (notably soy and African palm) sectors. The result is an investment fever that recalls the *mística* of partisan emotion in the 1940s – blind adherence to a creed, fed by confusion or feigned confusion, which results in material gain for those in power.

At the turn of the century, Plan Colombia, purportedly aimed at reducing narco-trafficking, included an amendment requiring the Colombian government to open its economy to foreign investment (Mazure, 2010). FDI increased by eight hundred percent over the next decade. A few years after Plan Colombia was put in place, the government began offering incentives for foreign extractivist operations, awarding permits for mining companies all over the country, including on environmental reserves (The Economist, 2014). The results were swift: from 2000 to 2010 alone, Colombia's coal production doubled, and is expected to double again before 2019. Colombia is now the fourth-largest exporter of coal in the world. The production of oil, most of which is exported to the United States, is up more than 35% since 2008, to more than a million barrels a day. Natural gas production has more than doubled since the late 1990s (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015).

AGA began its operations there. During my fieldwork in 2013, local activists held a "people's court" with testimonies accusing the company of collaboration with neoparamilitaries.

No sector, however, has seen a fevered rush of multinationals quite like the gold mining sector. Responding to a hike in the price of gold due to the global financial crisis, investment in gold mining increased 640% from 2000 to 2010 and continues to rise ever faster, jumping another 21% from 2012 to 2013 alone (The Economist, 2015). Reportedly, more than 40% of rural land is under concession to three multinational gold companies—one of which, AngloGold Ashanti, is rumored to have written much of Colombia’s 2009 mining code (Mazure, 2010; Silva, 2009). In 2011, María Teresa Ronderos, editor of the Colombian weekly *Semana*, published a broad-based investigation of the process by which mining titles were being awarded. In my 2013 interview with Ronderos, I asked her to comment further about the circumstances that led to what she called the “boom minero.” She responded:

Por un lado, tantos años de dominio guerrillero, sobre todo, que eran muy anti-inversión en minería, en tantas zonas selváticas donde están los recursos naturales, ha sido muy difícil que la gente se animara invertir, porque, pues, nadie quería – de decreto, hay que pagar vacuna. Lo hacían. Pero digamos que era difícil. Pero la verdadera cosa que cambió fue los precios. Precios internacionales, el precio del carbón, el precio del oro. Y hizo que los precios subieron tanto que la – que digamos, aún a pesar de los riesgos – que los riesgos también bajaron, pero había riesgos. Pero aún a pesar de los riesgos, las empresas, digamos, se quisieron meter sobre todo por los precios que alcanzaron los minerales desde 2010. (...) en ese momento, el gobierno nombró a gente muy política y muy corrupta en el gobierno – es el gobierno de Uribe. El gobierno de Uribe casi en todo fue así. Entonces nombró una gente horrible en la minería. Entonces eso se voló muy corrompido, y el poco que yo cuento allí es como estos grandes magnates consiguieron una cantidad de títulos extraordinaria, muy rápido, porque los compraban porque se pagaba con *bribes* y cosas esas.

No matter how the mining titles were acquired, multinationals have jumped to use them, descending on unexploited territory with what Ronderos (2011) called a *fiebre minera*. One investors’ publication offers an example:

For over 500 years, the world has been enticed by Colombia’s gold. But for several decades, the South American nation has been so weakened by drug cartels and Marxist revolutionaries that foreign miners stayed out. As a result, Red Eagle Mining CEO Ian Slater says, “Colombia hasn’t had modern exploration.” To him, this makes for opportunity without parallel (Grace, 2012).

This opportunity is broadcast loud and clear by the administration; Finance Minister Juan Carlos Echeverry commented in 2013 that though he “was constantly peppered with questions about drug trafficking when he studied in New York in the 1990s... he now tries to lure foreign investors with talk about ‘the Colombian miracle.’ (...) ‘There has been this humongous, tectonic change of stereotype of Colombia, to promised land from wasteland’” (Forero, 2013). Investors’ publications join the chorus, lauding the Colombian people’s allegedly unanimous consent to having their resources managed by outsiders: “What’s the secret to Colombia’s success? According to Standard & Poor’s, the country has benefited greatly from a general consensus that’s developed between the population and its leaders about the importance of unbridled private investment” (Bourdillon, 2011).

Accounts like this one, along with others in the mainstream press, reflect a fervid desire to paint Colombia as a newly peaceful investors’ utopia, despite the displacement and violence taking place on the ground as a result of new development ventures.⁴⁶ Their glassy-eyed descriptions of the golden carpet being laid out by the Colombian government, and the charmed acquiescence of the local population (Grace, 2012), belie accusations on the ground of cooperation between mining conglomerates, the military, and neoparamilitary organizations (Red de Hermandad, 2013; see also Pérez & Brown, 2013).⁴⁷ “Colombia has been on such a roll,” wrote one financial consultant, “there’s almost an investor euphoria” (Trotta, 2011). “A lot of people have discovered,” wrote another, “that Colombia is a great jurisdiction for mining. It has good, clean, democratic government” (Gordon and Rocha, 2011). The country “has become a mecca for junior miners searching for the next big find” (ibid.). This neoliberal euphoria, blindly immune to realities of violence and displacement on the ground, is the new *mística*: what Polanyi

⁴⁶ For an informative account of past displacement resulting from mining ventures, see Ramírez C., 2005.

⁴⁷ See also PBS’ *The War We Are Living* (2011) for a profile of Afro-Colombian activists resisting displacement from gold-rich territories.

called the “evangelical fervor” of the liberal creed (1944, p. 135). As in the earlier Colombian *mística*, proponents of this church resist any efforts to cast doubt on their faith. In response to a 2011 report of social unrest in Colombia and its potential risk to investors, one young economist called the discrepancy in reports (between the optimism of investment publications and the caution in reports from the ground) “puzzling,” attributing negative press to “naysayers” intent on sullyng the country’s investment reputation (P. Rojas, 2011). Another analysis acknowledges the “social and community problems” facing the development of mining megaprojects in Colombia,⁴⁸ but blames it on the “manipulation of the media,” the Santos administration’s lack of clarity, and the complexity of the armed conflict, not the uprooting of the local community or the mining company’s para/military alliances on the ground (Felder, 2014). By blaming bad press on confusion, the mining industry is able to blur the realities of its actions in Colombia, maintain a glowing reputation among foreign investors, and accumulate capital by dispossession – dispossession which, as in earlier decades, is made easier by gaps in institutional record keeping, damaged or destroyed land titles, and public uncertainty about the identities and alliances of the armed actors who clear lucrative lands of their inhabitants.

Artful Confusion:⁴⁹ The Benefits of Uncertainty

I argue that confusion, rather than being a natural and essential feature of Colombia’s conflict, as it is so often portrayed, is instrumental; that is, specific people use it for specific purposes. Its persistence, both historically and in the modern day, has material benefits:

⁴⁸ The Economist (2014) cites a study admitting that “economic and social development in towns next to large mining operations is worse than in places where illegal coca crops are grown for making cocaine.”

⁴⁹ “There is no outside anymore, just as there is no clear boundary between the paras and the State, which is, I believe, the most crucial characteristic of the war machine... Their coming to roost in [this] town is but the latest twist to this artful confusion...” (Taussig, 2003, p. 23).

confusion in land titling, uncertainty about the perpetrators of crimes, the conflation of civilian and guerrilla, and the separation of today's paramilitaries from yesterday's paramilitaries benefit agribusiness and mining concerns; they benefit Colombian landed elites and those on their paramilitary payroll; and they benefit a rentier State eager to open its doors to foreign investors. Confusion over the authorship of crimes and the identity of paramilitaries nourishes what Michael Taussig calls a "culture of terror," placing a "fanatical stress on the mysterious side of the mysterious" and "woven in a dense web of magical realism" (Taussig, 2004, p. 40). These nebulous criminal identities, operating along the hazy boundary between legality and illegality, combined with the conflation of resistance movements and guerrilla groups to blur fact and fiction, creating what anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes calls a "mass hysteria and paranoia that can be seen as a technique of social control in which everyone suspects and fears every other: a collective hostile gaze, a human panopticon" (2004, p. 182; Scheper-Hughes was referring here to crime in a Brazilian camp for the displaced).

Confusion, understood this way, is not an accident or a by-product of violence; on the contrary, it is an active character in international political economy. The dissolution of boundaries between official and unofficial violent actors, and the imposed silence about the crimes committed, have material effects. Auyero and Swistun, referring to confusion as a "sociopolitical product" (p. 82), delineate several aspects of uncertainty. These include what they call "misinformation" and "shifted responsibility" (p. 91). In the case of their ethnography, widespread confusion about who is behind toxic contamination in a shantytown allowed both the Shell Corporation and the state to avoid leading cleanup efforts. In Colombia's case, the state's outsourcing of its repressive apparatus during the 1990s allowed it to differentiate itself from the most heinous accounts of violence during that era (Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 17) – and

made possible Colombia's reputation as a democratic, good-governance alternative to the dirty wars under military regimes in other countries in South America during that time.

Confusion about land ownership, legal rights, and titling also has a longstanding connection to material gain. During *La Violencia*, as thousands of Colombians (mostly poor peasants) fled or were pushed from their land to newly settled *colonias* in the southern parts of the country, wealthy rural latifundistas⁵⁰ followed in the dusty wake of displacement to collect the spoils. Uncertain public records of land ownership only added to the concentration of land and wealth that served as fuel for armed resistance movements. The main benefactors of tenant flight were members of a new social class that would come to be the main sponsors of paramilitarism in later years. Sánchez explains:

The lands [peasants] abandoned had various destinies. Sometimes they passed to a landholder in the area, sometimes to peasants of the opposing side, and very frequently to a new group of merchants, people affiliated with both parties, known as *aprovechadores* (those who take advantage), which came into existence as a commercial and landholding class through the turbulent dealings of the Violence (1992, p. 99).

This dynamic of capital accumulation by taking advantage of violence continues in the modern day. The example of the port city of Buenaventura is illustrative. Conversations I had in 2012 with Afro-Colombian women in Buenaventura pointed to official uncertainty and delays in issuing titles to communities claiming land based on Ley 70, passed in 1993 to ensure territorial rights for ethnic minorities. That uncertainty enabled private investors to purchase that land for port construction, highway, and other megaprojects. The Pacific coastal city has plans for a mining port to rival Chilean ports, a huge seawall and pier, and a dredging project in the bay (El Tiempo, 2012). Also as part of Ley 70, Naya indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities

⁵⁰ Sánchez (1992, p. 91) reports that once *La Violencia* erupted in the countryside, the major landowners and political figures tended to remain in the cities, out of the way of most of the fighting. The lesser landowners who remained in the countryside, and had been able to marshal peasant violence to defend their land (e.g. by hiring the Chulavita police forces), would thereafter come to represent one of Colombia's most powerful political sectors: the cattle ranchers.

possess the right to prior consultation before any development project is undertaken which will displace or affect them, but their assertion of this right obstructs the path of both licit and illicit capital accumulation (the latter of which travels through Buenaventura, Colombia's biggest port, at a high volume). The results have been bloody, with dismembered and decapitated victims of the bacrim washing up on shore with some regularity, and even more disappearing and never returning (see Dickinson, 2011; Wallace, 2014; HispanTV, 2014; and Valenzuela, 2014). This has the effect of attenuating local social movement organizing against the megaprojects and removing obstacles to development.

This ability of foreign investors and local elites to capitalize on confusion has contributed to a level of income inequality that does not match equalizing trends taking place in other countries in the region (Molina, 2014). Since 2010, Colombia's level of income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) has been among the top three countries in Latin America, falling shortly behind Haiti and passing the second spot back and forth with Honduras (note that Haiti and Honduras are two countries whose GDPs per capita are mere fractions of Colombia's, and whose Human Development Index [HDI] ratings are also much lower [World Bank, 2015]). Land ownership in Colombia has been on a consistent trajectory of concentration fueled by violence for several decades (Brittain, 2010, pp. 80-85), with six to eight *million* hectares of land violently appropriated between 1985 and 2015 (Richani, 2015). The latest figures show 0.4 percent of landowners controlling 61.2 percent of all arable land (Brittain, 2010; ABColombia). In terms of *all* land, Oxfam (2013) reports that 80% of territory lies in the hands of 14% of landowners (who themselves comprise a subset of the entire population). As a result of this concentration, and the neoparamilitary violence used to enable it, Colombia now has the highest

population of displaced people on the globe: more than seven million⁵¹ internally displaced, more than Syria and the Sudan (World Bulletin, 2016).

Increased investment in the resource export sector, despite its evident effects on inequality, displacement, environmental degradation, and violence, is seen in this new confusion as a sign of the increasing strength and legitimacy of the Colombian state. This story, told and retold in the international press, has become the new teleology of Colombia's neoliberal security state and its supporters: *(para)militarization of the countryside leads to lowered risks leads to multinational investment and resource extraction leads to stability and security*: what Polanyi (1944, p. 135) called “a veritable faith in man's [sic] secular salvation through a self-regulating market.”




Fig. 6: Teleology of the neoliberal security state.

Capital accumulation, in this case, is made possible by governmental and civilian confusion over land ownership, peasant allegiances, and criminal activity – revealing Colombia's confusion trope to be not only an aspect of its historiography, but an active player in the perpetuation of the country's cycle of violence that enables this capital accumulation and blocks class-based attempts at popular empowerment.

Régimes of Truth

Alongside its opportunistic and obfuscatory role, confusion is evident as a useful analytical tool for understanding power. If Colombia's conflict is framed as confused or

⁵¹ When I began this dissertation, the number of IDPs in Colombia was slightly over five million; I have had to continuously update this chapter as official figures continue to climb.

confusing, it is in opposition to the ideal-typical binary conflict between government and rebels, dictatorship and democracy, capitalism and communism, or the always-already-good actor and the always-already-evil actor. Describing the political doctrine of former president Uribe, political scientist Ana María Bejarano (2013) writes: “it was an appealing discourse because it helped to simplify the heterogeneity and complexity of Colombian society, turning it into a black-and-white picture” (p. 334). This black-and-white ideal type is in contrast to a more Foucauldian understanding of power as ever-present, distributed and passed back and forth among different actors, not a “zero-sum game” (Foucault, 1982, p. 786). Foucault’s *Power/Knowledge* is helpful here. In it, he describes power as being dispersed beyond the realm of the State: “first of all,” according to Foucault (1980), “because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations” (p. 122).

If conflict is not inherently binary, then why does Colombia’s inability to fit into binary columns so confound academics and journalists? Foucault is useful again here, for his conception of the way that defining what is “true” feeds power. The tight fiction of binary conflict constitutes what he calls a “régime of truth,” one of the many loci of power in society.

Each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true (...) ‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it (1980, pp. 131,133).

The binary way in which conflict narratives are told, and into which Colombian realities are pushed to fit, serves to mask the complexity of *every* armed conflict – and, importantly, both reflects and extends expressions of dominant force. That is, the power of defining truth-as-binary

belongs to the hegemonic understanding of Colombia's armed conflict, and once so defined, the binary framework serves to entrench power. When the specter of the always-already-evil actor and the comfort of the always-already-good actor have been created and established in the public discourse, all that's left is to label each conflict actor in terms of one or the other pole. Not only power, but righteousness, evil, and motivation are painted as mutually exclusive, zero-sum games, a portrayal which cements the power held and expressed by the dominant class before the insurgent or the critic or the activist takes her first step out the door.

In an analysis of the U.S. war in Afghanistan in which he draws comparisons to civil conflict in Colombia, Yale political scientist Stathis Kalyvas (2003) makes

...a simple, though consequential, observation that appears to be as common as it is theoretically marginalized: civil wars are not binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous processes that foster an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and actions—to such a degree as to be defined by that mix. Put otherwise, the widely observed ambiguity is fundamental rather than incidental to civil wars, a matter of structure rather than noise. (...) Civil wars are typically described as binary conflicts, classified and understood on the basis of what is perceived to be their overarching issue dimension or cleavage (...) Yet such characterization turns out to be trickier than anticipated, because civil wars usually entail a perplexing combination of identities and actions (pp. 475-6).

Colombia's armed conflict, though it may diverge from the simplistic, *Uribista* definition of a black-and-white contest, shares its complex nature with other civil conflicts – despite assertions like that of the Economist magazine in 2015 that “Colombia's conflict is unusually messy.” This “binarization” of conflict, like other hegemonies, is constantly contested and never total; nonetheless, though the binary continues to be contested on the ground and has not been successfully, universally imposed, the State's *attempts* to impose it continue to aid in the maintenance of traditional power structures. Notwithstanding its natural complexity, the features of Colombia's long war are legible if we are willing to look – as Marc Chernick (2003) points out, “[D]espite the changing narrative of conflict(,) there has been remarkable continuity in the

geographic zones of the violence, in the actors of conflict, in the illegal use of state and para-state violence, and in the regional and social causes of violence” (p. 186). The task of scholars, then, is to avoid relying on the tired interpretation of Colombia’s conflict as confusing, and instead frame its dynamics as representative of the shifting, polyvocal, multisited nature of power. It is what Foucault called “a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays... of detaching the power of truth itself from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time” (pp. 132-3).

While we as narrators of Colombian violence are faced with redefining confusion as a more accurate reflection of conflict realities, there is another group of actors redefining it as a tool of resistance.

Confusing Colombia’s Violence:

Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres

The history of Colombia’s women’s movement (see Chapter 3) has been one of shifting, temporary alliances, occasional suspicion and mistrust, and a continuous tension between a centralized feminist movement in the cities and smaller organizations and networks addressing issues specific to regional realities. These latter networks seem to be in line with what Escobar (2008) terms “meshworks” – characterized by decentralized, more heterogeneous, and less hierarchical relationships between organizations. My conversations with women’s peace networks in Colombia indicated that even Ruta Pacífica, the largest, most visible, and most structured network of the three under study, has not become centralized to the extent that it would fall outside of Escobar’s characterization. Though it has a central office in Bogotá, my interviews indicated that the function of the Bogotá office is largely external; that is, it deals with

funding and membership in international networks more than interfering with the work of the regional offices, which were frequently described as self-contained and self-directed. A large-scale, top-down umbrella representatives of women's organizations has not emerged, or at least has only emerged for short periods of time; it has been contingent on strategic partnerships surrounding a particular political moment, and then has dissolved. Wills and Gómez attribute this lack of a centralized feminist movement to the "confused nature" of the armed conflict:

La naturaleza confusa de la confrontación armada explica por qué en Colombia, a diferencia de lo ocurrido, por ejemplo, en Argentina bajo la dictadura, no ha sido posible gestar una organización sombrilla como la de las Madres de Plaza de Mayo, cuyas afiliadas tenían todas un enemigo en común (2006, p. 12).⁵³

This "meshwork" status has allowed Ruta Pacífica, and other networks, to address local needs in their own ways – often with the use of creative, imaginative, even whimsical tools. Rather than (or perhaps in addition to) being hampered by the "confused nature" of war, Ruta Pacífica, I argue, appropriates confusion and uses it as a tool to transform conflict. This occurs in two ways: one, it is used literally as an aspect of creative nonviolence; and two, the group's activities confuse the gendered logic of war and upset the often-hidden foundations of conflict itself. I will focus here on the deployment of confusion in four aspects of Ruta Pacífica's mobilizations: its literal confusion of armed actors during *rutas* to militarized territory; its confusion of the logic of confinement via the spatial transgressions of its mobilizations; its symbolic confusion of women's prescribed roles during its urban marches; and finally, its confusion of the symbolic lexicon of war via its development of alternative symbolism and ritual.

⁵³ It is worth noting that even Wills and Gómez's description of peace movements refers to them having "enemies." This dynamic – in which the logic of militarized conflict is reflected even in its social movement opposition – is significant, and recalls Wills' own assertions (see Chapter 3) that the logic of war affects all parties, even peacemakers.

(1) “Te sientes que puedes descolocarlos”: The Rutas and Active Neutrality

The formative moment in the foundation of Ruta Pacífica was its first mass mobilization in 1996. Activists received word that a reported 80% of women, most of them Afrodescendant, in the township of Pueblo Nuevo had been raped in the context of the armed conflict. Though travel in the region was prohibited by paramilitary curfew, activists organized buses to travel to the town of Mutatá, in the banana-growing region of Urabá, on November 25th, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, to express solidarity with the community (Ruíz, 2003, p. 14; Arango, 2013; Magallón, 2010, p. 98). Eight hundred women participated, refusing an army escort and declaring a policy of active neutrality.⁵⁴ Active neutrality, in Ruta Pacífica’s words, is understood as a conscious abstention from support for or collaboration with any armed group, legal or illegal (including the Armed Forces); in a context in which armed groups are defined as the only active players in the conflict, this declaration of active neutrality positions Ruta Pacífica within – and insists on the possibility of – a different logic. Moreover, its emphasis on *active* neutrality flies in the face of the hegemonic understanding of war in Colombia, according to which every actor is aligned with one or another armed group – and those who are not “active” in war are passive bystanders or victims.

The new organization’s second *ruta*, to the town of Andes, Antioquia in 1997, was undertaken in solidarity with an indigenous community which had declared itself to be actively neutral, as well, declaring, “Somos neutrales frente al conflicto armado, pero no indiferentes frente a la muerte” (Sánchez G., 2008, p. 101). By the time of the 1999 negotiations in El Caguán between the FARC-EP and the Pastrana Administration, Ruta Pacífica had achieved

⁵⁴ The concept of active neutrality has a long history; the term was coined in the Netherlands in the 1920s (where it was known as *zelfstandigheidspolitiek*, or independent politics) as a postwar strategy to protect Dutch geopolitical interests (Wylie, 2002). In the modern day the term is most closely associated with the neutral political stance of Switzerland, home base of many NGOs active in Colombia, including one of Ruta Pacífica’s funders.

enough visibility to be invited by the FARC-EP to speak at a hearing during the talks; continuing to abide by their policy of non-cooperation with any armed group, they refused (ibid., pp. 38-39).

Two *rutas* were best remembered by the activists with whom I spoke in 2012 and 2013: the first to Bojayá in the Chocó in 2002, in response to a FARC-EP bomb that landed on a church where civilians were taking refuge from the fighting between the FARC and the AUC; between 79 and 100 civilians were killed. In the aftermath, it was difficult for humanitarian groups to gain access to the zone; one would need to travel down the Rio Atrato, which had been completely paramilitarized and made inaccessible. Women from Ruta Pacífica boarded a fleet of boats and rafts and went down the river, singing and playing the drums to announce their presence. When they successfully arrived in Bojayá, the women said, they were the first outside group to enter the village after the bombing.

Another *ruta* traveled to Putumayo in 2003, to call attention to the effects of coca fumigation on civilians. By this time the network had grown in visibility and reach, and was joined by 3,500 women who entered FARC-controlled territory by bus. Cauca Regional Coordinator Alejandra Miller recounted the event this way when we spoke in 2013:

Pues, Putumayo es un territorio supremamente militarizado, paramilitarizado, y la gente no podía salir a la carretera después de las 6 de la tarde, las mujeres no podían salir... por el miedo y el terror. Y que la Ruta haya interrumpido – que 3,500 mujeres en un territorio, pues, que es muy chiquito, pues, es un pueblito super-chiquito. Las mujeres han llegado a interrumpir, a violar las normas establecidas por los guerreros... [entrando en] un retén de la guerrilla. Y [los guerreros] dijeron, “Ustedes qué hacen, ustedes llevan en esos buses inteligencia militar.” Y decimos, “¿Inteligencia? Toda. Militar? Nada.” (*Laughter*) Ese tipo... Nos miraba así, como (*feigning shock*)... no estaba preparado, ellos no estaban preparados. Para el no miedo.

Miller recalled that the men who boarded her bus were taken aback by the sight of the women: holding homemade butterflies and colorful banners, playing the drums and singing. The guerrillas demanded that the women exit the buses; the women refused, and eventually were

permitted to go on their way.

These literal acts of confusion, in which armed actors are thrown off their usual *modus operandi* and forced to deal with unexpected actors behaving in unexpected ways, is a key part of Ruta Pacífica's strategy of creative nonviolence – and, I argue, a key part of conflict transformation. In addition to the fact the protestors are women, allowing them to be seen by armed groups as less threatening than men (Kaufman & Williams, 2010; Institute for Inclusive Security, n.d.), a key to Ruta's success is its collectivity. The mass of ruta participants allows women to act as part of a huge group and to “feel our power” (Miller, 2013). “Somos desobedientes,” she explained. “Porque no les creemos, y nos tomamos las carreteras y punto. ¿Qué van a hacer? Si somos 3,000 mujeres, estamos hablando de 100 buses.” She continued:

Un colectivo de mujeres, pues, eso da mucha fuerza. Muchas energía, y te sientes que puedes develar – no, es que hemos hecho. No es que podéis, es que habéis. Frente a los guerreros. Pero además de eso, descolocarlos, descolocarlos con otros lenguajes, descolocarlos con – desubicarlos. Lo sacas de su matriz militarista. De su lenguaje guerrillero. De su simbolismo. Y los pones en otro lenguaje simbólico, en otra lógica, que es la lógica de la vida, de la alegría... entonces, ellos no saben que hacer con nosotras. Están confundidos. Entonces, esos guerrilleros: “Pues, sigan” (2013).

The *rutas*, and the way they call attention to the power of women's collectivity, neutrality, and subjectivity, are key to insisting on a role for Colombian women – and, further, for any social movement actor – outside the boundaries of what the armed conflict has prescribed for them. Colombia's context of hegemonic political elitism and the consistent blockage (either by party alliance or bloodshed) of popular pushes for reform, let alone radical change, has resulted in social movement actors being forcibly aligned with one side or the other and thereby marked as legitimate targets. Even as Ruta Pacífica activists set their bodies down in the middle of a crossfire, where they should *expect* to be targets of violence, they actively *insist* on the idea that they are *not* targetable – that they occupy a third space between illegal armed group and State forces. This insistence surprises and unsettles armed actors, and in so doing, unsettles and

confuses the binary logic of war imposed on Colombia by those in power.

(2) Spatial transgressions

It is not only the unabashed and defiant *way* that women activists enter militarized territory that confuses structures of violence built on a foundation of gendered exclusion; the very fact of their being there at *all* is itself an important facet of conflict transformation. Armed conflict restricts the lives of women. It confines them to limited spaces, both politically and physically. As the Mesa de Trabajo Mujer y Conflicto Armado wrote in 2004, following the nadir of paramilitary brutality,

El confinamiento es una estrategia de guerra utilizada por los grupos armados – legales e ilegales – que pretende obtener el control sobre los recursos económicos y las relaciones sociales de las zonas en disputa, a través del encierro o aislamiento de población (...) Estas prácticas diversas de control poblacional, territorial y socioeconómico han sido también llamadas bloques, encajonamientos o sitios (...) [Es una] estrategia de aislamiento y limitación (pp. 31-32).

This kind of spatial control should not be read as a division between public and private space, or exposed and protected space. In fact, with the militarism/marketization partnership expanding its reach, what were formerly considered safe or protected spaces (the home, the woman's world, social reproduction, the church, etc.) are now considered fair game for both military and market activities (Jean Franco's 2004 essay on the desanctification of Church and family in the dirty wars of the 1970s and 1980s is illuminating). Rather, it is control of *both* public and private spaces in different ways; an extension of the control of armed actors into spaces (social relations, family and marital life, dress, public and private comportment) that were formerly off-limits. The rise of narco-trafficking in the context of Colombia's armed conflict only exacerbated this confinement, especially in the Caribbean region, as men hitched their fortunes to the drug trade and women, deprived of other economic opportunities and dependent as well on narco-

livelihoods, became increasingly subject to a pre-feminist social division of labor in which their route to survival was to be objectified by powerful men (Solano, personal communication, 2013). For instance, the drug trade has given rise to what is called the narco-aesthetic, or the image of the *mujer operada* – woman with plastic surgery – as the ideal companion for a drug lord, with a look and a body type to which women are instructed to aspire (Yagoub, 2014).⁵⁶

In this context of overt control of spatial mobility and compartmentalization of occupyable and restricted space, such as in blockades and curfews, women's presence in areas restricted to those who hold gender, military, and market power is transgressive. Their refusal to honor the codes of confinement laid out by these power-holders undermines the latter's authority, making them appear weak or laughable according to their own rubric of power (i.e., because authorities base power and respect on masculine, militarized enforcement and control, activists who ignore that control are able to undermine their power and respect). Geographer Tim Cresswell's 1996 analysis of spatial transgression and social change demonstrates the power of the Greenham Common women's peace camp in 1981, during which a group of Welsh women occupied the Greenham Common airbase outside of London to protest nuclear proliferation. Because of the unspoken code that nuclear facilities were militarized, masculine spaces to be respected, women's continued presence there – and the fact that they were able to enter it in the first place – were upsetting, even mocking, to hegemonic power structures. Again, the way power was structured offered tools to power's opposition. In Cresswell's words, "The unintended consequence of making space a means of control is to simultaneously make it a site of meaningful resistance" (1996, p. 163; see also Enloe, 2000). In this way, the transgression of women activists into spaces claimed by men whose power is upheld by the nexus of

⁵⁶ There have been several publications in the last decade focusing on the *narconovela*, or the Colombian soap opera featuring women who embody this kind of "narco-aesthetic"; these productions are a fruitful terrain for exploring the effect of the drug trade on Colombian women's subjectivity.

militarization, patriarchy, and marketization (see *Colombia's Stage* for more on the way the marketizing project is implicated in this triad) is, in itself, a method of confusing violence when violence relies on the assumption that its claims will be respected. The demystifying of masculine, military-controlled space by women activists since the 1990s has established women in the national imaginary as active political subjects with valid claims – a process that is arguably coming to fruition, though much remains to be done, with the presence of women and gender experts at the peace talks in Havana. I submit, moreover, that the *presencia lúdica* of women in these restricted spaces was a key step in the process that led to the possibility of peace talks happening at all.

(3) Mujeres Desobedientes: Confusing Women's Roles

In addition to literally confusing armed groups by unabashedly entering restricted territory, the women of Ruta Pacífica confuse traditional images of who and what Colombian women are. They are known for marching bare-breasted, with slogans and images painted on their bodies; this not only calls attention to the mobilization (see Lunceford, 2012), but also allows women to claim a subjectivity that departs from traditional assumptions of timidity, modesty, and caution. While the role of the body in mobilization will be discussed further in Chapter 6, it is important to highlight the actions of women during mobilizations and the way they confuse the ideal-typical manifestations of femininity accorded to women in situations of violent conflict. It is useful to recall Anthias and Yuval-Davis' four roles of women in nationalist conflicts (see Chapter 1).

Though certainly the activists in Ruta Pacífica fall into the final category – physical participants in national political struggles – the subjectivity they are working to construct serves

as a counterexample to the reductionism of the other categories (cultural border guards, biological reproducers, and outposts of categories of identity). They are acting beyond the boundaries of reproduction, social reproduction, and patriarchal symbolism to insist on a level of agency and freedom not afforded to them by a society at war.

“Gallina que canta en el gallinero,” goes a rural saying in Colombia, “hay que matarla porque es de mal agüero” (Mesa de Trabajo Mujer y Conflicto Armado, 2005b, p. 85). By marching in the streets bare-breasted and singing, with painted bodies, activists are confusing traditional expectations of public femininity – even those that have in other contexts been appropriated by women’s movements to claim legitimacy. Charles Tilly and Leslie Wood (2012) describe what they call WUNC displays by social movements: a statement, manner of comportment, or slogan that implies *worthiness* (what the authors call a “sober demeanor; neat clothing; presence of clergy, dignitaries, and mothers with children”); *unity*; *numbers*; and *commitment* (making ostentatious sacrifice; braving dangerous conditions or bad weather). While Ruta Pacífica’s public mobilizations contain elements of unity, proof of numbers, and evidence of commitment, they do not seem to seek Tilly and Wood’s brand of “worthiness.” This is in contrast to previous generations of women’s movements, like the Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, who in their early years relied on traditional expectations of femininity and motherhood to protect and legitimate them (though those expectations were, it can be argued, subverted). But rather than aiming at traditional centers of power to validate their actions, the mobilizations of Ruta Pacífica aim elsewhere, at a more epistemic – one might even say decolonial – target. A 2000 joint statement by Ruta Pacífica and the OFP explained: “Nosotras continuaremos trabajando con empeño, alimentadas de creatividad, lúdica, persistencia y esperanza, conjunta y solidariamente, para construir una sociedad y una patria donde quepamos

todos y todas” (Sánchez G., 2006, p. 68). This reference to *lúdica*, or playfulness, was repeated several times during my fieldwork with Ruta Pacífica. One activist I interviewed laughed as she recounted a mobilization in which topless women were speaking with a local priest. The priest didn’t know where to set his gaze while speaking to the women, she remembered; he either looked above their heads or at their feet the entire time they were speaking. The priest’s awkwardness immediately put the women in a position of power over a traditional authority of patriarchal society, especially in conservative Popayán. This upending of power dynamics, even for a moment, is an important element of conflict transformation. Women’s insistence on a playful, brazen, unapologetic public appearance is not only a method of increasing mobilizations’ visibility. In refusing to abide by traditional, legitimating expectations of feminine behavior, these mobilizations confuse the gendered structures of power and discipline that form the scaffold on which the armed conflict is constructed.

(4) Otro Language Simbólico: Ritual and Symbolism

The final key element of Ruta Pacífica’s methodology that serves to confuse violence is its emphasis on symbolic language and ritual. In its mobilizations, planning sessions, and workshops, the activists place a heavy emphasis on identifying the symbolism of patriarchy and militarization, and replacing it with symbols of their own creation. These efforts are based in feminist theorizing about war and militarization, which illuminates the way military logics are imposed on society through the subtle transformation of cultural symbols with which meaning is constructed. In Cynthia Enloe’s words, militarization “never is simply about joining a military. It is a far more subtle process (...) The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions

to be not only valuable but also normal” (2000, pp. 2-3). The militarizing process partners with masculinist ideologies and marketizing projects in a tripod of domination and control, disseminating itself by way of cultural symbols – the militarization of toys and the media, or fashion (Sutton, 2013; Sutton & Paarlberg-Kvam, 2016), or by linking power and respectability to a militarized brand of masculinity and by feminizing dissent, for example.⁵⁸

In a 2006 report on Ruta Pacífica’s achievements, Olga Amparo Sánchez Gómez writes:

La Ruta Pacífica en sus procesos de movilización presta especial atención a la construcción de formas de comunicación en interacción en las cuales lo simbólico, lo ritual, la palabra y las prácticas culturales cobran sentidos nuevos y son vehículos de transformación de los imaginarios sociales a través de los cuales se da sentido a la guerra y a la violencia (p. 77).



Fig. 7: The symbol of the *espiral*, like this one made by activists in the workshop I attended in 2013, substitutes a symbol of violence for peace: the women identified a spiral of violence and power in Colombian history, and chose the same shape to represent the work of peacebuilding. Author photo.

⁵⁸ The importance of cultural symbols to the militarizing project in the United States has been well documented: on symbolic politics in militarization, see P. Regan (1994), “War Toys, War Movies, and the Militarization of the United States, 1900-85,” *Journal of Peace Research* 31.1. 45-58. Ritual and symbolism have also been acknowledged as important tools for U.S. counterinsurgency programs, as documented in Roberto J. González’ study of U.S. Army field manuals (Militarizing Culture: Essays on the Warfare State [2010], Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press).

It is this *sense-making* quality of militarized social imaginaries which is key to the way Ruta’s approach confuses the structure of violence. The activists’ theoretical praxis aims to uncover the language and ritual embedded into everyday social life which make militarism and violence seem like the most sensible responses to adversity, and to consciously replace those symbols and rituals with others. In public mobilizations and private workshops, Ruta activists perform written, call-and-response liturgies not unlike those used in religious services. They infuse these rituals with references to pre-colonial religious themes: “tierra, fuego, madera y viento. Las diosas míticas




Fig. 8: Theoretical Production.

latinoamericanas, las abuelas de todos los tiempos...” (ibid., p. 77). Colors are also used with symbolic emphasis: yellow for truth, white for justice, green for hope, red for life, et cetera. In establishing cultural reference points that emphasize femininity, natural elements and cycles, nonviolence, and peace, the women of Ruta Pacífica unite what they identify as pre-colonial imaginaries with modern-day political goals. This process – deploying feminist theorizing on militarization, referring back to pre-colonial symbology, and collectively creating a new lexicon of symbols and reference points to be used in their public and private activities – contributes to the *creation* of modes of thinking that address the entire tripod of patriarchy, militarization, and marketization supporting Colombia’s conflict. More than being mere cultural performances, these actions work to resignify politics, as Álvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar famously argue: “Culture is political because meanings are constitutive of processes that, implicitly or explicitly, seek to redefine

social power” (1998, p. 7).

While this symbolism is carefully constructed among the leaders of the network and its chapters, I wondered whether it was universally significant to all of the women involved in mobilizations. Alejandra Miller stated that among the women who are directly involved in Ruta Pacífica, the collective symbology is significant. Women gather together prior to a mobilization to decide on the symbols they are going to employ; symbols are not predetermined or centrally mandated. At the regional level, she said, the symbols are discussed collectively. During the workshop that I attended, the 25 or 30 women participants discussed the symbol of the *espiral* at the beginning of the day, while the flowers and candles were being arranged; nonetheless, it was clear that some women were more invested in this process than others, and those who arrived late to the event were not part of that discussion. Since many of the attendees were participating in their first workshop with Ruta Pacífica, it seems logical to assume that the symbolism was not universally understood. Moreover, public mobilizations like the *rutas* can involve several thousand women, not to mention bystanders, the press, political targets, and the public, who may fail to understand what the activists mean to convey. Sánchez Gómez (2006) warns that the messages at each Ruta Pacífica event may be too diverse for all participants to have sufficient ownership of all the symbols (pp. 81-82).

Whether the symbolic language employed by Ruta Pacífica is universally meaningful or not, it plays at least two important roles. One, it enables the development of a shared identity of contention. Even within one regional chapter of the network, women come from diverse backgrounds of race, ethnicity, class, age, sexuality, education, religion, and even political orientation. Creating a shared set of symbols and rituals is key to establishing a shared subjectivity. Dorothy Holland and Jean Lave assert that “[i]n the course of local struggles,

marginalized groups create their own practices. These practices thus provide the means by which subjectivities in the margins of power thicken and become more developed and so more determinant in shaping local struggles” (qtd. in Escobar, 2008, p. 219). María Andrea Campo Ayala, organizer and legal adviser to Ruta in Popayán, identified this unifying aspect of ritual in her own experience with the network. Participants, she asserted, “puedan hablar en un mismo lenguaje, independientemente de lo negro, lo indígena, lo blanco, lo mestizo, lo rural, lo urbano – un lenguaje colectivo que habla en contra de la guerra y en contra de las violencias.”

Furthermore, Lisa Schirch (2005) maintains that the use of ritual and symbol in conflict transformation projects has the capacity to redefine conflict participants’ understandings of their own identities and relationships – to “make sense” of the conflict in a potentially transformative way. By forming bonds between activists who engage in them, rituals can strengthen a community’s commitment to nonviolence, transform relationships, “rehumanize” victims of violence (p. 124), and work to heal trauma. The process of identifying and healing trauma is key to Ruta Pacífica’s symbolic language and ritual. One way in which this takes place is via the identification of a continuum of violence against women, which both precedes armed conflict and becomes one of its key apparatuses (Campo and others described war as “an expression of patriarchy,” rather than a separate structure). This links previous acts and postures of violence suffered by women activists, committed by husbands, fathers, and other men in their lives, with the violence that is exacerbated in wartime. As Campo explained in our 2013 conversation:

Cuando aparece el conflicto, cuando aparece la guerra, cuando aparece las armas, los actores armados ilegales, esas prácticas de violencia se exageran. Y aparecen otros lenguajes donde el cuerpo de la mujer es perfecto para validar a los vencedores, para desquitarse de otros, para romper el tejido social, para romper a las comunidades, para intimidar – sí, otros lenguajes que hacen parte de la guerra. Pero que es ese lenguaje simbólico que ha permitido encontrarnos.

Furthermore, Ruta’s language allows women to *name* those acts of violence, whether they come

from an intimate partner or an armed actor (or both), and to ground their victimization in an event, not an inherent state (see the chapter on *victims* for more about this distinction). Campo continued:

Ha sido un lenguaje que justamente ha desnaturalizado esas prácticas de violencia contra las mujeres. Les ha puesto rostro. Y les ha puesto nombre. Se llama marido, se llaman actores armados, se llama militar, se llama guerrillero, se llama paraco, se llama político, se llama hermano, tiene un nombre. (...) Pierde ese nombre para llamarse criminal, para llamarse violador. Y ¿cuánto le cuesta las mujeres? Primero: reconocer que violencias que se ejercen contra ellas sin que ellas sepan que son violencias. “Pero era el esposo. Pero era otra cosa. Pero era, pero era, pero era.” Y lo segundo es que ese que la ejerció en su condición o de marido, o esposo, o de hijo, o de hermano, de demás, siempre se llamara criminal.... ¿sí? Se llamara así el delito que se aparece en dos. La víctima y la aparición de los victimarios. La victimización es consecuencia.

This process of naming their victimizers and connecting their victimization to a broader context of patriarchy is capable of giving name and dimension to a nameless pain; once defined, it may be easier to control. Some scholars argue that experiences of trauma defy subjectivity, separating the mind from its bodily experiences. Elaine Scarry (1987) has defined the experience of pain as the “unmaking of the world,” converting the victim’s experience of existence into something incommensurable with her or his experience of it prior to the endured trauma. It obviates its own description, making language – a tool for describing and overcoming pain – useless. “Pain,” writes Scarry, “does not simply resist language but actively destroys it” (p. 4). The ritual practices of Ruta Pacífica are an attempt to redraft language as a tool in the service of healing from trauma – and in rebuilding women’s agency and subjectivity in a way that is both collective and deeply individual. Furthermore, the way that Ruta’s symbolic and ritual practices have to do with mourning needs further investigation. Butler’s (2004) analysis of the post-9/11 United States asserts that rituals like mourning and funeral marches can be powerful practices in narrating conflict and constructing subjectivity. More work remains to be done on understanding the way Ruta Pacífica’s symbology contributes to the process of grieving and the healing of

trauma, in addition to taking a measure of the symbolism's effectiveness beyond the organization itself.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have endeavored to interrogate the near-ubiquitous interpretation of Colombia's conflict as not only complex, but inherently confusing. I have attempted to tease out the way that confusion, along with the understanding of war as an essentially binary conflict against which the complexity of Colombian history is counterposed, has been used to the material benefit of certain actors and to disempower or delegitimize others. Finally, I have argued that members of Ruta Pacífica marshal this trope of confusion and use it for their own purposes: by unabashedly entering restricted territory, refusing to respect the masculinist logics of war that confine their bodies, behaving in ways that upset the roles prescribed to women in conflict, and destabilizing the conflict's lexicon of militarization. In this way women activists appropriate the tool of confusion, used against their interests by paramilitaries, State forces, and international actors seeking to paint the conflict as a binary system, and use it to destabilize the structures of power that work against them. The creative nonviolence of this network of women, and their insistence on "actively defining reality" (Sánchez G., 2006, p. 69), present a powerful example of what Foucault described as the possibility of using hegemonic discourse as a "starting point for an opposing strategy":

Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (1998, p. 100).

In appropriating the discursive tool of confusion that has served the interests of the powerful, Ruta Pacífica, along with other women's peace networks in Colombia today, is taking actions to destabilize the gendered exclusion of masculinist power structures, militarizing projects, and

market agendas that keep the country trapped in a cycle of violence to the benefit of a few. The process of mobilizing to confuse Colombia's violence threatens to upend the decades-old arrangements that have sustained the armed conflict – revealing women peace activists as perhaps the best and brightest hope for ushering in a just peace.

Yo creo que en Colombia no existe nadie que puede decir que no es víctima del conflicto armado. Es decir, hay gente que no se le conoce como víctima. Pero todos la somos.

–Alejandra Coll Agudelo, 9/19/13

Chapter 5

The Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011:

State-Sponsored Subjectivity

On June 10th, 2011, after several months of congressional deliberations, President Juan Manuel Santos signed Law 1448, the Victims and Land Restitution Law. Considered the cornerstone of Santos' peace efforts, along with the peace talks already in the planning stages by the time the law was signed, the so-called Victims' Law is based on a conceptual foundation of “transitional justice” and aims to grant reparations both to the families of the dead and to Colombians who have been displaced from their land as a result of conflict. The law is one of the most expansive land restitution proposals in the world, and carries the potential of damages paid to victims, the restitution and titling of their original land or an equivalent plot of land elsewhere, psychosocial and legal services, a promise that the government will prevent revictimization, and the satisfaction of a national day of mourning and the collection of popular testimony (República de Colombia, 2011). Claimants, in order to become beneficiaries of the land restitution portion of the law, have to submit documents proving that they were displaced within certain parameters of time and circumstance; they are also required to provide evidence that their use of the land will be honest and productive (Barrett, 2012b).

The women activists with whom I spoke during fieldwork had much to say about the Victims' Law, its effects (real and potential) on their lives, and the challenges it posed for them. “Tiene cosas buenas y cosas malas,” one woman in Cauca told me. “Dice que se le tienen que escuchar, que nos reconocen como víctima, y que hay reparación.” Women activists are working

to ensure that eligible victims are able to gain access to these benefits. Nonetheless, our conversations pointed not only to various logistical and political hurdles faced by the government in carrying out its promises, but also indicated that certain stipulations of the Victims' Law point to a deeper conceptual issue which is deeply gendered: what it means to be a legally recognized "victim" of the armed conflict, who benefits from the boundaries of that definition, and what it can tell us about women's subjectivity in the neoliberal security state. In this chapter I will attempt to decode that message, and examine the actions of women peace activists involved in claiming reparations under the Victims' Law, illuminating the ways in which their actions might contribute to a more subversive subjectivity for women who have suffered the effects of war.

Crafting the Victims' Law

The Victims' Law was signed after more than a year of debate in the Colombian congress. Santos began to focus on land restitution immediately after taking office in 2010, with the 2010-2014 Plan de Desarrollo, and the Victims' Law was a subsequent step in that process.⁵⁹ Though most members of Congress indicated that they supported the law, strong opposition came from the camp of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who objected to the idea that victims of State violence would be repaired in addition to victims of guerrilla violence (El Espectador, 2010). Uribe's opposition was representative of the feelings of regional elites in the northern part of the country, who, while they enjoyed a close relationship with the former president, have distanced themselves from the Santos administration. This sector of society, which was the primary source of funding for paramilitary groups, present what is perhaps the

⁵⁹ Mery Rodriguez (2013) points out that no victims were involved in writing the legislation; this absence likely contributed to some of the "vacíos y omisiones" (Salinas A., 2011) visible in the final product.

most daunting obstacle to the success of Santos' plans for restitution. The Victims' Law, at its heart, proposes to "fundamentally change the power structure" in rural Colombia (Tate, 2013a); as such, its detractors are invested (literally and figuratively) in putting up a fight.

Nonetheless, initial reports from the government one year after the law was signed were positive; in September of 2012 the director of the victims' agency asserted that the Santos administration anticipated meeting its target of distributing \$457,000,000 to 110,000 victims two months ahead of schedule (O'Gorman, 2012a). Later reports from news sources and conversations during my own fieldwork, however, indicate that these figures belie persistent problems with the execution of the law.

Obstacles to the Execution of the Law

Law 1448 is not Colombia's first attempt at restitution to victims in the framework of armed conflict. Land reform measures were passed in 1961, 1984, 1988, and 1994, with all but the first paying special attention to women's land rights (Deere & Leon, 2001). Restorative measures also formed part of the 2006 Justice and Peace law, the cornerstone of which was the so-called "demobilization" of paramilitary fighters, which resulted in the creation of regional tribunals designed to host the confessions of paramilitary leaders and grant victims' families the relative peace of knowing the details of their loved ones' killings. This attempt at transitional justice was strongly criticized by victims' groups and their advocates, especially for the law's failure to adequately address issues of gender justice (Meertens & Zambrano, 2010). Given the disproportionate effects of land seizure and displacement on women, both in terms of statistical presence and in the way displacement affects women's lives (Ruiz, 2010; Meertens, 2012; Wyss, 2012), the law's scant attention to gender justice issues is striking.

The Victims' Law of 2011 contains several measures aimed particularly at ensuring access to justice for women. Women heads of households are given "preferential attention" in the restitution process, and once their land is restored to them, women are given priority in gaining access to social services and assistance from the state. However, one report indicates that the way this preferential treatment takes place is left up to local authorities, who "tend to be conservative when it comes to establishing the rights of women, often requesting explicit, material proof of a marital relation to the man. Since many couples were never officially married, a formal marital connection is hard to establish" (García-Godos & Wiig, 2014, p. 28). The security of women claimants is also a priority, though as Donny Meertens (2012, p. 14) points out, the law fails to specify how that security will be guaranteed. Finally, the Victims' Law improves on its antecedents by mandating that newly formalized land titles be registered jointly to men and women when couples are receiving land (República de Colombia, 2011:Article 118)⁶⁰; this goes beyond earlier, more formally familistic land reform measures that merely "included" women on titles held by their partners, and left them at a disadvantage after a separation, widowhood, or divorce.

If land seizures and forced displacement have disproportionate effects on women, restorative justice programs face disproportionate challenges in their attempts to offer reparations to women victims. Despite the aforementioned legal advantages, reports and my own fieldwork indicate that this has been the case for the 2011 Victims' Law, under which women have faced difficulties in gaining access to proffered benefits (see Salinas A., 2011). These difficulties stem from six observable power differentials.

⁶⁰ The aforementioned report by a Norwegian NGO indicates that the joint titling mandate is not always carried out on the ground, where local cases have been reported of married men being the only parties named on newly distributed land titles (García-Godos & Wiig, 2014, p. 28).

(1) Already-existing differentials in land tenure. More than 40% of female landowners in Colombia lack formal title to their property (Meertens, 2013, p. 45). Land laws in Colombia have, by and large, failed to adequately address issues of familism and the resulting discrepancy in titling between women and men, although gradual progress has been made in recent decades. The 1961 Agrarian Law, while it did not explicitly discriminate against women, listed only one householder on land titles, which in practice usually meant a man. This was in keeping with the civil code of the time in which the provision of State services was meant to be funneled through men in a heterosexual, nuclear family, with their “dependents” receiving benefits only by virtue of their connection to the male head-of-household rather than enjoying a direct relationship with the State (Meertens and Zambrano, 2010, p. 196). Moreover, according to Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena León (2001, p. 85-86), the law’s point system executed by INCORA, the agrarian reform institute, gave preferential distribution of land to people with a work record, formal education, and a “good reputation” in the area surrounding the plot in question. This stipulation, combined with a failure to specify that daughters and widows would be on the preferred list to inherit land, meant that women were much less likely than men to be given land or be named on titles thereto. As a result of the activism of ANMUCIC (the National Association of Indigenous, Black, and Campesina Women of Colombia), land reform programs in the 1980s did finally address gender-based inequities, but they failed to confer significant benefits to women because the law was unevenly applied (Deere & León, 2001, pp. 79, 86; Meertens and Zambrano, 2010, p. 196). Finally, later years saw several important steps for women’s land tenure – the 1991 Constitution and land laws in 1994 and 2002 – but these were accompanied by a “reverse land reform” spurred by the rise in paramilitary and narco-trafficking power. In the decade of the 1990s alone, up to *three times* the amount of land as the nation’s land reform

policies had redistributed in the previous 35 years was concentrated in the hands of drug traffickers (Deere & León, 2001, pp. 173-174). The rising tide of violence also exacerbated pre-existing power divisions based on gender and race, with the result that the end of the 1990s saw “a decrease in land adjudication in favor of women and an increase in joint or male ownership [which] reflected a deeply ingrained cultural devaluation of women’s responsibility” (Meertens & Zambrano, 2010, p. 197).

Although the Victims’ Law aims to restore formal titles to the internally displaced, women who never had a title to their land to begin with are at a disadvantage. It is much more difficult to prove that a victim was displaced from a particular plot of land if the land was never titled, or titled in the name of a male partner or relative. This dynamic reflects Butler and Athanasiou’s claim that “we can only be dispossessed because we are already dispossessed”; that is, because human vulnerability is constructed by sociohistorical processes (2013, p. 5). In sum, the law’s provision of equal *opportunity* of land tenure represents progress, but obstacles remain. The road to land tenure may be being repaved, but historical differentials in titling mean that it remains blocked to a significant sector of Colombian women.

(2) Power differentials in the process of filing for benefits under the law. In Colombia today “claiming victimhood is an incredibly contested field,” writes Winifred Tate (2013b). The initial step in claiming reparations under the Victims’ Law is to file a *denuncia* or a *declaración* with either a *Centro Regional de Atención y Reparación* or a regional office of the local ombudsman or inspector general (República de Colombia, 2011). This first step may be the most difficult for women, especially rural women, to take, and presents various obstacles to receiving justice under the law (Meertens, 2013, p. 47). During the September 2013 workshop I attended

with Ruta Pacífica’s Cauca chapter held in Santander de Quilichao, women who had filed (or attempted to file) a *declaración* under the Victims’ Law reported that their victimizer (the individual or group who was the assailant, responsible for the death of their family member[s], or in some other way the cause of their displacement) often remains in the same town, especially after the “demobilization” of the AUC; any attempt, therefore, to file a formal complaint is a highly visible act. One woman reported that her assailant was physically present in the office at the time she went in to file for benefits. No matter how progressive a piece of legislation may be when it comes to offering justice to women victims, that justice will be difficult to serve if the women are threatened into not claiming benefits under the law.

