

BOUNDLESS REVOLUTION: GLOBAL MAOISM AND COMMUNIST
MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1949-1979

by

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES

(History)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

(Vancouver)

July 2017

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that Chairman Mao Zedong's written texts, his thought (毛澤東思想, *Máo Zédōng Sīxiǎng*), and the institutions that he envisioned and established in China formed an ideological system, which evolved through several stages until manifesting outside China. In relevant scholarship thus far, due attention has not been paid to the complex interplay between Maoism and the intellectual foundations of Communist movements in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The dissertation applies a theoretical framework that expands upon Edward Said's concept of "Traveling Theory," which outlines three principal conditions of *production*, *transmission*, and *reception* by introducing three subsidiary problems of *reception*, *adaptation*, and *implementation* to uncover how Maoism came to be and, subsequently, globalized. Philip Kuhn's theory of the ideal socio-contextual "fit" of exogenous ideas allows us to uncover how one *receives*, interprets, and *adapts* exogenous ideas. Kenneth Jowitt's understanding of Leninism allows us to understand the essentials of *implementation*, whereby an adapted theory is put into practice by a regime tinged by the outside ideology. By focusing on Said's triad, we may approach the problems of *reception* of radical thought in Southeast Asia, its *adaptation* into different thought streams, and its *implementation* under Maoist or Marxist-Leninist courses.

Radical intellectuals from these countries who became Communists were networked individuals within a situated thinking responding to crises by taking a radical turn. Their reception of radical thought led to the original idea's transformation into a variant that was congruent with contemporary norms. As a genealogy of the social experiences and a close textual exegesis of political writings and pronouncements by the Cambodian Paris Group (Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Saloth Sar), José Maria Sison, and Dipa Nusantara Aidit ultimately reveals, their reception of radical thought from outside their milieus was *dialectical* in nature. They *spoke back*, investing Maoism with new signification, without abandoning the universality of the original theory (its Russian or its Chinese accretions), which stood as an alternative global model for waging national revolution and socialist transformation. In this way, this empirical study contributes to a better understanding of radical thought.

Lay Summary

The dissertation's purpose is to explain how Mao Zedong's written texts, thought, and institutions that he envisioned and established as Supreme Leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC, 1949-1976) formed the foundation of an ideology that he would export outside China, particularly in Southeast Asia. In Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, radical intellectuals engaged with this ideology after encountering Mao's works as students, and their reception of these materials paired with their experiences as Third World citizens to lead to their adaptations of Maoism into variants that spoke to norms and conditions in their respective countries. The goal is to shed long overdue light on the ways in which ideas borrowed from outside China for service to China by Mao, and then from Maoist China in Southeast Asia by radical thinkers, helped some societies cope with the intense pressures of economic, industrial, and political modernization.

Preface

This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, Matthew Galway, and represents an unpublished, independent work under the guidance of the doctoral dissertation committee: Dr. Timothy Cheek, Dr. Glen Peterson, and Dr. John Roosa.

Fieldwork for this dissertation across two years, and was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Doctoral Fellowship, the University of British Columbia Faculty of Arts Doctoral Fellowship, and supplementary grants from the Fukien Chinese Association, and the Ministry of Education of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Archival research began in Shanghai and Xiamen in 2014 and 2015, respectively, since the 中國共產黨中央對外聯絡 (International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China) and 外交部檔案管 (Foreign Ministry Archives of the People's Republic of China) in Beijing are off limits to foreign researchers. I conducted research at 上海圖書館 (Shanghai Library) and the 上海檔案管 (Shanghai Municipal Archives) and obtained complementary materials from the open stacks at East China Normal University and Fudan University. The 東南亞研究中心 (Southeast Asia Research) at Xiamen University provided useful sources that were easily obtainable, such as indispensable newsprint holdings that have not received prior attention in China-Cambodia analyses. I also conducted archival research at two national archives in the Kingdom of Cambodia: បណ្ណសាស្ត្រានជាតិកម្ពុជា (National Archives of Cambodia) and មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជា (Documentation Centre of Cambodia). The majority of primary sources obtained from these two archives include Khmer language issues of ផង បដិវត្តន៍ (Revolutionary Flag) newspapers, correspondences written by key political figures, and numerous speeches, interviews, and essays by the Communists under analysis in chapters four and five. Other key sources came from Paris at the Bibliothèque CUJAS of the Université Paris-Sorbonne, which provided original French-language copies of doctoral dissertations by some the central figures under examination in this study. No extant study has analyzed these three dissertations in relation to the origins of Cambodian Communism all at once, thus it represents a significant contribution.

Any typos or errors in the prose or translation are my fault alone and not those of the tireless committee members who devoted much of their time and energy to peering through the dense, detail-heavy fog that is my writing style.

Table of Contents

| | | |
|--|-----|-----|
| Abstract | ii | |
| Lay Summary..... | iii | |
| Preface | iv | |
| Table of Contents | v | |
| Acknowledgements | vi | |
| Dedication..... | x | |
| Introduction | 1 | |
| <u>Part One—From Mao Zedong Thought to Global Maoism</u> | | |
| Chapter One—A “Brilliant Beacon”: The Nature and Form of Mao Zedong Thought | | 36 |
| Chapter Two—Discovering Truth through Practice: Mao Zedong Thought, Implemented, and Transformed, 1949-1965..... | | 85 |
| Chapter Three—Revolution Exported: Mao’s Global Revolution | | 123 |
| <u>Part Two—Maoism in the Golden Land: The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK)</u> | | |
| Chapter Four—The Origins of Cambodia’s Maoist Vision: Revolutionary Intellectuals and Maoism, 1949-1975 | | 179 |
| Chapter Five—“We Must Combine Theory and Practice”: The Implementation of Cambodia’s Maoist Vision, 1975-1979 | | 256 |
| <u>Part Three—Maoism in the Coral Triangle</u> | | |
| Chapter Six: Maoist China and Communism in the Philippines and Indonesia..... | | 313 |
| Conclusion | | 388 |
| Bibliography | | 395 |

Acknowledgments

The dissertation research and writing processes have been literal and figurative journeys during which I experienced some of the most memorable encounters, made some amazing discoveries, and met truly inspirational and thought-provoking people who have influenced this work in innumerable ways. There were challenges, for sure: accessing primary documents, months upon months of translation across several languages, and frustrations with my own mechanical and, at times, horribly dry writing style. If one lesson was to be learned from writing this extensive (and exhaustive) study of Maoism in Southeast Asia, it is that taking on such an ambitious project that covers a broad range and period was a trial indeed. But it has been every bit as rewarding as I had imagined when I set out to conduct archival research for this project in Shanghai in 2014, or when my interest in Maoism piqued when I was an undergraduate student balancing a full course load with thirty-plus hours a week customer service jobs (genesis of my class consciousness).

While this dissertation represents the summation of over two years of research and writing, it is neither the product of mere talent, nor any kind of innate skill; rather, it is the result of hard work, through and through. The immortal Stephen King once wrote in his 1981 *Danse Macabre* that “writers are made, not born or created out of dreams or childhood trauma—that becoming a writer (or a painter, actor, director, dancer, and so on) is a direct result of conscious will. Of course there has to be some talent involved, but talent is a dreadfully cheap commodity, cheaper than table salt. What separates the talented individual from the successful one is a lot of hard work and study; a constant process of honing. Talent is a dull knife that will cut nothing unless it is wielded with great force—a force so great that the knife is not really cutting at all but bludgeoning and breaking (and after two or three of these gargantuan swipes it may succeed in breaking itself...)... Discipline and constant work are the whetstones upon which the dull knife of talent is honed until it becomes sharp enough, hopefully, to cut through even the toughest meat and gristle. No writer, painter, or actor—no *artist*—is ever handed a sharp knife (although a few people are handed almighty big ones; the name we give to the artist with the big knife is “genius), and we hone with varying degrees of zeal and aptitude.” (*Danse Macabre*, 88-89).

Many wonderful people have helped me with both the research and thought-work for this dissertation, and it is an absolute pleasure for me to acknowledge them for their helpful guidance

at various stages of the dissertation process. First and foremost, I am indebted to my professors. I may have quit long ago were it not for my devoted and always supportive doctoral adviser, Dr. Timothy Cheek, whose encouragement, patience, and selfless time and care were sometimes all that kept me at my desk day after day hard at work. My intellectual debt is to him and his scholarship, which inspired my interest in Mao and Maoism. I came to UBC a student whose rough experience in a previous doctoral program made it seem that actually finishing the final stages of the PhD appeared to be impossible. Dr. Cheek opened up a world of writing and speaking opportunities to me, and I cannot express my profound gratitude enough for what essentially boils down to him rescuing me from myself. I owe a lifetime of thanks to everything that he has done for me. I would also like to express my sincerest gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Glen Peterson and Dr. John Roosa, who provided helpful guidance and sage wisdom throughout the writing process. Their tireless efforts and patience with my sometimes confusing and impenetrable prose made this project so much more refined and well rounded. I would also like to thank Dr. Abidin Kusno, who was originally slated to serve on this committee, but whose advice during the preliminary stages of the dissertation and prospectus was every bit as instrumental.

The mere thought of graduate studies would have been beyond reach for me were it not for my Master's advisor, Dr. Micheline Lessard, who inspired my love of all things Southeast Asia and who remains a great friend. I also thank my friend Dr. Timothy Sedo, who was the first to encourage me to study intellectual history at the PhD level, and at UBC no less. Several scholars have influenced me greatly in my encounters and have guided my projects in one manner or another. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Yeh Wen-Hsin, Dr. Anne Ruth Hansen, Dr. Andrew Mertha, Dr. Timothy Brook, Dr. Malcolm Thompson, 馮永祥 Frank Smith, Dr. Brad Davis, and Dr. Ian Stewart. I would be remiss if I did not also express my gratitude to the agencies that funded my research ventures overseas. My heartiest thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for granting me a fellowship for the length of my research and writing endeavors. I also thank the University of British Columbia for the doctoral awards that kept me afloat while working in Vancouver, the UBC Department of History for always supporting my travels for research and to present at or attend major international conferences, and lastly, to the Huayu Enrichment Grant, which enabled my intensive study of Chinese.

At home and abroad, friends and academic colleagues brought their collective energies and enthusiasms into my world, and I would be equally remiss to not express my gratitude to them. In Vancouver, my sincerest thanks to members of my cohort—Jonathan Henshaw, Sarah Basham, Thomas Peotto, Ty Paradela, Eriks Bredovskis, Edgar Liao, Francois Lachapelle, Brandon Davis, Soma Banerjee, and Fred Vermote—for providing a listening ear to my plenitude of anxieties, problems, and overall nonsensical musings and/or political rants. You approached me with a subtle grace and compassion for which I am eternally grateful. Due thanks as well to my co-conspirator, Kampila Kalpashnikova, without whom our publication would not have come to realization, and to my friends and officemates Zhang Linting and Guo Li, who made CK Choi all the more inviting and fun to work in during my writing. Thanks also to my St. John's College brethren Chen Xing and Felipe “El Padre” Banados Schwerter for always welcoming me into a conversation and for remaining ever the stalwart colleagues through and through. In Shanghai, my 華東師範大學 (ECNU) colleagues, Zhang Hongbin, Li Yufeng, Lu Hua, Ma Nan, and my friend and co-author Liu Yajuan, were sources of tremendous inspiration throughout the research and writing of this study. I am indebted to their hospitality, encouragement, and kindness both in China and in Vancouver. My Taipei cohort of Paul Wanjohi, Daniel Bourke, Siriwat “真的”Phil, Yuki “不振的” Yanai, Jung Tse and Alison Roberts, Alex Lewis and Andrew Cunane, Lachlan and Nour Gannon, Will Turner, Simon Luk, and Elena Ebner, were all wonderful friends who welcomed me into their lives and took me at my best and worst without batting an eye. Words fail to express how much I appreciate that you are all in my life.

My colleagues at the University of Washington in Seattle, too, were equally as supportive, and introduced me to new opportunities across the world. To Lin Hongxuan and Jorge Bayona, who brought me on for panels in Seoul and Lima, respectively, I owe a lifetime debt of gratitude for your faith in me and what I could bring to the table. In Lima, specifically, I am indebted to Jorge for introducing me to a world of new friends, namely Jorge Barton Alba and Jorge Valdez Morgan from Peru, and University of Wisconsin-Madison PhD student Gioconda Coello of Ecuador. I look forward to seeing you all again, and collaborating on future transnational projects on our shared interests. My thanks also to Yale University's Marc Opper, and Cornell University's (and fellow Ottawan) Chris Tang, for your sage wisdom and enthusiasm for working with me as I follow your prodigious leads into the academic field.

Throughout this entire process I have relied on my family and friends, who have provided me with encouragement and support at every turn. To my UBC friends Benjamin Kearney, Myron Medina, Craig Duke, Ian “Colonel” and Tristan “TJ Grundy” Meiman, Mike Alexandersen, Jon Roth, Daniel Clegg, Kara Shin, Lavino Tan, and Tatsuya Suzuki, I offer my sincere gratitude, for each of you kept me going when times were their toughest. And to my students in Hist490, especially Erin Quittenton, Aviah Shanaz Randhawa, Eugenia Serrano, Noah Yatsko, Kat Friege, Tim Garner, and Trevor Leung: I am so honored to have taught you, and could not be more proud of you as you enter the next stage of your lives. Thank you for your patience with this first-time instructor, and for making that seminar the most fun and fulfilling experience of my young career. Lastly, I thank my family and friends for sticking with me over the years despite all of my silliness. Special thanks to my decades-long friends Michael “Ice Trey” Woods, Adam “Point Shot” Teav, and Ashley Toll, as well as to more recent, yet equally as special comrades Ken Commerford-Everett, Jordan “Pasquale” Melo, and Timothy Chung, who have remained in contact despite my globetrotting and who are always there to welcome me when I return home.

Dissertation work can seem like a Sisyphean ordeal, using all of your strength and energy to perform a task only to have to do it again, and for as long, the next day. But each and every person who I have listed above made what was an otherwise lonely and frustrating business that much more bearable. As Camus once said in his 1948 *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (The Myth of Sisyphus): “*La lutte elle-même vers les sommets suffit à remplir un cœur d'homme; il faut imaginer Sisyphe heureux* (The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy) (Gallimard, 1948; 168). As Sisyphus could accept, and even thrive in, the absurdity of the daily grind, my teachers, family, and friends stood by me and powered me through the absurdity of my task. I am so happy to have them in my life.

Dedication

I dedicate the following dissertation to four people without whom none of this would have been remotely possible.

To my mother, who never wavered in her support for me throughout my studies, and who taught me the value of hard work and dedication to a craft

To my grandmother, *Er cof cariadus* (1923-2015), whose love and encouragement carried me through some of the most difficult times of my life

To my advisor, Dr. Timothy Cheek, for his patience, helpful guidance, and for always encouraging me throughout my tenure at UBC

And to my hero, Chris Cornell, whose music served as a motivating and inspirational force throughout my life, and who died tragically on 17 May 2017 as this dissertation was near completion.

*And I'm lost, behind
Words I'll never find
And I'm left behind
As seasons roll on by*

Introduction

[A]s in private life one differentiates between what a man thinks and says of himself and what he really is and does, so in historical struggles one must distinguish still more phrases and fancies of parties from their real organism and their real interest, their conception of themselves, from their reality.¹ —Karl Marx, 1852

It is a confluence of socio-psychological strain and an absence of cultural resources by means of which to make sense of the strain, each exacerbating the other, that sets the stage for the rise of systematic (political, moral, or economic) ideologies.² —Clifford Geertz, 1964

At the 26 December 2013 symposium to commemorate the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth, the recently appointed General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping (习近平, *Xí Jìnpíng*), gave a speech in which he encouraged Party members to carry aloft the enduring spirit of "Mao Zedong Thought" (毛澤東思想, *Máo Zédōng Sīxiǎng*).³ Throughout the speech, Xi heralded Mao's role as ideological steward of the CCP and founder of the People's Republic of China's (PRC), whose brilliant thought was canonized at the Seventh Congress of the CCP in 1945 and included in the 1975 PRC constitution as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Importantly, Xi places particular emphasis on three basic tenets of Mao Zedong Thought in the peroration: 1) "to seek truth from facts" (實事求是, *shí shì qiú shì*); 2) the mass line; and 3) the importance of China's independence and "socialism with Chinese characteristics."⁴ All three of these pillars of Mao Zedong Thought, which Xi interpreted to refer to China specifically despite universal applicability, are notable since they pertain specifically, in his view, to China as a *particularity*. Indeed, the first invokes the 漢書 (Book of Han, *Hàn shū*) while Xi refers to it as "a fundamental tenet of Marxism," the second places primacy on the people as the motive force of history in China's revolution, while the third concerns the safeguarding of China's independence and the application of socialism to China's particular historical and cultural contexts.⁵

¹ Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *Karl Marx Surveys from Exile: Political Writings, Volume 2*. (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1992), 38.

² Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in *The Interpretation of Cultures*. (NY: Basic Books, 1973), 220.

³ Xi Jinping, "Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought," in *The Governance of China*. (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2014), 27-33.

⁴ *Ibid*, 27, 32. See also Xi Jinping, "Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," in *The Governance of China*, 23-26.

⁵ On the Book of Han, see Homer H. Dubs, trans., *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*. 3 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Waverly, 1938-55).

Towards the end of his speech, Xi's views on universal norms, or more specifically, universal modes of development, reveal themselves to be very much a vivid reflection of his China-centric view towards these three pillars of Mao Zedong Thought after his rise to CCP leadership and during his reign as Great Helmsman.⁶ He states that there “is *no such thing in the world as a development model that can be applied universally*, nor is there any development path that remains carved in stone. The diversity of historical conditions determines the diversity of the development paths chosen by various countries.”⁷ Xi's claim here is particularly interesting since he spent his formative years experiencing the Mao-centrism of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (including a tenure as a sent down youth in Shaanxi) when Maoism—by the 1960s a “vision and ideology fully implemented as social praxis,”⁸ was propounded ever so fervently by Mao loyalists like Lin Biao as a *universal* ideological system. Moreover, the pillars of Mao Zedong Thought that Xi identifies as inherent to China's past, present, and future success were, during Mao's time as Supreme leader of the PRC, all held as *universals* that virtually any Communist movement the world over could copy, with adaptation, to their own particular national struggles. Thus Xi's bold assertion that a universal mode of development is non-existent represents a false binary construct of universal (Marxism)/particular (China), which not only contradicts his own contention about universals, but also breathes new life into the discussion of how foreign ideas become familiar.

This dissertation focuses on the historical consequences of “traveling theory”⁹ by tracing the global linkages and shared political processes among the Communist movements in China, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. It selects these case studies since, during the Seventeen Years period (1949-1965), socialism in Communist China moved from an emphasis on class revolution to a larger anti-colonial project that sought to cast out Euro-American imperialism from Asia, establishing Asian independence in the global sphere in its place.¹⁰

⁶ David S. Goodman, *Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography*. (London: Routledge, 1995), 54-56.

⁷ Xi Jinping, “Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought,” 31. Emphasis added.

⁸ Liu Kang, “Maoism: Revolutionary Globalism for the Third World Revisited,” *Comparative Literature Studies* 52, No. 1, *Special Issue: Global Maoism and Cultural Revolution in the Global Context* (2015): 12-28, on page 17.

⁹ Edward W. Said, “Traveling Theory,” in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 226-247.

¹⁰ As John Garver explains, the PRC sought to support Communist movements in Southeast Asia to push back American encirclement and containment and a sincere ideological commitment to spread socialism as part of an idiom of revolutionary activism. Indeed, “[s]uccessful revolutions in Southeast Asia would vindicate the ‘correctness’ of Mao's approach to world affairs. Expanding the frontiers of socialism just as Lenin and Stalin had

Southeast Asia presents us with three insightful case studies from this period, with Cambodian and Filipino Communists, specifically, regarding China's historical experience as a proletarian-led protracted Communist movement consisting largely of peasants as suitable for their own endeavors. The present study takes a genealogical approach to uncovering the processes whereby Mao Zedong Thought, then known internationally as Maoism, came into being, and the conditions and problems of its emergence in Cambodian, Filipino, and Indonesian Communist circles, and in the first two cases, how their leaders came to regard it as an "alternative vision of modernity for Third World peoples" in their movements against imperialist hegemony.¹¹ It examines how Maoism interacted with endogenous thought and the would-be Maoist intellectuals' social experiences to shape their worldviews. The study regards Maoism as at once particular *and* universal, until becoming a universal ideological system: an ideology grounded in national experience and which gains universality *a posteriori*. And within this Maoist system certain emancipatory aspects such as its program for autonomous socialist transition and transformation, an inclusionary stress on collective movement, including peasant guerrilla warfare (a principal strategy of the Chinese revolution)¹² made it a suitable "fit" for Southeast Asian Communist movements. Accordingly the dissertation seeks to explain how Maoism as a "knowledge and theory of modernity"¹³ became an ideological system due to its unity of theory with practice, its emphasis on creative adaptation to concrete national realities, and its transformation of Marxism into a non-Western vision of universal modernity.

The present study argues that Mao Zedong's numerous written texts, his thought, and the institutions that he both envisioned and that he established in China during his reign formed the foundation of this ideological system, which evolved through several stages until manifesting outside China. Much like Mao, radical intellectuals from Southeast Asia who became Maoists were networked individuals within a situated thinking, who, to borrow from Thomas S. Kuhn, "responded to crises" (in these instances, colonization, post-independence underdevelopment and political corruption, capitalist imperialism, and urban/rural socioeconomic disequilibria) by

done would confirm Mao's position as rightful successor to Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Perhaps most importantly, a rising tide of revolution in Southeast Asia could encourage the revolutionary struggles Mao was directing within China to continue the revolution in anti-'revisionist' directions." John W. Garver, *China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 196-231, quote from page 196.

¹¹ Liu, "Maoism," 13.

¹² Ibid, 15.

¹³ Ibid, 14.

taking a radical turn to Maoism as their guidepost to national salvation.¹⁴ The reception of Maoism by these Communist Parties' intellectual thrust, moreover, led to its transformation into a variant that was congruent with contemporary norms and conditions. As textual exegesis and analyses of the political practices of these Maoists reveal, this reception was *dialectical* rather than a genuflection. These radical intellectuals *spoke back*, revivifying, and investing Maoism with new signification, without abandoning the universality of the original theory (its Russian or its Chinese accretions), which stood as a global model for waging national revolution and socialist transformation.¹⁵ In this way, this empirical study contributes to a better understanding of radical thought.

In relevant scholarship thus far, however, due attention has not been paid to the complex interplay between Maoism and the intellectual foundations of these three cases' Communist movements. Beyond shared ideological tenets, similar patterns between Mao's own reception of Marxism and formulation of Maoism, and the Southeast Asian intellectuals' own espousal of Maoism and subsequent adaptation of it represents a crucial connection that has remained, to this point, unnoticed. Social experiences and cultures act as moderating variables that form the building blocks of the body politic, thus the processes whereby the cultural and political norms shaped how outside thought was perceived, received, and transformed deserves considerable

¹⁴ As Kuhn states: "Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones." As for the response, he argues that when "Confronted with anomaly or with crisis, scientists take a different attitude toward existing paradigms, and the nature of their research changes accordingly." Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 66-76, first quote from page 68, and 77-91, second quote from pages 90-91. I also thank panel participants Timothy Weston (CU-Boulder), Christina Till (University of Hamburg), and Shakhari Rahav (University of Haifa) for their input, and Wen-hsin Yeh, as discussant, for some of the terminology. "May Fourth and Its Aftermath in a Transnational Context," (Association for Asian Studies Conference, Seattle, Washington, 1 April 2016).

¹⁵ On this point, I agree with notable scholars of Modern China Arif Dirlik and Nick Knight. Dirlik argues that Mao's Marxism is at once locally Chinese and universally Marxist: "Mao did not reduce Marxism to a Chinese version or view China merely as another illustration of universal Marxist principles. His exposition of the relationship is at once metonymic (Chinese Revolution reduced to aspect or function of Marxism in general) and synecdochic (intrinsic relationship of shared qualities). The result was a conception of the relationship that insisted on China's *difference* and yet represented Chinese Marxism as an embodiment of Marxism." Arif Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 97-100. Nick Knight, meanwhile, asserts that Mao's "'Sinification of Marxism' was an attempt to discover a formula by which the universal theory of Marxism could be applied in a particular national context *without abandoning the universality of that theory*." Nick Knight, *Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong Thought*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 199. See also Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995) 190-192; and Hans Van de Ven, "War, Cosmopolitanism, and Authority: Mao from 1937 to 1956," in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, Tim Cheek ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 96. Marxist features that remained *in toto* include the materialist concept of history (conflict between social classes), critique of capitalism's exploitation of the urban proletariat, and the theory of a proletarian revolution.

attention. The goal is to shed long overdue light on the ways in which norms borrowed from outside China for service to China by Mao, and then from Maoist China in Southeast Asia by radical thinkers, helped and/or hindered these societies in Southeast Asia cope with the intense pressures of economic, industrial, and political modernization. Much like ideology, the varied methods by which these radical intellectuals made the foreign accessible to themselves and then to their constituent vanguard bases, and how their largely elite, educated leadership was able to carve inroads into peasant societies, forms an essential cog in the moving wheel of the following work.

At the root of the issue, though, is how to trace the processes whereby Maoism came to be, and was later localized by Southeast Asian radical intellectuals. Edward Said brings us to this dilemma, asking the question, “What happens to it [a theory or idea] when, in different circumstances and for new reasons, it is used again and, in still more different circumstances, again?”¹⁶ To answer this question, the dissertation applies a theoretical framework that expands upon Said’s concept of “Traveling Theory,” which outlines three principal conditions, or processes, of how ideas travel across cultures: production, transmission (or export), and reception.¹⁷ It introduces three subsidiary problems of reception, adaptation, and implementation, to Said’s overarching theory for the purpose of uncovering how Maoism came to be and, subsequently, globalized. For the first two problems of reception and adaptation, Philip Kuhn’s theory of the ideal socio-contextual “fit” of exogenous ideas serves as the key to uncovering how one receives, interprets, and adapts ideas from without.¹⁸ As for the essentials of implementation, Kenneth Jowitt’s neo-Weberian understanding of Leninism, which posits that Leninist organizations combine charismatic-impersonal with rational bureaucratic [status/ classificatory] features, allows us to understand the methods by which an adapted theory is put into practice by a regime tinged by the outside ideology.¹⁹ By focusing specifically on the overarching processes of production (the crystallization of Mao Zedong Thought from Marxism), transmission (its export to the world), and reception (of Maoism by foreign Communists in various sociocultural contexts), we may approach the problems of reception of Maoism in Southeast Asia, its

¹⁶ Said, “Traveling Theory,” in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, 230.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 226-247.

¹⁸ Philip Kuhn, “Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-Cultural Dimensions of a Chinese Rebellion,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, No. 3 (July 1977): 350-366.

¹⁹ Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 1-49, and Timothy Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 10-13.

adaptation into different thought streams, and its implementation under these Maoist courses. Most crucially, an expanded model of Said's "Traveling Theory" is useful as a mid-level theory because it allows us to explain how and why ideas emerge when and where they do, why intellectuals espouse them and what dialectical process is at work in grasping foreign materials, and how they go about applying them concretely/ creatively in several (sometimes failed) stages. The expanded model also helps us to think freshly about Mao, Maoism, and our Southeast Asian case studies, although the present study's aspiration is to polish the model through time.

Three thematic sections comprise the dissertation, throughout which it applies the theoretical framework informed by Said, Kuhn, and Jowitt. The first section, titled "From Mao Zedong Thought to Global Maoism," focuses specifically on the formation of Mao Zedong Thought (process of production/ problem of reception), the mechanisms by which it rose to prominence within the CCP (problem of adaptation), its implementation in the newly established PRC (problem of implementation), and how in the 1960s, "Maoism" emerged as an ideology to be exported abroad (process of transmission). Each chapter traces threads between Mao's own experiences and encounters and those of the would-be Maoists in Cambodia since many of the same patterns occurred in these different contexts. The second section, "Maoism in the Golden Land: The Communist Party of Kampuchea," applies the three problems of ideas across cultures to Cambodia, which serves as a rich example and test case to generate by induction major factors to test across the other two cases.²⁰ The final section, "Maoism in the Coral Triangle," applies the three problems of ideas across cultures to the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines. It seeks to identify specific shared contextual factors, ranging from responses to colonial/neo-colonial subjugation, a critique of Soviet revisionism under Khrushchev, and a mutual criticism of American hegemony, across the three cases.

Chapter one discusses Maoism as per the Chinese leader's own writings and pronouncements as compiled by Takeuchi Minoru, and translated by Stuart Schram and Nick Knight (for particular verbiage in English). It uses these works to outline the ways in which Chinese Marxism became an ideological system through putting Marxism-Leninism into practice in China, making it congruent with contemporary norms, and ultimately forming Maoism after

²⁰ France's unwillingness to develop educational infrastructure despite its *mission civilisatrice* shares commonalities with the Dutch and American policies in their respective colonial holdings. See John Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor: King Sisowath and the 'Mission Civilisatrice' 1904-1927*. (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 225-226, 229, 310-311.

its export outside China. The second chapter examines how Mao Zedong Thought as codified in 1949 was put into practice, as Maoism, under the Chairman's rule and how it transformed as Mao confronted different challenges as Supreme Leader of Communist China, with particular attention placed on the policies that stood as hallmarks of his thought. The aim here is to give a picture of what Maoism looked like by 1965 when Saloth Sar ((Pol Pot, his *nom de guerre*, short for *Politique Potentielle*, coined for him by the Chinese leadership and derived from a French Communist slogan) came to drink at this font. The third chapter delves into the rise of Maoism beyond Mao and China by examining closely the CCP's effort to "export the Chinese revolution to the world" (向世界輸出革命, *xiàng shìjiè shūchū géming*), thereby leading to the globalization of Maoism.²¹ A close textual exegesis of a range of Chinese sources, ranging from Mao's own pronouncements to memoirs, Chinese newspaper articles, and documents on the Foreign Languages Press and International Bookstore, serves to illuminate the degrees to which the CCP balanced political objectives with a concerted effort to promote Maoism's universal applicability.

The second section shifts the attention from China to the intellectuals who founded the Communist Party of Kampuchea (hereafter CPK),²² and who took a radical turn to Maoism as a response to various crises in Cambodia in the early-to-mid-1950s. Chapters four and five examine the *reception* and *adaptation* of Maoism as it emerged in the foundational national texts of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), the doctoral dissertations written by the Khmer intellectuals, to determine the crux of what the Cambodian theorists were saying and Maoism's role in crafting their viewpoints. To date, no English-language genealogy of the origins and nature of the CPK's Maoism (in theory or in practice) exists, and those studies that have labeled the Party as Maoist

²¹ Cheng Yinghong, "向世界輸出革命：文革在亞非拉的影響初探 (Exporting the Revolution to the World: A Preliminary Study on the Influence of the Cultural Revolution on the Regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Xiàng shìjiè shūchū géming: Wéngé zài yà fēi lā de yǐngxiǎng chūtàn)," 毛主義與世界革命[Maoist Revolution: China and the World in the Twentieth Century, *Máo zhūyì yǔ shìjiè míng*]. (Hong Kong: Tianyuanshuwu, 2009). In an October 1978 meeting with Deng Xiaoping about China's support of Communist movements in Southeast Asia, Singaporean leader Lee Kwan Yew urged China to "必須停止革命輸出 [Stop exporting the revolution, *bìxū tíngzhǐ géming shūchū*]," to which Deng replied "你要我怎么做 [How do you want me to do this? *Nǐ yào wǒ zěnmě zuò?*]." Lee replied "停止馬共與印度尼西亞共在華南的電台廣播，停止對游擊隊的支持" [Stop broadcasting to the Communists in Indonesia and Malaysia altogether and stop support for the guerrillas, *Tíngzhǐ mǎ gònghé yìn dù ní xī yǎ gòng zài huánán de diàntái guǎngbò, tíngzhǐ duì yóují duì de zhīchí*]. "特稿：剪不斷理還亂 李光耀的中國情結," (22 March 2015) [http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/indepth/2015/03/150322_liguangyao_china#share-tools] (Accessed 19 May 2015).

²² In the following dissertation, I use the more accurate Party name Communist Party of Kampuchea instead of "Khmer Rouges" or "Red Khmers," both of which were informal nicknames that King Norodom Sihanouk used in reference to them.

fail to problematize it. For instance, what form did their Maoism take? Did the CPK experience a similar intra-Party struggle, culminating in the rise of a charismatic leader? And, to borrow from Timothy Cheek's study of Maoism, did this new Maoism undergo the same type of schism, wherein the charismatic and managerial strands that had come together so harmoniously before broke apart, thereby splitting the Party along ideological lines?²³ This study traces the CPK's Maoism to Paris in the 1950s where Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim all made the transition from apolitical students to "Thanhist-Democrat," Stalinist and, ultimately, Maoist intellectuals while they pursued advanced degrees.²⁴ As this dissertation makes clear, the Paris Group (Hou Yuon, Saloth Sar, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim) that founded and led the CPK thought of themselves as Maoists, as Sar's one-time mentor Keng Vannsak recalled in a 1982 interview ("When everyone began to criticize Stalin, *we became Maoists*").²⁵ The overt Stalinism of the *Parti communiste français* (French Communist Party, PCF) was the Paris Group's first exposure to a hard-line Communist Party organization, with the PCF's emphasis on the personal charisma of its leader, Maurice Thorez, and its stress on clandestinity and organization striking a sympathetic chord with Saloth Sar. He would spend years working as a Communist under Hanoi's direction after returning to Cambodia (without a degree) in 1953) while his colleagues remained in Paris, writing economics dissertations that drew from Maoism in their efforts to determine a solution to the various pre-and-post-independence problems that confronted their young nation (independent in 1953).²⁶

Additionally, this dissertation challenges Stephen Heder's thesis that the CPK was not led by a cohort of French-educated intellectuals, who he asserts were marginal, but by those who were influenced by the Vietnamese Communists, such as Pol Pot and Nuon Chea.²⁷ The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) certainly guided the formation of the CPK's predecessor organization, the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), and until Pol Pot's infamous

²³ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 3, 10-15.

²⁴ David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 64, citing David P. Chandler, "Interview with Keng Vannsak," (November 1986); Marie Alexandrine Martin, "Interview with Keng Vannsak," (Montmorency, France, 10 November 1982); and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 121-122.

²⁵ Martin, "Interview with Keng Vannsak"; Martin, *Cambodia*, 99; and Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 119. Emphasis added.

²⁶ Sacha Sher, *Le Kampuchéa des « Khmers rouges »: essai de compréhension d'une tentative de révolution* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004), 207.

²⁷ Stephen Heder, *Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model. Volume I: Imitation and Independence, 1930-1975*. (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2004).

“revising” of Party history, the Vietnamese contributions to Cambodian Communism had been significant.²⁸ Indeed, the Vietnamese Communist imprint on the organizational and tactical approaches of the Cambodian Communists is undeniable (Pol Pot worked under Hanoi’s direction for some time, as this study acknowledges). Also influential was the Stalinism of the PCF, and as Ben Kiernan has shown, it may have actually been Stalinism that guided much of CPK implementation.²⁹ Yet Mao’s works—which Pol Pot encountered in PCF-organized readings groups (in French and Khmer) in 1950s Paris and that his future fellow CPK leaders developed in dissertations and applied unsuccessfully as politicians—made sense to him more than a decade after his first encounter with such writings, not unlike Hong Xiuquan’s dream brought to life his earlier readings of a Protestant tract of Liang A-fa in the genesis of the Taiping vision. This was especially true after Le Duan dismissed Sar’s Cambodia programme in a 1965 meeting in Hanoi, which prompted Sar visit to Beijing and, later, rename the Party and declare openly Mao’s imprint on the CPK movement. Heder’s contention that the CPK sought to surpass Vietnam as superior Communists mirrors this author’s position that the CPK sought to surpass any previous Communist state, which its leaders viewed as having not gone far enough. Kiernan’s contention that the CPK slogan of a “Super Great Leap Forward,” while an “exaggerated imitation of Maoist policies of the late 1950s,” was more of a reflection of the Cambodian Party’s “perceived need to demonstrate Kampuchean superiority over Vietnam in socialist construction,”³⁰ ignores that the CPK leadership regarded itself as without equal in history. Pol Pot’s rejection of Maoism while emphasizing an apparent Khmer road to pure socialism is actually very Maoist; it mirrors Mao’s break with the Soviet model of authoritarian total governance and subsequent implementation of a “Chinese road to socialism.”

Indeed, the ideas that the Khmer intellectuals proposed in their doctoral dissertations provided the “theoretical rationale for some of Pol Pot’s actions,” namely isolationism, the evacuation of Cambodia’s cities, the abolition of currency, the deference to agricultural

²⁸ David P. Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When Was the Birthday of the Party?” *Pacific Affairs* 56, No. 2 (Summer 1983): 288-300.

²⁹ Ben Kiernan, “Kampuchea and Stalinism,” in *Marxism in Asia*. Colin Mackerras and Nick Knight, eds. (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 232-250.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 235. Kiernan’s claim that the Cultural Revolution was “never explicit or permeating” in official CPK documents is because only the top leadership visited the PRC during that time (Sar visited before it had begun, as Philip Short has shown, though there is debate among China scholars on the CR’s starting point).

production instead of developing Cambodia's industries, and the expulsion of foreigners.³¹ It is therefore equally important to pair a study of their written works with an understanding of Paris during the 1950s: the popularization of Communism as practiced by Stalin; the critique of American hegemony; the rise of Third World liberation movements as important phenomena (including Mao's Three Worlds). As a corrective to the understated importance of this relationship between ideology and space, movement and moment, the chapter highlights Paris and its role in the ideological formation of the CPK intellectual thrust. It also connects the "bureaucratic Maoism" that made sense to the Paris intellectuals in the 1950s to the "faith Maoism" that Sar brought back from Beijing in 1966. Bureaucratic Maoism, as Cheek describes, "turned ideology into a method which highly educated 'culture bearer' savants applied rationally in order to make manifest the ideas provided by the leader," whereas faith Maoism "turned ideology into faith in the charismatic authority of the leader and gave functionaries the role of 'cog and screw' to carry out the leader's wishes."³² Also important is to make linkages between that which Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Saloth Sar/Pol Pot wrote and that which the CPK practiced. Chapter six therefore turns to *implementation*, seeking to uncover how the ideas presented by the future intellectual foundation of the CPK made the transition "from 'page to paddy.'" The chapter outlines how the CPK was able to penetrate into peasant society and mobilize the largely uneducated masses, tracing threads between the doctoral dissertations that serve as "foundational" and the various revolutionary newspapers, official speeches and essays, and additional propaganda and government documents.

The chapter that comprises the final section makes a preliminary comparison of Indonesia and the Philippines with the Cambodia case to determine whether the initial soundings yield confirmations or contrasts. In all cases, the intellectuals hailed from countries that had yet to reap the economic benefits of "modernization" (what we now call "globalization"). After exposure to Mao's works and with China's renewed effort to export Maoism, the future leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) came to regard Maoism as an adaptable alternative ideological system that could be synthesized in new and innovative ways. As for Indonesian

³¹ Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1975*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 391, 443-444; Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930-1975, Second Edition*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 416-417.

³² Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 69.

Communists such as Dipa Nusantara Aidit, it was less Maoism and more Communist China to which they turned their attentions. We begin with Jose Maria Sison, a self-proclaimed Maoist and CPP leader, and draw from the theories of Said, Kuhn, and Jowitt to uncover how and why the system of Maoism made sense both to him and his supporters as the guiding light for their on-going struggle against the ruling government. We then turn to Indonesia, a case that is less about self-proclaimed Maoists, but concerns the ways in which the writings of Aidit, leader of the Parti Komunis Indonesia (PKI), dealt with similar issues to those that Mao both experienced during the Chinese revolution and alluded to in his critique of imperialism. A concluding section details the dissertation's findings, and presents some avenues for further research on Maoism after Mao.

Ideas Across Cultures and Beyond

Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel—from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another. Cultural and intellectual life are usually nourished and often sustained by this circulation of ideas, and whether it takes the form of acknowledged or unconscious influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation, the movement of ideas and theories from one place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity.³³—Edward Said, “Traveling Theory,” 1983

The following section presents an overview of the debate on ideas across cultures, at the end of which is a section that outlines the theories used to uncover the system of Maoism in Southeast Asia. We begin by considering: where does Said's framework on Traveling Theory, including the theoretical subsets, fit into the broader debate? Much like President Xi Jinping's robust claim that there are no universal norms, there exists no single textbook model for addressing the problem of explaining the complex inner-workings of transnational exchanges of ideas and concepts. The result is a debate across various disciplines on how to best approach the problem in such a way that sheds light on how ideas from without interact, become modified, and are ultimately reborn as revived wholes within different contexts. The following section introduces some valiant efforts undertaken by philosophers, anthropologists, critical and cultural theorists, historians, and political scientists to address the problem at hand. At root, each of these

³³ Said, “Traveling Theory,” *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, 226.

approaches wrestles not only with how ideas move across time and space, but also with the significance of ideas moving to new homes.

German-American anthropologist Franz Boas (1858-1942)³⁴ proposed in his study of indigenous communities in British Columbia that ideas do, in fact, travel.³⁵ He argues that “only borrowing could explain his material from British Columbia... For if all similarities are due to psychic unity, geographic position becomes negligible: resemblances [are] as likely between remote as between near tribes.”³⁶ Beyond linguistic exchanges and similarities, however, Boas’ study does not explain in specific detail the means by which ideas travel. Edward Said, by contrast, approaches how an idea moves and whether an idea or theory from one place, time, situation, or cultural setting changes when it emerges in others. He identifies three critical moments as part of a “recurrent pattern” in the movement of ideas across cultures: 1) a point of origin; 2) the passage of an idea from one place and time to another, and its introduction as well as its acceptance and toleration; and 3) its transformation, or rebirth, via “its new uses [and] new position in a new time and place.”³⁷ Ideas, therefore, originate, make passages across time and place, emerge within a receptive context, and ultimately become rejuvenated with new importance.

Philosopher Arthur Lovejoy’s contribution to this investigation, meanwhile, addresses the issue of ideas across time. In his William James lectures at Harvard University in 1932-1933, he introduced his theory of “the Great Chain of Being,” which contains “three specific, pregnant, and very curious characteristics... the principles of plenitude, continuity, and gradation.”³⁸ His

³⁴ Boas is heralded as “the man who shaped modern anthropology in North America” and some recognize him as a trailblazing cultural relativist.

³⁵ Ludger Muller-Wille, “Franz Boas (1858-1942),” *Arctic* 36, No. 2 (1983): 212-213; and Robert H. Lowe, “Franz Boas (1858-1942),” *The Journal of American Folklore* 57, No. 223 (January-March 1944): 59-64.

³⁶ Lowe, “Franz Boas (1858-1942),” 61. Linguistic features shared by both the Navaho and Athabascans are due to “a later connection as well as an original one... it is necessary to prove a differential resemblance between the Navaho and the Northwest—one exceeding that with... the Eastern tribes.”

³⁷ Said, “Traveling Theory,” 226-247. See also Timothy Cheek, “Chinese Socialism as Vernacular Cosmopolitanism,” *Front. Hist. China* 9, No. 1 (2014): 102-124, on page 106. Cheek terms these critical moments as origination, institutionalization, and revivification.

³⁸ Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), xxiii, 20. Plenitude, continuity, and gradation, he argues, imply “a certain conception of the nature of God; that this conception was for centuries conjoined with another to which it was in latent opposition...” Lovejoy’s objective is thus to apply a “distinctive analytical method in the attempt to understand how new beliefs and intellectual fashions are introduced and diffused, to help to elucidate the psychological character of the processes by which changes in the vogue and influence of ideas came about; to make clear, if possible, how conceptions dominant, or extensively prevalent, in one generation lose their hold upon men’s minds and give place to others.”

tracing of these three characteristics from their origins in Plato's idea of the gods of Perfection and Fecundity through to the new cosmographies of Bruno and Descartes culminates with the rise of natural history and Friedrich Schelling's thought in the eighteenth century and beyond.³⁹ A "world of time and change," Lovejoy concludes, "is a world [that] can neither be deduced from nor reconciled with the postulate that existence is the expression and consequence of a system of 'eternal' and 'necessary' truths inherent in the very logic of being."⁴⁰ In essence, Lovejoy brings us closer to understanding that certain ideas, or truths, pass on for centuries at a time, and while in different incarnations, maintain much of the original idea/concept intact despite the temporal change. It is through the constant process of revivification and adaptation that such ideas, though changed, take root among people outside the original intended audience, and upon their reception of them, the idea/concept becomes something of significance.

In his efforts to explain the diffusion of Nazism, German philosopher Ernst Bloch's theory of *Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen*, or "simultaneity of the non-contemporaneous," brings additional insight to the notion of ideas across time.⁴¹ Bloch's effort was to challenge the notion of linear time passage, arguing instead for a concept of simultaneity. For Bloch "[n]ot all people exist in the same now...Rather, they carry earlier things with them, things which are intricately involved."⁴² Ideas and concepts are not bound temporally and constrained to a linear progression of history. Instead, as Bloch posits, ideas and concepts move across time as history bifurcates, and in so doing the idea or concept, although changed by its travel and reception, shares much of what made the original. As with Lovejoy, though, Bloch grounds his approach exclusively in a Western philosophic tradition, which produces a Eurocentric answer to larger, more global processes and problems.

Philosopher Alasdair Macintyre, by contrast, approaches the problem of ideas across cultures via the specter of comparison. He focuses on Aristotelian and Confucian treatment of the virtues in an effort to ground his theory of incommensurability across different traditional

³⁹ Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, xxiii, 20-21, 182-183.

⁴⁰ Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 333.

⁴¹ Ernst Bloch, "Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics," *New German Critique*, No. 11 (Spring 1977): 22-38.

⁴² Bloch, "Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics," 22.

and cultural lines.⁴³ Although the Confucian and Aristotelian traditions share some common ground regarding the virtues, MacIntyre argues that the two are ultimately incommensurable since the different *modi vivendi* stem from either incompatibility or outright rejection.⁴⁴ He states that the cause of this incommensurability is a competing “standard and measures of interpretation, explanation, and justification internal to [themselves],” thus no middle ground is apparent.⁴⁵ However, conceptual schemes contain what MacIntyre terms as a “historical existence,” and “two different and rival conceptual schemes may be incommensurable at one stage of their development and yet become commensurable at another.”⁴⁶ To become commensurable, there must be a lapse of the extant theory and practice due to its own deficiencies and void, and recognition of success and/or lapse whereby the adherents, who recognize that this theory and practice has failed, explain why a certain tradition failed or succeeded “by its own standard of achievement.”⁴⁷ Although MacIntyre’s analytical tool is focused less on placing ideas across time or in different places, his proposed conditions provide an optimistic approach to overcoming the complexities that underpin incommensurable modes of thought across temporal and cultural milieus.

The above theories set the stage by suggesting that ideas can communicate across time and space in a substantial fashion, albeit with great difficulty and not always. Now, we come to step two in our key question: the mechanisms by which one can trace the processes whereby

⁴³ Alasdair MacIntyre, “Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues,” in *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives*. Eliot Deutsch, ed., (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 110. MacIntyre defines incommensurability as “a relationship between two or more systems of thought and practice, each embodying its own peculiar conceptual scheme, over a certain period of time.” He cites language and translation as reasons that may render commensurability impossible: “[W]hile both the Confucian and the Aristotelian moralist will see and report one and the same person giving freely and liberally to someone in need, the Confucian may observe an absence of *li*, of that ritual formality which is an essential characteristic of *jen*, a type of absence necessarily invisible to the Aristotelian, who has no words in either Aristotle’s Greek or William of Moerbeke’s Latin to translate *li*, an expression captured neither by such Greek words as *hosia*, *orgia*, or *teletai* used of religious rituals, nor by their medieval Latin equivalents. By contrast, the Aristotelian will observe... an example of disposition evidencing a particular ordering or disorder of the *psyche*, a conformity or lack of it to what is required of a citizen of a *polis*, both understood in terms of an ultimate *telos* conceived in a highly specific way, all of which must be invisible to the Confucian who has no words for *psyche* or *polis* either in the ancient Chinese of Confucius or in the later Chinese of Sung Neo-Confucianism.”

⁴⁴ Ibid, 105-106, 112. MacIntyre elaborates further: “The two systems of thought and practice are incommensurable in the sense made familiar to us by Thomas Kuhn—the concept, if not the word, was anticipated both by Bachelard and by Polanyi, and has in the last thirty years in various conceptual guises played a key part in the writings not only of Kuhn and Feyerabend, but also of Foucault and Deleuze...”

⁴⁵ Ibid, 109-110.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 109.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 117-118.

ideas take on different forms in different cultural contexts. It is worth noting beforehand, though, that the topic of “culture” deserves some attention. This dissertation focuses on *lived culture*, that is, culture in a lived sense, which allows us to see how people thought about politics, society, and themselves, while also positioning us well for uncovering how Maoism fit into the equation. Much like Philip Kuhn’s approach to uncovering how the Taiping vision took into account Confucianism, Hong’s classical education, its role in shaping his reception of Liang’s translation of a Christian missionary tract, and the administrative structure of Guangxi where he lived, ours is a study that incorporates the myriad complexities of these vastly different locales into understanding the lived cultures of our intellectuals who became Maoists.

A *lived culture* perspective builds on previous approaches to defining “culture” across a range of scholarly disciplines. Anthropologist Edward Burnett Taylor’s broad definition describes culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”⁴⁸ Max Weber once opined that “man is an animal caught in the webs of meaning he has himself woven. There is no activity, even of an economic nature, that does not immediately produce meanings and symbols.”⁴⁹ American anthropologist Clifford Geertz provided a useful semiotic definition that expands upon Weber’s view, asserting that since “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative in search of meaning.”⁵⁰ To him, culture “denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life.”⁵¹ Yet an important question posed by James Clifford asks, “What are the essential elements and boundaries of a culture? How do self and other clash and converse in the encounters of

⁴⁸ Edward Burnett Taylor, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Customs, Volume I*. (London: James Murray, 1889), 1.

⁴⁹ Jean François Bayart, *The Illusion of Cultural Identity*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 9.

⁵⁰ Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 5.

⁵¹ Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 89.

ethnography, travel, modern interethnic relations?”⁵² Modernization/globalization, he contends, has caused a “syncretic, post cultural,” replacing authentic cultures with “collages.”⁵³

The problem, then, is how to understand “cultural practices, which are often exuberant and constantly changing, without reifying them in series of clichés regarding the economic and political mentalities of the people [.]”⁵⁴ Indeed, as Jean François Bayart asks, “How can we stop seeing the encounter of ‘civilizations’ as an inevitable ‘clash’? How can we avoid thinking of acculturation and globalization as a simple zero-sum game in which adherence to foreign representations and customs inevitably leads to a loss of substance and authenticity?”⁵⁵ One proposal that he puts forward is that we cease viewing cultural appropriation as something total, and instead perceive it as a process of selectivity in which the agent(s) negotiate their own practice of reception. For instance, as French historian Fernand Braudel proposes, primacy of the West in shaping culture(s) prevents us from seeing Western exports such as the industrial revolution as “only one of the characteristics of Western civilization... by accepting it the world does not necessarily accept at the same time the whole of that civilization. On the contrary.”⁵⁶ This is important since we do not want to posit Maoism as an invading *Other* that disrupted the authenticity of cultures in Southeast Asia; rather, we wish to view it as something from without that was adapted dialectically by radical intellectuals in a situated thinking, with culture representing *an* instead of *the* sole determining modifying variable.

A contrarian viewpoint is from Bayart, who views culture as an *imaginaire* that is “inseparable from the order of *materiality*... [and] does not represent a coherent totality, since it includes a host of heterogeneous, constantly changing figures.”⁵⁷ Bayart’s use of *imaginaire* is useful since our three case studies represent locales in which religion and culture were “reinvented,” in a sense, under colonial rule, and in the Cambodian context specifically, the French protectorate sought actively to revive what it viewed as Cambodian-ness, linking

⁵² James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 8.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 95; and Bayart, *The Illusion of Cultural Identity*, 4-5.

⁵⁴ Bayart, *The Illusion of Cultural Identity*, 5-6.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*.

⁵⁶ Fernand Braudel, *Grammaire des civilisations*. (Paris: Arthaud-Flammarion, 1987), 38-39.

⁵⁷ Bayart, *The Illusion of Cultural Identity*, 233. Emphasis added.

ahistorically the *cambodgiens* of the present to the Khmer builders of Angkor.⁵⁸ As Geertz observes:

ideas—religious, moral, practical, aesthetic—must as Max Weber, among others, never tired of insisting, be carried by powerful social groups to have powerful social effects: someone must revere them, celebrate them, defend them, impose them. They have to be institutionalized in order to find not just an intellectual existence in society, but, so to speak, *a material one as well*.⁵⁹

Yet ideas, while tied inextricably to materiality, are never static or fixed. Instead, people have agency over interpretation, reception, adaptation, practical application, and inversion or perversion, and their surroundings help to inform an idea's appraisal as something useful to fill a void.⁶⁰ In relation to the specific cultural contexts of our case studies, which represent very complex, multilayered historical societies, one question that emerges is: what are the relevant aspects of the cultures of those societies that we must take into account to explain Maoism's rise to fill that void? *Lived culture*, this study contends, allows us to see religious tradition, social experiences, and intellectual spaces, among others, as instrumental strands that explain Maoism's spread, practice, and creative adaptation. Processes of reception and adaptation are therefore dialectical, with Maoism *speaking to* leftist intellectuals as a "fit" for the crises that they faced, and the intellectuals *speaking back* through its stages of practical application to concrete realities.

However, as Bayart points out, ethnic and religious identities are not necessarily synonymous with "the poisonous state itself," which, as this dissertation shows, materialized under French, Spanish, American, and Dutch colonial rule.⁶¹ Instead, we ought to move beyond a "culturalist discourse," in which essentialized understandings of a culture "imprison concrete historical societies in a substantivist definition of their identity by denying them the right to borrow, to be derivative."⁶² To provide one example, some scholars have traced Theravada

⁵⁸ Penny Edwards, *Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 19-39; David P. Chandler, *Brother Number One*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 12-13; David P. Chandler, "From 'Cambodge' to 'Kampuchea': State and Revolution in Cambodia, 1863," *Thesis Eleven* 50, No. 35 (1997): 35-49; David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 6-9; Anthony Barnett, "'Cambodia Will Never Disappear,'" *New Left Review* 180 (1990): 101-125; Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolour*, ix, 311; Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and its People*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 54-57.

⁵⁹ Clifford Geertz, "The Politics of Meaning," in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 314. Emphasis added.

⁶⁰ MacIntyre, "Incommensurability," 117-118.

⁶¹ Bayart, *The Illusion of Cultural Identity*, 88.

⁶² *Ibid*, 245.

Buddhist reservoirs as direct influences on CPK thought.⁶³ We know that Hu Nim and Saloth Sar/Pol spent time in renovated *wat* schools in the French protectorate, and celebrated Buddhism as an essential component of Cambodian national identity while in France. The link between a useful (or even *passé*) but potentially minor influence on their later radicalism and their iconoclastic, Maoist implementation of their vision in the Democratic Kampuchea experiment (including the defrocking and execution of monks and outlawing of Buddhism) does not take into account all of the intellectual maturation that occurred in between. As with Frederic Wakeman's similar contention that earlier philosophical tracts informed Mao Zedong's later ideology and practices,⁶⁴ we ought to question the degree to which Buddhist or other important cultural modes remained unchanged after the Southeast Asian Communists' conversion to Communism. Thus while Theravada Buddhism certainly was part of the language that Cambodian intellectuals used to understand their world, and later, to recruit, it figured less prominently as *the* dominant thought stream after their Communist awakening in 1950s Paris (as did Islam among PKI members (en vogue in 1920s, but *passé* after WWII),⁶⁵ or Roman Catholicism among CPP cadres).⁶⁶ Communists, moreover, needed to engage people in terms that they could understand, with religion often serving as the meeting ground between complex historical materialism learned by intellectuals in classrooms abroad, and actual problems of poverty, oppression, and exploitation as experienced by people *on the ground*. To understand how Maoism came to influence Communist movements in Cambodia and the Philippines, and in the PKI case, emerge in 1966 after the Party had been forced underground, we must look at a host of possible strands, including but certainly not limited to religion and cultural norms, and understand how they changed over time, both within colonial contexts and without.

This brings us to localization theory, which allows us to see how exogenous ideas synthesize with endogenous norms to make the foreign familiar by dint of its local imprint.

⁶³ Ian Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age: Cambodian Monks Under Pol Pot*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), Chs. 3-4; Alexander L. Hinton, *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), *sic passim*; and Jean-Louis Margolin, "Le Cambodge des khmers rouges: de la logique de guerre totale au génocide," *Vingtième Siècle* 77 (janvier-mars 2003): 3-18, on page 16.

⁶⁴ Frederic Wakeman Jr., *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973).

⁶⁵ I thank Dr. John Roosa for noting that Islam was less of a guiding precept in the PKI after WWII.

⁶⁶ See Tan Malaka, "Communism and Pan-Islamism: Speech to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in November 12, 1922." (12 November 1922). [<https://www.marxists.org/archive/malaka/1922-Panislamism.htm>] (Accessed 14 April 2016); and Kenneth Fuller, *A Movement Divided: Philippine Communism, 1957-1986*. (Quezon City, the Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2011), 223-256.

Localization, as Wolters describes, is “calling our attention to something else outside the foreign materials,” with “something else” representing a local statement of cultural interest in which foreign elements, distanced from their original source, transmogrify into something unique.⁶⁷ As a theory, localization is the processes whereby exogenous ideas and concepts are transformed locally by receptors that are neither passive nor lacking in agency to fit unique historical, geographic, and religious contexts. Anthropologist Arnd Schneider asserts that we need to focus on the “hermeneutic process of appropriation... ‘a taking out of one context and putting in another,” which implies that cultural elements “are invested with new signification.”⁶⁸ As “rapidly as different forces from cultural and economic centers are brought into new societies they tend to become indigenized in one or other way[s],” he contends.⁶⁹ But people do not merely reproduce these materials *verbatim*, infusing exogenous ideas and norms with locally determined meanings. The masses, Michel De Certeau notes, “always renegotiate the meanings offered them,” allowing rulers or ruling classes that localized the foreign concept to proclaim its uniqueness.⁷⁰ While the above points suggest that localization happens, explanations of *how* localization works are the key to understanding the mechanisms by which ideas become received and transformed.

Historian O.W. Wolters’ pioneering study provides one such example. In his examination of the spread of Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism during the years of the Khmer Empire (២៣៣០-១៤៣១, 802-1431 CE) Wolters argues that complex systems of concepts and practices such as Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism “have to be localized in different ways” before they can fit into various complexes of religious, social, and political systems and belong “to new cultural ‘wholes.’”⁷¹

⁶⁷ OW Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1999), 56.

⁶⁸ Arnd Schneider, “On ‘Appropriation’: A Critical Reappraisal of the Concept and its Application in Global Art Practices,” *Social Anthropology* 11 (2003): 215-229, on page 224; and Laura L. Adams, “Globalization, Universalism, and Cultural Form,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, No. 3 (2008): 614-640, on page 616.

⁶⁹ Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” *Theory, Culture, and Society* 7 (1990): 295-310, on 295.

⁷⁰ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), as cited in Jeremy Prestholdt, “Similitude and Empire: On Comorian Strategies of Englishness,” *Journal of World History* 18, No. 2 (2007): 113-138, on pages 114-115.

⁷¹ Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*, 55. Wolters mentions Cambodia, where Indian religions such as Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism [“the Teaching of the Elders” or “the Ancient Teaching,” the oldest surviving Buddhist school] developed into localized Cambodian variants via a process of fracturing, restating, and ultimately draining of “their original significance by a process of localization.” The Hinduized Angkor temples that the Khmer rulers built originally as monuments devoted to the Hindu god Vishnu

Only upon the successful adaptation of the foreign idea would the people embrace these fragments and accept them in form. Indeed, Khmer kings received Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism from India, and held Brahmins and monks in their court under their patronage.⁷² Yet the ideas that were transmitted from India and promulgated in the Khmer courts took on a local character; first Hinduism, then Theravada Buddhism essentially took on characteristics of the new cultural setting, and in fact, Khmer Hinduism informed the adaptation of Theravada Buddhism, and so forth.

We have looked at mechanisms of transmission and these approaches tend to assume a general or social agent. However, ideas are often imported and domesticated by political or social leaders who assume these responsibilities themselves. This brings us to the third step in the dissertation's analytical model: the processes whereby leaders/visionaries build a support base through the transmission of these adapted ideas/concepts. Charisma provides one such avenue, and given this dissertation's focus on Southeast Asia, Max Weber's theory on the relationship between tradition and charisma provides for a more than suitable point of departure. For Weber, charisma and tradition are antithetical; on one hand, charisma "calls for revolution," while on the other, tradition calls "for conservation."⁷³ The former influences action because of the personal authority of the individual, while the latter, tradition, inspires others because of status, or because it has always been that way. The charismatic and traditional, however, converge as much as they diverge with one another since charisma draws people in, and its convergence with that which is traditional and rational-bureaucratic allows the charismatic authority figure to gain entry into a society of which he has little or no *a priori* exposure.⁷⁴ Weber's theory is therefore two-fold: on one hand, charismatic leaders and organizations have specific qualities that are congruent with the features of the society into which they seek to gain access; on the other, a charismatic leader or organization must be able to oscillate between revolutionary commitments and an urgent need to rally members from a strata that orients itself culturally and socially along status (or traditional) lines. An essential feature to charismatic

became Theravada Buddhist sites, and other ideas, rites, and practices from without ultimately joined with exogenous influences to become something that became particular to a Cambodia's region, culture, and people.

⁷² Interestingly, some kingdoms in Southeast Asia appropriated Indian ideas over the first millennium CE, and not ideas from the Sinosphere, though they were in constant touch with Imperial China. Southeast Asian rulers and peoples must have seen China adapting Buddhism at the same time, yet not all embraced Confucianism.

⁷³ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 13, citing Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 3. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 1122.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

leadership is to be Janus-faced, with one side faced towards that which is rational-bureaucratic, while the other faces those features that allow for the recruitment of bodies for revolution.⁷⁵

Another facet of charisma is OW Wolters' conception of "men of prowess," which channels much of Weber's theory, but places it within the context of Southeast Asia. Wolters uses his concept of "men of prowess" to trace threads of connection between the areas of Southeast Asia that went through a process of Hinduization, and those areas in which such a phenomenon did not occur at all. "Men of prowess" are, by his description, leaders who resisted the bureaucratization of Western society by virtue of their personal charisma:

... the ruler was not an autocrat; he was a mediator, accessible and able to keep the peace and mobilize many disparate groups. He needed to attract loyal subordinates to his entourage and to satisfy their self-esteem... by organizing exciting court occasions at which the entourage was made to feel that it belonged to his company of faithful servants. This system... [was] "patrimonial bureaucracy." The personal type of government, indicated by Weber's term, made a virtue of improvisation, and an illustration is provided by the Angkorean rulers' creation of special posts with ceremonial functions and prospects of future favors in order to attract particular sections of the elite to their side.⁷⁶

"Men of prowess" were therefore the essential cogs in the gears of localization, which has been described as "a suprahuman form of cultural 'agency' emanating from the region" that channeled "men of prowess" and their functionaries to allow for the greater diffusion of foreign concepts.⁷⁷ In essence, Wolters' conception provides us yet another useful tool in understanding the spread and adaptation of foreign concepts, and most importantly, grounds the concept in a specific history and culture.

Now we have the tools to explain the successful movement of a set of influential ideas across culture in the form of Maoism taking root in some Southeast Asian areas. We can think of this analysis as the genealogy of an ideology. But how do we initiate the process of mapping this ideological genealogy? While the approaches above provide some very useful analytical tools, some questions remain if we apply them to the cases under analysis in this dissertation. For instance, what was the social context of knowledge and how was an ideological system such as Maoism raised in different thought streams among Southeast Asian intellectuals? How did these

⁷⁵ Ibid, 14-15.

⁷⁶ Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asia*, 29.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 65; and Tony Daly, *Fluid Iron: State Formation in Southeast Asia*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 9-10.

intellectuals, who came from elite, educated backgrounds, rally the marginalized to their causes? What exactly was the process whereby Maoism inspired a collective conscience, as reflected in individual thought, community action, and cultural production within a society, across different cultural contexts? How and why did the Communist movements in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia happen as they did? To answer these questions, this dissertation approaches the problem of ideas across cultures by channeling Edward Said’s Traveling Theory to address the three principal processes of how ideas travel across cultures: production, transmission (or export), and reception, and introduces three subsidiary problems of reception, adaptation, and implementation (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Expansion on Said’s Traveling Theory triad to include subsidiary problems

For the two problems of reception and adaptation, Philip Kuhn’s theory on how thought is related to social experience (or to borrow from sociologist Karl Mannheim, a “social milieu”),⁷⁸ moves us toward uncovering what contexts/mindsets the Communist leaders who espoused Maoism were in when they adopted and applied the ideological system. Kuhn’s method is three-fold: 1) the precise language of the textual material that impinged on the host culture; 2) the underlying structure of the historical circumstances into which this material was introduced; and 3) the process whereby foreign materials became important to sectors of society *outside* the group that first appreciated and received it and thereby becomes a significant historical force.⁷⁹ He applies this method to his analysis of how failed civil service student Hong Xiuquan (洪秀全, 1814-1864), a man who made sense of his vision upon a second reading of the modestly educated Liang A-fa’s (梁發 1789-1855) heavily politicized “hellfire and brimstone” Christian tract 勸世良言 (Good Words to Admonish the Age, *Quànshì liángyán*). Key to Kuhn’s analysis is

⁷⁸ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. (New York: Harcourt, 1936), 265.

⁷⁹ Kuhn, “Origins of the Taiping Vision,” 350.

a group of bandits and radicals formed by Feng Yunshan (馮雲山, Hong's cousin) called the 拜上帝教 (God-Worshipping Society, *Bàishàngdìjiào*) whose efforts reinforced shared dialect and faith founded on Hong's vision among the Guangxi Hakka in 1846. The Society, Kuhn argues, acted as the disseminators of Hong's vision to the Guangxi Hakka, who years later went on to support the Taiping movement. The chiliastic Protestantism that the God-worshipping Society preached ultimately fulfilled a *social need* for the Guangxi Hakka in their struggle with local "punti" Chinese over access to resources. We see this as an ethnic struggle, but there was no concept for "ethnicity" in Confucian statecraft theory of the time, so the God Worshipping Society's new identity filled that void for the Guangxi Hakka.⁸⁰

Kuhn's study is particularly useful in relation to the first two problems. As Kuhn notes, since Hong neither embraced Liang's politicization nor had exposure to the conditions in Guangxi, yet his vision reached an oppressed audience who used it to conceptualize their oppression in transcendent terms and contextualized their subjugation in terms of a collective conscience.⁸¹ Although it was the "perfection of the 'fit' between Liang's vocabulary and the underlying structure of the Hakka's social plight that facilitated the doctrine's reception," it was ultimately the "larger *imperfection* of the 'fit' with the native culture"—the Chinese rejection of Christianity—that initiated such a change.⁸² Therefore, Kuhn's three part method is useful to uncover how elite intellectuals, from China to Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, normalized ideas and/or examples from without in their respective polities and mobilized it to speak to status societies in their home countries *and* alerts us to the creative potential of the parts that fit less well.

The problem of implementation, meanwhile, is addressed in Kenneth Jowitt's analysis of Leninist organizations' synthesis of charismatic-impersonal with rational bureaucratic [status/classificatory] features. Jowitt argues that Leninism is at once a "conflictual yet effective amalgam of charismatic impersonalism," and a "particular response to the status organization of peasant society and the related phenomenon of dependency."⁸³ For Jowitt, authority is invested in tradition, and a status society's rational-bureaucratic features mean that there are rules that

⁸⁰ Ibid, 365.

⁸¹ Ibid, 364-366.

⁸² Ibid, 366.

⁸³ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 1, 43, 161-162.

everyone in that society follows. Charisma initiates one to obey the “peasant visionary” because he sways your opinion, thus a millenarian Party led by elites can mobilize peasants and run scientific facilities and research by making transitions from a traditional status society to a modern one under duress and total warfare. In a contemporary Asian context, Jowitt hypothesizes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) succeeded in rallying peasants to its cause because “as an organization it contained a number of features at least formally or structurally congruent with a number of the defining features of a peasant-status society.”⁸⁴ Such allowed the CCP’s Leninist organization to shift back and forth between its charismatic-revolutionary designs for China and the status orientations of the peasant base on which it depended for revolutionary success.

For the case studies under analysis in this dissertation, if we look at the structure of the Leninist response, the respective Communist movements in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia follow a similar, albeit not entirely the same, structure of other Leninist states. In each of the cases, elite intellectual-driven Communist Parties arose under the leadership of charismatic representatives who succeeded because they were able to oscillate back and forth between their revolutionary commitments and the traditional, rational-bureaucratic features of peasant/status societies into which they sought to make inroads.

Historiography—Maoism Outside China

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past... The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot take its poetry from the past but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped away all superstition about the past. The former revolutions required recollections of past world history in order to smother their own content. The revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead in order to arrive at its own content. There the phrase went beyond the content—here the content goes beyond the phrase.⁸⁵—Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

The content of Xi Jinping’s peroration, Mao Zedong Thought (or Maoism), has among the largest global footprints as far as twentieth century ideologies are concerned. But Maoism did not just “happen”; this is a reductionist explanation for its diffusion and for the bevy of Maoist

⁸⁴ Ibid, 16; and Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 10-13.

⁸⁵ Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in *Karl Marx Surveys from Exile, Volume 2*, 149.

Parties that emerged outside Communist China. While Radical intellectuals did indeed visit China and became inspired by the revolution, Maoism emerged first and foremost in intellectual exchanges and radical thought streams that inspired such visits to take place. Soon to be Maoist converts began with little knowledge of Mao's China of that time, and before pilgrimages to Communist China they became well versed in the Marxist-Maoist canon. But how did the seminal works of Mao reach these intellectuals situated so far outside China? What was its great appeal? How did Maoism's strong moral overtones and "its disregard for material trivialities [which] only fit comfortably with the Chinese Confucian mixture of morality, righteousness, and intellectualism,"⁸⁶ emerge in different cultural contexts? The global historical context into which Maoism took root is therefore essential if we hope to understand how Maoism resonated with radical intellectuals from Southeast Asia.

Since the Soviet Union's foundation in 1922, its leaders endeavored to assert authority over the interpretation of Marxist organization and ideology across the globe. After the Second World War, strong ideological tensions emerged between the ruling communist parties in the Soviet Union and China over the notion of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist Western powers culminated in the Sino-Soviet split. Beginning with the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia, which famously crystallized the non-aligned movement, the CCP, represented at Bandung by senior statesman Zhou Enlai, charged that the Soviet Union had adopted a "revisionist" interpretation of Marxism and that the Soviet leadership now carried the banner of "social imperialism." Thereafter, the CCP reoriented its foreign policy around building relationships in the developing world, most notably in Southeast Asia, by sending supplies and technical advisers.⁸⁷ As a result, many Communists in Southeast Asia turned not to Soviet style Marxism-Leninism, but to Maoism as an alternative, and one that suited their respective

⁸⁶ Serge Thion, "The Cambodian Idea of Revolution," in *Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays*. David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan eds., (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983), 22.

⁸⁷ Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 220-221; Sophie Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 102, 105, 119, 123-124; and Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 105, 127. For example, Brady notes that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) "trained insurgent groups" from several countries, and that it also "practiced 'benevolent trade' in this period: buying up large quantities of products from countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—often goods for which there was little demand—selling much-needed commodities at bargain prices." See also Philip Snow, "China and Africa," in *Chinese Foreign Policy*. Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 288.

struggles more fully.⁸⁸ While the CPK and CPP borrowed extensively from the Chinese revolution, the PKI, by contrast, did not turn to Maoism for ideology, siding with the CCP and opposing the USSR starting in 1962-63 but maintaining its political course despite this development.

Nearly forty years after Mao's death, Mao Zedong Thought remains a powerful political ideology that has shaped Communist Parties across the globe, ranging from the Communist Parties of India and Nepal to the Communist Party of the Philippines to Peru's Shining Path movement.⁸⁹ It did not start that way, and an explanation of both its formation and transmission is equally as necessary to understand the elusive phenomenon of Maoism's emergence outside China. As Nick Knight contends, Mao "establish[ed] a formula by which a universal theory such as Marxism could be utilized in a particular national context and culture *without abandoning the universality of that theory*."⁹⁰ Mao did so because there was only concrete Marxism, which he defined as Marxism that had "taken a national form and... applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China."⁹¹ Contrary to claims that Mao's Marxism was *ersatz*, then, this study encourages a re-thinking of Maoism as an ideological system with significant

⁸⁸ Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 39-66, 101; Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 3-6, 65-86, 215-216; Thomas Engelbert and Chris Goscha, *Falling out of Touch: A Study of the Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930-1975*. (Clayton, Australia: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash Asia Institute, 1995), vi, 71-81; Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*. (Sheffield, UK: Equinox, 2006), 25, 329-363; and Bertil Lintner, *The Rise and Fall of the Burmese Communist Party*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1990), 1-5, 22-36, 44-45.

⁸⁹ Alexander C. Cook, "Third World Maoism," in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*. Timothy Cheek, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 288-312.

⁹⁰ Nick Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writings on Philosophy*. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 44-47; Nick Knight, *Marxist Philosophy in China: From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong, 1923-1945*. (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2005), 102-109, 165-169; Knight, *Re-thinking Mao*, 197-216; and Nick Knight, "The Form of Mao Zedong's 'Sinification of Marxism,'" *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 9 (January 1983): 17-33, on page 18.

⁹¹ Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Zedong*. (New York: Praeger, 1969), 172. See also Raymond F. Wylie, "Mao Zedong, Chen Po-ta and the 'Sinification of Marxism,'" *The China Quarterly* 79, No.1, (September 1979): 447-480, on 471. Mao maintained throughout his life that China's struggle was part of a worldwide revolution against capitalism in which national liberation was the primary goal for the revolution. Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *Mao's Road to Power, Volume VII: New Democracy, 1939-1941*. Stuart Schram ed., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1992), 367-369; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhūyì lùn*), 毛澤東集第七卷 [Works of Mao Zedong, Volume VII], Takeuchi Minoru, ed., (Tokyo: Suosuosha, 1970-1972), 201-204; and Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhūyì lùn*)," 毛澤東選集第二卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume II], 666-669.

universal, and universalizing, appeal within a global Third World as “an alternative modernity.”⁹² Indeed, as James Hsiung argues:

In its international application, the term Maoism is... a specific strategy, attributed to Mao, for Communist world revolution. Shaped essentially by the experience of the Communist revolution in China, the Maoist strategy is a synthesis of the classical “left” and the classical “right” strategy of the international Communist movement. From the obsolescent classical “left,” Mao took the idea of a “united front from below.” From the classical right, Mao borrowed the idea of a two-stage revolution. During the first stage, Communist-type social demands are subordinated to national and democratic goals. During the second stage, Communist goals will predominate. Like that of the classical right, the Maoist strategy in the first stage appeals to all anti-imperialist groups and classes, including the national bourgeoisie and even patriotic landlords. In addition, Mao insists that Communist hegemony must be maintained from the very first stage of the two-stage revolution, rather than wait until the second stage, as advocated by the classical right strategy.⁹³

Evidently, Maoism is not an exotic offshoot or nationalist deviation from Marxism, nor is it insular and lacking international reach. It was, by contrast, *global*, and remains so to this very day. It is for this reason that global Maoism has become an emerging field within the study of Communist China in general, and Mao Zedong’s era as supreme leader, in particular.

Scholarly attempts by Robert Alexander, William Heaton, and Thomas Marks, explain the rise of Maoism in intellectual thought streams either through the scope of international relations, as a nationalist response to the limitations of the Bolshevik model of organization, or through the perspective of strategy and operational art vis-à-vis Mao’s military tactic of People’s War.⁹⁴ Other scholars explore the emergence of Maoism on a micro scale by focusing on specific Maoist Parties from their ideological formulations and successes to their defeats and continuing struggles to survive.⁹⁵ The problem, however, is an oversimplification of a complicated dialogue between outside idea and host recipient, resulting in an analysis of Maoism as nothing more than

⁹² Liu, “Maoism,” 25-26.

⁹³ James Chieh Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 159; Donald Zagoria, “Russia, China, and the New States,” in *Soviet and Chinese Communism*. Donald Treadgold, ed., (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1967), 405-407; and John H. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*. (New York: John Wiley, 1962), 70.

⁹⁴ Robert J. Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*. (London: Praeger, 1999); William R. Heaton, “China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy,” *Asian Survey* 22, No. 8 (August 1982): 779-800; and Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia*. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: White Lotus, 2007), xv.

⁹⁵ See Fuller, *A Movement Divided* and Part III of Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, eds. *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*. (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997), 267-385.

an event rather than understanding Maoism as a complex system, and its reception and adaptation as multidimensional processes. The result of their analyses resembles more of a graft of one idea or ideology to a host body, and an assumption that the host received it without agency. But as historian Huynh Kim Khanh notes in his use of grafts in botany as an example, a graft requires both the “insertion of a scion from a foreign plant into the stock of a native plant” and the rejection or adaptation and acceptance of that graft.⁹⁶ Much of the same is true for an idea or ideology as it enters new locales. Instead, to understand fully the complexities involved with ideological normalization, we ought to explore the process whereby intellectuals made sense of and adapted Maoism based on their own social experiences to form the ideological underpinnings of their anti-imperial struggles.

Recent scholarship, by contrast, focuses on Maoism as a global ideological force and, in so doing, goes much further to explain its diffusion across cultures and in determining why and how it made sense to Communists and revolutionaries the world over. The essays that comprise the section “Maoism in Global Marxism” in an edited volume written by Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, provides insightful analyses of the Maoist movements in Peru, the Philippines, India, and Vietnam. Alexander Cook’s volume on Chairman Mao Zedong’s *Quotations of Chairman Mao* (毛主席語錄, *Máo zhǔxí yǔlù*), the infamous “Little Red Book,” continues along this pioneering effort to explain global Maoism. His effort represents the first scholarly approach to Mao’s *Quotations* from a global historical perspective, and the fifteen essays that comprise the volume, all of which originate from a 2011 University of California, Berkeley conference, place overdue attention on the Little Red Book’s origins, domestic spread, and emergence in new contexts. Cook argues that *Quotations* represents a well traveled, accessible, and “dynamic script for revolution”—which the dissertation’s third chapter explores in greater detail—while subsequent chapters by a host of scholars delve into the Little Red Book’s formation and emergence in China, as well as its global footprint and legacy.⁹⁷ Although Dirlik et al. and Cook et al. are not without shortcomings vis-à-vis exploring the process whereby Maoism was normalized, their endeavors contribute to the literature on global Maoism in new and exciting

⁹⁶ Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 20-21.

⁹⁷ Alexander C. Cook, “Introduction: The Spiritual Atom Bomb and its Global Fallout,” in *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History*. Alex C. Cook, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 19.

ways, and stand as ambitious forays into the factors that led to Mao's impact throughout the world.

Additional works have also shed valuable light on the global permeation of Maoism. Ann-Marie Brady draws from Chinese-language sources on Communist China's foreign affairs to show the ways in which Beijing sought to expand its network of "international friends," which is one important aspect of Maoist China's appeal as an alternative socialist model.⁹⁸ Recent work by Bill Mullen and Fred Ho, as well as Matthew Johnson's informative article on the Black Panther Party, bring to light PRC outreach efforts to host African-American writers, thinkers, and activists in Communist China throughout the 1950s and 1960s. These visits, they contend, gave CCP officials the opportunity to posit China as the epicenter of a countercultural movement, one of a global character, in which all peoples of color rebelled against imperialism, racism, and exploitation.⁹⁹ Julia Lovell's insightful essay on Maoist China's transnational cultural diplomacy through hosting foreign representatives expands on these works, using sources from the 上海市檔案館 (Shanghai Municipal Archives, *Shànghǎishì dǎng'ànguǎn*). Here, Lovell highlights the domestic and foreign uses of its hosting programme, which is important in light of the many Southeast Asian leaders, revolutionaries, and delegates that visited Beijing in the 1950s-1960s.¹⁰⁰ Though throwing useful light on this dimension of PRC outreach, these works do not explain why some of these visitors *became Maoists*, as Pol Pot did after his 1966 Beijing trip.