Furthermore, despite the advances in Article 118 that legislate joint land titling for couples (whether heterosexual or same-sex couples), the legacy of familism in land titling procedures has left its mark on current attempts to restore land to women. When the *former* plot of land from which a woman was displaced enters into a restitution process, if she was not listed on the title – which is a probable scenario, given that Article 118 represents a departure from the historical norm in Colombian land policy – she is likely to face difficulties in filing for reparations without a male partner present. This potential obstacle becomes especially clear when we consider that in the process of displacement and the social, relational, economic, and geographical upheaval that it entails, it is common for families to separate or divorce (Meertens, 2013, p. 48). Under the Victims’ Law, if the erstwhile male tenant claims reparations—either on his own or with a new partner—his former partner may be barred from gaining access to benefits under the law. As Donny Meertens (*ibid.*) writes, what is needed is a brand of justice “transformadora de ese pasado, no solo como reparación del acontecimiento traumático sino

como generación de condiciones para que ellas sean tomadas en cuenta como autónomas portadoras de derechos, independientemente de su posición en la familia.”

(3) Threats and violence against the displaced who claim reparations under the law.

Once a victim of the armed conflict files a *declaración* and goes through the bureaucratic process of gaining access to benefits, s/he can be faced with retribution either from her or his former victimizer(s) or from new actors eager to prevent land restitution from becoming a successful step in resolution of the armed conflict. Even if a victim has his or her plot of land restored and chooses to return to live and work on it, the armed actor who forced the original displacement may still be present in the area (Neuman, 2012). This coexistence, along with efforts by paramilitary successor groups to ensure that the Victims’ Law is unsuccessful, has resulted in numerous attacks against land claimants and their families. Documented cases of violence against Colombians who claimed reparations under the Victims’ Law include the May 2013 torture and assassination of twenty-three year old Rigoberto Rivera Catalán, whose mother had claimed benefits under the Victims’ Law six months earlier in Carmen de Bolívar. Two other men were assassinated in the same year who had been assigned protection by the National Protection Agency (*Unidad Nacional de Protección*) created to serve Colombians who filed claims under the Victims’ Law (Verdad Abierta, 2013). According to the Associated Press,

...From its start, the reparation campaign has been bloodstained. After the first ceremonial land handover on Sept. 21, one recipient was bludgeoned to death as he walked home in the turbulent Uraba [sic] banana-growing region on the Caribbean coast. The killers left four bullets beside Hernando Perez's body as a warning to his comrades. The latest killing occurred in San Onofre... On June 30 [2011], a gunman shot and killed a town councilman who had worked closely with peasants fighting to regain usurped land (Bajak & Sequera, 2011).

According to Al Jazeera, in 2013 alone, more than 500 claimants received death threats (Serrano, 2014). While the cases mentioned above involved threats to and assassinations of men, as of

2016 the numbers of men and women who filed for benefits under the law were nearly equal, with women making up a slightly higher percentage. Moreover, women are more likely to report being threatened, displaced, and sexually assaulted than men (Gobierno de Colombia, 2016), and are subject to these risks at a disproportionate rate. The security concerns facing would-be land reoccupiers present a major hurdle to the Victims' Law's success.⁶¹ Between June 2011, when the law was passed, and September 2013, Human Rights Watch documented the cases of ninety land claimants who had to be relocated after threats were made against them; the report also found that only *one* of the *six hundred and fifty-one* families who had received land under the law had actually returned to live on it (Human Rights Watch, 2013; Wyss, 2012).

(4) Threats and violence against community leaders who assist in the reparations process. During the years of popular advocacy for land restitution that preceded the Victims' Law's eventual passage, local organizers and community leaders have been repeated targets of threats and violence. According to the Colombian ombudsman, in the five years leading up to the passage of the law, seventy-one advocates for land restitution, representing fourteen of the country's thirty-two departments, were assassinated (El Tiempo, 2012b). It is little wonder that this violence has continued, and even intensified, since the Victims' Law took effect. Targets, of which one study counted thirty-seven in the first six months of 2013 (WOLA, 2013), have included advocate Manuel Ruiz and his teenaged son, Afro-Colombians from a "humanitarian zone" coveted by palm oil exporters in the Chocó, who were killed and disappeared in 2012 (ABColumbia, 2012), and Carlos Olmos Cardenas, a community activist in Sucre who was gunned down in 2013 several hours after meeting with a Colombian senator to discuss land restitution issues (Global Post, 2013; see also C. Kraul, "Colombia Law Fails to Put Land Back

in Farmers' Hands," *Los Angeles Times*, 1/5/14). This is not to mention women victims of anti-restitution efforts, who as mentioned above are more likely to be threatened and displaced (and therefore less likely to make the news) than male victims, who are more likely to be assassinated and/or disappeared.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, during the time of my fieldwork community groups and human rights activists with whom I met were struggling to identify the source of death threats signed by a group calling itself the "Anti-Restitution Army." One such threat asserted: "We will not allow the taking of this land from good people to give to guerrillas disguised as victims" (Barrett, 2012b). Women's peace networks, several of which are at the forefront of advocacy and popular education about the benefits available under the law, are not immune from such threats. In February of 2012, Ruta Pacífica was among three organizations to receive a letter from the neoparamilitary group Águilas Negras, reading: "Quit fucking with the land issue, because anyone who keeps it up will be assassinated, no matter how protected they are. We give you thirty days to abandon the city" (Women in Black, 2012). The resurgence of threats around Victims' Law advocacy speaks, perhaps, to the law's potential to shift power in the country – if it is successfully implemented. At the moment, it seems that the Santos Administration is struggling to implement a law of post-conflict reparations and restitution in a context in which the conflict, storming around the epicenter of access to the country's land, is still very much alive.⁶²

(5) Lack of organization or interest on the part of local government bodies. In

September of 2013, women from Ruta Pacífica's regional chapter in Cauca led several

⁶² Violence that is a response to the execution of the Victims' Law can also, in a sort of circular dance, serve to obstruct it at the legal level; according to the news outlet Colombia Reports, the Colombian military asserts the right to impede the land restitution process in areas experiencing violence (Bedoya, 2014).

roundtable discussions about women's experiences filing *declaraciones* under the Victims' Law. The picture painted was one of local state functionaries who frequently gave misinformation to those seeking reparations under the law. Several of the women who attended the workshop reported that they received no confirmation number when they filed for benefits; if true, this would have been a direct violation of Article 36 of the law, which entitles the victim to regular communication regarding the status of her or his case.

Much of the apparent disorganization at the local level was blamed on the system's reliance on the *Registro Único de Víctimas* (RUV), the Santos Administrations' central database of claimants. As Alejandra Coll, a member of Ruta Pacífica's legal team, explained to a group of exasperated community leaders: "Although Cauca is receiving about 1,000 *declaraciones* per month, the system is not accessible except in Bogotá. Local authorities cannot access it. It is an Excel spreadsheet in Bogotá" (my translation). The database's centralized location in the capital, and its inaccessibility to the outlying regions of the country, is emblematic of Colombian centralization and the peripheralization of the *regiones*. Victims are required to be officially registered in the RUV in order to be eligible for benefits. As of July 2016, the national victims' agency claimed that just over 8 million Colombians had been registered (Gobierno de Colombia, 2015; see also ABColombia, 2012).

Misinformed or disinterested local officials present another barrier to the success of the law, especially since the first step of filing a *declaración* is a point at which women – particularly rural women – face a host of obstacles (Meertens, 2013, p. 47). A number of women at Ruta Pacífica's workshop in Santander de Quilichao reported that government representatives in Cauca had been known to (falsely) tell women that only their names could be on the paperwork for the *declaración*, not the names of their families or community members. Women

also stated that the filing process was cumbersome, confusing, and sometimes failed to result in a successful *declaración*; the form that victims must fill out to be registered is ten pages long, which for some claimants is “traumatic” (Haugaard, Castillo, Tate, & Romoser, 2013). One 2012 case resulted in a group of victims being promised benefits after a lengthy filing process; the benefits were later withdrawn “due to gaps in record keeping” (Barrett, 2012a). The blog *Colombia Land Rights Monitor* reported a similar story of frustration:

Inspired by President Santos and his Victims’ Law, [Argemiro] Hernández went to the newly founded Land Restitution Unit (URT) in Apartadó with a group of six other victims of displacement in April 2012. Their four-hour trip to the office proved fruitless. Half of the group was handed a receipt for officially claiming the land that they lost. The other half of the group was told that the staff at the URT was currently unable to assist them and that they would have to return at a later date—the waiting room was empty. Some of the victims called the URT a month later to see if there was any progress in their cases. Their queries were brushed aside and they were told to wait (Colombia Land Rights Monitor, 2012).

After a fact-finding trip to Colombia’s Caribbean coast in 2012, Lisa Haugaard of the Latin America Working Group reported “very little interest [in the Victims’ Law] at the local government level. Some officials are interested, but they receive no support and no resources so that they can begin to resolve the issues” (O’Gorman, 2012b). Another report echoes this problem: “Even well-intentioned local government officials interested in implementing the law had little direction or resources from the national government with which to do so” (Haugaard, Castillo, Tate, & Romoser, 2013; see also Latin America Working Group, 2012 on local officials seeing the law as an unfunded mandate). This lack of resources experienced by officials at the local level threatens to deepen the power disparity between region and center, as the central urban governments have more access to the benefits provided by the law. Regional power structures, as noted above, present perhaps the biggest obstacle. As of 2014, the Santos administration had received only forty-one percent of the *declaraciones* it had anticipated; of that forty-one

percent, only two percent had been approved, according to a Colombian NGO – a paltry 0.8 percent of the anticipated total⁶³ (Bedoya, 2014; see also Acuña, 2014b). Tate (2013a) notes that the scant percentage of land claims that have been resolved represents those parcels that are not in dispute; the vast majority has been met with counter-claims to the land by a “well organized (...) well-funded opposition.” A November 2014 report by Amnesty International, “A Land Title is Not Enough,” lambasted the Victims’ Law for the inefficiency of its execution, as well as the continued threats and violence visited on those who have claimed benefits.

Critiques of the Law’s Conception

Beyond the existing obstacles to efficacious execution of the Victims’ Law, critics in Colombia and abroad have argued that the way in which the law was originally conceived contains misapprehensions of the nature of the armed conflict, and internal contradictions which risk leading not to an exit from violence, but to a *reinforcement* of the conflict’s foundations. The three most salient critiques of the law’s primary structure revolve around the concept of transitional justice, the limits on potential beneficiaries of the law, and the relationship between the terms of the law and the underlying structure of the armed conflict.

(1) Transitional justice, or war is over, if you want it. The Victims’ Law presents itself

⁶³ These statistics do not indicate that a dearth of Colombians has been listed on the RUV or claimed benefits; on the contrary, according to a recent study, *a full fourteen percent* of the country’s population is now listed in the register, more than in any other reparations program in the world to date (Sikkink, Marchesi, Dixon, and D’Alessandra, 2014, p. 2). Between 2012 and 2013, 39% of land claimants were women (Meertens, 2014); as of 2016, women represented the majority of claimants who filed as having been forcibly displaced (Noticias Uno, 2015; Gobierno de Colombia, 2016), though Afro-Colombians and the indigenous make up a tiny and unrepresentative percentage of claims (Haugaard, Castillo, Tate, & Romoser, 2013). The millions of Colombians eligible for restitution present one of several obstacles to a holistic and timely reparations process. Given the ten-year period during which benefits from the Victims’ Law will be available, these numbers indicate that at the current rate, the stipulated period will end before many potential claimants receive land or reparations.

within a framework of transitional justice,⁶⁴ defined by the United Nations as the “full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations, 2010).⁶⁵ It is the “*past* abuses” (emphasis mine) aspect of transitional justice which has perhaps incited the loudest critiques, which argue that it is impossible to focus on a transition from conflict to post-conflict without first resolving the conflict. Amnesty International opined in 2012 that “[t]he Law presents itself as part of a project of transitional justice, implying that the internal armed conflict is a thing of the past. However, in reality the conflict, which has long been characterized by widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, is continuing as are human rights abuses” (Amnesty International, 2012).

In this light, the Victims’ Law can be seen as establishing an exit point for a state eager to move on from an expensive and bloody armed conflict. Its existence lends credibility to the Santos administration’s push for peace, and as the first step of Santos’ two-pronged peace

⁶⁴ The Transitional Justice (TJ) model of conflict resolution has emerged within the last quarter-century as an internationally agreed-upon method for countries to come to terms with past violence. Its roots are in the international human rights movement and the international NGOs that guided that movement. Its prominent features include reparations programs, criminal tribunals, truth commissions, and efforts to promote national remembrance. One major controversy in the application of the TJ model is the debate over “truth” versus “justice,” as many governments with TJ programs have engaged in fact-finding projects without sufficiently punishing the perpetrators of crimes; the model has also been criticized for focusing on individual crimes rather than their institutional foundations. TJ models are dependent on the existence of a strong civil society, without which the reconciliatory aspects of the model cannot be implemented. In recent years, TJ advocates have called for a stronger gender focus to be implemented in countries where the model is followed; the successes of this kind of advocacy have resulted in major changes to international law to the benefit of women in armed conflict situations. Nonetheless, feminist scholars have criticized the model as overly masculine (Fischer, 2011). All of these features of TJ programs are clearly applicable to the Colombian case, with the important exception that this particular armed conflict has not, in practice, come to an end.

⁶⁵ The UN’s conception is both echoed and expanded in the Victims’ Law itself, which understands transitional justice as “los diferentes procesos y mecanismos judiciales o extrajudiciales asociados con los intentos de la sociedad por garantizar que los responsables de las violaciones contempladas en el artículo tercero de la presente Ley, rindan cuentas de sus actos, se satisfagan los derechos a la justicia, la verdad y la reparación integral a las víctimas, se lleven a cabo las reformas institucionales necesarias para la no repetición de los hechos y la desarticulación de las estructuras armadas ilegales, con el fin último de lograr la reconciliación nacional y la paz duradera y sostenible.”

agenda, it likely made negotiations with the FARC-EP in Havana possible. However, as native son Gabriel García Márquez famously remarked in 1994, Colombia is “dos países a la vez: uno en el papel y otro en la realidad.” Moreover, beyond simply providing *insufficient* justice, critics argue that the law *limits* the justice that might be served: it creates a cutoff on paper for a conflict which continues in flesh and blood, and thereby allows the state to abdicate its future responsibilities to victims of the conflict who are daily being created anew.⁶⁶ To “transition” from an unresolved conflict is to suspend the conflict in time, recalling Roland Barthes’ assertion that to photograph a life form is to make it experience “a micro-version of death... this death in which [the photographer’s] gesture will embalm” the subject, turning it into an examinable object that can be manipulated (Barthes, 1980, p. 14). The Victims’ Law takes a photograph of the armed conflict and addresses it as it was in that moment, up until its imposed and fictitious end; it fails to account for the conflict as a dynamic, mobile force that changes with new geopolitical realities, adding new layers to an existing palimpsest of war.

(2) Limits on who can benefit from the victims’ law. Beyond critiques of the legal framework in which the Victims’ Law was conceptualized, observers take issue with various restrictions on potential beneficiaries. The law simultaneously *creates* a definition of a victim of the armed conflict and *restricts* it; in codifying victimhood, victimhood is constrained. These stipulations fall into five categories: restrictions related to the date of victimization, the circumstances of victimization, the identity of the victimizer, the activities of the victim, and the status of seized land.

⁶⁶ In 2012 alone, more than 250,000 Colombians were *newly* displaced from their land, according to one report (Hauggaard, Castillo, Tate, & Romoser, 2013).

(a) Victimized too early or too late. Women and men who were displaced, assaulted, and/or lost a family member prior to 1985⁶⁷ are ineligible for material benefits (land or financial compensation) under the Victims' Law; the text of the law offers simply "reparación simbólica" (including public acknowledgement of the events and the receipt of a broad apology) and a vague guarantee that they will not be victimized again. Those whose victimization occurred between 1985 and 1991 are eligible to receive financial compensation, but are ineligible for land restitution (República de Colombia, 2011: Articles 3, 61, 75, 141, and 142). Colombians who are eligible for land restitution *and* financial compensation under the law must have been victimized after January 1st, 1991, and before June 10th, 2021 (ten years after the law took effect). If their victimization took place prior to the law's approval, victims were given four years (from the date of approval) to claim benefits; if the victimization takes place afterward, they are given two years to file. The 1991 start date for victims eligible for land restitution, which was chosen because it marked the adoption of the current constitution (Nolen, 2014), has been criticized for leaving out a significant portion of the displaced, with activists pointing to the escalation of displacement as a strategy of armed groups which began in 1980 – eleven years before the start date for land restitution (Martinez, 2011). As one legal review points out, "the best transitional justice processes have been those that look simultaneously backwards to repair the past and forwards to establish a more just and peaceful future. The Victims' Law certainly glances in both directions, yet the ongoing conflict may unfortunately impede deep engagement with either" (Summers, 2009, p. 234).

⁶⁷ The start date for the terms of the law was the subject of significant debate; the decision to begin in 1985 and not 1986, as originally proposed, means that victims of the 1985 attack on the Palacio de Justicia by M-19 guerrillas are eligible for financial compensation and other (non-land-related) benefits. The majority of victims of this event were members of the government or armed and police forces.

(b) Victimized in the wrong way. Even the chronologically accepted group, those victimized between 1991 and 2011, faces myriad obstacles in gaining benefits under the law. Once a victim claims benefits, provides the appropriate information or documents, and is registered in the RUV, s/he is eligible to reclaim the land lost in conflict *if* s/he remained in the geographical area around the site of victimization after it took place. On the other hand, if the victim left the area where their victimization occurred (e.g., a woman who was raped or whose partner was killed, who fled to another region or to the capital in fear for her own safety or to find a sustainable livelihood), may not be eligible to be registered in the RUV unless s/he *previously* went through the process of being registered as an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) (Amnesty International, 2012). But research on the subject shows that although most registered IDPs are women, women are also less likely than men to be successfully registered as IDPs. Similar to the stipulation of the current law that victims must be registered in a central database to qualify for benefits, IDPs must be registered in the *Registro Único de Personas Desplazadas* (RUPD). The challenges to successfully registering oneself in that database echo the gendered nature of the challenges with the Victims' Registry discussed above: in the early years, only IDPs who had been displaced after 1995 were counted, and those displaced by coca fumigation were not counted; those displaced by development megaprojects or natural disasters were not counted; those claiming to be displaced by state violence were not counted at all, with those displaced by paramilitary successor groups facing significant hurdles to being successfully registered. As a result of these and other restrictions, in 2011 the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center showed that an approximate 35% of IDPs were not registered in the RUPD (in Small, 2012). It stands to reason that a significant portion, if not a majority, of that 35% is made up of women, since many of the obstacles to registration are gendered: women displaced

due to alleged sexual violence, for example, often are not believed by officials, and hesitate to report the incidents in question (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Furthermore, given that the official number of *registered* IDPs in 2011 was 3.9 million, the 35% of unregistered persons represents more than 1.3 million people who would currently face a major bureaucratic obstacle to collecting the benefits promised by the Victims' Law.

Therefore, even if the Victims' Law were gender-neutral or even anti-patriarchal in its stipulations, it would still be laid over a long and layered history of past sexism and its material effects. And so this provision – that victims who left their territories and were not registered as IDPs are not immediately eligible for restitution – results in new actions of discrimination against women victims.

(c) Victimized by the wrong people. In order to be registered as victims, it is necessary to prove that the victimization took place in the context of the armed conflict; that is, that the victim was victimized by a recognized armed actor. Leaving aside for a moment the complex question of what defines the limits of that context (is a woman who suffers domestic abuse from a soldier returning home victimized “in the context of the armed conflict,” for example? Or a man whose indigence is a result of a cutback in social services connected to the militarization of the federal budget?), two issues that arise from this requirement are, first of all, that if a victim's relative was killed by a member of the army or the police, an official investigation in the courts must prove that the deceased was not a member of an illegal armed group. The victim, in other words, is presumed-guerrilla-until-proven-civilian, and the onus is on the victim's family to prove that the killing was a crime and not a matter of law enforcement. Moreover, given the recent wave of killings carried out by members of the Armed Forces who dressed the cadavers of innocent

civilians in guerrilla fatigues in order to boost body counts, and the fact that “investigations into unlawful killings rarely if ever reach a conclusion” (Amnesty International, 2012; see also Brown, 2011), the likelihood that a relative of a person killed by the Armed Forces or the police will receive compensation or land restitution under the law is remarkably slim.

Secondly, since the so-called “demobilization” of self-defense forces in 2005 under the Justice and Peace law, paramilitary actors have re-emerged (or been re-named) as members of *bandas criminales* (criminal bands, or *bacrim*), and continued to threaten and terrorize peasants, human rights defenders, and land claimants. Members of the *bacrim* reach as high as ten thousand, or a third of the demobilized paramilitary forces; they are reportedly active in a third of Colombian territory (see Human Rights Watch, 2010; and Suárez, 2013, *inter alia*). Nonetheless, the original version of the Victims’ Law did not include the *bacrim* as valid victimizers; that is, Colombians victimized by paramilitary successor groups after the 2005-2006 “demobilization” process were ineligible for reparations or restitution.

After a two-year outcry by human rights groups and social movements, the Colombian Supreme Court ruled in 2013 that victims of the *bacrim* would be eligible for reparations under the law, equal to any other victim of the armed conflict (Caracol Radio, 2013). This broadening of the definition of a “victim” congruent with current realities represents a victory for civil society, whose persistent demands resulted in an expansion of the concept of “victim” beyond the State’s conception of someone who suffered only at the hands of aggressors whose actions the State was willing to address. It points to the further potential of social movement actors to make such demands, and in so doing effect important changes to the way that the State interacts with and conceptualizes its citizens.

(d) Victimized while mobilized. As alluded to above, Colombians who are or were acknowledged members of illegal armed groups, and within that context suffered a violation of their human rights or of International Humanitarian Law, are not eligible for benefits. Critics argue that this imposes a fictive demarcation between guerrilla and civilian, since maintaining neutrality in certain years and geographical zones was tantamount to suicide:

The poor rural population was often forced to align with one of the warring factions... If one side was defeated by the other, the farmers had to leave and the new power invited their farmers in. One informant described such a process in Norte de Santander, where slum residents in Cucuta [sic] and farmers in Catatumbo literally exchanged positions when the paramilitary and the guerrilla alternated in controlling this jungle area. The small-scale farmers in each of these waves can be defined both as IDPs and beneficiaries of violent acts (García-Godos & Wiig, 2014, p. 34).

During many years of armed conflict, small farmers existed in a context in which the State was largely absent, and cooperating with one armed group or the other was a matter of survival;⁶⁸ it is as if this particular stipulation of the Victims' Law demands that Colombians who were thrown into a pool of water prove that they never got wet.⁶⁹ Moreover, entire sections of the country have been painted by the State as controlled by the guerrilla; any resident of Putumayo, for instance, would have been seen (and may still be seen) by the rest of the country as presumed guilty by virtue of geography (Tate, 2015, p. 111). Combined with the prevalence of accusations of guerrilla involvement as punishment for activism, it seems safe to assume that some innocent Colombians face obstacles to benefits under the law based on a false, or at best tenuous,

⁶⁸ While acknowledging the impossibility of neutrality in the context of guerrilla and paramilitary occupations, it is also important to frame civilians as agents. Alcina Honwana (2006), in a study of child soldiers, refers to a distinction between "tactical" and "strategic" agency: tactical agency is agency of the weak, she writes, who are forced to carve out breathing space within an oppressive system. Strategic agency is more equipped, held by actors with more power and mobility. "Aligned" Colombian civilians likely possess(ed) both at different times.

⁶⁹ My own fieldwork and activism in Colombia has indicated that this requirement – that political actors abide by a binary fiction of "nonviolence" – exists in solidarity and nonprofit work, as well. Mark Duffield points out that while in the Cold War certain armed insurgencies in the Global South were seen in the North as defensible, sparking solidarity movements, these days violence is anathema to Northern activists and funders: "... liberal governance has all but abolished the idea of a just cause. Many NGOs, the erstwhile representatives of social movements, now agree" (2001, p. 129). Tate (2013b) concurs, noting that transnational solidarity organizations advocating for Colombians privilege certain identities over others and depend on a narrow conception of innocence.

presumption of guilt.

(e) Displaced from land now in use by higher-priority actors. A final and important limit placed on potential beneficiaries of Law 1448 has to do with land use and the country's protection of elite domestic and multinational corporate interests. Even in the case of a Colombian citizen whose conflict-related victimization took place within the time period and circumstances stipulated by the Victims' Law, whose victimizer is recognized and accepted by the state as an aggressor, and whose activities have been within the bounds of the law, s/he may nevertheless fail to receive restitution of land if the land in question is currently being used for productive agro-industrial projects (República de Colombia, 2011, Article 99). One obvious beneficiary here is the palm oil industry, which (following closely on the heels of gold mining) is the new fever in Colombia's economy. The in-country production of palm oil, used globally from everything to snack food to cosmetics to jet fuel, doubled between 2004 and 2014. The areas with the highest concentration of palm oil production correspond to areas with high levels of paramilitary and paramilitary successor violence and displacement (Miroff, 2014, p. 1).⁷⁰ Despite these connections, the industry remains protected by the law. If the land of which the individual has been dispossessed (for example, by being forced to "sell" the land for a fraction of its worth) is now the site of a development project (for example, if the party responsible for the displacement then sold the land to a palm company), the state will agree to return the land to the original owner only on the condition that s/he sign a contract with the palm company stipulating the latter's continued use of the land. The restitution of the original owner's name to the title, in

⁷⁰ The farming community of Las Pavas, in southern Bolívar, is a high-profile example of the connection between displacement and African palm cultivation. 123 displaced families have been fighting, literally and legally, with a palm company called Aportes San Isidro; for the farmers' account of events, see retornoalaspavas.wordpress.com and the 2014 film *Algún Día es Mañana*.

other words, does not guarantee his or her use of the land; the owner may simply become a renter or an “associate” of a palm oil or hardwood exporter (ABColumbia, 2011). This means, as the Associated Press points out (Bajak & Sequera, 2011), that “many who were forced at gunpoint to sell at larcenous discounts will likely end up as tenant farmers on land that once was theirs.” It also means that, although an individual member of a former community (now an “associate” of a developer) may have his or her name put on the title to the land, the community of which that landowner was once a part will have no access to it. It is an individual reparation at the expense of the community, which – with some of its members now associates of developers, and others still landless – will be much less likely to mobilize for its rights.

Evidently, Article 99 poses several obstacles to a just and transformative restitution of land. Given the panorama of Colombia’s conflict and the land seizures that have been the spark, the fuel, and the ashes of that conflict, it will be difficult to prove which companies or developers own stolen properties “in good faith” (i.e., owning land that was stolen, but not being aware of or responsible for the original theft) and which do not. Due to the manner in which extractivist development has been intertwined with paramilitary violence and displacement, the likelihood is high that in the various laundered transactions in which land changed hands, some of the buyers and sellers operated knowingly. If tracks were covered adequately, a company knowingly in possession of stolen land may be granted an avenue to regularize its profitable activities and not risk having to return the land to its original owner. Moreover, the terms of the law do not dictate that land proven to have been purchased in *bad* faith and now being used for agro-industrial projects will automatically be returned to the original owner to be cultivated as s/he chooses. Rather, the land will be turned over to a third party, whose productive use of the land will contribute to financial remunerations paid to the original owner. Whether the developer bought

the land in good faith or bad faith is left up to local courts to ascertain – courts which, critics argue, are subject to local corruption and threats from paramilitary successor groups (who may have been responsible for the displacement in the first place and, according to many, remain closely tied to developers in the palm oil and extractive industries). Moreover, in the process of prioritizing megaprojects over the rights of the original landowner – not to mention the broader context of free trade agreements recently signed by the government – small farming and the community life that accompanies it give way to monoculture, a small step in a larger process of depeasantization (Bryceson, Kay, & Mooij, 2000). On a broad scale, this process changes the nature of the *campesinado*, incorporating them – without a fight, since the best option available seems to be to sign on the dotted line – into wage labor on plantations. Article 99 is contingent justice. It provides for reparation or restitution to take place *if* it does not interfere with the government’s prioritization of the extractivist economic model. In this panorama, some farmers may return to their land only if they are willing (or have little choice but to) become members of what might be called the palm oil proletariat. In a curious twist on Karl Polanyi’s (1944) periodization of economic history, the Santos administration is offering protection *within* a broader schema of marketization – and in so doing, guaranteeing continued profits to multinational enterprises that have benefitted from past violence (Semana, 2014).

Article 99, in addition to the injustice it permits and promotes, is reflective of a broader shortcoming of the law and begs the question of the State’s commitment to true conflict transformation. When I discussed the reparations available to victims with a woman activist in Cauca in 2013, she remarked, “La palabra queda mal. ¿Cómo se le puede reparar la vida?” In paying insufficient attention to the role of land concentration and resource extraction in the armed conflict, and in its evident desire to hold on to the *benefits* of war while simultaneously

repairing its victims, the State is demonstrating a lack of willingness to disrupt the power structures that have been strengthened by – and perpetuated – the country’s long war. Critiques of the transitional justice model (O’Rourke, 2015) indicate that such a stance is not uncommon, and that the model itself prioritizes technical changes over transformative ones. In Colombia, current institutional arrangements – divisions of power between center and periphery, the structure of political culture, and gendered systems of land tenure, for instance – are key components in the scaffolding of conflict. If the Victims’ Law, in its desire to retain these arrangements and the benefits they offer to powerholders, fails to shake that scaffold, then it risks being merely a tool for silencing victims of conflict while perpetuating conflict’s foundations. This is particularly evident in the case of neoparamilitary activity surrounding land claims, which, along with opposition from speculators and business interests, is the source of the majority of threats to claimants (Haugaard, Castillo, Tate, & Romoser, 2013).

(3) The Terms of the Law and the Foundations of Conflict. Critics of the Victims’ Law – both representatives of domestic and international human rights organizations and activists with whom I spoke during fieldwork – assert that various terms of the Victims’ Law not only fail to *address* underlying issues of the conflict, but have been and continue to be used by “anti-restitution” parties to *further* the conflict which the law is intended to resolve and repair. This is clearest in the cases of human rights defenders who are under threat and offered State protection under the law. Activists who are threatened have been granted protection provisions under several laws and programs in past years; the Victims’ Law continues those protections and applies them to victims of displacement who return to their lands. Protection programs include

the provision of armed escorts, state-provided transportation, and cell phone services,⁷¹ and are afforded to sectors at higher risk, including women, social movement activists, and union members. In the recent past, however, state-provided protection measures have used to illegally surveil and track their purported beneficiaries. Vehicles provided by protection programs have been bugged as recently as 2011 (Center for Justice and International Law, 2011), allowing the surveilling party access to the private conversations and whereabouts of high-profile activists and social movement leaders. A significant portion of accusations of illegal surveillance have been levied at the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, or DAS, with the high-profile conviction of its director after the 2009-2010 “chuzada” scandal, in which the intelligence agency was revealed to have engaged in illegal wiretapping and other activities aimed at destabilizing human rights organizations and NGOs (Latin America Working Group, 2010; International Service for Human Rights, 2011). President Santos dissolved the agency in 2011, but mistrust of state-provided protection measures continues among human rights defenders. In August of 2014, several officials from the Unidad de Víctimas were arrested for selling the personal data of victims registered in the RUV. The data was used for several purposes, among them to identify those registrants who reported their victimizations – presumably including the names of the victimizers – to the government. Victims who entrusted their claims to the State, in other words, faced having their personal information passed into the hands of the armed groups who necessitated those claims in the first place (Bargent, 2014).

In what is perhaps a less sinister but ultimately no less destabilizing move, activists who participate in state protection programs are sometimes transferred to other cities for their own safety. Such is the case in the Barrancabermeja, long a “red zone” in the conflict,

⁷¹ Cell phone plans provided by protection programs are notoriously ineffective; because of the limited number of minutes on the plans, one Coca-Cola union leader with whom I spoke in August of 2013 joked that his government cell plan should have been called “Plan Lámame.”

which saw a bloody incursion by paramilitary forces at the turn of the century that brought the city nearly to its knees (Isacson, 2001). Extrajudicial killings, massacres, targeting of unionists and social movement actors, and massive displacement have left a legacy of fear and mistrust in Barranca, and local activists talk of the difficulty of uniting the Left in the region. This is made all the more difficult when activists are transferred out of the city. During meetings of activists' roundtable in Barrancabermeja I attended in 2013, which brought union organizers, human rights defenders, and women's organizations together to collaborate and support one another's work, a number of activists attributed the dispersal of social movements to state protection measures and were less than confident that such dispersal was accidental. Combined with the already-difficult task of organizing social movements in a city plagued by armed violence, having movement leaders shipped to other cities raises suspicion, and the protections and advances provided by the Victims' Law have failed to convince many organizers that the state is on their side. An organizer with the National Teachers' Union commented in one such meeting that "la Ley de Víctimas existe con una contrareforma simultánea por el mismo Estado."

The

Reification of Victimhood and the Víctima Permitida

The

process of restricting the number and type of beneficiaries of State social policies is not new; few such policies are universal in their availability to citizens. But the dynamics and purpose of that restriction, and the code of priorities hidden in them, is seldom discussed. It is useful here to interject an illustrative parallel example of such a code and the way it reflected hegemonic priorities.

From the 1920s to 1960s, countries across Latin America saw the rise of a

nationalist political ideology and an accompanying movement known as *indigenismo*. Aimed at fomenting nationalist cultural pride in the face of foreign and neocolonial advances, as well as making possible the political inclusion of the masses and the creation of a more symbolically pluricultural nation, *indigenismo* purported to celebrate elements of indigenous culture that remained in the (in its own worldview) largely mixed-race culture of the time. Though it seemed a welcome departure from overtly racist ideologies that preceded it, in practice *indigenismo* served to venerate a pre-modern conception of indigeneity, celebrating indigenous culture more as an artifact than as a dynamic force (giving a new meaning to the cinematic expression of the U.S. frontier, ‘the only good Indian is a dead Indian’). Moreover, tied up with deeply problematic notions of modernity, *indigenista* policies sought to ‘incorporate’ indigenous citizens into the mestizo population, rather than serving their needs in a way that allowed for the possibility of indigenous cultures remaining autonomous (Giraud & Lewis, 2012).⁷² In short, proponents of *indigenismo* painted it as a philosophy of social uplift, while using it to entrench and fortify racialized structures of power. In so doing, argues Jorge Coronado, “the discourses that sought to articulate [a reconfiguration of society in terms more amenable to the indio] all constructed *particular versions* of the indio and of indigenous culture. As a result, the indio, represented by others’ projections, became the critical component of the new configurations of Andean society and culture that these practices imagined” (2009, p. 1; my emphasis). The salient dynamic of *indigenismo* which I want to highlight is this: the “particular versions” of the identities of a subordinate group constructed by the dominant group in an effort to rectify past abuses served, in practice, to aid the already-existing

⁷² It is worth noting that the word *indigenismo* has lately been appropriated and repurposed by identity-based social movements led by indigenous people in Latin America; I refer here to its earlier meaning.

structure of power in maintaining itself.

Is there a “particular version” of what it means to be a *víctima* propagated by the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law? If so, what is it, and what purpose does it serve?

(a) Víctimas are Women. As of August of 2015, the numbers of women and men registered in the *Registro Único de Víctimas* were nearly equal; women represented a smaller percentage of those successfully registering for restitution of land, as opposed to financial reparations (Hoyos, 2013). Nonetheless, State documents (printed versions of Law 1448) visually portray victims exclusively as women, and a review of media and NGO reports on the law and its progress also reveals a significant, if not dominant, visual representation of victims as female. Meanwhile, women as victimizers – as members of the paramilitary, guerrilla, and State armed forces whose actions have resulted in the displacements and assassinations being attended to by the Victims’ Law – are largely excluded from public discussions of conflict resolution and reparations. The FARC-EP comprises up to 40% women, who, albeit mostly occupying the lower ranks, have ascended to a few high-ranking positions. Though women reportedly make up a much smaller percentage (2-4%) of paramilitaries (Tate, 2007, p. 54) and an even smaller percentage (less than 1%) of the Armed Forces (Roorda, 2009), the presence of women in what are recognized as the victimizing forces should destabilize our understanding of victimhood and femininity as isomorphic. The effect of this absence of women from the discourse of post-conflict reckoning on actual women combatants in a post-accords demobilization process will likely be significant.

Nonetheless, casting victims of armed conflict as women is an important part of

crafting the narrative of State benevolence and strength imbued in the Victims' Law. "A regime's policies concerning gender form part of the structural and ideological grid upon which state power is based," writes Sonia Álvarez (1990, p. 22). A strong state that protects its "women and children" (Enloe, 1993) is a legitimate state, and the casting of women as protectable subjects is an important part of building that legitimacy. As Anne McClintock reminds us, "the representation of male *national* power depends on the prior construction of *gender* difference" (1993, p. 62). By restituting women victims (or claiming an intent to do so), the State positions itself as a paternal benefactor protecting its family – if the family (in this case, feminized victims) is willing to cooperate with the law's explicit and implicit stipulations.

As Joan Scott writes,

[E]mergent rulers have legitimized domination, strength, central authority, and ruling power as masculine (...) and made that code literal in laws (...) that put women in their place. These actions and their timing make little sense in themselves; in most instances, the state had nothing immediate or material to gain from the control of women. The actions can only be made sense of as part of an analysis of the construction and consolidation of power. An assertion of control or strength was given form as a policy about women (1986, p. 1072).

A second key part of this crafting of the ideal-typical *víctima* is that (s)he agrees to passive reception, rather than active demanding, of the proffered benefits.

(b) Víctimas are Passive Beneficiaries

In addition to being presented as female, as in the documents above, the ideal-typical *víctima* is uncontesting, a passive receiver of state services. In fact, in going through the process of seeking reparations under the Victims' Law, claimants may end up foregoing their right to take their victimizer (military, paramilitary, or guerrilla) to court to face justice. A judicial decision on such a case generally takes about five years and requires hiring a lawyer, which results in legal fees not available to most working-class Colombians; it is an easier, faster,

cheaper, and ultimately, in some cases, surer process to pursue reparations under the Victims' Law (A. Coll, personal communication, 2/27/15).

Moreover, as mentioned above, becoming a recipient of reparations under the law relies on a model in which the State is the protector and the benefactor, and the claimant the beneficiary. The State proposes to protect women victims from the forces (political, military, and/or economic) of dispossession. But as discussed earlier, the State's simultaneous "protection" of victims and "marketization" of that protection recalls Polanyi's *Great Transformation* (1944), which pits protection and marketization as dualist, adversarial forces, casting protection as the warmer, friendlier alternative to marketization's cold shoulder.⁷³ Nancy Fraser (2011; 2013) critiques Polanyi's depiction of State protection as the better alternative, pointing out that women do not always stand to gain from being protectees of the State. "Protections normalize institutional understandings," Fraser said in a 2011 lecture, "not only of danger and safety, but also of family, community, and belonging; of personhood, dignity, and desert; of dependency, contribution, and work – hence, necessarily, of gender, nationality, and race." State protection can be cast in a gendered light, says Fraser, and feminist scholars need to interrogate these programs: "Do the institutionalized meanings and norms that define who is protected, from what, and how entrench relations of domination? Is the ethical substance that informs protection hierarchical or egalitarian?" In this light, the Victims' Law can be seen as treating claimants like passive consumers of State programs, or objects to be administered⁷⁴ – normalizing feminine dependency, as if the best route for reparations were to receive help from

⁷³ Polanyi's take on the rise of liberal economics envisioned two poles of State action, which he called marketization and protection; these are painted as foils in his text. What Polanyi may not have envisioned was that under neoliberal economics, marketization would expand beyond the economic realm to all sectors of public life, encompassing even its erstwhile foil, protection. What the Victims' Law demonstrates is that protection itself has been marketized, and is no longer its opposite: Colombians who wish to claim benefits must do so in the framework of market logic.

⁷⁴ See also Fraser, N. (1989). *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

the State. As Verónica Schild (1998) argues, to rely on the state is to be positioned as client subjects. Moreover, in Colombia's case, the State has been the *aggressor* often enough that to accept protection from it has particularly complicated repercussions: in the words of Wendy Brown, "to be 'protected' by the very power whose violation one fears perpetuates the specific modality of dependence and powerlessness marking much of women's experience across widely diverse cultures and epochs" (1992:9). In my interview with Yolanda Becerra, organizer with the Movimiento Social de la Guerra and the Organización Femenina Popular in Bucaramanga, she discussed her experiences being on the receiving end of State protection programs, which she entered into after facing threats and violence as a result of her activism. The protection program, she said,

...es una cosa supremamente machista... Entonces, nos imponen, nos tomen... comportan como si fuera, con la protegida, que llaman, como si fueron los maridos, se vuelve en una situación muy difícil y una esquema, además, armado, con una lógica que 'el único que protege son las armas'; entonces, militar. Y eso ha sido una lucha permanente. (...) Los que dirigen el tema de las unidades de protección, que dirigen estas empresas, son hombres, y hombres militares. Retirado, de una cosa o de otra, pero son militares. Entonces, se vuelve mucho más difícil.

To rely on State protection programs legitimates the dynamic of a paternalist, militarized State caring for a feminized beneficiary. In the process, "[e]l estado," according to Sonia Álvarez, "resignifica, aplica, sostiene y representa [el poder masculino] y así *produce* a los subjetividades femeninos" (1998, p. 21). This leads to the next characteristic of victim subjectivity offered by the State.

(c) Víctimas are a Vulnerable Class

In 2012, about a year after the passage of the Victims' Law, President Santos offered a public update on the progress of reparations under the law. In it he explained the government's triage approach to financial disbursements, saying, according to the radio station Caracol, "...que

por ahora se está dando prioridad a las víctimas que han estado esperando la indemnización desde hace varios años por la legislación anterior y a las más vulnerables, como aquellas con discapacidad, las madres cabeza de familia con niños a cargo, y los adultos mayores” (Caracol Radio, 2012). Women heads-of-household, under this approach, constitute a vulnerable subgroup of victims, and make up (according to the latest available statistics, which date back to 2000 and likely underrepresent current realities) about a third of displaced households (Guevara, 2000). Álvarez points out (1998, p. 12) that even to refer to “women heads-of-household” is to employ the exception that proves the rule; it distinguishes these women as aberrations from the androcentric, familistic norm expected by non-specific State conceptions of the household.

This “vulnerability” ascribed to women heads-of-household is metonymic of the way women victims of wars in general are presumed to be in a pre-existing state of vulnerability. The Victims’ Law includes eighteen instances of the word “vulnerable” or “vulnerability”; four of these instances refer directly to women, while five others are in the context of statements regarding “vulnerable groups” or “vulnerable populations” which refer to members of specific rural communities in addition to women as a group. The women heads-of-household to whom Santos refers – lumped together in a category with the elderly and the disabled – are understood within this discourse to be a vulnerable class, without provoking questions about how they came to occupy the position of women heads-of-household in the first place, and whether the State or its paramilitary allies had any role in that process. Rather than painting *víctimas* as people (women and men) who have endured specific effects from a specific conflict, they are instead depicted as *essentially* vulnerable and in need of outside protection. This trend is characteristic of State and even NGO policy on refugee women (see Freedman, 2012). But as Carol Cohn (2013) illustrates, though vulnerability is cast as an essential aspect of femininity, it is the gendered

constructions of femininity and women's roles that *place* women into spaces of vulnerability during wartime:

If the gender arrangements of society place men but not women in the paid labor force of the formal economy, and/or allow men but not women to own land, the women left behind when men depart to fight or die in battle will have little resources to support their families; this leaves them vulnerable to a variety of socially, economically and sexually exploitative relationships... it is not a woman's biology that is the principal shaper of her experiences of war, but the gender arrangements within which she lives (Cohn, 2013, p. 8).

In cooperation with the broader frame of armed conflict constructing women's vulnerability is an economic model which makes women's lives and livelihoods more precarious (Álvarez, 1998, p. 14; Wichterich, 2000; Momsen, 2004; Cabezas, Reese, & Waller, 2007; Banerjee & Goldfield, 2007; Jaquette, 2009; Chant, 2010; Colón & Poggio, 2010). If, then, women's vulnerability in war arises from their subordinate position in the gender hierarchy, and from the type of subjectivity offered to them by a neoliberal State that sees its own role as best played by enabling and sustaining market logic in society and politics (Marttila, 2012), then it follows that troubling that hierarchy and challenging the circumstances that produce vulnerability would be more efficacious than essentializing that vulnerability, casting women-on-their-own as always-already vulnerable.

(d) Víctimas are (Disconnected) Individuals

During my fieldwork, I spoke with several women in Cauca province who had been told by government representatives that only their individual names could be on the paperwork for a declaration of victimization and registry into the RUV. This is false according to the law, which permits multiple claimants to appear on the same claim, but the government representatives' mistakes nonetheless succeeded in creating, in the minds of potential claimants,

an individualized subjectivity for victims. Many (if not most) of the displaced were members of entire displaced communities, and lost not only an individual plot of land, but an entire series of interpersonal relationships – their social embeddedness. Once displaced and disembedded, IDPs lost access to their social capital and their communities of trust, not only their physical territory. An atomized conception of what it means to be a *victima* means that the displaced individual may see the plot of land (or a similar plot) restored, but the community network will never be rebuilt by including only a single name on a legal document.

Article 99⁷⁵ of the Victims' Law is a significant contributor to an individualized subjectivity for victims. As detailed above, claimants whose former land is now being used by a developer of a megaproject or a palm or hardwood plantation may only regain that territory if they agree to become “associates” of the developer. No reparations are offered to the claimants' former neighbors or community members who were *also* bereft of community bonds by the act of displacement; in fact, by signing the paperwork to allow the developer (or a third-party developer) to continue exploiting the land, the individual claimant is essentially re-entering her or his land and closing the gate to the other members of the community to which s/he once belonged. The act transforms community-based labor into a contract between private enterprise and individual labor; in so doing, the atomized victim is recognized not as a part of a whole, but

⁷⁵ The text of Article 99 reads as follows: “CONTRATOS PARA EL USO DEL PREDIO RESTITUIDO. Cuando existan proyectos agroindustriales productivos en el predio objeto de restitución y con el propósito de desarrollar en forma completa el proyecto, el Magistrado que conozca del proceso podrá autorizar, mediante el trámite incidental, la celebración de contratos entre los beneficiarios de la restitución, y el opositor que estuviera desarrollando el proyecto productivo, sobre la base del reconocimiento del derecho de dominio del restituido o restituidos, y que el opositor haya probado su buena fe exenta de culpa en el proceso. Cuando no se pruebe la buena fe exenta de culpa, el Magistrado entregará el proyecto productivo a la Unidad Administrativa Especial de Gestión de Restitución de Tierras Despojadas para que lo explote a través de terceros y se destine el producido del proyecto a programas de reparación colectiva para víctimas en las vecindades del predio, incluyendo al beneficiario de la restitución. El Magistrado velará por la protección de los derechos de las partes y que estos obtengan una retribución económica adecuada” (República de Colombia, 2011).

as an individual subject looking out for her or his own interests at the expense of collective justice.

Such subjectivity is in line with the neoliberal understanding of an individual and the State's relationship to that individual. In the neoliberal project, citizens are constructed not only as motivated by their own needs, but responsible for securing them: in recent years this phenomenon has been called the "self-as-enterprise" (McNay, 2009); or "the conception of society as an enterprise made up of enterprises" (Dardot & Laval 2014, p. 255). The neoliberal subject, according to Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2014), is produced to behave as "an entity in a competition," evidenced most clearly in the rise of the contract ("the yardstick of all human relations") as a tool in the pursuit of rights (257-8). To some extent this true of Enlightenment thinking, as well, but neoliberal thinking departs from its liberal foundations in its understanding of the role of government. In classic liberalism, the State was cast as distant from the economy; states were encouraged to create the conditions for a market economy to flourish, and then leave it to regulate itself (Marttila, 2012, p. 18). The neoliberal turn envisions a State that has withdrawn from regulation of the economy, but *expanded* its role in the creation and maintenance of a marketized society. Thus is every individual seen as an entrepreneur, every action a business venture, and every failure a result of personal irresponsibility (Kendall, 2003; see also Harvey, 2005, and Springer, forthcoming).

Finally, the Victims' Law reinforces its conception of the victim as a disconnected individual by separating the victimhood from the act of victimization: that is, the person(s) responsible for the victimization do not need to be explicitly named or brought to justice for the victim to receive reparations and the case considered closed (República de Colombia, 2011, Article 3). The law is the first of its kind to "depart sharply from legislative precedent in a

number of ways... [it] detaches the process of earning legal ‘victimhood’ status from that of determining perpetrator responsibility” (Summers, 2009, p. 26). It removes the criminal from the resolution of the crime, casting “justice” as one-sided: as long as the victim has been paid off, the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrator is irrelevant. This stipulation may have been necessary to convince Congress to pass the law in the first place (El Espectador, 2010); this too indicates a political class eager to silence the clamoring of those dispossessed by war without challenging or punishing those responsible.

Evidently, just as *el indio* and indigenous subjectivity were produced and reified in the mid-twentieth century in a way that resulted in the reinforcement of power for the dominant class, the Victims’ and Land Restitution Law has *created* a victim subject with bounded parameters and specific characteristics, and reified that subject so that it is now widely recognized as a character in the conflict (and, presumably, in its resolution). In the course of my fieldwork it became evident by listening to and participating in conversations among activists, lawyers, and Colombian individuals that society was increasingly familiar with this victim subject. As early as 2013, *víctimas* was tossed around like an established political term; I even found myself wondering, upon meeting a woman from the *campo*, whether or not she was a victim – as if all of the poor in Colombia were not victims; as if those without the proper paperwork to prove their displacement were not victims. This categorization serves to reinforce an exclusive, binary system: if some Colombians are victims, it follows that many others are not. In the case of women who have suffered the losses of war, these “non-victims” (who failed to follow the rules of bureaucracy, or were victimized in unrecognized ways) are cast as responsible for resolving their problems without the aid of the State. In creating these categories, the State is

able to claim that it has repaired victims, since those who are not being repaired are by definition not victims.

Charles Hale (2004) refers to the neoliberal dawn of the *indio permitido*, a “cultural project, which contributes both to the rising prominence of indigenous voices and to the frustrating limits on their transformative aspirations... The menace resides in the accompanying, unspoken parameters: reforms have pre-determined limits, benefits to a few indigenous actors are predicated on the exclusion of the rest; certain rights are to be enjoyed on the implicit condition that others will not be raised” (2). We seem to be witnessing, in the Santos’ administration’s efforts to resolve decades-old dispossessions in Colombia, a State-sponsored subjectivity of the *victima permitida*. The question this begs is whether and how women victims of the conflict, and the networks of peace organizations that advocate for them, engage with, manipulate, or contest that subjectivity as prescribed.

Women’s Peace Activism:

Subversive Subjectivities?

If the State-sponsored subjectivity for *victimas permitidas* is one of passivity, vulnerability, atomization, and dependence on State administration of benefits, to what extent – if any – are the three women’s peace networks (WPN) under study contesting that subjectivity? Returning for a moment to the work of Nancy Fraser in articulating a Polanyian feminism, *étatiste* protection or social welfare programs, of which the Victims’ Law is arguably one, are framed through Polanyi’s (1944) worldview as the friendlier side of the protection/marketization dichotomy. But Polanyi’s framework “overlooks harms originating elsewhere, in the surrounding ‘society.’ Occulting non-market-based forms of injustice, it also tends to whitewash forms of

social protection that are at the same time vehicles of domination” (Fraser, 2013, p. 229). Fraser recasts Polanyi’s dichotomy as a three-sided contest, in which what she calls “emancipation” (anti-imperial and feminist movements, for example) necessarily mediates conflicts between protection and marketization, as protection mediates conflicts between emancipation and marketization and marketization mediates conflicts between protection and emancipation.




Fig. 9: Mediation between three forces.

Key to Fraser’s argument is that feminism (along with other movements of emancipation) does not reliably ally with either marketization or protection. As a strategic (or sometimes careless) force, feminism has at various historical moments found the greatest advantage to lie in fealty to one side of Polanyi’s dichotomy or the other (witness second-wave feminism’s criticism of the “family wage,” which indirectly supported capital accumulation via the marketization of women’s work, for example). Fraser advocates for a third orientation for emancipation movements, which is to “aim neither to dismantle nor to defend existing protections, but rather to transform the mode of protection” (2013, p. 233), but simultaneously to “become more aware that we [feminists] operate on a terrain that is also populated by marketizing forces” (p. 241). My question for WPNs in Colombia echoes Fraser’s: in what ways are women peace activists in Colombia establishing a political subjectivity distinct from that proffered by the State, and will they use or appropriate the Victims’ Law to “protect” women in a non-subordinating way, or do they risk a “dangerous liaison” (Fraser, 2013, p. 224) with a neoliberal marketizing project?