The following dissertation builds upon these trailblazing works to show the global linkages and shared political processes among the Communist movements in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (the latter of which eventually worked alongside the ruling National Party). I treat Southeast Asian Maoists' interpretations and adaptations of Maoism—that is, Mao Zedong Thought as exported by the CCP during the Seventeen Years Period—in Cambodia and the Philippines as the central focus to shed new light on Maoist movements in the region. The Indonesian case, by contrast, situates the importance of China's experiences as a revolutionary

⁹⁸ See Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China*.

⁹⁹ Bill V. Mullen and Fred Ho, *Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 100-101; and Matthew Johnson, "From Peace to the Panthers: PRC Engagement with Africa-America Transnational Networks, 1949-1979," *Past and Present* 218 supplement 8 (2013): 233-257.

¹⁰⁰ Julia Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and International Image-building in the People's Republic, 1949-1976," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (December 2015): 135-158.

Party and ruling Communist government in Indonesian Communists' views and designs for the country's role in the global anti-imperialist struggle. By placing the factors that led to Maoism's (and Communist China's) emergence in Southeast Asia at the center of analysis, the dissertation seeks to explain how the Chinese Chairman's ideological system interacted with indigenous thought streams and the respective social experiences of the radical intellectuals to shape their respective *weltanschauungen*.

Sources

The sources used reflect the overarching theoretical framework based on Said's Traveling Theory and the subsidiary problems. For the problems of reception and adaptation, the dissertation draws from Mao Zedong's own written works—both before and during the Yan'an period—as translated by Takeuchi Minoru (毛澤東集, *Máo Zédōng jí*, Writings of Mao Zedong, Volumes I-X), Stuart Schram, and Nick Knight. The Foreign Languages Press in Beijing versions of 毛澤東選集 (毛沢東セット *Mōtakutō setto*, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, *Máo Zédōng xuǎnji*) are also important editions, although these collections factor in less in the China portion and more in the Southeast Asia sections since it was these versions that the intellectuals had read. Mao's post-Yan'an works and speeches inform the chapter on implementation, as Mao applied his synthetic/normalized Marxism-Leninism to China after the PRC was established in 1949. But what do Chinese sources, however restricted, reveal about the role of Maoism in Southeast Asia? To answer this question in relation to the final problem—transmission—the dissertation probes primary sources on the Foreign Language Press and the International Bookstore, as well as Mao's Cultural Revolution-era pronouncements in which he situated China at the very center of the Third World movement, and promoted actively China's revolutionary experience as a model for Communist movements worldwide.

Additional sources for the first part were obtained during archival research in Shanghai and Xiamen. The initial plan was to access primary sources from the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC; 中國共產黨中央對外聯絡, *Zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng zhōngyāng duìwài liánluò*) in Beijing, which is the main agency under the CCP that directs its foreign relations. However, the IDCPC archives, along with the Foreign Ministry Archives of the People's Republic of China (外交部檔案管, *Wàijiāobù dǎng'àn guǎn*),

are off limits to foreigners and many Chinese nationals as well. As a result, alternative locations to obtain primary sources that relate to my topic were necessary. The 上海圖書館 (Shanghai Library, *Shànghǎi túshūguǎn*) and the 上海檔案館 (Shanghai Municipal Archives, *Shànghǎi dǎng'àngǔǎn*) as well as some complementary materials from the open stacks at East China Normal University and the 東南亞研究中心 (Southeast Asia Research, *Dōngnányà yánjiū zhōngxīn*) at Xiamen University provided useful sources that were easily obtainable. From Shanghai, I obtained period journals such as 東南亞研究 (Southeast Asia Research, *Dōngnányà yánjiū*), 東南亞研究資料 (Southeast Asia Studies, *Dōngnányà yánjiū zīliào*), and 東南亞問題資料 (Southeast Asian Affairs, *Dōngnányà wèntí zīliào*) yielded useful insight into Chinese scholars' interest in Southeast Asia before and during the Cultural Revolution. 人民日報 (People's Daily, *Rénmín Ribào*) newspaper articles, meanwhile, contained some very valuable supporting information on specific state visits, Party proceedings, and many of the China-DK exchanges. Such sources allowed me to gauge the degree to which China sought to export its revolution to Southeast Asia even while much of the data on PRC-DK relations remains restricted due to the PRC's deeming of such information as too sensitive for public access.

Additional newsprint holdings from the Xiamen University's 東南亞研究中心, many of which have not received any attention in previous studies of China-Cambodia analyses, were even more helpful. Newsprints such as the long overlooked Phnom Penh-based Chinese-language 棉華日報 (Sino-Khmer Daily, *Miánhuá rìbào*) and 工商日報 (Industry and Commerce Daily, *Gōngshāng rìbào*), both of which, from the early 1950s on to the 1960s, documented many Sino-Cambodian exchanges in Chinese for Sino-Khmer readers. These two newsprints also provided invaluable information on China's unceasing support for Cambodia and its genuine, fraternal relations with the small-nonaligned Southeast Asian nation. Others such as 參考消息 (Reference News, *Cānkǎo xiāoxī*), 今日新聞 (Today's News, *Jīnrì xīnwén*), 廈門日報 (Xiamen Daily, *Xiàmén rìbào*), and 華聲日報 (Huasheng Daily, *Huáshēng rìbào*) from the PRC, and 遠東日報 (Vien Dong Daily, *Yuǎndōng rìbào*) from Vietnam also discuss early PRC-Cambodia trade and relations, and betray a strong ideological tinge, which indicates clearly the PRC's early efforts to cement strong ties with Cambodia in particular, and Southeast Asia in general.

On the origins of Maoism in Cambodia, the Kingdom of Cambodia's two main archives, the National Archives of Cambodia (NAC) and the Documentation Centre of Cambodia

(DCCAM), proved to be fertile grounds. The majority of primary sources obtained from the NAC and DCCAM include Khmer language issues of គង្គ បដិវត្តន៍ (Revolutionary Flag) newspapers, correspondences written by Prince Sihanouk, Son Ngoc Thanh, and Khieu Samphan, and numerous speeches, interviews, and essays by CPK leaders Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and Pol Pot. Other useful sources from these archives include CPK forced confessions, transcribed radio broadcasts (particularly Radio Phnom Penh), and some brief yet useful cadre reports on Chinese-funded building plans in DK. Among the great finds at the NAC was Hu Nim's 1965 doctoral dissertation *Les services publics économiques au Cambodge* (The Economic Public Services of Cambodia). This is so since Hu Nim, the former vice President of the Maoist *Association d'Amitié khmero-chinoise* (Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association, or AAKC) made numerous ideological and rhetorical homages to Maoism in his dissertation.

Perhaps the most central sources came not from Phnom Penh, but from Paris at the Bibliothèque CUJAS of the Université Paris-Sorbonne. CUJAS holds the original copies of Hou Yuon's 1955 doctoral dissertation *La paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernization* (The Cambodian Peasants and their Prospects for Modernization, 1955) and Khieu Samphan's 1959 *L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation*, both of which this study holds as Democratic Kampuchea's (DK) foundational national texts. The doctoral dissertations represent the origins of Maoism in Cambodian intellectual conversations (outside of friendly exchanges in private between Prince Sihanouk and Mao Zedong). The present study seeks to uncover the relation between these proposals and Pol Pot's own writings and other CPK literature about CPK Maoism *in practice* in DK. My interpretation of these texts is fourfold: Maoism and how it interacted with Cambodian political culture; economic development issues between rural and urban Cambodia; *imaginaires* of Cambodia's pre-colonial past based on the French "construct"; and xenophobia towards Vietnam and other foreigners.¹⁰¹ The final section of the dissertation draws largely from sources written by the intellectuals themselves. José Maria Sison's speeches and his written works from his time as Communist Party of the Philippines theorist and leader inform the last chapter on how Sison received and adapted Maoism. DN Aidit's written works and speeches, albeit translated versions of them, English-language translations of *Harian Rakjat* (People's Daily, Indonesia), and post-1965 statements by

¹⁰¹ Chandler, "From 'Cambodge' to 'Kampuchea,'" 35-49; Edwards, *Cambodge*, 19-39; and Barnett, "Cambodia Will Never Disappear," 101-125.

prominent survivors such as Sudisman and Aditjondro that laud Mao and the utility of aspects of Maoism serve a similar function and are instrumental to answering the questions that surround Maoism in radical Indonesian circles.

Caveats and Limitations

There is... no ascent to truth without descent to cases.—Clifford Geertz, 1968¹⁰²

As the previous section indicates, a detailed account of China's relationship with the CPK is particularly difficult since many crucial Chinese-language primary sources and virtually all information about CCP-CPK relations are restricted to both non-Chinese and Chinese researchers. Henri Locard, in particular, notes that there were indeed many Chinese advisers on the ground in Cambodia and that they were certainly important in developing infrastructure there, but the degree to which they actually influenced CPK policy remains a mystery:

There were thousands of Chinese technical experts living in the country, mainly working in industry, transport, and energy. But there must have been also a number of military advisors, all weapons being provided by China which had built a vast secret air base, with two runways near Kampong Chhnang at Phum Krang [Leav]. Since the army was so much involved in the repression it is difficult to imagine the Chinese were completely unaware of what was going on in the country. This cannot be demonstrated—nor disproved—until all archives are opened.¹⁰³

Evidently, as with any topic on the CCP's relations with controversial regimes outside China, a researcher must work with what is available and connect the dots via the use of those limited primary sources not deemed by the Chinese state as sensitive. Since recent publications on PRC-DK relations by top-notch scholars such as Sophie Richardson and Andrew Mertha cover the topic of diplomatic relations adequately and cogently, the present study discusses such relations only in a contextual sense, and avoids getting into the issue of placing blame on the PRC for the crimes that the CPK committed. As Richardson and Mertha show, Chinese advisers had active roles before the CPK takeover, but figured less prominently as Cambodia became the total police state that was Democratic Kampuchea. As Mertha argues, despite Chinese involvement "in every aspect and at each stage of the CPK rise to power... on the policy front at least, it was in fact

¹⁰² Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 22.

¹⁰³ Henri Locard, "The Khmer Rouge Gulag: April 17, 1975—January 9, 1979." Unpublished Manuscript, quoted by Andrew Mertha, "Surrealpolitik: The Experience of Chinese Experts in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, No. 4 (September 2012): 65-88, on page 66.

China that ended up as the subordinate Party... the political history of China's relationship with Democratic Kampuchea confirms that the expected outcome—a relationship in which Beijing dictated critical strategic terms to Phnom Penh—never came to pass.”¹⁰⁴ An interviewee of Mertha went on record stating that China was “very much opposed [非常反對] to their domestic policy, but supported their foreign policy.”¹⁰⁵ While Beijing granted the Cambodian Communists technical assistance, material aid, and rhetorical support for their “just struggle,”¹⁰⁶ it ultimately did not exercise a significant level of influence over CPK policies, even if Communist China provided the ideological/intellectual inspiration for nearly all of them.¹⁰⁷

The dissertation is also about ideological transmutation, and does not in any way purport to endorse the ideas of the Communists under analysis, or act as an apologist for Mao Zedong's catastrophic errors as Supreme Leader of the PRC. It is indeed not attempting to provide a hagiographic account of Mao, replete with unremitting praise for him. But focusing exclusively on Mao's or the Chinese revolution's failures—for instance, the horrible outcomes of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution—does not allow us to evaluate more fairly the contributions of Mao both to China and the world.¹⁰⁸ Mao Zedong Thought, this study asserts, ought to be placed under the lens of analysis as a global thought system that appealed to likeminded Communists across the world, and continues to resonate in movements in the present day. Whether we like Mao or not, Maoism has value as a lens through which we can examine global responses to modernization/ globalization.

Due to the present study's emphasis on the intellectual origins of the CPK, it does not write extensively on Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, Vorn Vet, and other major CPK figures, though they certainly left their imprint on the intellectuals under analysis. To cover all of these

¹⁰⁴ Andrew Mertha, *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 2, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Andrew Mertha, “Interview 10BJ01,” (15 January 2010), as quoted in Mertha, “Surrealpolitik,” 65.

¹⁰⁶ See 柬埔寨人民的偉大勝利：熱烈慶祝柬埔寨愛國軍民解放金邊 [Great Victory of the Cambodian People: Warmly Congratulating the Patriotic Cambodian Armed Forces on the Liberation of Phnom Penh and All of Cambodia]. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1975); and *Fighting Cambodia: Reports of the Chinese Journalists Delegation to Cambodia*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975).

¹⁰⁷ John D. Ciociari, “China and the Pol Pot Regime,” *Cold War History* 14, No. 2 (2014): 1-21.

¹⁰⁸ For favorable depictions of Mao, see Han Suyin, *The Morning Deluge: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893-1954*. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1972). Bill Willmott describes Han's work as hagiographic in a 2010 essay. Bill Willmott, “From Wild Swans to Mao: The Unknown Story,” in *Was Mao Really a Monster?: The Academic Response to Chang and Halliday's “Mao: The Unknown Story.”* Gregor Benton and Lin Chun, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 176. See also pages 1-11.

men and their individual passages through different thought spaces and social encounters is certainly important, but it falls outside of the present study's purview. This dissertation chooses Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Saloth Sar, for their Paris connection, roles as the intellectual architects behind the foundational national texts that envisioned Democratic Kampuchea, political and revolutionary posts in the 1950s and 1960s, and eventual break from each other after 1975 as the two competing factions within the CPK became conflictual. Thus while Ieng Sary, for instance, fits this criteria and was indeed a leading figure within the CPK, we do not find the same degree of ideological planning for Cambodia in any of his Paris writings (if any), and his contribution falls under the organizational rather than ideological category.

While Maoism in Philippine and Indonesian intellectual circles is a very important part of the dissertation, the author recognizes that Cambodia occupies the central focus. The motivation behind this choice is to set up additional case studies for postdoctoral work. The majority of the sources used here are in Chinese, French, or Khmer, while the sources used for the latter two cases are available in English. The present study is also not an attempt to take agency away from Southeast Asian intellectuals by placing emphasis on Maoism as a driving agent. Rather, it is an attempt to connect Southeast Asian radicals to the history of ideas, which is a global history, and one in which these men, however controversial, do indeed belong.

Part One—From Mao Zedong Thought to Global Maoism

Chapter One—A “Brilliant Beacon”¹: The Nature and Form of Mao Zedong Thought

Knowledge is a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible... If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must make physical and chemical experiments of the chemist to change the state of the atom. If you want to know the concrete theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience... This saying holds true for the profit making of the merchant, and also holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.²

—Mao Zedong, “On Practice,” July 1937

This chapter argues that the social experiences of Mao Zedong, who was an intellectual with international connections and whose thinking was situated in correcting China’s social and political ills, give valuable insight into the processes whereby a radical thought such as Marxism (and later, Maoism) emerges as a guidepost for revolution. His passages through intellectual and ideological spaces help to explain similar patterns among fellow networked intellectuals in Southeast Asia decades later, who, like him, reacted to life-altering changes in governance during their time by taking a radical turn. The purpose of this chapter is to look at Mao Zedong thought and Maoism in terms of our model for the movement of ideas across cultures, in which we see the cusp of Said’s triad—conditions of production, transmission, and reception. Here, *reception* of Soviet and European Marxism-Leninism is transformed in its *production* of a new variant, or to borrow from Nick Knight, a “complete ideological system,” in China (Mao Zedong Thought).³ To accomplish this task, the chapter performs a close textual exegesis of Mao’s most

¹ Nayan Chanda, “Pol Pot Plays up to Beijing,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 October 1977, 30. In 1976, Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) leader Pol Pot eulogized Mao in an address during which he praised Maoism as the “brilliant beacon” for revolutionaries all over the world and the “most precious aid” that has been provided by China.

² Mao Zedong, “On Practice: On the Relation between Knowledge and Practice, between Theory and Reality, between Knowing and Doing,” *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*. Nick Knight, ed., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1990), 137-138; Mao Zedong, “實踐論 (On Practice, *Shíjiàn lùn*),” in 毛澤東集補卷第五卷 [Supplements to Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume V, *Máo Zédōng jí dīwǔjuǎn*]. Takeuchi Minoru, ed., (Tokyo: Suosuosha, 1983-1986), 225-226; Mao Zedong, “實踐論 (On Practice, *Shíjiàn lùn*),” 毛澤東選集第一卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 1, *Máo Zédōng xuǎnjí, dì yī juǎn* (hereafter *XJ*)], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe chuban, 1952), 263-264; and Mao Zedong, “On Practice,” *Selected Works Vol. I*, [hereafter *SW*] (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 309-310.

³ Nick Knight, “The Form of Mao Zedong’s ‘Sinification of Marxism,’” *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 9 (January 1993): 17-33, on page 30.

influential writings and pronouncements to grasp the nature and form of Mao Zedong Thought. Works under analysis include, but are not limited to, Mao's "Yan'an Period" (1936-1948) essays as collected by Takeuchi Minoru.⁴ These works represent foundational components in the formulation of his thought, and reflect the maturation of his views on Marxism, China's revolution, and his perception of these two in light of the protracted struggle against Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the Guomindang (GMD).

The first half of this pivotal stage of "traveling ideas," *reception*, is the focus of the chapter's first section. Here, Philip Kuhn's methodological approach to the conditions of the socio-contextual fit that shapes the reception of exogenous ideas carries us through Mao's own encounter with, and reception of, Marxism, leading to his "conversion" to it in 1920.⁵ The next section focuses on Mao's *adaptations* of Marxism: first, *practical adaptation*, or putting theory into practice to create a theory based on *a posteriori* knowledge, such as "Mao Zedong Thought" (毛澤東思想, *Máo Zédōng Sīxiǎng*); and second, *normative*, which is to make a foreign idea congruent with particular norms to create an ideological system, such as Mao Zedong Thought. The section draws from Kenneth Jowitt's neo-Weberian understanding of Leninism to explain the conflictual yet harmonious blend of charismatic (charismatic-impersonalism) and rational-bureaucratic features at work in Mao's adaptation of Marxism into Sinified Marxism/Mao Zedong Thought. In Leninism, as Jowitt contends, charismatic leadership draws people in, influencing action because of the personal authority of the individual. The enmeshment of charismatic and rational-bureaucratic modes, what he calls charisma and class/status-classificatory modes of domination, or "language of political legitimacy," allowed a charismatic authority figure such as Mao to gain entry into a society of which he had little or no *a priori* exposure.⁶ There is ultimately a convergence with rational-bureaucratic features, which alone inspire others because of agreed procedures based on rational deliberation. The theories of Kuhn

⁴ Yan'an Period (1936-1948): The period between the Chinese Civil War (1927-1950) and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1948) when Mao Zedong consolidated his ideology as the Party's guide to action. See Mark Selden, *The Yanan Way*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971); Arif Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 78-86; and Raymond F. Wylie, "Mao Zedong, Chen Po-ta and the 'Sinification of Marxism,'" *The China Quarterly* 79, No.1, (September 1979): 447-480.

⁵ Maurice Meisner, *Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 25; See also Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of the Chinese Communist Party*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 209-212.

⁶ Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993), 13, citing Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 3. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 1122.

and Jowitt are therefore two useful lenses that bring the key mechanisms of *reception* and *production* into sharp focus.

The first section focuses on three key variables of the reception of exogenous thought, with Kuhn's method moving us towards making sense of how ideas from without resonate among peoples within a different socio-cultural setting. In his study of Hong Xiuquan's Taiping vision, he identifies three salient steps: 1) the precise language of the textual material that impinged on a host culture (impact/relational); 2) the structure of the historical circumstances in which this material emerges (condition of reception); and 3) the process whereby foreign materials become important to, and made normative by, sectors of society outside the group that appreciated and received it initially (practical/normative).⁷ If we apply Kuhn's methodology to Mao's reception and adaptation of Marxism, his social experiences emerge as the first cogs in the moving wheel of his revolutionary thought. Here, three key issues, or variables, in the reception of traveling theory, emerge: 1) the relation of language of Marxism to China's cultural setting at the time (impact/relational); 2) the structure of the historical circumstances in China (condition of reception); and 3) the process whereby it became important to Mao and his fellow Communists (practical/normative). These three factors then take us to the social and political problems that were not handled successfully by the actors in question for whom the exogenous theory seemed to offer novel solutions, and which, through some trial and error, these actors managed to *adapt* to address those social and political problems successfully.

The final section on *normative adaptation*, meanwhile, Jowitt's argument that Leninist organizations combine charismatic-impersonal with rational bureaucratic (status-classificatory) features is particularly useful since Max Weber's two seemingly incompatible modes of domination—tradition and charisma—come together in Mao's adaptation of Marxism into Mao Zedong Thought and, later, Sinified Marxism.⁸ In fact, both charisma and rational-bureaucratic features undermine the third form, tradition, which is just what revolutionaries such as Mao sought to accomplish. The beauty of Bolshevism, as Jowitt shows, is that it made these two previously conflictual modes harmonious. This is important since Mao infused so much of his

⁷ Philip Kuhn, "Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-Cultural Dimensions of a Chinese Rebellion," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, No. 3 (July 1977): 350-355, on page 350.

⁸ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 13, citing Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 3, 1122.

charisma into Mao Zedong Thought, grounding the abstract ideology of Marxism-Leninism in the concrete realities and historical experience of China.

Two salient examples of normative adaptation that stand out are Mao's fall 1938 speech “論新階段” (On the New Stage, *Lùn xīn jiēduàn*) in which we find his “Sinification of Marxism,”⁹ and the 1941-1944 延安整風運動, (Yan'an Rectification Movement, *Yán'ān Zhěngfēng Yùndòng*). Both elucidate that the charismatic-impersonal features of the Leninist Party do not always transcend the leader; rather, Mao's “Sinification” represents a type of modification that leads back to the leader, while Yan'an Rectification consolidated him at the center of the CCP and rephrased the Party's history in a Mao-centric way. The section thus explores the ways in which Mao, a charismatic revolutionary, synthesized national distinctiveness with a particular mode of class struggle that was rooted deeply in both China's particular historical experience and Mao's own personal charisma. As we will see, in his adaptation of Marxism to Chinese conditions, Mao oscillated between China's particular historical and cultural settings and Marxism-Leninism's universal features to forge a place for his charismatic thought within a competitive CCP. He also used it to mobilize rank and file and to recruit new followers, and through Rectification's process of what David Apter and Tony Saich call “exegetical bonding,”¹⁰ transformed these new believers into devoted Maoists who held his Yan'an canon as holy scripture. Mao and his Southeast Asian disciples later on vacillated between rational-bureaucratic currents that were the underpinnings of the Party's vanguard, and the Party's modern (or high modern in the Cambodian case) program for Communist revolution to garner the necessary human resources that they required to capture state power. Then, they weeded out rivals, leaving only a legion of devoted followers of the charismatic leader's ideology.

While the focus of the following chapter is primarily on Mao's own experiences and transformations, it traces preliminary threads between the encounters that guided him toward creating a “Chinese model” of revolution, and those of the intellectuals from Southeast Asia. Indeed, Mao's experiences in engaging with, shaping, and re-shaping Marxism into Mao Zedong

⁹ Mao Zedong, “論新階段 (On the New Stage, *Lùn xīn jiēduàn*),” (12-14 October 1938) 毛澤東集第六卷 [*Mōtakutō setto*, Works of Mao Zedong, Volume VI (hereafter *MZJ*)], Takeuchi Minoru, ed., (Tokyo: Beiwangshe, 1970-1972), 260-261. See also Arif Dirlik, “Discourse of ‘Chinese Marxism,’” in *Modern Chinese Religion II: 1850-2015, Volume I*. Vincent Gossaert, Jan Kiely, and John Lagerway, eds. (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2016), 305-306.

¹⁰ David Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 263-293.

Thought provide a helpful guide to these later Communist revolutions. As later chapters will show, for some political leaders in Southeast Asia their encounters with, and adaptation of, ideas from outside their sociocultural milieus positioned them firmly at the forefront of their national revolutions. Radical social change combined with personal passages through mental and physical spaces to lead the Khmer, Philippine, and after the 1965-66 massacres, Indonesian intellectuals to regard Maoism as ideal for their respective historical situations. Thus as we shift to Mao's own social experiences, it is important to examine four important issues from the history of history writing on Mao: 1) the demonization of Mao and Maoism; 2) the nature of Mao's Marxism; 3) defining his Thought (as singularity, plurality, or ideological system); and 4) outlining the mechanisms by which Mao Zedong Thought came into existence.

Mao, Maoism, and Mao(s)ism(s): Scholarly Approaches to Mao and his Thought

The lasting legacy of Maoism, both within China and without, varies considerably. Among many Chinese, including ranking CCP members, Mao is still a polarizing figure. Some hold him in unrelenting high regard as the national father, the hero of the Chinese people, and the liberator of China from inequality, corruption, civil strife, and foreign occupation. His thought also receives significant attention among Party loyalists and members as the foundational principle of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the guiding light of revolutions in the Third World. However, one can deny neither the human cost of the Great Leap Forward, nor the violent iconoclasm of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, for which Mao is largely responsible.¹¹ The following section delves deeply into the ongoing scholarly debate and (re)appraisal of Maoism, highlighting that Mao's mistakes and personal failings do not prove that his thought was ineffective or unimportant; we do not have to like Mao to study Mao and see value in his thought.

In recent scholarship on contemporary Chinese history, several scholars cast Mao in an exceptionally negative light by characterizing him indiscriminately as a brutal and bloodthirsty twentieth-century dictator not unlike Hitler or Stalin.¹² Chang Jun and John Halliday, in

¹¹ Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 459-462.

¹² See Chang Jun and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Untold Story*. (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing, 2011); Frank Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*. (London and New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010); and Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao*. (New York: Random House, 2011).

particular, portray Mao “as a liar, igoramous,, fool, philistine, vandal, lecher, glutton, hedonist, drug-peddler, ghoul, bully, thug, coward, posture, manipulator, psychopath, sadist, torturer, despot, megalomaniac, and the greatest mass murderer in the twentieth century.”¹³ Whether these authors foreground Mao’s vengeful personality, sexual proclivities, or paranoia, the result is the outright dismissal of Mao as anyone who had even the slightest positive historical role in the Chinese revolution in place of the promulgation of sensationalist claims with distorted or out-of-context evidence to support ad hominem-based arguments. They also occlude the necessary context, ignoring wholesale the socioeconomic, political, and cultural aspects of China in Mao’s time, and disregard Mao’s intellectual development and social experiences that shaped his ideas.¹⁴ Reasoned analysis ultimately takes a backseat to a negative portrait that, as historian Nick Knight asserts, “render[s] nugatory any serious scholarly study of Mao.”¹⁵

In response, several scholars authored *Was Mao Really a Monster?* as a riposte, in which the contributors agree that Mao’s faults and responsibility for disastrous policies, although part of understanding and appraising Mao, do not stand in for the whole picture of Mao and Maoism. Rather than toeing the Chang and Halliday line, which “eschew[s] any attempt to balance the good and bad”¹⁶ and presents a “Maoist denunciation of Mao himself, done in the florid style of the Cultural Revolution denunciations,”¹⁷ they suggest that we ought to go much deeper than cursory evaluations. The contributors urge us to evaluate sources not solely to fit the procrustean bed of demonizing Mao, to avoid facile explanations of events in Maoist China by portraying Mao as inherently evil, and to gauge sources as evenly as possible to avoid “portray[ing] a possible but not plausible Mao.”¹⁸ Yet such positions notwithstanding, the most challenging task in the study of Maoism begins not with the man’s flaws and disastrous programs once he was in power, but with his thought—its nature, form, and effect.

No definition of Maoism has universal acceptance, especially since it was “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought” that the CCP codified and “Maoism” only emerges as a way to

¹³ Gregor Benton and Lin Chun, eds. *Was Mao Really a Monster?: The Academic Response to Chang and Halliday’s Mao: The Unknown Story*. (London: Routledge, 2010), 1.

¹⁴ Benton and Lin, eds., *Was Mao Really a Monster?*, 7.

¹⁵ Nick Knight, *Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong Thought*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 4.

¹⁶ Delia Davin, “Dark Tales of Mao the Merciless,” in *Was Mao Really A Monster?*, 16.

¹⁷ Timothy Cheek, “The Number One Counter-Revolutionary Inside the Party: Academic Biography as Mass Criticism,” in *Was Mao Really A Monster?*, 55.

¹⁸ Andrew J. Nathan, “Jade and Plastic,” *Was Mao Really A Monster?*, 28.

categorize and describe those foreign Parties that subscribed to Mao's theory and practice. Nevertheless, scholars have made significant efforts to define it by highlighting its features. Peter Zarrow defines Maoism as "a theory of rural and peasant-based revolution, with a strong military component, and tight, Leninist party organization... [as well as] a strong element of subjectivism or voluntarism."¹⁹ Stuart R. Schram and Nick Knight, by contrast, focus their analyses on Mao's written works, taking utterly opposing stances due in no small part to their adoption of different Maos (the man and the system of thought). While Schram uses the map and compass of historiography by understanding Maoism in its historical context, Knight uses the textual map and compass of political theory or literary criticism/academic Marxism to understand Maoism. Schram highlights Mao's nationalism as the guiding factor in his thought to the exclusion of other core elements that we can see in his thinking. He argues that Mao is "a deeply convinced Leninist revolutionary, [but] while the categories in which he reasons are Marxist categories, the deepest springs of his personality are... found in the Chinese tradition, and China's glory is at least as important to him as is world revolution."²⁰ Knight, however, opposes this culturist view, and in his riposte to psychological perspectives on Mao, he takes the Chairman's Marxism and his theoretical contributions to Marxism seriously, as they appear in the texts. Indeed, Knight believes that there remains some significant value in the scholarly analysis of Mao Zedong Thought. In particular, he thinks that understanding Mao thought is significant to understanding China's past and present, since Mao's influence "has in no way been expunged."²¹ China's historians, political scientists, and politicians, he contends, "still operate within an intellectual context" that owes much to China's revolutionary and socialist past history.²² Whether Schram or Knight adopted the disciplinary approach first that led to their conclusions, or whether they had an insight or impression first and found their respective guide languages congenial for articulating those insights is unknown, even though they both approach the topic from a very serious academic Marxist perspective.²³ But what is important for our story in this dissertation is the usefulness of Mao's texts to explain Maoism's development from Marxism normalized by Mao to the concrete realities of China into an ideological system that had much broader applicability.

¹⁹ Peter Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 234.

²⁰ Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. (New York: Praeger, 1969), 16.

²¹ Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 5.

²² Knight, *ibid.*

²³ My thanks to Dr. Timothy Cheek for his insight on this particular dimension of their debate on Mao's Marxism.

The debates above, however, tend to ignore the myriad complexities that make an effort to define Maoism particularly difficult. What is important for our story in this dissertation is that Maoism is a complex ideological system with essential components that comprise it. As Lu Xun once said, “Great buildings are built one brick and one piece of wood at a time,” and so too was Maoism. “Multiple Maos” existed at different stages of his life and during the Chinese revolution, thus to choose “one dominant image is to distort the whole.”²⁴ That is, the Mao of the 1920s, working in the GMD to promote proletarian revolution, is not identical to the Mao in the hills of Jiangxi who was forced into making a rural revolution, or the Mao of the 1950s trying to make shift from revolution to governance. Since such multiple Maos exist, then does it make sense to discuss Maoism as a singularity? As Arif Dirlik argues, to regard Maoism as a singular fixed entity is profoundly myopic because:

... there is more than one Mao Zedong Thought, just as there is more than one Marx or Marxism. The Maoism of ‘New Democracy’ (1940) in Yan’an was one that secured the hegemony of the CCP and its revolutionary policies, which had been overshadowed by the Maoism of the Cultural Revolution. Yan’an was very important to understanding the latter as well as the political organicism demanded by the Cultural Revolution had been visible during the Yan’an period. But now it was unchecked by other considerations, and mistook coercion and dictatorship for hegemony, which would bring about its downfall and the discrediting of the whole Maoist enterprise.²⁵

In fact, Mao himself held that thought is transformed in a process of dialectical interaction between theory, practice, and theory again, culminating ultimately in the wedding of Marxism-Leninism’s universal principles to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.²⁶ Mao’s application of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese realities had resonated as a political viewpoint by the Long March, and while Mao was in the political minority and his re-appointment to a significant office in the CCP at Zunyi was purely a military move, Mao thought was crystallizing into something with serious revolutionary potential.²⁷

²⁴ Timothy Cheek, *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, Tim Cheek ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xi.

²⁵ Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 7.

²⁶ Mao Zedong, “Reform Our Study,” (19 May 1941) *Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1941—Volume VII: New Democracy, 1939-1941* (hereafter *MRP*). Stuart Schram, ed., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1992), 747-748; Mao Zedong, “改造我們的學習, (Reform Our Study, *Gǎizào wǒmen de xuéxi*),” 毛澤東選集第三卷 *XJ III*, 753-754; and Mao Zedong, “Reform Our Study,” *Selected Works, Vol. III*, 17-18.

²⁷ Brantley Womack, *The Foundations of Mao Zedong’s Political Thought, 1917-1935*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1982), 188. Long March: there were several “long marches,” all of which were Red Army (later People’s Liberation Army, PLA) retreats between 1934 and 1935.

As far as the maturity of Mao's thinking is concerned, it developed most crucially in the "quiet years" of 1937-38 when he read and wrote "On Contradiction" and "On Practice." Maoism as we have come to know it was pulled together and propagated in the famous Yan'an Rectification Movement of 1941-44. Mao's thinking veered left and right through civil war and land reform in the late 1940s, and the challenges of administering the whole of China prompted more rethinking, as in Mao's famous 1955 "Ten Great Relationships" essays.²⁸ The bravado and failures of the Great Leap Forward, too, changed Maoism further, and later, the Cultural Revolution altered Maoism again into an ideology that placed a greater emphasis on exporting revolution abroad.²⁹ The different Maoisms that emerged in other countries also varied since they blended with existing forms, ranging from extant political cultures to specific historical contexts into which Maoism took root. Thus the process whereby Maoism transformed from a formula that was at once Marxist and Chinese into a complete ideological system deserves long overdue attention since it remains contested territory in the scholarly polemic on Maoism.³⁰ It is for these reasons that this section refocuses our attention on Mao's social experiences as the first cogs in the moving wheel of his revolutionary thought.

Mao's earlier experiences and social milieu serve as the point of departure for uncovering how he marshaled Marxism into something simultaneously Marxist/universal and Chinese/particular. His early life experiences as a youth during China's political turmoil, a student and librarian in Beijing during the 1919 May Fourth Movement, and later, the political battles that he fought in as a CCP member, are part of the whole process of his *reception* and *adaptation* of outside political thought. Equally crucial, of course, is the milieu into which Mao encountered, received, and applied foreign materials to China's historical situation. For, as Dirlik notes, Mao Zedong Thought "stands at the intersection of two histories: a global history that, beginning in the late 19th century, intruded with increasing forcefulness on Chinese thinking, and provided a new frame of reference for thinking about the past, present, and future of Chinese society; and a Chinese history the autonomy of which appeared as an issue as the new world impressed itself in Chinese consciousness."³¹ As the Chinese Communist Revolution continued

²⁸ See Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships," *SWV*, 284-307.

²⁹ Sophie Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 66.

³⁰ Raymond F. Wylie offered *The Emergence of Maoism* in 1980 as one possible explanation, but not all accept his conclusions.

³¹ Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 75.

into the 1930s, Mao's thought crystallized around Marxism, a foreign ideology, and Chinese society, or more superficially, a particularly rural society.

By 1938, Mao's "Sinification of Marxism," with which he "read the Chinese historical experience into Marxism in the process, 're-creating' Marxism,"³² was certainly a watershed moment in the evolution of Mao's thought's from dogma into an ideological system. However, his formulation of Sinified Marxism was but one of several key reasons for his rise to CCP helmsmanship between 1935 and 1943.³³ Of course, Mao's rise was not based solely on these ideas. CCP helmsmanship was still out of his grasp.³⁴ To get the wheels in motion, Mao secured the (reluctant) endorsement of Stalin by 1938, survived a military challenge by Zhang Guotao, and out maneuvered his key Party challenger, Wang Ming, by 1939.³⁵ The pressures of the anti-Japanese war slowed his next step—to inculcate the Party leadership in his "correct thought"—but he mobilized a talented cadre of fellow CCP leaders, ranging from Liu Shaoqi to Peng Zhen to Kang Sheng, to support his plan for cadre education and administrative reform—the Yan'an Rectification Movement. Ideology, military power, and bureaucratic politics were key variables, but so, too, were the successes of his administrative reforms to streamline the Party to get cadres into the villages and to improve the treatment of civilians by the army. In the context of total war with Japan and egregious failings by the Chinese government of Jiang Jieshi on all scores, one does not have to resort to explanations of terror or self-deception to understand why Maoism was attractive to so many in the 1940s. But it did not start that way. It is therefore important to examine the process whereby Mao's experiences helped to shape his worldview, and how this view facilitated his later conversion to Marxism and Communism—a process that holds importance for the case studies in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, respectively.

³² Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 75-76.

³³ Scholars generally date Mao's accession to undisputed helmsmanship to March 1943 when he won the deciding vote in the CCP three-man secretariat.

³⁴ Mao certainly had the content of his thought sorted out and, at the 6th Plenum, threw down the gauntlet. But he had not convinced enough of his colleagues to guarantee his acceptance within the Party in general until at least 1942. After all, he had to publish "On New Democracy" in a little-known new journal, 中國文化, (Chinese Culture, *Zhōngguó wénhuà*) in its obscure first issue in Jan. 1940.

³⁵ Raymond F. Wylie argues that Mao's Sinification of Marxism was a power-play that he used to outmaneuver the pro-Soviet Returned Scholars, who were led by Wang Ming. See Wylie, "Mao Zedong, Chen Po-ta and the 'Sinification of Marxism,' 1936-1938," 447-480; and Raymond F. Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Chen Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980).

A Man of Many Facets: Mao's Social Experience, 1893-1927

The Hunanese often say, “Straw sandals have no pattern—they shape themselves in the making.”³⁶—Mao Zedong, 1958

We now turn to the social surroundings of Mao Zedong that engendered a young student to turn to revolutionary ideas. Mao's social experience was shaped very much by the social and political upheavals³⁷ that characterized his formative years, as well as by a “sense of mission and freedom” that drove many people of ideas to look outside China for inspiration.³⁸ It was during this tumultuous period that Chinese intellectuals developed a sense of iconoclasm towards Chinese culture and traditions, while others developed strong nationalist sentiments.³⁹ For these reasons, *reception* takes center stage in the movement of ideas across culture. This section explores the intellectual journey that Mao experienced en route to espousing Marxism. The section also explores the social dynamics and spaces in which he found himself situated that played an equally crucial part in this transformation. The section's purpose is therefore to explain how and why Marxism both “spoke” to Mao and, ultimately, became important to him and other radically minded Chinese intellectuals. This reveals the major theme of seeing Mao Zedong Thought and, later Maoism, as a product of the same processes of cross-cultural borrowing and fit that Southeast Asian Communists would engage later on in their respective social and intellectual experiences.

³⁶ Mao Zedong, “Speech at a Supreme State Conference,” (28 January 1958), in 毛澤東思想萬歲! (Long Live the Thought of Mao Zedong!), *Máo Zédōng sīxiǎng wànsuì!*, (Beijing: Red Guard Publication, 1969), 94, as quoted in John Bryan Starr, *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), ix.

³⁷ See Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 1-3, 10, 64-75; and Douglas Robertson Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 17-37.

³⁸ Tang Xiaobing, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 22; Rebecca Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 3, 4, 53-82, 196, 198. For Eastern European and other non-Western examples, see Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 127-133; and Brantley Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary: Mao from the 1920s to 1937,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*. Timothy Cheek ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 62.

³⁹ To outline nationalism's links and contrasts with the fundamental modes of organizing experience, Benedict Anderson argues that “a new conception of time [emerged] that made the imagining of nations possible, a conception of simultaneity marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.” See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983), 24; and Jonathan Culler and Preng Cheah, eds., *Grounds of Comparison: Around the Work of Benedict Anderson*. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 31.