Ruta Pacífica: Women as Political Subjects

The current work of Ruta Pacífica involves two distinct efforts that speak to the network's role in claiming a subversive subjectivity for women victims. The first is a popular education campaign about the law itself, and the second is their recent work on the Truth and Memory Commission.

The weekend retreat I attended with the Cauca chapter of Ruta Pacífica in 2013 was attended by approximately twenty-five women from the region, belonging to smaller organizations that are member groups of the network, participated in discussions about armed conflict, human rights, and their opportunities under the Victims' Law. Spending the weekend with these women, sleeping in bunks, sharing meals on the floor, and swimming together in the hot afternoons afforded me the opportunity to talk to them about their experiences with the law. The majority of the women who attended the retreat identified as Afro-Colombian, with a few mestiza and two indigenous women. They came from various parts of Cauca, including Buenos Aires, Villa Rica, Puerto Tejada, Santander de Quilichao, el Resguardo Indígena de Jambaló, and Parrilla. For some of the women, it was the first event they had attended that was organized by Ruta Pacífica; it also became clear through our conversations that many, if not most of the women had been displaced themselves or had a family member killed by an armed group. It was also clear that most of the women were community leaders in the municipalities where they lived.

The first day of the workshop was devoted to learning and reviewing women's basic rights in Colombia, Violence Against Women legislation, and women's access to land under the Victims' Law. It began with a "pre-test" covering women's rights (see below). Sitting among the women as they took the test, I could overhear several whispered conversations about the

questions; the women sitting next to me also asked me to check their tests before they handed them in. In response to the question “True or False: International Humanitarian Law does not apply in Colombia,” both of the women next to me answered True (it is not); in response to the question “True or False: Only women who own property can obtain land under the Victims’ Law,” both answered True (it is not). It was clear, therefore, that Ruta Pacífica had its work cut out for it in terms of establishing *concientización* about the various frameworks of women’s legal rights (and equally clear that several of the attendees considered me an automatic expert on Colombian law, simply by virtue of being a foreign academic).

After the test, Ruta Pacífica’s representatives began a discussion of various laws in Colombian and international law that benefit or protect women: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325, the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and others. One workshop leader explained that under Law 295 of 2013, women (especially the displaced) have federal money allotted to them so that they are not forced, for lack of another economic option, to live with their aggressor. The workshop participants erupted into conversation at this point; it was clear that the information was new and relevant.

In another conversation, one attendee referred to the “Ley de Abandono de Hogar” that prevented her from leaving her partner. Ruta Pacífica’s legal advisor responded that that law no longer exists, and has not applied since 1991; the woman was shocked. This led to conversations about divorce; several women were under the impression that they were unable to obtain a civil divorce without Church approval, until the workshop organizers informed them otherwise – at which point the room filled with chatter. I wondered how long some of the participants had been

remaining in relationships or marriages out of economic need or fear for their safety, and what would happen in their own lives as a result of this workshop.

Following the review of legal supports, and a more in-depth discussion of filing *denuncias* and claiming benefits under the Victims' Law, Ruta Pacífica led the workshop attendees in a series of role plays in which they were asked to approach public officials about filing for benefits. While the workshop leaders portrayed government officials who ranged from recalcitrant to condescending, attendees were encouraged to speak confidently and think of themselves not as petitioning officials for favors, but claiming rights that they already had. “Una pregunta:” asked Coll at one point, “¿necesito un papelito que dice que yo soy víctima? No. Yo soy víctima desde el momento en que ocurrió el hecho. Listo? No depende de ningún reconocimiento estatal, no de ningún tipo de documento.” Claimants' confidence in the workshop was predicated on the framework of federal and international law, the basics of which they had spent the day learning about – rather than being framed as administrable subjects of governance.

Women's inherent vulnerability was also called into question during the two-day workshop. Ruta's representatives pointed out that women are generally seen as being vulnerable, partially because of their status as females, but especially when they are unaccompanied by a man, as in the case of a woman victim claiming benefits under the law without a male partner. But this vulnerability was interrogated. When Coll asked the group why they thought it was important to focus on the human rights of women, one participant spoke up, “Because women are more vulnerable.” She responded that this response carried an element of danger, because an assumption of vulnerability could be used to keep women in the private sphere; this led to a lively discussion of what could be called more structural factors in the creation of the vulnerable

victim, including the differentiated experiences of women in wartime. The street mobilizations of women organized by Ruta Pacífica and other WPN present another critical engagement with

Comunitas

diakonia
CENTRO QUE CAMBIA EL MUNDO

¡Juntas por el Derecho a la tierra: fortalecimiento de las mujeres víctimas y sus organizaciones en el Cauca para el acceso a la tierra y el territorio 2012-2015

**ESPIRAL EXIGIBILIDAD DE DERECHOS.
PRE TEST**

Ciudad Municipio : _____
 Fecha : D__ M__ A__
 Nivel Educativo : Primaria__ Secundaria__ Técnica__ Universitaria__

Marque al frente de cada enunciado SI o NO según considere:

Orden	Concepto	SI	NO
1	Los derechos de las mujeres son beneficios que otorga el Estado.		
2	Solo los hombres son sujetos de derechos.		
3	Los derechos de las mujeres son derechos humanos.		
4	El Derecho Internacional Humanitario DIH no se aplica en Colombia.		
5	Las víctimas tienen derechos a la verdad, la justicia, la reparación integral y las garantías de no repetición.		
6	Solo las mujeres propietarias pueden adelantar el proceso de restitución de tierras.		

psecmtr

Fig. 10: Espiral pre-test.

vulnerability; by publically appearing in these marches, which sometimes involve nudity, women use their own vulnerability as a performance to protest it (these demonstrations will be further analyzed in Chapter 6).

Several days prior to the Espiral, in an interview with María Andrea Campo Ayala, one of Ruta Pacífica's legal advisers, I asked her about the symbolic language that Ruta constructs and uses in its work. She responded that symbolic language allows for an alternative to the extant prototype of women in Colombia, which is one of victimhood. This language names the victimizer, in addition to the victim, and deconstructs “esas lógicas donde la sumisión, la subordinación, el control, se empieza a convertir en un prototipo... es el prototipo de *usted obedece, para eso es mujer, para eso es esposa, para eso es secretaria, para eso, para eso, para eso*. Ese lenguaje ha servido para salirse de ese rol.” Ruta Pacífica's focus, through pedagogy, *concientización*, and the construction of a new way of describing women's identities, allows for the construction of alternative subjectivities, both political and personal. In engaging with the State's proffered subjectivity of vulnerability and administrability, both in the language it uses and teaches and in its efforts to empower women to know and claim their rights under the law, the network's activism points to a more subversive subjectivity available to women victims of the armed conflict.

These efforts are also clear in Ruta Pacífica's recent Truth and Memory Commission, part of the network's activism surrounding the peace talks in Havana between the Santos Administration and the FARC-EP. In November of 2013, Ruta released a report detailing the results of the commission, a three-year project in which a team of activists traveled the country collecting women's testimonies about their experiences in conflict (Ruta Pacífica, 2013a). The report, over 1,500 pages of cases and analysis undertaken with the participation of more than one

thousand Colombian women conflict survivors,⁷⁶ was prepared in advance of any truth and reconciliation commission that might take place if peace talks with the FARC-EP result in disarmament. It is meant to serve as an influential tool in an eventual commission or post-peace accords scenario. The report, like much of Ruta's work, both contains and contributes to important theoretical currents in what it calls "emancipatory feminism" and conflict resolution, emphasizing the construction of a female subjectivity where traditional power brokers have long sought to deny it. "El informe reúne," states the report, "los relatos producidos por las subjetividades femeninas como fuentes de conocimiento de la realidad del conflicto armado colombiano" (Ruta Pacífica, 2013a, p. 11). Though it would be impossible here to undertake a thorough discursive analysis of the representation of victims in the report's 1,500 pages, we can extrapolate, from selections in the text, the general discourse about victims propagated by the project.

The discourse of victimhood evident in the Truth and Memory Commission report stands out for its emphasis on the subjectivity and agency of women victims. The project, "protagonizada por las mujeres víctimas" (p. 11), insists that it is reporting not only raw facts about violations of women's human rights, but narrating the way women have lived, confronted, and survived those facts as they happened. The interviewers involved in the project, as well as the writers of the report, were encouraged to create a space for women victims to speak and narrate their own histories in the first person; what resulted was a much more complex narrative about victimhood than the dominant discourse produced in most civil society reports (not to mention the Victims' Law itself).

⁷⁶ According to Ruta Pacífica, about half of these women were mestiza; a quarter of them Afro-Colombian; between five and six per cent were indigenous; the remaining twenty percent identified as "other." Their median age was 45.86 years old, and three out of four had children. They had experienced, on average, four to five separate incidents of conflict-related victimization (Ruta Pacífica, 2013a, p. 18).

First, victimhood is conceived of as a distinctly gendered process, rather than a naturalized one; women's vulnerability in conflict is produced, in other words, rather than being inherent. This conception makes clear that victimization is an act, not an identity: the Commission aims to situate women's victimization in conflict as an inherent and integral part of the militarized gender order, rather than a side effect of an ungendered war. In our September 2013 conversation, Cauca regional coordinator Alejandra Miller explained the Commission's goals: "la idea es eso, pues, mostrar las mujeres víctimas en el conflicto armado en una perspectiva feminista. Que también creemos que eso no se ha dado, y... las comisiones de verdad lo que hacen es un capítulo sobre las mujeres, y nunca es de una perspectiva feminista."

Second, the trope of women victims as *receivers* of abuses – as passive objects of violence – gives way to a narrative of active survival, strategizing, and planning for the future – not only the futures of women victims and their families, but of Colombian society more broadly. As the report explains, "[l]as mujeres víctimas no solo hablan de su sufrimiento, sino también de sus esperanzas y sus ideas para hacer posible otra Colombia" (Ruta Pacífica, 2013a, p. 18). This framing grants women victims a level of authority to speak not only about the microconflicts in their daily lives, but of the macroconflict behind them. They are recognized as authoritative speakers about the issues at which they have been the center, and how to address them. This stands in clear contrast to the "women victims as administrable subjects" discourse visible in the Victims' Law, in which the authority over solutions to conflict is "always already" external to women victims.

Selections from interviews with women reveal active protagonists in the process of recognizing their strengths – something Ruta Pacífica also endeavored to encourage. "Pues bueno, como le digo," said one woman in Cauca, "en el sufrimiento ya uno tiene que ayudarse"

(Ruta Pacífica, 2013a, p. 21). Another respondent, from Norte de Santander, recalled: “Se siente rabia, se siente impotencia, se sienten ganas, muchas veces, hasta de acabar uno con la misma vida de uno... ¿Cómo lo he afrontado? Yo creo que con mucho valor” (ibid., p. 778).

Importantly, one of the strengths identified throughout the report is a community strength: that of organizing *procesos sociales*, social movements and organizations begun as a strategy for surviving victimization (ibid., p. 85). Social movements are collaborative and collective in nature, focusing on the victimization of *community* life, not simply individual lives: a gestalt of all the acts of victimization that took place within a municipality. This is a chief distinction between the discourse of victimhood displayed in the Truth and Memory Commission and the one evidenced by the Victims’ Law. In the former, victimization is a decidedly collective act, and therefore any reparations must also be collective, aimed at repairing the social fabric damaged by violence. In the Victims’ Law, acts of victimization are conceived of as momentary, fixed events taking place on a particular date (which may or may not be within the acceptable temporal parameters), to a particular individual or family; reparations, then, are made to that individual or family without attention to – and, as shown earlier, sometimes at the expense of – the community. The report’s summary describes the overall impressions on its interviewers of the women who participated:

La capacidad de las mujeres de afrontar, y superar las adversidades e inenarrables sufrimientos producidos por los actores de esta guerra, se ha revelado como sorprendente a través de los testimonios dados a la Comisión. Las mujeres muestran una actitud activa en defensa de la vida y de manejo del dolor y sufrimiento. Dicha actitud no se queda en la resistencia a la destrucción y en la capacidad de protegerse y cuidar a sus familias, sino que se manifiesta en la fuerza para rehacerse, para empezar de nuevo, después de tantas pérdidas sufridas. Las mujeres víctimas del conflicto armado, se revelan a través de los testimonios como mujeres fuertes, creativas y recursivas. Frente a la inercia y desprotección del Estado, ellas han afrontado, con los escasos recursos disponibles, estrategias de seguridad y cuidado (ibid., p. 83).

The Truth and Memory Commission insists that women victims in the national conversation about armed conflict and reconciliation be afforded a degree of political subjectivity not granted to them by the dominant discourse of which the Victims' Law is a part. In my September 2013 interview with Alejandra Miller Restrepo, coordinator of Ruta Pacífica in Cauca, she explained that what she hopes for the Commission is that it paves the way for holistic reparations to women victims. In the process, she asserted that “hay que preguntar a las mujeres sobre el tema de la reparación, de la verdad y la justicia, de todos, de que piensan... Pero creo que también va a salir una ruta de reparaciones importante, es una del decir, a las mujeres de este país víctimas, ¿qué piensan sobre la reparación? ¿Qué quieren? ¿Cierto?” This emphasis on *asking* women victims about how they might best be served stands in contrast to the legislative process which created the Victims' Law, from which victims and their representatives were largely absent.⁷⁷ The Commission, rather than awaiting the attentions of a benevolent State, is claiming an active subjectivity and a protagonism for victims – working to ensure, as María Andrea Campo Ayala explained during one of our 2013 interviews, “la posibilidad de que las víctimas tuvieran voz.” This does not mean, necessarily, that women victims will never portray themselves in an essentializing light; rather, it grants the project's participants the right of self-portrayal. As Cynthia Cockburn (2004) asks, “When should women be treated as ‘mothers,’ as ‘dependents,’ as ‘vulnerable’? When, on the contrary, should they be disinterred from ‘the family’... and seen as themselves...? Ask the women in question. They will know” (p. 29).

⁷⁷ Interestingly, of women victims who were asked by Ruta Pacífica which reparative measures they found most appropriate, 30% chose a focus on memory and forgiveness; 51% identified policy and legal changes at the State level; 68% elected truth, justice, and reparation programs; 86% stressed demilitarization and redistributive measures; and only 32% named the return of land and assets as their priority (2013a, p. 89). This is in opposition to the State reparations plan, which seems to focus on the return of land and assets as the linchpin of its programming.

In its efforts around the Victims' Law and the contribution of its Truth and Memory Commission, women activists in Ruta Pacífica are claiming and constructing a political subjectivity that has never been offered to racialized, poor, or victimized women in Colombia – and in so doing, they are painting a new panorama for a post-conflict future, in which the full rights of citizenship are available to those outside the traditional centers of power. Speaking about the representatives of the government and the FARC-EP who sit at the negotiating table, one of the organization's leaders explained the insufficiency of the peace talks in addressing the needs of a future peace, and showcased the network's insistence that Colombia's women not be seen as State subjects to be administered: “Ustedes pacten la terminación de la guerra, pero lo que viene es la implementación de los acuerdos. [Necesitaremos] los actores de la sociedad civil fortalecidos con sus voces, con sus propuestas, y lo demás... Las mujeres no queremos ser las pactadas de la paz, sino que queremos ser pactantes, sujetas políticas activas, con voz, con representación.”

Red de Mujeres del Caribe: Decolonial Regional and Racial Subjectivity.

Miles away from Ruta Pacífica's work in Cauca, the Red de Mujeres del Caribe (RMC) on the Caribbean coast is addressing a distinct set of challenges in its bid to claim political subjectivity for Caribbean women and victims of conflict. The network is at the forefront of efforts to “regionalize” the Caribbean, inspired by the work of Orlando Fals Borda, in opposition to the centralization (or “Bogotization”) of State protection of its citizens as embodied by the Victims' Law's *Registro Único de Víctimas*. This regionalization process, aimed at creating a more self-reliant region with more access to its own resources, has a strong decolonial and anti-racist component, and extends to efforts by the network to decolonize the available forms of

resistance for women. When I spoke to Yusmidia Solano, she explained the organization's work in decolonial feminism and the establishment of a "feminismo zambo" as a response to the racist centralization of State policy which has replicated itself in the feminist movement. As discussed in Chapter 3, the network is insisting on a new kind of feminism in Colombia (and a new subjectivity for Afro and indigenous women, who are insisting on not just their own "inclusion," but agency and subjectivity, in the feminist movement), one that necessarily involves attention to and work with the Afro and indigenous working class.

Colombian anthropologist Patricia Madariaga (2009, p. 392) asserts that the majority of Colombian women feel unrepresented by the feminist movement. This criticism might be levied at feminist movements anywhere in the world; nonetheless, my conversations with women activists from the Red de Mujeres del Caribe indicated that they are embarking on a journey specific to Colombian feminism, in which they are attempting to democratize, decentralize, and decolonize the movement, insisting on its relevance to Afro and indigenous women and combating the narrative of *mestizaje* that has papered over the particular experiences of women of color. During our 2013 conversation, Solano explained:

Yo personalmente estoy dando un giro en parto que me definía como feminista socialista, pero ahora estoy trabajando mucho con la idea del feminismo decolonial, y la Red está trabajando mucho con lo del feminismo negro, y el feminismo indígena. Yo creo que eso es algo que sólo empezamos a hacer ahora, pero que tiene mucho sentido, porque la mayor parte de nuestras afiliadas y los grupos de mujeres son ese tipo de mujeres. Y no de pronto el feminismo pequeño burgués, de los Encuentros, y que tienen su relación principalmente con el Estado – es distinto. Entonces, yo creo que el efecto sólo van a ver en los próximos años. Apenas estamos – yo me he definido como feminista Zamba, para utilizar una categoría que fue una categoría racista colonial, que era la mezcla entre indígenas y negros. Y entonces, lo estoy tomando para resignificarlo, y ver la necesidad de que trabajemos juntas las mujeres Afro y las mujeres indígenas.

In seeking to develop a decolonial feminism, the women of the RMC are positioning themselves in opposition to, or perhaps simply "beyond," the State-allied feminism of Fraser's "dangerous liaison" (and Fraser's critiques themselves have been accused of being Eurocentric).

Decolonial feminism, according to María Lugones, entails “a rereading of modern capitalist colonial modernity” through the lens of, following decolonial theorists like Mignolo and Quijano, the coloniality of gender (2010, p. 1; see also Espinosa Miñoso, 2009; Gómez, 2011b, and the work of the Decolonial Feminisms Working Group at the University of California, Berkeley). Decolonial feminism is, at its heart, a collective enterprise. According to Lugones,

One does not resist the coloniality of gender alone. One resists it from within a way of understanding the world and living in it that is shared and that can understand one’s actions, thus providing recognition. Communities rather than individuals enable the doing; one does with someone else, not in isolation... [it is an] affirmation of life over profit, communalism over individualism, ‘estar’ over enterprise (2010, p. 754).

The endeavor stands in direct opposition to the market conception of self-as-enterprise (McNay, 2009; Marttila, 2012; Dardot & Laval, 2014) that guides the neoliberal subject. In its pursuit of a decolonial feminism and a *feminismo zambo*, the activists of the RMC are positioning themselves to depart from – and even to challenge and reform – mainstream feminism’s failure to attend to the neoliberal consequences of its alliances.

Finally, the women I spoke to from the RMC had a long history of a critical, interrogative stance on relations with the State. Operating chiefly on the Caribbean coast means that the network is removed both from the national centers of power *and* from the centralized resistance taking place in the mainstream Colombian feminist movement. Since its inception, the network has had various levels of participation in national supra-network feminist activities, and at the moment of my fieldwork, it was choosing to pull back from that involvement. Solano recounted the network’s experiences with national-level women’s peace networks during the wave of civil society involvement surrounding the Uribe administration’s Law of Justice and Peace and the concomitant “demobilization” of paramilitaries:

Eso fue uno de los puntos con los cuales nosotras terminamos haciendo la estructura – digamos, al principio fuimos partícipes de que se presentara una postura de iniciativas para la paz para hacer seguimiento al proceso de negociación con los paramilitares. Pero luego,

entonces, cuando Patricia Buriticá, que era dirigente de IMP, entra de ser parte de la Comisión [Estatal] Nacional de la Reparación (la CNRR), entonces empezamos a ver que eso tenía muchos problemas, y que el Estado controlaba muchos organismos que no se tenía autonomía e independencia, claro la necesidad de retirar, y eso fue el punto de discusión de la asamblea donde decidimos que no podíamos seguir en una organización que tenía tanta dirigencia, que no tenía democracia en su interior.

In response to my question about whether the network continued to belong to a supra-network of women peace activists in Bogotá (e.g. the *Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz* or the *Red Nacional de Mujeres*), Solano explained:

No. No, hemos decidido que no, porque pensamos que la centralización que hay del país, en términos del gobierno y el estado también, se reproduce a nivel de las organizaciones. Y entonces, hay mucha necesidad de utilizar a los grupos regionales solo de relleno y para cumplir con los requisitos de las agencias internacionales. Y no se tiene autonomía, y no se tiene capacidad de decisión, y entonces utilizan mucho a los grupos locales y regionales.

In response to this dynamic, part of the NGOization of the feminist movement discussed in previous chapters (see Álvarez, 1999; Schild, 1998), Solano indicated that the network has made a choice to form networks and relationships with regional women's organizations led by Afrocolombian women:

Decidimos, después de la experiencia de la IMP,⁷⁸ que nos íbamos a mantener así. Y más bien, como buscar éstas alianzas. Y se ha buscado alianzas con KAMBIRI, la organización nacional de mujeres Afro, y con esa se han tenido incluso el intento de hacer una red de mujeres Afros tanto del Caribe como del Pacífico. Y se trabajó también en algún momento con la red departamental de mujeres del Chocó.

Nonetheless, even while its intentional alliances with regional and Afrocolombian women's organizations contribute to processes of regionalization and solidarity, the centers of power and financial support remain in the capital. To address that reality, the *Red de Mujeres del*

⁷⁸ Solano explained that in addition to the RMC's sense that the IMP was working too closely with the State and funding agencies to be able to preserve its autonomy, there had been a fissure between the two networks in which the former IMP, by mutual agreement, was dissolved, but then Bogotá-based activists reformed the network and monopolized international funding that would otherwise have been divided among former members of the network. Later in the interview, she asserted that the RMC's participation in the IMP was very important for them, and that she does not regret it, despite what happened; moreover, she felt that the IMP was beginning to undertake some important reforms.

Caribe has an outpost of sorts in Bogotá, in the person of Norma Carmona. Her involvement as the network's Bogotá representative is evidence of a change in strategy. She explained:

Pero estamos tratando a también como de abrir la Red a otros espacios, sobre todo porque la parte de la financiación es muy difícil. Y algo que tú señalabas ahorita, pues, las organizaciones que están en Bogotá tienen muchas ventajas, en cambio las de las regiones no. Y eso se da también por algo contra que venimos luchando, que es la centralización. ¿Verdad? Que hace que todo se concentra en Bogotá, y las regiones no tienen una propia economía, ¿verdad?, desde ningún punto de vista, desde lo presupuestal, ni desde lo político, ni desde el manejo de sus recursos, entonces, esa es una de las cosas que también venimos como empujando de cómo desarrollar un proceso de ordenamiento territorial que permita a la región ser desde su identidad territorial.

In addition to offering critiques of the Victims' Law in their events and published writings,⁷⁹ I argue that the RMC's pursuit of regional autonomy and a decolonial or *zambo* feminism is significant to the law's discourse. The RMC's endeavors establish a subjectivity for women victims of the armed conflict beyond what is offered by the law: active subjects of an inclusive, decentralized State; a non-dependent citizenry with jurisdiction over its own resources. Furthermore, the RMC's nascent attentions to decolonizing feminist resistance, and its longstanding critical eye toward NGOization and State alliances in the feminist movement, make clear its accordance with Fraser's admonition that feminists much watch our steps. The testimony of Ofelia Fernández Valdéz, participant in an RMC member organization, is evidence of the network's role in insisting on a political subjectivity for women beyond that of sufferers, receivers, or victims of the armed conflict:

Trabajar con la Red de Mujeres del Caribe, le ha dado un nuevo sentido social a mi vida: ha cambiado mi manera de ver las cosas... El entrarme, para mí, en la lucha por la igualdad, la equidad de género, la paz y el tema de la autonomía regional, me hizo hacerme el inventario personal y preguntarme: ¿quién soy yo en esta historia de dolor y muerte?, ¿qué papel juego en la historia?, ¿lo escogí yo o me fue asignado? Y por último el gran interrogante, después

⁷⁹ In addition, Afro-Colombian advocacy groups (many of which are affiliated with the RMC) maintain that the Victims' Law was enacted without the prior consultation of Afro-Colombian communities, which puts it in violation of Afro-Colombian collective rights as stated in the constitution (Law 70, passed in 1993, guarantees a full consultation when a law will affect black communities); for more, see <http://www.afrocolombians.com/pdfs/MesastatementEngl.pdf> and http://www.wola.org/publications/afro_colombian_victims_ignored_in_development_of_victims_law.

de descubrir que estaba predeterminada a la inercia y la indiferencia: ¿qué puedo hacer para cambiar esto (Jiménez G., 2013, pp. 99-100)?

The history of Colombian society and politics may not portend a welcome reception for the decolonizing and regionalizing efforts of the RMC, but several changes in recent decades present them with a political opportunity. The rights accorded to Afro-Colombians in the 1991 Constitution, as well as the passage of Ley 70 in 1993 guaranteeing territorial protection and economic development to black communities, provide important legal tools. The network's participation in planning major events with other feminist networks reflects their influence on the evolution of the women's peace movement in the country; their participation in public policy conversations at the local level reflects the network's rootedness in the Caribbean region and its resistance to being subsumed by national efforts in the capital which might, intentionally or not, paper over the particular experiences of its members (Jiménez G., 2013, pp. 59-61; 163-167). Whether or not this balance can be maintained and simultaneously allow the network to exert material influence in the broader women's peace movement will depend not only on the RMC itself and how it forms and maintains alliances (Jiménez G., 2013, p. 169), but also on whether and how national-level networks engage with their contentions. As RMC coordinator Audes Jiménez concludes in her 2013 thesis on the network, the extent to which the peace movement incorporates regionalist concerns remains to be seen:

Si la apuesta del movimiento social en la construcción de la paz es la de llegar a una paz positiva, sus estrategias deberían encaminarse a la consecución de este fin y no a limitarse, como se ha hecho por muchos años, al desarrollo de aquellas estrategias que sean alcanzables en el marco de la oferta institucional actual (...) El movimiento social necesita trascender sus expectativas, necesita pensar la Región, pensar el país, pensar el continente y sobre estos pensamientos recreados debe re-pensar las estrategias con las que se pueda intervenir simultáneamente (2013, p. 181).

Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra: “Aunque no nos quieran.”

The current actions of Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y Por la Paz offer perhaps the clearest of the three examples here of women activists engaging with the State’s definition of victimhood, by virtue of the fact that the Organización Femenina Popular – the driving force behind MSM – has been involved in direct negotiations with the State since 2011 about receiving collective reparations as an organizational victim of the armed conflict, after an invitation from the State in recognition of persecution of the organization. In the words of an OFP lawyer, the Victims’ Unit offered the reparations “como un gesto de paz, de cambio institucional y de reconocimiento de la responsabilidad del Estado por acción o por omisión en los más de 140 crímenes cometidos contra la OFP” (Yañez, 2015b). As such, the OFP is faced with the task of being defined as victims in a framework which could offer them much-needed benefits, but also has the potential to limit their subjectivity according to the parameters discussed above.

My initial conversations with allies of the organization⁸⁰ implied that women activists have been insistent that the negotiations operate on their own terms, frustrating government officials’ desire for a quick reparations process that could be held up as one of the law’s early successes. As of August 2013, the negotiations had been in process for two years, but State officials and OFP representatives had not yet had a complete meeting. Women reported that the government negotiating unit continuously left out an agreed-upon part of the meeting agenda, or invited another women’s group (with different histories and concerns) and attempted to lump them all together. In response, the OFP hired its own team of lawyers, and its representatives

⁸⁰ ECAP, the Barranca-based organization with whom I volunteer, has a long collaborative history with the OFP, and at least one of the meetings about reparations held between State representatives and OFP activists took place at the house where I lived during part of my fieldwork. My initial understandings of the reparations process arose from those relationships.

have been known to walk out of meetings when they feel that the government officials are not taking them seriously. Because the Santos administration was (and may still be) attempting to prove the law's worth to the public, the State needed an example of successful collective reparations; this gives the activists a relative upper hand in demanding that the process not be superficial. (By the end of 2014, the Ministry of the Interior still listed the OFP as “en proceso de alistamiento” into collective reparations.)

The negotiations have, as of this writing, led to the emergence of a thorough list of objectives and demands made by the OFP that can serve as a window into the organization's negotiation of state-sponsored subjectivity. After the Victims' Unit invited the organization into negotiations in late 2011, the activists engaged in several months of internal discussions, during which women expressed their “miedos... de reconocerse como *un sujeto política víctima* con el derecho a ser reparada integralmente” (Yañez, 2015a; my emphasis). After grappling with the decision to be recognized as victim subjects, the organization accepted the government's invitation in October 2012. After further conversations, the activists narrowed down five distinct goal areas for negotiations, with six proposed programs composed of sixty-four individual measures of reparation. These five goal areas are as follows:

- (1) Building democracy on a foundation of respect, tolerance, and recognition of difference and political opposition;
- (2) Rooting peace in community life;
- (3) Developing women political subjects with leadership roles;
- (4) Ensuring that development proposals are rooted in the community; and
- (5) Building democratic institutions that are trusted by the people.

These goals speak to the organization's insistence that the peace to be built, of which reparations are a part, move away from the country's historical model of top-down, centralized social and political organization predicated on a unitary ideal-typical Colombian subject, which leaves out the particularities of gender, race, ethnicity, and region. In addition to these five goal areas, the six proposed programs subdivided into sixty-four reparative measures (which I will not outline here) are these:

- (1) Recuperating the organization's tradition of political advocacy (damaged after many years of persecution and accusations of guerrilla involvement);
- (2) Reconstructing the fabric of society;
- (3) Reestablishing OFP's good name in the national discourse;
- (4) Granting access to justice and disallowing impunity;
- (5) Providing psychosocial, mental health, and health interventions to OFP members; and
- (6) Recuperating the organization's economic and material infrastructure (Yañez, 2015a).

The OFP's insistence on these goals and programs establishes them as a clear counterexample to the parameters of State-sponsored subjectivity for victims as outlined above. The activists' insistence on democracy-building, social life, and community empowerment is in direct opposition to the atomizing conception of victimhood offered under the neoliberal governance of the Victims' Law. The women expressly link a true and lasting peace to its rootedness in the community, rather than to individual reparation of land and assets.⁸¹ Furthermore, the organization's focus on the harms done to the organization by armed actors, including a tacitly-

⁸¹ The OFP also critiqued the individualism of the truth commission following the Justice and Peace negotiations with the AUC a decade earlier. The nature of their critiques reveals the effects of their community-rootedness on their relationships with other women's organizations: "[Y]o no solamente necesito saber qué pasó con mi cuerpo, o qué pasó con mi vida, sino qué pasó con mis hijos y esos son hombres, qué pasó con mi marido, con mi amante, con mi vecino. En ese sentido esa verdad no puede quedarse solamente en la perspectiva de género en mujeres, sino en la perspectiva del pueblo. ¿Qué pasó con mi pueblo?" (Ramirez P., 2009, p. 41).

approving State, rejects the notion of an inherent vulnerability for victims – on the contrary, attention is called to the *circumstances* of that vulnerability’s creation. Finally, as opposed to the construction of victims as passive subjects of State administration, the activists are using the political opportunity created by the State’s offer to engage in negotiations to insist on benefits beyond those initially offered by the law. They are establishing themselves unquestionably as active claimants of rights that arise from their roles as political subjects, not solicitors of rights granted to them by a benevolent State.

As of 2015, the OFP had begun to express – and to publicize – various difficulties and obstacles it had encountered in the process of negotiating collective reparations with the Victims’ Unit. These include:

- (1) Crimes committed against the organization have been slow to be revealed in detail; thus, justice has not been served;
- (2) Land restitution for OFP members has been slow in coming, and is not guaranteed;⁸²
- (3) The health measures for OFP members undertaken by the Ministry of Health have been slow to be implemented;
- (4) The *Registro Único de Víctimas* has presented particular difficulties with regard to *collective* reparations; protection offered by the law tends to focus on individuals, to the exclusion of a collection dimension;
- (5) There is a lack of adequate cooperation and collaboration by local and national government bodies; and

⁸² Because OFP members’ land claims exist primarily in the Magdalena Medio, a resource-rich, deeply contested, and thoroughly paramilitarized part of the country, the parcels in question are unlikely to fall into the category of “uncontested claims” discussed above (Tate, 2013a); as such, claimants are likely to face powerful opposition, resulting in the slowness of land restitution that OFP members report.

- (6) Women victims need a stronger voice in both the peace process, taking place in Havana, and in the *process* of collective reparations (Yañez, 2015b; see also Yañez and Becerra, 2014).

The Organización Femenina Popular is aiming at broad reconstructive measures, using the reparations process to attempt to recover their former organizational activities and role in communities of the Magdalena Medio, which continues to be one of the most conflict-affected regions of the country. As part of that process, the organization reports eight reparative measures that have already been implemented since negotiations began (Yañez, 2015b):

- (1) The organization reopened its artistic, cultural, athletic, and social school for youth in 2013, which had been closed since the height of paramilitary violence in 2003. There are more than two hundred youth now enrolled in the school in Barrancabermeja, where the curriculum alternates art classes with human rights training. In 2014, five more of these schools opened in the region, bringing the total number of youth enrolled up to three hundred fifty. The schools include a women's soccer championship, with the slogan, "Si un partido quieres ganar, la paz debes buscar";
- (2) The organization has relaunched its media outlets: TV and radio spots locally, and their printed magazine, *Revista Mohana*;
- (3) They have founded an Observatory of Discrimination and Violence Against Women, which in 2013 produced an action plan regarding issues of security and gender-based violence; 2014 saw the organization of a regional summit on gender-based violence;
- (4) The activists are in the process of organizing leadership schools for women human rights defenders. In 2014 they developed two training modules on issues of politics and human

rights and delivered them to twenty-five local women leaders. They also developed a seminar on peace, women, and security;

- (5) The organization is expanding their local income-generating projects, primarily women-run bakeries and vendors of soy products;
- (6) The office infrastructure (computers, printers, and air conditioners) is being revitalized; these were subjects to frequent vandalism in past years, and activists attribute these occurrences to the reputational damage done to the organization by State accusations of guerrilla complicity;
- (7) The organization is working on projects of historical memory and offering psychosocial attention to community members, including a planned building to be devoted to an exhibit on women's human rights; and
- (8) There is progress on the implementation of "non-repetition measures," scholarships available for higher education, and the creation of security councils for women in four separate municipalities in the Magdalena Medio region.

In accepting the hand offered by the State in its proposal to feature the OFP as a prominent recipient of collective reparations under the Victims' Law, the activists are engaging in a risky liaison with a potentially undermining power (see Brown, 1992; Schild, 1992; Fraser, 2011). But as Doris Lamus (2010, p. 153) points out, "Trabajar con el Estado no es *per se* malo, es más bien *estratégico*. El asunto es... cómo se mantiene distancia respecto de las políticas regionales que quieran absorber el movimiento de mujeres, su liderazgo, y utilizarlo." In its insistence that the negotiations operate on their terms – from using State resources to address issues of violence against women to rooting their reparations in community life to linking local reparative processes to the faraway peace negotiations in Havana – and enforcing those demands by

walking out of government negotiations and take advantage of the State's need for a public success under the law – it seems that activists from the OFP and its MSM project are turning the State's offer of a victimized identity on its head, using the terms and circumstances of the Victims' Law to subvert the very idea of being *víctimas permitidas*. Indeed, these women may be embodying a new extension of Charles Hale's (2004) understanding of indigenous identity negotiation – they are *víctimas bravas*. This should not imply that relations with the State are utopian, or that there is mutual affection between the two entities – but that the activists have been able to carve out and defend a space of political subjectivity in a framework which seeks to reduce them to a more limited identity. As OFP and MSM director Yolanda Becerra explained to me in 2013, “Para nosotras no ha sido fácil y no es fácil. Y menos, hablar del tema del poder no es fácil, no ha sido fácil. Pero hay una cosa, es que tenemos un reconocimiento político y hay una legitimidad. Y eso hace que aunque no nos quieran, o a nosotras no ha sido tan fácil, tampoco es fácil de que nos nieguen los espacios.”

Conclusion

In June of 2014, the parties involved in peace negotiations between the FARC-EP and the Santos Administration being held in Havana agreed to the creation of a gender subcommission. The subcommission, installed that September and made up of delegates from both negotiating parties, is intended “to review and guarantee, with the support of national and international experts, that the agreements reached and an eventual final agreement will have an appropriate gender approach” (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2014). The subcommission entertained, and as of this writing will continue to entertain, visits from teams of gender advisors in the process of its work. Three months later, in the process of negotiating justice for victims of the conflict (the

fourth of six points on the agenda – see Chapter 7 for details of the peace negotiations), three women’s organizations representing victims of the conflict sent delegations to visit the table in Havana (Bouvier, 2014).

The recognition by negotiators of the importance of a gender perspective, and the presence of women victims in Havana, did not happen as a result of benevolence or sensitivity on the part of the State or the FARC-EP. Only after three years of organizing, strategizing, outcry, and intense lobbying by women’s peace networks did these advances come to pass. The three women’s peace networks under study are engaged in different levels of this activism: insisting on political subjectivity and creating important resources for a post-accords future, in the case of Ruta Pacífica; insisting on a different relationship with the State through a process of withdrawing from its centers of power, in the case of the Red de Mujeres del Caribe; and insisting on a different relationship with the State through a process of cautiously and assertively working together, in the case of the organization at the core of the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz. All three, I argue, are establishing a political subjectivity distinct from the reductive and neoliberal option proffered by the State in the discourse of the Victims’ Law; each is taking a distinct approach to that project, contributing to a new, active, and holistic subjectivity for women victims of conflict.

In *The Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci (1999[1971]) referred to the creation of “historical blocs,” social forces forged by political and economic alliances of actors coming together under unitary ideals. A historical bloc, distinct from a political party, may be capable of installing a counterhegemony. I have argued above that the Victims’ Law and its surrounding discourse have created and reified a unitary identity of the *víctima permitida*. But it is also possible that the creation of this reified and convenient identity, when marshaled and reappropriated by women

victims and the networks that advocate for them, may lead to the creation of a historical bloc which can then take action on an agenda that serves its needs. In what is perhaps an illustrative example of such a process, political scientist Andrea Louise Campbell (2005) has argued that the institution of Social Security *created*, or at least enabled the creation of, the political subject of the senior citizen in the United States. She explains:

The program increased seniors' engagement with politics by connecting their fortunes tangibly and immediately to government action. It fashioned for an otherwise disparate group of people a new political identity as program recipients, which provided a basis for mobilization by political parties, interest groups, and policy entrepreneurs. And Social Security incorporated seniors into the highest level of democratic citizenship, their relationship with the state marked by full social and political rights and privileges, including the right to fend off proposals for program change that they find objectionable (2005, p. 2).

If recent activism around the Victims' Law and its implementation were to lead to a recognized, dignified political subjectivity for victims of the armed conflict, with their futures tied to the actions of the State, Colombia could see a new actor step onto its political stage – one whose history is acknowledged and respected. Until the passage of the Victims' Law, according to María Andrea Campo Ayala of Ruta Pacífica, “Lastimosamente, el dolor de las víctimas en este país – que son un montón – que son millones – su dolor no es un relato oficial para la sociedad. So les pasó eso, fue porque se lo buscó... como si existiera alguna razón justificante por la cual se pueda llegar a aceptar lo que nos pasó en este país” (Interview, 2013). Seen in this light, the Victims' Law, with its recognition of and intended redistribution to victims of conflict, has the potential to dignify the long-ignored experiences of one in ten of Colombia's citizens. But for women victims in particular, the new institutional focus on their needs does not have a positive history: “The incorporation,” Sonia Álvarez (1990) reminds us, “of women and gender-specific issues into institutional arenas in Latin America most often led to the reinforcement of existing gender and power arrangements [...] by harnessing women's political activity into ‘auxiliary’ women's organizations, co-opting women's movement organizations, and/or appropriating their

political discourses, acquiescing to limited demands through public policy making, or suppressing women's movement demands altogether" (p. 20).

The Victims' Law has far-reaching potential, and represents good will on the part of the Santos administration. But the State's lack of technical capacity, resource maldistribution (Sikkink, Marchesi, Dixon, & D'Alessandra, 2014), and decades-old power arrangements present significant obstacles to its success. Thus far it has demonstrated a lack of willingness, and possibly a simple inability, to directly confront the power of the country's rural elite who stand to lose hard-fought hegemony established by their paramilitary proxies. But what remains to be seen in the coming months and years, as victims' organizations and women's peace networks negotiate their relationships with the State and the terms of the law, is whether the Victims' Law *itself* – inadequate and reductive – is evidence of subversive subjectivities for women victims. Though the tool is deeply flawed, it is in part a result of women's activism, which in itself is a victory for conflict transformation. Furthermore, the ways in which women's peace networks are engaging with the State through the law are evidence of a changing relationship: not one between a benevolent State provider and a passive, administrable citizenry, but an active dialogue between two political subjects. Veteran journalist María Teresa Ronderos, during our interview in 2013, spoke about the role of women peace activists in the creation of the Victims' Law and the evolution of the State's relationship with victims:

Ellas, en su participación en todo el proceso que fue la Ley de Víctimas, fue fundamental para ese ley (...) De alguna manera, hay algún Estado que responde. Que por lo menos tu tienes, bueno, la defensoría en algunas partes, o la procuraduría en otras, ¿no? Y la Unidad Víctimas ahora, que digamos es muy respetuosa de esos procesos. Me parece que es gracias a ellas se han constituido ahora alguna institucionalidad protección de víctimas, y es gracias a su valentía, y a la organización, y a la fuerza.

Lo que ha hecho la cultura patriarcal como una superestructura, y la guerra como una expresión, ha sido robarse la identidad de las mujeres. Robarse de la identidad, imponer otra identidad. Imponerla desde el cuerpo, además... hay un cuerpo propio que toca recuperar.

– María Andrea Campo Ayala, 9/18/13

Chapter 6

Un Cuerpo Propio:

Somatophobia and Armed Conflict

A few weeks after I defended a prospectus in preparation for this research, I discovered that I was pregnant. Over the next four years, as I delved into the process of research, fieldwork, and writing, my body would miscarry, become pregnant again, become involved in the fight for natural childbirth, give birth to a daughter, and sustain her by nursing. The simultaneity of these processes – research and reproduction – meant that women peace activists’ focus on their bodies as central to their work carried a special, personal significance for me. Women activists in Colombia are producing a discourse about the roles and rights of the female body that illuminates the crucial place of bodies in masculinist philosophy, in the production of war, and in the transformation of the armed conflict at a systemic level.

In this chapter, I will situate the embodied practices of women peace activists, particularly members of Ruta Pacífica and Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra, in the somatophobic traditions of classical and Enlightenment philosophy. I will examine the role played by the female body in war-making, and the ways in which the body is both the canvas and the paintbrush for the panorama of conflict. But the power exerted over women’s bodies in war endows them, I argue, with the potential for upset. With that in mind, I will analyze the ways in which the body is being *recuperado* by women activists and reappropriated as a tool in the construction of their alternative social imaginary in ways that can be seen simultaneously as

essentialist and deeply transformative. With this chapter I hope to answer Adelman and Ruggi's (2015) call to "intensify research on the embodied experiences of war and violence, of economic and ecological crisis, so complexly woven into a global symbolic economy" (pp. 15-16).

The Body in Western Philosophy

Various aspects of late capitalism, including population growth, medical technologies, and the rise of the free market, have prompted scholars to turn their attention to the body and its role in consumer culture and identity. This is particularly true for feminist theorists as they examine the way femininity is produced from femaleness, which is itself produced (Adelman & Ruggi, 2015; see also Brownmiller, 1984). As part of this trend, several scholars in the 1980s and 1990s (Spelman, 1982; Grosz, 1994; Shildrick & Price, 1999) published feminist examinations of the role of the female body in classical philosophy. The mind/body or soul/body dualism central to this period served as a tool to assign the higher plane of being (the mind/soul) to men, and the lower plane (embodied existence and concerns) to women. Hence men were seen as normative, ideal-typical subjects; Plato established a hierarchy with free men at the top, followed by free women, free children, enslaved men and women, and animals. Aristotle, though known for his assertion that women's souls and minds had equal capacity to men's, also scorned women for what he saw as their excessive connection to the material life of the body; though they had *access* to the superior plane of the mind, they failed to pay sufficient attention to it (Spelman, 1982). Classical philosophy's somatophobia (fear of the body) would influence later generations, as well. Enlightenment and Cartesian philosophy inherited this relegation of women to the realm of animals; as the life of the mind was paramount, women's supposed exclusion from it justified their subordination. Descartes' famous statement, after all, is *cogito ergo sum*, not *menstruo ergo*

sum. This dualism, and the assignment of women to the inferior half of it, has served for many centuries to justify gendered hierarchies of power. The female body, as Shildrick and Price (1999) point out, has generally been seen as “out of control, beyond, and set against, the force of reason” (p. 3) – or, in Mary O’Brien’s more incisive words, “the bloody flux of femininity... has fairly consistently frightened men out of their wits” (1983, p. 48).

Feminism’s Dual(istic) Legacy

The mind/body dualism of masculinist philosophy has been made concrete in global politics, economics, and social processes. The “cultural inscriptions” that are the heirs of dualistic thinking, writes Grosz, “quite literally constitute bodies and help to produce them as such” (1994, p. x). Medicine, biological studies, carceral systems, psychology and psychiatry, and studies of sexuality have all relied on dualistic conception of differences between the sexes; in them, the body has been used as a source of disempowerment. The female body in this sense has been dangerous for women. This led many Western feminists of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and even early twentieth centuries to be reluctant to theorize the female body and its processes, particularly the reproductive ones, as a source of identity and power. Feminists including Mary Wollstonecraft, Simone de Beauvoir,⁸³ Shulamith Firestone, Betty Friedan, and Mary Daly all either ignored or intentionally distanced themselves from women’s corporeal existence, inadvertently reinforcing the soul/body distinction (Lennon, 2014; Spelman, 1982; Grosz, 1994).

In recent decades, however, Western/Northern feminist theorists have engaged the body as a site of cultural production and disempowerment, and begun to reappropriate it as a source of

⁸³ Though de Beauvoir is often cited for having eschewed the body as a source of power, her work on women’s internalization of the male gaze did influence and anticipate the later investigations of feminist phenomenologists who explored women’s embodiment (Lennon, 2014).

resistance to subordination. This is particularly true of Adrienne Rich, who wrote in *Of Woman Born*:

In order to live a more fully human life we require not only *control* of our bodies (though this is a prerequisite); we must touch the unity and resonance of our physicality, our bond with the natural order, the corporeal ground of our intelligence (1976; qtd. in Spelman, 1982, p. 126).

Rich's adjuration was reflected (and continues to be reflected) in the natural childbirth movement (Shildrick & Price, 1999, p. 4), which seeks to wrest the subjectivity of the reproductive body from the medical/pharmaceutical complex. These examples have inspired feminist theorists to assert that "bodies have all the explanatory power of minds" (Grosz, 1994, p. vii), and that female subjectivity can be seen to be embodied without that embodiment being used to disempower. Drawing from the work of various scholars over several centuries – Baruch de Spinoza's philosophy of monism, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of physical posture as a produced experience, Marcel Mauss' conception of technologies of the body, Pierre Bourdieu's work on the body as a medium for the reproduction of domination, and Foucault's exploration of biopower, in particular (Lennon, 2014; Grosz, 1994; Adelman & Ruggi, 2015) – feminists analyzed the embodied experiences of "hysteria," anorexia, phantom limbs, autoscopy (seeing the body from outside), and various "technologies of the self" (Foucault, in de Lauretis, 1987). Sandra Lee Bartky (1988) and Andrea Dworkin (1974) illustrated the way women's bodies are disciplined, policed (including by the self), infantilized, and restricted. Susan Bordo (1993) centralized the body as both an object and a subject of power. Iris Marion Young (1980) brought a feminist perspective to Merleau-Ponty's work on posture, examining the way women and girls use their bodies and occupy space; she also explored menstruation, pregnancy, and lactation as sites of potential power.

Perhaps most famously, Luce Irigaray (1985) advanced poststructuralist sexual difference theory, focusing on the specific morphology of the female body as foundational to women's thinking and existence in the world. Irigaray posed important questions about the role of the body, physical and symbolic, in the apprehension and interpretation of reality. At the same time, her work has been criticized as biologically deterministic and presumptuous of a homogenous essence of womanhood. This tension between reclaiming and essentializing the female body will be revisited later in the chapter.

White feminism (with some notable exceptions) has long been guilty of ignoring or paying insufficient attention to the way mind/body dualism has been inscribed very differently for women of color and colonized women, but twentieth and twenty-first century scholarship has begun to take up the link between the gendering and the racializing of bodies. "Somatophobia," Spelman (1982) explains, "historically has been symptomatic not only of sexism, but of racism, so it is perhaps not surprising that someone who has examined that connection between flesh-loathing and sexism would undertake an examination of racism" (p. 128). Feminists of color, including Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, Angela Davis, and Audre Lorde, have produced a more holistic scholarship of the body that takes the processes of race into account (Shildrick & Price, 1999). Female bodies of color have been used differently than their white counterparts (Lennon, 2014; Alcoff, 2005): they have been produced as the foil for white women's bodies, the repository of the base sexuality that was a necessary tool in the colonial domination of bodies of color while also confirming white women's relative subordination to white men. Western philosophy's ideal-typical femininity was not accessible to racialized bodies: "African women were seen as wanton perversions of sexuality, not paragons of piety and purity," writes Londa Schibinger (1999, p. 27; see also Ahmed, 2002). While white women's embodied femininity is

protected and funded by the State, the embodied femininity of women of color is seen as excessive, transgressive, and irresponsible. As Western somatophobia cast the white female body as an imperfect copy of the male, the black female body was a perverse reference to the white female body. Women of color have long been encouraged to try to perform a white female embodiment, knowing not only that they will never achieve it, but that if they get too close, they will be punished. The punishment and erasure of trans and gender-nonconforming bodies also serves as a tool to reinforce imagined bodily binaries, ferreting out and castigating those whose bodies' existence destabilizes hegemonic understandings of gender.

Western somatophobia/negrophobia/transphobia is not only concurrent with colonialism, but consubstantial, as the domination of the "other" was accomplished by animalizing people of color and reducing them to mere bodies (Adelman & Ruggi, 2015) and imposing heteronormative social life. Indeed, the relegation of women of color to a strictly physical plane is essential in the construction of white male identity: "It is only by projecting all that is dangerous onto her figure that he can come to inhabit the body that he does" (Ahmed, 2002, p. 58). In this way, women of color have been denied a gendered position, seen only as a "sexual subset of their race" (ibid., p. 28), not as part of womanhood as such. Localized embodied experiences of women in colonial and postcolonial contexts are examined in the work of scholars like Naila Eljaouhari (2013, cited in Adelman & Ruggi, 2015), and Katherine Bullock (2003), who focus on the un/veiling of Muslim women's bodies as a site of political, cultural, and economic control of territory. The female body, this scholarship reveals, is a crucial and therefore highly policed tool of the colonial project.

This discourse is invaluable for understanding the role of the female body in modern-day Colombia, which exists in a context of postcolonial, violent, and variously racialized struggle.

Studies of the body in the Latin American context require specific, localized attention, as Olga Sabido Ramos (2011) points out. In Latin America scholarly attention to the body has resurged only since the 1990s (Sabido R., 2011, p. 44; see also Brown, 2011; Sutton, 2010; Monárrez F., 2010). Foci of this scholarship have included studies of state formation and governance, or “la relación del proceso de ordenamiento político de los Estados-nación desde las primeras décadas del siglo XIX y el impulso bio-político que los alienta” (Pedraza G., 2004, p. 10). This relation has been made manifest in State attention to police and military projects, processes of internal colonization and public hygiene, cartography, and pedagogy. Radcliffe and Westwood (1993) cite the Latin American body as central to various projects advanced by the State, including mestizaje and management of subordinated populations. A second scholarly focus has centered on the institution and enforcement of social order, bound up with questions of morality, the power of the Catholic Church, and the postcolonial nation (ibid.).

What Latin American scholarship on bodies and corporeality illuminates is that though the broad features of somatophobia, misogyny, and racism exist everywhere, the Latin American context necessitates a scholarly focus on colonialism, the hegemony of the Catholic Church, mestizaje, the relationship between modernity and coloniality (Sabido R., 2011), and particular state forms (e.g., Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes and their relation to the citizenry). The Latin American context also demands attention to global economic processes like the colonialism, modernization, and the neoliberal project, which have been instrumental in sculpting the experiences of bodies (see Sutton, 2010). In a region where bodies are assassinated because of economic processes (Berta Cáceres and other anti-megaproject activists are today’s key examples), studies of bodies would be incomplete without the political economy perspective. Furthermore, the region’s history of dirty wars necessitates attention to bodies disappeared and

killed by the State (Johnson, 2004), and the treatment of “subversive” bodies that have been the target of State and para-state violence under both military and civilian governments. Here as well, the distinct treatment of indigenous and black bodies merits particular attention, as does the role of the female body – as mother, reproducer, or boundary marker of the nation (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989) – which has been crucial to the carrying out of violent nationalizing projects. Female sexuality has also been particularly subject, given the role of the Church, to technologies of the body intended to limit control of “fertility, health, and freedom of movement” (Radcliffe & Westwood, 1993, p. 14). All told, the last two decades of Latin American scholarship have built a theoretical base for the study of the body as “a concept with democratic potential, challenging commonly held beliefs and supporting those who wish to reclaim personal politics as integral to global emancipatory strategies. Examining the impact of global forces on bodies provides a central fulcrum of analysis” (Vargas, 2009, pp. 151-2).

For the Colombian case, I will begin with an analysis of the role of the body in wars and armed conflicts, and the way the body is lived differently in that context by women and men, and then turn to the way those dynamics are manifested in Colombia specifically.

War on Bodies

“The body,” wrote Foucault (1984[1971]), “is the inscribed surface of events” (p. 83). This is perhaps nowhere as clear as in war and conflict zones, where bodies – male and female – carry the marks of violence. The way that bodies operate in war – marching in formation, bearing scars, dying, going hungry, and protecting, suffering from, or inflicting violence on other bodies – reveals them as important sites in the production of conflict. But that production does not happen the same way for each body. “War,” explains Carol Cohn,

is a profoundly gendered practice, both at a practical and symbolic level. Practically, although both men and women experience many of the same phenomena, such as sexual assault, injury, torture, displacement, loss of livelihood, and the death of loved ones, they do so in related but distinct ways. The differences in how they experience these are due to the many different facets of gender relations, including: men and women are differently embodied; because they symbolize different things to their communities and their opponents, they are targeted differently and their injuries have different social impacts; they have different responsibilities to their families and communities, and thus end up differently in harm's way... (2013, p. 22).

Differently gendered bodies bear different traces of war – and among women's bodies, the experience of war is different for racialized, queer, and differently abled bodies. Isis Nusair's (2008) and Liz Philipose's (2007) work on U.S. torture at Abu Ghraib, and the way the othered body is produced by racialized, militarized discourses of nationalism, offers key examples of these differences. For women, broadly speaking, it is their reproductive capacity (real or imagined) that makes their bodies into sites of contention. As reproducers of other bodies, reproducers of the national collective (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989), or "soldier production units" (Nikolić-Ristanović, 1998), women's bodies are granted less sovereignty when militarism escalates, due to the nationalist need to maintain or increase particular ethnic populations. Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović describes the discourse about women's bodies in pre-war Bosnia, recalling that every obstetric examination was attended by a nun to ensure that the mother felt Church pressure to carry the child to term; this pressure was accompanied by contraceptive shortages (1998, p. 236).

Even outside of what we call wartime, women's reproductive bodies play a key role – part of nationalism, after all, is the constant preparation for war against an other. Women's bodies present a threat to the nationalist project because of their capacity to birth the children of those "others," and therefore must be diligently policed. This control of bodies' reproductive capacity is a deeply racialized discourse, valuing women for their ability to maintain "purity" of

a country's bloodline, and punishing those who fail to do so. Across the globe, women have been encouraged to enforce the racial and genetic boundaries between nations and groups, and to maintain the country's eugenic purity. Writes political scientist V. Spike Peterson,

From... South Africa, where white women were exhorted to bear 'babies for [apartheid-era President P.W.] Botha,' to financial incentives for child-bearing in contemporary France, women have been admonished to fulfill their 'duty' to the state/nation by bearing children in service of group reproduction. (Ranchod-Nilsson & Tétrault, 2000, p. 64)

The reduction of women's bodies to reproducers of pure collectivities is part of what produces them as vulnerable bodies (see Cohn, 2013, p. 8), subject to campaigns of wartime rape intended to demoralize an enemy and splinter its social foundations, in addition to impregnating the women of an enemy state.

Though the UN classified rape as a war crime only in 1998 (Crider, 2012) and war rape as a crime against humanity only in 2001 (Bergoffen, 2003), it has long been a potent tool of armed conflict. World War II saw the rape of hundreds of thousands of Korean "comfort women," held hostage by the Japanese army and kept as domestic and sexual slaves (Hicks, 1994). And reports of war rape seem only to have increased over the last several decades. "War has always dealt cruelly with women," said UNICEF Director Carol Bellamy in 2004, "but the nature of violent conflict in the world has changed in past decades in ways that are taking an even greater toll on women and children" (UNICEF, 2004). In the Sudanese conflict of the early twenty-first century, Amnesty International counted 250 rape cases in one month in Darfur province, and estimated that the actual number of rapes was twice that (Wax, 2005, p. 58). This violence was racialized as well; Janjaweed militias systematically raped darker-skinned women, with the intent not only to humiliate them, but also to impregnate them and lighten the skin of the next generation (Lacey, 2004; Polgreen, 2005). Racist killings in the context of war are often accompanied by rape, as in the case of U.S. soldier Steven Dale, who in the context of a military

occupation with clear and imperial divisions of power raped a fourteen-year old Iraqi girl and set her body on fire before killing her family in 2006 (Gander, 2014). Both of the current wars taking place in Iraq and Syria continue to feature rape and sexual violence as key tools in the domination of populations (Badkhen, 2008; Reuters, 2013). This is to say nothing of the abuse of female bodies by men *within* militaries, which in the case of the U.S. armed forces manifests in the staggering thirty to forty percent of female soldiers reporting rapes (Lazare, 2011; Hynes, 2012). Wartime rapists have forced their victims into maternal roles *before* raping them, as well. In World War I France, German soldiers were reported to “impose a parody of domestic interaction on the victim, with rapes initiated after a request for wine, milk, eggs, or a meal” (Harris, 1993, p. 173). Similar situations have been documented in all corners of the globe (Hale, 2010; Kelly, 2010; Wood, 2010).

As Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman remind us, “Men and women die different deaths and are tortured and abused in different ways in wars” (2004, p. 36). Wartime rape is accompanied by other gender-specific, sexually specific violence on the female body; in myriad civil wars women have faced gynocide alongside genocide, for example. As one report on the Congolese conflict in the late 1990s writes, “[G]ang rape has been so violent, so systematic and so common during the country's five years of war that thousands of women are suffering from vaginal fistula” [rips in the vaginal wall which eliminate control of urination]” (Reproductive Health Matters, 2004, p. 181). Male fighters have cut off the breasts of women and girls in Belgium, the Congo (UN News Centre, 2009), and Nazi Germany (Durham and Gurd, 2005, p. 148).

Long before wartime rape was recognized as a crime against humanity, it served as a powerful tool in nationalist projects, as racialized propaganda intended to rally support for military campaigns. Susan Grayzel, writing about World War I Europe, explains:

The emphasis on *mothers* as the victims of rape and atrocities, seen in French and British propaganda, in French wartime debates on abortion, and in both countries' literature, demonstrated wartime society's overarching concern not with violence done to women, but with "racial" mixing and attacks on national honor (1999, p. 84).

Accounts of rape and violence in the First World War were widely publicized (Grayzel, 1999, pp. 64-65), and even dramatically sensationalized. Writes Ruth Harris,

If women's narratives of sexual violation were unadorned and often reticent, propagandists preferred a strikingly gendered and emotive vision... In the array of pamphlets, posters, and newspaper articles, two pictures went in tandem—that of the rolling, gentle Belgium or France invaded and the innocent, virtuous Belgian or Frenchwoman violated (1999, p. 173).

The legacy of wartime terror on female bodies is one of appropriation – not only are female bodies usurped and used as sites of contention between fighting forces, but the usurpation itself is appropriated by States and armed groups, who use the female body as an allegory to further their own military and political projects, rather than as an impetus to care for women victims of violence. Women's own testimonies of rape often serve to *deepen* their incorporation into the militarized nationalist project, not extricate them from it.

I turn now to the role of the female body in Colombia's armed conflict, and the specifics of the usurpation of women's and girls' bodily sovereignty in that context.

Women's Bodies in Colombia's Conflict: Torture as Text

La CIDH recopiló testimonios sobre mujeres reclutadas por las AUC en el Cauca, donde se indica que los líderes paramilitares de la zona 'mandan a buscar' a niñas entre 12 y 14 años de edad para que residan con ellos, presten servicios sexuales y se hagan cargo de las tareas domésticas. Se recibió información sobre el caso de una joven embarazada que fue asesinada como represalia por haber escapado de esta situación doméstica, y su bebé removido y

expuesto como símbolo de desaliento para otras niñas en similar situación (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2006, p. 36).

While conducting archival research in Bogotá, I read report after report of the mutilation of the female body during the armed conflict. I found my arms crossed over my own pregnant belly, my body hunched over it until my back ached, cataloguing instances of breasts severed, genitals mutilated, fetuses extracted from wombs. Men's bodies also suffer in Colombia's conflict; they are also killed, also raped. Among men, violence is especially suffered by racialized, Afro-descendant and indigenous male bodies. But it is women's bodies, *qua* women and used as the canvas of domination, that interest me here. It is the gendered capacities of those bodies – to bear children, to nurse them, to reproduce Colombian society – that are made into symbols and symbol-bearers (Sánchez-Gómez, 2006, p. 79), used as tools by men in the domination of other men and the institution of a gendered social order. As Begoña Aretxaga writes in her analysis of women's prison protest in Northern Ireland, women's embodied femininity is a key aspect of the way violence is carried out. "Political violence performed on the body," she writes, "cannot escape the meaning of sexual difference" (2004, p. 252). Attacks on men via their economic, political, or class attributes – their public lives – stand as a foil for attacks on women-as-bodies, the inheritance of dualist, somatophobic classical philosophy. The armed conflict according to Colombian women, as in many other contexts around the globe, is a history written on the body. In what follows, I will examine four ways in which this phenomenon takes place: rape and sexual violence; gendered policing and social control; bodily displacement and disease; and the wartime/peacetime continuum of violence against women.

Raping the body. Scholarly attention to wartime rape and sexual violence has mushroomed in past years, particularly with the attention of global civil society following the

wars in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Adelman & Ruggi, 2015, p. 15). Male combatants routinely rape the women in communities they occupy; while men are perceived as threats and more likely to be killed in war, the violation of women's bodies is a powerful tool in the domination of one group by another. It may accomplish more in a military project, in other words, to rape women than to kill them, though certainly women also suffer death at the hands of these forces. The increased global focus on wartime rape is illuminating a longstanding practice. Bergoffen (2003) writes that the decision at the Hague to classify wartime rape as a crime against humanity was a significant step in upsetting the universalization of the male body as the stand-in for "humanity" and centering the female body as a subject in its own right. But this has not been enough to prevent armed groups in Colombia, particularly the armed forces, right-wing paramilitaries, and their successors, from seizing control of the bodies of women and girls. The CIDH reports that girls as young as eight years old were "joining" the AUC when they felt they had no other option, serving as combatants, informants, and messengers, but also subject to rape and sexual and domestic slavery (CIDH, 2006, pp. 34-36). One paramilitary commander in El Chocó fathered twenty children, one with a twelve-year-old girl, before he was extradited to the U.S. on drug trafficking charges (Forero, 2013). A witness of a paramilitary assault in Meta describes combatants' rape and murder of a woman in front of her daughter:

La estropearon y entonces la cogieron por delante más de diez de ellos. Ellos la tuvieron tres días detenida, donde la torturaron hasta matarla. A la niña no le hicieron nada físicamente, pero vió todo el sufrimiento de su mamá. Me dijeron que no fuera a denunciar nada de lo que había pasado, porque ellos me buscaban donde fuera y me mataban. Nadie quería ir al hacerle el levantamiento (...) porque a ella le dejaron en un filo, donde está una base de los paramilitares (CIDH, 2006, p. 22).

This woman's body became an object of violence when paramilitaries raped and tortured her. It was a transmitter of trauma when the crimes were committed in view of her daughter. Finally, her body became the bearer of a message to her community when it was left in a ravine, where

even her family feared to collect it. Paramilitary rapes were known to be this sinister. In the Caribbean region, for example, paramilitary bosses were known to stage beauty pageants in small towns featuring young women and girls, and rape them after the pageants were complete (Alsema, 2008). Paramilitaries have also used these pageants as a way to single out queer and gender nonconforming men for ridicule and violence. In San Onofre, Sucre, men known as homosexuals were forced to participate in a boxing match organized by paramilitaries in homage to their commander. Paramilitaries forcibly collected the men, bringing them blindfolded in the back of a truck to the boxing ring, where they were forced to box women and one another. “A ellos le trajeron ahí como para una burla,” one observer recalled, “como para burlarse de ellos. No trajeron los boxeadores profesionales sino los maricas. A la gente le daba mucha risa” (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, 2011, p. 68). At least one individual was killed.⁸⁴ Paramilitaries have cut off women’s breasts (Forero, 2013) and cut open young women’s stomachs (BBC, 2004). In El Placer, Putumayo, residents reported that parents would sleep on either side of their daughters to protect them from being abducted by paramilitaries during the night (Forero, 2103). Afro-descendant women are particularly subject to sexual violence, which is normalized in Colombia by the sexualization of the black female body (Sánchez, 2011). All told, Casa de la Mujer in Bogotá asserts that half a million women suffered sexual violence related to the armed conflict from 2001 to 2009 alone (Restrepo R., 2016). Women’s vulnerability to rape is higher when their bodies are displaced from their communities – an act of violence also more likely to be suffered by women, especially Afro women. Amnesty International reported in 2004 that 36% of displaced women had stated that they had been raped (The Guardian, 2004), and the CIDH reports that these and other existing statistics underestimate

⁸⁴ This trend is in keeping with violence against trans youth in the United States and elsewhere, as hegemonic forces police and attempt to systematically eliminate bodies that trouble binaries.

magnitude of the problem (2006, p. 23). Nor are sinister rapes confined to the paramilitary era; Colombian feminist Lola Luna reports a story from the era of *La Violencia* about instances in which pregnant women were raped, their unborn children cut out of their wombs and replaced with the carcasses of animals (Luna, 2004, p. 147). The links to the relegation of women to animalistic corporeality in Enlightenment philosophy are chilling.

While guerrillas (the FARC-EP, ELN, and others) are also accused of committing sexual violence, María Emma Wills of the Historical Memory Commission asserts that the details and scope of such violence remain largely unknown. “There’s a silence now because the guerrillas are still around and they are armed,” she says (Moloney, 2013), whereas the “demobilization” of the AUC allowed for testimonies of wartime sexual violence to be recorded. Hansen-Bundy (2013; see also Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz, 2007) asserts that most reports of rape in the FARC-EP are inter-rank; i.e., recruits forced into sexual relationships with their superiors. The testimonies that do exist of male guerrillas’ sexual violence are condemnable and in need of judicial action. At the same time, they pale in comparison to the scope of paramilitary violence, which was characterized by brutal gang rape (Moloney, 2013), and the level of sexual assault committed by the armed forces, which have committed anywhere from 54% to 87% of the reported rapes in the country depending on what years the data was collected (Hansen-Bundy, 2013).⁸⁵ Both paramilitaries and the armed forces have systematically used rape to punish communities where the guerrillas operated, under the assumption that locals were complicit (Bastick, Grimm, & Kunz, 2007). Wood (2010) writes that Colombia’s insurgent groups “appear

⁸⁵ This fact should not be taken as proof that the armed forces are responsible for such a majority of sexual assaults; rather, the existence of a public command structure and some degree of accountability may mean that rape committed by a soldier is more likely to be reported. Moreover, given some combatants’ dual membership in the army and the paramilitaries, it is possible that a rapist acting in his capacity as a paramilitary, whose paramilitary affiliations were known to the victim, would be reported instead in his capacity as a soldier. The threat of paramilitary retribution (and of retribution by the guerrilla command against victims in its own ranks) would be enough to keep any survivor from going public with her accusations; indeed, rape is also used to punish women who report crimes (Bastick, Grimm, & Kunz, 2007).

to strictly limit sexual violence but engage in other forms of violence against civilians” (p. 131). At the same time, however, accusations are widespread that FARC commanders have mandated the use of contraceptive injections, and forced hundreds of female combatants to have abortions (Briceño F., 2016; Patterson, 2013), an accusation the FARC-EP staunchly denies (FARC-EP, 2016).

Policing the body. In addition to carrying out sexual violence directly on the physical body, in Colombia the AUC was notorious for its imposition of a right-wing social order, in which the bodies of women and girls were policed, regimented, and tightly controlled. This control ranged from how the body was dressed and decorated to where it traveled, when, and with whom. The standards of control imposed on the body were gendered; men were punished for wearing earrings, long hair, or other feminized body modifications. Queer bodies were seen as inherently suspicious, at best, requiring violent policing or assassination to reinforce fictive categories of gender. The punishment for women who transgressed gender boundaries was haunting: in one example, submitted to the United Nations by several women’s peace organizations including Ruta Pacífica and RMC, women accused of adultery or prostitution were stripped naked and paraded on horseback past their neighbors, with letters hung on their necks detailing their “charges” as destroyers of the home (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2006, pp. 37-38). In another, documented by Ruta Pacífica, paramilitary control of women included literally marking their bodies: “obligarlas a bailar desnudas, marcas como raparles el cabello y untarles pegantes, marcarlas con tinta indeleble o con cuchilla” (Gallego, 2010).⁸⁶ “The body was ruled,” recalls María Emma Wills. “I don’t know if social order was so

⁸⁶ For a fascinating and sobering reflection on the global phenomenon of men shaving women’s heads to mark the latter’s alleged collaboration with a military rival, see Beevor, 2009.

created in other contexts around the world” (Moloney, 2013). Paramilitaries also targeted gay men, Colombians believed to be HIV positive, and focused specifically on women activists and heads-of-household (because the absence of the spouse was assumed to be due to his collaboration with the guerrilla) (Batick, Grimm, & Kunz, 2007).

The paramilitary “demobilization” process in the mid-2000s, under the framework of the so-called Law of Justice and Peace, did not signal an end to the paramilitary *modus operandi* of social control over the female body: the Bloque Central Bolívar, one of the most prominent paramilitary successor groups, was reported to institute codes of conduct, curfews, dress codes, and romantic regulations for women in the Magdalena Medio (Mesa Mujer y Conflicto Armado, 2005, pp. 15-16)., and the impunity enjoyed by paramilitaries seems to have extended to their heirs (Patterson, 2013). Rape and assault of female bodies has also been committed by foreigners, including DEA employees (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015), U.S. soldiers, and private security contractors, who according to a Colombian government report raped 54 minors in Colombia between 2003 and 2007 and sold video footage of the rapes. Because of immunity agreements, they were never punished (Grandin, 2015; Otis, 2015b).

Displacing, contaminating, and precaritizing the body. As of this writing, there are seven million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Colombia, with displacement circumstances ranging from massacres to violent threats to fumigation to land grabs, to say nothing of displacement for “economic” reasons related to natural resource exploitation or loss of livelihood. Individuals, families, or entire communities can be displaced. Though the level of displacements fell off slightly after peaking following the failure of the FARC-Pastrana talks, displacements after 2007 began to increase again with the rise of the Bacrim. Women are

disproportionately represented among the displaced (Cockburn, 2007, p. 3), and almost half of all displaced families are headed by women, most of whom have no spouse present (Meertens, 2012).

Displacement, like all effects of armed conflict, affects women differently than men, and in embodied ways. Because women, especially poor women, have less economic and social capital than men, displacement from an established community to an urban environment can destroy their networks of survival. Ruta Pacífica writes about the way displacement is only part of a pattern of the isolation and usurpation of women's bodily sovereignty:

Las Mujeres son generalmente las vencidas en la guerra. Sus cuerpos, sus propiedades, sus animales y sus derechos son botín del vencedor. Sus fuentes de ingreso desaparecen, igual que sus redes familiares y vecinales de apoyo. Llevan el duelo, el miedo y el desarraigo adentro, sus cuerpos no pueden movilizarse o amar libremente, porque hasta el amor es regulado de acuerdo a las normas que imponen los guerreros y al dominio del territorio de estos (n.d.).

Displacement (both the process as it is happening and the condition once a woman is resettled) also makes women's bodies more vulnerable to rape, sexual violence, forced abortion, forced prostitution, and bodily control. A reported 17.7% of the displaced are survivors of sexual assault (Hinchliffe, 2011), a number that likely underestimates the reality. In many cases, sexual violence was what caused the displacement; in others, women are victimized after being severed from their community networks (Meertens, 2012, p. 9). Almost half of displaced women report suffering intimate partner violence (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Displacement of female bodies has other effects, as well; once a woman, a family, or a community relocates, health and social services are often more difficult to access (Patterson, 2013). IDPs are likely to live in poverty, often moving to city centers from the countryside, where they were smallholders connected to the farming and fishing economy. Displaced women's primary method of subsisting is to engage in informal wage work, which in recent

years is more open to them than to men. However, this work (selling food or cigarettes on street corners, washing clothes, engaging in domestic labor) carries with it its own risks and insecurities, while formal-sector work seen as “male,” although perhaps harder to find, is more secure and easier to keep (Moser & Clark, 2001, p. 142). Furthermore, IDPs often settle in poorly equipped camps, with diminished access to potable water or electricity. Afro and indigenous Colombians are more likely than mestizos to settle in displacement camps (Lamus, 2011); as such, adverse health effects of displacement are more concentrated among displaced Afro and indigenous communities. This concentration has even resulted in a new category of identity, as Luz Nery Ramírez of AFRODES explains: “aquí en Bolívar hay muchos afros pero nosotros somos afrodesplazados” (Lamus, 2011, p. 7). Another displaced respondent in Cartagena detailed the conditions in which her body lived:

En mi caso yo vivo arrimada; hay otras personas que además de ser desplazadas son damnificadas por el invierno y les dieron unas casitas por Flor del Campo pero son casitas de paloma y se están rajando, no cabe toda la familia. La situación no es nada favorable. En Majagua y El Limón, las casas son de barro, no tienen servicio de agua, no hay acueducto, la energía eléctrica no está legalizada, los niños viven enfermos porque el agua es de un pozo (ibid., p. 6).

The effects of displacement on the body sometimes force IDPs to choose between two threatening options: returning to the site of their displacement, where the original threat may remain or even increase, or staying in a camp or a shelter where their health will suffer. In 2012, I spoke with members of an indigenous community in Bajo Calima, Valle de Cauca, who had been displaced from Bajo Calima because of the adverse health effects of coca fumigation mandated by Plan Colombia. After two years in the city living in what they described as a barracks made of corrugated metal, with limited or no access to health services, two of the community’s newborn babies died. As a result, the community made the difficult choice to return

to their land, where they now have relationships with international accompaniment organizations.

This case highlights the fact that damage done to the body is not only incurred as a result of displacement or direct violence. The body suffers effects of U.S. military intervention that extend beyond sexual violence, as seen in reports of pregnant women exposed to coca fumigation giving birth to malformed babies, adults and children with skin conditions, and increased cancer rates resulting from the 1.5 million hectares of territory sprayed (often from planes flying too high) with carcinogenic glyphosate (Lohmuller, 2015).⁸⁷ This is to say nothing of fumigation's destruction of food crops, resulting in bodily hunger and malnutrition; bodily sustenance is also harder to come by in an area with the presence of armed groups, given the limits on mobility (Cockburn, 2007).

Violence and displacement have particular effects on women's and girl's reproductive bodies, in addition to affecting and precaritizing them disproportionately based on their social position. Maternal mortality, for instance, is 7.6 times greater in conflict-ridden areas of Colombia than in areas with lower rates of armed violence. A reported five hundred women per year die in childbirth in Colombia, the vast majority of whom could be saved with access to the right resources (Fox News Latino, 2015). In addition, UN reports indicate that the fertility rate for girls between the ages of ten and fourteen is higher in zones where armed conflict exists, due to rape, loss of opportunities, and the sexualization of girls that accompanies militarization (ibid.).

⁸⁷ Stacy Alaimo (2010b)'s conception of "transcorporeality," which highlights the natural porosity of homonid and other bodies, helps to situate the role of the body in carrying traces of U.S. antidrug policy. All bodies flow through one another, Alaimo insists, leave traces of themselves, and carry traces of others. This is particularly clear in (though not exclusive to) the mothering body, which transmits those traces through the placenta and through breastmilk.

The role of the body in Colombian political economy is also ripe for theorization, as militarized extractivist projects also produce health effects, pollution, and forced displacement, especially of Afro and indigenous bodies. Barbara Sutton (2007a, 2010) writes that women's experiences in neoliberal Argentina often were tied to bodily issues: food insecurity, lack of access to health care, and the way the State outsourced the work of social reproduction onto the shoulders of women (see also Athanasiou, 2014). These embodied experiences are also racialized (Jiménez G., 2013). The production of vulnerable Afrodescendant bodies lends itself to the project of territorial consolidation, particularly on Colombia's Pacific coast (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2006, p. 41); in addition to being displaced from resource-rich territories so that extraction can begin, black bodies are also much more likely to be relegated (even before any displacement occurs) to areas without potable water, sanitation, or access to farmland.

Yolanda Becerra of MSM spoke during our 2013 interview about women's bodies in the Magdalena Medio. She focused on the effects of development megaprojects like dams, which she argued constrict and confine women's bodies, making them more financially dependent on their male family members and less mobile in society. She referred to women as "encerradas" by the construction of megaprojects and its attendant securitization, affected in a way that is distinct from the projects' effects on men:

Yo creo que [con] el tema del desarrollo, el concepto del desarrollo, entre hombres y mujeres hay una brecha muy grande. Es muy diferente escuchar un concepto de desarrollo del fondo de las mujeres, así sean hasta de los alternativos, ¿sí? Y nosotras decimos que el tema del desarrollo mientras no está discutido con las mujeres también, no vamos a lograr un desarrollo colectivo. Porque las mujeres tenemos, digamos, una capacidad de mirar a las cosas pequeñas que nos están pasando. Los megaproyectos sí, afectan diferente a las mujeres y a los hombres. Nosotros tenemos el ejemplo ahorita: estamos acompañando el proceso de las mujeres pescadoras afectadas por el megaproyecto de Hidrosogamoso.⁸⁸ Y las

⁸⁸ Becerra refers to a dam, the Hidroeléctrica del Río Sogamoso in Santander, that was constructed by the State power company ISAGEN. At the time of our interview it was being built, and construction was completed in

afectaciones de que ellas hablan son hasta de la autonomía de ellas, o sea, de la pareja. Las relaciones de las parejas han cambiado, porque ellas eran autónomas económicamente. Hoy, ya no hay pescado, ya no pueden trabajar con el pescado y ellas dependen del marido. Y eso ha cambiado totalmente la vida de las mujeres.

The effects of megaproject development, in this case, were to reverse the gains in women's autonomy that had been won over many years – echoing what Yusmidia Solano asserted about the effects of narcotrafficking in the Caribbean. The elimination of the fishing trade resulted in a reversion to a system in which women are confined to dependence on male partners. The female body, and women's autonomy over it, is a casualty of this dependence in the context of the disintegration of community life, as Becerra went on to explain:

[Otro] ejemplo: las mujeres cuentan – o sea, las casas que están construidas, las casas eran abiertas, totalmente, no tenían seguridad. Las casas no tenían puerta, las casas no tenían – no necesitaban de eso, porque se conocían todas las familias, no habían ladrones, no habían – hoy el megaproyecto ha cambiado totalmente eso. ¿Eso qué hace? Que va a encerrar a las mujeres. Sí, las mujeres van a quedar encerradas, que ellas no estaban – con la movilidad. La relación con los hijos, o sea, los hijos han cambiado totalmente, el tejido de afuera, de la sociedad ha cambiado, y son ellas que enfrentan eso, son ellas que tienen que mirar como protegen a sus hijos. La relación con la naturaleza. Eran ellas las que cuidaban las maticas, que siembran alrededor de las playas del río, eran ellas las que hacían la comida con su pescado, eran ellas las que hacían - ¿sí? Todo eso ha cambiado. La vida realmente le cambia *totalmente* a las mujeres, para mala, además.

Becerra's account of the neoliberal enclosure of the female body bears remarkable resemblance to Polanyi's explanation of Britain's enclosure of the commons in the nineteenth century, in which he writes: “[t]he lords and nobles were upsetting the social order, breaking down ancient law and custom, sometimes by means of violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They were literally robbing the poor of their share in the common (...) The fabric of society was being disrupted (...) harassing its people and turning them from decent husbandmen into a mob of beggars and thieves” (1957[1944], p. 35). While the neoliberal project's enclosure of the

January 2015. ISAGEN itself was sold to Canada in January 2016 in the “biggest privatization in Colombia in a decade” (Dube & Ramirez, 2016). The sale is being criticized for irregularities, and the Finance Minister is under investigation (Reuters, 2016).

commons targets all of the poor, regardless of gender, its effects on women are distinct, due to the fact that the enclosure takes place on a patriarchal palimpsest. Women's bodies are made more vulnerable, and less mobile, by neoliberalism's effects on local economies (Cabezas, Reese, & Waller, 2007; Momsen, 2004). The idea that women's bodies are also enclosed and restricted by a neoliberal project intended to restrict access to public waterways and territories begs the question of the long discursive relationship between the female body and the land. This relationship is one that has been referenced and appropriated by women's peace networks, particularly Ruta Pacífica and MSM. At the end of this chapter, I will explain and interrogate WPNs' reliance on this conflation of women's bodies with territory.

Violence “outside” of war. Although the violence carried out on female bodies by armed actors is gut-wrenching, it is not the whole story. The effects of war on women's bodies also extend beyond the framework of the conflict itself *as such*. Though violence carried out on women's bodies is exacerbated during wartime, that violence also predates armed conflict, as the CIDH asserts: “La violencia y discriminación contra las mujeres no surge sólo del conflicto armado; es un elemento fijo en la vida de las mujeres durante tiempos de paz que se empeora y degenera durante el enfrentamiento interno” (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2006, p. 17). As Ruta Pacífica explains, “Si bien las violencias perpetradas por los actores armados, legales e ilegales, parece cobrar el mayor número de víctimas y ser la que más atención despierta, no es la única forma de violencia que se vive en el país” (Sánchez G., 2008, p. 31). As discussed in Chapter 1, the gendering of conflict takes place outside what is usually characterized as the site of war, extending to violence against women committed by intimate partners. Rates of intimate partner violence are high in Colombia: in one 1995 study, almost 20%

of women surveyed reported being assaulted by their current partner alone (Krug, et. al., 2002). Oxfam reported in 2003 that between 60 and 70% of women in Colombia have suffered some kind of violence in their lifetimes (Patterson, 2013), and those numbers have risen – 30% more women reported intimate partner violence in 2012 than in 2003; the government attributes this both to an increase in reporting *and* an increase in violence (Zwehl, 2014). The position of Colombian society toward such violence is similarly bidirectional; this ambiguity between awareness and augmentation was encapsulated in the 2015 Congressional debate over whether to pass a law honoring a famous Vallenato singer for his musical contributions, despite the fact that he was convicted of killing his partner and dumping her body in a cow pasture. The debate was held only a few months after the passage of another law toughening punishments for femicide (Otis, 2015a) (As of this writing, the bill is stuck in the Senate, waiting to see the light of day).

As Virginia Bouvier pointed out (2013), “conflict violence is a palimpsest” laid over an already-existing fabric of violence against women in Colombia. One of the most chilling manifestations of what Ruta Pacífica and Red de Mujeres del Caribe (Jiménez G., 2013) both refer to as the “continuum” of violence against women⁸⁹ is in the recent wave of acid attacks in Colombia, what one reporter called the most intense wave of such incidents in the world (Tegel, 2016). Beginning around 2010, an increasing number of women (into the hundreds each year) reported having nitric or sulfuric acid thrown in their faces by men with whom they had had relationships, men with whom they had refused relationships, or even by men they had never met (one man unknown to the victim threw acid into her face after yelling, “this is so you don’t think you’re so pretty” [Forero, 2012]). While men also suffer acid attacks, it is at much lower rates; furthermore, the Colombian Secretariado de la Mujer reports differences in how the attacks are

⁸⁹ Colombian women activists’ reference to the continuum of violence against women is in keeping with feminist ideas from around the world; Liz Kelly (1991) famously advanced the idea in the U.S., though her work did not focus on political violence and war as points on the continuum.

carried out. Men tend to have acid thrown at their chests, while women have it thrown in their faces (Charner, 2015). The power of such an attack on the bodies of women is connected to women's position in the dualism of mind and body that is the legacy of classical philosophy. If women are essentially embodied in ways that men are not, then in effect, acid attacks target women's social identities and use-values, marking them as the property of the male attacker, and reflects Ruta Pacífica activist María Andrea Campo's assertion the effect of war on women is to "robarse de la identidad, imponer otra identidad; imponerla desde el cuerpo, además" (see also Lewis, 2012, and BBC, 2014).

Violence generally construed as individual or private – acid attacks and domestic violence are two examples – is often counterposed to the structural, "public" violence usually associated with war and armed conflict. But Colombian women peace activists argue otherwise, asserting (along with many women in conflict zones around the world) that violence against women's bodies in the private sphere and violence of war are nodes on a continuum and that armed conflict deepens and normalizes "private" violence. "La guerra exacerba todas las violencias contra las mujeres. Todas," explained Alejandra Miller in 2013.

Porque lo que se instala en una sociedad en guerra – se instala en la mente de todo el mundo – es el tema del autoritarismo, del dominio, de la violencia, de la jerarquía del poder, que es lo que generan los armados. En los territorios donde hay mayores niveles de confrontación, de militarización, donde los armados son los que imponen el modelo social que se construye alrededor, es tomado de allí también. Y entonces, las mujeres [están] más agredidas en sus casas. Pues, por – obviamente, son asesinadas. Pero los asesinatos, por ejemplo, en esos contextos de guerra – aunque no sean no directamente relacionados con el conflicto armado; pueden ser feminicidios allí en casa, de otras cosas, pero son más degradados. Las formas de homicidio son más agresivas.

Miller went on to explain the ways in which the armed conflict in Cauca has degraded or exacerbated "private" violence against women.

En el mundo la generalidad es que la mayoría de los homicidios de las mujeres [se cometen] con arma blanca. La mayoría. En el Cauca, así era, arma blanca. [Pero] en los momentos en que la guerra empezó a exacerbarse, la militarización, no sé qué, se cambia la lógica, y los

femicidios empezaron a ser mayoritariamente cometidos con armas de fuego, que es una forma más degradada. Porque la arma blanca, aunque puede tener intención de matar, *puede* tener la intención de herir. No necesariamente [de matar]. Pero el arma de fuego, quien usa el arma de fuego no la usa con la intención de herir. Es para matar. Entonces, vemos que hay una exacerbación, hay una degradación. O las mujeres que a veces son asesinadas por algunos actores armados, se les cercenan los senos. Entonces es de degradación. O el vientre, todo esto. Pero no solamente en el marco de la guerra... en todo, en la casa.

It is important to take stock of rape and violence against women committed by private citizens as existing within the war's continuum, as Enloe reminds us when she writes that the 1990s war in former Yugoslavia leaked into private homes: "domestic violence had increased inside homes in Belgrade... and that increase was no mere coincidence" (2000, p. 147; see also Cockburn, 2004; 2012). The relationship between masculinity and militarism is key to this continuum as well, which means that wartime violence is likely to continue beyond peace accords or demobilizations. As Janie Leatherman explains, "war-formed models of masculinity come to shape the definition of masculinity... in the post-conflict period, the horrors of sexual violence persist for vulnerable and marginalized women in new forms such as domestic violence, prostitution, and trafficking" (2011, qtd. in Patterson, 2013).

In Colombia, the continuum of violence has another feature – that of the drug trade. Yusmidia Solano added, during our 2013 interview, that the element of armed narco-trafficking that has flourished during the armed conflict also affects women's bodies in the Caribbean region, converting them into decorative objects to adorn and complement the masculinities of traffickers. This trend contributes to Colombia's relationship with the plastic surgery industry, which has its roots in the twin histories of narco- and sex trafficking (Yagoub, 2014). The rise of the narcotics industry and its mafia have been linked to the "narco-aesthetic" of women's body modification, which has pervaded Colombian society even outside the reach of drug barons. The fact that the Medellín Cartel's Pablo Escobar was reported to prefer "mujeres operadas" simply crystallized the notion that a glamorous woman was one who had been surgically altered. Silvana

Paternostro refers to Medellín as Colombia's "silicone valley," commenting drily that "instead of being taken over by the FARC, the rebel group fighting in the jungle for the past 50 years, Colombia has been overcome by silicone" (2011). For some women and girls, plastic surgery and the ability to become attached to a trafficker represent a way out of a life of poverty with few economic alternatives (ibid.; Forero-Peña, 2015, p. 109). This was the underlying plot line for the popular telenovela *Sin Tetas No Hay Paraíso*, which aired in Colombia in 2006. Alcira Forero-Peña frames this desperation in political-economic terms when she writes that "Colombian state policies[,] funded by terror and war, have intensified the effects of violence, leaving entire populations with nothing to live on except their bodies, bodies that are treated as disposable and consumable" (2015, p. 111). Moreover, Colombia's image as a breast-implant mecca has globalized, now drawing a stream of "medical tourists" to the country seeking affordable plastic surgeries (Forero-Peña, 2015; Acuña, 2014; see also Tovar-Rojas, 2004).

The intersection of bodily subordination. Patriarchy, war, and marketization form a nexus of influences on the female body in Colombia. War deepens patriarchy, patriarchy fuels and enables war, and both protect capital accumulation, whose embodied effects on women reinforce patriarchy. The following visualization of the intersectional, coconstitutive relationship between these three processes is only partial; furthermore, each process is carried out upon and felt distinctly by differently racialized bodies.



Fig. 11: The intersection of bodily subordination.

Given the interwovenness of the way war, patriarchy, and marketization use the female body as a symbol and wreak havoc on its integrity and autonomy, women peace activists in Colombia have a range of channels by which they can employ the body to resist such processes. In the next section, I will examine the way the networks under study (particularly Ruta Pacífica and the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra) theorize, mobilize, and reconstitute the female body as a site of resistance, conflict transformation, and healing.

Cuando las cosas están difíciles, los hombres, de alguna manera, están detrás de las mujeres. Están al lado de las mujeres. Pero no ponen el pecho, realmente.

– Yolanda Becerra, 10/7/2013

The Body Politic(ized):

Colombian Women’s Embodied Resistance

Colombia’s armed conflict has enabled men to mutilate the bodies of women. The conflict and its actors have raped them, impoverished them, contaminated them, displaced them, and imprisoned them. Conflict has appropriated them, used them as transmitters of messages and markers of masculine power. The female body has been made part of the scaffold of war, constructed on the twin foundations of patriarchy and militarism and bolted into place with marketizing projects. But if the female body, narrated as the silent victim of violence and confinement, is central to that scaffold, then what happens when the body shakes? What effects result from a female body whose image is changing, volatile (Grosz, 1994), and reappropriated as a symbol of agency and resistance by women?

Grosz (1994) implies that in relying on bodies as building blocks of war and domination, global power holders are building on sand. She writes: “The stability of the unified body image, even in the so-called normal subject, is always precarious. It cannot simply be taken for granted as an accomplished fact, for it must be continuously renewed” (1994, pp. 43-4). The fluidity and multiplicity of the human body (Butler, 1993) lends itself to a certain shape shifting that may allow it to slip through the grip of the masculinist war project. “Where there is power, there is resistance,” wrote Foucault in *The History of Sexuality* (1988, p. 95), in his famous insistence that resistance is always an integral part of power and domination, not something that approaches it from outside. Susan Bordo (1993) extends this concept when she asserts that feminism has “two Foucaults”: one contribution of his work is to illuminate the “‘grip’ of systemic power on

the body,” but another reveals “the creative ‘powers’ of bodies to *resist* that grip” (Bordo, 1993, p. 255).

In the case of the use of the female body in warmaking in Colombia, I argue that “where there is power, there is resistance” is only part of the story; in addition, where power is *built upon* a symbol, there is power *in* that symbol to upset the structures it has been used as a tool to create and maintain. The role of the body in protest has begun to be examined by feminist scholars. Sutton (2007a, 2010) examines the role of the mobilized body as fivefold: as a medium for protest, as a canvas to transmit messages (through attire, cultural and other affiliations, and symbols worn on the body); as connected to bodily needs and vulnerabilities; through the numbers of bodies that convey political commitment; and through emotions experienced by the body. Other examinations of bodies in protest have been undertaken by Parkins (2000), Sasson-Levy and Rapoport (2003), Butler (2012), Eileraas (2014), and Athanasiou (2014). In what follows, I will examine three elements of women’s embodied resistance in Colombia: (a) the physical body in public mobilizations, as it resists the patriarchy-war nexus; (b) the way WPNs’ body discourse aims to reclaim a disappeared subjectivity; and (c) activists’ positioning of women’s bodies as allegories for land and territory.

The Body in the Streets: Public Mobilizations

Members of all three of the networks under study carry out public mobilizations. The role of the body is clearest in the demonstrations of Ruta Pacífica and Movimiento Social de Mujeres, and so in this section I will concentrate on those groups of activists.

Ruta Pacífica defines its street mobilizations as a tactic to “create spaces for communicating and educating about women’s issues in the context of the armed conflict, and

articulate an agenda for political pressure and lobbying,” aimed at “the subversion of the dominant cultural codes about war” (Camilo I., 2004, pp. 7-8). During the *rutas*, women’s bodies travel across contested territory and place themselves in zones restricted by armed actors. As such, their bodies become symbols (and carry symbols) of resistance to war. Ruta Pacifica writes that “the mobilizations are a marvelous adventure in self knowledge; in them we recognize ourselves, we feel the scars on our bodies, criss-crossed by individual and collective histories” (ibid.). After an intense process of individual, collective, and logistical preparation, activists undertake any combination of public events: street demonstrations, academic presentations, public acts of symbolism and symbolic performance, and vigils carried out in cooperation with other organizations, which sometimes include litanies and recitations. Finally, the activists deliver a set of demands to local officials, the media, and the international community.

By placing their bodies in prohibited territory (physical and rhetorical), Ruta activists use their bodies as living symbols of alternative forms of knowledge and valuation. Through their collective presence, women’s bodies represent the insistent presence of those alternative understandings; through the preparation they undertake in presenting themselves as bodies in concert, they become a symbol of unity (Tilly & Wood, 2012). Finally, the fact that they are putting their bodies in danger is a symbol of their courage and their commitment to the cause. This particular symbol is made most clearly visible on the occasions when Ruta activists engage in topless protest, choosing symbols and colors and using the physical body to convey those painted messages to the world.

“Public nudity as a form of protest has a long history,” says Brett Lunceford (2012, p. 1), and is often – though not exclusively – undertaken by women, whose disrobing in public carries special significance based on assumptions of feminine modesty. The female body in collective

form is instantly understood as something more than it seems; there is something to it, in other words, that is quickly grasped by even the most disinterested observer. For this reason, women's nude protest has become a common (though rare enough to be notable) feature of mobilizations around the world – and it takes place not just in the streets, but in other zones of public discourse. In China, for example, a woman named Ai Xiaoming posted a series of nude photographs online, with messages written on her body to protest a wave of child sex abuse (Zeng, 2014; Fox News Latino, 2013). Ai was subject to state harassment as a result of her intervention, kept under house arrest. Her protest was particularly poignant because, as she was middle-aged, hers was expected to be a maternal body removed from the marketplace of sexuality. Similarly, a group of elderly and middle-aged mothers in Manipur, India marched nude onto a paramilitary base to protest paramilitaries' rape and killing of a young woman. The women carried a banner that read, "Paramilitaries, Rape Us Too." This took the shame usually assigned to rape victims and their families and turned it on the armed group, who by the very suggestion that they would rape an elderly group of mothers were associated with a taboo: the women appropriated the symbolic nature that had been assigned to their bodies and turned it against the rapists (Das, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2008). Other examples include the global Slut Walk/Marcha de las Putas demonstrations (Carr, 2013), the work of Ukrainian-born, Paris-based FEMEN, and the 2003 demonstrations in Australia, California, and other locations to protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in which women disrobed and spelled messages of peace with their bodies (CNN, 2003; Lunceford, 2012). Most recently, female nudity has been part of the demonstrations of the #BlackLivesMatter and #SayHerName campaigns in the United States; in 2015, women in San Francisco protested police brutality and violence against women of color by painting messages on their bodies. Said organizer Alicia Bell, "The baring of breasts is

historically an act of mourning, grief or protest. We liberated our bodies as an act of greater political liberation” (Helm, 2015). Even men are taking up (or taking off) this tactic as a sign of political commitment: in Mexico City in the late 1990s, anti-austerity protestors marched into Congress and stripped bare (Wickham-Crowley & Eckstein, 2015, p. 10).

The tool of the unclothed body is more than a media strategy, though it is often an effective one, especially when used by women. It is both collective and specific; that is, while it is the mass of bodies that represents the seriousness of what is being protested, it also focuses attention on the lived experience of particular bodies in particular places (Alaimo, 2010a). And it is the willingness of those particular bodies to put themselves in the way of harm, shame, or even death that contributes to the effectiveness of embodied protest. In an examination of a nude performance protest during the 2003 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Barbara Sutton explains, “The body (clothed or unclothed) is the tool of protest par excellence. Most political protest is enacted through the body—from marches, to political theatre, to the chaining of the body to a tree or building. The body is a key vehicle of protest. The body also serves as a symbol, a text that conveys political meanings” (2007b, p. 143). In other words, when a body is chained to a building, denies itself food and water, or lies down in front of a bulldozer, the protester’s willingness to risk harm and death immediately amplifies the message the body is intended to convey. This is also true of women protestors who demonstrate nude or partially nude. As the Australian singer Grace Knight, who participated in the 2003 Iraq war protests, explained, “It’s absolute complete vulnerability, and in that vulnerability there’s also an awful lot of power, there’s a mighty well of power there” (CNN, 2003).

Alejandra Coll, of Ruta Pacífica in Cauca, described the power of naked protest in Popayán, not only for observers, but for the women in particular, in our 2013 interview:

Es una ciudad muy conservadora, hay una iglesia en cada esquina. Entonces cuando vean las mujeres desnudas, se impacta, y nos gusta. (...) Yo pienso que la Ruta, sí, es un movimiento social de mujeres contra la guerra. Pero también vamos haciendo otra cosa sin querer, y es como derrumbar estereotipos. Como por ejemplo que los cuerpos de las mujeres deben ser perfectos. Las musas [women who demonstrate topless] son mujeres como cualquiera. Y sin ninguna vergüenza, pues, las musas están orgullosas de mostrar, no están [*pantomimes a woman covering herself*]. Entonces es interesante: sin quererlo, creo que también hemos contribuido un poco a que la gente derrumbe estereotipos. A veces logramos con mucho éxito.

The presence of the naked female body in public mobilizations has multiple effects, then.

Though it carries multiple risks, from physical risk to the danger of the body being overdetermined, relying on and reinforcing the patriarchal gaze, when undertaken consciously it can serve as a strategy to call attention to the armed conflict's effects on women. It carries the network's messages in highly visible ways; in Ruta's case⁹⁰ it troubles public understandings about the way a female body should look (and where it should be – see Chapter 5); and, finally, it serves as an act of empowerment for the women themselves. In Colombia's context, this last aspect of embodied protest carries a special significance to which I now turn.

The Recuperated/Re-corporated Body: Reclaiming Subjectivity

Though nudity in public protest is often an effective public relations strategy, Ruta Pacífica's use of it as a tactic is part of a broad and carefully considered praxis. Alejandra Miller commented at length about the role of nudity in Ruta's mobilizations, delving much more deeply than Lunceford (2012), whose analysis of nudity in public protest focuses almost exclusively on its external effects – a corralling of public and media attention – and largely ignores its internal or personal significance. Miller described the process of nude protest as deeply symbolic, in a context of a war that has robbed women of their bodily sovereignty and embodied subjectivity.

⁹⁰ This is in contrast to FEMEN and SlutWalk demonstrations, which by and large fail to trouble hegemonic understandings of what the female body should look like.

The body, she explained, must be reclaimed and healed as part of women's work for peace. This part of our conversation is worth quoting at length:

En el lenguaje simbólico que la Ruta utiliza, trabajamos mucho hablar desde el cuerpo, desde un cuerpo que ha sido recuperado, para mí, que es mío, que me pertenece, que yo decido sobre el cuerpo, no sé qué. Luego puedo hablar desde este cuerpo recuperado. Entonces, en las movilizaciones, en los plantones de mujeres, o lo que hacemos con las mujeres, con el cuerpo desnudo, pintado con mensajes, por ejemplo, por la desmilitarización de la vida civil, por la negociación política, le pone en sus cuerpos. Y lo que es más bonito aquí en el Cauca es que eso lo hacen no las jóvenes universitarias – pues, bueno, mujeres adultas, de sesenta años. La última compañera que se pintó en una movilización por las víctimas fue una mujer de setenta años, indígena. Es mostrar que (...) es el cuerpo mío recuperado, y nadie me puede hacer nada, ni mis hijos, ni mi marido, ni nadie, porque soy yo. Eso es muy bonito. Es un signo de meternos en – es decir, una mujer que hace eso es una mujer que ha ganado. [Ha ganado] la autonomía... Y eso debía [haber] sido a punta de años de proceso. No es que llegó el otro día y ya está quitando la ropa, no. (*Laughter.*) Es de años, muchos años de proceso y empoderamiento sobre el cuerpo.

These years of process were shared by other women's movement organizations; an examination of the role of the body was also a significant part of the work of the Organización Femenina Popular in the 1980s, as Madariaga writes: “la construcción colectiva de una lectura del cuerpo femenino en términos políticos que lleva que, para algunas mujeres, la visión del cuerpo cambie con la pertenencia al movimiento” (2009, p. 402). By understanding the role that the female body is made to play in the *construction* of armed conflict, we can begin to understand the significance of this bodily reclaiming as part of the dismantling of that conflict.

In my 2013 conversations with Ruta activists, we discussed the reclaiming of the female body in the context not only of street demonstrations, but their work on the 2013 Truth and Memory Commission report, which was just about to be released. Teams of activists were assigned to collecting and cataloguing women's experiences of victimization in each area where Ruta Pacífica works. Alejandra Coll described this process as a difficult one, requiring Ruta activists to change their usual mode of working to attend to the emotional heaviness of what they were doing:

Es pesado, porque todo ese ha sido muy duro porque trabajamos todos los días con esas mujeres, pero sentarte todo un día a leer esas historias, es pesado, emocionalmente hablando. Entonces, eso también ha retrasado un poco el trabajo, porque normalmente somos unas máquinas de trabajar aquí en la Ruta. Pero con esas cosas han sido duras porque es la primera vez en la historia de la Ruta donde hemos hecho un ejercicio de sentarnos, leer las historias, y dar nuestra, como... darles cuerpo. Nunca lo habíamos hecho. Siempre estábamos en espacios donde tal vez había una mujer que nos contaba su historia, [pero lo usual] es, pues, pensar en otra cosa, pero el ejercicio de la Comisión de la Verdad, no tiene ese... no se puede.

This process of “giving body” to women’s histories is something that the eventual Truth Commission document also attended to. The testimonies of women who worked to collect and catalogue testimonies of victimization are also included, highlighting their impressions of what they encountered. Several of these accounts speak to the role of the body in conflict and victimization, and the power of efforts to recuperate that body.

El cuerpo de las mujeres ha sido violentado y ultrajado históricamente; sobre el cuerpo de las mujeres se han tejido estéticas, imaginarios y poderes. Una vez más, aunque repitamos y retomemos las consignas feministas, como “mi cuerpo es mío, este cuerpo mío no se utiliza, no se mata, desnudas o vestidas que respeten nuestras vidas.” (...) En los casos de violencia sexual, me impresionó toda la forma como se violenta el cuerpo, cómo los victimarios sienten que tienen el control del cuerpo de las mujeres, cómo las humillan y menosprecian desde el cuerpo. Me impresionó el estado en el que las mujeres violentadas quedan después del hecho. Es una forma de anular a la mujer, su vida, sueños y vida de pareja (Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres, 2013b, p. 160).

This description of the victimization of women’s bodies as an annulment of subjectivity makes clear the transformative power of a mobilization process that takes the female body as its central point of empowerment. In focusing on the recuperation of the body, Ruta Pacífica makes possible the recrafting of subjectivities that have been usurped by conflict. Scholars have written extensively about the role of testimony and oral history as a way to piece together a broken subjectivity after a traumatic event. Allen Feldman, for example, explores the staging and commodification of the human body by violence and torture in Northern Ireland. Feldman refers to oral history as the site where the “fragmented body” is put back together, in what he calls “the weaving of a new body through language” (1991). Similarly, Elaine Scarry (1987) explains the

way that trauma undoes human subjectivity, separating the mind from its bodily experiences in such a way as to make the act of speaking from an “I”—a cogent sense of authoritative identity— impossible. Scarry defines the experience of pain as the “unmaking of the world,” converting the victim’s experience of existence into something incommensurable with her/his experience of it prior to the endured trauma. Scarry’s assertions would foretell Werner Hamacher’s 1989 statement about subjectivity and authorship after the Holocaust: “We do not just write ‘after Auschwitz.’ There is no historical or experiential ‘after’ to an absolute trauma. The historical continuum being disrupted, any attempt to restore it would be a vain act of denegation. The ‘history’ of Auschwitz... deranges all dates and destroys the ways to understand them” (1989, p. 459). Alejandra Coll spoke to this incommensurability in our 2013 interview, and the ways in which participating in a mobilization allows women to reconstruct an embodied subjectivity by giving a name to what cannot be named.