Much like future Maoists Saloth Sar and Jose Maria Sison, Mao's early life was a peasant upbringing and, more accurately, a rural one.⁴⁰ He was born in Shaoshan village in the eastern part of Hunan, to a family of 富農 (wealthy peasants, *Fùnóng*). His father had struggled for years as a farmer until finally achieving considerable wealth and an ameliorated social standing. Young Mao's early life was reasonably comfortable, although his relationship with his father was anything but pleasant.⁴¹ While he was not born into the intellectual elite of his society and he never went to college or university, his family and the environment in which he grew up granted him certain advantages that were unavailable to the vast majority of his compatriots. For instance, he was able to become a "petit intellectual," which meant that he was "part of the educated elite of his country, but *not* the top intellectual elite."⁴² His parents' status as wealthy peasants thus gave him otherwise unobtainable upward social mobility, although he later reviled his class origins as Marxism came to dominate his thinking.⁴³ Mao received a classical education not unlike many Chinese youth of a similar class background, taking an early interest in Chinese philosophy, literature, and history, writing poetry, and reading Chinese historical novels. Much of his early exposure to China's literary classics served to inspire much of the rhetoric he used, and homages he made, in his later essays and speeches.

Such an advantageous position within this particular social milieu also afforded him an opportunity to move beyond his humble origins, a trend that is consistent across the cases under analysis in this dissertation. Mao was not isolated from major developments that occurred in China's major epicenters, which allowed him limited, albeit crucial, contact with the outside world. In 1911 at seventeen years of age, Mao moved to Changsha.⁴⁴ For many rural youths, including Mao, the period leading up to May Fourth was a time of significant change. Not unlike the Khmer intellectuals' pilgrimages to Paris decades later, Mao's move to Changsha was an

⁴⁰ Xiao Yanzhong, 巨人的挺生 [Genesis of a Colossus, *Jùrén de tǐngshēng*]. (Beijing: Guoji Wenhua chuban Gongsi, 1988), 26-27. Both Sar and Sison were born to wealthy landowning peasants. Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon, by contrast, were born to elite families with ties to the French colonial government, while Hu Nim was the only one of the group of Khmer intellectuals under analysis to come from a genuinely impoverished background. Interestingly, Sar, Khieu, Hou, and Hu all come from Sino-Khmer ethnic backgrounds.

⁴¹ Womack, "From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 63. Womack notes that Mao had "conflicts with his father at the age of 10, but because of his mother's difficulties with pregnancies, he was raised from ages two to eight as part of a four-generation family at his maternal grandmother's house in the adjoining county." On page 63, citing Xiao 巨人的挺生, 24-25.

⁴² Robert A. Scalapino, "The Evolution of a Young Revolutionary—Mao Zedong in 1919-1921," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 42, No. 1 (November 1982): 29-61, on page 30.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 29-31, 56-58.

⁴⁴ Womack, "From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 63-64.

internationalist awakening.⁴⁵ Here, Mao “saw his first newspaper and became more aware of current events in China and the world.”⁴⁶ He attended Hunan First Provincial Normal School, where his peers elected him secretary of the Student Association of First Normal, then general manager of the student association. Soon thereafter, Mao and his colleagues established 新民學會 (New People’s Study Society, *Xīnmínxuéhuì*), which, although “not intended to become a large organization,” had an international membership and encouraged active and collective living.⁴⁷ Mao soon wrote his most famous “A Study of Physical Education” (1917),⁴⁸ in which the principles of living actively and improving oneself physically stood in as metaphors for reversing China’s present state of weakness.

Young Mao’s experiences and the ideology of New People’s Study Society⁴⁹ were rife with ideological twists and turns, blending Chinese organizations and values with modern ideas from outside that became superlative forces for drastic upheaval. Cities in what Mao would later describe as “semi-colonial” and “semi-feudal” (terms that surfaced in the writings of the Southeast Asian intellectuals in critiques of their own societies), for instance, stood as the focal points of youth dissidence and political upheaval. Chinese society at the time of Mao’s youth was in the midst of a “desperate renaissance,”⁵⁰ during which the country’s traditions and socio-political structures came into direct confrontation with non-Chinese alternatives. However, political movements that centered on radical change in China emerged among Chinese elites and the Chinese state not as a reply to Western imperialism; rather, they were already a half century in progress, meaning that imperialism accelerated instead of initiated them.⁵¹ The shortcomings of Republican China, which was founded in 1911, and the onset of the May Fourth Movement in

⁴⁵ See Wen-hsin Yeh, *Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996). Though Yeh’s case is the “middle counties,” which applies only to counties up the Qiantang river from Hangzhou (thereby excluding Mao), I extend her point to include those rural students who experienced similar phenomena.

⁴⁶ Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 64.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 65-67.

⁴⁸ Mao Zedong, “A Study of Physical Education,” *MRP I*. Stuart Schram, ed., 113-127; and Mao Zedong, “體育之研究 (A Study of Physical Education, *Tǐyù zhī yánjiū*), 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 35-48.

⁴⁹ Womack describes the 新民學會 ideology as “a hybrid between traditional Chinese organizations and values and the modern inspirations coming from the West.” Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 65.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁵¹ Mary B. Rankin, *Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), 1-2, 5, 27.

1919 engendered further acceleration of iconoclasm throughout China's major cities. Wen-hsin Yeh describes the situation in Hangzhou in the following passage:

Many strands of development...joined together in the months between April and October 1919, to stretch the long existing tension between the conservatives and the progressives to the bursting point of open hostility...Thousands of students swarmed Hangzhou's streets shouting slogans against the conservative provincial authorities. By early fall, Hangzhou students were publishing radical journals, openly forming intellectual alliances with radical iconoclasts in Shanghai and Beijing, espousing their goals, and shunning the state celebration of Confucius.⁵²

Iconoclasm spread like wildfire during the New Culture Movement (1915-1921). While not solely a response to a challenge from outside thought and institutions—ample indigenous thought reservoirs proved to be sufficient as modes to critique the status quo of Chinese society—iconoclastic Chinese intellectuals varied from calling for drastic reform of Chinese society via gradual change with Western borrowings to totalistic upheaval.⁵³

As extant ideas and concepts failed to rectify the numerous problems that confronted a very rapidly changing China, exogenous reservoirs entered the fray as sources for guidance. In this space of “repeated assaults” from New Culture iconoclasm and Western influences that were in vogue among Chinese intellectuals, Mao's experiences pushed his thought into a definite state of flux. His classical education blended with several “progressive” influences such as the work of Zheng Guanying⁵⁴ and writings by late Qing reformers Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. Thereafter, Mao looked to “new influences, including the democratic message put forward by Sun [Yatsen] and his revolutionaries, socialism, first introduced by Jiang Kanghu, and German idealism, advanced and made compatible with classical Chinese theories by his beloved normal School Teacher, Yang Chengji.”⁵⁵ His views changed yet again, however, when he became an editor for 湘江評論 (Xiangjiang Review, *Xiāngjiāng pínglùn*), an important mouthpiece of the Hunan Students Association, as exogenous thought intermingled with progressive ideas in China, thereby making the foreign make sense to China's particular historical setting in the late 1910s.

⁵² Yeh, *Provincial Passages*, 146.

⁵³ Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*; John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture and Class in the Nationalist Revolution*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); and Henrietta Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911-1929*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also Michael YL Luk, *The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism: An Ideology in the Making, 1920-1928*. (Hong Kong/New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁵⁴ Zheng Guanying: a Guangdong compradore who called for increased modernization efforts.

⁵⁵ Scalapino, “The Evolution of a Young Revolutionary...,” 30-31.

These shifts all reveal the nature of the changing space in which Mao found himself, and his ever-changing ideological pastiche of indigenous and foreign materials for service to changing China.

Mao's ideological shift towards Marxism began, however gradually, soon thereafter, as Mao made the transition in light of the May Fourth Movement from being a middle intellectual who was rooted in the classics to an activist, librarian, and staunch social critic.⁵⁶ Mao's writing during his time with 湘江評論 is characterized by Robert Scalapino as "eclectic... absorbing and seeking to synthesize ideas from diverse sources."⁵⁷ Such sources ranged from the works of John Dewey (as translated by Dewey's student Hu Shi⁵⁸) to Friedrich Paulsen's notions of individual morality in *System Der Ethik* to future CCP founders Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao.⁵⁹ While Mao leaned initially towards democracy as an ideal political system for China, and embraced liberalism in place of the radicalism that emerged in Russia at the time, he grew dissatisfied with inaction. He looked to Chen Duxiu, who preferred active, practical engagement with problems in China, as well as to a brand of non-violent anti-annihilationist anarchism that emerged from the thought of Pyotr Kropotkin.⁶⁰ Kropotkin's anarchism initiated Mao's interest in socialism as a corrective to present social problems, notably those related to family and women's liberation.⁶¹

As traditional Chinese society during this time came under attack by New Culture adherents, outside alternative structures and systems facilitated the rise of a "radical culture" that

⁵⁶ Scalapino, "The Evolution of a Young Revolutionary," 29-61; and Womack, "From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary: Mao from the 1920s to 1937," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 61-86.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 32-33. See also Dirlik, *Origins*, 201, 209-210. Dirlik states that when Mao returned from Beijing and Shanghai to Changsha he lauded Chen Duxiu as "our teacher" and the "pioneer of the thought revolution."

⁵⁸ Dewey came to Mao via Hu Shi and not Dewey himself, not unlike Taiping leader Hung Xiuquan's interpreting his dream about meeting with God through the lens of Liang A-fa's *Good Words to Admonish the Age*, though perhaps Hu Shi gave a more accurate rendition of his foreign original than did Liang. Kuhn, "Origins of the Taiping Vision," 350-355. For an interesting take on this dimension of Mao's thought, see Xiaodong Niu, "Mao Zedong and John Dewey: A Comparison of Educational Thought," *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET)/ Revue de la Pensée Éducative* 29, No. 2 (August 1995): 129-147.

⁵⁹ Womack, "From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 67-69; and Jack Gray, "Mao in Perspective," *China Quarterly* 187(September 2006): 669-673. Wakeman declares that Mao's philosophy teacher, Yang Changchi, brought Mao Chinese translations of Friedrich Paulsen's works. Frederic E. Wakeman, *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives on Mao Zedong Thought* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 202-214.

⁶⁰ Scalapino, "The Evolution of a Young Revolutionary," 33. Influences from Chen and Li inclined Mao toward the idea of a "bloodless revolution... produced by political pressure rather than violence," yet he realized eventually that such passivity was ineffectual if China were to alter its perceived errant course. Dirlik mentions that at this time (1919) Chen still "owed more to Dewey and Russell intellectually than to Marx and Lenin." Dirlik, *Origins*, 197.

⁶¹ Dirlik, *Origins*, 94. Both issues were "central to Chinese anarchist thinking" and "explains why the Chinese youth found anarchism most congenial."

had been fomenting for decades from the ashes of late Qing China.⁶² The anarchist movement was part of this trend, and the vision of an anti-statist and non-coercive Chinese society gained considerable appeal in Mao's thinking.⁶³ By the late 1920s, however, many anarchists turned to the rightist Guomindang in order to avoid the dislocation that intellectuals suffered in the years beforehand, and the tension between different interpretations of anarchism and the "unavoidable concern with the seemingly endless crises of Chinese identity and survival" led to the decline of Chinese anarchism in intellectual circles.⁶⁴

After trips to Shanghai and Beijing in 1918 Mao had determined that "national radical currents"⁶⁵ had more appeal, stating that his "present view of absolute liberalism, anarchism, and even democracy is that these things sound very good in theory, but are not feasible in reality."⁶⁶ In lieu of anarchism's decline and the appropriation of The New Culture Movement's "New Youth" by Marxists, radical thought streams that stressed organization and promoted a clear program for challenging state authority rose to the forefront.⁶⁷ Yet Mao's espousal of Marxism was not a foregone conclusion at this stage, for many of the issues that initiated anarchism's declining popularity among many intellectuals were equally prevalent in Marxist circles—identity, interpretation, and organization.

A confluence of two events led to Mao's shift to Marxism. The first was the 1919 Versailles treaty, which Mao and other Chinese intellectuals viewed as casting doubt on Western moral pre-eminence due to its inclusion of a clause that transferred the former German colonies

⁶² Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 1, 6-7, 11-13. Early forms of anarchism "were thoroughly Daoist... rejected authoritarianism and provide[d] an image of a free society" while the "Confucian stress on minimal government, the goodness of human nature, and a notion of equality provided some of the tools for understanding Western anarchism." Dirlik, meanwhile, asserts that Chinese anarchists played an important role in the fashioning of a particular radical culture, thus an understanding of anarchist origins of Chinese Marxists "may be important to an understanding of how they became Marxists... [and may explain] some features of Chinese Marxism," especially in its Maoist version, that "diverged from the Leninist interpretation of Marxism that they espoused formally." Arif Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 1, 3-4.

⁶³ Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*, 3-4, 299-300. Dirlik believes that this influence explains many of his later populist leanings.

⁶⁴ Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 257-258.

⁶⁵ Womack, "From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 70-71. Womack notes that it was during this time that Mao began to advocate for Hunan self-government.

⁶⁶ Mao Zedong, "Letter to Xiao Xudong, Cai Linbin, and the Other Members in France," (1 December 1920), *MRP II*, Stuart Schram, ed., 8; and 新民學會資料 [Materials of the New People's Study Society, *Xīnmín xuéhuì zīliào*], 144-152, reproduced in 毛澤東集補卷第一卷 [Supplements to Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I]. Takeuchi, ed., 289-296.

⁶⁷ Dirlik, *Origins*, 150.

on Chinese territory, including Shandong, to Japan. The May Fourth Movement (1919), which was part of the broader New Culture Movement (1915-1921), consisted largely of student-led demonstrations of protest against the Yuan Shikai-led Chinese government and its decision to mortgage Chinese interests.⁶⁸ May Fourth initiated among urban elites and intellectuals a newfound appreciation of science and technology, “lifestyles of experimentation,” internationalism, and “a reassessment of the past infused by an atmosphere and language of possibility and progress.”⁶⁹ May Fourth also had the effect of “strengthen[ing] the orientation of radical youth to the working class and to anarchism and Marxism.”⁷⁰ Unsurprisingly, then, Mao soon sought to cast off the shackles of a backward past via critiques of the centralized state, placing emphasis instead on popular mass movements.⁷¹ Upon his return from Shanghai to Changsha, May Fourth currents had entrenched in Mao further the primacy that he placed on organization, more specifically, the union of the masses of people.⁷²

After years of advocating for Hunan’s self-determination in light of China’s present state of turmoil, during which Mao drew from ideas of liberation, revolution, and popular power—all of which he found in Enlightenment discourse—Mao shifted to popular power as the paramount force to enact change in Chinese society.⁷³ He composed an essay titled “The Great Union of the Popular Masses” (1919) in which he framed some of history’s most famous revolutionary successes as contingent upon a great union of the people, most notably referencing the French, Bolshevik, and Eastern European cases.⁷⁴ Mao asked “Why is the great union of the popular masses so terribly effective?,” to which he answered, “Because the popular masses in any country are necessarily more numerous than the aristocrats, capitalists, and the other oppressors

⁶⁸ Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution*, 3-4, 11.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 70-79, 100-101.

⁷⁰ Alexander Vatlin and Stephen A. Smith, “The Comintern,” *The Oxford Handbook of The History of Communism*. Stephen A. Smith, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 196-197. However, Comintern documentation reveals that it is “implausible” to discuss the movement of radical Chinese students towards contacting and uniting workers into a Communist Party without Voitinsky’s intervention in April 1920 and, especially, of Henricus Sneevliet’s involvement the following year.

⁷¹ Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 189-190; and Stuart Schram, ed. *Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1949. Volume 1: The Pre-Marxist Period, 1912-1920*. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1992), xxxiii.

⁷² Ishikawa Yoshihiro, *The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party*. Joshua A. Fogel trans. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 16-33.

⁷³ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 189-201. Duara states that Mao viewed Hunan as a subjugated territory under China’s authority, and that Hunanese needed to organize to initiate the processes of self-rule.

⁷⁴ Mao Zedong, “The Great Union of the Popular Masses,” (21 July 1919-4 August 1919), in *MRP I*, Schram, ed., 378-389; and Mao Zedong, “民眾的大聯合 (The Great Union of the Popular Masses, *Mínzhòng de dà liánhé*), 毛澤東集第一, *MZJ I*], Takeuchi, ed., 57-70.

in a single country.”⁷⁵ Even more important were Mao’s allusions to issues that he would later confront head-on in his infamous “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan” (1927): that the union of many groups into one, numerically superior force could initiate a great reform of Chinese society.

The second event to influence Mao’s shift to Marxism was his correspondence with Cai Hesen, a fellow founder of the New People’s Study Society, while Cai was on work-study in Paris in 1920. The two had spent considerable time meeting with likeminded peers and discussing radical trends as presented by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, the latter of whom established the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory at Peking University, and later, a Communist cell.⁷⁶ Despite leftist leanings, Mao was apprehensive to embrace an ideology with links to the violent Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Cai’s radicalism “had already divided members of the New Citizen’s Study Society in France, and Mao was getting contradictory messages from his comrades.”⁷⁷ While Mao was at this time still in favor of a moderate approach to revolution, Cai’s letters on Bolshevism, in which he updated Mao on events in Moscow and insisted that only a violent revolution could reverse the country’s negative social and political trends, eventually gained considerable headway in Mao’s thinking.⁷⁸ Whether it was Cai’s connection of China to a worldwide Bolshevik movement, or his emphasis on organized activism, Mao was on board, once stating that “there is not one word with which I do not agree.”⁷⁹ Cai’s influence ultimately prompted Mao’s conversion to Marxism, which presented a lens through which to interpret a host of social problems that permeated throughout China, specifically in terms of “class” and “class conflict.”⁸⁰

Although Mao was by 1920 a Marxist, the reception and acceptance of Marxian ideas among other Chinese intellectuals—and enough of them to found a Party—was far from reality.⁸¹ Much of Marxism was open to interpretation in a non-European setting, and although it

⁷⁵ Mao Zedong, “The Great Union of the Popular Masses,” in *MRP I*, Schram, ed., 379; and Mao Zedong, “民眾的大聯合,” in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJI*, Takeuchi, ed., 58.

⁷⁶ Dirlik, *Origins*, 149. See also Ishikawa, *The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party*, 41, 190-192.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 210-211.

⁷⁸ Cai Hesen, “Lettre de Cai Hesen à Mao Zedong, 13 août 1920,” *Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident* 2, No. 2 (1983): 143-149.

⁷⁹ Hans Van de Ven, *From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 35.

⁸⁰ Dirlik, *Origins*, 113-114.

⁸¹ On the reception of Marxism in China, see Ishikawa, *The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party*, 16-81.

certainly identified a problem in Chinese society, it gave no indication on how to proceed with solving the problem. As Dirlik argues:

In the Marxist theoretical system Chinese intellectuals encountered the most comprehensive ‘sociology of change’ to issue from nineteenth century European thought, one which unequivocally posited society to be the starting point of historical inquiry and sought in social processes the forces that shaped history. In its new context, Marxist historiography represented an unprecedented undertaking to root history in social structure, revolutionizing the conceptualization of China’s past.⁸²

Indeed, it was the “tenuous appreciation of the relation between theory and practice” that characterized early Chinese intellectual encounters with and reception of Marxism, which entailed grounding theory in the particular setting of Chinese history.⁸³ The popularization of Marxism among Chinese intellectuals grew exponentially, however, with the arrival in April 1920 of Grigori Voitinsky, Chief of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern, in Beijing.⁸⁴ Although not the sole activating agent, his visit led students to visit Lenin’s writings, which also made the foreign theory of Marxism palatable since it was grounded in the success of the Bolshevik Revolution and the fight against imperialism (the highest stage of capitalism) rather than abstract dogmatism. Voitinsky’s visit led the “messianic message” and “melodrama” of the Leninist world image of Marxism to rise to the forefront in radical thought circles in contrast to the gradualism of Dewey’s approach and a growing impatience with democracy and science. Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, who met with Voitinsky in Shanghai, established a Shanghai Communist cell shortly thereafter, which would serve as the launch pad for the CCP.⁸⁵

Mao’s approach was not unlike Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, the “spiritual fathers of Marxism-Leninism in China” and the founders of the CCP, who embraced Marxism because they wanted to break with tradition and regarded Western norms as a means to it.⁸⁶ Indeed, as

⁸² Arif Dirlik, *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 1. Dirlik argues that the success of Marxist historiography was twofold: 1) its methodological breakthrough—the Marxists’ introduction of socioeconomic theory to the field of history; 2) the Marxist’s effort to establish an immediate connection between historical study and the social and political changes in modern China. See pages 1-18.

⁸³ Dirlik, *Origins*, 96, 120.

⁸⁴ Ishikawa, *The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party*, 95-105. For more on Voitinsky’s visit, see Tony Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring), Volume I*. (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1991), 43-46.

⁸⁵ Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 26; Dirlik, *Origins*, 149-150; and Ishikawa, *The Formation of the Chinese Communist Party*, 190-192.

⁸⁶ Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, 26.

Gregor Benton and Lin Chun describe, “[a]t the time of its founding in 1921, the CCP was inspired by noble aims. Its founders had stepped out of the New Culture Movement of the late 1910s, which campaigned for enlightenment, democracy, women’s liberation, social justice, internationalism, and the resolution of China’s crisis of sovereignty.”⁸⁷ An interest in Marxism soon led to recognition of communism’s practicability, as a “belief in Communism”—a commitment to an organizationally defined interpretation of Marxism—emerged.⁸⁸ Mao’s active role within the New People’s Study Society thus evolved from organizing night classes for workers to rallying Hunan labor unions to plan work stoppages. Mao’s organizational efforts increased labor organizing exponentially, and it was due to such successes that he played a founding role in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) first congress in 1921. By that year, Mao was entrenched firmly in the Communist camp.⁸⁹

In sum, the various currents of thought that surround Mao, and his social experiences in epicenters of radical social change, guided him towards radical critiques of China’s and the world’s *status quo*. “From the beginning,” as Brantley Womack states, “Mao was not attempting to uphold an old order but rather to create a new one, and he reveled in the risk, opportunity, and glory implicit in a revolutionary enterprise. Radical politics came naturally to him, but he was neither a dreamer nor a loner. From the beginning, Mao combined theory and practice, with the heavier emphasis on practice. And even before he became a Marxist, he was convinced that the ultimate political strength was mobilized popular support.”⁹⁰ He moved from a classical education to wedding exogenous materials together, thereby starting a trend of synthesizing familiar ideas with new and exciting ones from outside his cultural and intellectual thought-space. He explicated his ideas in a familiar “language” and a foreign one, couching traditional Chinese political thought and Western philosophies in “a hybrid language of its own in modern China.”⁹¹ Yet, as Dirlik states, the problem was that the “Chinese became Communists before they were ever Marxists since they moved too rapidly to put it into practice before a careful understanding of its theory.”⁹² As we will see in some instances in the case studies of this dissertation, the careful understanding of a theory often took a backseat to practical application. Thus how to

⁸⁷ Benton and Lin, eds., *Was Mao Really a Monster?*, 7.

⁸⁸ Dirlik, *Origins*, 216.

⁸⁹ Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary...,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 72-74.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 61.

⁹¹ Wakeman, *History and Will*, xi.

⁹² Dirlik, *Origins*, 244.

make the foreign familiar—and more than something abstract and dogmatic—was for Mao and the Southeast Asian intellectuals the first step in adapting *thought* into a complete and practical *system*.

Formulation by Fire: The Crystallization of Mao Thought into a System, 1927-1940

Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement, 'Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.' Each of a man's actions (practice) is guided by his thought (思想), so naturally without thought there can be no action whatsoever. But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no use. Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return to practice.⁹³—Mao Zedong, "On Practice," July 1937

The second problem in traveling theory, *adaptation*, consists of two particular strands. The first is *practical adaptation*, as in, the process whereby an idea is adapted so that it both speaks to people other than the initial receptor(s). The second strand of *adaptation*, which the next section analyzes, is *normative adaptation*, whereby the receptor(s) take that which is gleaned from the experience of practical application to create a new ideology, or ideological system, that was congruent with contemporary norms. The present section examines Mao's effort to ground Marxism in Chinese experience through his early writings and his most famous essays from the Yan'an period (1937-45). It also details his experiences during this period, from his early years in the CCP to his time as a revolutionary in flight to when he became the leading figure in the CCP's struggle against the GMD and invading Japanese imperial forces. The ultimate goal is to show the ways in which Marxism and Communism became important to Mao and his fellow Communists during their nadir in the mid-to-late 1920s. The section also endeavors to show how their experience as a fledgling Communist movement led to a reassessment and additional adaptation of Marxism to fit the conditions that surrounded them. Both are essential factors that help us to explain why Marxism needed to be Sinicized (and Mao

⁹³ Mao Zedong, "On Practice...", in *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, Knight, ed., 142; Mao Zedong, "實踐論," in 毛澤東集補卷第五卷, *MZJ V*, Takeuchi, ed, 229; Mao Zedong, "實踐論," in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJI*, 268-269; and Mao Zedong, "On Practice," *SWI*, 304.

set about doing it beginning in 1938) and, as chapters four and five show, why the Southeast Asian intellectuals sought practical adaptations and made Maoism *normative* in their turn.

To begin, Mao's experiences working on the CCP's Central Committee in Shanghai in 1923 gave no indication that he was to become the supreme theorist of the CCP. He found bureaucratic life considerably less satisfying than his earlier activism, and by 1925, he relocated to Hunan to shed his disenchantment with CCP politics and all of the unappealing frustrations that he had experienced. Although the May Thirtieth Movement (1925) that erupted in Shanghai and Guangzhou shifted Mao's outlook from malaise to optimism, directives from Moscow for the CCP to collaborate with the GMD was not conducive to renewed activity for him.⁹⁴

During the 19 July- 17 August 1920 Third International, or Comintern, in Moscow, the Bolsheviks proclaimed that their revolutionary experience in seizing state power ought to form "the basis on which the strategy and tactics of the Comintern were formulated" and, thus, the guiding strategy in the toppling of capitalism.⁹⁵ "Bolshvization," more specifically its "drift towards bureaucratic centralism," "iron discipline," and "extreme centralism" allowed no room for innovation or creative adaptation, thereby restricting Communist Parties like the CCP that sought to develop their own strategies.⁹⁶ The Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) had authority over the various national Communist Parties, including the CCP, and its outright neglect of the national Parties' interests presented significant challenges to the Chinese movement. The CCP had attempted for years to communize the GMD, yet internal disagreements between prominent Comintern officials Grigori Voitinsky and Mikhail Borodin over the notion of a CCP-GMD united front caused the ECCI to pursue a policy of compromise. This move ultimately forced upon the CCP leadership "a hopeless dilemma" of pursuing its goals of communization while reluctantly upholding the integrity of a united front without abandon.⁹⁷ This stagnation moved the momentum squarely into the GMD camp, as Jiang Jieshi's Northern Expedition, in full swing by 1926, soon gave way to the 12 April Incident (or Shanghai Massacre). The violent episode undid much of the ground that the Communists had gained, and

⁹⁴ Maurice Meisner describes the May Thirtieth Movement as an en masse effort by workers to launch widespread demonstrations in "one of the most militant working class movements in the history of the 20th century." Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*. (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 42; Ku Hungting, "Urban Mass Movement: The May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai," *Modern Asian Studies* 13, No. 2 (1979): 197-216; and Womack, "From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary...", *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 73-74.

⁹⁵ Vatlin and Smith, "The Comintern," in *Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism*, 188.

⁹⁶ Benton and Lin, eds., *Was Mao Really a Monster?*, 7.

⁹⁷ Vatlin and Smith, "The Comintern," in *Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism*, 190-196. Quote on 196.

further GMD repression against CCP coalition members followed, which forced the Communists into retreat to China's rural areas. The CCP was now in flight and in a fight to survive.

The Chinese Communists were indeed in a crisis. The CCP had “lost 90 percent of its membership”—between 15,000 and 25,000⁹⁸ members—and it soon “abandoned any dreams of a cosmopolitan, proletarian revolution.”⁹⁹ Womack identifies two facts about the CCP's beleaguered state during this time: 1) the CCP “had been dealt a mortal blow” at the hands of Jiang Jieshi's repression and Northern Expedition; and 2) the model of rural revolution “arose from the practical struggle for survival.”¹⁰⁰ Both of these facts underpinned Mao's thinking during this time, and characterized the period of transition from Mao's thought (subjective) to a system of practical revolution (objective). In essence, the communists' near vanquishing prompted a desperate yet creative improvisation in Mao's thinking, with an emphasis on practical application and adaptation in place of abstract dogmatism. The Party's fight for survival, meanwhile, instigated him to look to rural revolution, then to survival as a means to establishing a “new paradigm of revolution.”¹⁰¹ This new paradigm emphasized practice and included within it both a military strategy (People's War) and a method by which to overcome imperialism and state military might (New Democracy).

Before the CCP's retreat, however, Mao had tremendous reason for optimism. In 1927, he discovered in the Hunan peasants' movement the revolutionary zeal of the Chinese peasantry, which, if working under the leadership of the country's proletariat, could form a truly national revolutionary base. Contrary to Maurice Meisner's claims that Mao “had little interest in the urban working class... in the fall of 1925,” and that Mao “all but ignored the successfully rebellious workers in favor of potentially rebellious peasants,”¹⁰² Mao's emphasis from the beginning was on the proletarians harnessing the revolutionary potential of peasants to effectuate change in China. Indeed, Mao's recent appreciation and application of Marxism to China mark Mao's thinking during this thirteen-year period, with his shrewd appraisal of the class situation in the country and the view of China's revolution as part of a worldwide struggle.¹⁰³ During the

⁹⁸ Peter Carter, *Mao*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 62.

⁹⁹ Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 77.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Meisner, *Li Ta-Chao*, 42.

¹⁰³ I use the word “thinking” here because Mao's thinking was not yet a systematic “Thought” before at least 1938, and more likely 1942 when he rounded out his theory-practice-theory formulation. Wylie, “Mao Zedong, Chen Po-ta and the ‘Sinification of Marxism,’” 447-480.

tumultuous period for the CCP after 1927—a time marked by flight, improvisation, adaptation, and rebirth (as well as a shift from Bolshevism to armed struggle)—Mao not only read Marxism “in accordance with a Chinese historical experience,” but he also “insistently read the Chinese historical experience *into* Marxism, in the process ‘recreating’ Marxism.”¹⁰⁴

Two of Mao’s earliest Marxist writings, “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” (1926) and “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan” (1927), illuminate the way in which he assessed the status of China’s various classes and concluded that the proletariat and peasantry, if united, possessed the greatest revolutionary potential to reverse China’s negative historical trends.¹⁰⁵ In “Analysis,” Mao confronted a Chinese society that was largely agricultural with only a marginal urban working class, whereas Marx had formulated his analysis of the classes based on a largely industrialized Europe. Mao’s breakdown of class structure in Chinese society was not simply for segmenting his countrymen into categorical groups shot through a Marxist lens; rather, he used this essay to put forward his assessment of why “all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little,” which he argued was because there was a “failure to unite with real friends.”¹⁰⁶ Mao contended that China’s proletariat, semi-proletariat, petty bourgeoisie, and the lumpenproletariat, had failed to seize the opportunity to unite and resist oppression by imperialists and the proprietor and comprador classes. Part of the reason for this failure, he argued, was the proletariat’s “backward” status and unwariness towards the potentially damaging middle bourgeois class, which ought always to be held at arm’s length should its anti-left factions create confusion among the ranks.¹⁰⁷ The solution was therefore for the proletariat to channel the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, which consisted mostly of peasants, and who in Mao’s view were “[b]rave fighters but apt to be

¹⁰⁴ Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 75. Emphasis added.

¹⁰⁵ Mao Zedong, “中國社會各階級的分析 (Analysis of the Various Classes in Chinese Society, *Zhōngguó shèhuì gè jiējí de fēnxī*),” 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 161-174; Mao Zedong, “中國社會各階級的分析 (Analysis of the Various Classes in Chinese Society, *Zhōngguó shèhuì gè jiējí de fēnxī*),” 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 3-11; and Mao Zedong, “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,” *SW I*, 13-22. See also Maurice Meisner, *Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 25; Selden, *The Yanan Way*, 121-136; and Dirlik, *Origins*, 209-212.

¹⁰⁶ Mao Zedong, “中國社會各階級的分析,” in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 161; Mao Zedong, “中國社會各階級的分析,” in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 3-4; and Mao Zedong, “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,” *SW I*, 13.

¹⁰⁷ Mao Zedong, “中國社會各階級的分析,” in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 161-174; Mao Zedong, “中國社會各階級的分析,” in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 3-11; and Mao Zedong, “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,” *SW I*, 13-22.

destructive... a revolutionary force if given proper guidance.”¹⁰⁸ The Chinese proletariat and its “friends” ultimately needed to harness this revolutionary force if the lower and middle classes were they ever to succeed in unshackling themselves from the chains of imperialist and landlord oppression.

Mao’s recognition of the paramount importance of a worker-peasant alliance developed further in his seminal essay on the Hunan Peasants’ Movement, the “Hunan Report.” Mao’s report as chief expert of the Hunan peasants for both the CCP and GMD can be described as “a report, not a manifesto, and the target audience is not the masses but the ‘revolutionary party.’”¹⁰⁹ In the report, Mao wrote an eyewitness account of the conditions of five Hunan counties between 4 January and 5 February 1927, focusing chiefly on the formation of peasant associations during Jiang Jieshi’s Northern Expedition (1926-1928) to unify China. Upon witnessing firsthand the movement in full swing, Mao made this bold prediction:

In a very short time, several hundred million peasants in China’s central, southern and northern provinces, will rise like a fierce wind or tempest, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to suppress it. They will break through all the trammels that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will, *in the end*, send all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local bullies, and bad gentry to their graves. All revolutionary parties and all revolutionary comrades will stand before them to be tested, to be accepted or rejected as they decide. There are three alternatives. To march at their head and lead them? To march at their head and lead them? To stand behind them, gesticulating and criticizing them? Or to stand opposite them and oppose them? Every Chinese is free to choose among the three, but by the force of circumstances you are *fated* to make the choice quickly.¹¹⁰

As is evident, Mao recognized in China’s peasantry an enormous base that had taken charge for themselves, and that they had done what Sun Yat-Sen had failed to accomplish in his time: they had overthrown the feudal forces that plagued China.¹¹¹ The peasants therefore constituted the

¹⁰⁸ Mao Zedong, “中國社會各階級的分析,” in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 173-174; Mao Zedong, “中國社會各階級的分析,” in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 10-11; and Mao Zedong, “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,” *SW I*, 21-22.

¹⁰⁹ Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 76.

¹¹⁰ Mao Zedong, “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” (February 1927), *MRP II*, Schram, ed., 430; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告(Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan, *Húnán nóngmín yùndòng kǎochá bàogào*),” 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 207; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告(Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, *Húnán nóngmín yùndòng kǎochá bàogào*),” 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 13; and Mao Zedong, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *SW I*, 23-24.

¹¹¹ Mao Zedong, “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *MRP II*, Schram, ed., 432-433; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告,” in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 211-212; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告,” in 毛

most essential cog in the moving wheel of the national revolution since, as Mao phrased it, “the national revolution requires great change in the countryside. The Revolution of 1911 did not bring about this change, hence its failure.”¹¹² Thus while the feudal classes abhorred the rise of strong, self-supporting peasant associations, the “clear-sighted” classes saw in them tremendous revolutionary potential.

In addition, Mao provided in his “Hunan Report” a particularly resonant quote, which often stands as representative of his thought at the time vis-à-vis revolution in general and rural revolution in particular:

... a revolution is not like inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so ‘benign, upright, courteous, temperate and complaisant.’¹¹³ A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another. A rural revolution is a revolution by which the peasantry overthrows the power of another... The rural areas must experience a great, fervent revolutionary upsurge, which alone can rouse the *peasant* masses in their thousands and tens of thousands to form this great force.¹¹⁴

As we can see, Mao insisted that a revolution must be violent, or as he elaborates further on, it must “bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area” to oust the oppressive counter-revolutionary classes.¹¹⁵ At the front of this movement had to be the poorest of peasants since the wealthy peasants lacked revolutionary fervor and are inactive, while middle peasants ought to be important allies, but not leaders of the peasant associations. Such a position was particularly salient during the period of the CCP’s flight, during which the Party lacked a strong proletarian constituency and, ultimately, “encouraged indiscriminate recruitment of party members.”¹¹⁶

澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 15-16; and Mao Zedong, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *SW I*, 24-25.

¹¹² Mao Zedong, “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *MRP II*, Schram, ed., 433; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告,” in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 212; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告,” in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 16; and Mao Zedong, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *SW I*, 24-25.

¹¹³ Schram ed., *Mao’s Road to Power: Volume II*, 434n16.

¹¹⁴ Mao Zedong, “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *MRP II*, Schram, ed., 434-435; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告,” in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 213-214; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告,” in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 16-17; and Mao Zedong, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *SW I*, 24-25.

¹¹⁵ Mao Zedong, “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *MRP II*, Schram, ed., 435; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告,” in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 214; Mao Zedong, “湖南農民運動考察報告,” in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 17; and Mao Zedong, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *SW I*, 29.

¹¹⁶ Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary...,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 76-77; and Philip C. C. Huang, “Intellectuals, Lumpenproletarians, Workers, and Peasants in the Communist Movement: the Case of Xingguo County, 1927-1934.” *Chinese Communists and Rural Society, 1927-1934*. Philip C. C. Huang, Kathy Lemons Walker, and Lydia Bell, eds. (Berkeley, CA: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1978), 13.

Due in large part to the GMD's October 1930 resolution, which launched the first of five campaigns that sought aggressively to wipe out the Communists, the CCP went on the defensive, as intraparty factionalism prevented the Party from maximizing its potential by uniting against their numerically superior foe.¹¹⁷ The end of what Tony Saich calls "legal Communism" by 1927 and the absence of an alternative strategy therefore forced the CCP's hand in relying steadfastly on their soviet strongholds in the countryside.¹¹⁸

The CCP depended on three principal soviets by 1930, all of which operated in rural central China around Wuhan: 1) the Jiangxi Central Soviet, which is discussed in this paragraph and was south of Wuhan; the E-Yu-Wan Soviet (Hubei-Henan-Anhui) north of the city; and the western Xiang-Exi Soviet (West Hunan-Hebei). The Jiangxi Soviet Period (1931-1934), in particular, brought another challenge in Mao's practical adaptation of Marxism—the problem of contradictions between the Red Army and the recently recruited local Communists. Now well into the throes of its life-or-death fight, the reeling Chinese Communists recruited lumpenproletarians (the very poor, bandits, smugglers, gamblers, and vagabonds) in Xingguo, that is, before the land reform in southern Jiangxi.¹¹⁹ Yet in their haste, the CCP leadership did not resolve existing tensions between the Red Army and local Communist forces that continued to plague the Party following the post-Li Lisan affair re-organization.

It is worth noting that Mao's troubled role and his activities in Jiangxi in light of these tensions are particularly relevant as part of his social experience in the process of *adaptation*. Two particular activities stand out: the purge of the Anti-Bolshevik (AB) Clique; and the 1931 Land Reform. Mao used the Jiangxi Soviet government to "begin a purge of the Jiangxi Action Committee, which had been created just before the July 1930 offensive."¹²⁰ Mao levied strong accusations against his opponents, the AB Clique, for their supposed involvement in a "nationalist secret organization," which led to an unsuccessful Red Army revolt against Mao that ceased at Futian in December 1930.¹²¹ Although Mao had no evidence of "liquidationist tendencies" and "anti-Bolshevism" among the accused, the "Futian Incident" threw light on

¹¹⁷ Tony Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis*. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1996), 509.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*,

¹¹⁹ Huang, "Intellectuals," in *Chinese Communists and Rural Society*, 20-27.