Lo que pasa es que todo el tiempo, se usa y hacen actos simbólicos. Nosotras llevamos plantones. Siempre llevamos velas, nos pintamos la cara o el cuerpo. Las musas, las llamamos. Es algo simbólico, es como una forma de llamarlo y nombrarlo, lo que no tiene nombre. ¿Cómo le pones para el dolor? ¿Qué nombre le pones para el dolor? Entonces, no te puedes parar en la esquinita a gritar algo que no sabes como expresarlo. Lo que hicimos con la Ruta fue – no [bloqueamos] lo que salga. A veces las mujeres bailan, a veces quedan simplemente en silencio en la esquina, a veces salen, que hacen ‘body painting,’ a veces – es muy espontáneo.

Centralizing women’s contentious mobilizations in the process of recuperating the body makes it clear that performative testimony, not only written testimony, has a healing capacity. This performance is spontaneous and mutable, like the body itself; women’s agency in deciding how and when to employ their bodies in protest, along with the boldness of their physical presence in public streets and restricted territories, is a way of putting back together the pieces of a self, and insisting on the subjectivity and full humanity of women. As a result of Ruta Pacífica’s activism, and collaborative efforts by other activists, the Colombian state has begun to respond. In 2008,

the courts admitted that sexual violence in the country was “habitual, extensive, systematic, and invisible”; four years later, the Attorney General declared that the paramilitaries’ rape of journalist Jineth Bedoya was a crime against humanity (Patterson, 2013). These developments contribute to the centering of the female body as a subject, though as always, the challenge is to realize those legal commitments in day-to-day life.

El Primer Territorio

In the mobilizations of Ruta Pacífica, and to an even greater extent, of the network Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra to which they once belonged, the female body is framed as analogous to physical territory. This analogy, common among Colombian SMOs in general, is also made by member organizations of the RMC – especially among the Wayuu, who link the body of the earth (understood as female) with the bodies of indigenous women (Jiménez G., 2013). During the two-day workshop I attended with Ruta Pacífica activists in 2013, a workshop leader asked the group, “El primer territorio, ¿qué es?” to which the women responded in unison, “El cuerpo!”⁹¹ This analogy is visible in several of the organizing slogans of all three networks under study, in which they insist that the female body not be treated as “botín de guerra,” making it analogous to a resource that can be taken as the spoils of war. Ruta Pacífica also conceives of the body as “el primer territorio de paz” and “el primer territorio de resistencia” in various Ruta Pacífica publications. Women’s resistance is framed in terms of bodily roles and capacities, in a slogan that has been used by both Ruta Pacífica and MSM: “Las mujeres no parimos ni forjamos hijos e hijas para la guerra.”

⁹¹ Interestingly, the workshop leaders used the body-territory analogy to apply not only to women, but to men; e.g., they framed men who engaged in physical and sexual violence as undeserving of territorial reparation under the assumption that if they were unable to properly manage their own bodies, they would not be fit to manage land, either.

This explicit parallelization of the female body with Colombian territory is an argument MSM frequently made concrete in its critiques of the rentier capitalism of the Colombian State and the way multinational investment was encroaching on the country's sovereignty. In drawing these parallels, it is worthwhile to ask whether activists risk essentializing the corporeality of femaleness. Given the way this analogy – of violated female bodies as linked to land that has been encroached upon – has been used by governments to rally support for war, rather than for women's sovereignty over their *own* bodies (Grayzel, 1999; Harris, 1993), are activists playing a dangerous game and risking reinforcement of the mind/body, culture/nature dualism that posits women as prerational based on their supposed links to bodily processes? Even if it serves as a method of short-term empowerment, is this essentialism – in Alice Stone's words when she asks similar questions of Irigaray's work – “internally unstable” because it “pursues the revaluation of femininity and the body only *as symbolized*, thereby reinforcing precisely that valorization of the symbolic over the corporeal which it seeks to contest” (Stone, 2004, p. 6)?

I will briefly examine these questions by analyzing the language Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra used to publicize the event they organized in August of 2010: the Encuentro Internacional de Mujeres y Pueblos Contra la Militarización, which was a response to an agreement between Colombia and the U.S. that the latter would build or fortify a number of military bases in Colombia.

The event itself was carried out in three stages. The first featured three days of humanitarian actions in various rural areas of Colombia. Participants then convened in Barrancabermeja, Santander, for two days of speakers, roundtables, panels, and group discussion, with the stated purpose of “shar[ing], denounc[ing], and mak[ing] visible the effects of militarization and war on the bodies of women and on the land” (Minga/Mutirão Informativa,

2010, my translation). The conference concluded with a public march to the park in the city center, where more movement leaders spoke and the delegates participated in a public vigil.

According to the organizers, the *Encuentro* drew roughly 3,000 people.

Mujeres Contra la Guerra's open invitation to attend the summit read as follows:

The militarization of our territories in the Americas has led to the loss of the people's sovereignty, autonomy and self-determination, and has become a threat to the continent. (...) We call on women - peasant, indigenous, African, academic, working class, students, church, social, political, and women's organizations, along with all social organizations of our country, and our sisters and brothers of the world, to participate together in this grand gathering for life, autonomy, and sovereignty of our bodies and territories (Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra, 2010b).

Women's bodies in MSM's rhetoric surrounding the Encuentro were frequently mentioned, as above, as *parallel* to land, as concerns about military encroachment come hand-in-hand with concern about women's and children's health and bodily sovereignty. The conference slogan reads as follows:

MI CUERPO = MI CASA
MI CASA = MI TERRITORIO
¡NO ENTREGO LAS LLAVES!

The slogan appears next to the image of a young woman holding an oversized key, looking fiercely at the viewer as her body turns away. The image and the slogan send clear messages about national sovereignty, the results of militarization on women's and girls' bodily sovereignty, and women's agency in refusing to be encroached upon. These are strong messages; however, connecting women's bodies to land that has been invaded or encroached upon echoes what Suzanne Bergeron calls the "rape script" of globalization (2001, p. 997). Framing globalization and its attendant militarization in terms of a breach of women's sovereignty over their bodies threatens to portray it as an inevitable, uncontested process – a done deal, in which women are necessarily the intended victims, even if they succeed in fighting off their aggressors.

That is: as it is generally portrayed, land lies still. It is mute. It requires others to speak in its defense. It is possible that such an analogy risks reinforcing a logic of subordination.

On the other hand, recent decades have made it plain that land reacts to abuse. It eventually rebels, responding with droughts, floods, and in Colombia's case, mudslides. This active understanding of land may be more in keeping with that evinced by women's activism. Is it possible that the positing women's bodies as territory is a trope that is reenacted consciously? Can women use the imposed conflation of corporeality and territoriality to achieve their goals? If Colombian society is more likely to stand up for women's bodily rights when they are framed as threatened by foreign powers, then using that framing is a logical choice. Generations of feminist scholars have asked this question of other women's groups, who sneak in the back door of political power by committing revolutionary acts in a way that makes them seem acceptable and innocuous (mothers' movements are central to this body of literature – see Kaplan, 1997; Radcliffe & Westwood, 1993; Jelin, 1990; Guzmán B., 1994, *inter alia*). Other scholars have critiqued this strategy, asking whether, in the end, it serves to further entrench public conceptions of women's essentialized identities (as mothers, or nurturers, or vulnerable, or connected to land and nature), based at their root on subordination. Certainly it can be argued that WPNs' rhetoric of the body is essentialist, conveying women's roles and personages as physical, bodily, or inextricable from the processes of sexuality and biological, and social reproduction. But it is also possible that such conveyance can be undertaken with the purpose of subverting the power structures that maintain it, if women (in their actual lived identities) can impersonate "women" (in their culturally represented and traditional essentializations) for political gain. One approach to women's posing as "women" was taken by Luce Irigaray, in her explanation of a concept she calls mimesis. Irigaray explains:

There is... only one “path,” the one historically assigned to the feminine: that of mimicry. One must assume the feminine role deliberately. Which means already to convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus to begin to thwart it. Whereas a direct feminine challenge to this condition means demanding to speak as a (masculine) “subject”... to play with mimesis is... to try to recover the place of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it (1985, p. 76).

Irigaray implies that women, in enacting and performing womanhood, can subvert it; a playful reenactment of their essentialized roles can differ just enough from those roles as originally conceived that there is a space for empowerment. Alice Stone, in a rereading of Irigaray’s essentialism, argues that “essentialist preconceptions are deeply embedded in dominant symbolic structures, so much so that they can be overcome only when confronted and – paradoxically – repeated and redoubled” (2004, p. 10).

But I argue that it is not only the repeating and redoubling that gives these mimicry performances their potential strength. Their power is in the *difference* from women’s assigned corporeality. In other words, though they focus on women’s corporeality, activists are not appropriating the vision of womanhood that is the heritage of Cartesian philosophy. Unlike early American feminists, whose eschewing of corporeality arguably did more to reinforce the subordinating power of mind/body dualism than to upset it, Colombian peace activists are claiming the body as a site of agency and autonomy. Even the young woman featured in the publications advertising MSM’s Encuentro, who at first glance might appear to be repeating Bergeron’s rape script, is repeating the trope with a difference. She is not asking the viewer to protect her from foreign militarizing powers; she is holding the key to her own body (*mi casa, mi territorio*) and refusing to hand it over. The power is *with* the female body, not over it. In Colombia’s context, in which women’s access to land tenure is fraught with obstacles (see Deere & León, 2001), framing women’s bodies as their *own* territory has multiple destabilizing ramifications. Similarly (perhaps to an even greater extent), Ruta Pacífica’s recuperated body is

reclaimed not as a mute corpus, imprisoned by its attachments to bodily processes, but rather as a site of resistance, peacemaking, conflict transformation, and healing from trauma. As Alejandra Miller writes, the fact that the body has become a symbolic ground means that it is also a ground for resymbolizing reality:

El cuerpo, en tanto localización inmediata que conforma el lugar y el campo perceptivo, implica una materialidad inmersa en un proceso histórico. Así pues, si asumimos el carácter construido del cuerpo como cuerpo sexuado, nada impide pensar en la posibilidad de que esta categoría pueda cambiar a medida que las sociedades se transformen o que aspectos como la guerra refuercen significados y símbolos, pues el cuerpo es el escenario de las pulsaciones del devenir individual y colectivo. De manera que, en la expresión “nuestro cuerpo, nuestro primer territorio” se enuncia una relación cultural determinada, en la que las mujeres se remiten al cuerpo históricamente tomado, al territorio conquistado (Ruta Pacífica, n.d.).

Rita Segato (2013) has examined this phenomenon in her work on femicide in Ciudad Juárez, in which she writes that since women’s bodies have been usurped to be used as transmitters of messages of territorial domination sent by armed male elites, women are uniquely positioned to decode those messages. Women, in other words, are called on to be the cartographers of their own bodily territories. In Colombia, in the face of all the brutally sadistic ways in which armed groups have usurped and employed the female body, women peace activists’ reclaiming of it *on their own terms* represents a real threat to the foundations of masculinist, militarized conflict in the country. Elsewhere in the region, these foundations have begun to shake. In March of 2016, a Guatemalan court ruled that systematic rapes of Q’eqchi’ women during that country’s armed conflict constitute both a war crime and a crime against humanity. It is the first time in history that a domestic court has made that ruling (Avila, 2016), and may have an effect on Colombian jurisprudence in the future.

As Susan Bordo elegantly explains,

The most powerful revaluations of the female body have looked, not to nature or biology, but to the culturally inscribed and historically located body (or to historically developed *practices*) for imaginations of *alterity* rather than “the truth” about the female body. (...)

Without imaginations (or embodiments) of alterity, from what vantage point can we seek transformation of culture? And how will we construct these imaginations and embodiments, if not through alliance with that which has been silenced, repressed, or disdained (2004, p. 41)?

Even as we deny that women are inherently more embodied than men, we cannot deny that we have been *positioned* that way since Plato's time. If that is where women are located, whether by our own design or not, then it is from that location that we necessarily act. Alejandra Miller spoke to this phenomenon in 2013, when we discussed women's roles as peacemakers. I asked her if she thought women, by virtue of their reproductive capacities, are inherently more peaceful (see Cockburn 2012; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Kaplan, Alarcón, & Moallem, 1999). She responded by drawing a distinction between inherent qualities and socialized qualities:

Lo que creemos es que las mujeres somos constructoras de paz. Básicamente por el proceso de socialización que tuvimos. Un poco – que es interesante, porque tiene que ver el tema de cuidado. Cómo esa socialización, esa crianza que nos puso en ese rol de madres, y madres protectoras, y no sé qué y no sé qué, pues también nos generó, nos otorgó habilidades para otras cosas que los varones no tienen. Aún [las mujeres que no tienen hijos], porque es un tema de crianza. Es un tema de formación, que desde chiquita te pusieron a cuidar. A cuidar el hermanito, a cuidar la hermanita. Es una relación. Ahora, se tiene dos caras, obviamente. La cara de la esclavitud y la obligatoriedad, que es miércoles (*laughter*), porque “nosotras somos las que tenemos que cuidar, porque los hombres no cuidan,” también. Pero la otra cara también es cuales son las habilidades que eso nos generó para ponerse constructoras de paz de una manera mucho más fácil. (...) Yo creo que nosotras tenemos ahí unas habilidades que tenemos que saber, también explotar para este tema de la construcción de la paz.

What this embodied imaginary – this passionately sought-after alterity – means for women's peacemaking in Colombia is another question. If women's bodies are being imagined and inhabited as territories of peace and resistance, against everything that insists on using them to perpetuate war, what does that mean for a future peace? What *kind* of peace is being embodied? The nature of peace and its various definitions are the subject of the next chapter.

Peace is going to be marvelous.

– President Juan Manuel Santos, 2/3/16

Chapter 7

Otra Mirada de Paz:

Peace, Pacification, and Women's Participation

During my stay in Colombia in 2013, the country was abuzz with talk of peace. Every cab driver was quick to offer his opinion on whether President Santos was a hero, a hypocrite, or a guerrilla apologist; every activist and social movement leader I spoke with talked about the nature of organizing at the conjuncture of the Havana negotiations. Declarations of support from foreign governments came trickling in over the radio and television along with optimistic statements from the administration and music videos released by the FARC-EP. Like victimhood, the concept of peace was exchanged in Colombia like currency, passed around as if it had an agreed-upon meaning. But my conversations with women activists pointed at a more complex reality, echoed in the writings of peace studies scholars around the world: that peace as a concept is marshaled by different actors with different goals, and can point to myriad and contradictory significations.

In this chapter, I will analyze various understandings of peace as espoused by Havana negotiators, foreign investors, and women activists, and illuminate the ways in which WPNs' theory and praxis of peacemaking goes deeper than – and perhaps even counter to – hegemonic notions of peace. I begin by revisiting the timeline of peace talks and women's involvement in them as introduced in Chapter 2, and go on to address the questions that remain for the process of negotiations. I begin to unpack peace using a “feminist flashlight” (Enloe, 2007), and outline the contributions of feminism to global peace discourse. I will examine some of the dangers of peace as experienced by women's peace networks in Colombia, before examining the roles of

WPNs as “pactantes de la paz,” active agents and sculptors – not merely objects – in the crafting of a future peace. I will illuminate the kind of peace toward which they are working: a holistic, long-term, and structural transformation of Colombian society. Finally, I will examine the way activists’ notions of peace engage with the structural supports of patriarchy, militarization, and marketization that uphold the armed conflict in the country, and outline some of the potential changes to feminist activism in a post-accords scenario.

What is Peace?

Like the other “characters” on Colombia’s stage analyzed in the preceding chapters, peace is a complicated and contested concept. When President Santos assures the public that “peace is going to be marvelous,” what kind of peace is he envisioning? Is he speaking of the same peace that the FARC-EP envision when they sit down at the negotiating table? When it mobilizes around the Havana talks, is civil society striving for the same peace? When they take to the streets demanding a negotiated solution, are women activists imagining the same peace? In an entry in the American Association of Geographers’ upcoming *International Encyclopedia of Geography*, Sara Koopman asserts, “One might question if the term is useful. The danger is that if the term is left undefined it is too often assumed as a universal across time and place, and sentimentally idealized as either simply not-war, or all that is good” (Koopman, 2017). Similarly, the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies’ David Cortright calls peace a “highly emotive” term, asserting that it “is often abused as a tool of political propaganda. When peace is defined narrowly it can imply passivity and the acceptance of injustice” (Cortright, 2008, p. 6).

Peace, like violence, may be conceived of as a spectrum, not a binary. As I will explain below, various forms and constructions of peace may exist inside of war, just as in peacetime

there are many forms of violence. Peace must be understood to be not only physical (as in military treaties), but quotidian, structural, discursive, and symbolic. In what follows, I will trace several historical understandings of peace at various points on such a spectrum: negative and positive peace, liberal peace, and the less defined feminist peace.

(1) Negative and positive peace. Cortright (2008, pp. 255-257) asserts that Western understandings of peace were defined for many years by the early writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant's vision included various priorities by which nation-states should conduct themselves in pursuit of international peace: the abolition of standing armies, the avoidance of debt accumulation, and the establishment of republican constitutions, for instance. But though Kant advocated for the right of every person to migrate to another nation-state, his vision did not include a focus on social equality (ibid.).

This longstanding understanding of peace began to be referred to as a “negative peace” following the critiques of Johan Galtung (1964). Galtung argued that traditional understandings of peace were generally subordinated to the definition of war, situated within and dependent upon conceptions of violence. This limited global understanding of peace to the absence of war, and focused attention on individual acts of violence rather than the structural acts of violence that *led* to the direct, observable violence usually focused on by scholars and governing bodies. In other words, global understandings of peace and war, argued Galtung, too often focused on the symptoms of violence rather than the violence itself. This violence began with what he called “cultural violence,” an understanding which necessitates a turn toward the creation of a culture of peace (Fisas, 1998).

Once Galtung identified the concept of negative peace, it was up to peace studies scholars to expand on his notion of a “positive peace” and to envision broader, more holistic understandings of what peace meant and how it was constructed. If negative peace was the absence of direct violence, then a positive peace must include the absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1969), a concept which Galtung extrapolated from Brazilian liberation theologian Leonardo Boff’s understanding of “originating violence” (Cortright, 2008, p. 7). A positive peace, in other words, is not simply the absence of war; it is the presence of justice (see Zook, 2015). This is in contrast to the “Pax Romana” model of peace-as-pacification, generally implied by political scientists, in which harmony and prosperity are centered around a political authority and do not extend to society’s peripheries (Galtung, 1981, p. 187). More recently, David Barash and Charles Webel define a positive peace as

a social condition in which exploitation is minimized or eliminated and in which there is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying *structural violence*. It denotes the continuing presence of an equitable and just social order as well as ecological harmony (Barash & Webel, 2015, p. 7).

Importantly, a positive peace does not connote the complete absence of conflict; rather, conflict of some kind may be necessary so that individuals and groups may be “protected against the violence or extortion of aggressors, and (...) defended against exploitation and abuse by the more powerful” (Cortright, 2008, p. 7). As such, peace understood positively is not static, but involves a continuous guarding against structural violence and exploitation. As Koopman explains, this means that peace cannot be understood to be separate from war: “Peace then is not a separate endpoint to achieve in time or space. Peace also happens inside war, not only in peace zone enclaves, but in everyday peacebuilding by all sorts of actors. But whether made in the midst of armed conflict or not, peace is always precarious and must be constantly remade” (Koopman, 2017; see also Koopman, 2011 on the construction of peace inside of war).

(2) Liberal peace. Galtung's theories have been further advanced in recent years by a critical understanding of the modern-day manifestation of a Pax Romana: what scholars call a "liberal peace." This notion, critics argue, is a similarly top-down understanding of peace, and one which does not extend to societies' peripheries – but the liberal manifestation is centered around the belief advanced by Adam Smith and the 19th-century Briton Richard Cobden that trade between nation-states will prevent them from going to war against one another. This notion, which ignores the role of imperialism and the power of the arms sector (Cortright, 2008, pp. 237-240), led quite clearly to a technocratic framing of trade liberalization as peacecraft. Despite the damage often done to local and small-scale economies by this process, and the profits accumulated by elites, liberal trade was able to adorn itself with a crown made of olive branches.

Koopman (2017) refers to liberal peace as the "hegemonic understanding of peace amongst elites," and links it to the idea that peace is best ushered into societies by way of capitalist development. She asserts that this creed is belied by, among other examples, post-conflict countries, where trade liberalization has brought anything but a positive peace (see also Klein, 2007). Other scholars have furthered this idea of a liberal peace by referring to a "donor peace" (Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009, qtd. in Koopman, 2017), in which diplomats frame liberal peace as something that is funded by altruistic foreign powers. This understanding of peace is not only imperialist and often racist, but "hides an economic liberalization agenda that links peace to capitalist development" (Koopman, 2017; see also Murtagh, 2016).

The notion of a liberal peace is crucially important for understanding and framing Colombia's peace accords, and the critiques of them by women activists which I will further explore in subsequent sections. One has only to look at footage of the 2012 press conference in

Oslo announcing the commencement of talks, and the conceptions of peace advanced by the government and FARC-EP spokesmen, to note this importance. In their opening statements (Canal Capital Bogotá, 2012), Ivan Márquez' "peace" was bound up with redistribution of land and wealth, the equalization of Colombia's extreme disparities in wealth and access to territory, and the reversal of neoliberal policies that he framed as exacerbating those problems. Humberto de la Calle's "peace" was a peace of pacification – a vision of the future in which rebels are disarmed and integrated into the political system, where their policies can be defeated at the voting booth, rather than on the mountainside. It should be no surprise that the concerns of the FARC-EP were underrepresented by the government – when de la Calle did address concerns about mining and free trade, it was only to dismiss them as unrealistic, non-serious issues that were not on the table for discussion (Koranyi & Murphy, 2012). As Colombian political scientist Paula Martínez Cortés asserted, prohibiting the negotiations from addressing the country's dominant model of economic development, as the government team did, risks ignoring one of the key drivers of the armed conflict. Like Article 99 of the Victims' Law, discussed in Chapter 5, this is a contingent peace – subordinated to neoliberal constraints on real structural transformation. Martínez writes:

[E]n la Habana ya se han llegado a unos acuerdos preliminares entorno al problema agrario en el país, sin embargo, el modelo de desarrollo que impulsa el gobierno va en clara contravía con los intereses de las poblaciones agrarias (...) El mismo gobierno ha dicho que 'ni el modelo de desarrollo económico que tiene Colombia en la actualidad, ni el régimen jurídico que ampara la propiedad privada, ni el modelo de inversión extranjera vigente en el país, ni la doctrina militar, serán parte de la negociación de paz entre el gobierno y las FARC.' Pero son precisamente estas problemáticas las que han sido pospuestas históricamente y que acentúan cada vez más el conflicto socioeconómico y político en el país (Martínez C., 2013, p. 10).

What is as yet unclear is the extent to which the conception of peace evinced by the coming accords will engage with this past, or whether it will cling to the idea of a liberal peace in an attempt to paper over the role of capital accumulation and dispossession at the root of the

conflict. As Paul Van Zyl, of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, warned: "[t]he choice is not whether to face up to the past. That is inevitable; countries will face it whether the terms are good or bad. The real question is under what terms (...) they choose to address their histories" (qtd. in Kirk, 2009, pp. 44-45).⁹² In my 2013 conversation with Yolanda Becerra of the MSM, she asserted that the terms of the peace process have been guided by the logic of war. "La reconstrucción se queda en un concepto más de los que hicieron la guerra," she said. "Los recursos se van en la reconstrucción para los que hicieron la guerra. Pero no para los que hemos vivido la guerra, o nos tocó vivir la guerra, o hemos sufrido la guerra, o tenemos otra mirada de paz y otra mirada de guerra."

(3) Feminist peace. If the dominant conception of peace has advanced beyond a Kantian framework, it has not been without help. Cortright (2008, p. 255) credits socialists and feminists with the important work of deepening and interrogating what diplomats and political scientists mean and work toward when they talk of peace. Feminist thinking was key to identifying the role of gender binaries in understanding war and peace: not only have militarism and masculinity been long bound up together (see Chapter 1), but the term "peace" has been feminized, which has assisted with its being disregarded. Men in politics have cast peacemaking as passive and effeminate, diplomacy as a lack of masculine resolve (Cohn, 2013, p. 12). Andrew Carnegie is one example of a man whose political projects aimed at peacemaking, but who refused to use the term (Cortright, 2008, p. 6). But adopting a gender perspective in peace studies is crucial to an accurate understanding, as Catalina Rojas explains: "[una perspectiva de género] nos permite pensar la paz en términos de oportunidad para transformar las nociones y los comportamientos

⁹² A key manifestation of Van Zyl's statement was seen recently at the Havana talks, when the government denied that the recent wave of attacks by the bacrim had anything to do with Colombia's paramilitary history (see Alsema, 2016a).

que alimentan la inequidad y las desigualdades, que a su vez facilitan la perpetuación de la violencia, seamos actores armados o no” (Rojas, 2012, p. 459). The role of masculinity in warmaking has been fertile ground for theorization elsewhere (Enloe, 1998, 2007; Via, 2010; Hutchings, 2008; Ruddick, 1998). In what follows, I will analyze the role of femininity in understanding peace and the contributions of feminism to peace discourse. Later in this chapter, I will explore the ways in which the three networks under study craft a working definition of a feminist peace.

Feminist thinking on peace has expanded our understanding of it in important ways. Cockburn (2010) cites women’s auxiliaries of early 19th century Quaker peace movements as some of the first examples of women’s overt engagement with peace politics, at least in the Western/Northern world. By the 1980s, women’s peace activism had earned global recognition, as U.S. women marched on the Pentagon to protest the arms race and women gathered at Greenham Common to protest nuclear proliferation. After the 1990s, women’s peacework took on a new character as the nature of war shifted, and grassroots women’s peace organizations became visible all over the world, advancing a deeper understanding of peace than had been previously understood by those in power. Feminist peace discourse weaves together a critique of patriarchy, militarism, racism, classism, and economic exploitation as constitutive elements of warmaking (Cockburn, 2010), and insists that all must be addressed in the construction of peace. “Practically,” writes Carol Cohn,

feminists see war as neither beginning with the first gunfire, nor ending when the treaties are signed. Before the first gunfire is the research, development and deployment of weapons; the maintaining of standing armies; the cultural glorification of the power of the armed force; and the social construction of masculinities and femininities that supports a militarized state (2013, p. 21).

The importance of a feminist understanding of peace is made clear by returning to feminist standpoint theory. War and armed conflict, being profoundly gendered phenomena,

cannot be adequately or clearly understood without the perspective of those disempowered by the gender divide. An accurate view of peace, too, must incorporate the perspectives of women and feminists who measure its gendered contours. In order to institutionalize this understanding of peace, feminists have made clear the necessity of including women in peace negotiations and conflict resolution processes. Feminist activism was responsible for the passage of UN/S/RES 1325 in 2000, which along with the Convention of Belém do Pará and, more recently, the Obama administration's 2012 National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (Marshall, 2012), has been a key tool for women peace activists around the world. The long history of feminist intervention in peace discourse raises two important questions: Are women, as has often been claimed, essentially more peaceful than men? And are their contributions to peace discourse incorporated into the centers of power?

Women for peace: essentializing strategies. In 2000, the United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls upon the United Nations and member states, among other things, to include women in peace negotiations and to increase the participation and clout of women in peacebuilding institutions (Anderlini, 2007).⁹³ 1325 represented a victory for women activists around the world, who had been insisting for many years that women's inclusion in peace talks was essential. The effects of women's presence on the success and holistic framing of peace accords has been well documented by scholars and NGOs, especially in analyses of armed conflict of Central and West Africa (Tripp, Casimiro, Kwesiga, & Mungwa,

⁹³ S/RES/1325 "reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace- building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. [It] urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. It also calls on all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict" (www.un.org).

2009; Gbowee, 2009, *inter alia*). When women are left out of negotiations, NGOs and activists insist, the goal of the armed actors becomes not only to make peace, but to ensure a peace in which they hold power at the expense of their rivals. Sanam Naragh-Anderlini, cofounder of the International Civil Society Network and adviser to the UN, explains: “The problem (...) is that the guys with the guns, when they’re making the deals, they’re also cutting out power for themselves and (...) coming up with agreements that are not sustainable. And, from the international side, we aid and abet this because we want a quick-fix solution” (Patrick, 2011). When those on the underside of gender power are excluded, activists argue, the accords produced in the room will inevitably reinforce the pre-accords patriarchy.

But these strategies risk collapsing global understandings of “gender” with “women and women’s needs.” Every room is gendered, whether women are present or no; diplomats’ and politicians’ adherence or departure from patriarchal gender norms is a key manifestation of gender as an element of social relationships (Scott, 1986). Moreover, women’s presence alone does not guarantee an anti-patriarchal outcome. Negotiators often claim that gender concerns have been addressed because women are present at the table, disregarding or misapprehending the fact that gender issues are broader than the simple physical presence or even vocal participation of women.

When women are incorporated into peace negotiations, even when their participation is auxiliary, talks’ successes are often credited to an inherent peacefulness associated with femininity. Male negotiators see women as more cool-headed, and able to marshal a kind of maternal shaming to keep men’s alleged propensity toward conflict in check (de Alwis, Mertus, & Sajjad, 2013). Civil society actors pressing for women’s inclusion sometimes perpetuate this notion uncritically, allowing essentialist notions of women as good negotiators to propagate

themselves as a strategic way to advance their practical goals. Diplomats and IGOs dedicated to conflict resolution routinely assert that when women are included in negotiations they tend to be “about the peace processes, not about themselves,” in the words of Carla Koppel (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2016). All-male negotiations tend to stall, slow to reach agreements in which either party would have to make sacrifices. Women in Colombia have concurred; recently, women combatants in the FARC-EP quipped that the negotiations would be proceeding more quickly if more women guerrillas were on the team (Verdad Abierta, 2015).

Many global women's peace organizations rely on traditional feminine identity narrations to imply that femininity is a naturally peaceful state, or that peacefulness is inherently associated with the ability to mother (Ruddick, 1989). The conflation of peace with traditional femininity is visible in the ubiquitous narration of women in Spanish-speaking countries, particularly indigenous and popular-sector women, as “tejedoras de paz.” But such a feminization of peace simultaneously, and dangerously, “reinforces the masculinization of war” (de Alwis, Mertus, & Sajjad, 2013, p. 175); theorizing women as peaceful is “an intellectual cul-de-sac” that brings us back to women’s exclusion from peace processes by relegating ‘peaceful women,’ who know nothing of war, to the private sphere (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2016, p. 184). Judy El-Bushra (2007) argues that women do not have any more of a claim on peacefulness than men; rather, the activism of women for peace arises from our positioning in societies. Malathi de Alwis, Julie Mertus, and Tazreena Sajjad (2013) contest essentialist notions when they write: “Instrumentalist arguments, such as women should be included in peace talks because they are better at peacemaking, have been countered with several feminist arguments... women should be included in peace talks because they constitute half the population and because it is their right as political subjects” (2013, p. 178).

An example of such an instrumentalist argument can be seen in the discourse around the creation of the “gender subcommission” at the Havana talks, which both represents a victory for feminist concerns and also reifies the idea that women are the gendered, particular foil to the ungendered, universal male subject. Moreover, in their attempts to open the doors of negotiation chambers to women, activists and diplomats sometimes imply a universal womanhood, as if achieving more female representation would automatically mean all females would be represented. The question we must ask of this representation of “women” as a unified group is whether it is, in Spivak’s (1987, p. 205) words, a “strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest,” or merely an uncritical means to an end. As feminist scholars, our task must be to accompany women in the process of demanding a place at the table, and respect the strategic choices they make in their self-representation without uncritically retransmitting that representation. The dilemma is not a new one, as Joan Scott writes: “This paradox – the need to both accept and refuse ‘sexual difference’ – is a constitutive condition of feminism as a political movement” (1996, qtd. in de Alwis, Mertus, & Sajjad, 2013).

But not all women’s and feminist organizations essentialize peace. Many of the women I interviewed, for example, came to pacifism only after years of experience with non-pacifism. This is not to say those women will always define themselves as pacifist, but that in the current moment they have made that choice. The Organización Femenina Popular, by contrast, does not define itself as pacifist, though it cannot be argued that the organization is not working for peace. Clearly, moreover, women around the world, from Colombia to the United States, have engaged in warmaking and war profiteering along with men; they are part of imperial projects as often as they are victims of them. Thus can femininity be disinterred from inherent peacefulness. Rather,

women peace activists draw from their positioning as women to understand and frame what peace means for them. El-Bushra writes:

[W]omen peace activists are united by several factors, including: a capacity to build bridges across political divides on the basis of shared experience; an interest, borne of their caring and social service roles, in the restoration of security; a shared experience of oppression which encourages in them an appreciation of the value of peace; their capacity as wives and mothers to influence other family members; and the fact that in many societies women have traditionally played mediation roles in violent conflict (2007, p. 142).

Though the author fails to note that many women are neither wives nor mothers, this “shared experience of oppression” may certainly be central to the activism of many women peacemakers. Nonetheless, it is part of the trend that implies a universal female subject, and disregards the experiences of both women combatants and elite women who benefit from the continuation of wartime inequalities. Though it may be true that women peace activists are united, that may be a result of political need: since women, wholesale, are excluded from peace tables, it benefits them to advocate for the right of women, writ large, to be included. This, I contend, is a force that has led women activists to play crucial roles in advancing peace discourse around the world (see *Thirteen and Fork Films*, 2011 for an evocative investigation into women and peace processes).

Women’s contributions: in the spotlight, but on the sidelines. But feminist contributions to peace have been actively relegated to the periphery of peace discourse, even as the peace negotiations in which they are active are more successful. In general, women are called upon to intervene more often in post-conflict reconstruction than during the process of negotiation itself. Writing about women's contributions to peace in Somaliland, El-Bushra says that women were said to be “the wind behind the peace conference... in terms of mobilizing the elders, in preparing the venue, the food, and in encouraging the participants to keep going until

the final peace deal was reached” (2007, pp. 139-40) – but that when the moment came to make a final decision on the accords, women were asked to leave the room. Around the world, using S/RES/1325 as a tool of accountability, women and feminist peace activists continue to press for their contributions to peace discourse to be recognized, not tokenized – and incorporated into conflict resolution processes from the start.

Las Primeras Que Empezamos a Hablar de Paz

In Colombia, as elsewhere, the community work of poor and working-class women is key to whether peace accords will be successful: signed, in the short term, and effective in the long term. Their place in the local contexts where the day-to-day operations of conflict take place makes their participation in peace talks essential for establishing trust and legitimacy on the ground. Popular women’s organizations have been responsible for numerous local-level, “Track II” negotiations that have laid the foundations for national-level talks to take place at all (Bouvier, 2012). As women engage with peace negotiation, conflict resolution, and mediation, Bouvier stated that they “discover” themselves as mediators, realizing that the work is akin to what they have been doing for many years (United States Institute of Peace, 2016).

Nonetheless, though women activists in Colombia have been credited for playing a key role in creating the atmosphere that led to the declaration of talks, their scant representation at the table is part of a long global pattern of gendered exclusion from peace accords and reconstruction. Though women are disproportionately victimized in gendered ways during wartime, they are rarely part of the teams that lay down peace agreements. As the Brookings Institution’s Elizabeth Ferris commented in 1995, “The typical pattern (...) is for women’s particular concerns to be ignored – even when they played important roles in the struggle” (qtd.

in McKay, 1998, p. 355). The U.S. Institute of Peace asserts that the varied natures and levels of women's participation in peace processes make it difficult to count their number; in other words, women's peacework is invisibilized. Few observatories even attempt to count Afro and indigenous women involved in the process (United States Institute of Peace, 2016). In the Colombian case, like many others, the more observable numbers are those at the top: the plenipotentiary negotiators whose presence at the table is visible. The number of women included on those teams has been clear. There were none in the Pastrana-FARC dialogues from 1999-2002, none in the paramilitary negotiations in 2004, and none in talks with the ELN in 2006. Trujillo-Gómez (2013) remarks that although Pastrana did name a woman to his team at the beginning of the Caguán talks, she was removed shortly after talks began. The FARC also named a woman to their team at El Caguán, but only as a member of a thematic subcommittee. Among the thirty peace documents signed in Colombia since the 1980s, only fifteen signatories have been women, compared to two hundred eighty men (Londoño & Nieto, 2006, qtd. in Mendez, 2012).

The dearth of women's names on Colombian peace documents is unrepresentative of their work. When I interviewed Alejandra Coll of Ruta Pacífica in 2013, she spoke of the long struggle of the women's peace movement and its tireless commitment. Like other activists in Ruta Pacífica, she credited this indefatigability not only for the level of recognition the network has earned, but for the way civil society has come together under the banner of conflict transformation. Women activists, she said, have been the vanguard of that struggle. "Ya no sólo las mujeres tienen ese discurso," she said. "Las primeras que empezamos a hablar de paz aquí en Colombia fuimos las mujeres. En el '95, '94, empezaron con la comunidad de San José de Apartadó en Mutatá, empezaron a decir, 'no queremos más guerra.' Y parece que era un tema

sólo de mujeres. En el 2000, un poco más atrás, ya empezaron otras organizaciones a decir[lo].” Having established this goal, women’s SMOs led the peace movement after the breakdown of Caguán talks, and continued to advance their goals through the Constituent Assembly process and beyond (see Chapter 2).

Peace on the Horizon? 2012-2016

When representatives of the Santos Administration and the FARC-EP began meeting in Oslo and then in Havana in late 2012, they announced that negotiations would focus on six areas: agrarian reform; the political participation of demobilized FARC-EP combatants; the logistics and security guarantees of the end-of-conflict period; the illicit drug economy; reparations for victims of the conflict; and the final stage, the implementation, verification, and ratification of the eventual accords. Negotiations began in fits and starts, facing a staunch opposition campaign led by former president Uribe and struggling to establish legitimacy and public trust. Nonetheless, in May of 2013 the parties announced that they had come to an agreement on agrarian reform. That November they reached an agreement on political participation, and the public discussion in Colombia turned a more hopeful eye toward the negotiations.

When I spoke to Alejandra Miller of Ruta Pacífica about the network’s advocacy during the first year of the Havana negotiations, she spoke about women’s insistence that civil society be represented on its own terms, rather than being spoken for by the guerrillas, as the model has been in Central American conflicts of past decades.

[La mesa de negociación] tiene que ser una mesa constituida por cuatro patas. O sea, una: donde estuviera, por supuesto, la insurgencia. Otra donde estuviera el gobierno. Pero también como sociedad civil, gente como mujeres, lo que siempre pensamos es que estos no nos representan. No representan nuestros intereses. Vamos a tener una voz propia como sociedad civil, o como mujeres dentro de la sociedad civil, para negociar nuestras apuestas políticas, nuestras demandas, lo que queremos. Y no entregar nuestra agenda, digamos, ni a estos, ni a

estos. Sino entrar a una mesa. Porque hay diferencia. Y en otra pata, pues, la comunidad internacional, que también es muy importante en estos procesos como garante, acompañante.

What ended up being installed, Miller lamented, was a two-legged negotiating table occupied by the government and the insurgents, with occasional auxiliary participation from civil society. Miller's assertion that the negotiating table would be more secure with four legs (and her implication that the peace itself would be more secure, as well) echoes the claims of feminists and conflict resolution actors globally, who have for two decades now been pressing vocally for further and deeper women's involvement in peace processes.

While women and civil society activists continued to press for a greater degree of involvement in negotiations, the talks continued to advance. In May of 2014, the teams agreed to a framework to unravel the various aspects of the so-called drug war: State fumigation policies, guerrillas' involvement in the drug economy, and the needs of coca farmers. This was a victory for the administration's image, and in June, Santos won reelection by a slim margin over a vocal Uribista opponent. Santos was hailed as "the peace process president" (O'Hagan, 2014), and indeed staked his presidency on the negotiations' success. Santos implied that he would resign if the eventual accords were not ratified (Lander, 2015), and explained, "It's much easier to make war and get trophies. But this is a more fulfilling path" (Miroff, 2015).

But the next year, 2015, would see the negotiations' rockiest period. The unilateral ceasefire declared by the FARC-EP in December of 2014 fell apart by April, when there was an increase in army airstrikes of FARC targets and in FARC attacks on oil infrastructure. Peace talks in Havana broke down in May, and Colombia held its breath. The FARC-EP called a provisional, one-month unilateral ceasefire in an attempt to hold the talks together (Brodzinsky, 2015). The parties came back to the table, but June was the most violent month in the country since the advent of talks. Government lead negotiator Humberto de la Calle declared this the

nadir of the negotiations, and Santos' approval ratings fell to 28% (ibid.). Only a third of Colombians polled believed the process would reach a positive conclusion (WOLA, 2015a). Then in July, the administration announced an agreement to de-escalate the conflict while peace talks were underway; though this fell short of a coveted bilateral ceasefire, it patched up the negotiations enough to ensure that they would continue.

On September 23rd, 2015, President Santos flew to meet the teams in Havana, where they announced an agreement on transitional justice, part of the agenda point dealing with victims of conflict. The announcement was accompanied by the much-discussed handshake between President Santos and Comandante Timochenko, after which Santos commented, "He's a much nicer person than I imagined. A simple man, with good intentions" (Miroff, 2015). This was broadly interpreted as the point of no return for the peace talks, and Santos announced publically that they would be concluded six months later, on March 23rd, 2016. The next month the teams announced plans to locate and identify Colombia's disappeared, estimates of whom number between 51,000 and 113,000. In December, a final accord was reached on reparation for conflict victims.

The first months of 2016 saw several developments that made it seem increasingly that peace accords were in sight. In January the United Nations announced its intention to send an observer mission to oversee the transition to post-conflict (Lederer, 2016), and in February Santos traveled to Washington to meet with U.S. officials. In a joint press conference, President Barack Obama announced that he would ask the U.S. Congress for \$450 million in aid, shifting the focus from Plan Colombia to "Peace Colombia" (BBC News, 2016). The next month U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Havana to urge continued commitment on both sides, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs traveled to Colombia to work with the military on its plans to

monitor the power vacuum that would be left by demobilized FARC-EP fighters (Watkins, 2016). In a development that surprised few observers, the March 23 deadline to reach a final accord was missed. Both teams announced their support for extending the deadline in favor of an agreement that would not be rushed. Though observers were disappointed by the lack of a bilateral ceasefire (activists from Ruta Pacífica in Cauca publicized a campaign, *Que no se levanten de la mesa*, urging such a ceasefire), public opinion rallied after the March 30th announcement that the government would also begin peace talks with the ELN. Finally, the fifth major agreement was reached in June, culminating in a declaration of a bilateral ceasefire and public declarations that the country's long war was coming to an end. In July the courts decided that the country will vote on the accords in an October plebiscite, the outcome of which will be binding.

No matter the results of the plebiscite, women's activism can be given some credit for making it possible for the Santos administration and the FARC-EP to come to the table at all. It was ten years between the failed Caguán talks and the Havana negotiations, and the decade of women's incessant demand for a negotiated solution, combined with work they did in collaborating with and pulling together various SMO efforts, created a language and a culture to support the two parties' engagement in negotiations. Owing to social movement activism, the Havana talks have slightly advanced Colombia's dismal record of women's formal participation. As discussed in Chapter 2, María Paulina Riveros and Nigieria Rentería were added to the government's team in 2013 after a sustained effort by women activists. They were placed on the five-member team of plenipotentiaries, replacing Oscar Villegas. The FARC-EP's negotiating team increased its female representation in 2013 with the addition of Victoria Sandino Palmera as a plenipotentiary negotiator. Beyond Sandino, the team has shifted, but at times has comprised

33% women (UN Women, 2015). Though parity remains a distant goal, women have been active, visible participants in the Havana talks to a greater level than at any time in Colombian history, and at any time in much of the world. Women have succeeded in guaranteeing that the issue of sexual violence will be present in the final accords. Attention to sexual violence in post-conflict negotiations is rare (de Langis, 2011); only two percent of peace agreements globally in the last quarter-century even mention it. Sexual violence may even be considered a crime against humanity, as took place in Guatemala in 2016 (Ordoñez, 2016; see Chapter 6 for the significance of this possibility). Moreover, the establishment of the gender subcommission in September of 2014 represented a positive step, despite the reductiveness discussed above. The subcommission is charged with ensuring that a “gender perspective” and attention to women’s rights are considered in each accord (UN Women, 2015); it has held hearings attended by “gender experts” (largely women) on the conflict’s gendered effects and the needs of victims. The subcommission is not a panacea; it *reviews* each accord, which does not mean it has an active role in crafting or envisioning the agreements (one female FARC-EP combatant described it as toothless). It is a contingent body, there to advise the largely male negotiators in a technical capacity. One of the women who traveled to Havana as a gender expert told an interviewer, “I believe that this Gender Subcommittee is really achieving something; it has earned recognition and legitimacy from the negotiating table” (Marín C., 2016). Despite these obstacles – the need to prove itself to the negotiators, and its auxiliary role in the eventual accords – the gender subcommission is a rare step toward a more accurate understanding of the role of conflict and opens a space for women to be more central to the crafting of a post-conflict society.

Women’s involvement in the Havana negotiations (whatever its limits), argues American University law professor Paul Williams, is the reason the talks have advanced as far as they have

(Williams, 2016). Women's SMOs show no signs of retreating after talks conclude, either; veteran Colombian feminist Rosa Salamanca asserts that the women's movement is "banking on" the transition from the accords to the post-accords to advocate for the institution of its agenda (Salamanca, 2014, p. 27; see also Shayne, 2007 for comparative analyses of Latin American feminist movements in post-accords scenarios).

As I concluded this dissertation, two points on the agenda remained to be negotiated: the logistics of the demobilization (the poorly named "end of conflict"), and the details of the implementation (the public vote to ratify the accords). One major sticking point of the accords centered on the proposed *zonas de concentración*, or demilitarized zones where FARC-EP fighters will be located during the demobilization process. The logistics of these zones were the subject of debate. One sector with misgivings was the military, whose role would shift to *protecting* the FARC-EP in these zones, rather than attacking them. Another comprised Afro and indigenous communities, who spoke out after it was implied that the zones might be located, without permission or prior consultation, in Afro and indigenous territories (Isacson and Kinoshian, 2016).

Other developments included a FARC agreement to begin disarmament procedures 60 days after accords are signed, a joint demining venture in Meta and Antioquia, and an effort to begin locating and exhuming the disappeared (about 1,000 bodies have been exhumed so far). Jailed former FARC combatants have begun to be reincorporated into civilian life. The U.N. observer mission is in the planning stages, and the FARC-EP has raised its recruitment age to eighteen, releasing some of its estimated 2,000 soldiers who are minors (Bouvier, 2016). Despite continued and increasingly desperate ramblings from the camp of former president Uribe, many in the Colombian and global press and civil society were beginning to approach the accords with

cautious optimism that the hemisphere's longest-running civil conflict might, if not come to an end, at least reach an official peace accord that would allow Colombian society to begin the long process of healing from its wounds.

Post-Accords: Potential Spoilers

As of this writing, various questions remain for the peace negotiators in Havana, both logistical and conceptual. Many of them are closely connected to the critiques that women have been making of the Havana negotiations, and the issues which women's peace organizations insist need to be addressed. In what follows I will address the potential "spoilers" of peace, or factors that could complicate or obstruct a post-accords scenario.

Speaking to a U.S. audience in Washington DC in early 2016, President Santos said of Colombians who oppose the FARC-EP negotiations,

They are afraid. They are afraid of change; they think the peace might be bad. It's what happens to a prisoner who's in jail for forty years, and then you gonna [sic] be free. He's terrified... peace is going to be marvelous. It's much better to have peace than to have war (Santos, 2016).

Santos' claim that the opposition had simply to be convinced that everything was going to be all right was countered by the more cynical take of a social movement organizer with whom I spoke in Bucaramanga in 2013, who asked, "¿Cuánto le vale un conflicto con las FARC? Es más rentable la guerra." Both statements speak to a deep-seated resistance on the part of conflict actors, directly and indirectly involved in fighting, to give up the only way of life they've ever known – whether that life is in jungle combat or in collecting rents from a profitable war. Aside from Colombian voters, who will have the choice to accept or reject whatever accords are presented to them when talks conclude, potential spoilers to the accords come from four sides:

the FARC-EP itself; neoparamilitary groups; the closely related Uribista political camp; and the military.

Most sources estimate that there are 7,000 – 8,000 FARC combatants still mobilized in the countryside, in addition to another 10,000 *milicianos*, or civilians who assist with guerrilla operations. No matter the intentions of the FARC-EP negotiators in Havana, a successful demobilization will require extensive internal work among guerrillas, and the provision of a safe and protected path to civilian life. The armed group has been conducting workshops in jungle camps about reintegration, but challenges remain. In areas of Colombia where the FARC-EP has been the de facto State, withdrawing into a civilian political party that has to struggle for authority at the ballot box will be a difficult task. Demobilized combatants “represent an enduring threat to family and community unless psyches are healed, nonviolence (re)learned, and means of livelihood are found,” writes Cohn (2013, p. 21). Many of the FARC’s older combatants, who have seen conflict for decades, have expressed a commitment to a life in peace, but some of the younger members are less convinced. Since younger combatants form the bulk of the guerrilla forces, this obstacle is daunting; an estimate 25% of fighters are under the age of eighteen, with many more in their twenties and thirties. As a combatant named Tomás, age 37, asked poignantly, “How do we sever ourselves from the weapon we have carried for so many years” (Velasco, 2016)?

Secondly, the continued existence and remobilization of paramilitaries has been well documented, and there are an estimated 4,000 of them today – half as many as FARC-EP combatants (Isacson & Kinosian, 2016). Neoparamilitaries or bacrim have threatened, assassinated, disappeared, and tortured women activists, human rights defenders, and leaders of Afro and indigenous groups since the AUC’s purported demobilization in 2005 and 2006. But

lately it has been worse. In February and March of 2016, the weeks leading up to the March 23 deadline set by negotiators in Havana, Colombia saw a brutal upswing in neoparamilitary violence. As neoparamilitaries and the interests they protect saw the moment approaching when their grip on Colombia's symbolic and material power economy might slip, they tightened their fists. Sixteen human rights defenders were killed in February, at a rate four times that of the preceding months (Isacson and Kinosian, 2016). In the first two weeks of March alone, neoparamilitaries killed twenty-nine leftist activists (Gill, S., 2016). This is on top of 54 human rights defenders killed in 2015, one hundred and five union organizers killed, 596 injured, and 1,337 who received death threats between 2011 and 2015 (Jordan, 2016).

Violence has targeted leftist politicians, as well. Marcha Patriótica, the leftist party born of the FARC-EP's Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia and inspired by the the indigenous Minga in 2010, would likely be the political home of many demobilized FARC-EP combatants who choose to enter politics. But Marcha Patriótica has already seen more than 100 of its members assassinated since its founding (Marcha Patriótica, 2016), a fact that may deter guerrillas from laying down arms and entering the political arena.

The violence calls to mind the founding of Unión Patriótica in 1985, the political arm of the FARC under the framework of its peace negotiations with the Betancur administration. The UP had several early electoral successes, which marked them as a threat to the paramilitary establishment. Within three years of its founding the UP saw *four hundred* of its members assassinated, including two presidential candidates and four congressmen. In later years the party suffered 30 massacres, 120 forced disappearances, and hundreds of forced displacements (Memoria y Dignidad). In what may be another parallel, some Colombians recall the UP not only as a political party, but as a mask covering the fact that the FARC were still engaged in military

actions (Winifred Tate, personal communication, July 21, 2016). If the FARC-EP fear such violence in today's context, some combatants may feel similarly ambiguous about demobilization. Writing in 2003 about the UP massacres, anthropologist Michael Taussig concluded, "Any assessment of the FARC's strategy, in particular its willingness to negotiate a just peace, must take this terrible fact into account. They cannot come in from the cold. They will be killed" (2003, p. 133).

The existence of the ELN, though smaller and now also in peace talks with the Santos administration, presents an additional threat to demobilizing FARC-EP members. The ELN is less vertical in its command structure, which allows for more internal dissidence (McDermott, 2016). There are already reports (Pettersson, 2016) that factions of the ELN have recruited FARC-EP combatants reluctant to demobilize. What if the ELN were to try to fill the power vacuum left by the FARC-EP? What if its combatants, due to a failed demobilization process, joined or formed strategic alliances with neoparamilitaries (Bargent, 2015)? But the Colombians who have the most to lose from anti-FARC violence in the context of a demobilization would be civilians, among them women, due to their gendered position in conflict (Cohn, 2013). If the FARC-EP were to attempt to demobilize and faced violence like that of the UP massacres, it would in all likelihood rearm, and the brutality of the conflict could continue or even increase, as it did after the failure of the Pastrana talks. The FARC-EP is not the only party with something to lose.