¹²⁰ Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, 510.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 509.

strong tensions between the old guard, the Red Army, and the new local forces.¹²² The 1931 Land Reform, meanwhile, forced the CCP to confront the suitability of applying Lenin's 1905 Constitution, which he designed with an industrial working class in mind, to the largely rural Jiangxi Soviet.¹²³ The CCP adopted it at the 7-20 November 1931 First All-China Congress, declaring that the Soviet was a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry,"¹²⁴ but the Soviet was no more than "a Communist one-Party dictatorship" with a non-existent industrial working class vanguard.¹²⁵ The Constitution also initiated some drastic changes in CCP land policy. The Soviet Land Law that the Constitution contained, for instance, sought to seize lands from the oppressive "feudal lords and landlords, militarists and village bosses, gentry, and other big private landowners."¹²⁶ But the reform was soft on middle peasants, who the Party had forbidden previously from earning profits from the sale of properties. The absence of any reference to nationalization and collectivization, too, undermined the Land Law.¹²⁷ Whereas previous land reform efforts such as the 1930 land reform in Xingguo succeeded in establishing a "genuine link between the Party and the countryside... [through] the systematic involvement of the farming population in the exercise of revolutionary power," the Jiangxi experiment "resulted in a clear decline in production, a problem compounded by impractical experiments in collectivization."¹²⁸

But despite Mao's dead-ends, such as murderous infighting with the AB Clique, the subsequent incident of Futian, and the radical land reform, he identified the various mistakes that he had made and learned from them. Jiangxi was a revelation for Mao, who came to realize that

¹²² On Futian Incident, see Stephen C. Averill, "The Origins of the Futian Incident," in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, Tony Saich and Hans Van de Ven, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 76-81. Also unfounded were the Futian rebels' counter claims that Mao "intended to arrest Zhu De and Peng Dehuai and then surrender to the GMD army... Despite the rebels' claims and despite Zhu De's and Peng Dehuai's different political characters and approaches, the two, together with Huang Gonglue, expressed their unequivocal support of Mao." Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, 510.

¹²³ "Land Law of the Soviet Republic," (November 1931) in *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, Saich, ed., 556-558.

¹²⁴ "Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic," (7 November 1931) in *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, Saich ed., 552-556.

¹²⁵ Conrad Brandt, Benjamin I. Schwartz, and John King Fairbank, eds., *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*. (London: Routledge, 2008), 218-219.

¹²⁶ Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, 515.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 515.

¹²⁸ Huang, "Intellectuals," in *Chinese Communists and Rural Society*, 7-8, 14-15, 17, 27; Brian James DeMare, "Turning Bodies and Turning Minds: Land Reform and Chinese Political Culture, 1946-1952," (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2011), 18. See also CCP Committee Resolutions to the *Zhonghua suweiai quyu zhongyang geming junshi weiyuanhui zong zhengzhibu* (General political department of the Chinese soviet areas' central revolutionary military council), as cited in Huang, Walker, and Bell, eds.

in order to apply theory to concrete realities one must practice that theory and then return to the drawing board with that experience to inform a new theory or ideological system. The Jiangxi Soviet period also shed light on the Party's lack of a more practical program for its revolution. It had found a base, albeit by-and-large a coterie of China's countryside peoples, breaking new ground with farmers. All that remained was how to proceed.

The two years between Jiangxi and Shaanxi (the infamous Long March) marked a major change in Mao's leadership status within the CCP. While the Long March devastated the Red Army upon its arrival in northwestern China, it signaled "the emergence of the military strategist Mao Zedong as the CCP's preeminent leader after bitter struggles with his political foes Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming."¹²⁹ After GMD army advances prompted the strategic transfer of Red Army soldiers under Chen Yi and Xiang Ying, the CCP convened at the recently claimed Guizhou city of Zunyi in 1935 to review their shortcomings in Jiangxi. Importantly, the Zunyi Conference "provided a decisive step in Mao's bid for supreme power" as he joined the five-person Secretariat alongside General Secretary Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, Bo Gu, and Zhou Enlai, the last of whom became Mao's right-hand man, or "chief assistant."¹³⁰ At Zunyi, Mao emerged as one of the major Party leaders in light of rival candidates' inadequacies, most notably due to his military expertise. Bo Gu and his supporters, for instance, "lacked a profound insight into the political relationships within which the CCP found itself enmeshed" and lacked Mao's military acumen and experience.¹³¹ Bo and Comintern agent Otto Braun (or Li De (Chinese: 李德)) were blamed by CCP leaders for Red Army failures and were removed from senior military positions. The Party then appointed Mao, and not the more Soviet-minded Returned Students (28 Bolsheviks) as leader of the Long March, with Zhou Enlai's support.

While the confluence of internal and external factors led to the CCP's abandonment of the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao's new leadership role after Zunyi initiated the CCP's transformation into what it grew to become in the years that followed.¹³² A barely unified Party by the time of the On 20 October 1935 Shaanxi re-settlement, the Communists banded together around a shared ideological zeal and seething hatred of their GMD enemies, which truly crystallized a few years

¹²⁹ Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, xxxix.

¹³⁰ Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen. *Zhou Enlai: A Political Life*. (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2006), 59-60; and Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, 524.

¹³¹ Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, 524.

¹³² *Ibid.*

later during the Yan'an Rectification Movement.¹³³ But Mao's new leadership role did not entrench him firmly as *the* dominant CCP figure. In fact, amid the uncertainties that surrounded Party leadership and a clearly defined political line, how to attain Party helmsmanship was still somewhat out of reach. How did he ascend to become Party leader? What differentiated him from his equally ambitious contemporaries?

Mao's assumption of Party leadership occurred because of a fortunate blend of *fortuitous chance* (poor leadership of the early Long March leaders, including Zhou Enlai) and *natural skill* (Mao was indeed a successful military strategist). As Jing Huang points out adroitly, Mao's predecessors such as Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Wang Ming were the "*messengers* who knew how best to explain the ideology, rather than the *organizers* who had developed [the Chinese revolution]."¹³⁴ Obstacles that kept the CCP from forging ahead presented opportunities for new "messengers" to take over the reins of leadership, and Mao was no exception. But where past CCP heads failed to assert themselves as either strong leaders or able military tacticians, Mao accomplished both by dint of his keen sense of survival and strong military reputation. Intriguingly, as chapter four explores further, the factors that engendered Mao's rise also occurred in the Cambodian Communist movement during its infancy. Pol Pot and his Paris Clique, the former *Cercle Marxiste* that included Party theorists Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon,¹³⁵ took advantage of Norodom Sihanouk's (សម្តេចព្រះ, *Samdech Euv*) harsh repression of opposition groups and ineffectual leadership of domestic leftist Parties to seize the reins of the revolutionary movement. As we will see, the confluence of fortuitous circumstance (the stagnation of the Cambodian Communist movement) and prowess (the Paris Group's success in recruiting urbanites) permitted the intellectual thrust of the Communist movement to seize Party control and direct the movement (1967-1970) against Sihanouk.¹³⁶

As for Mao, in the early Yan'an period he penned four seminal essays that mark the shift from writing ideological essays to formulating a genuine system for revolution: "On Practice," "On Contradiction," "On Protracted War," and "On New Democracy." The first, which Mao penned after the Long March and during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), represents

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Jing Huang, *Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 107.

¹³⁵ Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 544-545.

¹³⁶ Thu-huong Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1992), 49-51; and Mission du Front National du Kampuchéa, "Bulletin d'Information," (11 August 1972).

Mao's articulation of a "Marxist theory of cognition that stressed that knowledge arose as people used concepts to understand the concrete situation in which they found themselves and then sought to formulate general principles to guide action."¹³⁷ It also provides us with the first piece of the foundation of what would become Mao Zedong Thought.¹³⁸ In essence, these seminal essays reveal the key steps in the practical adaptation of Marxism in Mao's writings. These steps were the following: first, Mao proposed a model of theory-practice-theory, which channeled Wang Yangming's 知行合一 (unity of knowing and doing, *Zhīxíng héyī*) to unite Marxist-Leninist theory to the practice of the Chinese revolution and, then, to use that experience to inform an *a posteriori* theory/ideological system; second, a comprehensive and effective military strategy with which the Chinese Communists could crush their numerically superior GMD opponents; and third, a process of socialist transition and democratic centralism whereby the universal laws of Marxism-Leninism were applied to concrete realities in China. All three steps would form some of the fundamental pillars of the Maoist ideological system, and each stressed the central importance of *practical adaptation* in which wedding theory to practice, and then using that knowledge that was gleaned from experience, formed the basis for a new ideology.

In "On Practice," Mao raises the old Chinese saying, "How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger's lair?," (不入虎穴，焉得虎子, *Bù rù hǔxué, yān dé hǔ zǐ*) to emphasize the importance of practice, or direct experience, in a person's knowledge and perception of the objective external world.¹³⁹ His contention is that *a priori* knowledge is purely dogmatism, for *a posteriori* knowledge, that is, knowledge gleaned from practical application, is objective reality. Mao elaborates further:

...the first step in the process of cognition is contact with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgment, and inference. It is only when the data of perception are very rich (not fragmentary) and correspond to reality (are not illusory) that they can be the basis for forming correct concepts and theories.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Van de Ven, "War, Cosmopolitanism, and Authority," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 96-97.

¹³⁸ Philip Short, *Mao: A Life*. (London: John Murray, 2004), 355.

¹³⁹ Mao drew this saying from the 後漢書 (Book of the Later Han Dynasty, *Hòu hàn shū*), 25 AD-220 AD.

¹⁴⁰ Mao Zedong, "On Practice: On the Relations between Knowing and Practice, between Theory and Reality, between Knowing and Doing," in *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, 140; Mao Zedong, "實踐論 (On Practice, *Shíjiàn lùn*)," 毛澤東集補卷第五卷 [Supplements to Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume V, *Máo Zédōng jí Bǔ juǎn dìwǔjuǎn*], Takeuchi, ed., 227; Mao Zedong, "實踐論 (On Practice, *Shíjiàn lùn*)," 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 267; and Mao Zedong, "On Practice," *SW I*, 302.

Mao's point, evidently, is that when the proletariat interprets capitalist society, or the Chinese people perceive imperialism, they derive knowledge through practical application.¹⁴¹ Mao's answer to the question, "how does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice?" is thus located in a "theory-practice-theory" paradigm,¹⁴² wherein one formulates knowledge through practice, and success or failure informs knowledge with greater signification. By emphasizing the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, Mao unifies "knowing and doing" not unlike Ming Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming had done with his theory of 知行合一, thereby establishing a Chinese approach to, or method of, Communist philosophy.¹⁴³

Mao's essays "On Contradiction" and "On Protracted War," meanwhile, deal specifically with articulating a locally relevant strategy for making revolution—one of the sub-stages of the *practical adaptation* problem. While "On Contradiction" offers a novel strategy on how to approach the contradiction of universal and particular, "On Protracted War" concerns a military strategy with which the Communists could defeat their enemies. The former, alongside "On Practice," epitomize Mao's effort to "formulate systematically the abstract principles underlying his revolutionary practice."¹⁴⁴ "On Contradiction" identifies five problems in what Lenin termed the "law" or "kernel of dialectics,"¹⁴⁵ and argues that the key was to identify that "all phenomena had contradictions, that in each set of contradictions one was central, and that this one [central contradiction] had a universal as well as a particular aspect."¹⁴⁶ While Marxism-Leninism has both universal and particular dimensions, since the application of this *universal* ideology occurred in a *particular* historical setting, the Chinese revolutionaries ought to find a practical

¹⁴¹ Mao Zedong, "On Practice..." in *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, Knight, ed., 138-139; Mao Zedong, "實踐論," in 毛澤東集補卷第五卷, Takeuchi, ed., 226-227; Mao Zedong, "實踐論," in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 265-266; and Mao Zedong, "On Practice," *SW I*, 301.

¹⁴² Mao Zedong, "On Practice..." in *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, Knight, ed., 134; Mao Zedong, "實踐論," in 毛澤東集補卷第五卷, Takeuchi, ed., 222; Mao Zedong, "實踐論," in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 261; and Mao Zedong, "On Practice," *SW I*, 297. On theory-practice-theory, see Knight, "The Form of Mao Zedong's 'Sinification of Marxism,'" 17-33. Knight provides a particularly useful graph to explain this process on page 31.

¹⁴³ Philip Short, *Mao: A Life*. (London: Henry Holt & Co., 2000), 355.

¹⁴⁴ Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 77.

¹⁴⁵ VI Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics," *Collected Works, Russ. ed., Vol. 38* (Moscow: 1958), 215, quoted in Mao Zedong, "The Law of the Unity of Contradictions [On Contradiction]," *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, Knight, ed., 154; Mao Zedong, "矛盾論 (On Contradictions, *Máodùn lùn*), 毛澤東集補卷第五卷 [Supplements to Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume V, *Máo Zédōng jí Bǔ juǎn dìwǔjuǎn*]. Takeuchi, ed., 240; Mao Zedong, "矛盾論 (On Contradictions, *Máodùn lùn*), 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJ I*, 274; and Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction," *SW I*, 311. Mao identifies these problems as the following: 1) the two world outlooks; 2) the universality of contradiction; 2) the particularity of contradiction; 3) the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction; 4) the identity and struggle of the aspects of a contradiction; and 5) the place of antagonism in contradiction.

¹⁴⁶ Van de Ven, "War, Cosmopolitanism, and Authority," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 97.

approach that neither deviated from the universality of Marxism-Leninism nor abandoned China's historical milieu. The careful and concerted application of the universality of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese revolution therefore represented the solution to this contradiction rather than the entrenchment of it, or of the contravention of Marxism-Leninism's universal features.

As for "On Protracted War," it deals less with Marxist theory and more with military strategy.¹⁴⁷ As the Second Sino-Japanese War raged on, and as GMD-CCP civil strife continued in lieu of the tenuous Second United Front, Mao saw fit to formulate a stratagem that relied on the support of the population and that engaged the enemy in guerrilla warfare in less than favorable conditions for both sides. "People's War," as he came to term it, consisted of three essential protracted war stages: 1) strategic defensive; 2) strategic stalemate; and 3) strategic offensive. Mao elaborates further:

The object of war is specifically 'to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or 'deprive him of the power to resist,' and does not mean his complete physical destruction)... Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. In attack the immediate object is to destroy the enemy, but at the same time, it is self-preservation, because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defence the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but, at the same time, defence is a means of supplementing attack of preparing to go over to the attack. *Retreat is in the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, while pursuit is a continuation of attack.*¹⁴⁸

Here, Mao places primacy on the principles of self-preservation and attacking the enemy with the aim to decimate their ranks. By drawing the enemy into the interior, Mao argued, the guerrilla forces could use attrition to bleed the enemy forces dry.¹⁴⁹ This tactic had reverberations both within China and without, as the Chinese communist revolutionaries mastered this technique to the chagrin of hundreds of thousands of GMD soldiers, thereby setting an example that virtually any beleaguered Communist troupe could follow. This example of practical adaptation of

¹⁴⁷ Frederick Teiwes, "Mao and his Followers," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 132.

¹⁴⁸ Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," (26 May-3 June 1938), *MRP VI*. Schram, ed., 358-359; Mao Zedong, "論持久戰 (On Protracted War, *Lùn chǐjiǔ zhàn*)," 毛澤東集第六卷, *MZJ VI*, Takeuchi, ed., 103; Mao Zedong, "論持久戰 (On Protracted War, *Lùn chǐjiǔ zhàn*)," 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 449-450; and Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," *SW II*, 80-82 (on three stages), quote from page 156. Emphasis added.

¹⁴⁹ Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," in *MRP VI*. Schram, ed., 321-323; Mao Zedong, "論持久戰," in 毛澤東集第六卷, *MZJ VI*, Takeuchi, ed., 51-54; Mao Zedong, "論持久戰," in 毛澤東選集第一卷毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 409-411; and Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," *SW II*, 115-117.

Marxism to an Asian context, as it turned out, would be a compelling example to Southeast Asian revolutionaries in their own struggles for power.

Above all of these earlier formulations Mao's January 1940 *magnus opus*, "On New Democracy," signaled the shift, or evolutionary step, from the *practical adaptation* stage to *normative adaptation* stage, as Mao proposed applying exogenous thought (Marxist-Leninist universals) to contemporary norms (China's concrete realities), and pursuing a "third way" for the Chinese revolution that was neither Soviet socialist nor Euro-American capitalist.¹⁵⁰ "On New Democracy" was, as Arif Dirlik describes it, the "classic formulation of the premises of Chinese Marxism." Although it did not receive widespread acceptance at first, this essay represents the point of departure for Mao Thought as ideology to become an ideological system with global applicability—"Maoism."¹⁵¹ Here we see the culmination of Mao's practical application of Marxism to China into a coherent program. It is within "On New Democracy" that we find Mao's formulation for the "Sinification of Marxism" (reference to making Marxism Chinese emerged first in his 1938 speech "On the New Stage").¹⁵² "On New Democracy" is noticeably nationalist *and* Marxist-Leninist,¹⁵³ and its central point is that the Chinese revolution comprises a democratic and a socialist revolution, with the former belonging to a new category rather than an old one—"New Democracy." In the essay, Mao contends that democracy would occur in China under terms and conditions that differentiated from those in "Two Worlds" of the West and the Soviet Union, namely that the state and governmental structure would emerge under the stewardship of the "joint dictatorship of several anti-imperialist classes."¹⁵⁴ He therefore sees fit to explore the complex relationship between economics, politics, and culture, which for him constitute the three levels of society, rather than the existing paradigm of base-

¹⁵⁰ Liu Kang, "Maoism: Revolutionary Globalism for the Third World Revisited," *Comparative Literature Studies* 52, No. 1, *Special Issue : Global Maoism and Cultural Revolution in the Global Context* (2015): 12-28, on page 15.

¹⁵¹ Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 79.

¹⁵² Dirlik, "Discourse of 'Chinese Marxism,'" *Modern Chinese Religion II, Vol. 1*, 304-305.

¹⁵³ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," (15 January 1940), *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 368-369; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhǔyì lùn*), 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 202-203; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhǔyì lùn*), 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 667-668; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *SW II*, 380-381. Interestingly, Mao makes two notable concessions. See Timothy Cheek, "Mao, Revolution, and Memory," in *Critical Introduction to Mao*, 10.

¹⁵⁴ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 333, 340-341, quote on 341; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 151-152, 166-167, quote on 167; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 627-628, 638-640, quote on 638-640; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *SW II*, 342, 350-351, quote on 351.

superstructure.¹⁵⁵ Mao's classificatory approach to the world and society thus constitutes his problematization of existing transcendental political economy approaches to addressing issues on the ground in particular milieus.

As a corrective, Mao contextualized in "On New Democracy" China's present historical environment as "colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal," thereby situating China's struggle against imperialism within the broader scope of a worldwide movement against imperial subjugation that would later gain headway in Third World movements. He states that:

Since the invasion of foreign capitalism and the gradual growth of capitalist elements in Chinese society, *that is, during the hundred years from the Opium War to the Sino-Japanese War*, the country has changed by degrees into a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. China today is colonial in the enemy [Japanese]-occupied areas and basically semi-colonial in the nonoccupied [Guomindang] areas, and it is predominantly feudal in both. Such, then, is the character of present-day Chinese society and the state of affairs in our country. The politics and the economy of this society are predominantly colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal, and the culture, reflecting the politics and economy, is also colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal. It is precisely against these predominant political, economic and cultural forms that our revolution is directed. What we want to get rid of is the old colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal politics and economy and the old culture [in their service]. And what we want to build up is their direct opposite, that is, new politics, the new economy and the new culture of the Chinese nation.¹⁵⁶ ... [A] revolution in any colony or semi-colony that is directed against imperialism, that is, against the international bourgeoisie or international capitalism, no longer comes within the old category of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but within the new category. It is no longer part of the old bourgeois, or capitalist, world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Such revolutionary colonies and semi-colonies... have become allies of the revolutionary front of world socialism.¹⁵⁷

As is evident, Mao viewed the Chinese revolution as part of the world revolution against capitalism, with national liberation as the primary goal. The concepts of "new nation" and "new

¹⁵⁵ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 331; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 148; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 624; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *SW II*, 340. See also Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 166-168. Mao argues that "Any given culture (as an ideological form) is a reflection of the politics and economics of a given society, and the former in turn has a tremendous influence upon the latter, and politics is the concentrated expression of economics." The passage is notable since it elicits Mao's break from viewing society through the base-superstructure lens, thereby revealing his effort to distinguish politics from culture in society, for the latter was the "concentrated expression [集中的表現, *Jízhōng de biǎoxiàn*] of economics."

¹⁵⁶ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 332; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 151; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 626; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *SW II*, 341. Emphasis added by Mao.

¹⁵⁷ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 334; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 151; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 626-627; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *SW II*, 343-344.

culture” were therefore necessary means to achieve this end, and Mao’s placement of China within a long history of victimization at the hands of feudal and semi-feudal, colonial and semi-colonial forces, and later, both Western and Japanese adventurism, throws light on this fact. The solution, he urged, was to embrace democratic centralism, inclusionary participation, and to develop China’s economy “along the path of the ‘regulation of capital’ and the ‘equalization of landownership,’ and [it] must never be ‘privately owned by the few’; we must never permit the few capitalists and landlords to ‘dominate the livelihood of the people’; we must never establish a capitalist society of the European-American type or allow the old semi-feudal society to survive.”¹⁵⁸ Only by defeating Japanese aggression and reversing the old and feudal “culture” that had beleaguered China and prevented it from transcending into something at once “new” and “democratic” could China reverse these negative forces.

As a whole, though, what allowed this work to carve such a legacy was that it “made sense of China’s history and, more important, gave Chinese readers a sense of purpose, hope, and meaning,” all of which emerged during the intense study of Mao’s Yan’an texts during Rectification.¹⁵⁹ Some essential components of New Democracy that helped to inspire such feelings of renewed optimism include a belief that all classes must play a role (inclusionary vs. exclusionary politics) in China’s future, the promotion of democratic centralism irrespective of sex, creed, property or education, and a hard stance against “single step socialism.” Such inclusionary impulses and the stress on multi-step socialism characterized Mao’s thinking at this time, and led him to develop his “Sinification of Marxism,” which “represent[ed] a local or vernacular version of a universal Marxism [that] was very much a product of the globalization of Marxism outside Europe.”¹⁶⁰

Indeed, Mao sought with his synthesis of universal and particular laws the maintenance of the central features of Marxism¹⁶¹ while combining them with Chinese national forms.¹⁶² Since he believed that there was “only concrete Marxism,”¹⁶³ which he defined as Marxism that

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 344; Ibid, 167; Ibid, 639; and Ibid, 353.

¹⁵⁹ Timothy Cheek, “Mao, Revolution, and Memory,” *Critical Introduction to Mao*, 10. Cheek also states that Mao drew from VI Lenin’s *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. (Moscow: Zhizn' i znanie, 1917).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 333-343; Ibid, 151-166; Ibid, 626-638; and Ibid, 342-352. See also Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 78-79.

¹⁶¹ Marxist features: the materialist concept of history (conflict between social classes), critique of capitalism’s exploitation of the urban proletariat, and the theory of a proletarian revolution.

¹⁶² Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 190-192; Van de Ven, “War, Cosmopolitanism, and Authority,” in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 96.

¹⁶³ Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Zedong*, 172.

had “taken a national form and... applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China,”¹⁶⁴ the course of the Chinese Communist revolution ought to be grounded in its own experiences and tempered by the practice of Marxism-Leninism in China, namely, it consisted of these three steps: 1) take the theory of Marxism-Leninism as the Party’s guiding ideology; 2) put it into practice in the Chinese revolution; and then 3) use that revolutionary experience to create a new theory, or ideological system (Maoism).¹⁶⁵

As this chapter has argued, the ideas Mao Zedong developed both in his early writings as a Communist and in his seminal Yan’an works reveal his careful adaptation of Marxism to suit China’s particular conditions, or “peculiarities” as Mao described in “On New Democracy.” From his classification of China’s classes to determine which among them could serve as leading forces in China’s revolution to his lauding of the revolutionary peasantry as a motive revolutionary force, it is clear that Mao took great pains to uncover which revolutionary base could service the CCP’s movement and, vicariously, China. His “On Practice” placed primacy on “doing,” while his essays on strategy developed the way in which the CCP could “do” Marxism, or put it into practice and, eventually, seize state power. Finally, “On New Democracy” signaled Mao’s rethinking and reworking of Chinese Marxism after his experiences during the ongoing struggle against the GMD and Japanese forces.

The culmination of his most famous writings, “On New Democracy” is most important because it would provide a “spark that started a prairie fire”¹⁶⁶ of anti-colonial movements throughout the Third World. Indeed, as Arif Dirlik has asserted, “New Democracy... represented a new stage in historical progress appropriate to all societies placed similarly to China in the world.”¹⁶⁷ But perhaps the most important theoretical achievement that Mao proposed in “On New Democracy” concerns the final procedure whereby Maoism became an ideological system to be exported, Mao’s Sinification of Marxism, which he discussed toward the end of the essay and later positioned him as the principle theorist of Chinese communism.¹⁶⁸ Sinification, as later chapters show, is a seminal example of applying exogenous materials to concrete realities. Through a synthesis of transcendental Marxist-Leninist features and the contemporary norms of

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Knight, “The Form of Mao Zedong’s ‘Sinification of Marxism,’” 17-33.

¹⁶⁶ Mao Zedong, “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire,” (5 January 1930)

[http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_6.htm] (Accessed 10 March 2012).

¹⁶⁷ Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 81.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 118.

a national setting, the new ideological system may guide a national revolutionary movement. As later chapters elicit, the ideological system that the CCP ultimately exported in the 1960s (Maoism) initiated a very similar process of adoption, adaptation, and application in the dissertation's Southeast Asian case studies.

Practice Makes Perfect: The Normative Adaptation of Marxism and Rise of Mao Zedong Thought, 1940-1949

At present the fundamental weakness of the Yan'an Cadre School lies in the lack of contact between theory and practice, between what is studied and what is applied, and there exists the serious fault of subjectivism and dogmatism. *This fault manifests itself in letting students study a plethora of abstract Marxist-Leninist principles, and not paying attention (or hardly paying attention) to understanding their essence and how to apply them in the concrete Chinese situation.* In order to correct this defect, it must be stressed that the purpose of the study of Marxist-Leninist theory is to enable the student to correctly apply it in the resolution of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution, and not the ill-digested cramming and recitation of principles found in books.¹⁶⁹—Mao Zedong, “Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Yan'an Cadre School,” 1941

The second strand of adaptation, *normative adaptation*, consists of making an exogenous thought or idea congruent with contemporary norms of a particular society through the addition of a charismatic element. In the case of Mao Zedong Thought becoming an ideological system and *the* guiding principle of the CCP, this stage consists two essential processes: 1) Mao's “Sinification of Marxism,” which is generally dated to the 1938 speech “On the new Stage”¹⁷⁰ and lauded by Stuart Schram as Mao's “greatest theoretical and practical achievement”¹⁷¹; and 2) the process whereby Mao's adaptation of Marxism became important to others, which occurred during the the 1941-1944 Rectification Campaigns. The first component, as this section endeavors to show, embodied Mao's adaptation of Marxist-Leninist concepts to suit the particular condition and context of China that initiated the process whereby his thought became an ideological system. As for *how* it became important to others, Jowitt's idea of the charismatic impersonalism of the Party, if applied to Mao's adaptation of Marxism to China, may help

¹⁶⁹ Mao Zedong, “中共中央關於延安幹部學校的決定 (Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Yan'an Cadre School, *Zhōnggòng zhōngyāng guānyú yán'ān gàn bù xuéxiào de juédìng*),” 毛澤東集第八卷, *MZJ VIII*, Takeuchi, ed., 43, Emphasis added. Also quoted in Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 206.

¹⁷⁰ Mao Zedong, “論新階段 (On the New Stage, *Lùn xīn jiēduàn*),” (12-14 October 1938) 毛澤東集第六卷, *MZJ VI*, Takeuchi, ed., 163-263.

¹⁷¹ Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*. (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1966), 68.

explain the way in which Mao's thought resonated so deeply among his peers before his 1943 ascendancy. As the sections shows, Mao established himself, the charismatic "man of prowess,"¹⁷² as the exemplar during the Rectification Campaigns of 1941-1944, which occurred after several leadership changes and against the backdrop of an ongoing Civil War. An explicit counterpunch to Jiang Jieshi's own March 1943 promulgation of "Jiang-ism," the Rectification Campaigns facilitated through exegetical bonding Mao's centrality to the CCP, with him entrenched firmly as its principal theorist and leader.¹⁷³ Mao thus emerged as "the correct interpreter of the past," and established the "necessary 'symbolic capital' to enhance his own status as the revolution's supreme leader and interpreter."¹⁷⁴

The first aspect of the normative adaptation stage concerns the adaptation of Marxism to contemporary norms, and with the added personal charisma of the theorist, renders a new ideology that is congruent with such norms. Marxism's inherent teleology of capitalist modernity and Eurocentrism posed major obstacles to its application in China.¹⁷⁵ Marxism therefore "had to be rephrased in a national voice," as Dirlik contends, "for a Marxism that could not account for a specifically national experience abdicated its claims to universality; worse, under the guise of universalism, it replicated in a different hegemonism of capitalism, of which it was historically a product."¹⁷⁶ Mao set forth in his speech at the Sixth Plenum in 1938 that Sinification was the blending of Marxian universals with the "concrete historical practice of the Chinese revolution" to suit the country's unique historical experience, struggle, and culture (termed by Mao as its "national" or "special" characteristics).¹⁷⁷ As Mao argued:

¹⁷² OW Wolters *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1999), 112-125.

¹⁷³ Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*, 263-293.

¹⁷⁴ Saich, ed. *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, lxi. On symbolic capital, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of the Theory of Practice*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflective Sociology*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 123-139. For its adaptation and application to Mao Zedong and Yan'an, see David Apter, "Discourse as Power: Yan'an and the Chinese Revolution," in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Revolution*, 190-215; and Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*, 263-293.

¹⁷⁵ Mao addresses these obstacles in Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," in *Mao's Road to Power, Volume VII: New Democracy, 1939-1941*. Schram ed.; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東選集第二卷; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *Selected Works, Vol. II*. See also Mao Zedong, "新民主主義的憲政 (New Democratic Constitution, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhǔyì de xiànzhèng*)," 毛澤東集第二卷, *MZJ II*, Takeuchi, ed., 237-248.

¹⁷⁶ Arif Dirlik, "Modernism and Antimodernism in Mao Zedong's Marxism," in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*. Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, eds. (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997), 70.

¹⁷⁷ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," (15 January 1940), *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 367-368; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhǔyì lùn*)," 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 201-203; Mao

Another task of study is to study our historical legacy and to evaluate it critically using Marxist methods. A great nation such as ours with several thousand years of history has its own developmental laws, its own national characteristics, its own precious things... The China of today is a development out of historical China. We are Marxist historicists; we may not chop up history. We must evaluate it from Confucius to Sun Zhongshan, assume this precious legacy, and derive from it a method to guide the present movement... Communists are Marxist internationalists, but Marxism must be realized through national forms. There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, there is only concrete Marxism. The so-called concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken national form; we need to apply Marxism to concrete struggle in the concrete environment of China, we should not employ it in the abstract. Communists who are part of the great Chinese nation, and are to this nation as flesh and blood, are only abstract and empty Marxists if they talk about Marxism apart from China's special characteristics. Hence making Marxism Chinese, imbuing every manifestation of Marxism with China's special characteristics, that is to say applying it in accordance with Chinese characteristics, is something every Party member must seek to understand and resolve. We must discard foreign eight-legged essays, we must stop singing abstract and empty tunes, we must give rest to dogmatism, and substitute in their place Chinese airs that the common people love to see and hear. To separate internationalist content and national form only reveals a total lack of understanding of internationalism.¹⁷⁸

He explains the process of Sinification further in "On New Democracy":

...in applying Marxism to China, Chinese Communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or, in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must have a national form [be combined with specific national characteristics]¹⁷⁹ if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula.¹⁸⁰

As Mao makes clear, the synthesis of the universal "laws" of Marxism, which, left alone, "did not represent Marxism as a complete ideological system," with specific "laws" that described the "regularities characterizing China as a particular historical situation," is a crucial evolutionary

Zedong, "新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhǔyì lùn*), 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 667-668; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *SW II*, 380-381. For example, Mao used the traditional Chinese saying "相反相成" (*xiangfan xiangcheng*: things that oppose each other also complement each other), which shows an effort to blend China's particularities with Marxism's universality.

¹⁷⁸ Mao Zedong, "On the New Stage," (12-14 October 1938), *MRP VI*, Schram ed., 538-539; Mao Zedong, "論新階段," in 毛澤東集第六卷, *MZJ VI*, Takeuchi, ed., 260-261; and Dirlik, "Discourse of 'Chinese Marxism,'" *Modern Chinese Religion II, Vol. 1.*, 304.

¹⁷⁹ At present, there is no existing explanation in adequate detail what Mao means by "national characteristics," although this could be because Mao's own use of these terms was ambiguous. Perhaps Mao meant the "social and political conditions in China at that time," or the traditions of Chinese statecraft available to Mao and his generation, which is, essentially, what Philip A. Kuhn discussed in *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 102-113.

¹⁸⁰ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 367-368; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 201-203; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 667-668; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *SW II*. 380-381.

process to render Marxism into something beyond abstract dogma.¹⁸¹ By uniting universal and particular laws, Mao sought to realize concrete Marxism in China's historical setting. But while Mao's Sinification of Marxism has received some attention in recent scholarship, debate over its nature, purpose, form, and legacy reveals its somewhat undervalued importance.

Some scholars prefer to foreground Mao's nationalism, militarism, and doctrinaire Leninism as factors that led to Mao's ultimate deviation from Marxist orthodoxy,¹⁸² whereas others regard Mao's formulation of Sinified Marxism, which laid the groundwork for his thought, purely as a ploy against the rival Soviet-backed Returned Scholars within the CCP.¹⁸³ Stuart Schram, for instance, bases his analysis specifically on Mao's written works to argue that Mao's Sinification placed a strong nationalistic emphasis on China's revolutionary experience, which was ultimately antithetical to Marxism since it elevated the particular over Marxism's universal laws.¹⁸⁴ Frederic Wakeman attempts a genealogical approach, which points to parallels between Mao's thought and the emphasis on the "unity of thought and action" in the Wang Yangming school of Confucianism in which Mao was interested as a young radical, while Benjamin Schwartz observes continuity with Confucian tradition in Mao's preoccupation with morality in politics.¹⁸⁵ Thomas Metzger, lastly, suggests that Sinification "came to express and implement the traditional ethos of interdependence."¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Knight, "The Form of Mao Zedong's 'Sinification of Marxism'," 24-28, 30.

¹⁸² Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Zedong*, 112-116; Jack Gray, *Mao Tse-tung*. (London: Lutterworth Press, 1973), 41; Selden, *The Yen-an Way*, 119-120, 191. Schram suggests that Mao remained "technically an orthodox Leninist," and although he succeeded in incorporating nationalist values, Chinese traditions, and elements of populism into his thought, he remained "a disciple of Lenin [and] an original and independent Leninist thinker." See also Wakeman, *History and Will*, 195-205, 291.

¹⁸³ Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963), 193; Karl A. Wittfogel, "The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 277, Report on China (September 1951): 22-34; Wylie, "Mao Zedong, Chen Po-ta and the 'Sinification of Marxism,'" 463. See also Meisner, *Mao Zedong*, 52-54, 82, 100; and Lee Feigon, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*. (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 11, 182-183, for a contrarian viewpoint. Mao certainly broke with Stalin (to the degree possible when the CCP also had no alternative but to rely on Moscow in the Cold War, and Mao's Marxism moved significantly away from Stalin's variant. Mao's behavior and the system he nonetheless led, though, was deeply Stalinist in organizational terms: central economic planning, no markets, strong secret police presence, and the moral-ideologization of policy. Mao broke with Stalin, but he imported much of the Stalinist system, which grafted onto the sterner sinews of late imperial Chinese statecraft amazingly well.

¹⁸⁴ Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Zedong*, 112-116.

¹⁸⁵ Wakeman, *History and Will*, 238-258; Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, 1-17.

¹⁸⁶ Thomas Metzger, *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 233.

Marxist scholars such as Nick Knight and Arif Dirlik, by contrast, “rethink Mao thought” through the perspective of the Marxian dimensions of his ideology and the ways in which he applied Marxism to China without abandoning its universal features.¹⁸⁷ For Knight, Sinification represents Mao’s attempt to “establish a formula by which a universal theory such as Marxism could be utilized in a particular national context and culture *without abandoning the universality of that theory*.”¹⁸⁸ Dirlik expands upon this argument, stating that Mao’s “insistence on the vernacular” with Sinification ushered in a “new kind of nonhegemonic universality in which a genuinely universal Marxist discourse [was] constituted out of various vernacular Marxisms.”¹⁸⁹ Sinification, in Dirlik’s view, is a “local or vernacular version of a universal Marxism [that] was very much a product of the globalization of Marxism outside Europe.”¹⁹⁰ Sinified Marxism, moreover, is “Chinese reflection upon global socialism spoken in a vernacular voice by a Chinese subject who expressed through Marxism local and specifically Chinese concerns.”¹⁹¹

In essence, application through practice was not the endgame, but rather the point of departure for Sinified Marxism, for theory as theory was disconnected from Chinese realities. Through practice, and through recognition of China’s historical status as semi-feudal and semi-colonial, Marxism could be marshaled by the CCP to reverse such negative historical trends and defeat fierce repression at the hands of the imperialist aggressors. As Mao argued (and Xi Jinping invoked in a 2013 speech), “[t]he relation between Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese Revolution is the same as between the arrow and target...The arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to hit the target of the Chinese Revolution... If it was otherwise, would we want to study Marxism-Leninism?”¹⁹² Indeed, for Mao, abstract universal laws, in their own right, did not represent Marxism as a completed or realized form.¹⁹³ He urged cadres to embrace concrete

¹⁸⁷ Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, 184-186, 204; and Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 10, 118, 199. Schwartz remarks that Mao was the first to put the Chinese movement in a Chinese setting and relate it to Chinese social conditions, which indicates that he believes that Mao adapted Marxism-Leninism without abandoning the core features of that theory/ideology.

¹⁸⁸ Nick Knight, *Marxist Philosophy in China: From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong, 1923-1945* (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2005), 102-109, 165-169; Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 197-216; and Knight, “The Form of Mao Zedong’s ‘Sinification Marxism’,” 18.

¹⁸⁹ Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*, 79.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 84-85.

¹⁹² Mao Zedong, “Rectify the Party’s Style of Work,” (Beijing: 1 February 1942) [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_06.htm] (Accessed 4 June 2015).

¹⁹³ Knight, “The Form,” 25, 27-30; and Hung-yok Ip, “Mao, Mao Zedong, and Communist Intellectuals,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 180-181. One famous rebuke was: “‘Your dogma is of no use,’ or ‘your dogma is less useful

Marxism, that is, Marxism realized in a particular setting; a vernacular Marxism, or universal Marxism made normative, so that it was “relevant to China as a nation with a problematic identity in a new historical situation.”¹⁹⁴ But as innovative as Mao’s Sinification of Marxism was, though, he still required a legion of believers to get behind it.

The second dimension of *normative adaptation* concerns investing the ideology with the personal charisma of the theorist, and the subsequent process of bonding that occurred through textual exegesis, which took place during the 1941-1944 Rectification Campaigns. Due to ongoing civil strife and anti-imperialist struggle, there was no clear indication that Mao would emerge atop the CCP hierarchy, or that his ideology would become Party doctrine. His theoretical works had gained him substantial respect among his peers, and he established strong partnerships to secure power relations based on loyalty within the Party.¹⁹⁵ Mao had also laid much of the groundwork for his political thought by 1937, during which “rural revolution returned as the main driver of the Civil War with the Guomindang from 1945 to 1949.”¹⁹⁶ Even still, the Soviet Union made no orders from the Kremlin in Moscow to hand the reins of CCP leadership to Mao. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) initially did not hold the CCP in the highest regard, electing instead to support the easily influenced GMD, over which Voitinsky and Borodin had argued years beforehand. But the CPSU’s stance was constantly in flux during the Third International, or Comintern, years (1919-1943), at first supporting a CCP movement as part of the larger bourgeois democratic revolution, then urging other approaches that were “disconnected from Chinese realities.”¹⁹⁷

The CCP, too, was in a state of flux. New leadership brought with it new lines of direction, as the Qu Qiubai faction (1927-1928) struggled to regain a proletarian base, which failed, and Li Lisan’s leadership (1928-1930) was compromised both by his authoritarian treatment of his peers and rivals and his military defeat after taking Changsha.¹⁹⁸ Li’s authority now eroded completely, the Wang Ming-led Returned Student Clique (28 Bolsheviks), with their

than excrement.’ We see that dog excrement can fertilize the field and man’s can feed the dog. And dogmas?... Of what use are they?’ See Mao Zedong, “整頓學風黨風文風 (Correct the Incorrect Trends of Our Study, Party, and Literature, *zhěngdùn xuéfēng dǎng fēng wénfēng*),” 毛澤東集第八卷, *MZJ VIII*, Takeuchi, ed., 70-75

¹⁹⁴ Dirlik, *Marxism...*, 78, 96.