Often cited as the political arm of neoparamilitary interests, Centro Democrático, the political party founded in 2013 by former president Álvaro Uribe, has been the mouthpiece of anti-negotiation voices. Many of these are women; the Centro Democrático's list of senators is 30% female, close to the percentage of women in the FARC-EP (Centro Democrático, 2016;

several citizen organizations known as “Mujeres Centro Democrático” also espouse vocal opposition to the negotiations). Much of the opposition comes from the landed elite, who stand to lose territory (often acquired illegally) under the agrarian reform portion of the Havana agreements. Uribe organized a mass mobilization against the peace talks on April 2nd (Jordan, 2016). Marches were staged in several cities, the biggest of them in Medellín and Bogotá (Agence France-Press, 2016), and Centro Democrático spoke out against what it saw as “peace with impunity” for the FARC-EP and their assertion that Santos is handing over the country to the FARC-EP and the ELN (Mejía M., 2016). Should Uribe and his allies succeed in spreading enough opposition to the peace accords, the public vote to ratify could present a major challenge.

Finally, the Santos administration has faced significant opposition from within Colombia’s Armed Forces, of which Santos, as former Defense Minister, was once the head. There are 450,000 active duty members of the military. Though while in the service they are prohibited from speaking publically against the president, the body representing retired military officers has been vocal in opposing negotiations (WOLA, 2015b). In early 2014 it was revealed that military intelligence officers had been spying on peace talks, wiretapping and monitoring politicians and journalists connected to the talks, including some of the government’s own negotiators (Agencia EFE, 2015). Many of the top brass are said to be in the Uribista camp, and to have “misgivings about transitional justice, the likelihood of a deep cut to their personnel and budgets, and uncertainty about their roles in a post-counterinsurgent Colombia” (Isacson, 2016).⁹⁴ In late 2014 Santos told the military that any officer who showed disloyalty by opposing

⁹⁴ A deeper analysis of the military’s trepidation, particularly the role of militarized masculinity as a ballast of power and respect in the country, would be a fruitful subject for further research. Cohn (2013) and others demonstrate the way diplomacy is feminized in military and political discourse, while militarization is respected as masculine. Women too espouse this rhetoric; much of the social media rhetoric of the aforementioned Mujeres Centro Democrático groups centers around questioning President Santos’ masculinity in the context of his supposed acquiescence to the FARC-EP.

the negotiations would be fired (WOLA, 2015b), a threat which reportedly drove a wedge between officers and the administration. Combined with ideological opposition in the military, stemming from the long tradition on the Right of conflating all social action with guerrilla affiliation (General Jorge Enrique Mora, who has been accused of complicity in the killing of a leftist journalist, reportedly stood up and walked out of peace negotiations when a woman representing victims of forced disappearances took the floor [Alsema, 2016b]), logistical misgivings about the military's changing role could be the harbinger of a dangerous divide between the military and the administration. In sum, many parties in Colombia still have much to gain from warmaking, and much to lose from a peace deal. As Kathryn Sikkink said in an analysis of the Colombian conflict in 2009, “[i]nternational and domestic actors must continue to identify ways to increase incentives for peace while simultaneously increasing the costs of violence” (Sikkink, 2009, p. 88).

Feminist Questions for a Post-Accords Colombia

In this section I will also address the upcoming DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) process in Colombia from a feminist perspective and outline several dynamics which feminist observers should focus on in the coming months and years. Analyzing peace accords, especially Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration processes, can reveal crucial elements of negotiating parties' understandings of and goals for post-conflict societies. An important and oft-overlooked element of DDR is the place of gender, and feminist scholars have offered myriad questions to ask of demobilizations before and as they are occurring. Though many of these are impossible to answer at the current conjuncture, they are an important

element of any analysis of peace in Colombia and should be considered for future research on the subject.

First of all, post-accords analyses need to consider the ways in which the framework of peace is gendered. How are relationships between women and men, and between femininity and masculinity, sustained or reinforced in peace agreements and the legal reforms that accompany them? What access to women have to land tenure and political participation? What needs have women, civilian and combatant, expressed for the peace process, and to what extent are those needs addressed and met? How do DDR and reconstruction serve the needs of women victims of gendered trauma and sexual torture; to what extent do they attempt to heal the social fabric torn by such events? As Susan McKay asks, “What psychological processes affect the ability of women to play full, equal, and effective roles in societal reconstruction? (For example, power arrangements, social identity processes, gender role stereotyping)” (1998, p. 352). What is the rate of violence against women in post-accords societies – does it increase or decrease (United States Institute of Peace, 2016)?

The role of masculinity is also crucially important in DDR and post-accords reconstruction, due to the preponderance of men in fighting forces and the indelible links between militarism and masculinity discussed in Chapter 1. Cynthia Enloe has pushed for increased feminist attention to DDR processes, and focused explicitly on masculinity, arguing that male fighters need to be seen not just as combatants, but as men and boys. DDR processes need to address men’s “anxieties about their reduced power in peacetime and pride in their status as gun-holding masculinized men” (Enloe, 2007, pp. 126-7), and also to where the guns go when they are removed from the battlefield – does civilian society become more heavily armed? Are the men who carry these demobilized weapons suffering from a gendered anxiety about their

roles as men in postconflict? What are the effects of these dynamics on women (Enloe, 2007, p. 127; see also Cohn, 2013 and Cockburn & Zarkov, 2002)? Is the intent of peace accords “to demasculinize or remasculinize public life” (McKay, 1998, p. 355)?

Furthermore, though lawyers, political scientists, and anthropologists have explored the roles played by women FARC combatants based largely on testimonies of individual demobilized fighters or deserters (e.g. Graham, 2008; Stanski, 2006; Tabak, 2011; see also Gjelsvik, 2010 and Mendez, 2012), much of this research is undertaken in advancement of U.S.-led antiterrorism policies, not as part of an applied feminist investigation. A counterexample is the work of Kimberly Theidon (2007, 2009), whose study of masculinities among ex-combatants in Colombia raises crucial questions about how demobilized male fighters might maintain their sense of identity as masculine subjects, and the effects of patriarchal gender expectations on demobilized women fighters. Such questions must continue to be asked if a mass demobilization takes place in coming months. As the Institute for Inclusive Security’s Jacqueline O’Neill (2015) argues, DDR programs tend to ignore the gendered needs of women combatants, in addition to the women who live in civilian communities where demobilized fighters settle. What constraints and opportunities will characterize the lives of women who demobilize? Will they have access to land and livelihoods? O’Neill points out that many DDR programs offer cash to demobilized fighters, but that it is accorded by rank, meaning that women (who occupy the lower ranks of fighting forces) receive less. Moreover, the benefits are given to couples, not to individuals; these familistic policies risk disempowering women and making them dependent on men. In other DDR programs, benefits are only given in exchange for combatants’ guns, but many of the girls and women who participate in guerrilla forces do so in non-combat roles, and thus have no gun to exchange for benefits (Enloe, 2007, p. 128). If women are left out of reintegration

programs, will they be more likely to be recruited by the still-active ELN, or by traffickers or neoparamilitaries? Where will they find sustainable livelihoods?

Finally, the FARC-EP has elevated its critique of patriarchal society far above that of generalized political discourse in Colombia; whatever the armed group's failings, its thousands of women combatants have lived for years or decades occupying gender roles that, if not wholly free of traditional constraints, engage at the very least in what Shayne (2004) calls "revolutionary gender-bending." How will women combatants' roles change in DDR – will they receive the message that as Colombian society "returns to normal," they should "return" home and occupy roles they may never have known, as has happened to former combatants in Central American revolutions? How will women respond to such constraints? Will the challenges to their established autonomy motivate them to engage in radical feminist politics? And if demobilized fighters do join or start civilian women's organizations, what tensions will arise when they collaborate with existing women's organizations, some of whom define themselves as pacifist (Sánchez B., 2013)?

No matter the gendered understandings of peace ensconced in Colombia's hoped-for peace accords, no DDR process is ever total; both female and male ex-combatants face a hard road in acclimating to (and undoubtedly transforming) civilian life. As María Emma Wills pointed out in 2013, "You keep on being that social being that was produced by the armed organization. It's not a matter of sign here and you will be a better, more democratic person" (qtd. in Moloney, 2013, p. 3). What is happening in Havana is a partial negotiation between two actors in a broader conflict, not a guarantee of peace. "Es que el conflicto armado puede haber cesado," the MSM's Yolanda Becerra told me in 2013, "pero las violencias están en su máxima expresión." In the words of a campesina from the Magdalena Medio, speaking about the

demobilization of the AUC in 2005, “¿Proceso de negociación? No coma cuento de eso, niña. Eso solo pasa por televisión y mientras tanto aquí los vemos todos los días en vivo y en directo” (qtd. in Mesa de Trabajo *Mujer y Conflicto Armado*, 2005a, p. 5).

The Paz de Silencios

In a 2006 article, David Harvey interrogates the concept of “freedom” in the context of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration’s ubiquitous use of the word belied its complex meaning, Harvey writes, and he quotes Matthew Arnold: “Freedom is a very good horse to ride, but to ride somewhere” (2006, p. 7). In Iraq, the horsemen rode freedom straight to the privatization of all state enterprises and the elimination of trade barriers, creating a paradise for investors (see Klein, 2007).

Peace can also be described as a good horse to ride. But its destination is equally unfixed. What are the goals of the Santos administration and international allies for an eventual peace? For what is peace a vehicle, and for whom? Two dangers arise here, which I will analyze below: (1) the narrative of the “Colombian miracle” and its appeal to investors and tourists, who stand to benefit from peace accords at the expense of the poor and displaced; and (2) the withdrawal of international support and monitoring in a post-accords scenario, which can have grave effects on the operation of women’s peace networks.

(1) Benefits for investors and tourists. Even before peace talks began in 2012, the outlook of the international press, especially the business community, on Colombia was becoming rosier. As Chavismo in neighboring Venezuela entered its twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth year, U.S. political interests centered on Colombia as a crucial ally, “the Israel of

Latin America” – an oasis in a desert of pink. The militarism funded by Plan Colombia was lauded for achieving its desired results of killing guerrillas, and the economy was on the rise. Colombia was “emerging from half a century of crippling guerrilla, drug and political violence and (...) making a serious bid to be Latin America’s new economic and diplomatic player,” said *Time Magazine* (Padgett, 2012). The country was referred to as “Latin America’s latest miracle” (Bourdillon, 2011), having transformed itself “to promised land from wasteland” (Forero, 2012b). The link between pacification of the guerrilla and the sale of the resources they once made inaccessible is clear in the press. “Colombia, once considered a failing state,” wrote Reuters excitedly in 2010, “has drastically improved its security with a U.S.-backed offensive against armed groups that opened up parts of the country once under rebel control and spurred an influx in foreign investment” (Reuters, 2010). Another headline panted to investors, “Colombia bolts from no-go to go-go” (Ham, 2012). The hero in these fairy tales is the free market, with its allegedly attendant good-governance models. The *New York Times* writes that Colombia

...has gone from a near-failed state, with a barracks-bound military unable to control a large, geographically segmented nation swarming with guerrillas, paramilitary groups and predatory criminal organizations, to a vibrant institutional democracy with a strong, free-market economy and powerful, capable security forces fully respectful of their civilian masters (Londoño, 2015).

This shift in public opinion is the result of a concerted effort on the part of the Uribe and Santos administrations, with a two-pronged public relations strategy aimed at potential tourists and foreign investors. “We are a country where people are again becoming happy,” Santos explained proudly to *Time* in 2012. “I try to do this every day: feed the optimism” (Padgett, 2012).

The story of the Colombian miracle is accompanied by the promise of profits. According to the Global Peace Index, a project that measures peace and violence across time and space,

Colombia's armed conflict has cost the country an estimated \$113.7 billion (Vision of Humanity, 2016). The potential for recuperating those costs is attractive. "Profit may bloom from the peace," reads a headline; the accords "may open up even more of the country's rich farmland" (CNN Money, 2015; see also Hockman, 2014). Another investment advisor cautions that in order to assure these profits for investors (for whom "Colombia's straitened circumstances may be a boon"), the government will have to lower its infrastructure spending and implement austerity measures (Stratfor, 2016). In addition to the oil and agriculture sectors, the tourism industry expects a bump. Minister of Tourism Ricardo Cifuentes promises an additional 5.2 million tourists (Tourism Review, 2015). This increase follows on the heels of an increase in domestic tourism, largely consisting of wealthy Colombians traveling to their vacation homes as a result of Uribe's Democratic Security policy (Ojeda, 2013). The catchy slogan of the Ministry of Tourism – "the only risk is wanting to stay" – has already convinced skittish foreign travelers to begin frequenting parts of the country formerly off-limits because of the presence of guerrillas.

While investors line their pockets and tourists line up at the airport, Colombians in the popular sector stand to lose. The increased availability of "the country's rich farmland," even in the last few years, has led to (and been made possible by) the displacement and securitization of campesino communities. As neoparamilitaries partner with palm oil and mining conglomerates, small farmers and miners are threatened, displaced, and assassinated. As the government pursues the construction of megaprojects like dams and ports, local populations are dispossessed and pushed from their land (Isacson & Kinosian, 2016). As long as peace is predicated on a neoliberal model of rentier capitalism, the benefits will be shared chiefly at the top. Indeed, peace accords elsewhere in the world have been used as an opportunity to cement the neoliberal model, reinforcing its hegemony on the grounds of a liberal peace. In Nicaragua,

for instance, the disarmament of the Contras under Violeta Chamorro linked peace with profit in a way that further dispossessed an already decimated poor population (Luciak, 2000). Klein (2007) offers a chilling global perspective of the dangers of peace for the poor – and risks are particularly high for women. Deere and León, for example, write that the land redistribution that was part of Central American peace accords favored former combatants at the expense of rural women (Deere & León, 2001, p. 160). This is on top of the already-disproportionate effects of structural adjustment on women, who bear the brunt of the shifting boundaries of what is commoditized (see Colón & Poggio, 2010; Fernández P., 1996, *inter alia*). In terms of tourism, Ojeda (2013) writes that the Uribe administration’s project of securitization for tourism – what she calls “the conjuring of a pacified country” (2013, p. 1) – benefitted the rich at the poor’s expense. She writes:

[T]he securitisation of tourist routes and destinations has not usually translated into more safety for local communities as evidenced by the growing numbers of forced displacement and selective assassinations (...) those places that tourists can finally visit again are those to which millions of displaced people cannot return” (2013, p. 8).

The danger of peace, in other words, is that the conflict’s model of accumulation-by-dispossession will be legitimated, not transformed. As Gloria Cuartas, former mayor of the peace community San José de Apartadó, asked in 2012: “¿Qué es la paz? Porque seguramente el gobierno colombiano tiene una esperanza de que haya una paz de silencios, donde multinacionales pueden garantizar la exploración y explotación de recursos naturales (...) sin obstáculos.” Cuartas’ incisive comment was echoed at the 2015 conference of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLASCO) in Medellín, in which sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos also spoke of peace as neoliberal pacification. “Un territorio libre de conflicto es libre para la gran explotación industrial de los recursos,” he affirmed. As such, campesinos and the indigenous, de Sousa said, are within their rights when they refuse or are reluctant to take

part in peace movements, knowing that pacification is likely to result in land grabs and displacement. To build solidarity, peace movements must define their terms, theorizing a solid concept of peace as “anticapitalista, anticolonial y anti-patriarcal” (Morsolin, 2015).

(2) The withdrawal of international support for SMOs. Investors and tourists are not the only sector whose belief that Colombia is at peace has negative effects on the lives of the poor. Donor countries, NGOs, international foundations, and the United Nations also change their behavior in response to the peace narrative. When peace talks began, the mission of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights withdrew from Bogotá (Isacson & Kinosian, 2016). Alejandra Coll of Ruta Pacífica decried this development in our 2013 interview, explaining that President Santos’ message to the U.N. was that “ya no les necesitan, porque estamos en el pos-conflicto – cuando a fácilmente media hora de aquí, en este departamento, puede ver combate.” Coll continued that the remaining international aid is now being funneled through the government, rather than going directly to SMOs, because Santos’ message is “mire, ya las organizaciones no necesitan dinero. Lo necesito yo para manejar el pos-conflicto.” International foundations reduce and refocus their funding to the detriment of grassroots organizing. “En esa manera ha cambiado la realidad colombiana,” Coll concluded. “Y es que avanzan la negación del conflicto, y las organizaciones sociales van replegándose. Se hacen más pequeñas cada vez.”

This folding-up of social movement organizing was nowhere as clear as in the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra, which essentially shuttered its operations in 2013 due to a withdrawal of funding. Yolanda Becerra attributed this withdrawal precisely to the government’s project of narrating Colombia as a country in post-conflict. “La cooperación, la dinámica ha cambiado,” she commented in 2013. “Y los objetivos, digamos, las apuestas han

cambiado para la misma cooperación.” She attributed this change not only to foundations no longer seeing Colombia as a country in crisis, but to an objective, from the start, of pacifying the countryside so that profits could be gained by exploiting natural resources. SMOs were seen as a viable partner in this pacification, and so they were supported while they were needed. Becerra continued:

Yo creo que los intereses han cambiado. Y han logrado, también, los intereses. Entonces, ejemplo: el Magdalena Medio era una zona donde el conflicto estaba muy, muy crudo, y invirtieron mucho en la pacificación. El momento de que pacifica, de una manera ya están – se puede invertir. Se puede extraer los recursos naturales. Y eso es perverso, de toda manera. Hoy en día entiendo. Hace mucho tiempo no entendía. Creía que era más inocente la cosa. Pero [es] muy perversa la cooperación. De pronto no todas las expresiones de cooperación, pero muchas cooperaciones son perversas. Entonces, ya lograron sus objetivos.

Against such a backdrop – of a peace already in motion, used as an excuse to further the neoliberal model and turn away from former social movement allies – women’s peace networks continue to insist on an alternative imaginary and use the global conversation about peace in Colombia as a vehicle to ensure that their needs are not subordinated and their agenda for a holistic peace is advanced.

Hace mucho rato estamos haciendo la paz.

– Yolanda Becerra, 10/8/13

Las Pactantes de la Paz:

Colombian Women’s Imaginaries of Peace

If the peace envisioned by the State, the international community, and foreign investors is a liberal peace, a negative peace, or a “paz de silencios,” the vision of peace advanced by the three networks under study is holistic, transformative, and women-centered. In Chapters 2 and 4, I explored the specific actions of WPN in the context of the peace talks in Havana – roundtables, women’s courts, and the Truth and Memory Commission, among others. In this section, I will illuminate the nature of peace as envisioned by women in the three networks. It is a peace imagined from the center of entrenched violence, only a portion of which is the result of the armed conflict; as such, it a peace aimed at radical structural change, not only the demobilization of 17,000 guerrillas. Every activist I spoke with in 2013 discussed her understanding of peace, and the collection of these interviews reveals an alternative imaginary that engages with three foundational supports of the armed conflict: patriarchy, militarism, and marketization.

A feminist peace

Several members of Ruta Pacífica in Cauca spoke about the difference between being “pactadas” by a peace accord, constrained as administrable State subjects with no voice in the process, and “pactantes,” active drivers and signatories of conflict transformation. “Si las mujeres no fueron invitadas a ser participants de la guerra,” quipped Alejandra Miller, “pues, si nos tienen que invitar a pactar la paz. Las mujeres no tienen porque estar en la retroguardia del proceso de paz.” WPN in Colombia, whether or not they adopt the feminist mantle, consistently critique the armed conflict as a tool of masculinist power and place women at the center of their

peace agendas. Ruta Pacífica's work, for instance, places conflict transformation side-by-side with the transformation of women's subordinate roles (Willis G., 2009). The OFP's decades of community work to alleviate war's effects are addressed squarely at expanding the possibilities for women to live secure and autonomous lives. The RMCC, whose demands incorporate regional autonomy alongside women's emancipation and a negotiated solution to the armed conflict, further expands our understanding of what needs to change in Colombia to allow for and cultivate a real and lasting peace. Women's agenda for peace is broader than that of either party at the negotiating table in Havana; in addition to calling for structural economic changes like agrarian reform, women also demand a focus on gender violence (Salamanca, 2014, p. 27). A feminist peace contrasts with a top-down liberal peace in that it "makes peace visible in the everyday and built from below" (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2016, p. 182). Women's broad repertoire of action in peacebuilding, directed at all levels of society, writes Judy el-Bushra, "suggests the need to adopt a definition of 'peace' which encompasses the totality of women's needs and interests and which puts the accent on structural change towards justice and towards representativity in political decision making" (2007, p. 144). This was reflected in my conversations with Ruta Pacífica's María Andrea Campo, who asserted that peace must not only be holistic, bottom-up, and visible from within Colombia (not just declared from outside of it), but that peace must also be women-centered:

Colombia no sólo atraviesa por un conflicto armado, [pero] un conflicto político, social, histórico. Económico. Y más. Entonces, la paz no solamente pasa porque un periódico mañana diga que se acabó el conflicto en Colombia. *The New York Times* o *El Espectador*. *El País*. O el que sea. '¡Se acabó el conflicto armado en Colombia!' Esto es un solo proceso. La paz empieza por la casa de las mujeres, por el empleo de las mujeres, por la economía de las mujeres, por la familia de mujeres, por la garantía de la salud de las mujeres.

For women peace activists, the end of combat, unless it is accompanied by structural changes, is not the transformative future they are striving for. As one of the slogans often used at

Ruta Pacífica's events tells it, "no queremos una guerra que nos mate, ni una paz que nos someta."

A fully demilitarized peace

Secondly, the three networks under study place varying degrees of emphasis on militarism and militarization as key obstacles to peace. This focus is most explicit in the work of Ruta Pacífica and the MSM, but it is also present in the discourse of the RMC. An example was a conference held by a collaboration called Mujeres por la Paz, which took place alongside the Havana negotiations in 2012. Signatories of the conference statement called for a demilitarization of society, including the end of obligatory military service. They asserted that the government's idea of supporting rural Colombians, being debated at the negotiations, was to militarize the countryside. This makes matters worse, the women insisted, stating instead that "la paz no es el silenciamiento de los fusiles en lo público y en lo privado. La paz significa desmilitarizar los territorios, las mentes y la palabra." The statement was signed by both Ruta Pacífica and the RMCC (Mujeres por la Paz, 2012). The MSM, for its part, has also been at the forefront of this call. It organized and hosted the 2010 "Encuentro Internacional de Mujeres y Pueblos Contra la Militarización," spurred by the 2009 agreement between the U.S. and Colombian militaries to fortify several Colombian army bases. It was at this Encuentro, attended by 3,000 people from 18 countries, that the cortes de mujeres began, holding both the Colombian and U.S. governments, in addition to multinationals, accountable for the effects of their militarization on the lives of women and girls. It was one of several events in recent years in which WPN's activities have drawn the participation and cosponsorship of other SMOs, including labor unions and indigenous councils (Colectivo de Abogados, 2010). María Andrea

Campo asserted in one of our 2013 conversations that women's peace organizations played key role in connecting disparate movements dedicated toward peace; Colombia had a pantheon of differently-articulated peace organizations with varying interests, she said, and they were not working together. It took women's activism to form ties between those SMOs.

The three networks under study are at the vanguard of a collective demand by Colombian SMOs that the negotiations in Havana address not only the demobilization of a single armed group, but the broad demilitarization of Colombian society writ large. The women I interviewed insisted that the armed groups are only part of the problem: as Yolanda Becerra commented, "este país – todo el país no es FARC," despite the efforts of various administrations to treat it that way. The OFP in particular has led the charge through their decades of work in Barrancabermeja neighborhoods. When I asked Yolanda Becerra what she considered the OFP's best moments, she thought for a moment and responded,

Nosotras hicimos un trabajo con los jóvenes. Hicimos un trabajo del movimiento juvenil, que tengamos una escuela de arte, en donde logramos salvar tantos jóvenes de la guerra, que no los reclutaron o no tomaran la opción de irse, ni para la guerrilla ni para los paramilitares, ni para el ejército ni para la policía. Entonces, creíamos que era un buen trabajo; era salvar el presente y el futuro de este país.

The negotiations in Havana are not addressing the militarization of society among the youth, and certainly not as pertains to military and police recruitment. WPN, particularly Ruta Pacífica and MSM, have made militarism and militarization a key focus of their contention. In one of our 2013 conversations, Alejandra Miller explained that the network's view of demilitarization goes beyond the demobilization of the FARC-EP and extends to the demilitarization of civilian life as well. "Es que la guerra, y tantos años de guerra," she explained, "generó para el país una militarización del territorio, ¿cierto? Que saben que el ejército, pues, es lo más potente de América Latina, y es uno de los más fuertes, en términos

proporcionales, del mundo.” María Andrea Campo was also in the room, and interjected: “efectivamente las prácticas que militarizan no solamente son ejercidas por actores armados. También las ejerce la ciudadanía. No se requiere ser actores armados para tener prácticas militarizadas.” Miller nodded and concluded that what is needed is “una desmilitarización de la vida civil, de los territorios de las conciencias. Es cómo nos sacamos esto de que aquí, los conflictos se resuelven con las vías armadas.”

This rhetoric of the demilitarization of civilian life was common among my interviews with representatives of all three networks, including women from the networks’ member organizations. Yusmidia Solano of the RMCC also talked about the need to look beyond disarmament and advance broader a peace agenda. The RMCC’s conception of a positive peace, as Solano explains, has much to do with regional justice and redistribution of access to resources:

Yo creo que se está buscando es una paz negativa en el sentido de que sólo es callar las armas. Y sólo se acabe, digamos, el enfrentamiento entre los grupos armados. [Tenemos que] buscar una paz positiva que no solamente sea el silenciamiento de las armas, sino garantizar condiciones para que la guerra no se reinicie en cualquier momento. Y eso pasa por reformas importantes del Estado que garantice condiciones de salud, educación, y vivienda a la gente. También descentralización del país, por supuesto; autonomía, y garantía de recursos, redistribución del presupuesto nacional más equitativamente, todo ese tipo de asuntos. Tiene que ser para una paz duradera.

When I spoke with Yolanda Becerra, she was emphatic that the Havana negotiations should not be referred to as a peace process: though demobilization is an important step, but “si estuvieran hablando de la paz de este país, tendría que estar la sociedad civil, las expresiones sociales, las mujeres, los jóvenes, todos los sectores, digamos, tendríamos que estar en mesas, tendríamos que estar en nuestros escritorios, en nuestras agendas tendría que estar el tema y no lo está.” The rest of the country, she asserted, is carrying on in its struggle for survival; regional politicians were ignoring the Havana talks, and even many social movements were not

committed to a holistic peace. “Todo el mundo sigue la vida,” she exclaimed. “No ha alterado la vida para nada. No ha pasado nada.”

When I responded by asking what she thought a true peace process would look like, Becerra thought for a moment; her response is worth quoting at length.

Hace mucho rato estamos haciendo la paz. ¿Cierto? Y el proceso de *esta* paz no se logró consumir, en medio de todo que hemos vivido. Porque remendamos la guerra todos los días, remendando la paz todos los días. Hacíamos posible la vida y seguimos haciendo posible la vida. Y creo que lo solo que ha hecho posible es que esa sociedad no se derrumbara completamente. Que en medio de la muerte hubieron grietas de vida, grietas de paz. Que en medio de las propuestas de muerte, se lograba construir y extender derechos humanos, derecho a la vida, derecho de la región, derecho a una cultura. Para lograr la paz *tendría* que hacer esto. Tendría que hacer un escenario que lograra abrirse, digamos, a la diversidad del concepto, de la construcción, de la visión, del sueño, y de las realidades de este país – para que el futuro sea distinto.

As a vision that incorporates structural change to what women consider the drivers and foundations of conflict, including patriarchy and the global militarizing project, women’s peacebuilding in Colombia stands in contrast to the limited, partial vision of peace-as-accords advanced by the Santos administration, donor countries, and international supporters. Women’s peacebuilding in Colombia is a long-term project of permanent investment; a bottom-up, community-led process of constructing peace piece by piece. The women with whom I spoke had no illusions about the challenge. While we were discussing the possibility of an accord, María Andrea Campo remarked soberly, “Sé que no voy a conocer la paz en este país. Soy optimista de que se acabe el conflicto, y creo que se va a acabar. Pero Colombia – hay muchas cosas dolorosas en este país. Hay una conciencia narcoparamilitar, incluso en los niños y las niñas. Hay una lógica guerrerista, militarista.” Alejandra Miller echoed this sobriety when she asserted that when the peace accords come, if they come, women activists’ role will be to find places where they can build what they see as a true peace – including equity for women, equal access to resources, and freedom from violence. “Creo que esa es la visión feminista de la paz,”

she said. “Es como logramos, realmente, que las mujeres [sean reconocidas] cómo sujetos de derechos plenos, en este país y en el mundo. Pero esa es una cosa, pues, que no va a tocar a nosotras verla, ni a nuestras hijas, y bueno, quién sabe.”

A peace that challenges market hegemony

Finally, the conception of peace advanced by WPN in Colombia begins to challenge the model of neoliberal capital accumulation powered by resource extraction and elite benefits that forms the thrust both of the Santos’ administration’s vision of a post-accords Colombia and of the Obama administration’s declarations of support for the process. As Virginia Vargas writes, feminism is a key tool in the deconstruction of fundamentalisms, from the religious to the free-market, due to the way the effects of these dynamics on women call them to confront hegemonic models (2009, pp. 51-2). All three networks have participated in national-level supra-networks that frame their activism in terms of resistance to the reigning model of capital accumulation. Until the current moment, however, WPN’s engagement with the neoliberal model has taken place largely at the local level, where activists contest the effects of things like megaprojects and large-scale resource extraction. Two conclusions are evident: one, that the three networks’ leaders, on some level, are engaged in explicit critiques of the neoliberal model of marketization in Colombia and its effects on women and the poor. This is in line with the rest of the feminist movement in Latin America, which “había venido haciendo importantes contribuciones a la crítica de este modelo[,] especialmente explicando las consecuencias de la elevada concentración e inequidad presente en éste” (Carosio, 2012, p. 11). Two, in their organizing work, the networks tend to focus not on the model itself, but on the actors *involved* in the model and the impunity

they enjoy, in addition to the misallocation of resources and the economic exclusion, for example, of the resource-rich Caribbean.

In what follows I will analyze each of the three networks' actions and rhetoric regarding the hegemony of free markets, and then offer predictions about where that rhetoric might take them in a post-accords scenario. I argue that the local-level contestation of the marketizing project they have demonstrated in recent years might be broadened and deepened after peace accords are signed, but that this rhetoric might also be tamed by NGO funding from donor countries with extractivist goals. I will outline the features of possible moves toward reformism or radicalism with respect to WPNs' engagement with the neoliberal project advanced by the Colombian State.

(1) Ruta Pacífica. Ruta Pacífica showed an early willingness to implicate multinational investors as a manifestation of the power structure they were aiming to dismantle. One year after the network's formation it released a statement on its policy of active neutrality, calling on foreign investors to assume more responsibility for the violent effects of their actions:

Las mujeres hemos expresado nuestra preocupación por el modelo de desarrollo imperante, ligado a los intereses transnacionales de los grandes monopolios económicos, y la tendencia a la globalización. [Apostamos a un mundo] en el cual las mujeres y los hombres compartamos equitativamente las responsabilidades y beneficios del desarrollo. (...) Que... [los empresarios y las multinacionales] asuman la responsabilidad que les compete en las causas que originaron esta violencia y se dispongan a la redistribución de las riquezas que producimos quienes trabajamos en este país. También convocamos... a no exacerbar más el conflicto armado aliándose con los diversos actores armados y para que sus inversiones tengan en cuenta la situación social y política de cada zona..." (Ruíz, 2003, pp. 96-98).

The network clearly identifies the current model of multinational investment as part of the problem, given its ties to paramilitarism and its siphoning of resources away from those who produce them, particularly women. The presence of these political-economic issues in Ruta Pacífica's activist scope was due in part to the context of its founding: the consolidation of the

network in the mid-90s happened in the midst of a lowering of tariffs and a rise in foreign investment,⁹⁵ making the effects of the neoliberal model a salient aspect of any political critique.

Whether these critiques are advanced at all levels of the network, or concentrated among the top-level organizers, remains unclear. In the weekend *espiral* I attended with members of Ruta Pacífica in 2013, the workshop leaders' conversations with members concentrated on the realm of the family and community life. The conversations certainly referenced what might be called political-economic issues, but not in an explicit way; rather, the focus was on existing laws and programs that might protect community life from the incursions of multinational investment. But among themselves, the workshop leaders (e.g. on the bus to and from the retreat, or in the Popayán office) were more explicit about their critiques.

(2) Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra. The MSM has a long history of explicit critique of foreign mining operations and the Colombian government's courtship of them at the expense of its own citizens. The network's membership represents a broad swathe of Colombian SMOs, from labor unions to indigenous councils and church groups; some of these are very vocal about the neoliberal model, and many of their critiques are incorporated into the network's message. But the network's contribution to antineoliberal discourse is a gender-framed one, in which the critiques made by some of its male-led member organizations are understood by way of a feminist lens. In the previous chapter, Yolanda Becerra spoke about the way Colombia's model of development, centered around megaprojects, encloses the lives and bodies of women and reverts to a male-dependent state. Later in our conversation, I asked her whether

⁹⁵ As discussed in Chapter 1, Colombia neoliberalized more gradually than its neighbors, in part because of the crudescence of violence that took place in the 1980s and early 1990s. While other Latin American markets were seeing a rush of foreign investment due to Structural Adjustment Programs, investors were much more cautious about the risks of doing business in Colombia, but neoliberal reforms increased in intensity in the late 1990s and under Uribe. All of these events formed the economic context for Ruta Pacífica's founding.

she felt that the MSM was engaging this economic model in its activism. Her response was one of a realist:

Yo no sé si logramos cambiar, o afectar... es que los megaproyectos y el tema de un concepto de ese modelo de desarrollo como el que se está imponiendo, eso no tiene – es una cosa de un gran poder. Y es una cosa que ya está hecha. Y es una cosa que beneficia unos cuantos... Los megaproyectos van, con o sin [nosotras]. Yo creo que nosotras tratamos de hacer conciencia, de socializar, de sensibilizar, por lo menos nosotras, saber porqué lo que estamos viviendo, qué es lo que está pasando. Es como racionalizarlo de como nosotras lograr a ser concientes de eso, y lograr hacer una denuncia de la situación, [pero] que uno no está donde eso pueda cambiar caminos. *[Interviewer: pero están haciendo lo que –]* Lo que nos toca.

Both ways in which “lo que nos toca” can be interpreted – either “we address what affects us” or “we address what it’s our duty to address” – reveal the model of economic intervention in which WPN have engaged in recent years. This attention to what might be called the “downstream” effects of the neoliberal extractivist model – rather than a critique of the “upstream” forces that are necessitating women’s intervention in the first place – will be discussed below.

(3) Red de Mujeres del Caribe. The RMCC has also called for more equitable economic policy, particularly where it concerns the Caribbean region and the use of its resources. When I spoke to Silvia Torres of the Corporación Miss Nancy Land, a member organization of the network, she discussed the outflow of royalties from mining ventures in the region and the way foreign and multinational mining companies were siphoning out the Caribbean’s wealth. Similarly, the network has demanded a tax policy oriented toward income redistribution, aimed at fomenting gender equity and uplift for dispossessed regions of the country (Jiménez G., 2013, p. 51). But, like the conversations taking place in the other two networks under study, the RMCC’s focus tends to be on the effects of the neoliberal model, rather than on the features of the model itself. When I spoke to Norma Carmona, the network’s representative in Bogotá, she said that the power of multinational corporations in Colombia is not a primary focus of the

network. “Digamos que no es un [tema] fuerte de la Red,” she said, “pero es un tema que si afecta un territorio donde la Red tiene presencia, se toca entonces. Cuando la presencia [de las multinacionales] en los territorios – ¿verdad? pero no es un tema fuerte de la Red, no es un prioridad, el modelo económico, de la Red.” The issue they do focus on, she continued, is the way territorial economies are managed. We spoke about artisanal mining communities in southern Bolívar, which I visited in 2010, where multinational and foreign mining concerns are displacing small-scale gold miners. Carmona stated that the RMCC has advocated for miners, who are being targeted by the State for “illegal” or irregular mining in an effort to give space to large-scale, foreign-owned ventures.

Nonetheless, though the members of the network may not feel that their focus on the dominant economic model is explicit or central, our conversations did reveal a trenchant critique of that model from their position as Caribbean women working for regional autonomy. Yusmidia Solano, who began her activism in the Trotskyite left, commented that the government’s model of development

...ha impuesto a Colombia como país dependiente en el modelo extractivista en el cual, a sacar minerales, violando todas las reglas ambientales, además; cambiándole la función a los territorios de comunidades indígenas y Afros, de campesinos, de gente – entonces, yo creo que grave es el efecto que tiene en la vida de las mujeres. Porque las mujeres pierden su territorio, y con la pérdida del territorio viene la pérdida de la identidad, y viene la pérdida de las relaciones familiares, y todo. Y además, yo creo que ese modelo extractivista está siendo retomado por el paramilitarismo y de alguna manera, entonces, conlleva un grado alto de violencia. Y creo que en general, el modelo neoliberal que se ha impuesto en Colombia [se hace] un aliado principal de los Estados Unidos en el continente, entonces digamos así, como el Israel del América del Sur.

Further, as part of the Women’s Emancipatory Constituent process in 2002, the network signed onto a statement of goals to confront economic exclusion, including the need to “establecer alianzas estratégicas entre diversos actores sociales para la defensa de la soberanía económica y política de Colombia, proceso que debe ir acompañado de acciones concertadas de movilización

y construcción de alternativas que vigilen y rechacen el impacto del neoliberalismo en Colombia” (Jiménez G., 2013, p. 61). The document suggests alliances with the anti-globalization movement, the World Social Forum, the anti-FTAA movement, and others.

Evidently, WPNs’ critiques of the economic model tend to center around its effects as it is carried out in the territories where activists live. A focus on the effects of the development model *as it is in place*, rather than as the way it was conceived, may lend itself in the long run to an effort to humanize the economic model rather than dismantle it. In other words, a focus on the effects of neoliberalism might enable multinationals to engage in more consultation with local residents, or more social investment in the territories they mine, rather than resisting their presence in the region in the first place. The features of this kind of development model – whether it is referred to as neoliberalism with a human face (Green, 2003, p. 211), new developmentalism (S. Rojas, 2013), *nuevo cepalismo*, or Latin American neostructuralism (Leiva, 2008) – have been well documented and thoroughly critiqued. In Polanyian terms, this model might be called “protected marketization” – a taming of the savagery of capital characteristic of the 1980s and early ‘90s model in Latin America. Such a model is likely to be on the table after a positive transition – from dictatorship to democracy, or at the end of an economic crisis or an armed conflict. But this “new,” “participatory” model of capital accumulation does not depart from the export orientation characteristic of its predecessor, and ignores the power dynamics of gender, race, and class that sculpt its effects on the lives of Latin American citizens (Leiva, 2008). As such, it is less a critical response to neoliberal policies than an attempt to legitimate it in the face of criticism (Murray & Overton, 2011).

The sources of WPNs' funding will likely shift (if not withdraw completely) in a post-accords scenario, but the role of that funding will be key to understanding whether the movement's course leans toward reformism or radicalism. One of Ruta Pacífica's main funding bodies, for example, is SUIPPCOL, the Swiss Program for the Promotion of Peace in Colombia. The NGO is itself funded in part by the government of Switzerland (Hoebink, 2011, p. 133), home to Glencore, a mining conglomerate with enormous investment in Colombia's coal sector. Though SUIPPCOL in recent years has been one of Glencore's most outspoken critics, exerting incredible effort in illuminating the corporation's neoparamilitary ties, the model of past NGO human rights campaigns (Petras, 1997) suggests that SUIPPCOL might be reluctant to link the mining giant's violence to the global development project of which it is a part. If WPNs receive funding from governments with an interest in legitimating the neoliberal model, their sphere of critique might be limited.

Fraser's (2009) adjuration to feminists to "disrupt the easy passage" from feminism to support for capitalism is well-timed in the era of so-called (and perhaps reversing) neoliberal crisis, in which SMOs around Latin America, including Colombia, are demanding economic change. "Capitalism remakes itself in moments of historical rupture," she warns, "by recuperating strands of critiques that have been made against it." Should the women's peace movement take a reformist stance, abstaining from critiques of the dominant development model and focusing exclusively on its (possibly tamable) savage characteristics, it might enable this crisis to blend smoothly into a future of humanized resource extraction and export that will fail to sever its roots from structures of disempowerment. But the current moment calls this future into question in important ways, and portends the possibility of a radical post-accords feminism that engages explicitly with the neoliberal model.

(4) A radical turn?: Antineoliberalism in a post-accords Colombia. My view of the possibility of a radicalization of WPNs' economic critique stems from two factors: an opening of discursive space due to a reduction in violence, and the effects of a FARC-EP demobilization, which has the potential to both strengthen Colombia's anti-free market discourse in general, even as neoliberal reforms are implemented more quickly (see Whitney, 2016 for an analysis of privatization projects in the works), and radicalize the existing feminist movement.

(a) A stronger antineoliberal discourse. Though their critiques have been vocal, in some ways WPNs in Colombia are only beginning to address questions of political economy. As a Colombian lawyer working with SUIPPCOL pointed out to me in 2013, the reduction in violence in recent years has provided a new space for women's organizations to address these questions – rather than seeing those “less pressing” concerns sidelined by the need to deal with immediate physical violence. Therefore, the continued opening of this political space provided by the reduction in violence – if it continues – may mean that WPNs' antineoliberal critiques will deepen. Moreover, witness what might be a parallel process: the history of “feminine” movements in Latin America is one of engaging the effects of patriarchy and, through collective analysis, developing an increasingly explicit contestation of the structure of patriarchy itself. Molyneux's (1985) division of women's organizing goals into “practical” and “strategic” interests inadequately represented the fluidity of these goals; specifically, the strategic nature of day-to-day goals, and the expansion of “practical” interests into movements for structural change. This expansion (or “explicitization”) of women's feminist critiques comes as a result of the collectivization of experiences of patriarchy. In a post-accords Colombia, what could be called Colombian women's “local market contestation” might follow a similar course and become “strategic market contestation”; either way, few would deny the impact that “feminine”

movements, which were the Trojan mares of the twentieth century, had on State and society in Latin America. In combination with the possibility that NGO funding – and with it, its influence – might withdraw after accords are signed, this dynamic illuminates a new space for an anticapitalist feminist critique. If the crudest violence in the country continues to wane, this new space will open even further.

How women will occupy it this space impossible to predict, but the potential demobilization and regularization of FARC-EP forces could have a significant effect. Ruta Pacífica's Alejandra Miller, when we spoke, talked about the way the armed conflict has made it dangerous for women activists to be seen as allied, even ideologically, with guerrilla forces. The effect of señalamientos, or public accusations of guerrilla complicity, is deadly. Were the FARC-EP (and even the ELN) to demobilize, activists of all stripes might feel an increased freedom to speak. The removal of the FARC-EP as a polar referent for all political discourse could mean that activists' agendas enjoy a safer space (Ferry & Isacson, 2012). In addition to the *removal* of the FARC-EP as a brush to paint leftists with, the potential *rise* of the FARC-EP as a political party could force open a space for public discourse about the economic model that has heretofore been closed. Several recent articles in *Forbes* warn U.S. investors about this possibility, explaining that the risk of a potential peace accord is that it “will boost democratic leftist parties by removing the stigma of terrorism. It therefore paves the way for a growing role of leftist parties in the traditionally conservative Colombian political establishment... [it] will empower the political left” (Wack, 2014). Another announces, “If [the FARC] is absorbed into one of the main leftist parties, this could prompt a hardening of the political landscape towards foreign investment in the future, particularly in sensitive areas such as resource extraction, environmental licensing regulation, human rights, and indigenous rights (...) social and

community unrest and activism will emerge as key challenges to foreign investment” (Hockman, 2014). This emergence could catalyze Colombian society into a public outcry against neoliberal dispossession, and further provide a space for WPNs to actualize the critiques their leaders offer in private settings. Alejandra Miller and I discussed the demands of the 2013 paro agrario, for instance, and she predicted that “en el tema agrario, creo que tenemos que trabajar lo más. Que eso va a ser un tema en los próximos diez años en este país, incluye del tema de minería, que va allí.” Any movement that WPNs make toward a stronger antineoliberal critique will likely and necessarily be a cautious one, given the risks from both sides: of delegitimation by the State and broader society as a result of perceived ideological affinity for (albeit demobilized) guerrillas, and of cooptation and being subsumed by Left political forces without a feminist compass.

(b) *A radicalized feminist movement.* Following Enloe’s call to ask feminist questions of DDR processes, it is essential to consider the political roles of demobilized FARC-EP women combatants in a post-accords scenario. There are thousands of women and girls in the FARC-EP, and they have been increasingly vocal in woman-centered spaces (see various communiqués at www.mujerfariana.org). FARC women, or Farianas, have levied cogent feminist critiques of the neoliberal model which are framed, unsurprisingly, in explicitly anticapitalist terms (Sandino P., 2016). What will be the relation, post-DDR, between Farianas and the existing feminist movement? Will the former’s critiques be incorporated into the latter?

As one observer recently pointed out, Farianas – some of whom have been combatants for most of their lives – have taken up positions of leadership in the FARC-EP. The likelihood that these women will demobilize and assume a traditional role in the private sphere is slim (Ordoñez, 2016). Julie Shayne’s (2007) study of revolutionary feminisms in Chile, Cuba, and El

Salvador analyzes the development of strong, critical feminist movements in post-dictatorship and post-conflict scenarios. She attributes the strength of these movements, where they exist, to five factors that she says must be present during and immediately following the revolutionary period: (1) women involved in the revolution or guerrilla army must have assumed nontraditional roles in that process (what she calls revolutionary gender-bending); (2) women must have taken part in logistical training and the development of organizational and political skills during the revolution; (3) a previously unavailable political space for action must open up; (4) women must have a feeling that the revolution is incomplete; that the goals for which they mobilized have not been met (in many cases, this happens as a result of a betrayal by male revolutionaries, whose feminist promises and rhetoric are moved to the back burner [or the trash can] after demobilizing or achieving State power); and (5) a “collective feminist consciousness” must develop (2007, p. 156), owing to various factors, including linkages with international feminism. In the Colombian case, Shayne’s first, second, and third factors are already present, and her fifth is likely – female (and even male) FARC-EP representatives use the feminist label consistently, and a critique of gender power is significant in many of their writings and communiqués. The links between civilian Colombian organizations and international feminism, both regionally and globally, are well established, and if Farianas were to collaborate with those organizations, they would be affected by those linkages as well. The fourth factor – a sense of betrayal or incomplete commitment by FARC-EP leadership – is impossible to predict with certainty, but no feminist student of Latin American history would be bowled over if the comandantes’ feminist rhetoric were to assume a more whispered tone in response to the circumstances of political institutionalization.

Two forces may emerge in a post-accords Colombia: a revitalized feminist movement with a new space for radical, antineoliberal critique, and several thousand women fighters whose feminist rhetoric is concretized and strengthened by their experiences of demobilization. There are two possibilities for a confluence of these forces: one, they could collaborate directly, though the explicit antimilitarism of networks like Ruta Pacífica, combined with the history of guerrilla violence and the lack of a feeling on the part of civilian SMOs that the FARC-EP has represented their needs or interests, would make this collaboration complicated. Two, even if they do not “join forces,” the feminist critiques of neoliberal effects on women advanced by both groups, combined with the Left discourse of the FARC-EP’s political institutionalization, would carve out a larger share of the public discourse for a synthesis of feminist and anticapitalist forces. But in the regional context, in which the Pink Tide may be turning and the Right is holding onto power (I write these words as the Brazilian Senate is voting on Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment), those forces will likely face significant obstacles. What goals and strategies the three networks under study will articulate and employ in the coming years, and whether the vision of peace they advance will be one of economic reformism or radical critique, will be the subject of future research. It is certain they have no plans to recede into the woodwork once peace accords are signed.

Conclusion

This chapter has interrogated the concept of peace, exploring varying and contradictory notions of negative and positive peace, liberal peace, feminist peace, and a multinational *paz de silencios*. The negotiations currently underway in Havana have advanced further than many thought possible, despite their potential spoilers, and women have been key to making the

process stick. All the same, they have been insufficiently included in decisionmaking spaces, and continue to press for a stronger gender perspective at the highest levels. I have argued that the three women's peace networks under study are advancing, through theory and praxis, an alternative model of peace: one that engages with patriarchy as a foundational element of war; with the need for demilitarization at all levels of society and not just among guerrillas; and with the effects of the neoliberal extractivist model on the lives of Colombian women. WPNs' contestation of free market hegemony is evolving, and is likely to take on new features if peace accords are ratified and the FARC-EP is institutionalized as a political party. Alejandra Miller described her vision, both optimistic and sober, of what is to come in our 2013 conversation:

Estamos convencidas que es una oportunidad histórica de esta vez. Es decir, hay muchos elementos que permiten pensar que esta vez sí va a ver negociación. Que esta vez sí hay, como, la voluntad política que no se veía en el Caguán, pero esta vez como que sí hay voluntad política, realmente, de llegar a un acuerdo. Y a terminar el conflicto armado. En ese sentido, lo que nosotras estamos planteando es, del movimiento de mujeres, tenemos que fortalecernos porque lo que se viene es más complicado.

Miller's analysis makes clear the role of women's peace activists in the country's future. The current conjuncture opens myriad exciting and compelling avenues for future research on the roles of women and gender in what one hopes will come: a post-accords Colombia.

Wars don't simply end, and wars don't end simply.

– Cynthia Enloe

Chapter 8

Conclusion:

What Does It Mean to End a War?

Colombia's long armed conflict was never a simple war between a State and a guerrilla army. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find any conflict so simple, though many are narrated that way. It has involved and victimized all Colombians, not to mention citizens of other countries around the world. It has deep roots and linkages with conceptions of citizenship, of who has the right to have rights, of who and what the State is designed to serve and protect, of how best to address social conflict, and of the inherent natures and roles of women and men. Global conflicts cannot continue to be narrated from a "gender blind" perspective in which men, as universal subjects unaffected by their assigned gender roles, are the actors and women are the nameless victims. As the OFP's Yolanda Becerra commented to me in 2013, "la historia en el Siglo XXI no puede seguir siendo contada, como toda la vida, sin la mirada de las mujeres y el sentido y la cara y el rostro de las mujeres." Nor can historians, political scientists, or governing bodies continue to ignore the essential and foundational role of gendered structures of power in armed conflict, which, in Colombia's case, is held together by the collaborative power of patriarchy, militarism, and neoliberal marketization.

In this dissertation I have endeavored to examine the features of this collaboration and the ways in which it is contested by women activists in three regions of Colombia, who are articulating a challenge to the triad of these forces that has the potential to broker social movement connections and create a counterhegemonic force. In Chapter 1, I introduced this theoretical framework and argued that armed conflicts in the context of late capitalism cannot be

fully understood without an analysis of the interactions of patriarchy, militarism, and marketization that entrench their cycles of violence and ensure that the profits of war are available to trade in a free market. In Chapter 2, I traced the development of today's women's peace networks, beginning with their roots in the feminist movement and its subversive trajectory. Chapter 3 delved more deeply into the experiences of the three networks today, examining their engagement with some of the most significant challenges facing women's social movements in Colombia.

In the second set of chapters, I engaged with four characters on Colombia's stage and the way women's peace movements, through their symbolic praxis and their material demands, are turning those characters, long used as weapons of domination, into potent tools of resistance. I conceived of these characters as central, though often implicit, actors in the armed conflict. I argue that identifying and theorizing various conceptual underpinnings of power structures as characters can help us understand and map those structures in fruitful and important ways.

Chapter 4 examined the role of confusion in maintaining Colombia's war system and conflict narrative, and the actions of women activists in confusing that violence. Chapter 5 offered an exegesis of the 2011 Victims' and Land Restitution Law, uncovering the neoliberal subjectivity offered to beneficiaries of the law and the strategic engagement of women activists with the neoliberal state. Chapter 6 analyzed the role of female bodies in the armed conflict, positing that women's bodies are the text of violent domination. This corporeal role endows bodies with a power to trouble the foundations of conflict; their malleable nature makes them a powerful and meaningful tool in conflict transformation by way of the transformation of women's embodied identities. Finally, Chapter 7 examined the meanings of peace in Colombia, written at a time when those meanings were changing and being variously instituted leading up

to the Havana accords. In it I argued that the three networks under study are advancing a notion of peace that is more holistic, more foundational, and more complete than the notion being discussed in Havana and in the press. As one activist put it, “women are not only making demands on issues related to gender, they are thinking about all aspects of life in Colombia. There has been no other actor that has thought so comprehensively; this is why women’s contributions are of utmost importance” (qtd. in C. Rojas, 2004, p. 22). Women’s peace networks are advocating for and modeling a peace that unravels the braided rope of militarism, patriarchy, and neoliberal marketization that has, for half a century, tied Colombia to its war.

How does one measure the success of a social movement? Does it rely on recognition by the State and increased power in the halls of government where decisions are made? Is it evident simply in the ability to imagine an alternate reality in the face of all that is insisting on the current one, as Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Kuecker (2008, p. 339) indicate? Or is it found in between these poles, in the space where relationships are formed, where subjectivities are enacted, where lives are lived? Marina Sitrin argues that social movement success is “not just about ‘winning’ a struggle, but about the process, which no matter how or where it takes place, forever transforms people’s ways of seeing themselves and their relationship to others” (2013, p. 14). Perhaps, as Sitrin argues, “success can only be determined by those people in struggle” (2013, p. 12); at the very least, activists’ understandings of whether, how, and by what measure their work has been “successful” should be at the forefront of any scholarly analysis of movement effects. In Chapter 3 I recalled part of one my conversations with Alejandra Coll of Ruta Pacífica in Cauca, in which I asked her about the network’s success. “Yo no sé si la Ruta ha cambiado el país,” she mused. “Pero es que yo estoy *segura*, y te puedo decir, que hemos cambiado vidas de personas.” In the day to day reality of life in an armed conflict, women peace

activists and the organizations and networks that are inspired and mobilized by them have enacted and insisted on a different performance of citizenship than the one scripted for them on a patriarchal, militarized, and marketized stage. They have created and continue to insist upon an emancipatory subjectivity for Colombian women, a success larger and deeper than any State recognition can offer them. What is a country, after all, but the lives of people?

Que Descanse en Paz

On June 23rd, 2016, photographs made their way around the world of a funeral wreath placed in Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá. “R.I.P. the War in Colombia: 1964-2016,” read the sign posted on the wreath. Earlier that day, the Santos Administration and the FARC-EP had announced their agreement to a bilateral ceasefire. Under the terms of the agreement, which is the penultimate deal to be reached before the accords are ratified in September 2016 by Colombian voters in a plebiscite, guerrilla combatants will demobilize immediately after accords are signed and disarm fully within 180 days. With international guarantors verifying the process, combatants will gather in 23 protected demobilization zones whose locations have yet to be announced. Once disarmament is organized and completed, the weapons collected will be melted down and turned into three public monuments (TeleSur English, 2016).

What does it mean to end a war? When the monuments have been built and the peace accords’ first, fifth, tenth anniversaries have been commemorated, what will the view look like through the eyes of rural and working-class women? What will social movement activists say when they recall the day that Santos and Timochenko shook hands? What does the end of war mean for demobilized fighters, for the army, for neoparamilitaries? Any careful analysis of the history of Colombia’s armed conflict will reveal that a ratified agreement between the two

parties represents a resolution to one aspect of the war, one head of a hydra. The neoparamilitary threat, with its corporate alliances, lives on. The neoliberal model, whose love for everything under Colombia's ground presents at least as much of a threat to campesinos as the guerrilla, lives on. These present an "ordinary violence," writes anthropologist Diana Bocarejo, "in which banana and palm plantations have access to better water than people; in which farmers are criminalized while the regional elite remains untouchable; and where paramilitary dominance hides amid an unstable and fragile calm ready to collapse" (2015).

But the funeral wreath in the Plaza de Bolívar also points to a new moment and a new political opportunity, in which social movements have begun to collaborate and discourses that were formerly peripheral have entered the mainstream. In 2015, the *New York Times* reported on an Afro-Colombian woman named María Roa, who after being displaced in the 1990s worked in Medellín as a domestic worker in conditions of slavery. Today she leads a union of domestic workers that has won several legislative and policy victories and gained international visibility, made possible in part by the current discourse surrounding the peace talks, which highlights the structural inequality underlying the armed conflict (Londoño, 2015c). The question for activist scholars studying Colombia's new future is whether a mass-based anti-neoliberal mobilization might rise into the new political aperture presented by the Havana accords, or whether the demobilization of the FARC-EP will be read as the wholesale defeat of the Left.

The Postwar Future of the Women's Peace Movement

In the introduction to this dissertation, I pointed to the role of indigenous social movements in Bolivia, who framed their demands in such a way that broad sectors of Bolivian society could unite, however temporarily, under the *wipala*. Eduardo Silva wrote that even if

these movements' campaigns were "rarely officially coordinated, they still had the effect of magnifying the impact of contentious action" (2009, p. 120). Women's peace networks in Colombia have followed a similar path, coming together at strategic moments to organize a mass mobilization or a funding collaborative, and focusing national attention on their demands for a negotiated solution to the conflict. Their efforts, as I have discussed, played a key role in moving political discourse to a place that allowed for negotiations to take place, and resulted in a discussion of the gender dynamics of conflict at the highest levels. They have insisted on a relationship with the State that honors their status as full citizen-subjects who have the right to be seen as active agents, not passive victims of a faceless violence or presumed combatants. They insist on mobility, on holistic reparations, on regional autonomy and rights, and on the construction of peace from the bottom up. Arising from their theoretical engagement with the deepest foundations of patriarchy and war, women peace activists' contentious politics grapple not only with material dispossession, but with the ritual, language, and symbolism that enable it.

Silva writes that new social movement theorists largely overlooked the material repercussions of so-called identity politics (2009, p. 10). In Chapter 7, I asked whether WPNs' engagement with the extractivist model was direct enough to portend the growth of a mass-based antineoliberal movement. A new social movements approach might tell us that women's focus on issues of identity and symbolism means a turn away from material, economic demands. But if neoliberalism institutes itself by moving the boundaries of commodification, expanding into previously non-commodified realms of life, then resistance will arise from those newly commodified areas. Marcus Taylor refers to the neoliberal project as an attempt to enforce "market ontology," to "coerce reality into the axioms of human interaction projected by neoclassical economics" (2009, pp. 22,33). By challenging the consequences of the neoliberal

model on women's lives, activists may create "countershocks" that move up the pipeline of this project to its generator. As Silva explains, "Because the construction of market society involved reforming economic, political, and social relationships, neoliberal reforms bred grievances radiating from all three sources. This gave diverse types of protest groups, grievances, and demands their anti-neoliberal character; their origins all lay in the consequences of the neoliberal project" (2009, pp. 18-19).

It is possible that post-accords geopolitical changes will tame WPNs' demands, allowing the authors of the country's neoliberal shift to incorporate social movement concerns in order to legitimate a more participatory model of export extractivism. But by combining their attention to the consequences of the neoliberal project with an incisive focus on militarization and patriarchy as twin forces, women activists' contentious politics nonetheless present a profound challenge to intertwining power structures. Local and foreign elites, old and new, maintain their hegemony by standing on the foundations of patriarchy, militarization, and neoliberal marketization. This is what endows the women's peace movement with counterhegemonic potential: elite power depends on the country's ability to normalize these three forces, even as women's peace networks insist that they be acknowledged and contested. The networks' theoretical synthesis enables other sectors to feel their demands represented, leading to a potentially powerful, mass-based social movement in a place where it has been least expected.

Future Directions

The theoretical model I have advanced in this dissertation can be a fruitful framework for future research. The current moment provides important opportunities for investigation of the

dynamics of patriarchy, militarization, and marketization, and this dissertation reveals three questions with which I argue that future scholarship should engage:

- (1) What role do masculinities play in the post-accords panorama? How will male combatants experience demobilization and disarmament in a Colombia that has historically valued weapons as a marker of masculine power? What alternative models of masculinity will be presented or performed, and to what effect?
- (2) How will Farianas – women FARC-EP combatants – experience demobilization? How will they integrate their lives into civilian society, and what will be their engagement with social movements and Left politics? The signing of the accords might facilitate researchers' connections with demobilized guerrillas, and these should be investigated in order to reveal a clearer picture of the lives of women combatants.
- (3) If the accords are ratified and the women's and feminist movement focuses its attentions beyond the immediate needs engendered by the conflict, what will be the direction of the regionalist and decolonial currents advanced by Afro and indigenous women in the Caribbean region? How will institutional feminist centers engage with the challenges evinced by those movements?

It is my fervent hope that this research will contribute to a growing global conversation about gender structures and women's movements in late capitalism, and encourage a focus on the intersecting, mutually supportive power structures that fuel the world's wars. I offer this contribution as a flashlight to illuminate the way these structures of power interact, and the ways in which social movements can, by their theory and praxis, shake the foundations of armed domination. Above all, I submit it as a testament to the indefatigable bravery and incredible commitment of the women activists of Ruta Pacífica, the Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra

la Guerra, and the Red de Mujeres del Caribe, all of whom are actively envisioning a Colombia at peace.

APPENDIX A: ARCHIVES CONSULTED

Biblioteca Central, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia.

Centro de Memoria Histórica, Bogotá, Colombia.

Fondo de documentación mujer y género *Ofelia Uribe de Acosta*, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia.

Organización Femenina Popular library, Barracabermeja, Santander, Colombia.

Red de Bibliotecas del Banco de la República, Sala de Libros Raros y Manuscritos, Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, Bogotá, Colombia.

Red de Mujeres del Caribe Private Archives, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Sede Caribe, San Andrés, Colombia.

Ruta Pacífica Private Archives, Regional Office, Popayán, Cauca, Colombia.

REFERENCES

- ABColumbia (2012). Colombia the current panorama: Victims and Land Restitution Law 1448. *ABColumbia: CAFOD, Christian Aid, OxfamGB, SCIAF, Trócaire*. Retrieved from ABColumbia.org.uk.
- (n.d.). Poverty, inequality, and drugs in Colombia. *ABColumbia: CAFOD, Christian Aid, OxfamGB, SCIAF, Trócaire*. Retrieved from ABColumbia.org.uk.
- Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. (2007, June). Securing the city: private security companies and non-state authority in global governance. *International Relations* 21, 237-253.
- Acuña, P. (2014a, May 29). Plastic surgery tourism in Colombia: an increasing trend. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- (2014b, April 8). Vast majority of land restitution requests in Colombia have been denied: NGO. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Adelman, M., & Ruggi, L. (2015). The sociology of the body. *Current Sociology* (in press), 1-24.
- Agence-France Press (2016, April 3). Thousands protest across Colombia against government. *Breitbart*. Retrieved from www.breitbart.com.
- (2015a, August 2). Colombia to buy land for poor in post-war period. *Yahoo News*. Retrieved from http://news.yahoo.com.
- (2015b, October 18). Bogotá, rebels reach deal on those missing in Colombia conflict. *Yahoo News*. Retrieved from http://news.yahoo.com.
- Agencia EFE (2015, January 23). 25 Colombia military, police sanctioned for spying on peace talks. *Fox News Latino*. Retrieved from http://latino.foxnews.com.
- Ahmed, S. (2002). Racialised Bodies. In M. Evans & E. Lee (Eds.), *Real Bodies* (pp. 46-63). London: Palgrave.
- Alaimo, S. (2010a). The naked word: The trans-corporeal ethics of the protesting body. *Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory* 20(1),15-36.
- (2010b). *Bodily natures: Science, environment, and the material self*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Alcoff, L.M. (2005). *Visible identities: Race, gender, and the self*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Alsema, A. (2016a, April 8). 'Paramilitary' threat puts Colombia peace talks virtually on hold. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.

- (2016b, March 19). Colombia military negotiator ‘walks out of meeting with war victims.’ *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- (2015, June 25). Colombian army continued killing civilians throughout 2014: US. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- (2012a, August 14). Fact sheets: false positives. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- (2012b, August 25). Colombian judge absolves 8 soldiers accused of killing civilians. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- (2011, January 16). ‘Farc use illegal mining to finance war.’ *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- (2008, May 8). Paramilitary bosses rapes 17 beauty queens. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Álvarez, S. (2009). Beyond NGO-ization? Reflections from Latin America. *Development* 52(2),175-84.
- (1999). Advocating feminism: the Latin American feminist NGO ‘boom.’ *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1(2),181-209.
- (1998, May 6-9). ¿En qué Estado es el feminismo? Reflexiones teóricas y perspectivas comparativas. Seminar *Experiencias de investigación desde una perspectiva de género*, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá.
- (1997). ‘Even Fidel can’t change that:’ trans/national feminist advocacy strategies and cultural politics in Latin America. Paper presented at the Department of Cultural Anthropology, Duke University, Durham, NC
- (1990). *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women’s Movements in Transition Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Álvarez, S., Arias, A., & Hale, C. (2011, May). Re-visioning Latin American Studies. *Cultural Anthropology* 26(2),225-246.
- Álvarez, S., et. al. (2003). Encountering Latin American and Caribbean feminisms. *Signs* 28(2),537-579.
- Álvarez, S., Dagnino, E., & Escobar, A. (Eds.) (1998). *Cultures of politics, politics of cultures: Re-visioning Latin American social movements*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Amnesty International (2012, April). The Victims’ and Land Restitution Law: An Amnesty International Analysis. London: Amnesty International.

- Anderlini, S.N. (2007). *Women building peace: What they do, why it matters*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Anthias, F., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1994). Women and the nation-state. In J. Hutchinson & A. Smith, *Nationalism* (pp. 312-315). New York: Oxford University Press.
- (Eds.) (1989). *Woman-nation-state*. London: Macmillan.
- Anzaldúa, G., & Moraga, C. (1981). *This bridge called my back: Writings by radical women of color*. Watertown, MA: Persephone Press.
- Appelbaum, N. (2003). *Muddied waters: Race, region, and local history in Colombia, 1846-1948*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Aretxaga, B. (2004). Dirty protest: symbolic overdetermination in Northern Ireland ethnic violence. In N. Scheper-Hughes & P. Bourgois (Eds.), *Violence in war and peace: An anthology* (pp. 244-252). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Arango Vargas, C. (2013). Resisting oppression, seeking autonomy: partnerships and feminist grassroots organizing in antioquia, Colombia.” Paper presented at the Annual Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington DC.
- Archila, M., et al. (2009). *Una historia inconclusa. Izquierdas políticas y sociales en Colombia*. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP).
- Arruzza, C. (2013). *Dangerous liaisons: The marriages and divorces of Marxism and feminism*. Torfaen, Wales: Merlin Press.
- Asher, K. (2009). *Black and green: Afro-Colombians, development, and nature in the pacific lowlands*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009.
- Ashplant, T., Roper, T., & Dawson, G. (Eds.) (2006). *The politics of war memory and commemoration*. New York: Routledge.
- Asociación de Cabildos de Indígenas Norte del Cauca – ACIN (2012, May 16). Amenazan a Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres. Retrieved from Nasaacin.org.
- Athanasiou, A. (2014). Precarious intensities: gendered bodies in the streets and squares of Greece. *Signs* 40(1),1-10.
- Auyero, J., and Swistun, D. (2009). *Flammable: environmental suffering in an Argentine shantytown*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ávila, A. (2009, October 20). Como se está dando la guerra en el Cauca hoy. *Semana*. Retrieved from www.semana.com.

- Avila, R. (2016, March 2). Sexual violence a crime against humanity, Guatemalan court rules in historic verdict. *TruthOut*. Retrieved from www.truth-out.org.
- Badkhen, A. (2008, November 24). Rape's vast toll in Iraq war remains largely ignored. *Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from www.csmonitor.com.
- Bahamón Serrano, C.M. (1995). Las organizaciones no gubernamentales feministas frente al estado colombiano y su papel en el movimiento de mujeres. Unpublished thesis, Department of Sociology, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 174 pp.
- Bajak, F. & Sequera, V. (2011, August 13). Leaders of Colombia's landless in new peril. *The Associated Press*. Retrieved from www.SFGate.com.
- Ballvé, T. (2012a, October 17-19). Grassroots masquerades: development, paramilitaries, and land laundering in Colombia. Paper presented at the 2nd International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
- (2012b). Everyday state formation: territoriality, decentralization, and the narco landgrab in Colombia. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 30,603-622.
- (2009, June 15). The Dark Side of Plan Colombia. *The Nation*. Retrieved from www.thenation.com.
- Banerjee, D., & Goldfield, M. (Eds.) (2007). *Labour, globalization, and the state: Workers, women and migrants confront neoliberalism*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Barash, D. & Webel, C. (Eds.) (2015). *Peace and conflict studies*. 3rd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Bargent, J. (2013, April 28). ELN: imminent peace talks with Colombian govt? *Insight Crime*. Retrieved from www.insightcrime.org.
- (2014, August 6). Sale of victims' data undermines Colombia land restitution. *Insight Crime*. Retrieved from www.insightcrime.org.
- Barrett, B. (2012a, June 8). Paramilitary victims' compensation overturned. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Barrett, B. (2012b, July 5). Death threats revealed against 13 Colombian human rights advocates. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Barrig, M. (1998). La larga marcha: movimiento de mujeres en Colombia. *Revista Foro* 33 (Mujeres y Política) 42 p.
- Barthes, R. (1980). *Camera lucida: Reflections on photography*. New York: Hill and Wang.

- Bartky, S. (1988). Foucault, femininity and the modernization of patriarchal power. In L. Quimby & I. Diamond (Eds.), *Feminism and Foucault: Paths of resistance* (pp. 61-86). Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
- Bastick, M., Grimm, K. & Kunz, R. *Sexual violence in armed conflict: Global overview and implications for the security sector*. Geneva, Switzerland: Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
- BBC (British Broadcasting Company). (2016, March 22). U.S. urges Colombia and FARC to sign peace accord. *British Broadcasting Company*. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news.
- (2014, April 5). Colombia: man accused of high profile Bogotá acid attack arrested. *British Broadcasting Company*. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news.
- (2004, October 13). Rape 'a weapon in Colombia war.' *British Broadcasting Company*. Retrieved from www.bbc.com/news.
- Bedoya, N. (2014, October 1). Bureaucracy and military slowing down land restitution in Colombia: experts. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Beevor, A. (2009, June 5). An ugly carnival: how thousands of French women were treated after D-Day. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com.
- Bejarano, A. (Alberto) (2012, February 6). About Sintra14, the Cane Cutters' Union. Address in Cali, Colombia.
- Bejarano, A. (Ana María) (2013). Politicizing insecurity: Uribe's instrumental use of populism. In C. Arnsón and C. de la Torre (Eds.), *Latin American populism in the 21st century* (pp. 323-349). Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center.
- (2003). Protracted conflict, multiple protagonists, and staggered negotiations: Colombia, 1982-2002. *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 28(55-56),223-247.
- Berents, H. (2012, October 8). Participation of women essential for Colombia's peace talks. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Bergeron, S. (2001, Summer). Political economy discourses of globalization and feminist politics. *Signs* 26(4),983-1006.
- Bergoffen, D. (2003, Winter). February 22, 2001: Toward a politics of the vulnerable body. *Hypatia* 18(1),116-134.
- Beverly, J. (2011). *Latinamericanism after 9/11*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

- Bhatnagar, B., & Williams, A. (1992, October). Participatory development and the World Bank. *World Bank Discussion Papers*. Retrieved from elibrary.worldbank.org.
- Björkdahl, A., & Selimovic, J.M. (2016). Gender: the missing piece in the peace puzzle. In O. Richmond, S. Pogodda, and J. Ramović (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of disciplinary and regional approaches to peace* (pp. 181-192). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bloomberg (2011, October 12). Cocaine eclipsed by gold as ‘next major threat’ as Colombian rebels tap mining wealth. *Vancouver Sun*. Retrieved from www.vancouversun.com.
- Bocarejo, D. (2015, April 30). An ordinary peace in a disparate landscape of longings. Hot Spots: *Cultural Anthropology*. Retrieved from <http://culanthorg/fieldsights>.
- Bordo, S. (2004). *Unbearable weight: feminism, Western culture, and the body*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- (1993). Feminism, Foucault, and the politics of the body. In C. Ramazanoglu (Ed.), *Up against Foucault: explorations of some tensions between Foucault and feminism* (179-202). Howe, UK: Psychology Press.
- Bourdillon, Y. (2011, November 17). Latin America’s latest miracle: the comeback of Colombia. *Les Échos/Worldcrunch*. Retrieved from www.worldcrunch.com.
- Bouvier, V. (2016, March 15). Race to a finish line that proves elusive brings multiple advances at Colombia’s peace table. *Colombia Calls*. Retrieved from <http://vbouvier.wordpress.com>.
- (2014, December 16). Gender experts arrive in Havana. *Colombia Calls*. Retrieved from <http://vbouvier.wordpress.com>.
- (2013, November 27). Tables turned: how two women could shake up Colombia’s unprecedented peace talks with the FARC. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from www.foreignpolicy.com.
- (2013, May 29-June 1). Breaking the cycle of conflict in Colombia: the gender key. Paper presented at the Annual Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC.
- (2009). *Colombia: Building peace in a time of war*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
- Bradshaw-Smith, A. (2015, April 7). The rape of a 12-year old Colombian girl that never took place, according to the U.S. Army. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.

- Briceño Flores, E. (Host). (2016, March 1). El aborto como arma de guerra. [audio podcast]. *La Silla Vacía*. Retrieved from <http://lasillallena.lasillavacia.com>.
- Bristow, M. & Jenkins, C. (2012, September 21). Colombia finance chief sees Asia-like growth if rebels disarm. *Bloomberg News*. Retrieved from www.businessweek.com.
- Brittain, J. (2010). *Revolutionary social change in Colombia: the origin and direction of the FARC-EP*. New York: Pluto Press.
- Brodzinsky, S. (2015, July 8). FARC rebels announce unilateral truce in an attempt to rescue peace talks. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com.
- (2004, October 14). 'Thousands raped' in Colombia. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com.
- Brown, L. B. (2011). *Body parts on planet slum: Women and telenovelas in Brazil*. London, New York and Delhi: Anthem Press.
- Brown, D. (2011, June 15). The challenges of Colombia's Victims Law. *Amnesty International*. Retrieved from <http://blog.amnestyusa.org>.
- Brown, W. (2005). *Edgework: Critical essays on knowledge and politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1992, Spring). Finding the man in the state. *Feminist Studies* 18.1: 7-34.
- Brownmiller, S. (1984). *Femininity*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Bryceson, D., Kay, C., & Mooij, J. (Eds.) (2000). *Disappearing peasantries? Rural labor in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. London: Intermediate Technology.
- Buch, E. & Staller, M. (2007). The feminist practice of ethnography. In S. Hesse-Biber & P. Leavy (Eds.), *Feminist Research Practice* (pp. 187-222). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Bullock, K. (2003). *Rethinking Muslim women and the veil: Challenging historical and modern stereotypes*. Herndon, VA: The International Institute of Islamic Thought.
- Burt, J. & Mauceri, P. (2004). *Politics in the Andes: Identity, conflict, reform*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Bushnell, D. (1993). *The making of modern Colombia: A nation in spite of itself*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Butler, J. (2012). Bodily vulnerability, coalitions, and street politics. In M. Kuzma, P. Lafuente, & P. Osborne (Eds.), *The state of things* (pp. 161-167). London: Koenig.

- (2004). *Precarious life: The power of mourning and violence*. New York: Verso.
- (1990). *Gender trouble, feminism and the subversion of identity*. London: Routledge.
- (1993). *Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of sex*. London: Routledge.
- Butler, J. & Athanasiou, A. (2013). *Dispossession: The performative in the political*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Cabezas, A., Reese, E., & Waller, M. (Eds.) (2007). *The wages of empire: Neoliberal policies, repression, and women's poverty*. Transnational Feminist Studies Ser. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Cameron Price, A. (2014). Beyond the Beauty of a Dozen Roses: Implications of Free Trade on Women Workers in Colombia's Cut Flower Industry. Unpublished thesis, Department of International Studies, University of Oregon. 110 pp.
- Camilo Ibarra, A.L. (2004). Women peacemakers mobilizing against war. New Tactics in Human Rights Ser. *Center for Victims of Torture*. Retrieved from www.newtactics.org.
- Campbell, A. L. (2005). *How policies make citizens: Senior political activism and the American welfare state*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Canal Capital Bogotá (2012, October 18). Puertas abiertas para la paz rueda de prensa desde Oslo, Part 1 [Video file]. Retrieved from www.youtube.com.
- Canel, E. (1997). New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory: the need for integration. In M. Kaufman & H. Dilla (Eds.), *Community power and grassroots democracy: The transformation of social life* (pp. 189-221). New York: Zed Books.
- Caprioli, M. (2000). Gendered Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 37(51), 53-70.
- Caracol Radio (2013, May 17). Corte Constitucional ordena incluir en la Ley de Víctimas a afectados por las Bacrim. Retrieved from www.caracol.com.co.
- Caracol Radio (2012, August 19). Santos aspira a que este año 115 mil víctimas de la violencia sean reparadas por el gobierno. Retrieved from www.caracol.com.co.
- Carosio, A. (Ed.) (2012). *Feminismo y cambio social en América Latina y el Caribe*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: CLASCO (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales).
- Carr, J. (2013). The SlutWalk Movement: A Study in Transnational Feminist Activism. *Journal of Feminist Scholarship* 4:24-38.
- Carvajal, O. (2001, 11 October). Naciones Unidas premia labor de la OFP en Barrancabermeja. *Vanguardia Liberal*. 6B.

- Castro, D. (2014, May 8). The trail of death: Thirty years of massacres in Colombia. *Insight Crime*. Retrieved from www.insightcrime.org.
- Center for International Policy (CIP) (2003, October 29). The Uribe Administration and NGOs. *The Center for International Policy's Colombia Project*. Retrieved from <http://archive.is/fhsg1#selection-641.0-641.29>.
- Center for Justice and International Law (2011, May 23). Colombian human rights defenders continue to endure threats, attacks, harassment and illegal surveillance under Santos government. Retrieved from www.cejil.org.
- Centro Democrático (2016). *Congresistas. Centro Democrático: mano firme, corazón grande*. Retrieved from www.centrodemocratico.org.
- Chaney, E. (1979). *Supermadre: Women in politics in Latin America*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Chant, S. (Ed.) (2010). *The international handbook of gender and poverty: Concepts, research, policy*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishers.
- Charner, F. (2015, April 11). Survivors of acid attacks in Colombia fight for justice. *Al Jazeera America*. Retrieved from america.aljazeera.com.
- Chernick, M. (2003). Colombia: does injustice cause violence? In S. Eckstein & T. Wickham-Crowley, *What justice? Whose justice? Fighting for fairness in Latin America* (pp. 185-216). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Christman, J. (1995). Feminism and autonomy. In D. Bushnell (Ed.), *"Nagging" questions: Feminist ethics in everyday life*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 17-39.
- Cine Mujer (1991). Reunión de la Red Nacional de Mujer y Constituyente I. 20 minutes. DVD.
- CNN (2003, March 5). Naked anti-war demos sweep world. *Cable News Network*. Retrieved from www.cnn.com.
- CNN Money (2015, October 5). Peace in Colombia could mean profit for investors. *Cable News Network*. Retrieved from www.wgno.com.
- Cockburn, C. (2015). Standpoint theory. In S. Mojab (Ed.), *Marxism and feminism* (pp. 331-346). London: Zed Books.
- (2012). *Antimilitarism: Political and gender dynamics of peace movements*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- (2010). Feminism and peace. In N. Young (Ed.), *The Oxford international encyclopedia of peace*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- (2007). *From where we stand: War, women's activism and feminist analysis*. London, UK: Zed Books.
- (2004). The continuum of violence: a gender perspective on war and peace. In W. Giles & J. Hyndman (Eds.), *Sites of violence: Gender and conflict zones* (pp. 24-44). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cockburn, C. & Zarkov, D. (Eds.) (2002). *The postwar moment: Militaries, masculinities, and international peacekeeping*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Cohen, J. (1985). Strategy or identity: new theoretical paradigms and contemporary social movements. *Social Research* 52.4:663-716.
- Cohn, C. (Ed.) (2013). *Women and wars*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- (1987). Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals. *Signs* 12(4),687-718.
- Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo (2012, September 25). Paramilitares amenazan a la Organización Femenina Popular del Magdalena Medio. *Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo*. Retrieved from www.colectivodeabogados.org.
- (2010, August 31). Se crean cortes de mujeres contra la militarización. *Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo*. Retrieved from www.colectivodeabogados.org.
- Colectivo Cine Mujer, dir. (Sara Bright, Clara Riascos, Eulalia Carrizosa, Dora Ramirez) (1991). "Llegaron las Feministas." DVD.
- Colle, M. (2012, November 15 [1979]). Our methods of struggle: on the autonomous women's movement. Paper presented at the 11th Congress of the IV International, 1979. Retrieved from www.4edu.info.
- Collins, P. H. (2004). Learning from the outsider within: the sociological significance of black feminist thought. In S. Harding (Ed.), *The feminist standpoint theory reader: Intellectual and political controversies* (pp. 103-126). New York: Routledge.
- (2000 [1990]). *Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment*. New York: Routledge.
- Colombia Land Rights Monitor (2012, November 15). Colombia: diary of a displacement. *Upside Down World*. Retrieved from www.upsidedownworld.com.
- Colombia Support Network (2010, December 14th). International NGOs threatened in Colombia: Anglo Gold Ashanti's strategy continues. Retrieved from www.colombiasupportnetwork.net.

- El Colombiano (2004, August 11). Mujeres quieren voz en procesos de negociación. *El Colombiano*. 12A.
- Colón, A., & Poggio, S. (2010). Women's work and neoliberal globalization: implications for gender equity. In E. Maier & N. Lebon (Eds.), *Women's activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering social justice, democratizing citizenship* (pp. 47-59). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Congreso Nacional para la Paz (2012). Se celebra el Congreso para la Paz en Bogotá. *Rebelión*. Retrieved from www.rebelion.org.
- Combahee River Collective. (1983). *The Combahee River Collective Statement*. In B. Smith (Ed.), *Home girls: A black feminist anthology* (pp. 264-273). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) (2006, October 18). Las mujeres frente a la violencia y la discriminación derivadas del conflicto armado en Colombia. Washington, DC: Organización de Los Estados Americanos.
- Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación—Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2011). *Mujeres y guerra: Víctimas y resistentes en el Caribe Colombiano*. Bogotá, Colombia: Taurus.
- Conway, J. (2016, May 27). Popular feminism: its past, present, and possible future. Paper presented at the Annual Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, New York, NY.
- Cooke, M. & Woollacott, A. (Eds.). (1993). *Gendering war talk*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Coronado, J. (2009). *The Andes imagined: indigenismo, society, and modernity*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris (2016, March 29). 'Aguilas Negras' amenazan a líderes y organizaciones del suroccidente del país. *Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris*. Retrieved from www.arcoiris.com.co.
- Corradi, J., Fagen, P., & Garretón, M. (Eds.) (1992). *Fear at the edge: State terror and resistance in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cortright, D. (2008). *Peace: A history of movements and ideas*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2011, September 2). Colombia's gold rush: the silver lining for guerrillas and paramilitaries. Retrieved from www.coha.org.

- Crandall, R. (2008). *Driven by drugs: U.S. policy toward Colombia*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Craske, N. (1999). *Women and politics in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Crenshaw, K. (1991, July). Mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. *Stanford Law Review* 43(6),1241-1299.
- Cresswell, T. (1996). *In place/out of place: Geography, ideology, and transgression*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Crider, L. (2012, March 30-31). Rape as a war crime and crime against humanity: the effects of rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda on international law. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Alabama Political Science Association, Auburn University, Auburn, AL.
- DANE (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas) (2015). Censo General. Retrieved from www.dane.gov.co.
- Dardot, P., & Laval, C. (2014). *The new way of the world: On neoliberal society*. New York: Verso.
- Das, S.K. (2008). Ethnicity and democracy meet when mothers protest. In Banerjee, P. *Women in peace politics* (pp. 54-77). South Asian Peace Studies ser. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Davies, T. (2014). *NGOs: A new history of transnational civil society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- de Alwis, M., Mertus, J., & Sajjad, T. (2013). Women and peace processes. In Cohn, C. (Ed.), *Women and wars* (pp. 169-193). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- de Langis, T. (2011, July 5). Why women need to be part of the peace process. *Common Dreams*. Retrieved from www.commondreams.org.
- de Lauretis, T. (1987). *Technologies of gender: Essays on theory, film and fiction*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Deere, C., and M. León (Eds). (2001). *Empowering women: Land and property rights in Latin America*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006). *Social movements: An introduction* (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Dennis, M. (2006). National identity and violence: the case of Colombia. In W. Fowler & P. Lambert (Eds.), *Political violence and the construction of national identity in Latin America* (pp. 91-109). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Denzin, N. and Y. Lincoln (2005). *The SAGE handbook of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Deutsche Welle (2005, September 25). Gold replaces coca for Colombian mafia. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from www.dw.com.
- Dickinson, E. (2011, August 1). Colombia's invisible war. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from www.theatlantic.com.
- Dore, E. & Molyneux, M. (Eds.) (2000). *Hidden histories of gender and the state in Latin America*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Dube, R. & Ramirez, D. (2016, January 15). Colombian president takes heat for sale of power generator Isagen. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://wsj.com>.
- Duffield, M. (2001). *Global governance and the new wars*. London: Zed.
- Durham, H. & Gurd, T. (2005). *Listening to the silences: Women and war*. International Humanitarian Law ser. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers.
- Dworkin, A. (1974). *Woman hating*. New York: Dutton.
- Eckstein, S. & Wickham-Crowley, T. (2015). The persisting relevance of political economy and political sociology in Latin American social movement studies. *Latin American Research Review* 50(4), 3-25.
- The Economist (2015, January 31). The last lap in Colombia. *The Economist*. Retrieved from www.economist.com.
- (2014, March 15). Mining in Colombia: digging itself out of a hole. *The Economist*. Retrieved from www.economist.com.
- Eichler, M. (2013, November). Gender and the privatization of security: neoliberal transformation of the militarized gender order. *Critical Studies on Security* 1(3),311-325.
- Eileraas, K. (2014). Sex(t)ing revolution, femmen-izing the public square: Aliaa Magda Elmahdy, nude protest, and transnational feminist body politics. *Signs* 40(1),40-52.
- Eisenstein, H. (2005). A Dangerous Liaison? Feminism and Corporate Globalization. *Science and Society* 69(3),487-518.
- El-Bushra, J. (2007, January). Feminism, gender, and women's peace activism. *Development and Change* 38(1),131-147.

- El Espectador (2013, May 29). Gobierno Santos rectificó señalamiento que hizo Uribe contra Apartadó. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from www.elespectador.com.
- (2010, December 12). Guillermo Rivera pone la cara por la ley de víctimas: "Uribe es el líder de la oposición al proyecto." *El Espectador*. Retrieved from www.elespectador.com.
- Encuentro Feminista Autónomo (2009, March). Un declaración feminista autónoma: el desafío de hacer comunidad en la casa de las diferencias [audio recording]. Mexico City: Encuentro Feminista Autónomo. Retrieved from www.radiofeminista.net.
- Enloe, C. (1993). *The morning after: Sexual politics at the end of the cold war*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- (1998). All the men are in the militaias, all the women are victims: the politics of masculinity and femininity in nationalist wars. In L.A. Lorentzen and J. Turpin (Eds.), *The women and war reader*. New York: New York University Press. 50-62.
- (2000). *Manuevers: The international politics of militarizing women's lives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (2007). *Globalization and militarism: Feminists make the link*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Escobar, A. (2008). *Territories of difference: Place, movements, life, redes*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Espinosa Miñoso, Y. (2009, July/December). Etnocentrismo y colonialidad en los feminismos latinoamericanos. In *Revista Venezolana de Estudios de la Mujer*, 14(33),37-54.
- Espinosa Moreno, F. (2012, July 14). Las razones detrás del conflicto en el Cauca. *Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris*. Retrieved from www.arcoiris.com.co.
- Fals Borda, O. (1969). *Subversion and social change in Colombia*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo) (2016, March 1). Las guerrilleras son mujeres revolucionarias concientes y libres. *Resumen Latinoamericano*. Retrieved from www.resumenlatinoamericano.org.
- Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). The five sexes: why male and female are not enough. *The Sciences*, 33(2): 20-25.
- Felder, F. (2014, August 6). Why Colombia's mining sector hasn't lived up to its promise. *Mining Markets*. www.miningmarkets.ca.

- Feldman, A. (1991). *Formations of violence: The narrative of the body and political terror in Northern Ireland*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Fellowship of Reconciliation (2011). *What's land got to do with it?* Nyack, NY: Fellowship of Reconciliation.
- Fernández Poncela, A. (1996). The disruptions of adjustment: women in Nicaragua. *Latin American Perspectives* 23(1),49-66.
- Ferry, S., and A. Isacson (2012, September 17). Violentology: a conversation about Colombia with Stephen Ferry. Podcast. Washington Office on Latin America. Retrieved from www.wola.org.
- Fisas, V. (1998). *Cultura de paz y gestión de conflictos*. Barcelona: Icaria Editorial.
- Fischer, M. (2011). Transitional justice and reconciliation: theory and practice. In B. Austin, M. Fischer, & H. Giessmann (Eds). *Advancing conflict transformation: The Berghof Handbook II*. Leverkusen, Germany: Barbara Budrich Publishers. 405-430.
- Fisher, W. (1997). Doing good? The politics and antipolitics of NGO practices. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26, 439-464.
- Fletcher, N. (2003). Advocates or obstacles? NGOs and Plan Colombia. *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 26(4),22.
- Forero, J. (2013, June 9). Rape in Colombia's war unearthed. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com.
- (2012a, July 26). Acid Attacks a Rising Menace for Colombian Women. *National Public Radio*. Retrieved from www.npr.org.
- (2012b, April 13). 'Colombian miracle' takes off. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com.
- Forero-Peña, A. (2015). Of beauty and 'beauties': female identities and body image in Colombia. In E. Sukhanova & H. Thomashoff (Eds.), *Body image and identity in contemporary societies*. New York: Routledge.104-114.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972 – 1977*. Ed. C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon.
- (1984 [1971]). Nietzsche, genealogy, history. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), *The Foucault reader* (pp. 76-100). New York: Pantheon.
- (1982). The subject and power. *Critical Inquiry* 8(4),777-795.

- (1998). *The history of sexuality: The will to knowledge*. London, U.K.: Penguin.
- Fox News Latino (2015, July 10). Violence, natural disasters multiply maternal mortality in Colombia. *Fox News Latino*. Retrieved from <http://latino.foxnews.com>.
- (2013, June 12). China harassing activist who stripped to protest child abuse. *Fox News Latino*. Retrieved from <http://latino.foxnews.com>.
- (2011, January 18). Colombia closes 56 illegal mines, arrests 573 people. *Fox News Latino*. Retrieved from <http://latino.foxnews.com>.
- Franco, J. (2004). Killing priests, nuns, women, children. In N. Scheper-Hughes & P. Bourgois (Eds.), *Violence in war and peace: An anthology* (pp. 196-199). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Fraser, N. (2013). *Fortunes of feminism: From state-managed capitalism to neoliberal crisis*. Brooklyn, New York: Verso.
- (2011, March 16). Between marketization and social protection: ambivalences of feminism in the context of capitalist crisis. Lecture, Kings College, Cambridge. Retrieved from www.crash.cam.ac.uk.
- (2009). Feminism, capitalism, and the cunning of history. *New Left Review* 36,97-117.
- (1997). *Justice interruptus: Critical reflections on the "postsocialist" condition*. New York: Routledge.
- Freedman, J. (2011, December 8). A gendered protection for the 'victims' of war: mainstreaming gender in refugee protection. In A. Kronsell and E. Svedberg, *Making gender, making war: Violence, military, and peacekeeping practices* (pp. 121-134). New York: Routledge.
- Gallego, M. (2010). *Documentación y memoria de las violencias contra las mujeres en el marco del conflicto armado*. Bogotá: Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres.
- Galtung, J. (1981). Social cosmology and the concept of peace. *Journal of Peace Research* 18(2),183-199.
- (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3),167-191.
- (1964). An editorial. *Journal of Peace Research* 1(1),1-4.
- Galvís Ortiz, Ligia (2011, June). Las mujeres en la Constitución de 1991, veinte años después: La mirada patriarcal liberal. *En Otras Palabras* 19. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

- Gander, K. (2014, February 19). Steven Dale Green suicide: former U.S. soldier convicted of murdering an Iraqi family found dead in his prison cell. *The Independent*. Retrieved from www.independent.co.uk.
- García-Godos, J. & Wiig, H. (2014). The Colombian Land Restitution Programme – Process, results and challenges, with special emphasis on women. *Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR-Rapport)*:14.
- Gbowee, L. (2009, March). Effecting change through women’s activism in Liberia. *IDS Bulletin* 40(2),50-53.
- Gill, L. (2016). *A century of violence in a red city: Popular struggle, counterinsurgency, and human rights in Colombia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Gill, S. (2016, March 14). Colombia’s left fears political extermination following 29 murders in 2 weeks. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Giles, W. & Hyndman, J. (2004). *Sites of violence: Gender and conflict zones*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Giraud, L. & S. Lewis (2012, September). *Pan-American indigenismo (1940–1970): New Approaches to an Ongoing Debate*. *Latin American Perspectives* 39:3-11.
- Gjelsvik, I.M. (2010). Women, war and empowerment: A case study of female ex-combatants in Colombia. Unpublished thesis. Peace Research Institute Oslo and Department of Peace and Conflict Transformation, University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway.
- Global Post (2013, October 10). Community leader murdered in northern Colombia. Retrieved from www.globalpost.com.
- Gobierno de Colombia (2016). Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral de las Víctimas. Retrieved from <http://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co>.
- Goetschel, L., and T. Hagmann (2009). Civilian peacebuilding: peace by bureaucratic means? *Conflict, Security & Development* 9(1),55–73.
- Goldstein, D. (2010, August). Toward a critical anthropology of security. *Current Anthropology* 51(4),487 – 517.
- Goldstein, J.S. (2001). *War and gender: How gender shapes the war system and vice versa*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodman, J. (2015, June 28). UN envoy urges restraint amid standoff in Colombia between police, residents of farming town. *Associated Press*. Retrieved from www.foxnews.com.
- Goodmark, L. (2009, March 5). Autonomy feminism: an anti-essentialist critique of mandatory

- interventions in domestic violence cases. *Florida State University Law Review* 37(1), n.p.
- Gómez Correal, D. (2011a). *Dinámicas del movimiento feminista Bogotano: Historias de cuarto, salón, y calle, historias de vida (1970-1991)*. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- (2011b). Feminismo y modernidad/colonialidad: entre retos de mundos posibles y otras palabras. In *En Otras Palabras*. Grupo Mujer y Sociedad. Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 43-61.
- Gordon, J. & Rocha, E. (2011, February 1). Feature: Canadian gold juniors discover newly stable Colombia. *Reuters*. Retrieved from www.reuters.com.
- González-Rivera, V., & Kampwirth, K. (Eds.) (2000). *Radical women in Latin America: Left and right*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Grace, K.M. (2012, July 5). All Mining is Local. *Resource Clips: Essential Resource News*. Retrieved from www.resourceclips.com.
- Graham, S. (2008). Mother and slaughter: a comparative analysis of the female terrorist in the LRA and FARC. In J. Pretorius (Ed.), *African politics: Beyond the third wave of democratization* (pp. 198-219). Cape Town, South Africa: Juta.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks*. Trans. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith. New York: International Publishers.
- Grandin, G. (2015, April 7). U.S. soldiers and contractors sexually abused at least 54 children in Colombia between 2003 and 2007. *The Nation*. Retrieved from www.thenation.com.
- Grayzel, S. (1999). *Women's identities at war: Gender, motherhood, and politics in Britain and France during the First World War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Green, D. (2003). *Silent Revolution: The rise and crisis of market economics in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Grewal, I. & Caplan, K. (2000). Postcolonial Studies and Transnational Feminist Practices. *Jouvert* 5(1). n.p.
- Grosz, E. (1994). *Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Gruoso, L., Rosero, C., & Escobar, A. (2003). The Process of Black Community Organizing in the Southern Pacific Coast Region of Colombia. In M. Gutmann, F. Matos Rodríguez, L. Stephen, & P. Zavella (Eds.), *Perspectives on Las Américas: A reader in culture, history, and representation* (pp. 430-447). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

The Guardian (2012, September 20). Women's participation in peace – how does it compare? *The Guardian*. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com.

---- (2004, October 13). 'Thousands raped' in Colombia. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com.

Guevara Corral, R. D. (2000). Mujeres desplazadas por el conflicto armado: situaciones de género en Cali y Popayán. Universidad del Valle – Asprodeso (Asociación de Profesionales para el Desarrollo Social). Retrieved from www.disasterinfo.net.

Guzmán Bouvard, M. (1994). *Revolutionizing motherhood: The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.

Gwynne, R. & Kay, C. (2004). *Latin America transformed: Globalization and modernity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Harrigan B. (2014). Colombia's bloom boom. *Slate*. Retrieved from www.slate.com.

Harris, R. (1993, November). The 'child of the barbarian': rape, race, and nationalism in France during the First World War. *Past and Present* 141, 170-206.

Hale, C. (2004, September-October). Rethinking indigenous politics in the era of the "indio permitido." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 38(2), 16-21.

Hale, S. (2010). Rape as a marker and eraser of sexual difference: Darfur and the Nuba mountains (Sudan). In L. Sjoberg & S. Via (Eds.), *Gender, war, and militarism: Feminist perspectives*. Boulder, CO: Praeger. 105-113.

Ham, L. (2012, June 5). Colombia bolts from no-go to go-go. *Brisbane Times*. Retrieved from www.brisbanetimes.com.au.

Hamacher, W. (1989). Journal, politics: notes on Paul de Man's wartime journalism. In W. Hamacher, N. Hertz, and T. Keenen (Eds.), *Responses: On Paul de Man's wartime journalism*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 459.

Hanratty, D. and S. Meditz (Eds.) (1988). *Colombia: A country study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Retrieved from <http://countrystudies.us/colombia>.

Hansen-Bundy, B. (2013, March 18). Sexual violence employed methodically in Colombia's conflict. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.

Haraway, D. (1991). A cyborg manifesto: science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. In *Simians, cyborgs and women: The reinvention of nature* (pp. 149-181). New York; Routledge.

Harding, S. & Norberg, K. (2005). New Feminist Approaches to Social Science Methodologies: An Introduction. *Signs* 30(4), 2009-2015.

- Harding, S. (Ed.), *The feminist standpoint theory reader: Intellectual and political controversies*. New York: Routledge.
- (1986). *The science question in feminism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Harris, R. (1993, November). The 'child of the barbarian': rape, race, and nationalism in France during the First World War. *Past and Present* 141, 170-206.
- Hartmann, H. (1979). The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Toward a More Progressive Union. *Capital and Class* 3(2),1-33.
- Hartsock, N. (1985). *Money, sex, and power: Toward a feminist historical materialism*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2006). Neo-liberalism and the restoration of class power. In *Spaces of global capitalism: a theory of uneven geographical development*. New York: Verso.
- (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Haugaard, L., Castillo, Z., Tate, W., & Romoser, A. (2013, November). Far from the promised land: land restitution on Colombia's Caribbean coast. Latin America Working Group Education Fund and Lutheran World Relief.
- Hellman, J.A. (1992). Latin American social movements and the question of autonomy. In A. Escobar & S. Álvarez (Eds.), *New social movements in Latin America: Identity, strategy and democracy* (pp. 52-61). Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press.
- Helm, A.B. (2015, June 10). #Sayhername puts female victims of police brutality at center of #blacklivesmatter movement. *Black Women Connect*. Retrieved from www.blackwomenconnect.com.
- Henderson, J.D. (2012). *Colombia's narcotics nightmare: How the drug trade destroyed peace*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- (2001). *Modernization in Colombia: The Laureano Gómez years, 1889-1965*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Hennessy, R. (2000). *Profit and pleasure: Sexual identities in late capitalism*. New York: Routledge.
- Hesse-Biber, S. & Leavy, P. (2007). *Feminist research practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Hicks, G. (1994). *The comfort women: Japan's brutal regime of enforced prostitution in the Second World War*. New York: Norton.

- Hinchliffe, T. (2011, December 13). Victims of sexual assault represent 17.7% of Colombia's displaced. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Hirsch, M. & Smith, V. (2002, Autumn). Feminism and cultural memory: an introduction. *Signs* 28(1),1-19.
- Hirsch, M. (2001). Surviving Images: Holocaust Photographs and the Work of Postmemory. *The Yale Journal of Criticism* 14(1),5-37.
- HispanTV (2014, October 5). Megaproyectos y paramilitarismo: La realidad de Buenaventura. Retrieved from <http://hispanTV.ir>.
- Hockman, D. (2014, November 29). In Colombia, peace could bring new challenges for business. *Forbes*. Retrieved from www.forbes.com.
- Hoebink, P. (Ed.) (2011). *European development cooperation: in between the local and the global*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press.
- Holland, D. & Gómez Correal, D. (2013). Assessing the transformative significance of movements and activism: lessons from *A Postcapitalist Politics*. *Outlines – Critical Practice Studies* 14(2),130-159.
- Holmes, J.S., Gutiérrez de Piñeres, S.A., & Curtin, K. (2008). *Guns, drugs, and development in Colombia*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Honwana, A. (2006). *Child soldiers in Africa*. Ethnography of Violence ser. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hoyos, M.P. (2013). Así va la restitución de tierras para las mujeres. *La Silla Vacía*. Retrieved from <http://lasillavacia.com>.
- Human Rights Watch (2015, June 24). On their watch: evidence of senior army officers' responsibility for false positive killings in Colombia. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- (2013, September 17). The risk of returning home: violence and threats against displaced people reclaiming land in Colombia. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- (2012, November 14). Colombia: obstacles to care for abused, displaced women. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- (2010). Paramilitaries' heirs: the new face of violence in Colombia. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- (2008, September 29). These fellows must be eliminated: relentless violence and impunity in Manipur district. *Human Rights Watch*. www.hrw.org.

- (1998). *War without quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Hutchings, K. (2008, June). Making sense of masculinity and war. *Men and Masculinities* 10(4),389-404.
- Hynes, H.P. (2012, January 26). Military sexual abuse: a greater menace than combat. *Truthout*. Retrieved from www.truth-out.org.
- Ibarra Mello, María E. (2011). Mujeres, verdad, justicia y reparación en Colombia. *Universitas Humanística* 72,247-273.
- Institute for Inclusive Security (n.d.). Why women? Washington, DC: Hunt Alternatives Fund. Retrieved from www.inclusivesecurity.org.
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2011, December 29). Colombia: property restitution in sight but integration still distant. *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*. Retrieved from www.internal-displacement.org.
- (2009, July 3). Colombia: new displacement continues, response still ineffective. *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*. Retrieved from www.internal-displacement.org.
- International Monetary Fund (2011, December). Colombia and the IMF. Retrieved from www.imf.org.
- International Service for Human Rights (2011, December). Human rights defenders in Colombia: how is the government protecting their rights? Retrieved from www.ishr.ch.
- Irigaray, L. (1985). *This sex which is not one* (C. Porter, Trans.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Isacson, A. (2016, March 24). The Colombian military faces post-conflict uncertainty. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America.
- (2010). Don't call it a model. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America.
- (2001). The new masters of Barranca. *Center for International Policy*. Retrieved from www.cip.org.
- Isacson, A. & Kinosian, S. (2016, March 24). How a ceasefire in Colombia can work [audio podcast]. Washington Office on Latin America. Retrieved from www.wola.org.
- Jacobson, R. (2013). Women “after” wars. In Cohn, C. (Ed.), *Women and wars* (pp. 215-241). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

- Jaquette, J. (2009). *Feminist agendas and democracy in Latin America*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Jelin, E. (Ed.) (1990). *Women and social change in Latin America*. London: Zed.
- Jiménez González, A. (2013). Los procesos de participación e incidencia del movimiento de mujeres de la Región Caribe en las dinámicas de paz y de regionalización (2001-2011) (unpublished Masters Thesis). Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Sede Caribe, Cartagena.
- Johnson, A. (2005). *The gender knot: Unraveling our patriarchal legacy*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Johnson, L. (Ed.) (2004). *Death, dismemberment, and memory: body politics in Latin America*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press.
- Jordan, J. (2016, March 10). Wave of right-wing violence threatens peace for Colombia. TeleSUR English. Retrieved from www.telesurtv.net/english.
- Kaplan, T. (1997). *Crazy for democracy: Women in grassroots movements*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Kalyvas, S. (2003). The ontology of “political violence”: action and identity in civil wars. *Perspectives on Politics* 1(3),475-494.
- Kampwirth, K. (2010). Gender politics in Nicaragua: feminism, antifeminism, and the return of Daniel Ortega. In E. Maier & N. Lebon (Eds.), *Women’s activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering social justice, democratizing citizenship*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 111-126.
- Kaplan, C., Alarcón, N., & Moallem, M. (1999). *Between woman and nation: Nationalisms, transnational feminisms, and the fate*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kaufman, J. P. & Williams, K.P. (2010). *Women and war: Gender identity and activism in times of conflict*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.
- Keck, M.E. & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kendall, G. (2003, November 21). From liberalism to neoliberalism. Paper presented at *Social Change in the Twenty-First Century*, Center for Social Change Research, Queensland University of Technology, Queensland, Australia.
- Kelly, L. (2010). The everyday/everynightness of rape: is it different in war? In L. Sjoberg & S. Via (Eds.), *Gender, war, and militarism: feminist perspectives* (pp. 114-123). Boulder, CO: Praeger.