¹⁹⁵ Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, 173-178, 187, 191-199.

¹⁹⁶ Womack, *Foundations...*, 193; and Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary...,” 61, 74.

¹⁹⁷ Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, 148-166. Quote from page 166.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 68-78, 100-126 (Qu Qiubai), 127-164 (Li Lisan).

defense of a Stalinist course against heterodoxy, were poised to take over CCP headship.¹⁹⁹ The Returned Scholars challenged authority mightily, and it behoved Mao to cement alliances with influential theorists and communists including Chen Boda and Liu Shaoqi, although the latter was not initially Mao's closest ally (he would later found the base on which the cult of Mao formed).²⁰⁰ It was this atmosphere of changes and Party factionalism that Mao found himself situated. Rather than the Soviet Union issuing a directive that asked Li or Wang Ming to relinquish CCP leadership, though, the gravitation of power to Mao was in fact "the result of circumstances and power relations that existed within the Chinese communist movement."²⁰¹ If Mao was to survive against the Wang Ming clique, he needed shrewd decision-making and, most importantly, endorsement from the Soviet Union. But until Moscow's vote of confidence could act as a *deus ex machina* and rescue Mao from marginalization within the CCP, he needed to rise to become recognized by his peers and rivals as a serious theorist, and influence enough men to throw their weight behind him as a formidable candidate for Party helmsmanship.²⁰²

Victory against the Returned Scholars was anything but assured, and while intra-Party factionalism and Jiang Jieshi's incompetence help to explain Mao's rise to power, Mao triumphed over the Wang Ming clique and became the principle theorist of the CCP for two interconnected reasons. The first, as the previous paragraphs show, was Mao's 1938 "Sinification of Marxism," which challenged the dogmatists' passive Marxism, applied Marxism to a Chinese context, and completed Marxism as an ideological system. The second, meanwhile, was Mao's ability to situate himself as a "man of prowess,"²⁰³ and his Yan'an canon—in which his personal charisma infuses his theoretical proposals—as irrefutable wisdom.

The first key to this process was the 黨 (Party, Dǎng), the magical, efficacious, mobilizational, concentrator of political power that could speak simultaneously in the political language of traditional society *and* the rational-bureaucratic language of modernizing states.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 148-163.

²⁰⁰ Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, "From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party," in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, 376-378. On Mao's alliances see pages 339-387; and Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*.

²⁰¹ Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, viii, 185, 187.

²⁰² Teiwes and Sun, "From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party," in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, 378.

²⁰³ Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*, 112-125.

²⁰⁴ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 13, 15-16, 28, 45; and Timothy Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 10-13.

While Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun characterize the mode of CCP leadership during this period and the atmosphere that allowed Mao to emerge as Party leader as shifting from “a fairly orthodox Leninist approach to one increasingly, if incompletely, charismatic in nature,”²⁰⁵ the binary of Leninism versus charismatic is a bit troubling. Kenneth Jowitt’s study of Leninist Parties, by contrast, identifies the ways in which Leninist political organizations blend charismatic features with the impersonal features that are endemic to it to enter status societies for recruitment.²⁰⁶ By using Max Weber’s distinction between status and class society, Jowitt argues that Leninism as a political organization and strategy offered a “particular response to the status organization of peasant society and the related phenomenon of [national] dependency.”²⁰⁷ In order to penetrate into peasant status society and recruit membership, the Leninist organization must therefore “simultaneously insulate itself from and recast the institutions of a peasant society and insulate the country itself from international ties that constrain, shape, and reinforce domestic institutional patterns.”²⁰⁸

Jowitt’s formulation is also relevant for the three case studies in Southeast Asia, since all three Communist movements depended on a largely peasant base with an exclusively elite intellectual leadership. The CPK leadership promoted the Party after seizing power on 17 April 1975 only as the mysterious, yet omnipotent and omnipresent អង្គការ (*Angkar*, “Organization”), which, through slogans, speeches, and sermons, stressed its benevolence and urged all to love it as they would their families.²⁰⁹ Although the intention was to establish a “relationship of personal dependency” between itself and its constituent peasant base, the CPK’s effort to posit the *Angkar* as, at once, an impersonal yet all-loving organization *and* “a personalized institution that watches movies and can be spoken to unless it is ‘busy working,’” mirrors Mao’s dual endeavors appropriately.²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ Teiwes and Sun, “From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party,” *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, 375.

²⁰⁶ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 1, 11, 16.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 43; and Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 10-11.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 44.

²⁰⁹ Alexander L. Hinton, *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 131. On slogans, see Henri Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar*. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2005).

²¹⁰ Hinton, *ibid.*; and Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930-1975*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), xviii.

Importantly, Mao and the CCP had to be equal parts charismatic-Leninist and Leninist-revolutionary by oscillating between rational-bureaucratic, status/kinship-based features of their peasant constituency, for which Leninism's charismatic features eased the process, and their commitment to the facilitation of revolution.²¹¹ Mao's charisma is undeniably evident in his Yan'an writings, as he infused his nationalism and internationalism in his formula, alongside a careful assessment of China's history and status as subjugated by imperialism, as well as by placing emphasis on the primacy of practical application to complete an ideological system rather than admiring theory for theory's sake. In so doing, he positioned himself and the Party well in their mutual effort to form a constituent base among peasants and rural workers from (traditional) status and kinship societies to support a (modern) revolutionary agenda.²¹² But how did the CCP, with its assembly of new recruits and intellectuals, end up coalescing around Mao and his thought?

The 1941-1944 Rectification Campaigns, which sought to reeducate the CCP's "storm membership drive" recruits through the rigorous study of Mao's Yan'an canon, provides us with the second key to Mao's ascendancy, and an important facet of *normative adaptation*.²¹³ Rectification established loyalty to Mao and elevated his image and written word as "core symbols of the CCP" through a phenomenon of "exegetical bonding." David Apter and Tony Saich explain further:

... exegetical bonding, while it is an engagement with words and ideas in a context of immediate social learning, results in an emotional and symbolic intensity that includes the consciousness of self in terms of others. The result of exegetical bonding then is prescriptive illumination. Its higher purpose is enlightenment by the transcendence of ordinary understanding. The act of realizing transcendental understanding results in a kind of bonding. Through a personal *Aufhebung*, one reaches a new plane of interaction intertwined with discourse itself. Selected works serve to recode the self in terms of shared signifiers that are highly charged, and that becomes the unique property of the membership as a whole. By this means too, every ordinary aspect of life is imbued with intersubjective consciousness.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 15-16, 43-44. Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 10-11.

²¹² Ibid, 13-14, citing Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 3, 1122. See also Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 10-11.

²¹³ Saich, ed. *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, lxi; and Joshua Howard, *Workers at War: Labor in China's Arsenal, 1937-1953*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 235.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 264-265.

Indeed, recent recruits and patriots transformed through their Rectification experiences into Maoist devotees with an invigorated sense of revolutionary purpose and loyalty to Mao.²¹⁵ The future supreme leader also used Rectification to author an official, Mao-centric Party history, which entrenched his Yan'an Thought (Yan'an Maoism) as ideological orthodoxy, with Mao occupying the role as revolutionary hero, genius, and exemplar. By curbing all vestiges of individualism within the Party and by crushing opposing lines of thinking that might challenge ideological harmony, Mao Zedong Thought became *the* ideological pillar of the CCP; questioning Mao became “tantamount to committing a mistake in ‘line.’”²¹⁶ But while the establishment of Mao at the center of the CCP through Yan'an Rectification had its “dark side,” it was a triumph for Mao in infusing his own personal charisma into the impersonal Leninist Party, with himself as the gold standard of the ideal revolutionary and theoretical architect. Mao's accession to undisputed helmsmanship occurred in March 1943 when he won the deciding vote in the CCP three-man secretariat and “Mao Zedong Thought” started to be bandied about by his fellow ranking leaders to package the local success of Yan'an Rectification for replication in other base areas.

To summarize, the problem of *adaptation* actually comprises two constituent parts, as in the case of Mao's practical application of Marxism in China and adaptation of it to contemporary norms (thereby excluding Marxism's Eurocentrism and marginal role for the peasantry). The first part, *practical adaptation*, is, quite simply, taking that idea or theory from without and putting it into practice. The problem that arises, as we see in Mao's initial attempts as a revolutionary, was that any dogma is empty without practice; one must “complete” an ideology such as Marxism by applying it to concrete realities, and then regroup with the knowledge obtained from practice to make something new. His most famous Yan'an works reveal much more than attempts to graft Marxism to a Chinese host. Rather, Mao believed that it ought to include several moving parts, including a means by which to seize state power and a program to direct the Party once they have seized power from their rivals. Mao's “theory-practice-theory”

²¹⁵ For a similar phenomenon, see Timothy Cheek, “The Honorable Vocation: Intellectual Service in CCP Propaganda Institutions in Jin-Cha-Ji, 1937-1945,” in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, 190, 238.

²¹⁶ Saich, ed., *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party*, lxi. As Saich states further, “Rectification was not just a peaceful proselytizing event, but entailed the eradication of alternative intellectual responses to his policy, no matter whether the challenge came from Wang Ming and supporters or from those intellectuals who represented the cosmopolitan trend of the May Fourth Movement within the CCP.”

formulation also coalesced as an ideological system, which represents not only a profound theoretical achievement, but also stands as his crowning accomplishment in making a new ideology (Sinified Marxism) congruent with contemporary norms in China. This leads us to the second part, *normative adaptation*, which consists of rendering that foreign idea into something that speaks to a people other than the recipient or theorist. Mao accomplished this task through the Sinification of Marxism (the theoretical dimension), which spoke at once in a political language of traditional society and a rational-bureaucratic language of modernizing states. Through making Marxism-Leninism normative, or congruent with contemporary norms, Mao Zedong Thought took on the all too important charismatic dimension of Jowitt's theory on the Leninist phenomenon. It was then a useful tool to use against Wang Ming, who was the future Chairman's principal rival within the CCP by 1938, and then again during the 1941-1944 Yan'an Rectification Campaigns to convert CCP recruits into dedicated Maoists through the mastery of his "holy scripture": the Yan'an canon. Soon, Mao was inseparable from Chinese Communist Party history, with his thought becoming one of the pillars of the Chinese Communist Party.

Conclusion

Mao's social experiences and his written works provide equally enlightening perspective on the emergence of Mao Zedong Thought, and explicate how he was able to grapple with a complex relationship between exogenous thought and its suitability for endogenous realities. His early years as a student tell us of his exposure to a plenitude of intellectual resources, both domestic and foreign, with Western philosophical works joining together with his early exposure to the Confucian classics. This immersion, which was very much reflective of China's own confrontation with its present changing situation, led him to realize the value of both Chinese philosophy and foreign thought such as Marxism-Leninism. His time as a revolutionary, too, was a revelation, as he reported in 1927 on the Peasants Movement in Hunan the sheer untapped potential of China's largest, yet socioeconomically poorest, demographic for effectuating real change in the failed Republic. It was with this arrow in his intellectual quiver that Mao sought to develop a Marxism that "fit" these concrete realities in China.

Mao's writings, especially his Yan'an works, reflect the true genius of Mao's *practical adaptation*. Here, within the pages of Maoist classics such as "On Contradiction" and "On Practice," we see Mao's painstaking efforts to address the various endemic contradictions in

Chinese society, as well as his outright emphasis on the importance of practice over abstraction. Practice, Mao contended, allowed one to take a theory and use it actively, then to take that experience and use it to inform a new theory that was congruent with the norms, values, and realities that practical application brought into sharp focus. It was the essence of his “Sinification,” which completed Marxism-Leninism as not just an ideology, but as an ideological system with a built-in plan for socialist transition—and invested with his own personal charisma. If Sinification represented Mao’s creativity in adapting an outside idea to contemporary norms represents a triumph in his career as a Marxist theorist, the Yan’an Rectification Campaigns elevated the notion of Mao as the exemplar and, later, *pater familias*, of a Party that needed a counterpunch to Jiang Jieshi’s own 1943 overtures. Through exegetical bonding in Yan’an, Mao’s greatest essays and pronouncements became religious scripture, in a sense, as green recruits transformed into revolutionaries who were imbued with an invigorated sense of revolutionary will and purpose.

As the next chapter shows, however, just when Mao Zedong Thought crystallized into an ideological system after Rectification and during the early years of the People’s Republic of China, it broke into two conflictual strands: bureaucratic, or managerial, Maoism, and faith Maoism. The trend that made disagreeing with Mao tantamount to treasonous activity, or counterrevolutionary thinking, drove a massive wedge between the more rational members of the CCP leadership. As Mao Zedong Thought took on diametrically opposed features—one still very much holding aloft the banner of the Yan’an spirit while the other propelled forward by Mao-centric zealotry—only one could, and would, remain. A series of cataclysmic events with disastrous results threatened to undo all that Mao and the CCP had achieved over decades of protracted warfare and socialist transformation. This brings us to *implementation*, the second subset problem of ideas across cultures.

Chapter Two—Discovering Truth through Practice: Mao Zedong Thought, Implemented, and Transformed, 1949-1965

Produce the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form develops in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing.¹—Mao Zedong, “On Practice,” July 1937

At the April 1945 Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Mao provided a comprehensive political report that detailed his vision for China. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), he said, would develop into “an independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous, and powerful new nation,”² from an agricultural into an industrial country, and from a new-democratic into a socialist and Communist society under the leadership of the working class and the CCP.³ However, the Party had not expected victory when they obtained it in 1949; they simply did not know how to proceed in governing such a large country.⁴ Initially, they relied heavily on the Soviet model of authoritarian total governance (Soviet state socialism) to guide them, but learned quickly that there was a significant difference between *fighting to obtain* power and *exercising* that power.⁵ This chapter, then, has two goals: first, to show how ideology

¹ Mao Zedong, “On Practice: On the Relation between Knowledge and Practice, between Theory and Reality, between Knowing and Doing,” *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*. Nick Knight, ed., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1990), 148; Mao Zedong, “實踐論 (On Practice, *Shíjiàn lùn*),” 毛澤東集補卷第五卷 [Supplements to Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume V, *Máo Zédōng jí dìwǔjuǎn*]. Takeuchi Minoru, ed., (Tokyo: Suosuosha, 1983-1986), 234; and Mao Zedong, “實踐論 (On Practice),” 毛澤東選集第一卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I, *Máo Zédōng xuǎnjí, dì yī juàn*], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe chuban, 1952), 273.

² Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” (24 April 1945), in *Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1949, Volume VIII—From Rectification to Coalition Government, 1942-July 1945*. Stuart Schram and Timothy Cheek, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 760; Mao Zedong, “論聯合政府 (On Coalition Government, *Lùn liánhé zhèngfǔ*),” 毛澤東集卷第九卷 [Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume IX, *Máo Zédōng jí dìwǔjuǎn*] Takeuchi Minoru, ed., (Tokyo: Hokuboshe, 1970-1972), 249; Mao Zedong, “論聯合政府 (On Coalition Government, *Lùn liánhé zhèngfǔ*),” 毛澤東選集第三卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume III, *Máo Zédōng xuǎnjí, dì sān juàn*], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe chuban, 1952), 98; and Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” *Selected Works Vol. III*, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 255.

³ Mao Zedong, “論人民民主專政 (On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, *Lùn rénmin mínzhǔ zhuānzhèng*),” 毛澤東集卷第十卷 [Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume X, *Máo Zédōng jí dì Shíjuǎn*]. Takeuchi Minoru, ed., 300.

⁴ Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd Edition*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 14, 166, 213, 300.

⁵ Susanne Ogdén, *China’s Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 38; Lee Feigon, *Mao: A Reinterpretation* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 11, 105. See also Ronald C. Keith, “The Relevance of Border-Region Experience to Nation-Building in China, 1949-1952,” *The China*

and practice of this period came to be; and second, to explain the process of implementation itself and to trace preliminary links between political processes in Communist China and their equivalents in Democratic Kampuchea (DK, 1975-1979). Not unlike the subset problems of *reception* and *adaptation* in our traveling theory triad,⁶ *implementation* contains phases that help us to elucidate it as both problem and process. This chapter identifies three subset phases of the *implementation* stage, each of which receiving section-length attention below. These three phases are genealogical rather than chronological, although they more or less overlap: 1) *consolidation*, embodied in the 1941-1944 Yan'an, 1956 Hundred Flowers (百花運動, *Bǎihuā yùndòng*), and 1957-1959 Anti-Rightist (反右運動, *Fǎnyòu Yùndòng*) Rectification Campaigns, as well as the 1959 Lushan Conference; 2) *economic reconfiguration*, which took the form of the 1958-1961 Great Leap Forward, 大躍進, *Dàyuèjìn*); and 3) *social transformation*, which was the primary objective of the 1962-1965 Socialist Education Movement (hereafter SEM, 社會主義教育運動, *Shèhuìzhǔyì Jiàoyù Yùndòng*). While *social transformation* was integral to both consolidation and economic reconfiguration, it was the extent of this transformation, within the Party and without, and the subsequent Mao-centric zealotry that arose because of it, that characterized the SEM as such.

We begin with a brief section that introduces the theoretical lens—Kenneth Jowitt's concept of the Leninist response—through which we will examine the phases of *implementation* of Mao Zedong Thought, or Mao Zedong Thought as practiced in official CCP programs during its first decade-and-a-half of rule. For identifying the *variables* at work in the *implementation* stage, Jowitt's insights on Leninism's three major status-like features provide a useful vocabulary. He identifies three particular phases: 1) a tendency to distinguish between insiders

Quarterly, No. 78 (June 1979): 274-295; and Nick Knight, *Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong's Thought*. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 218. Knight reminds us that “when talking of a ‘Chinese road to socialism’ one must be cautious in ascribing to Mao a carefully preconsidered and fully coherent perspective on socialist transition, for his views during the 1950s and 1960s frequently emerged in response to unfolding events in the international area and domestic context... while Mao's perspective was in part reactive and in part an application of preexisting themes in his thought, one can spy in the mix of concepts and ideas that came together under the rubric of the ‘Chinese road to socialism’ a broad strategy for socialist transition that departed in significant detail from its Soviet counterpart.” On page 219. On the economic dimensions of the Chinese road to socialism, see Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). For a highly thoughtful analysis of the CCP's efforts in its early years of governance, see David Shambaugh, “Building the Party-State in China, 1949-1965: Bringing the Soldier Back In,” *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China*. Timothy Cheek and Tony Saich, eds. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1997), 125-147.

⁶ Edward W. Said, “Traveling Theory,” in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Edward W. Said (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 226-247. See also Timothy Cheek, “Chinese Socialism as Vernacular Cosmopolitanism,” *Front. Hist. China* 9, No. 1 (2014): 102-124, on page 106.

(members of the Party) and outsiders; 2) the placement of power in the hands of cadres whose central personal role is emphasized, particularly during the initial developmental phases of Leninist regimes; and 3) an emphasis on the security and protection of belonging to a closed, well-bounded group. The chapter's first section elaborates on this further. The chapter then explores, in order, the variables of consolidation/control, economic reconfiguration, and social transformation, all of which shared one common feature: they were all responses to the problems of modernization.⁷ The first phase, *consolidation*, occurred with Mao's suppression of intellectuals and public criticism, which began with the Three Antis and Five Antis in the early 1950s, expanded in the 1957-1959 Anti-Rightist Movement that shut down the Hundred Flowers Movement, and concluded with the purging of Peng Dehuai after the Lushan Conference. Mao's suppression of his critics, many of whom were literati, inspired the Communist Party of Kampuchea's (CPK) own punishment of intellectuals, including its decision to defrock and delegitimize Buddhist monks, thus we trace preliminary threads between Mao's policies and those undertaken by the CPK.⁸ The next section focuses on *economic transformation*, which occurred with Mao's 1958-1960 program for rapid economic and industrial development, the Great Leap Forward. Once again, we link this program of rapid industrial and economic development as envisioned and implemented by Mao with the CPK's "Super" Great Leap Forward—a name that reflects an obvious rhetorical homage.⁹ The third section analyzes the *social transformation* phase, the SEM, which stood as an effort to cleanse the Party bureaucracy through the "Four Cleanups" (politics, economy, organization, ideology). It was against the backdrop of the SEM that a "faith Maoism" rose to prominence and underpinned Mao-frenzy that followed in the Cultural Revolution.¹⁰ The future leader of the CPK, Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) became so enamored with faith Maoism that after his 1965 visit to Beijing the young Khmer

⁷ Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Communism and China: Ideology in Flux*. (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 171-172.

⁸ Elizabeth Becker, *When the War was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and its People*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 156.

⁹ I agree with Kate Frieson's assertion that the "Super" Great Leap was "a clear linguistic borrowing from Mao's Great Leap Forward campaign." Kate Frieson, "The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea," *Pacific Affairs* 1, No. 3, (Autumn, 1988): 405-427, on page 419. On the Super Great Leap, see "The Party's Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977-1980," (Party Center, July-August 1976), *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977*. David P. Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua, eds., trans. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series 33, Yale Center for International and Area Studies 1988), 45-119. "Great giant leaps forward" is also a rhetorical device that the CPK used in its Party publications. See វង្សាតិបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag] No. 8 (1975), 2. Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCAM) Document Number D21410.

¹⁰ Timothy Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 12, 219-220.

revolutionary espoused a very similar *modus operandi* to the SEM to take control of a disunited Party and refocus the Cambodian Communist movement along a Maoist course.

As this chapter endeavors to show, all three phases of *implementation* allow us to see how Mao Zedong Thought as *implemented* in the 1960s was different from Yan'an Maoism/Mao Zedong Thought as Mao wrote, theorized about, and adapted during the Second Sino-Japanese War and as codified in 1945. Mao Zedong Thought went from “thaw” (the Hundred Flowers Movement), to “freeze” (the Anti-Rightist Movement) and the earth-shattering Great Leap Forward. It also underwent a transition during the post-Leap retrenchment, culminating with an “ideological revival”¹¹ by the onset of the SEM, which served as a prelude to fanatical faith-based Maoism of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976, 文化大革命, *Wénhuà Dàgéming*) that the Party sought actively to *export*. Pol Pot encountered this Maoism upon visiting Beijing in 1966.¹² The CCP's *implementation* of Mao Zedong Thought during its first fifteen years in power is essential to make sense of the nature of Mao Zedong Thought by the onset of the Cultural Revolution as well as its form by the time of the Party's efforts to export it. It is also important to show how the application of traveling theory helps us to see both the creation of what the CPK leadership borrowed from the CCP and the *process* that we will see repeated in DK from 1975 to 1979. In this way, the following chapter helps us to understand the history of Maoism in Southeast Asia more fully, and makes the theoretical contribution (the “how we know,” so to speak) of an improved way to look at the movement of radical thought in particular and all social thought in general.

The Leninist Response: Mao's Implementation of Traveling Theory

On the transformation of Mao Zedong Thought during this *implementation* phase, Jowitt's concept of the Leninist organization is especially helpful. The Leninist organization, Jowitt contends, underpinned the charismatic leader's thought, thereby serving as “an

¹¹ Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), 312. I use Dittmer's categories to mark the shift in CCP attitudes toward Liu Shaoqi, but applied to shifts in Maoist implementation.

¹² Thomas Engelbert and Chris Goscha, *Falling out of Touch: A Study of the Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930-1975*. (Clayton, Australia: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash Asia Institute, 1995), 77-81.

institutional amalgam of charismatic and modern orientations.”¹³ Class/modern components in Leninism, namely an emphasis on individual responsibility, achievement, personal-individual efficacy, and a more empirical or “scientific vs. magical” appreciation of social and political problems, are expressed institutionally rather than in social action.¹⁴ Indeed, as Jowitt makes clear, the “enmeshment of modern (and traditional) orientations in a novel type of charismatic framework” is what ultimately dictates how these “modern action orientations” emerge.¹⁵

While much of the philosophical basis for the thought that Mao formulated during the Yan’an Period—the pervasiveness of contradictions in society and the Marxist theory of historical change, for instance—were currents in 1950s and 1960s, he adapted and altered them when in power to suit China’s changing situation, and deviated significantly in many respects from his Yan’an rationality.¹⁶ The chapter therefore contrasts the resonating power of Yan’an Maoism in the years before the PRC’s founding with its gradual dissolution into diametrically opposed charismatic and managerial strands during the Party’s implementation of its modernizing initiatives. The chapter also traces preliminary connections between the particular sequences that inspired the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in its governance of Democratic Kampuchea (DK).

The story of the early years of the PRC has been refined usefully by previous studies that help us get a clearer picture of the implementation phase of traveling theory. The notion that Mao and his radical loyalists “won” a two-line struggle against conservative CCP members led by Liu Shaoqi is debunked by Frederick Teiwes, who instead proposes that a dominant Mao who was at times radical *and* conservative characterized this period.¹⁷ Timothy Cheek, meanwhile, uses Kenneth Jowitt’s analysis of Leninist Parties to frame Yan’an Maoism’s initial success in uniting Chinese leadership under Mao and the later bifurcation of Mao Zedong Thought into

¹³ Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 4; Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, pp. 16-19.

¹⁴ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 16-17. Jowitt states further that in the Leninist organization “individualism is expressed in the neocorporate unit of the collective (i.e., Party, cell, work collective); achievement as a premise of Party imperative is in continual tension with the charismatic premise of Party membership as a heroic intrinsic quality; and scientific socialism as a grasp of inexorable, universal, and unilinear historical laws.”

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 18.

¹⁶ Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 219.

¹⁷ Frederick C. Teiwes, *Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China: From a Charismatic Mao to the Politics of Succession*. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1984), 5-6.

charismatic and bureaucratic tendencies.¹⁸ Jowitt's description of the charismatic leader and the charismatic-impersonal organization helps to contextualize the phenomenon of Yan'an Maoism and its resonating power during the 1940s:

A charismatic leader dramatically reconciles incompatible commitments and orientations. It is in this sense that the charismatic is a revolutionary agent—someone who is able in certain social circumstances institutionally to combine (with varying degrees of success for varying degrees of time) orientations and commitments that until then were seen as mutually exclusive. It is the extraordinary and inspirational quality of such a leader that makes possible the recasting of previously incompatible elements into a new unit of personal identity and organizational membership.¹⁹

Indeed, the Leninist Party constitutes a “novel package of charismatic, traditional, and modern elements, a recasting of the definition and relation of these three elements in such a way that the Party combines impersonal and affective elements and appeals effectively, if not logically, to some persons and groups in a turbulent society who themselves are a composite of heroic, status, and secular orientations.”²⁰ Yet the pressures of ruling a huge country such as China pulled these once integrated strands apart, compounded further by policies of repression and intra-Party disunity.²¹ The triumph of the charismatic faith Maoism and sublimation of managerial/routine Maoism would, famously, characterize the frenzied iconoclasm of the Cultural Revolution. But what is most important is that *this* is what constituted “*Maoism*”: Mao Zedong Thought as exported ideology was the charismatic, faith-based strand that took hold of the CCP and brought it to its knees during the Cultural Revolution. Faith Maoism formed the basis of the Maoism that Communist China exported to the world, and it was this Mao-centric, iconoclastic, and frenetic version that captured the heart of Pol Pot, who visited Beijing in 1965 and returned to Phnom Penh with copies of *Œuvres choisies de Mao Tsé-toung* (Selected Works of Mao Zedong).²²

Indeed, faith and bureaucratic conceptions of Maoism are helpful to our analysis of the reception, adaptation, and implementation of Maoism in the Cambodian case study. As chapter

¹⁸ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 10-13. I use “bifurcated” here because bureaucratic Maoism, as Cheek states, was “not devoid of the living ideology claimed by the faith Maoists; rather the ideology of the bureaucratic Maoists stresses a method [that] could, with assiduous practice, become a daily regime that would guarantee, under Party guidance, success in practical matters and service to the salvation of China.”

¹⁹ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 2. Also quoted in Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 12.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 18-19. Also in Cheek, *ibid*.

²¹ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 10-11, 215-278.

²² Sacha Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges: de Paris à Phnom Penh, 1945-1979 » (The Political History of the Khmer Rouge: from Paris to Phnom Penh, 1945-1979), (PhD Dissertation, Université Paris X – Nanterre, 2001), 121.

four discusses in more detail, collective leadership characterized the CPK *modus operandi* following Sar's 1966 return from China and the years that preceded the 17 April 1975 takeover. The Paris-educated economics students who formed the intellectual thrust of the Party—Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim—had all engaged with Mao's texts critically and adapted ideas that they had drawn from such readings in their economics dissertations, and by 1967 all had joined Sar in the struggle to depose Sihanouk. Sar had brought faith Maoism back with him, and it was clear that despite its collective leadership the CPK contained those who aspired to become the charismatic leader whom all endorsed as opposed to the charismatic Party that is central to Jowitt's Leninist Party formulation. The balance of bureaucratic and faith Maoisms before 1975 that marked the impersonal, invisible yet charismatic អង្គការ (Organization, name for CPK before its 1977) was to shatter forever, as Pol Pot wrested power from potential rivals, purged much of his Paris cohort who had supported the charismatic Party over individual authority, and planted himself as the uncontested charismatic leader.

Consolidation: Ensuring Revolutionary Leadership, 1957-1959

罢黜百家，独尊儒术 (Dismiss the hundred schools, revere only the Confucian, *Bàchù bǎi jiā, dú zūn rúshù*)—Slogan of the former Han Dynasty

This section's purpose is to posit the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist Movements, both of which embody the “ugly side” of rectification, as the first sequence in Mao's implementation of traveling theory—*consolidation*. The section then delves into his autocratic turn, culminating in the seminal expulsion of Peng Dehuai after the 1959 Lushan Conference, which signaled the initiation of phase two of the Anti-Rightist movement and widened the gap between Mao Zedong Thought's two predominant tendencies. As Jowitt notes, the success of Leninism in peasant society lies in its establishment of a “charismatic (not legal) type of impersonal institutional framework at all levels and in all sectors in society.”²³ Mao's approach with Hundred Flowers is indicative of such an effort, but drawing from the disjointed intellectual class rather than the peasants for common service to the Communist nation. Unlike the earlier heroic mission that marked the 1942-1944 Yan'an Rectification (which opens this section on *consolidation*), unexpected criticisms of the Party raised by these intellectuals in the high tide of

²³ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 30.

the Hundred Flowers rectification in May 1957 led Mao to have an “abrupt volte-face,” resulting in his turn to purging his critics with the Anti-Rightist campaign in June 1957.²⁴

The incident at the Lushan Conference, moreover, stood as another example of Mao taking criticism personally and responding with disproportionate reprisal to consolidate his position as the preeminent force within the CCP. The post-Lushan era, as this section shows, was one in which any criticisms of Party actions and policies were now on par with levying a personal attack on Mao, the prodigious *paterfamilias* of the masses. The section also makes initial connections between Mao’s rectification methods and those of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), which sought to reform cadres during the clandestine struggle of the mid-1960s and, later, intellectuals in the Party’s first year in power (1975-1976). Thus to understand Mao’s later efforts to rectify his critics’ way of thinking, we must examine first the 1941-1944 Yan’an Rectification Movement, during which Mao rectified new recruits and rallied them around his personal example. For it was by dint of Yan’an Rectification that Mao was able to situate his ideological canon at the center of Party history, tying its fate inextricably to him.

Yan’an Rectification, 1941-1944

Both phases of Mao’s post-1949 rectifications were no coincidence, but instead reflected Mao’s frustration with the former Party Center that dated back to the Jiangxi Soviet years in the early-to-mid 1930s.²⁵ Whether the hopeful call for self-and-mutual criticism (Hundred Flowers) or the harsh attack on critics (Anti-Rightist), these phases had, in particular, characterized the original rectification in Yan’an in the 1940s (延安整風運動, (Yan’an Rectification Movement, *Yán’ān Zhěngfēng Yùndòng*).²⁶ Mao had obtained leadership of the People’s Liberation Army

²⁴ Geremie R. Barmé, “For Truly Great Men, Look to This Age Alone: Was Mao Zedong a New Emperor?” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*. Timothy Cheek, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 257.

²⁵ Gao Hua, 紅太陽是怎樣升起的：延安整風運動的來龍去脈 [How did the Sun Rise over Yan’an: A History of the Rectification Movement, *Hóng tàiyáng shì zěnyàng shēng qǐ de: Yán’ān zhěngfēng yùndòng de láilóngqùmài*]. (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000), 1-2, 24, 38; Merle Goldman, “The Party and Intellectuals,” *An Intellectual History of Modern China*. Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-fan Lee, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 380-389; Frederick TC Yu, *Mass Persuasion in Communist China*. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 49; Frederick C. Teiwes, “Mao and His Followers,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*. Timothy Cheek, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 131.

²⁶ For a more comprehensive analysis of Rectification, see David E. Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 281-288. Methods of “thought reform,”

(PLA) after The Long March (1934-1935) and the historic 1935 遵義會議 (Zunyi Conference, *Zūnyì huìyì*) in Guizhou, but the CCP turned to rectification in the base area of Yan'an in a concentrated effort to reform the study of intellectuals and recent recruits.²⁷ Stalinists from the Wang Ming troupe and the democratic liberal intellectuals who drew inspiration from the May Fourth reservoir²⁸ were the principal targets of Mao's call to "combat subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism."²⁹ Mao elaborates on the purpose and goal of the Yan'an movement in the following passage:

The mistakes of the past must be exposed without sparing *anyone's* sensibilities; it is necessary to analyze and criticize what was bad in the past with a scientific attitude so that work in the future will be done more carefully and better. This is what is meant by 'learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones.' But our aim in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings, like that of a doctor curing a sickness, is solely to save the patient and not to doctor him to death. A person with appendicitis is saved when the surgeon removes his appendix. *No matter how big his mistake is*, so long as a person who has made mistakes does not hide his sickness for fear of treatment or persist in his mistakes until he is beyond cure, so long as he honestly and sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he can become a good comrade.³⁰

which the Party initiated during Rectification, mirrored closely Soviet methods that the CPSU utilized previously. Robert J. Lifton, "Thought Reform of Chinese Intellectuals: A Psychiatric Evaluation," *Journal of Asian Studies* 16, No. 1 (November 1956): 75-88.

²⁷ Lee Feigon, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 67-81. Lee states that the Party experienced increased membership, from "around 40,000 in 1937 to more than 800,000 by 1940," but was disunited on issues of ideological foundation and direction.

²⁸ Gao Hua, 紅太陽是怎樣升起的, 1-2, 48-49.

²⁹ Mao Zedong, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," (1 February 1942), in *Mao's Road to Power, Volume VIII*, Schram and Cheek, eds., 18; Mao Zedong, 整頓學風黨文風 (Rectify the Party's Style of Work, *Zhěngdùn dǎng de zuòfēng*), 毛澤東集卷第五卷 [Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume VIII, *Máo Zédōng jí dì wǔ juǎn*]. Takeuchi, ed., 63; Mao Zedong, 整頓學風黨文風 (Rectify the Party's Style of Work, *Zhěngdùn dǎng de zuòfēng*), 毛澤東選集第三卷, 769; and Mao Zedong, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," *Selected Works Vol. III*, 36. Mao was particularly critical of Party writing. He returned to this issue later in his 1958 speech "Criticism of People's Daily, Which Should Not 'Oppose Adventurism,'" in *Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*. Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 393-396.

³⁰ Mao Zedong, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," (1 February 1942), in *Mao's Road to Power, Volume VIII*, Schram and Cheek, eds., 33; Mao Zedong, 整頓學風黨文風 (Rectify the Party's Style of Work, *Zhěngdùn dǎng de zuòfēng*), 毛澤東集卷第五卷 [Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume VIII, *Máo Zédōng jí dì wǔ juǎn*]. Takeuchi Minoru, ed. 84; Mao Zedong, 整頓學風黨文風 (Rectify the Party's Style of Work, *Zhěngdùn dǎng de zuòfēng*), 毛澤東選集第三卷, 785-786; and Mao Zedong, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," *Selected Works, Vol. III*, 50.

Here, the CCP appointed itself as national doctor and the counterrevolutionary elements as a sickness that needed to be cured via immersion³¹ in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist canon.³² As David Apter and Tony Saich note, Yan'an Rectification gave rise to a “symbolic capital” that, through the shared experience in Yan'an, gave extraordinary power to people who were mobilized as a united troupe toward a “depersonalized principle.”³³ Cadre purges certainly occurred during the movement, but Mao's and the CCP's ability, as a charismatic leader and organization, to transcend “certain social circumstances... [and] varying degrees of time,” fits Jowitt's Leninist phenomenon concept appropriately.³⁴ At the campaign's end in 1944, Mao had unified the Party around his Yan'an canon and historical role as the CCP's supreme theorist. His thought was codified in the CCP Constitution as the Party's guiding principle shortly thereafter.

Phase One: The Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist Movements, 1956-1959

A decade later the CCP faced yet another situation in which it turned to a rectification campaign, this time against its intellectual critics. Both internal and external factors help to explain Mao's authoritarian turn. Internally, the early 1950s had been banner years in many respects for the CCP. The Party had succeeded in suppressing counterrevolutionary elements within the Party ranks, and could claim credit for unifying China, ameliorating living standards, increasing peasant and worker income, and improving life expectancy.³⁵ The first half decade of

³¹ Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization*, 30, 516-517. Apter states that the Party published in May 1944 the first official compilation of Mao's works in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region “to aid cadre study.” A precursor to the infamous 毛澤東選集 (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, *Máo Zédōng xuǎnjí*), this effort represents the extent to which the Party sought to indoctrinate its intellectuals and recent recruits along the same line. Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*, 288. The CCP also circulated “Documents of the Rectification Campaign,” a document that included essays written by Mao and Liu Shaoqi, to direct “incorrect” thoughts towards proper Party principles.

³² Many of these rhetorical devices inspired CPK propaganda. A CPK publication referred to the national minorities, especially the Vietnamese, as “diseased elements,” “microbes,” “pests buried within,” and traitors “boring in.” “Another Step in our Cooperative Victories,” ផង្ក្រហម [Red Flag], No. 7, (July 1978): 1-4. Emphasis added.

³³ Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*, xi, 263-293, citing “symbolic capital” per Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflective Sociology*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 123-139. See also David Apter, “Discourse as Power: Yan'an and the Chinese Revolution,” *New Perspectives on the Chinese Revolution*. Tony Saich and Hans Van de Ven, eds. (New York: ME Sharpe, 1990), 190-215.

³⁴ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 2; and Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 13.

³⁵ Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. I: Contradictions Among the People, 1956-1957*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 19-25. He notes that life expectancy “rose from 36 years in

the CCP's rule in China was also a point of nostalgia for many Chinese, especially during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution.³⁶ Yet an increase in a rise in mass mobilization from 1955 to early 1956 and again from late 1957 to mid-1960 clashed against the Party's "sober emphasis on balance in 1956-1957"—the period of 反冒進 (opposing rash advance, *Fǎn mào jìn*).³⁷ Mao's relationship with the intellectual and artistic communities was already on shaky grounds, and in the years that followed Liberation there was considerably less mobility for the intelligentsia to be innovative and active. This culminated in significant opposition to the CCP's intensified effort to repress intellectual criticism of the Party, which began in January 1956 and culminated with the launch of the Great Leap Forward in 1958.³⁸

Externally, the Hungarian revolt, harsh Soviet repression of it, and subsequent execution of Imre Nagy led Mao to identify "human error" within the Soviet approach despite his fervent support for the Soviet decision.³⁹ Internally, the CCP's First Five Year Plan, the

1950 to 57 years by 1957." See also Nicholas Lardy, "Economic Recovery and the First Five-Year Plan," *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14: The People's Republic. Part I. The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-1965*. Roderick MacFarquhar and John King Fairbank, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 155; and Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, "The Politics of an 'Un-Maoist' Interlude: The Case of Opposing Rash Advance, 1956-1957," *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China*, 134. Mao himself referred to 1955 in particular as "the year of decision in the struggle between socialism and capitalism," in which "a raging tidal wave has swept away all the demons and ghosts." Mao Zedong, *Socialist Upsurge in the Countryside*. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1957), 159-160.

³⁶ Chinese journalist Liu Binyan recalls that most people "felt nostalgic for 1956 and regarded it as the best period in the history of the People's Republic, calling it 'the golden year.'" Liu Binyan, *A Higher Kind of Loyalty*. (New York: Pantheon, 1990), 61. Liu's terming of this period as a "golden year" is appropriate in light of the Party's successes. In the years before the 1956 Eighth Party Congress (the first to occur in over a decade) Mao and the CCP had ushered in a period of economic prosperity and successful socialist development. The official Party historiography echoes this favorable sentiment, evaluating the 1949 to 1956 period "as golden years characterized by the successful construction of socialism." Felix Wemheuer, "'The Grain Problem is an Ideological Problem': Discourses of Hunger in the 1957 Socialist Education Campaign," *Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine*. Kimberley Ens Manning and Felix Wemheuer, eds. (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2011), 108-109.