- (1991). *Surviving sexual violence*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Kirk, G. and Okazawa-Rey, M. (Eds.) (2000, Winter). Neoliberalism, militarism, and armed conflict. *Social Justice* 27(4) (Special Issue), 1-167.
- Kirk, R. (2009). Colombia: human rights in the midst of conflict. In E. Babbit & E. Lutz (Eds.), *Human rights and conflict resolution in context: Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Northern Ireland* (pp. 23-45). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- (2003). *More terrible than death: Massacres, drugs, and America's war in Colombia*. New York, NY: Public Affairs.
- Kirsch, G. E. (2005). Friendship, Friendliness, and Feminist Fieldwork. *Signs* 30(4),2163-2172.
- Klein, N. (2007). *The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism*. New York, NY: Picador.
- Koopman, S. (2017). Peace. In D. Richardson, Ed., *The international encyclopedia of geography: People, the earth, environment, and technology*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. In press.
- (2011). Let's take peace to pieces. *Political Geography* 30(4),193-194.
- Koranyi, B. & Murphy, H. (2012, October 18). Colombian government, FARC rebels to meet in Cuba for peace talks. *Reuters*. Retrieved from www.reuters.com.
- Krug, E.G., et al. (Eds.) (2002). *World report on violence and health*. Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved from www.who.int.
- Lacey, M. (2004, July 19). Amnesty says Sudan militias use rape as a weapon. *New York Times*: A9.
- Lamus Canavate, D. (2012). *El color negro de la (sin)razón blanca: el lugar de las mujeres afrodescendientes en los procesos organizativos en Colombia*. Bucaramanga, Colombia: Universidad Autónoma, UNAB.
- (2011). Relatos de vida de mujeres negras/afrodescendientes en contextos de pobreza y violencia. *En Otras Palabras* 19: *Mujeres, historias y memorias*.
- (2010). *De la subversión a la inclusión: movimientos de mujeres de la segunda ola en Colombia, 1975 – 2005*. Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia.
- Lander, R. (2015, November 20). Santos says he will resign if Colombia rejects FARC peace deal. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.

- Latin America Working Group (2012, September). Still a dream: land restitution on Colombia's Caribbean coast. *Latin America Working Group*. Retrieved from www.lawg.org.
- (2010, June). Far worse than watergate: widening scandal regarding Colombia's intelligence agency. *Latin America Working Group*. Retrieved from www.lawg.org.
- Lazar, S. (2008). *El Alto, rebel city: Self and citizenship in Andean Bolivia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Lazare, S. (2011, October 20). Military sexual assault and rape 'epidemic.' *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from www.aljazeera.com.
- Leal, C. & Arias, J. (2007, May/August). Aproximaciones a los estudios de raza y racismo de Colombia. *Revista de Estudios Sociales* 27,184-193.
- Lebon, N. (2010). Women building plural democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. In E. Maier & N. Lebon (Eds.), *Women's activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering social justice, democratizing citizenship* (pp. 3-25). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Lederer, E. (2016, January 20). U.N. Security Council begins work on Colombia observer mission. *Associated Press*. Retrieved from <http://news.yahoo.com>.
- Lee, R.W. (1991). *The white labyrinth: cocaine and political power*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- LeGrand, C. (2003). The Colombian crisis in historical perspective. *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 28(55),165 – 209.
- Leiva, F. (2008). *Latin American neostructuralism: The contradictions of post-neoliberal development*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lennon, K. (2004). Imaginary bodies and worlds. *Inquiry* 47:107–22.
- Levine, D. (1981). *Religion and politics in Latin America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Levine, D. & Wilde, A. (1977, April). The Catholic Church, "politics," and violence: the Colombian case. *The Review of Politics* 39(2),220-249.
- Lewis, M. (2012, May 21). Acid Attacks on Colombian Women. Retrieved from www.care2causes.com.
- LibreRed (2012, September 30). Integrantes de Marcha Patriótica reflexionan sobre proceso de paz en Colombia. *YouTube*. Retrieved from www.youtube.com.

- Lohmuller, M. (2015, May 1). Why Colombia is reluctant to stop fumigating drug crops. *Insight Crime*. Retrieved from www.insightcrime.org.
- Londoño, E. (2015a, September 25). The prospect of peace in Colombia. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com.
- (2015b, November 16). Taking stock of the \$10 billion Washington spent on Colombia's war. *The New York Times: Taking Note*. Retrieved from takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com.
- (2015c, December 28). A maid's peaceful rebellion in Colombia. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com.
- Lozano Lerma, B. (2010). El feminismo no puede ser uno porque las mujeres somos diversas: Aportes a un feminismo negro decolonial desde la experiencia de las mujeres negras del Pacífico colombiano. *La manzana de la Discordia*. Centro de Estudios de Género, Mujer y Sociedad, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia. 5(2),7-24.
- Luciak, I. (2000). Development and its discontents: life in post-conflict Central America. *Development* 43(3),43-49.
- Lugones, M. (2010, Fall). Toward a decolonial feminism. *Hypatia* 25(4),742-759.
- Luna, L.G. and Villareal Méndez, N. (2011). *Movimientos de mujeres y participación política, Colombia del siglo XX al siglo XXI*. Bogotá: Editorial Gente Nueva.
- Luna, L.G. (2004). El sujeto sufragista, feminismo y feminidad en Colombia, 1930-1957. Bogotá: Ediciones La Manzana de la Discordia.
- (2000). El logro del voto femenino en Colombia: La Violencia y el maternalismo populista, 1949-1957. Paper presented at the XI Congreso Colombiano de Historia, Bogotá. August 22-25, 2000.
- Lunceford, B. (2012). *Naked politics: Nudity, political action, and the rhetoric of the body*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Mackenzie, C., & Stoljar, N., (Eds.) (2000). *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Madariaga Villegas, P. (2009). La Organización Femenina Popular del Magdalena Medio: logros y conflictos de un movimiento de mujeres. In M. Archila N., J. Cote R., A. Delgado D., & M. García V. (Eds). *Una historia inconclusa: Izquierdas políticas y sociales en Colombia* (pp. 389-412). CINEP.
- Maier, E. (2010). Accommodating the private into the public domain: experiences and legacies

- of the past four decades. In E. Maier & N. Lebon (Eds.), *Women's activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering social justice, democratizing citizenship* (pp. 26-46). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Magallón, C. (2010 [2002]). Mujeres en las guerras, mujeres por la paz. In M. Elosegui, M.T. González Cortés, & C. Gaudó, Eds. *El rostro de la violencia: Mas allá del dolor de las mujeres* (pp. 83-102). Barcelona: Icaria.
- Manrique C., J. (2003, July 27). Mujeres: el otro dolor de la guerra. *Vanguardia Liberal*. 1F-2F.
- Marcha Patriótica (2016, March 19). Vigilia permanente por la vida y la paz. *Marcha Patriótica*. Retrieved from www.marchapatriotica.org.
- Marín Carvajal, I. (2016, February 4). Postconflict in Colombia (4). Uninvited: women in Havana. *Open Democracy*. Retrieved from www.opendemocracy.net.
- Marshall, L. (2012, January 31). Exclusive: U.S. acts on women, peace and security. *The Women's Media Center*. Retrieved from <http://womensmediacenter.com>.
- Martinez, H. (2011, April 28). "COLOMBIA: Displaced campesinos want a say on land restitution bill." Inter Press Service. Retrieved from www.ipsnews.net.
- Martínez Cortés, P. (2013, December). Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras en Colombia en contexto: Un análisis de las contradicciones entre el modelo agrario y la reparación a las víctimas. *Transnational Institute*. Retrieved from www.tni-org.
- Marttila, T. (2012). *The culture of enterprise in neoliberalism: Specters of entrepreneurship*. New York: Routledge.
- Maxwell, J.A. (2004). *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Mazure, L. (2010, August 12). The Colombian gold rush. *Latin America Bureau*. Retrieved from <http://lab.org.uk>.
- McCall, L. (2005). The complex of intersectionality. *Signs* 30.3:1771-1800.
- McClintock, A. (1993, Summer). Family feuds: gender, nationalism, and the family. *Feminist Review* 44,61-80.
- McDermott, J. (2016, June 23). 8 reasons why Colombia's post-conflict is still a ways off. *Insight Crime*. Retrieved from www.insightcrime.org.
- McFadden, P. (2007). Why women's spaces are critical to feminist autonomy. *ISIS International*. Retrieved from www.isiswomen.org.

- McKay, S. (1998). The psychology of societal reconstruction and peace: a gendered perspective. In L.A. Lorentzen and J. Turpin (Eds.), *The women and war reader* (pp. 348-362). New York: New York University Press.
- McNay, L. (2009). Self as enterprise: dilemmas of control and resistance in Foucault's *The Birth of Biopolitics*. *Theory Culture Society* 26,55-77.
- Medhurst, K. (1984). *The Church and labor in Colombia*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Meertens, D. (2014, May 6-9). Land, Gender, and Justice: Property Restitution and Women's Rights in Colombia's Transition to Peace. Presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington DC. Retrieved from www.wilsoncenter.org.
- (2013, July). Mujeres víctimas de despojo y la restitución de tierras: ¿se hará justicia? *Revista Javeriana*, 149(796),44-49.
- (2012, July). Forced displacement and gender justice in Colombia. The International Center for Transitional Justice and the Brookings Institution. Retrieved from www.ictj.org.
- (2008). Discriminación racial, desplazamiento y género en las sentencias de la Corte Constitucional: El racismo cotidiano en el banquillo. *Universitas Humanística* 66,83-106.
- (2005). Mujeres en la guerra y la paz: cambios y permanencias en los imaginarios sociales. In Noguera Díaz Granados, A.M., *Mujer, nación, identidad y ciudadanía: siglos XIX y XX*. Bogotá: Ministerio de Cultura.
- Meertens, D. and Zambrano, M. (2010). Citizenship deferred: the politics of victimhood, land restitution and gender justice in the Colombian (post?) conflict. *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 4. 189-206.
- Mejía Jaramillo, Lina M. (2011). El modelo de cooperación de la organización Mujeres de Negro de España con la Organización Femenina Popular en Barrancabermeja en el periodo 2000 – 2010. Unpublished manuscript, Department of International Relations, Universidad Colegio Mayor Nuestra Señora del Rosario, Bogotá.
- Mejía Mejía, Carlos F. (2016, April 10). Columna: Caldas marchó y dijo a Santos: ¡No más! *La Patria*. Retrieved from www.centrodemocratico.org.
- Memoria y Dignidad (n.d.). Genocidio partido político. *Memoria y Dignidad: Avanzando procesos de verdad, justicia, y reparación integral en Colombia*. Retrieved from <http://memoriaydignidad.org>.
- Mendez, A. (2012). Militarized gender performativity: women and demobilization in Colombia's FARC and AUC. Unpublished thesis. Department of Political Science, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

- Mesa de Conversaciones para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera en Colombia (2014, June 7). Comunicado Conjunto, La Habana. Retrieved from <http://mesadeconversaciones.com.co>.
- Mesa de Trabajo *Mujer y Conflicto Armado* (2005a, November). V informe sobre violencia sociopolítica contra mujeres, jóvenes y niñas en Colombia. Bogotá: Ediciones Ántropos.
- (2005b, November). La tradición, la semilla y la construcción: sistematización de tres experiencias de resistencia de organizaciones de mujeres frente al conflicto armado en Colombia. Bogotá: UNIFEM.
- (2004, October). IV Informe sobre violencia sociopolitical contra mujeres, jóvenes y niñas en Colombia. Bogotá: Ediciones Ántropos.
- Mignolo, W. (2000). *Local histories/Global designs*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Miller Restrepo, A. (2012, February 9). *Ruta Pacífica*. Lecture and discussion at the regional headquarters of Ruta Pacífica, Popayán, Cauca, Colombia.
- Minga/Mutirão Informativa de Movimientos Sociales (2010, August 10). Masiva y entusiasta apertura de debates del Encuentro Internacional de Mujeres y Pueblos de las Américas Contra la Militarización. Retrieved from www.movimientos.org.
- Miroff, N. (2015, October 31). Colombia's Juan Manuel Santos sees peace at hand, and threats too. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com.
- (2014, December 30). In Colombia, a palm oil boom with roots in conflict. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com.
- Mohanty, C. (2003). *Feminism without borders: Decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- (1988, Autumn). Under Western eyes: feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. *Feminist Review* 30,61-88.
- Molano, A. (2000). The evolution of the FARC: a guerrilla group's long history. *NACLA Report on the Americas* 34(2),23-31.
- (1992). Violence and land colonization. In C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda, and G. Sánchez. *Violence in Colombia: The contemporary crisis in historical perspective*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Molina, G. (2014, August 27). Inequality is stagnating in Latin America: should we do nothing? *The Guardian*. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com.
- Moloney, A. (2013, September 6). Breaking Colombia's silence over its war rape victims.

Thomson Reuters, Retrieved from www.trust.org.

- Molyneux, M. (2000). Twentieth-century state formations in Latin America. In E. Dore & M. Molyneux (Eds.), *Hidden histories of gender and the state in Latin America* (pp. 33-81). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- (1998). Analysing women's movements. *Development and Change* 29(2),219-45.
- (1985). Mobilization without emancipation? Women's interests, the state, and revolution in Nicaragua. *Feminist Studies* 11(2),227-254.
- Momsen, J.H. (2004). *Gender and development*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Monárrez Fragoso, M. (2010). The victims of the Ciudad Juárez femicide: sexually fetishized commodities (S. Koopman, trans). In R. Fregoso and C. Bejarano (Eds.), *Terrorizing Women: Femicide in the Americas* (pp. 59-69). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Moor, M. and van de Sandt, J. (2014, June). The dark side of coal: paramilitary violence in the mining region of Cesar, Colombia. Utrecht: PAX, The Netherlands.
- Morris, H., Lozano, J.J., Gattiker, I., Irmer, M., & Willcocks, N. (2010). *Impunity*. Brooklyn NY: Icarus Films.
- Morsolin, C. (2015, November 18). La paz tiene que ser anticapitalista, anticolonial y anti-patriarcal, llamado final de la VII CLACSO. *Kaos en la Red: Información Contrahegemónica para el Cambio Social*. Retrieved from <http://kaosenlared.net>.
- Moser, C., A. Acosta, and M.E. Vásquez (2006). *Mujeres y paz: construcción de consensos, guía para procesos participativos e incluyentes*. Alianza IMP. Bogotá.
- Moser, C. and Clark, F.C. (Eds). (2001). *Victims, perpetrators, or actors? Gender, armed conflict, and political violence*. New York, NY: Zed Books.
- Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra (2010). *Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y Por la Paz*. Retrieved from www.mujerescontrajaguerra.com.
- (2010b, May 25). Women and People's Summit of the Americas against Militarization [Press Release]. Retrieved from www.movimientos.org.
- (2009, October 2). *Movimiento Social de Mujeres Contra la Guerra y por la Paz* [Press Release]. Retrieved from www.vidadelacer.org.
- Mujeres del Caribe Colombiano (2014, December 30). Homenaje a Martín Arévalo desde la Red de Mujeres del Caribe. [Web log post.] Retrieved from mujeresdelcaribe.blogspot.com.
- Mujeres por la Paz (2012). Las mujeres también hemos cosechado tierra para la paz. *Mujer*

- Palabra*. Retrieved from www.mujerpalabra.net.
- Murdock, D. (2008). *When women have wings: Feminism and development in Medellín, Colombia*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Murphy, P. (2015, July 5). Colombia peace process at lowest ebb: government.” *Sydney Morning Herald*. Retrieved from www.smh.com/au.
- Murray, W.E. and J.D. Overton (2011, July). Neoliberalism is dead, long live neoliberalism? In *Progress in Development Studies* 11(4),307-19.
- Murtagh, B. (2016). Economics: neoliberal peace and the politics of social economics. In O. Richmond, S. Pogodda, and J. Ramović (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of disciplinary and regional approaches to peace*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 110-122.
- Nash, J. (Ed.) (2005). *Social movements: An anthropological reader*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Navarro, M. (1982). El Primer Encuentro Feminista de Latinoamérica y el Caribe. In Leon, M., Ed. *Sociedad, subordinación y feminismo: Debates sobre la mujer en América Latina y el Caribe*. Bogotá: ACEP. 261.
- Neuman, W. (2012, December 2). Displaced Colombians grapple with hurdles of going home. *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com.
- New York Times (2016, January 23). U.N. can seal the peace deal in Colombia. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.org.
- Nikolić-Ristanović , V. (1998). War, nationalism, and mothers in the former Yugoslavia. In L.A. Lorentzen and J. Turpin (Eds.), *The women and war reader* (pp. 234-239). New York: New York University Press.
- Nolen, S. (2014, December 30). Resettling Colombia: Land restitution a difficult step in the right direction. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from www.theglobeandmail.com.
- Noriega, R. (2015, December 17). Colombia may be letting down its guard to narcoguerrillas. *American Enterprise Institute*. Retrieved from www.aei.org.
- Noticias Uno (2015, April 25). Más de 3.5 millones de mujeres son víctimas del conflicto en Colombia. *Uno TV*. Retrieved from www.unotv.com.
- El Nuevo Liberal (2015, July 28). En la ruta hacia el reconocimiento de género. *El Nuevo Liberal*. Retrieved from www.elnuevoliberal.com.
- Nusair, I. (2008). Gendered, racialized and sexualized torture at Abu-Ghraib. In C. Mohanty, R. Riley, and M. Pratt (Eds.), *Feminism and war: Confronting U.S. imperialism* (pp. 179-193). London: Zed Books.

- Ojeda, D. (2013). War and tourism: the banal geographies of security in Colombia's 'retaking.' *Geopolitics* 00:1-20.
- Ordoñez, F. (2016, March 8). Women play expanded role in Colombian peace process. McClatchy DC. Retrieved from www.mcclatchydc.com.
- Organización Femenina Popular (2012). ¿Para qué las cortes de mujeres? *Organización Femenina Popular*. Retrieved from <http://organizacionfemeninapopularareas.blogspot.com.es>.
- Oquist, P. (1980). *Violence, conflict, and politics in Colombia*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Otis, J. (2015a, November 7). Will Colombia honor a beloved musician who was also a convicted killer? *National Public Radio*. Retrieved from www.npr.org.
- (2015b, April 15). Colombians accuse U.S. soldiers and officials of sexual assault and rape. *Time*. Retrieved from www.time.com.
- Oxfam (2013, October 21). Divide and Purchase: How land ownership is being concentrated in Colombia. *Oxfam Research Reports*. Retrieved from www.oxfamamerica.org.
- O'Brien, M. (1983). *The politics of reproduction*. New York: Routledge.
- O'Gorman, J. (2012a, September 26). Colombia's land restitution not yet working. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- O'Gorman, J. (2012b, September 28). Colombia's victims redress target to be met ahead of schedule: government. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- O'Hagan, E.M. (2014, June 17). Why Colombia's left and the west welcome a right-wing president. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from www.guardian.co.uk.
- O'Neill, J. (2015, April 20). Are women the key to peace in Colombia? *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from www.foreignpolicy.com.
- O'Reilly, K. (2009). *Key concepts in ethnography*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- O'Rourke, C. (2015). Feminist scholarship in Transitional Justice: a de-politicizing impulse? *Women's Studies International Forum* 51,118-127.
- Padgett, T. (2012, April 12). Colombia's president talks with TIME about Castro, capitalism and his country's comeback. *Time*. Retrieved from www.time.com.
- El País (2016, March 29). Investigan panfleto que amenaza a líderes y comunicadores del Cauca. *El País*. Retrieved from www.elpais.com.co.

- Parkins, W. (2000, April). Protesting like a girl: embodiment, dissent and feminist agency. *Feminist Theory* 1(1),59-78.
- Paternostro, S. (2011, April). Drug busts. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from www.theatlantic.com.
- Paterson, K. (2013, September 18). Women under siege: Colombia. *Women Under Siege Project*. Retrieved from www.womenundersiegeproject.org
- Patrick, S. (2011, November 18). Why Women Matter in Peacebuilding. *The Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org>.
- Payne, J. (1968). *Patterns of conflict in Colombia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Pearce, J. (1990). *Colombia: Inside the labyrinth*. London, UK: Latin America Bureau.
- Pécaut, D. (1999). From the banality of violence to real terror: the case of Colombia. In K. Koonings and D. Kruijff (Eds.), *Societies of fear: The legacies of civil war, violence, and terror in Latin America* (pp. 141-167). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Pedraza Gómez, Z. (2004). El regimen biopolítico en América Latina. *Cuerpo y pensamiento social*. *Iberoamericana* 4(15),7-19.
- Pérez, M. and Brown, D. (2013, November 15). Putting profits over people: extractivism and human rights in Colombia. *Upside Down World*. Retrieved from <http://upsidedownworld.org>.
- Petras, J. (2001). The Geopolitics of Plan Colombia. *Monthly Review*, 53(1),30-49.
- (1999, December). NGOs: in the service of imperialism. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 29(4),429-440.
- (1997, December). Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America. *Monthly Review* 49,10-27.
- Pettersson, O.O. (2016, March 6). ELN 'recruiting' dissident FARC guerrillas while negotiating peace. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Philipose, L. (2007). The politics of pain and the uses of torture. *Signs* 37(4),1047-1071.
- Pieterse, J. N. (2004, June). Neoliberal empire. *Theory, Culture & Society* 21,119-140.
- Polanyi, K. (2001 [1944]). *The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Polgreen, L. (2005, February 11). Darfur's babies of rape are on trial from birth. *New York Times*: A1.

- Power, M. (2011, April 23). The devastation of Colombia's civil war: in Colombia, years of civil war and assassinations have torn families apart. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from www.guardian.co.uk.
- Quintero, Beatriz (2005, February 21-23). Las mujeres colombianas y la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 1991 – participación e impactos. Paper presented at CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe), Unidad Mujer y Desarrollo: Seminario Internacional “Reformas Constitucionales y Equidad de Género.” Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia.
- Radcliffe, S.A. & S. Westwood (1993). *‘Viva’: Women and popular protest in Latin America*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Ramazanoğlu, C., with J. Holland (2002). *Feminist methodology: Challenges and choices*. London, UK: SAGE Publications.
- Ramirez Cuellar, F. (2005). *The profits of extermination: How U.S. corporate power is destroying Colombia*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage.
- Ramirez Parra, P. (2009, April). El movimiento de mujeres frente al conflicto armado en Colombia y la construcción de paz 1998-2008. *Revista Foro* 67,31-43.
- Ranchod-Nilsson, S. and Tetrault, M.A. (Eds.) (2000). *Women, states, and nationalism: At home in the nation?* London: Routledge.
- Ray, R. and Korteweg, A.C. (1999). Women’s movements in the Third World: identity, mobilization, and autonomy. *Annual Review of Sociology* 25,47-71.
- Red de Hermandad y solidaridad con Colombia (2013, September 1). Asesinada defensora de derechos y liderazgo campesina del Macizo Colombiano. Retrieved from www.redcolombia.org.
- Red de Mujeres del Caribe (2009). Historia de la Red de Mujeres del Caribe. Retrieved from Scribd.com.
- Red Nacional de Mujeres, Alianza Iniciativa de Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz, Corporación de Investigación y Social y Económica, and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (2012, September 3). OPEN LETTER: To Mr. Juan Manuel Santos President of the Republic of Colombia - Women at the Negotiation Table. Retrieved from Peacewomen.org.
- Red Nacional de Mujeres (2001). Audiencia pública de las mujeres: economía y empleo. San Vicente del Caguán, 6/25/2000. Bogotá, Colombia: Cuadernos de Mujeres en el Trabajo por la Paz.
- Rehn, E. and Sirleaf, E.J. (2002). Women, War, and Peace: The Independent Experts’

- Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict and Women's Role in Peace-Building. New York, NY: UNIFEM.
- Reproductive Health Matters (2004, May). Destruction of the vagina in violent rape a war crime in Congo. *Reproductive Health Matters* 12(23),181.
- República de Colombia, Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia (2011). Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras (Ley 1448). Bogotá, Colombia: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia.
- Restrepo Rhodes, Heidi Andrea (2016, March 7). Dreams and dignity: confronting gendered violence in Colombia. *TeleSUR English*. Retrieved from www.telesurtv.net.
- Reuters (2016, February 25). Colombia's finance minister under investigation for Isagen sale. *Business Insider*. Retrieved from www.businessinsider.com.
- (2013, January 14). Syrian war refugees flee sexual violence: aid agency. *Reuters*. Retrieved from www.reuters.com.
- (2010, November 20). Colombia says top rebel leader believed killed. *Reuters*. Retrieved from www.msnbc.com.
- Richani, N. (2015, April 20). Forced displacement, concentration of land property, and the rentier political economy in Colombia. *Journal of International Affairs*. Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. Retrieved from www.jia.sipa.columbia.edu.
- (2013). *Systems of violence: The political economy of war and peace in Colombia*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Richard, N. (1996). Feminismo, experiencia y representación. *Revista Iberoamericana* 62(176-177),733-744.
- Rodrigues Bozzetto, R. (2015, November 14). Translocal politics and the potential for new forms of cross-border solidarity. Paper presented at the annual congress of the National Women's Studies Association, Milwaukee, WI.
- Rodriguez, M. (2013, June 1). La trastienda política de la Ley de Víctimas: una mirada desde lo local. Paper presented at the annual congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC.
- Rohter, L. (2000, July 14). Colombians tell of massacre, as army stood by. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com.
- Rojas, C. (2012). La dimensión no tan conocida: el enfoque de género como una herramienta para analizar la construcción de paz. In A. Rettberg (Ed.), *Construcción de paz en Colombia* (pp. 437-461). Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes.

- (2004). In the midst of war: women's contributions to peace in Colombia. In Anderlini, S.M. (Ed.) *Women Waging Peace Policy Commission Series*. Cambridge, MA: Hunt Alternatives Fund.
- Rojas, R. (2014, February 7). La excarcelación de los paramilitares. *La Silla Vacía*. Retrieved from Lasillavacia.com.
- Rojas, S. (2013). Understanding neo-developmentalism in Latin America: new industrial policies in Brazil and Colombia. In D. Trubek, H. García, D. Coutinho, and A. Santos (Eds.), *Law and the new developmental state: The Brazilian experience in Latin American context* (pp. 65-113). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Rojas Mejía, P. (2011, March 11). Colombia: The only risk (for investors) is social unrest. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.org.
- Roldán, M. (2010). End of discussion: violence, participatory democracy, and the limits of dissent in Colombia. In E. Arias and D. Goldstein (Eds.), *Violent democracies in Latin America*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- (2002). *Blood and fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946-1953*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Ronderos, M.T. (2011, September 6). La fiebre minera se apoderó de Colombia. *Semana*. Retrieved from www.semana.com.
- Roorda, J. (2009, April 8). Women on their way up in Colombian army. *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Roschelle, A.R., Toro-Morn, M.I., & Facio, E. (2010). Toward a Feminist Methodological Approach to the Intersection of Race, Class, and Gender: Lessons from Cuba. In Segal, M.T. (Ed.) *Interactions and intersections of gendered bodies at work, at home, and at play* (pp. 357- 380). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Rubbo, A. (1975). The spread of capitalism in rural Colombia: effects on poor women. In R. Reiter (Ed.), *Toward an anthropology of women*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Ruddick, S. (1989). *Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace*. London: The Women's Press.
- (1998). "Woman of peace": a feminist construction. In L.A. Lorentzen and J. Turpin (Eds.), *The women and war reader*. New York: New York University Press. 213-226.
- Ruíz-Navarro, C. (2013, November 4). Lo que tienen que decir las mujeres sobre la paz. *Razón Pública*. Retrieved from www.razonpublica.com.

- Ruiz, D.B. (2010). El desplazamiento forzado tiene rostro de mujer. *La Manzana de la Discordia*. Centro de Estudios de Género, Mujer y Sociedad, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia. 5(1),65-78.
- Ruiz, M., Ed. (2003, June). Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres: No parimos hijos ni hijas para la guerra. Medellín: Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres.
- Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres (2013a, November). *La verdad de las mujeres: víctimas del conflicto armado en Colombia, Tomos I y II*. Bogotá: Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres.
- (2013b). *Memoria para la vida: una comisión de la verdad desde las mujeres para Colombia*. Bogotá: Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres.
- (n.d.) El cuerpo: nuestro primer territorio. Ruta Pacífica Cauca private archives, Popayán, Colombia.
- Sabido Ramos, O. (2011). El cuerpo y la afectividad como objetos de estudio en América Latina: intereses temáticos y proceso de institucionalización reciente. *Sociológica* 26(4),33-78.
- Safa, H. (1990, September). Women's social movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society* 4(3),354 - 369.
- Said, E.W. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Salamanca, R.E. (2014). Colombia: legitimacy, women, and the peace talks. Conciliation Resources. *Accord Series* 25,26-27. Retrieved from www.c-r.org/accord.
- Salinas Abdala, Y. (2011). *Mujeres y restitución de tierras*. Bogotá, Colombia: Indepaz.
- Sánchez, G., et. al. (2011). *Mujeres y guerra: Víctimas y resistentes en el Caribe Colombiano*. Informe del Grupo de Memoria Histórica de la Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. Bogotá: Grupo de Memoria Histórica.
- Sánchez, G., (1992). The Violence: An interpretive synthesis. In C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda, and G. Sánchez. *Violence in Colombia: The contemporary crisis in historical perspective*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Sánchez, N., & Line, M. (2012, October 18). Missing from Colombia, FARC peace negotiations: women. *Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from csmonitor.com.
- Sánchez Blake, E. (2013, May 29-June 1). De actores armadas a sujetos de paz: mujeres y reconciliación en el conflicto colombiano. XXI International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA). Washington, DC.
- Sánchez Gómez, O.A. (2006). *Nuevas formas de resistencia civil de lo privado a lo público: Movilizaciones de la Ruta Pacífica, 1996-2003*. Bogotá: Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres.

- (2008). *Las violencias contra la mujeres en una sociedad en guerra*. Bogotá: Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres.
- (1995). El movimiento social de mujeres. La construcción de nuevos sujetos sociales. In Velásquez Toro, M. (Ed.) *Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia. Tomo I: mujeres, historia y política* (pp. 379-402). Consejería Presidencial para la Política Social. Editorial Norma: Bogotá.
- Sandino Palmera, V. (2016, February 15). Impacto del neoliberalismo en la vida de las mujeres. *Farianas: Mujeres que hacen historia*. Retrieved from www.mujerfariana.org.
- Sandoval, C. (1991). U.S. Third World Feminism: The Theory and Method of Oppositional Consciousness in the Postmodern World. *Genders* 10,1-24.
- Santos, J.M. (2016, February 3). Colombia: its transformation and future challenges. Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center Amphitheater, Washington, DC: *The Wilson Center*. Webcast. Retrieved from www.wilsoncenter.org.
- Sasson-Levy, O. & Rapaport, T. (2003). Body, gender, and knowledge in protest movements: the Israeli case. *Gender and Society* 17(3),379-403.
- Scarry, E. (1987). *The body in pain: The making and unmaking of the world*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scheper-Hughes, N. (2004). Bodies, death, and silence. In N. Scheper-Hughes & P. Bourgois (Eds.). *Violence in war and peace: An anthology* (pp. 175-185). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Schiebinger, L. (1999). Theories of gender and race. In Shildrick, M. and Price, J. (Eds.), *Feminist theory and the body: A reader* (pp. 21-31). New York: Routledge.
- Schild, V. (1998). New subjects of rights? Women's movements and the construction of citizenship in the "new democracies." In Álvarez, S., E. Dagnino, and A. Escobar (Eds.). *Cultures of politics, politics of cultures: Re-visioning Latin American social movements* (pp. 93-117). Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Schirch, L. (2005). *Ritual and symbol in peacebuilding*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Schiwy, F. (2007). Decolonization and the question of subjectivity: gender, race, and binary thinking. *Cultural Studies* 21(2),271-294.
- Scott, J.W. (1986, December). Gender: a useful category of historical analysis. *American Historical Review* 91(5), 1053 – 1075.
- Segato, R. (2013). La escritura en el cuerpo de las mujeres asesinadas en Ciudad Juárez:

- Territorio, soberanía y crímenes del segundo estado. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Tinta Limón Ediciones.
- Semana (2014, November 27). AI denuncia ineficacia del proceso de restitución de tierras. *Semana*. Retrieved from www.semana.com.
- (2013, November 18). Farc azotan norte de Cauca y sur del Valle. *Semana*. Retrieved from www.semana.com.
- (2003, September 8). Intervención del presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez durante la posesión del nuevo Comandante de la Fuerza Aérea Colombia, general Édgar Alfonso Lesmez. *Semana*. Retrieved from www.semana.com.
- (2002, November 16). Las ONG: ¿héroes o villanos? *Semana*. Retrieved from www.semana.com.
- (1984, April 30). Narcoguerrilla: ¿otro embuchado? *Semana*. Retrieved from www.semana.com.
- Serrano, A. (2014, February 6). Dying for the promised land: Colombia struggles with land restitution law. *Al Jazeera America*. Retrieved from www.aljazeera.com.
- Shayne, J. (2004). *The revolution question: Feminisms in El Salvador, Chile, and Cuba*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Shayne, J. & Leissle, K. (2014). Introduction: research, risk, and activism: feminist stories of social justice. In J. Shayne (Ed.), *Taking risks: Feminist activism and research in the Americas*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Sherman, E. (2015, September 30). America is the richest, and most unequal, country. *Fortune*. Retrieved from www.fortune.com.
- Shildrick, M. & Price, J. (1999). Openings on the body: a critical introduction. In *Feminist theory and the body: A reader*. New York: Routledge. 1-14.
- Shiva, V. & Mies, M. (2004). The subsistence perspective. In S. Harding (Ed.), *The feminist standpoint theory reader: Intellectual and political controversies* (pp. 333-338). New York: Routledge.
- Silva, E. (2009). *Challenging neoliberalism in Latin America*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Silva, S.T. (2009, March 27). El Código de Minas: una de las rodillas temblorosas del establecimiento. El caso de Guamocó. *Prensa Rural*. Retrieved from www.prensarural.org.

- Sikkink, K., Marchesi, B., Dixon, P., & D'Alessandra, F. (2014, October 24). Reparaciones Integrales en Colombia: Logros y Desafíos (Draft). Harvard Kennedy School Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. Retrieved from http://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/Documento_409315_20141116.pdf.
- Sikkink, K. (2009). Comments on the Colombia chapters from the perspective of human rights theories. In E. Babbit & E. Lutz (Eds.), *Human rights and conflict resolution in context: Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Northern Ireland* (pp. 70-88). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Sitrin, M. (2013). Measuring success: affective or contentious politics? In N. Bookchin, et al., *Militant research handbook*. New York: New York University. Retrieved from www.militantresearchcollective.org.
- Sjoberg, L., and S. Via (Eds.) (2010). *Gender, war, and militarism: Feminist perspectives*. Boulder, CO: Praeger.
- Small, M. 2012: Challenges to IDP policy implementation in Colombia. The Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, The University of Minnesota. Retrieved from <http://www.hhh.umn.edu>.
- Smith, M. (2006, March 3). Colombia's baffling reality. *National Catholic Reporter*. Retrieved from www.natcath.org.
- Solano Suárez, Y. (2011). La difícil construcción del Caribe continental Colombiano como región. *Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Sede Caribe – Instituto de Estudios Caribeños*. Retrieved from <http://www.catedras-bogota.unal.edu.co>.
- (2007). The Women's Emancipatory Constituent Process for Peace in Colombia. In L. Durán, N. Payne, & A. Russo (Eds.), *Building feminist movements and organizations: Global perspectives* (pp. 181-189). New York: Zed.
- (2006). *Regionalización y movimiento de mujeres: Procesos en el Caribe Colombiano*. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Spelman, E. (1982). Woman as body: ancient and contemporary views. *Feminist Studies* 8(1),109-131.
- Spivak, G. C. (1988). *In other worlds: Essays in cultural politics*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- (1988). Can the Subaltern Speak? In C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Eds.), *Marxism and the interpretation of culture* (pp. 271-313). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Springer, S. (Forthcoming, 2016). *The discourse of neoliberalism: Anatomy of a powerful idea*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

- Stahler-Sholk, R., Vanden, H., and Kuecker, G.D. (2008). *Latin American social movements in the twenty-first century: Resistance, power, and democracy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Stanski, K. (2006). Terrorism, gender, and ideology: a case study of women who join the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In J. Forest (Ed.), *The making of a terrorist: Recruitment, training, and root causes* (pp. 126-150). Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Stephen, L. (1997). *Women and social movements in Latin America: Power from below*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Sternbach, N., Navaro-Aranguren, M., Chuchryk, P., and Álvarez, S. (1992, Winter). Feminisms in Latin America: from Bogotá to San Bernardo. *Signs* 17(2),393-434.
- Stokes, D. (2005). *America's other war: Terrorizing Colombia*. New York, NY: Zed Books.
- Stoltz Chinchilla, N. (1991, September). Marxism, feminism, and the struggle for democracy in Latin America. *Gender and Society* 5(3),291-310.
- Stone, A. (2004). From political to realist essentialism: rereading Luce Irigaray. *Feminist Theory* 5(1),5-23.
- Stratfor (2016, April 8). The limits of Colombia's imminent peace deal. *Stratfor: 20 Years of Global Intelligence*. Retrieved from www.stratfor.com.
- Suárez Gómez, E. (2013, September 18). Bacrim: heirs to Colombia's paramilitary groups. *Infosurhoy*. Retrieved from www.infosurhoy.com.
- Summers, N. (2009, September). Colombia's Victims' Law: Transitional Justice in a time of violent conflict? *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 25(1),219-235.
- Sutton, B. (2013). Fashion of fear: Securing the body in an unequal global world. In E. Masi de Casanova & A. Jafar, *Bodies without borders*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 75-99.
- (2010). *Bodies in crisis: Culture, violence, and women's resistance in neoliberal Argentina*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- (2007a). Poner el cuerpo: women's embodiment and political resistance in Argentina. *Latin American Politics and Society* 49(3),129-162.
- (2007b). Naked protest: memories of bodies and resistance at the World Social Forum. *Journal of International Women's Studies* 8(3),139-148.
- Sutton, B. & Paarlberg-Kvam, K. (2016). Fashion of fear for kids. In B. Lüthi & O. Stieglitz

- (Eds.), *InVisible Culture: An Electronic Journal for Visual Culture*, 25 [Special issue: Securitization and Visual Culture in Past and Present]. In press.
- Tabak, S. (2011). False dichotomies of Transitional Justice: gender, conflict and combatants in Colombia. *New York University Journal of International Law and Policy* 44,103.
- Tamayo, M. (1998). Los movimientos de mujeres en el proceso constitucional 1990-1991. MS. Fondo de documentación mujer y género Ofelia Uribe de Acosta, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá.
- Tarrow, S. G. (2011). *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- (1996). States and opportunities: the political structuring of social movements. In D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald, *Comparative perspectives on social movements* (pp. 41-61). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tate, W. (2015). *Drugs, thugs, and diplomats: U.S. policymaking in Colombia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- (2013a, October 7). Challenges to Land Restitution in Colombia: a conversation with Winifred Tate [audio podcast]. *Washington Office on Latin America*. Retrieved from www.wola.org.
- (2013b, June 1). Women and violence in southern Colombia: new agendas, old issues. Paper presented at the annual congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC.
- (2007). *Counting the dead: The culture and politics of human rights activism in Colombia*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Taussig, M. (1980). *The devil and commodity fetishism in South America*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- (2003). *Law in a lawless land: Diary of a limpieza in Colombia*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- (2004). Talking terror. In N. Scheper-Hughes & P. Bourgois (Eds). *Violence in war and peace: An anthology* (pp. 171-174). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Taylor, M. (2009). The contradictions and transformations of neoliberalism in Latin America: from structural adjustment to “empowering the poor.” In L. McDonald & A. Ruckert (Eds.), *Post-neoliberalism in the Americas*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Tegel, S. (2016, January 20). Colombia cracks down on a horrific wave of acid attacks against women. *Global Post*. Retrieved from www.globalpost.com.

- TeleSur English (2016, June 23). Live updates: Colombia, FARC sign cease-fire accord. Retrieved from www.telesurtv.net.
- Theidon, K. (2009). Reconstructing masculinities: the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants in Colombia. *Human Rights Quarterly* 31,1-34.
- (2007). Transitional subjects: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in Colombia. *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1(1),66-90.
- (2001). Terror's talk: fieldwork and war. *Dialectical Anthropology* 26,19-35.
- Thirteen and Fork Films (2011). *Women, War and Peace [Television Series.]* Public Broadcasting Service.
- Thorp, R. (Ed.) *Latin America in the 1930s: The role of the periphery in world crisis*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- El Tiempo (2014a, November 19). La Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres, galardonada con Premio Nacional de Paz. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from www.eltiempo.com.
- (2014b, October 9). Uribe adiciona más pruebas en la Fiscalía contra Hollman Morris. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from www.eltiempo.com.
- (2013, September 23) Litigio con Nicaragua por San Andrés. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from www.eltiempo.com.
- (2012a, November 14). Conozca los megaproyectos de Buenaventura. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from www.eltiempo.com.
- (2012b, April 9). En cinco años han asesinado a 71 líderes de tierras: Defensoría. *El Tiempo*. Retrieved from www.eltiempo.com.
- (2004a, August 13). "Mujeres piden paz sin impunidad." *El Tiempo*:1-4. Print.
- (2004b, May 12). "Mujeres Piden Respuestas." *El Tiempo*: 1-6. Print.
- Tilly, C. and Wood, L. (2013). *Social movements: 1768-2012*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Tinsman, H. (2008, December). A paradigm of our own: Joan Scott in Latin American History. *The American Historical Review* 113(5),1357-1374.
- Tourism Review (2015, August 7). Colombia: peace process to attract 5.2 million visitors. *Tourism Review*. Retrieved from www.tourism-review.com.
- Trotta, D. (2011, October 13). Election bloodshed mars Colombia's improved image. *Reuters*. Retrieved from www.reuters.com.

- Tovar-Restrepo, M. and C. Irazábal (2014, January). Indigenous women and violence in Colombia: agency, autonomy, and territoriality. *Latin American Perspectives* 41(1),39-58.
- Tovar-Rojas, P. (2004). El cuerpo subordinado y politizado: reflexión crítica sobre género y antropología médica. *Revista Colombiana de Antropología* 40. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia. 253-282.
- Tripp, A.M., Ferree, M.M., and Ewig, C. (Eds.) (2013). *Gender, violence, and human security: Critical feminist perspectives*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Tripp, A.M., Casimiro, I., Kwesiga, J., & Mungwa, A. (2009). *African women's movements: Transforming political landscapes*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Trujillo-Gómez, A. (2013, April 29). The role of women in peacebuilding in Colombia. Unpublished thesis, Department of Conflict Resolution, Georgetown University.
- UNICEF (2004, November 25). Press release: Women in armed conflict at extreme risk of sexual violence. *United Nations Children's Emergency Fund*. Retrieved from <http://www2.unicef.org>.
- UN Women (2015, May 28). *Women take the reins to build peace in Colombia*. Retrieved from www.unwomen.org.
- United Nations (2010, March). Guidance Note of the Secretary General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice. *United Nations Rule of Law*. Retrieved from www.unrol.org.
- (2009). *Human Security in Theory and Practice: An Overview of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*. Retrieved from www.un.org.
- United Nations News Centre (2009, October 15). Human rights expert calls joint UN-Congolese army action 'catastrophic.' *United Nations*. Retrieved from www.un.org.
- United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (2015, March). The handling of sexual harassment and misconduct allegations by the department's law enforcement components. Retrieved from <http://oig.justice.gov/reports>.
- United States Energy Information Administration (2015). Colombian Energy Data, Statistics, and Analysis. *U.S. Department of Energy*. Retrieved from www.eia.gov.
- United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (2016, March 8). Women in the Peace Process: Making Peace Last in Colombia. Webcast conference. Retrieved from www.usip.org
- University of Wisconsin Press (1986). Review of the book *The assassination of Gaitán: Public*

- life and urban violence in Colombia*, by Herbert Braun. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Retrieved from <http://uwpress.wisc.edu>.
- Uribe, M.T. (1995). La coyuntura de los años 80. La multiplicidad de la crisis y la contrastación de factores. In Velásquez Toro, M. (Ed.) *Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia. Tomo I: Mujeres, historia y política* (pp. 283-300). Consejería Presidencial para la Política Social. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Norma.
- Uribe, M.L. (1995). Mujeres y violencia: una historia que no termina. In Velásquez Toro, M. (Ed.) *Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia. Tomo I: Mujeres, historia y política* (pp. 348-361). Consejería Presidencial para la Política Social. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Norma.
- Urrutia, M. (1994). Colombia. In J. Williamson (Ed.), *The political economy of policy reform* (pp. 285-315). Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Valenzuela, S. (2014, April 5). Destierro en Bajamar. *El Espectador*. Retrieved from Elespectador.com
- Vanden, H. (2007). Social movements, hegemony, and new forms of resistance. *Latin American Perspectives* 34(2),17-30.
- Vanguardia Liberal (2004, November 27). Movimiento de mujeres por la paz hace duras críticas al proceso Gobierno-AUC. *Vanguardia Liberal*. 2A.
- (2003, March 8). Mujeres asociadas. *Vanguardia Liberal*. 2D.
- Vargas, V. (2009). International feminisms – the World Social Forum. In J. Jaquette (Ed.), *Feminist agendas and democracy in Latin America* (pp. 145-164). Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009.
- (2002). Los feminismos latinoamericanos en su tránsito al nuevo milenio. In D. Mato (Ed.), *Estudios y tras prácticas intelectuales latinoamericanos en cultura y poder*. Caracas: CLASCO.
- Velasco, H. (2016, February 26). In jungle camp, Colombia rebels take peace lessons. *Agence-France Press*. Retrieved from <http://news.yahoo.com>.
- Velásquez Toro, M. (1995). La República Liberal y la lucha por los derechos civiles y políticos de las mujeres. In Velásquez Toro, M. (Ed.) *Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia. Tomo I: mujeres, historia y política* (pp. 173-228). Consejería Presidencial para la Política Social. Editorial Norma: Bogotá.
- (Ed.) (1995). *Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia. Tomo I: mujeres, historia y política*. Consejería Presidencial para la Política Social. Editorial Norma: Bogotá.

- Velásquez Toro, M. & Reyes Cardenas, C. (1995). Proceso histórico y derechos de las mujeres, años 50 y 60. In Velásquez Toro, M. (Ed.) *Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia. Tomo I: mujeres, historia y política* (pp. 229-257). Consejería Presidencial para la Política Social. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Norma.
- Verdad Abierta (2015, May 8). Si en la mesa hubiera más mujeres la negociación iría más rápido. Retrieved from www.verdadabierta.com.
- (2013, May 29). Asesinan a hijo de reclamante de tierras en Bolívar. Retrieved from www.verdadabierta.com.
- Via, S. (2010). Gender, militarism, and globalization: soldiers for hire and hegemonic masculinity. In L. Sjoberg and S. Via (Eds.), *Gender, war, and militarism: Feminist perspectives* (pp. 42-53). Boulder, CO: Praeger.
- Villar, O. & Cottle, D. (2011). *Cocaine, death squads, and the war on terror: U.S. imperialism and class struggle in Colombia*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Villareal Méndez, N. (1995). Mujeres y espacios políticos. Participación política y análisis electoral. In Velásquez Toro, M. (Ed.) *Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia. Tomo I: mujeres, historia y política* (pp. 319-347). Consejería Presidencial para la Política Social. Editorial Norma: Bogotá.
- Vision of Humanity (2016). *Global peace index*. Retrieved from www.visionofhumanity.org.
- Voz (2004, May 19). El silencio de la impunidad. *Voz*.
- Wack, O. (2014, March 4). Colombia: with peace on the horizon, new risks emerge. *Forbes*. Retrieved from www.forbes.com.
- Wade, P. (2012). Afro-Colombian Social Movements. In Dixon, K. and Burdick, J. (Eds.), *Comparative perspectives on Afro-Latin America* (pp. 135-155). Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- (2000). *Music, race, and nation: Música tropical in Colombia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (1995). *Blackness and race mixture: The dynamics of racial identity in Colombia*. Johns Hopkins Studies in Atlantic History and Culture. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wallace, A. (2014, March 24). Buenaventura, la nueva capital del horror en Colombia. *British Broadcasting Company*. Retrieved from bbc.co.uk.
- Watkins, T. (2016, March 13). U.S., Colombian militaries eye a post-conflict future. *Agence-France Press*. Retrieved from <http://news.yahoo.com>.

- Wax, E. (2005, January). I am the mother of my enemy's child. *Marie Claire* 12(1),58-65.
- Whitney, W.T. (2016, January 25). Yes, peace in Colombia, but will there be justice? *Counterpunch*. Retrieved from www.counterpunch.org.
- Wichterich, C. (2000). *The globalized woman: Reports from a future of inequality*. New York: Zed Books.
- Wickham-Crowley, T. & Eckstein, S. (2015). The persisting relevance of political economy and political sociology in Latin American social movement studies. *Latin American Research Review* 50(4),3-25.
- Wilde, A. (1984, June). Redemocratization, the Church, and democracy in Colombia. *Kellogg Working Paper Series*. South Bend, IN: The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at Notre Dame University. Retrieved from www.kellogg.nd.edu.
- Williams, P. [paulwilliamsdc]. (2016, March 8). Colombia peace process success! Why? Bc women srsly involved in negotiations @USIP @nancylinborg #CPRF #IWD2016 [Tweet]. Retrieved from <https://twitter.com/PaulWilliamsDC>
- Willis Garcés, A. (2009, February 4). Ruta Pacífica: Colombian Women Against Violence. Upside Down World. Retrieved from www.upsidedownworld.org.
- Wills Obregón, M.E., & Sánchez Gómez, G. (2011a). La memoria histórica desde la perspectiva de género: conceptos y herramientas. Grupo de Memoria Histórica de la Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación. CNRR-Grupo de Memoria Histórica, Bogotá.
- Wills Obregón, M.E. (2011b). Las luchas por la ampliación de la ciudadanía de las mujeres en Colombia durante el siglo XX: Contrastes y aprendizajes de tres momentos. Retrieved from www.scribd.com.
- (2000). Las 5 viajes de los feminismos en Colombia (1980-1999): avances y estancamientos. Dpto. de Ciencias Sociales, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Cuaderno No. 13, Lima, Perú.
- Wills Obregón, M.E., & Gómez Correal, D. (2006). Los movimientos sociales de mujeres (1970-2005): inovaciones, estancamiento y nuevas apuestas. In *La Encrucijada: Colombia en el Siglo XXI*, 1. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Norma. 291-322.
- WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America) (2015a). Peace Timeline. *Colombia peace: Monitoring progress in Colombia's peace dialogues*. Retrieved from www.colombiapace.org.
- (2015b, January 24). Colombia's military and the peace process. *Washington Office on Latin America*. Retrieved from www.wola.org.

- (2014, January 23). Perspectives on Colombia's Peace Process and Opportunities for U.S. Engagement. Webcast conference. Retrieved from www.wola.org.
- (2013, October 24). Testimony of Adam Isacson before the House of Representatives' Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission. Retrieved from www.wola.org.
- Wood, E.J. (2010). Sexual violence during war: toward an understanding of variation. In L. Sjoberg and S. Via (Eds.), *Gender, war, and militarism: Feminist perspectives* (pp. 124-137). Boulder, CO: Praeger.
- Woolford, W. (2006). The difference ethnography can make: understanding social mobilization and development in the Brazilian Northeast. *Qualitative Sociology* 29(3), 335-52.
- Women in Black (2012, March 5). We Condemn the Threats Against Ruta Pacífica. Retrieved from <http://wibitaly.blogspot.com>.
- World Bank (2015). World Bank open data. Retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/>
- World Bulletin (2016, June 21). Colombia tops UN list with most displaced persons. *World Bulletin/News Desk*. Retrieved from www.worldbulletin.net.
- Wylie, N. (2002). *European neutrals and non-belligerents in the Second World War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wyss, J. (2012, November 14). New study highlights vulnerability of Colombia's displaced girls and women. *The Miami Herald*. Retrieved from www.miamiherald.com.
- Yagoub, M. (2014, February 5). Narco-aesthetics: how Colombia's drug trade constructed female 'beauty.' *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.
- Yañez, S. (2015a, June 3). Reparación Colectiva: Más que un derecho, una apuesta para seguir siendo sujetas políticas y tejer paz. *Organización Femenina Popular*. Retrieved from www.prezi.com.
- (2015b, March 4). Balance del Proceso de Reparación Colectiva. *Organización Femenina Popular*. Retrieved from www.prezi.com.
- Yañez, S. & Becerra, Y. (2014). *Re-parar para la paz: Caminos y reflexiones en el proceso de reparación colectiva de la Organización Femenina Popular*. Bogotá, Colombia: Organización Femenina Popular and Unidad Víctimas.
- Young, I.M. (1980, April). Throwing like a girl: a phenomenology of feminine body compartment motility and spatiality. *Human Studies* 3(2),137-156.
- Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Intersectionality and feminist politics. *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13(3),193-209.

- (2004). Gender, the nationalist imagination, war, and peace. In W. Giles & J. Hyndman, *Sites of violence: Gender and conflict zones* (pp. 170-190). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Zeng, J. (2014, Winter). The politics of emotion in grassroots feminist protests: a case study of Xiaoming Ai's nude breasts photography protest online. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 41.
- Žižek, S. (2008). *Violence*. New York, NY: Picador.
- Zook, D. (Ed.), *Introduction to peace and conflict studies*. San Diego, CA: Cognella Academic Publishing.
- Zwehl, P. (2014, January 9). Violence against women in Colombia fueled by machismo culture and 'institutional weakness.' *Colombia Reports*. Retrieved from www.colombiareports.com.