³⁷ Teiwes and Sun, "The Politics of an 'Un-Maoist' Interlude," *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China*, 151.

³⁸ John Bryan Starr, *Ideology and Culture: Introduction to the Dialectic of Contemporary Chinese Politics*. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 41. The disparity between periods was stark since the "obviously forceful role of Mao in the former and latter periods" and his "much lower profile" in the middle, which was "the most 'bureaucratic' phase of the Maoist era," and a time during which he had unparalleled political power, reveals the complexities that underwrote Mao's vision and development agenda. Frederick C. Teiwes, "'Rules of the Game' in Chinese Politics," *Problems of Communism* (September-December 1979). See also Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 219-220; and James Chieh Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 181-184.

³⁹ Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 113. The death of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) General Secretary Joseph Stalin on 5 March 1953 and the subsequent period of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union ushered in this era of harsh criticism from Communist China toward the "revisionist" direction that they believed Nikita Khrushchev was fostering in Moscow. As Lee notes, in a riposte to quiet his rivals such as Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen, Mao stated that a revolt equal in scope to the Hungarian one could not occur in China: "When there is a sore, things will be resolved when the pus breaks out. The Chinese Party, China's government, and the armed forces will not be toppled by these kids. If we allow students to topple us, then we would be good for nothing idiots." See Mao Zedong,

“Little Leap,” ended with mediocre harvest yields in 1955-1956, but the Party placed considerable investment in industry, thereby “creat[ing] new strains and bottlenecks calling for a more coordinated strategy.”⁴⁰ Amidst work stoppages in major centers and a growing need to acclimate Party cadres within the CCP to cooperate with citizens, another movement to rectify people’s thinking was difficult to avoid (despite opposition to Mao’s urging for it in 1956).⁴¹

In response, Mao gave a four-hour long speech on 27 February 1957 at the Eleventh Session of the Supreme State Conference titled “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People.” The speech addressed twelve topics that concerned “correct” socialist development. Mao asserted that, as opposed to the “antagonistic” contradictions between the CCP and its enemies, those between the leaders and their followers were “non-antagonistic” in nature. Contradictions, he believed, permeated regardless of China’s transition to socialism, but he stressed that even non-antagonistic ones between the government and the people, or between the leaders and the led, could transform into antagonistic contradictions if neglected or unresolved.⁴² Rather than adhere to his own colleagues’ wishes to limit the campaign to the CCP apparatus, however, Mao urged that it was “necessary to mobilize the CCP’s populist tradition”⁴³ through the encouragement of the people to voice their concerns so that the Party could serve the masses more effectively.

Chairman Mao intended Hundred Flowers Movement, which took its name from the saying 百花齊放，百家爭鳴 (Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend, *bǎihuāqífàng, bǎijiāzhēngmíng*), to promote the progress of the arts and sciences in the development of a genuine socialist culture while calling on critics to voice their opinions freely.

“Summary Address for the Conference of Provincial, Municipal, and Autonomous Region Party Secretaries,” (27 January 1957) in *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, Volume II*. Michael YM Kau and John K Leung, eds., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1989), 290.

⁴⁰ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 185. The “Little Leap” aimed to develop handicraft industries alongside the centralization of larger industries, all the while stressing equity in work and pay amongst rural workers and women. Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 284; and Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 105-106 (on the Little Leap, equity, and rural work).

⁴¹ MacFarquhar, “The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao,” in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 9-10; and Perry, “Shanghai’s Strike Wave of 1957,” *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China*, 234-261.

⁴² Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” (21 February 1957) in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 131-190; and Wu Yiching, *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 31-32. James Hsiung argues that Mao’s “classification of all twelve topics under the rubric of the correct handling of contradictions suggest a propensity on his part to sublimate personality or policy differences by transforming them into ideological contradictions needing rectification, on the assumption that an ideological purification would resolve policy disputes.” Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 183.

⁴³ Wu, *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins*, 32.

⁴⁴ He drew from the philosophical basis of his thought as he formulated during the Yan'an years, namely the notion that contradictions are universal and the driving forces behind all change, in a dual effort to avoid a revolt and to garner more enthusiasm from intellectuals for China's development.⁴⁵ Mao described this effort in his "Contradictions" speech:

Letting a hundred flowers blossom, letting a hundred schools of thought contend, long-term coexistence—how did these slogans come to be put forward? It was in recognition of various different contradictions in society. In the arts and literature it is expressed in letting a hundred flowers bloom. This hundred flowers blooming includes this sort of thing, that is, various different kinds of flowers; but it also includes one kind of qualitatively different flower. For example, [we] say that among the hundred schools contending there is Idealism, [and among] the hundred blooming it is possible that, although Hu Feng sits in prison, his spirit still lives in the world, writing Hu Feng kinds of words. But one requires only that he refrain from destructive acts. What was Hu Feng all about? He organized a secret group; that's not good. So long as he does not run secret groups, you [Hu Feng types] can cultivate that little flower; [since] our China's area is so big, 9 million square kilometers, what's so serious about this little flower blooming? Cultivate that little flower for everybody to see, [and] people can also criticize flowers like his, saying [that] I don't like your flower. [We're] talking about weeds and fragrant flowers. Some are poisonous weeds. If you want only grain, want only barley, wheat, corn, rice, millet, and absolutely don't want any weeds, that's unachievable... To ban all weeds, not allowing their growth, is that possible? In reality, it is not; they will still grow, [and] you will still have to how [to get rid of them], and that's that.⁴⁶

Mao's progressive tone in the speech above notwithstanding, Hundred Flowers was an orchestrated campaign against the Party bureaucracy, and represented a "reversal [to] the problem of 'redness' versus 'expertness.'"⁴⁷ Non-Party circles including scientists and engineers had the freedom to express their ideas without interference (*in theory*) from the Party, but the events that followed were marked by the CCP's harsh repression of intellectuals and peasants, a feature that remained in effect until the fall 1957 third plenum and, later, the Great Leap Forward. Indeed, Mao issued a bold challenge, urging critics to "dare to write" not unlike the "genuine Marxist" Lu Xun.⁴⁸ However, dissenting opinion that intellectuals and workers directed towards

⁴⁴ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 183-184; and Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 112. Mao drew from China's period when Confucianism and Taoism "sprouted during a time of contention and debate," and from Yan'an Rectification.

⁴⁵ Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. (New York: Praeger, 1963), 84-98.

⁴⁶ Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," (27 February 1957), in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 164-165.

⁴⁷ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 150.

⁴⁸ Mao Zedong, "Summary of a Talk with the Representatives of Press and Publishing Circles," (10 March 1957), in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 257-258. Mao stated further: "As the saying goes, 'He who does not fear being cut to pieces dares to unhorse the emperor.' Lu Xun was a genuine Marxist, a thoroughgoing materialist. The genuine Marxist [and] thoroughgoing materialist fears nothing, so he can write. Nowadays some writers dare not

the CCP—whether critical of the Party’s *raison d’être* or *modus Vivendi*, the legality of its hold on state authority, cadre corruption, the treatment of peasants and workers, or the CCP’s handling of educational policy—ultimately brought about repression as of early June 1957.⁴⁹

Yet central to the legacy of Hundred Flowers was Chairman Mao’s continued stress on the need to recuperate counterrevolutionary agents, whose minds were in need of rectification in light of their incorrect thinking and rightist tendencies. Unlike the Cambodian Communists who, years later, stressed that there was “*No gain in keeping, no loss in weeding out*,”⁵⁰ Mao believed, much the same as he did during Yan’an Rectification, in recuperating the counterrevolutionary into an active participatory body in service to the Communist revolution.⁵¹ Millions of old-guard intellectuals and bourgeois, he urged, should work with the CCP.⁵² He elaborates further:

How to treat people who have made mistakes is an important question. The correct attitude is to allow people to join the revolution. If people have committed mistakes, we must adopt a policy of ‘punishing those who have erred in the past so as to provide a warning for the future, and *curing the disease to save the patient*,’ thus helping them to reform... People who have made mistakes we should first ‘observe’ and then ‘help.’ They should be given work and assistance. We should not gloat over them, refuse to help them, refuse them work. This is a sectarian way of doing things. The more people who join the revolution the better. Of those who have committed mistakes, a small minority cling to their mistakes and keep repeating them, but the majority can be reformed. *People*

write [owing to] two circumstances: One is that we have not created for them an environment in which they dare to write; they’re afraid of being punished. The other circumstance is that they themselves have not learned materialism thoroughly. [If they were] thoroughgoing materialists [then they’d] dare to write. In Lu Xun’s era, to be punished meant to be put in jail and beheaded; but Lu Xun was not afraid. [We] still have no experience as to how light essays should be written now. I think [we should] bring out Lu Xun [to let] the people study and learn from him.”

⁴⁹ MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. I*, 280. One explanation for why Mao shifted towards punishing vocal critics of Party policies was that his contemporaries within the CCP ranks did not share his apparent enthusiasm for inviting criticism from subordinates. He felt considerable pressure to “disavow his original intention and to concur in the anti-rightist campaign” when the Party was privy to the extent to which popular dissatisfaction with Party had grown.

⁵⁰ Henri Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar*. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2004), 210.

⁵¹ Mao once stated that “people may be wrongly executed. Once a head is chopped off, history shows it can’t be restored, nor can it grow again as chives do, after being cut. If you cut off a head by mistake, there is no way to rectify the mistake, even if you want to.” Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Great Relationships,” (25 April 1956) in *Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971*. Stuart Schram, ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 82-83; and Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships,” *Selected Works Vol. V.*, 299-300. The CPK, however, believed in a very different approach: “*You can arrest someone by mistake; never release him by mistake*”; and “*Better to kill an innocent by mistake than spare an enemy by mistake*.” Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 209.

⁵² Mao Zedong, “事情正在起變化, (Things Are Beginning to Change, *Shìqíng zhèngzài qǐ biànhuà*),” 毛澤東選集 第五卷 [Selected Works of Chairman Mao, Volume V], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe chuban, 1977), 425-427; and Mao Zedong, “Things Are Beginning to Change,” *Selected Works of Chairman Mao, Volume V*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 443.

who have had typhoid become immune to it afterwards. Similarly, people who have made mistakes... will, if they take care, make fewer mistakes in the future.⁵³

[W]e must further improve our relations with them so that we can enable them to give better service to the cause of socialism and so that we can further remould them and help them gradually become part of the working class, thus transforming them into the opposite of what they are today. Most of them are sure to reach this goal. Remoulding involves both unity and struggle, with struggle as the means to achieve unity, which is the end. Struggle is mutual; now is the time that many people are waging struggle against us. The criticisms made by most people are valid or essentially so, including the sharp criticisms by Professor Fu Ying of Peking University, which have not been published in the press. They are making their criticisms in the hope of improving their relations with us, so these criticisms are well-intentioned. *But the Rightists' criticisms are usually malicious, because they are antagonistic. Intentions, whether good or bad, are not a matter of guesswork, they can be perceived.* The current criticism and rectification movement has been launched by the Communist Party. As we expected and hoped, *poisonous weeds have been growing side by side with fragrant flowers and ghosts and monsters appearing together with the unicorn and phoenix.*⁵⁴

Open criticism without fear of harsh reprisal from the CCP was, however, the result of Mao's miscalculation. Despite what Party leaders were telling him, Mao believed until mid-May 1957 that the intellectuals would criticize bureaucratism, but not him and the idea of the CCP.⁵⁵ When critics ranging from intellectuals to low-level Party workers voiced particularly harsh criticisms, Mao's response was to label them as "rightists" and sentence them to 勞動教養 (re-education through labor, *láodòng jiàoyǎng*) in the countryside. In light of large work stoppages, most notably the massive strike wave in Shanghai in 1957 and increasing attacks against the Party, the CCP had to abort Hundred Flowers in the second week of June.⁵⁶

⁵³ Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Great Relationships," (25 April 1956) in *Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971*. Stuart Schram, ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 78-80; and Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships," *Selected Works Vol. V.*, 302. For more insight on the multiple origins of 十大關係 (ten major relationships, *shí dà guānxi*) see Stuart Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of Permanent Revolution, 1958-1969," *China Quarterly* 46 (1971): 221-244.

⁵⁴ Mao Zedong, "事情正在起變化, (Things Are Beginning to Change, *Shìqíng zhèngzài qǐ biànhuà*)," 毛澤東選集 第五卷 [Selected Works of Chairman Mao, Volume V], 426-427; and Mao Zedong, "Things Are Beginning to Change," *Selected Works, Volume V*, 443. Emphasis added.

⁵⁵ See, for instance, Mao Zedong, "Interjections at a Meeting During the Qingdao Conference," (17 July 1957) in *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, Volume II*. Kau and Leung, eds., 638; and Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 117.

⁵⁶ Schwartz, *Communism and China*, 173-174; and Wu, *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins*, 32-33. Wu notes that in an essay titled "Two Kinds of Wages," a staff member of the CCP Central Committee named Wang "criticized the privileges enjoyed by senior Party officials, pointing out that in addition to wage on paper [名義工資, *Míngyì gōngzī*] they also enjoyed various forms of real wage [實際工資, *Shíjì gōngzī*] or perks, such as private, villa-like residences, domestic servants and private chefs, private cars, and so on." Another critic, a Communist Youth

Despite the failure of the Hundred Flowers Movement, it stood as an important influential rectification program on the CPK movement. During the Party's clandestine struggle, cadres were active participants in Party-run political indoctrination and rectification to "correct" their errant lines of thinking.⁵⁷ The CPK leadership showed particular fervor for forcing intellectuals to confess their dissatisfaction with the Party, purging the higher strata in an Anti-Rightist Movement, and creating rules that limited freedoms of speech and association. However, self-criticism/criticism sessions to discuss problems never found fault with the rules of "អង្គការ" or "អង្គការបដិវត្តន៍" ("Organization" or "Revolutionary Organization," hereafter *Angkar*), but instead with the peasants.⁵⁸ The slogan "តើខ្ញុំប្រឆាំងប្រឆាំងខ្មែរ" (He who protests is an enemy; he who opposes is a corpse)⁵⁹ prompted a culture of "hypervigilance" among the people, who were under constant surveillance from 1975 to 1979.⁶⁰ In DK, the CPK referred to itself as possessing an omnipresent and omniscient nature (self-proclaimed: "អង្គការភ្នែកម្នាស់," meaning "The Angkar has [the many] eyes of the pineapple")⁶¹ fostered strict obedience to Party-designated behavioral and thinking norms throughout its reign. Any problem or mistake was the fault of the individual, and never on the collective or the *Angkar*. Pol Pot also appropriated Mao's famous "blank page" with emphasis on young would-be cadres in his slogans that stressed re-education: "clay is molded while it is soft"; "Only a newborn is free from stain"; and "Those, among our comrades, who are young, must make great efforts to re-educate themselves... you have to be, and remain, faithful to the revolution."⁶² The CPK also turned on its country's literati class, as intellectuals and Buddhist monks became targets of the regime. During the clandestine movement, Communists in provinces such as Stung Treng and Svey Reng, for instance, had contact with local Buddhist monks, who were, in a sense, the *literatus* of rural

League organizer, described the Leninist Party's role in the country as absent genuine socialist democracy, and holding all the power. For more on the strike wave of 1957, see Perry, "Shanghai's Strike Wave of 1957," *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China*, 234-261; and Richard King, "Romancing the Leap: Euphoria in the Moment before Disaster," *Eating Bitterness*, 53.

⁵⁷ Karl D. Jackson, "The Ideology of Total Revolution," *Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death*. Karl D. Jackson, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 77-78; and Daniel Bultmann, *Inside Cambodian Insurgency: A Sociological Perspective on Civil Wars and Conflict*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015), 125, 162.

⁵⁸ Becker, *When the War Was Over*, 156.

⁵⁹ Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book*, 204. Emphasis added by author.

⁶⁰ Bultmann, *Inside Cambodian Insurgency*, 98. Bultmann uses Peg Levine's concept of "hypervigilance" in reference to people figuring out the rules to follow in constant fear of reprisal. Peg Levine, *Love and Dread in Cambodia: Weddings, Births, and Ritual Harm Under the Khmer Rouge*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2010), 210.

⁶¹ Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book*, 112. Emphasis added by author.

⁶² *Ibid*, 143-144. See also Colin Flint and Scott Kirsch, *Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 60-62.

Cambodia. At first, many Buddhist monks welcomed “liberation”; in Kampong Speu, the Communists “were ‘very kind,’ and were liked by the monks because they claimed to be the ‘children of *samtec*’ (ie., Sihanouk loyalists),”⁶³ with one monk in Battambang, Tan Vong, recalling that he and his fellow monks received kind treatment and were called “father” by CPK cadres.⁶⁴ But as time progressed, the CPK began to crack down on monks rather harshly. The Party defrocked hundreds of monks before it took Phnom Penh, stripping hundreds of monks of their rank and title, replacing dissident monks with those few who complied with Party commands, and resorting to forcing monks to marry against their will, or even killing monks outright.⁶⁵ In fact, as former CPK cadre Mak Le recalled, the Pol Pot regime was responsible for killing “nearly all of the intellectuals... and the Buddhist monks were also killed.”⁶⁶ Though the CPK took the repression of intellectual critics to new and devastating extremes, it is beyond question that Communist China’s own rectification programs provided the inspirational wellspring for this particular policy.

As we shift back to China, since the Hundred Flowers Movement ended abruptly, Mao initiated the repressive Anti-Rightist Movement to rein in intellectual dissent, expanding targets to include urban intellectuals as well as “rural rightists” who opposed accelerated collectivization. The Chairman maintained that contradictions were pervasive in Chinese society, and since the contradiction between the Party and China’s intellectuals “had not been handled correctly,” it became “antagonistic and had resulted in a struggle that necessitated recourse to force.”⁶⁷ The purpose of this movement, Mao claimed, was “to put non-Marxist things and *poisonous weeds* in front of the comrades and the non-Party people so as to temper everyone. Otherwise they will only know Marxism and nothing else, and that [would not] be good. It is like a smallpox

⁶³ Ian Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age: Cambodian Monks Under Pol Pot*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), 64, quoting Ian Harris, “Interview with Srey Khmang at Wat Preah Put Nippean, Preah Nippean, Preah Nippean, Kong Pisey, Kampong Speu,” (21 May 2004), *Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DCCAM) Buddhism and Communism (BAC) Interviews*.

⁶⁴ Ian Harris, “Interview with Tan Vong at Wat So Phy, So Phy 1, Ratanak, Battambang, Battambang,” (4 September 2003). *DCCAM BAC*.

⁶⁵ Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age*, 65-66, 80-89.

⁶⁶ “An Interview with Mak Le,” Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCAM), Document Number D17995 (Collection Date 7 September 2000).

⁶⁷ Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 225. Mao declared in *People’s Daily* at the onset of the Anti-Rightist Campaign that the “hundred schools of thought” were in actuality only the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Lu Dingyi, “百花齊放，百家爭鳴” (Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend, *bǎihuāqífàng, bǎijiāzhēngmíng*) 人民日報 [People’s Daily] (13 June 1956), 3. See also Mao Zedong, “Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal, and Autonomous Region Party Committees,” *Selected Works Vol. V*, 359.

vaccination [that] causes struggle inside the human body and produces immunity.”⁶⁸ To accomplish this task, he appointed Deng Xiaoping to head the campaign,⁶⁹ and during its first phase it targeted “rural rightists” who levied criticism against the Party’s intensified land, livestock, and property collectivization programs.⁷⁰ The second phase of the Anti-Rightist Movement, though, served to alienate the Party from Chinese intellectuals even further, as the CCP sought to move forward after a major locus of intra-Party contestation at the 1959 July-August Lushan Conference.

Phase Two: The Lushan Conference, 1959

At this mountaintop resort in Lushan, and in the middle of the Anti-Rightist Movement, the CCP began its gradual shift towards the faith Maoism that underpinned the Cultural Revolution and inspired revolutionaries including Pol Pot.⁷¹ Much in line with his earlier cautionary leanings towards the Great Leap Forward’s initial excesses, Mao’s stance at the onset of the Lushan Conference was to pursue a moderate course of mechanizing agriculture and establishing a Ministry of Agricultural Machinery.⁷² Despite these proposals, however, the Lushan Conference spun out into an intense argument between Mao and his once trusted Defense

⁶⁸ Mao Zedong, “Summary Address for the Conference of Provincial, Municipal, and Autonomous Region Party Secretaries,” (27 January 1957) in *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, Volume II*. Michael YM Kau and John K Leung, eds. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1989), 281. Emphasis added. See also Mao Zedong, “Talk when Receiving Members of the Second Committee of the National Student Federation,” (March 1957), in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 203-204.

⁶⁹ Lee notes that Mao’s choice of Deng was an ironic twist given Deng’s post-Mao criticism of many of the Chairman’s policies. Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 117.

⁷⁰ Bo Yibo, 若干重大決策與事件的回顧 [Recollections of Certain Critical Decisions and Events, *Ruògān zhòngdà juécè yǔ shìjiàn de huígù*] Volume 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1993), 1000-1001; and King, “Romancing the Leap,” *Eating Bitterness*, 53. See also Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 193-194, citing “The Great Call,” *Hung-ch’I*, (1 September 1959), noting that *Current Background* No. 590 provides the English translation. Hsiung notes that the “main thrust” of the campaign was that those who the Party accused had committed the following crimes, for which they required re-education through labor: 1) disparaged the efforts of the people; 2) denied that the tasks of “revolutionary construction” were within the competence of the masses; 3) criticized the mass movements without participating in them; 4) discredited the achievements of the GL; 5) magnified its [the GLF’s] drawbacks; and 6) shirked responsibilities and tasks that were objectively possible. Communist writers such as novelist Wang Meng, journalist Liu Binyan, and Marxist feminist Ding Ling, as well as over half a million “rightists,” received lengthy punishments. Yet “[a]ll three were fully rehabilitated only after Mao’s death” and “virtually all rightists were later exonerated, many during the early 1960s. Only a few like Luo Longji and Zhang Bojun, supposedly co-conspirators, seem still to be considered guilty men, presumably to preserve a fig-leaf of justification for the Anti-Rightist Campaign, currently criticized for being excessive, but not as totally unnecessary.” MacFarquhar, “The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao,” in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 13n20.

⁷¹ Teiwes, “Mao and His Followers,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 138.

⁷² Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 218. Cheek notes that Mao’s suggestion among other, more moderate ones “came in the midst of Mao’s welter of Great Leap bravado.”

Minister Peng Dehuai.⁷³ A consortium of likeminded high-ranking CCP officials including Zhang Wentian, the General Secretary of the CCP between 1935 and 1943, encouraged Peng to voice his critique of the Great Leap to Mao. In Peng's letter, the former general questioned many of the Great Leap policies,⁷⁴ yet all indication was that the letter was not offside. But Peng made one comment that Mao "may not have fully understood what was going on in his home village, as it appeared that the people there had received far more state aid than Mao had realized."⁷⁵ The Chairman responded by circulating Peng's critique, titled 彭德懷意見書 (Peng Dehuai's Viewpoints, *Péng Déhuái Yìjiàn shū*), to all members who were present at Lushan.⁷⁶

By now it was clear that Mao took Peng's criticisms personally, and paired with Peng's characterization of Mao's ideology cult "as embodied in the 'politics in command' formula" in which Mao's Great Leap was "left deviationism,"⁷⁷ Mao was determined to ostracize vocal critics like Peng from the Party ranks. In Mao's later response, he accused Peng of brokering a clandestine agreement with Nikita Khrushchev during a trip throughout Soviet-allied countries in the spring of 1959 (Peng returned to Beijing on 12 June 1959). Mao alleged that Peng proposed the cancellation of an agreement under which Moscow would provide Beijing with nuclear aid instead of urging for closer military and economic ties between the two Communist nations.⁷⁸

⁷³ Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 104; Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 29, 33. Peng had supported Mao previously during the Fujian Incident of 1930-1931, the Zunyi Conference in early 1935, and throughout Mao's conflict with fellow CCP founder Zhang Guotao.

⁷⁴ Peng voiced his displeasure with Mao's decisions previously. He opposed Mao's proposal to cut military spending, which was Peng's lifeblood as a ranking general, and called for the *omission* of Mao Zedong Thought from the PRC constitution. However, his opposition to these directives did not lead to any reprisal or ostracism; rather, relations Mao and Peng remained cordial despite their disagreement.

⁷⁵ MacFarquhar, *The Politics of China*, 105.

⁷⁶ Peng Dehuai, 彭德懷意見書 [*Péng Déhuái Yìjiàn shū*] (Peng Dehuai Submission). (CPC References No. 7, South China Normal University Department of Political History of the CPC, Teaching and Research, 1978), 462-467.

⁷⁷ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 192. Peng states further: "politics in command... [was] no substitute for economic principles, still less for concrete measures in economic work. *Equal importance* must be attached to putting politics in command and to effective measures in economic work; neither can be neglected." See Peng's Letter as translated in *Current Background* No. 851, p. 24-26. Emphasis added by Hsiung; and Peng Dehuai, 彭德懷意見書, 462-467. MacFarquhar alleges that Mao may have "set up Peng once he had received [Peng's] letter, using his actions as an excuse to replace Peng with his own favorite, Lin Biao." MacFarquhar, *The Politics of China*, 105.

⁷⁸ MacFarquhar, *The Politics of China*, 104. Peng's purpose on this visit was to mend the ties between the Soviet Union and Communist China, but Mao opposed this, and Peng may have used this meeting with Khrushchev to voice his concerns about Mao's economic development plans and the cool relations between the USSR and PRC. At the 17-30 August 1958 Beidaihe Conference, which the CCP organized to denounce Stalinist bureaucratism (for its overemphasis on heavy industry production), Soviet methods of socialist transformation, among other "revisionist" precepts, the CCP committed China to Mao's Great Leap program. It was at Beidaihe that Mao and his supporters "finally took leave of reality," as Mao's grandiose vision of the Great Leap and the People's Communes set off "a party-wide euphoria [that] translated into an overnight attempt to transform the People's Republic into a communist

Mao branded Peng a “right opportunist” for his covert dealings, and for obtaining Soviet support in disparaging the People’s Communes.⁷⁹ Out of fear that other Central Committee members shared Peng’s stringent remarks, and wondering why Peng had not voiced his reservations earlier (as he did previously), Mao accused Peng of attacking him instead of providing rational advice on improving upon the Great Leap. He regarded Peng’s letter as “an attack out of the blue, and evidently with substantial support from some quarters.”⁸⁰ Whether Mao was in the right to launch this counteroffensive or not—MacFarquhar notes that Mao was right to be angry with Peng’s silence, and that Peng did target Mao’s person at times in his letter—the Chairman’s reaction was a significant departure from the norm within the CCP.⁸¹ Peng and his associate Zhang were dismissed from their posts and, in August of that year, forced to confess their “crimes” at the CCP’s Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee.

The purge of Peng Dehuai and Zhang Wentian showed in clear view that the consequences of making even the slightest questioning of Party policy and direction were dire indeed and in line with the precedent that Mao had established with the Hundred Flowers and the Anti-Rightist Movements for extra-Party critics. Peng Dehuai’s dismissal, arrest, and replacement as Defense Minister and leader of the Central Committee’s powerful Military Affairs Commission by Lin Biao, the champion of faith Maoism, served as the microcosm of a larger trend within the CCP (discussed in the chapter’s final subsection).⁸² As Mao’s chief lieutenant, Lin assumed command of the Central Committee’s Military Affairs Commission, and

utopia where egalitarianism would be combined with plenty.” MacFarquhar, “The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao,” in *Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 15-16. However, against Mao’s optimistic claim that the Communes “contain the sprouts of communism,” Mao’s response to the lacking preconditions for communalization was to say that “some things are difficult to anticipate; blindness is unavoidable.” Mao Zedong, “Talk at the Beidaihe Conference (Draft Transcript),” (30 August 1958), in *Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 420-421; Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: The Cold War in the Communist World*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 89-90; and Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 192-193. Such an admission reveals to some degree that the Leap was to grow out of less than fecund grounds in the Communes.

⁷⁹ “Right opportunism,” MacFarquhar states, “was the sin attributed to Bukharin and his colleagues at the CPSU’s 16th Congress in 1930.” MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., *Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 287n14; MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution* 2, 248; and Leonard Shapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1960), 388-389.

⁸⁰ MacFarquhar, *The Politics of China*, 106.

⁸¹ MacFarquhar notes that Mao’s reaction to Peng’s letter was “so contrary to normal practice that there may have been additional considerations at stake.” MacFarquhar, *The Politics of China*, 106.

⁸² Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 191-194. The latter, as Hsiung notes, “enabled Mao to maintain control of the PLA while his grip on the civilian Party was slipping.” See also Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 218-220.

his selection gave Mao control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA) at a time when he needed to solidify himself atop the CCP most.

As we have seen, the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist Movements, as well as the purge of Peng Dehuai, reflected Mao's efforts to *consolidate* Communist power in China against potentially subversive forces. Edgar Faure, a French politician and essayist, claimed that "One must be Chinese, and, without doubt, also a good Communist to understand them [the Hundred Flowers campaign and other movements in Communist China]. At least, one must have been in China, as I was able to be... to understand what one does not understand."⁸³ But one did not need to be Chinese to comprehend the motives behind these rectification efforts: control. Peng's dismissal lends further credence to this effort, as it stands as a hallmark example of the extent to which Mao punished critics, even those who were well-respected ranking CCP members. These programs also reveal changes in Mao's thinking; the harmonious unity between charismatic and rational-bureaucratic tendencies was beginning to become unglued. While these anti-intellectual campaigns had precedents in Mao's Yan'an thinking, the forces at play, both external and internal, gave them their harsh and totalistic character. The call for criticism was well intentioned and genuine, yet the subsequent repression of critics revealed that the CCP neither expected nor valued so much negative feedback. Mao took this personally, and responded to opposition to his implementation of certain policies with much more vitriol than he had done previously. His "vision of a benevolently-run Communist society" had now descended into an "assault on the luckless bourgeoisie and unwary Party ministers."⁸⁴ The break between managerial Maoism and charismatic Maoism was now well underway, awaiting only a major breaking point to separate the once inextricably tied tendencies into competing lines of rational-bureaucratic and faith variants. Criticism of the Great Leap's "single-step socialism" would finally shatter the Yan'an roundtable, thereby "unravel[ing] the political consensus that had held the Yan'an leadership together through its days in the wilderness and its first decade in power."⁸⁵

Economic Reconfiguration: The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1961

⁸³ Edgar Faure, *The Serpent and the Tortoise*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958), 63.

⁸⁴ MacFarquhar, "The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao," in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 13. As MacFarquhar notes, "All three were fully rehabilitated only after Mao's death" and "virtually all rightists were later exonerated, many during the early 1960s. Only a few like Luo Longji and Zhang Bojun, supposedly co-conspirators, seem still to be considered guilty men, presumably to preserve a fig-leaf of justification for the Anti-Rightist Campaign, currently criticized for being excessive, but not as totally unnecessary." On page 13n20.

⁸⁵ MacFarquhar, *The Politics of China*, 111.

不識廬山真面目 (to “not know the true face of Lushan mountain,” meaning figuratively “cannot see the forest for the trees,” *Bù shí Lúshān Zhēnmìàn mù*)

This section examines the *economic reconfiguration* phase of Mao’s implementation, which took the form of a “permanent revolution” in the economic and industrial sectors: the 1958-1960 Great Leap Forward.⁸⁶ Equally integral to understanding this phase of Mao Zedong Thought’s implementation, of course, is the continuing *transformation* that Mao Zedong Thought underwent during and after the Great Leap. As the section conveys, Mao’s program for rapid economic and industrial development marked the transition of Mao as a strong, attentive, careful, and rational leader who demonstrated considerable respect for the CCP’s economic specialists, to a much more close-minded autocrat.⁸⁷ As the charismatic leader of the Leninist organization, Mao was able to mobilize countless millions of peasants and workers into service to his ambitious development program. Yet the years following Mao’s expulsion of Peng Dehuai at Lushan were “a time of ideological confusion”; Mao had lost the trust of his contemporaries, yet policy decisions were Mao-centric, as CCP leaders sought the Supreme Leader’s endorsement instead of voicing opposition.⁸⁸ Indeed, the Great Leap’s continuation and the precedent set at Lushan,⁸⁹ together, broke the once unshakeable Yan’an Maoist line; the sensationalist supporters of Mao now competed for the Chairman’s favor against those more rational, or even critical, agents of the CCP, and this tendency featured prominently in Mao Zedong Thought as implemented thereafter. As the section endeavors to show, the Great Leap stood as the major turning point in the CCP’s internal ideological schism, and engendered the subsequent emergence of faith Maoism, or Mao Zedong Thought bifurcated from its once-joined charismatic (faith) and rational-bureaucratic strands.

At meetings in Hangzhou in January 1958, and in Nanning and Chengdu thereafter, Mao put forward his plan for rapid economic development. The success of the Party’s agricultural

⁸⁶ Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 228. Knight asserts that for Mao, the Leap “represented another of the ‘revolutions [that] constituted the permanent revolution. Through this campaign, Mao hoped to propel China from its state of underdevelopment to a state of modernization and industrial development in the space of a few short years.’”

⁸⁷ Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun argue this point as well. See Teiwes and Sun, *China’s Road to Disaster*, 81-82, 177.

⁸⁸ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 218.

⁸⁹ Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 134; and Dali L. Yang, *Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Industrial Change Since the Great Leap Famine*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 53. As Yang asserts, the “worst consequences of the Great Leap Famine... could have been avoided had the Lushan conference turned out as originally intended by Mao,” but the confrontation between Mao and Peng made the Leap “a result of contingency and all the more senseless and tragic.”

cooperativization gave him the impression that the “positive response of China’s peasantry to the call for the cooperativization of agriculture stood in marked contrast to the Soviet experience in which the peasants had to be coerced, often with great violence, into joining cooperatives.”⁹⁰ Such successes, he believed, could underpin a rash advance and afford him the necessary political capital he needed to launch his alternative program.⁹¹ Top leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping lauded Mao’s vision, and left the methods by which to achieve this level of development to his discretion.⁹² The reason behind their decision to offer feedback on Mao’s rash advance was, however, not so positive. The 1958 meetings “raised the issue to a question of political line, saw the architects of the opposition of rash advance—Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun—come under severe pressure... directed harsh criticism at the bureaucratic practices of the leading economic coordinating bodies, found provincial leaders exercising a crucial role, and demonstrates Mao’s truly awesome power.”⁹³ By the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in the early spring, a new and crucial stage of the Great Leap was indeed about to begin, one in which a significant shift in Mao’s thinking—from the cautionary approach that marked the Yan’an years to one that was more rash and emotional—came to the fore.

At the Session, the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958 to “catch up with Britain in about fifteen years.”⁹⁴ The Leap was characterized by autarky from the onset—a foundational feature of the Cambodian Communist movement⁹⁵—but it was far more than simply an isolated, self-dependent attempt to equal the British in industrial and agricultural

⁹⁰ Mao Zedong, “Preface” to *Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), 7-10.

⁹¹ Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 219-220.

⁹² Teiwes and Sun, “Mao and His Followers,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 139.

⁹³ Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward, 1955-1959*. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe: 1999), 18-19, 73, 81. The authors state that in 1956 Mao “was willing to listen to others, and he demonstrated considerable respect for the CCP’s economic specialists.” Thus the “personal timidity of top leaders seeking to avoid the ‘rightist’ label, the special dynamics of competition among individuals, organizations, and areas, the continuing radical role of provincial leaders, and the peculiar bureaucratic inversion whereby the previously supreme coordinating agencies were now forced to dance to the tunes of key spending ministries” allowed Mao to assert almost unquestioned power over policymaking.

⁹⁴ The collection of Chinese Posters by Stefan R. Landsberger and Warren Van der Heijden contains two posters that state “十五年後一定超過英國” (In fifteen years we will surpass England, 1958) and “為爭取在十年左右的時間內在主要業產品產量方面趕上英國而奮勇前進” (To catch up with England in the output of industrial products in ten years we bravely forge ahead, 1959). See Stefan R. Landsberger and Warren Van der Heijden, *Chinese Posters: The IISH-Landsberger Collections*. (Munich: Prestel, 2009), 83, 99.

⁹⁵ On the Khmer Communist stress on autarky, see Khieu Samphan, “L’économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d’industrialisation,” (PhD Dissertation, Paris: Université Paris, Sorbonne, 1959), 7-51, 100.

output. Indeed, the Great Leap was equal parts a drive to increase industrial and agricultural production and an intensified effort on Mao's behalf to subvert bureaucracy and elitism, and it signaled the Supreme Leader's greatest effort to date to distance himself from the Soviet model of economic development. To accomplish a clean break, Mao ordered the Party to attack middle administrators, national bureaucrats and other professionals, and to send cadres to spearhead work units among the masses. Policy relevant actors broadened, incorporating previously peripheral lower-level organs, and the state set production quotas that were unrealistic bordering on outright implausible. All of these efforts were Mao's attempt to "join top and bottom directly; leaders and masses were to be in intimate relationship, bypassing the professionals who earlier stood between them."⁹⁶ Mao's command of the economy was therefore very hands-on, and voicing dissenting opinion against his orchestration was futile.⁹⁷ Whether a success or a failure of catastrophic proportions, the Leap rested squarely on the shoulders of Mao, who was its principal architect and its most enthusiastic proponent.

Why did Mao think that the Great Leap could live up to its lofty ambitions, especially in contravention to the conventional Marxist theory that developments in the forces of production caused radical changes in class relations of production and superstructure?⁹⁸ Mao's "distinctive understanding and deployment of the categories of the political economy of Marxism," scholars argue, underpinned his program for hastened economic advance.⁹⁹ As the Great Leap neared the completion of its first year, however, Mao's frenzied approach to accelerated development, which urged workers to endure "three years of suffering leading to a thousand years of happiness,"¹⁰⁰ began to take on a more cautious tenor. Despite his reduced, supervisory role, Mao took a genuine interest in economic questions¹⁰¹ and stressed caution, stating in a May 1958 speech that the Leap "should not be pushed too urgently. The students of red and expert schools

⁹⁶ Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization*, 71.

⁹⁷ Teiwes and Sun, *China's Road to Disaster*, 107, 177-178, 200.

⁹⁸ Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 227.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*; Steven Reglar, "Mao Zedong as a Marxist Political Economist," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 17, Issue 2 (July 1987):208-233; and Richard Levy, "Mao, Marx, Political Economy and the Chinese Revolution: Good Questions, Poor Answers," *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*, Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, eds. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997), 154-183.

¹⁰⁰ Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization...*, 71.

¹⁰¹ Teiwes and Sun, *China's Road to Disaster*, 177.

dozed off in class. This won't do at all... We must not push too hard."¹⁰² The early years of the Leap thus contained economic policymaking that was rational, and Mao's and his lieutenants' leadership was proactive and polemical.

On the growing number of drought and work related deaths, too, Mao expressed genuine concern about the speed at which the Leap was progressing. In his infamous meeting at the Jinjiang Hotel in 1959, for instance, Mao exclaimed that "all going hungry and starving to death is worse than having one half die and one half eat its fill... we need to concentrate limited resources and personnel, shorten the front line, and accomplish the tasks one by one."¹⁰³ His response was to enact policies in late 1958 at meetings in Zhengzhou, Hunan, and Wuchang (Hebei) that confronted the various problems that were caused by the Great Leap and its torrid pace. He admitted that the Leap's accelerated nature was detrimental rather than favorable, and permitted a measure of freedom for peasants to maintain possession of their homes and other belongings since they constituted private property, which he expressed in the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee speech "Resolution on Several Problems of People's Communes."¹⁰⁴

Mao's initial cautioned approach notwithstanding, the Great Leap shook the nation and Party at its very foundation. Beyond countless millions of deaths to starvation and overwork, the Leap failed to reach its unrealistic quotas in both the industrial and agricultural spheres of production. The People's Communes initiative, which was the unification of previously separate production brigades, did not generate the kind of production yields that Mao and the Party had envisioned. The Great Leap was indeed riddled with problems, from top to bottom. Backyard furnaces only produced pig iron of considerably poor quality, and in the feverish race to meet unrealistic production quotas for steel, much of the pig iron that the people churned out was useless. Open competition from local leaders led people to compete to be more productive and

¹⁰² Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Conference of Heads of Delegations to the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress," (18 May 1958) [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_11.htm] (Accessed 11 April 2015).

¹⁰³ Mao Zedong, "CCP Meeting at Jinjiang Hotel," (Shanghai, 25 March 1959). Joseph Ball translation. Document from CCP Archive in Gansu.[<http://www.maoists.org/jinjianghotel.htm>] (Accessed 12 April 2015).

¹⁰⁴ Yang, *Calamity and Reform in China*, 43-44; and Dali L. Yang, "Surviving the Great Leap Famine: The Struggle over Rural Policy, 1958-1962," *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China*, 263-265.

more revolutionary.¹⁰⁵ The Great Leap also established a “tournament system” in which “under a high degree of political control local governments competed against each other by setting high targets and by mobilizing social and economic resources fully” with the ultimate goal of achieving “high performance indicators of political loyalty.”¹⁰⁶ Although the intent of this system was to increase production yields through healthy competition, cadres and local leaders lied about outputs to get closer to Mao in general and to gain favor from local cadres in particular. The result of this malpractice was a lot of misinformation about production, and a persistent trend of sending inflated numbers to the Party, which played a major part in masking the catastrophe that the Leap had caused in the countryside.¹⁰⁷

While several factors led to the Leap’s failure, as the principal advocate Mao had to fall on his sword. Mao was not alone in taking the blame for the Leap’s failure, but his CCP leaders “were accessories to all that, but accessories after the fact”¹⁰⁸ since Mao had abandoned his Yan’an rationality. Kenneth Jowitt’s concept of the Leninist organization is crucial to understand just how important Mao’s departure from his earlier Yan’an reasoning was to the resonating power of his thought. In light of the Leap’s massive strain, Mao disregarded entirely the harmonious “enmeshment of class and status” in the “charismatic impersonal Party,”¹⁰⁹ leaving behind his own balanced approach to development in attempting single step socialism.¹¹⁰ His attempt to outdo England and the Soviet Union in production came at the expense of ameliorating China’s agricultural output after the Little Leap, and he ostracized his critics within the CCP ranks instead of engaging their concerns with rational dialogue. Thus the legacy of the Great Leap was that while Mao may have pushed for greater attention on objective conditions, it

¹⁰⁵ Zhou Feizhou, “錦標賽體制 (The Tournament system, *Jīnbīāosài tǐzhì*),” *Shehuixue yanjiu* (21 January 2009) [<http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=7137>]. (Accessed 21 April 2015).

¹⁰⁶ Zhou, *ibid*.

¹⁰⁷ Yang, “Surviving the Great Leap Famine,” *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China*, 262. the Leap, Yang states, “shook people’s faith in the the newfangled people’s communes” and forced the CCP hierarchy to “adopt remedial policy measures” to insure the survival of both peasants and cadres.

¹⁰⁸ Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 33; and Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 218.

¹⁰⁹ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 16; and Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 11. Cheek explores bureaucratic Maoism and its effects in the decade after Yan’an Rectification (before the Great Leap) on 155-157.

¹¹⁰ Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” (15 January 1940), *Mao’s Road to Power, Volume VII: New Democracy, 1939-1941*. Schram, ed., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1990), 333-338; Mao Zedong, “新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhǔyì lùn*), 毛澤東集第七卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume VII], Takeuchi, ed., 151-159; Mao Zedong, “新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhǔyì lùn*), 毛澤東選集第二卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume II, *Máo Zédōng xuǎnjí, dì èrjuàn*], 626-633; and Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” in *Selected Works, Vol. II*, 342-347.

was his relentless pursuit for unmatched economic and industrial progress that underwrote claims of success in all fields. The CCP's June Resolution may cast Mao's responsibility for the Great Leap and its aftermath as merely "primus inter pares," but there is little doubt that *sans* Mao no Great Leap, People's Communes, or mass steel output campaign, or revival of the Leap program would have occurred.¹¹¹ Yet despite its shortcomings and catastrophic consequences, the Great Leap had reverberations far removed from China, and decades after its initiation. In Democratic Kampuchea, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), then referring to itself only as the *Angkar*, implemented under the leadership of Maoist-disciple Pol Pot a phase of *economic reconfiguration* that drew exclusively from the wellspring of Mao's Great Leap. Its aim, according to Pol Pot's writings, was to transform Democratic Kampuchea rapidly into a state free from foreign intervention and entirely dependent on its own resources. The Cambodian Communists' "Super" Great Leap Forward, however, sought to go much further than Mao had gone, and as the sixth chapter shows, deviated significantly in the realms of industrial development.¹¹²

To summarize, the Great Leap symbolized Mao's shift from Yan'an rationality by dint of his attempt to bypass stages of socialist development and ignore agricultural needs. The forces that made Yan'an Maoism so appealing during the first rectification campaign was its mix of charismatic and rational-bureaucratic tendencies. But in the Leap's wake, Yan'an Maoism had broken into conflictual and competing Maoist lines, with the charismatic faith variant growing progressively more dominant in Mao's gaze. Many of the CCP's ranking officials held feelings of "confusing ambivalence,"¹¹³ as Cheek puts it, and the unstable combination of bureaucratic and charismatic forms of Mao Zedong Thought came apart in the crisis of the Leap. Gone were the days of more rational approaches and analyses, encouraging even-handed debate (even if empty), and more respectful criticism. Since he had lost the proverbial "mandate of heaven" for his inability to nourish the people, which led to countless millions of casualties, and his

¹¹¹ MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, 2, 333; and Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 218.

¹¹² James Tyner, *Genocide and the Geographical Imagination: Life and Death in Germany, China, and Cambodia*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 116; and David Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 245. Its objectives, much like the Chinese Great Leap was "to serve the people's livelihood and to raise the people's standard of living quickly, both in terms of supplies and in terms of other material goods." "The Party's Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields," *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 51.

¹¹³ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 218.

legitimacy as CCP Supreme Leader was now up for intense debate, Mao turned to much more autocratic methods to justify his position.¹¹⁴ The Leap's catastrophic consequences paired with the unease shared by many CCP functionaries over his unceremonious dismissal of respected Yan'an mainstays Peng Dehuai and Zhang Wentian to shatter the once united Yan'an roundtable.¹¹⁵ Now was a time during which only revolutionary fervor, bellicose speeches that lauded Mao, grandiose promises of utopian glory, and limitless potential for China and its populace was acceptable. The contentious aftermath of the Great Leap and Lushan, taken together, ultimately "set the stage for the final split of the Yan'an leadership: the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."¹¹⁶

Social Transformation: The SEM and Rise of Faith Maoism, 1960-1965

毛澤東的常勝思想萬歲! (Long live the ever-victorious Mao Zedong Thought, *Máo Zédōng de Chángshèng Sīxiǎng Wànsuì!*).

The retrenchment period that began at the July 1960 Beidaihe meeting signaled the end of the perilous Great Leap Forward and, between spring 1961 and January 1962, the CCP shifted away from criticism of it. Mao remained at the center of Party politics, yet some Party officials now believed the Supreme Leader could not be trusted with major policy decisions.¹¹⁷ Others, however, heralded Mao despite his failures (or "victories" as they saw it), holding his counsel as *verbum legis*. Policy debate among high-ranking CCP officials and Party leaders thus resembled a "dysfunctional family of an alcoholic stepfather (drunk with supreme power) in which siblings vie for fickle affections of the patriarch, divine his erratic desires, avoid his capricious wrath, and

¹¹⁴ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 191-199. This culminated in Mao's 1960 "retirement" from his post as State Chairman of the People's Republic in 1959, although he did remain Chairman of the CCP, and marked Liu Shaoqi's emergence as the new CCP President in April 1959.

¹¹⁵ MacFarquhar, *The Politics of China*, 111.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, 111.

¹¹⁷ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 218-219. The divisive nature of Party politics is particularly evident in the varied responses among Party members to Mao's *Selected Works Volume 4*, which was published in the fall of 1960. *Volume 4* contained some of Mao's most infamous Yan'an essays, which he wrote during the 第三次國內革命戰爭 (Third Revolutionary Civil War, *Dì sān cì guónèi gémìng zhànzhēng*) and reify the central importance of upholding Party discipline while also criticizing what Mao terms as "the wrong ultra-Left policy" of 1931-1934. Mao Zedong, "The Present Situation and our Tasks," *Selected Works Vol. IV.*, 164. Discussions about the unfair dismissal of Peng Dehuai at Lushan, too, revealed that at least some major ranking officials questioned Mao's earlier decision-making. Years later the late 1965, as Mao's former doctor Li Zhisui asserts, many officials compared the ousted Peng to Hai Rui, who was a character from the satirical historical play *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office*. Hai Rui was apparently a "Ming dynasty official purged by the emperor for his sound advice and wise criticism"—an official who, Li contends, Mao held in particularly high regard. See Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao*. (New York: Random House, 1994), 391.

survive by blaming others.”¹¹⁸ Indeed, in this context, two conflictual strains of Mao Zedong Thought emerged from the ashes of the once united Yan’an Maoism: the faith Maoism variant propounded most famously by Defence Minister Lin Biao, and bureaucratic Maoism that Mao’s more rational Party critics held.¹¹⁹

The break occurred against the backdrop of the CCP’s Socialist Education Movement (SEM, 1963-1966),¹²⁰ which, in its effort to rectify the thinking of millions of Chinese peasants, represents the third phase of Mao Zedong Thought’s implementation—*social transmogrification*. This section examines this latest of Mao’s rectification campaigns while also tracing the final stages of the *transformation* into the ideology that Pol Pot was exposed to in his 1965 visit (in the SEM’s last year) as a Vietnamese ally seeking approval of his Cambodia program for revolution.¹²¹ The 11 January-7 February 1962 七千人大會 (7,000 Cadre Conference, *Qīqiān rén dàhuì*), a watershed in the split of Yan’an Maoism and in Mao’s “loss of confidence” in Liu Shaoqi, underscores the post-Leap break that evolved into competing Maoist camps.¹²² The SEM, meanwhile, was unlike the earlier Yan’an Rectification, which was underpinned by the resonant Yan’an Maoism that engendered in its participants an “*élan, an esprit de corps, a sense of heroic mission.*”¹²³ By contrast, the SEM was underpinned by a “Maoism divided”; the CCP’s effort to mass-rectify throughout the rural communes occurred against the backdrop of the Party’s internal division as the CCP moved to cement faith Maoism as the foundation of the nation’s revolutionary *animus*. In the SEM’s failure, as will be shown, the harmonious balance of managerial and charismatic/faith strands of the Leninist Party and Yan’an Maoism that had been shattered by the Leap were now fervently oppositional.

¹¹⁸ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 219. Cheek notes that others such as Li Funchan, who served as chair of the State Planning Commission, channeled Mao’s earlier suggestions to present a more rational economic policy: in early 1960 Mao “stressed technical innovation and technical revolution, and Mao had been periodically endorsing the mechanization of agriculture since 1958, including a suggestion for a Ministry of Agricultural Machinery made at the 1959 Lushan Plenum.”

¹¹⁹ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 219.

¹²⁰ For a detailed look at the operational aspects of the SEM, see Richard Baum, “Revolution and Reaction on in the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 38 (April-June 1969): 92-119.

¹²¹ Philip Short argues that Pol Pot’s visit did not coincide with the Cultural Revolution, as many scholars have argued (see chapter three), but instead with the precluding SEM. Philip Short, *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*. (New York: John Murray, 2004), 159. On his visit, see Chapter Three.

¹²² Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965*. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1993), xxxix, xli. See also Liu Shaoqi, *Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch’i, 1958-1967*. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), 360-361, 375 Cf; and Gao Wenqian, *Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary*. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 94-97.

¹²³ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 13.

Before the SEM, though, the Party convened at the 30 January 7,000 Cadre Conference to address the eroding economic situation in China after the Great Leap. Here, Mao issued a statement in which he claimed that “Any mistakes the Centre has made ought to be my direct responsibility, and I have also an indirect share in the blame because I am the Chairman of the Central Committee.”¹²⁴ This “self-criticism” is indicative of Mao’s retrenchment era shift,¹²⁵ and subsequently, four voices—President Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen (Mayor of Beijing), Defense Minister Lin Biao, and Premier Zhou Enlai—shared their opinions of the Great Leap with some taking a firm stand with or against Mao. Liu, who represented the rational/managerial Maoism that had formed part of Yan’an Maoism, opened with an official government report that forewarned the attendees of the PRC’s dire situation.¹²⁶ He voiced specific criticism in his “new formulations,” which he put forward despite the fact that Mao knew only the “gist” of the presentation.¹²⁷ Liu abstained from confronting Mao directly about his Great Leap errors, but he did comment on Mao’s phrase of “nine fingers to one,” arguing that such a formula “glossed over mistakes because it diminished the severity of the situation that the country was facing.”¹²⁸ Rather, Liu suggested, the situation was “seven to three” since it was not purely a disaster of Mao’s or the Party’s doing, but instead a combination of flawed development programs and natural disasters. Mao ultimately received Liu’s speech without an outburst equal in degree to his lashing of Peng Dehuai at Lushan, although Mao “began to harbor unspoken resentment” of Liu, and he would recall Liu’s “rightist deviation” at the 7,000 Cadre Meeting when explicating his loss of confidence at the onset of the Cultural Revolution.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, 210; and Li Gucheng, *A Glossary of Political Terms of the People’s Republic of China*. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995), 351.

¹²⁵ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao’s China*, 228.

¹²⁶ Xun Zhou, *The Great Famine in China: A Documentary History*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).

¹²⁷ Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, xli. Teiwes does not believe that Liu intended to agitate Mao explicitly at the meeting. Lorenz Lüthi describes Liu’s opening report as “ambivalent on Mao’s personal responsibility, stating only that ‘although the Central Committee formulated correct policies, it did not check on them strictly or take effective measures to ensure their implementation.’” Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, 210, quoting Liu Shaoqi, “Report to Working Conference of the CPC,” *Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch’i*. (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1952), 333. Liu refrained from discussing intra-Party democracy in the initial draft, but after Mao’s urging he included it in the form of de-centering Mao and blaming regional leaders and local cadres for Leap’s effects. Anthony Pecotich, Frederick C. Teiwes, and Clifford J. Schultz, *Politics at Mao’s Court: Gao Gang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s*. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1990), 315n90; and Jin Chunming, 建國後三十三年[Thirty Years after the Founding of the Country, *Jiànguó hòu sānshísān nián*]. (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1987), 144. Jin notes that Liu also rejected the rehabilitation of Peng Dehuai on the charge that Peng had formed an anti-Party clique or “military club.”

¹²⁸ Gao, *Zhou Enlai*, 93-94.

¹²⁹ Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, xli.

The second speaker, Mayor Peng Zhen, took to criticizing the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Chairman himself for the failures of the Great Leap. Liu Shaoqi's top official, Peng was nowhere near as tactful or careful with his selection of words. Rather than walk on eggshells as Liu had done, Peng directed his impassioned speech at what he believed was the source of the Great Leap's failure: Mao Zedong. He charged that Mao was "personally responsible for 'blowing the Communist wind' in 1958 and promoting the rural canteens that, by allowing peasants to eat freely, had proved so calamitous to the grain situation."¹³⁰ Only by admitting his errors in front of the cadres who were present, Peng alleged, could China move forward from the Great Leap disaster. Peng thus stood out as the most vocal critic of Mao, and as a result it was made apparent that Mao could not simply repel criticism in the way that he had done with Peng Dehuai a few years earlier.¹³¹ Yet any headway Peng had gained with his bold stance on Mao's responsibility was undone by the presentation of Lin Biao, who made a predictably bellicose speech in which he "expressed far reaching praise of the Chairman."¹³²

Lin's pronouncement, in particular, reflected considerable flair and approbation for Mao and his contributions to China as Chairman. Lin famously approached Mao Zedong Thought much like a fundamentalist, which ran counter to Party doctrine as laid out in 1956 and, later, would reflect the quintessence of faith Maoism wherein the Party's charismatic power was linked inextricably to Mao the person and Mao Zedong Thought.¹³³ Lin "praised the Chairman with

¹³⁰ Gao, *Zhou Enlai*, 95.

¹³¹ Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 143. Peng Zhen was, however, the first major figure to be purged during the Cultural Revolution.

¹³² Teiwes and Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao*, 196.

¹³³ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 219-220. For more on Lin Biao, see Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1996). Lin contended that the "atom bomb of the spirit" is greater than a material one. Alexander C. Cook, "The Spiritual Atom Bomb and its Global Fallout," *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*. Alexander C. Cook, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1-19. As Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong stressed in their writings, Lin, too, stressed the primacy of human will over other metrics, and so much so that it took on a tone of religious fanaticism. Lin's approach to Maoism held that "politics is everything and correct politics stem from a nearly literal, and certainly ahistorical, reading of Mao's utterances." He launched a 1964 campaign to "distill Maoist thought into the *Little Red Book*, a selection of quotations that later became the bible of the Red Guards." Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 153-154. As Cheek notes, Lin's Maoism "is weak on method, that is, on how precisely to apply Mao to building a Model Army, and strong on faith. Lin's four key relationships of political work—between men and weapons, political and other work, ideological and other aspects of political work, and ideas from books and living ideas—offer less a method than a way of pandering to Mao's current hobby-horses." Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 219. Mao's infallibility as "our great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander, and great helmsman"—was a slogan that Lin popularized during the Cultural Revolution—was unquestionable in Lin's view. Lin Biao, "Comrade Lin Biao's Speech at the Celebration Rally," (1 October 1966) [<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1967/11/06.htm>] (Accessed 27 April 2015).

unembarrassed effusiveness in a song of adulation that completely bypassed the dire aspects of the economy.”¹³⁴ Lin lauded Mao’s thought as the guiding light that, if left alone and without interference from competing or dissenting views, would surely usher in an era of successful work. Years later, Lin echoed the same Mao centrism:

All our achievements and successes have been scored under the wise leadership of Chairman Mao and represent the victory of Mao Zedong’s thought. We must use Mao Zedong’s thought to unify the thinking of the whole Party and the thinking of the people of the whole country. We must hold high the great red banner of Mao Zedong’s thought and further unfold the mass movement for the creative study and application of Chairman Mao’s thought throughout the country. We must turn the whole country into a great school of Mao Zedong’s thought. We must build our great motherland into a still more powerful and prosperous country. This is the demand of the Chinese people as well as the hope placed in us by the people of all countries.¹³⁵

Lin’s opinion, at the 7,000 Cadre Conference and in his infamous “Long Live the Victory of People’s War” speech, was that Mao was an infallible theoretical genius, and his thought was canonical. Shortcomings were therefore a result of disrespect shown to Mao and his thought, while failures were a result of the meddling of others. Mao, according to Gao, called Lin’s pronouncement at the 7,000 Cadre meeting a “wonderful and heavy piece of oratory,” and recommended that it be disseminated among cadres for inspirational purposes.¹³⁶

Zhou Enlai was the last to speak, and while he limited his focus to economic matters, the CCP Premier made it explicit that he shared in the responsibility for the Great Leap’s negative economic effects on China. Zhou was well aware of the growing gap between Mao and President Liu Shaoqi, so he marshaled his speech into a call for greater harmony among the high-ranking CCP officials. He also invoked the famous quote “實事求是” (to seek truth from facts, *Shíshìqiúshì*) in an effort to refocus everyone’s attention on the daunting task presently at hand: China’s economic recovery and the means by which to achieve it. Zhou’s speech was nothing particularly substantive, but it served a dual purpose of offering a *modus operandi* for how the Party ought to proceed going forward, emphasizing simultaneously the need for unity within the Party in general, and between Mao and Liu in particular.¹³⁷ While the 7,000 Cadre meeting concluded without the same type of cataclysm that had occurred at the Lushan Conference in

¹³⁴ Gao, *Zhou Enlai*, 95.

¹³⁵ Lin Biao, “Comrade Lin Biao’s Speech.”

¹³⁶ Gao, *Zhou Enlai*, 95.

¹³⁷ Li, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao*, 389.

1959, it was clear that lines had been drawn in the sand. Mao would continue to distance himself from Liu while surprisingly Peng Zhen did not come under fire from the Maoists for another few years, and after the Cultural Revolution was underway. The legacy of the meeting is therefore that the pro-Maoist faction of faith Maoists, led by Lin Biao, was growing into a very influential and *en vogue* faction in the CCP. Lin's group of officials who held Mao in unrelenting high regard ultimately inspired much of the Cultural Revolution's sensationalism and iconoclasm by the mid 1960s. Lin's adulatory pronouncement at the 7,000 Cadre Conference is therefore a representative microcosm of Lin's faith Maoism taking considerable hold among ranking officials within the CCP, Mao chief among them, and the discordant opinions expressed at the meeting reflect the origins of the Cultural Revolution.¹³⁸

As for Mao's latest rectification campaign, the Socialist Education Movement (SEM), after the end of the Great Leap Forward Mao advocated fervently to his CCP cohorts that the Party should broaden the Anti-Rightist Movement to attack property owners and rich middle peasants, who represented the major exploitative forces of capitalism in the countryside.¹³⁹ He made an "impassioned plea" at the September 1962 Central Committee of the CCP's Tenth Plenum to "Never Forget Class Struggle!," after which the CCP initiated the SEM to wage class struggle and reform productive and administrative units in the rural communes.¹⁴⁰ Mao conceived the SEM to be a permanent revolution that he could use to win back popular favor after he had damaged his reputation with the Great Leap's failure. Peasant enthusiasm to the ever-corrupt rural cadres' arguments, however, led to considerable debate within the CCP on

¹³⁸ Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Bruce J. Dickson, *A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China: 1949-1986*. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1989), 126; and Gao, *Zhou Enlai*, 96.

¹³⁹ Huang Daoxia, 中華人民共和國四十年大史記: 1949-1989 [Great Forty Year History of the People's Republic of China: 1949-1989, *Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó sìshí nián dà shǐjì: 1949-1989*]. (Beijing: Guangming Ribao, 1990), 109-110; Zhongong Zhongyang dangxiao dangshi jiaoyanshi, ed., 中國共產黨歷史大史記 [Chronology of the Chinese Communist Party, *Zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng lìshǐ dà shǐjì*]. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989), 231; Richard Baum, meanwhile, identifies three systemic problems that called for rectification: 1) rural cadre and peasant neglect of the negative political impact of the CCP's more open policies on private agricultural plot cultivation and the operation of rural free markets; 2) the pervasiveness of corruption of and extortion of peasants by basic-level rural cadres, and the covert use of surplus grain from "state purchasing agencies" and the "misappropriation of collective funds, grain and properties" for private means (the so-called "four unclean"); and 3) the disheartening of rural cadres and peasants after the "three hard years" of 1959-61. Baum, "Revolution and Reaction on in the Chinese Countryside," 93.

¹⁴⁰ Baum, "Revolution and Reaction on in the Chinese Countryside," 93; Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 50.

how to best approach fixing this problem.¹⁴¹ Prior to the SEM's launch, Liu's policy of rationalization and stress on organization in preference to ideology had significant Party backing. But the policy on private plots, free markets, small private enterprises, and production quotas ("three freedoms and one guarantee") had established a rich-peasant economy that caused Mao to become concerned about how private ownership and independent entrepreneurship had resurfaced as obstacles in the Party's path. A rich peasant economy stood in contravention to the Party's preferred collective economy, and at the occlusion rather than inclusion of the lower peasant strata.¹⁴² Mao and Liu thus had competing ideas on the manner in which to approach cadre corruption in the countryside, and three major resolutions—the "Former Ten Points," "Later Ten Points," and "Revised Ten Points"¹⁴³—caused considerable contention within CCP policy-making and leadership on the means by which to implement the SEM.¹⁴⁴

The SEM began with the May 1963 "First Ten Points," or "Former Ten Points" and 四清 (Four Cleans, *sì qīng*), which established a revolutionary class army to investigate how local cadres handled supplies, balanced accounts, allocated work points, and maintained warehouses and granaries.¹⁴⁵ The SEM was initially a composite of three interrelated campaigns: 1) a

¹⁴¹ Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 9; and Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 57. Dittmer notes that Mao intended the SEM to require "five to ten generations" in its effort to stamp out "bourgeois tendencies."

¹⁴² Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 200-201. "Old bourgeois elements, landlords and rich peasants," Mao urged, had resurrected and revived "usury, speculation, profiteering, and exploitation of the hired labor they had recruited" from the lower classes.

¹⁴³ Roderick MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Volume III: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 339-348. Mao clearly did not approve of some of Liu's economic policies as President, especially those that had given rise to vestiges of capitalism in the countryside. This disagreement fostered a very contentious atmosphere.

¹⁴⁴ As Hsiung describes, policy differences broadly identified with Mao and Liu that emerged in the post-1958 era "set in motion a smoldering political struggle with ideological overtones." Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 200. Even though the SEM ostracized Liu further, he originally characterized the movement as "a great revolution, more profound, more complex, and more arduous" than previous CCP programs. Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei bangongting geming zaofandui, ed., 劉少奇在各地修正主義言論彙編 [Compilation of Liu Shaoqi's Revisionist Utterances Spread in Various Localities, *Liúshāoqí zài gèdì xiūzhèng zhǔyì yánlùn huìbiān*] (Shanghai, 1967), 210-211.

¹⁴⁵ Huang, 中華人民共和國四十年大史記, 109-110; Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao dangshi jiaoyanshi, ed., 中國共產黨歷史大史記, 231; Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 144; Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 50, 57; and Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic of China, Third Edition*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 274-275. As Maurice Meisner states, the First Ten Points was an "eminently Maoist document," with a stress on returning to socialist principles in China's rural areas through expanding education. See also "Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Some Problems in Cultural Work," as translated in Richard Baum and Frederick Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968), 58-59; and Dongping Han, "Impact of the Cultural Revolution on Rural Education and Economic Development," *Modern China* 27, No. 1 (January

broadened educational campaign directed at the broad non-Party rural masses; 2) the urban 五反 (five antis, *wǔ fǎn*) campaign against bourgeois elements; and 3) the 四清 (four cleanups, *sì qīng*) campaign against rural Party cadres.¹⁴⁶ However, the CCP's "Later Ten Points" (September 1963) by General Secretary Deng Xiaoping,¹⁴⁷ and the "Revised Ten Points" by Liu Shaoqi one year later, were attempts to remedy the situation by acknowledging that Mao's suggestions had merit while simultaneously curbing the movement's radicalism and scope via centralization.¹⁴⁸ The "Revised Later Ten Points," meanwhile, emphasized the "sending of a work team from the higher level,"¹⁴⁹ forcing teams to spend half-years rebuilding rural administrations from the ground up, and dismissed Mao's earlier leniency towards corrupt rural cadres, especially rich and middle peasants, treating peasant complaints of any nature with investigation or reprisal. The rectification campaign had, by this point, rendered nugatory any effort to disseminate Mao's concerns about revisionism, and turned eye instead toward regulating the rural Party apparatus.¹⁵⁰

2001): 59-90. See also Robert Weatherley, *Politics in China Since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule*. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 62.

¹⁴⁶ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 201; Baum, "Revolution and Reaction on in the Chinese Countryside," 92-94; and Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 464. Wu Yiching describes the SEM as a program to "remold the nation in the revolutionary spirit" of Maoism by sending down intellectuals to the countryside for re-education under peasant instruction. Wu, *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins*, 252-253n31. See also Richard Baum, *Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962-66*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). Martin King Whyte, meanwhile, states that in Ma Kan-pu's experiences during the three-anti campaign, "no special study groups were formed... the main emphasis was simply on reinvigorating class sentiments. Workers and peasants were invited to go to Ma's unit to tell bitter stories about their pre-1949 suffering, and cadres within the unit with similar pasts... also spoke of early hardships." Martin King Whyte, *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), 73-74.

¹⁴⁷ Meisner, *Mao's China and After*, 275. MacFarquhar states that all major Party leaders except Zhou Enlai assisted in drafting the "Later Ten Points," but Chinese sources vary in to whom they ascribe responsibility. See MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution* 3, 606, 56. For instance, Cong Jin states that Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi drafted the resolution. See Cong Jin, 曲折發展的歲月 [Years of Tortuous Development, *Qūzhé fāzhǎn de suì yuè*]. (Henan: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 531. Meanwhile, Bo Yibo and Richard Baum give credit to Peng Zhen. See Bo Yibo, 若干重大決策, Vol. 2 [A Review of Certain Major Policies and Events, Vol. 2, *Ruògān zhòngdà juécè*]. (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao chubanshe, 1993), 1112; and Richard Baum, *Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962-66*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 43. Richard Weatherley, by contrast, mentions all three as responsible. See Weatherley, *Politics in China Since 1949*, 62.

¹⁴⁸ Meisner, *Mao's China and After*, 275-276; and Weatherley, *Politics in China Since 1949*, 62. The Party took primacy in this draft, and those "higher organs" took over the initiative to rectify errant cadres and then to educate the rural masses.

¹⁴⁹ "Some Concrete Policy Formulations of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the Rural Socialist Education Movement," as translated in Baum and Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch'ing*, 105. Liu endorsed the "Later Ten Points," but its sluggish pace and ineptitude led him to the 1964 draft of the "Revised Later Ten Points."

¹⁵⁰ MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Volume III*, Ch. 15. Mao "ruled out physical punishment for crimes and prescribed education to deal with cadres who had strayed from the virtuous socialist path." Liu expelled thousands of local cadres, and Mao intervened to halt the purges. Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 144-145.

The ensuing January 1965 “Twenty-three Articles” (or “Twenty-three Points”) shifted the SEM to attacking corruption among the higher echelons of CCP leadership. Class enemies took on a more broad definition as Mao describes in the following passage:

The key point of this movement is to rectify those people in positions of authority within the Party who take the capitalist road, and progressively to consolidate the socialist battlefield in the urban and rural areas. Of those Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road, some are out in the open and some are at the higher levels... Among those at higher levels, there are some people in the commune districts, *hsien*, special districts, and even in the work of provincial and CC [Central Committee] departments, who oppose socialism.¹⁵¹

In so doing, Mao moved the “four cleanups” to the realms of politics, ideology, organization, and economics within the Party proper.¹⁵² His move also widened the gulf between those loyal to and uncritical of his line, and the managerial types like Liu Shaoqi, with Mao using the Twenty-three points to lambaste Liu’s “Revised” points for his errors. Among the criticisms, Chairman Mao noted that Liu had suppressed the Chinese masses and turned the Party into a class of a new type through “a process of alienation and *embourgeoisement*.”¹⁵³ While a decision to purge Liu from

¹⁵¹ “Appendix F: the Twenty-Three Articles,” in Baum and Teiwes, *Ssu-ch’ing*, 120. Mao declared in the Twenty Three Articles that: “[W]here leadership authority has been taken over by alien class enemies or by degenerate elements who have shed their skin and changed their [class] nature, authority must be seized, first by struggle and then by removing these elements from their positions... [T]hese elements can be fired from their posts on the spot, their Party membership cards taken away, and they may even, if need be, be forcibly detained... In places where authority must be seized, or under conditions where the people’s militia organization is critically impure, we should adopt the method of turning over the weapons and ammunition of the people’s militia to reliable elements among the poor and middle-class peasants.” “A Summary of the Discussions of the National Work Conference Convened by the Politburo of the Central Committee, January 14, 1965,” *The People’s Republic of China, Volume 2: 1957-1965, The Great Leap Forward and its Aftermath*. Harold C. Hinton ed., (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1980), 989-992.

¹⁵² “Chinese Communist Party Central Document No. 65, 026,” as translated in Baum and Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch’ing*, 120; Dali Yang, “Surviving the Great Leap Famine,” *New Perspectives on State Socialism in China*, 288; Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch’i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 50; Marc Blecher, *China Against the Tides: Restructuring through Revolution, Radicalism, and Reform*. (London: Continuum, 2003), 71; Wu, *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins*, 252-253n31; Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 212; and Wen Shaoxian, *Withered Flowers*. (Hong Kong: Everflow, 2011), 103-104. See also “Extracts from the Directive of 14 January 1965 on the Socialist Education Movement in the Countryside (Twenty-Three Point Directive),” (15 January 1965), in Baum and Teiwes, *Ssu-ch’ing*, 118-126; and Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, 323-325. Lee states that Mao “pinpointed the goal of the movement as the need to ‘rectify those people in positions of authority within the Party who take the capitalist road.’” While the “Twenty-three Articles” do not state so explicitly, Mao expressed to Edgar Snow that it was at this time that he was “determined to remove Liu Shaoqi from the Party leadership” since Liu had “opposed Mao’s inclusion of the phrase attacking ‘those people in positions of authority within the Party who take the capitalist road’ at the January 1965 work conference where the ‘Twenty-three Points’ were debated.” and Lee, *Mao: A Reinterpretation*, 143-145.

¹⁵³ Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch’i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 50, 57, 241. Quote from page 241. As Dittmer notes, Liu recognized that the main threat to socialism was “the restoration of capitalism,” but he failed to locate

the Party ranks was not yet finalized by Mao and his loyalist troupe, the stage was set for Liu's removal the following year, though few could have predicted the type of radicalism, sensationalism, and outright tumult of what was to follow.¹⁵⁴ In the end, the SEM was yet another failure for Mao, one that required the decade-long and turbulent Cultural Revolution to rectify.

Part of the SEM's legacy, despite its outright failure, was its characterization of the radical climate in Beijing by the time of Pol Pot's December 1965 visit. The rise of Lin Biao in general, and Lin's infamous "Long Live the Victory of People's War" in particular, brought to the Cambodian revolutionary the "justification to all of his arguments that had fallen on deaf ears in Vietnam."¹⁵⁵ Managerial Maoism had clearly taken the backseat to the charismatic faith variant that characterized Lin Biao's zealotry, and it was this ideology, as the following chapter shows, sold Pol Pot that the Cambodian revolution ought to follow this path to claim state power.

As the chapter has shown, the processes/sequences of implementation converged as a response to the overarching challenge of modernization. Mao had invested considerable thought and energy into breaking from the Soviet model of socialist development, and he believed that *consolidating*, *reconfiguring*, and *transforming* aspects of Chinese society could achieve it. The Party's rectification efforts to garner intellectual feedback from the people, though well-intended initially, turned into an anti-intellectual suppression effort that consolidated the Party and Party loyalists as the type of help that the Party sought. The Great Leap Forward's catastrophic human cost and small dividends paid mirrored the much more successful Soviet Five-Year Plans, although the Leap encountered numerous problems that served to undermine its success. The post-Leap retrenchment period, meanwhile, caused Mao to be "lessened," yet he remained beyond the shadow of a doubt the "father of the revolution" since, as Cheek states, "[t]o reject Mao, to 'kill' the father, [was] to kill something inside themselves."¹⁵⁶ The 7,000 Cadre Conference was a microcosm of this larger trend that was occurring in the CCP while the SEM placed a dual emphasis on mass mobilization against anti-corruption and political struggle (to the

"revisionist tendencies" within the CCP leadership, assuming that the principal issue was "the *embourgeoisement* of certain sectors of the peasantry and the corruption of local cadres." On 58.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 63-64. See pages 220-230 for Dittmer's analysis of accusations levied against Liu.

¹⁵⁵ Short, *Pol Pot*, 156.

¹⁵⁶ Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China*, 266.

point of encouraging outright social upheaval), revealing itself as an important dress rehearsal for the Cultural Revolution.

The Cultural Revolution put faith *Maoism* into practice. Mao and his devotees branded Liu Shaoqi as a “revisionist” and purged him from the CCP ranks, while countless others, both within the CCP and without, shared similar fates or worse. The “shrill assertions of faith Maoism as the only Maoism in 1966,” as Cheek opines, “completed the dissolution of the ‘symbolic capital’ of Yan’an Maoism,”¹⁵⁷ and ushered in an era during which faith Maoism was Maoism *ut totem*. In the sensationalist, adulatory idiom of Mao supporters such as Lin Biao, faith Maoism stood as a corrective, or alternative; Maoism was now to be the entire world’s revolutionary thought, and the CCP used the Cultural Revolution as a launching pad for the export of this variant of Maoism as a now-universal, Third World ideological system.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, in reference to Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic*, xi, 263-293.

Chapter Three—Revolution Exported: Mao’s Global Revolution

對偉大顆毛澤東主席心懷一個“忠”字。對偉大顆毛澤東思想狠抓“用”字。(In regard to the great teacher Chairman Mao, cherish the words “loyalty.” In regard to the great “Mao Zedong Thought,” stress vigorously the word “usefulness,” 1967)¹

Lee Kwan Yew: 必须停止革命输出 (Stop exporting the revolution)

Deng Xiaoping: 你要我怎么做? (How do you want me to do this?)

Lee: 停止马共和印度尼西亚共在华南的电台广播, 停止对游击队的支持 (Stop broadcasting to the Communists in southern Indonesia and Malaysia altogether and stop support for the guerrillas).²— Meeting between Singaporean leader Lee Kwan Yew and Chinese Chairman Deng Xiaoping about China’s support of Communist movements in Southeast Asia, October 1978

The 1966-1976 decade of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was, and remains so today, arguably the most catastrophic political event to have ever occurred in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It ushered in a decade during which Mao Zedong’s adherents, the faith Maoists, raised him to the position of an omniscient figure, and held his precepts as infallible, unquestionable wisdom.³ The Lin Biao-led faith Maoists were by the Cultural Revolution’s onset the most influential group within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), manifesting their fundamentalist, effervescent zeal in the “Thought of Mao Zedong.” Senior officials channeled urban youth frustration through documents and speeches that emphasized the revolutionary importance of Mao’s vision,⁴ and endorsed the ransacking of “bad-class” households and “bourgeois” possessions, attacking the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits), laying assaults on perceived bourgeois lifestyles and elitism, and the staging of public humiliations of “bad-class” residents.⁵ Party propaganda posters encouraged people to 以毛澤東思

¹ Stefan R. Landsberger and Warren Van der Heijden, *Chinese Posters: The IISH-Landsberger Collections*. (Munich: Prestel, 2009), 149. *Duì wěidà kē Máo Zédōng zhǔxí xīnhuái yīgè “zhōng” zì. Duì wěidà kē Máo Zédōng sīxiǎng hěn zhuā “yòng” zì.*

² “剪不断理还乱 李光耀的中国情结 (Lee Kuan Yew’s China Complex, *Jiǎn bùduàn lǐ hái luàn lǐguāngyào de zhōngguó qíngjié*),” (22 March 2015). [http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/indepth/2015/03/150322_liguangyao_china#share-tools] (Accessed 19 May 2015).

³ Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao’s Last Revolution*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 3-11; and Wu Yiching, *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), xv-xvii, 64-65. For antecedent causes, see Lynn T. White, *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China’s Cultural Revolution*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

⁴ Nick Knight, *Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong’s Thought*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 11-12, 261-262.

⁵ Anita Chan, *Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation*. (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1985), 11-18, 124-133.

想為武器，批判舊世界，建設新世界 (Criticize the old world; build a new world with Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon).⁶ The successful politicization of the Red Guards, meanwhile, created a young army of zealots willing to proselytize their peers in the name of Chairman Mao and carry out the Cultural Revolution's millenarian mission.⁷

But in the maelstrom of Mao-centric iconoclasm on the domestic front, China's foreign policy took on a global character, making a quantum leap from active participation in the Communist and nonaligned world movements to outright leadership. Indeed, Mao theorized about and sought to establish a model based on China's experience at this time that could serve as a guidepost for other countries to follow.⁸ This chapter argues that in the years following the Sino-Soviet Split (1960) Mao and the CCP sought actively to export, or *transmit*, the Chinese revolution to the world.⁹ The Chinese leader seized upon this shift in its relations with the Soviets to set an ideological example for others to follow—a red evangelism, so to speak—that stressed the worldwide suitability of China's revolutionary historical experience as a proletarian Party-led, rural, protracted movement that had applied the foreign theory of Marxism-Leninism to concrete realities in China.¹⁰ The chapter's subsections focus on three specific dimensions of the *transmission* stage of traveling theory: 1) *export*, which consisted of the CCP's international diplomacy, welcoming foreign revolutionaries, most notably Saloth Sar (Pol Pot, his *nom de*

⁶ Landsberger and Van der Heijden, *Chinese Posters*, 138. *Yi Mao Zedong sīxiǎng wèi wùqì, pīpàn jiù shìjiè, jiànshè xīn shìjiè*.

⁷ Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun, *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 2-6, 120-131, 144-146, 163-171, 187-194; and Wu *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins*, 104-105, 132, 138-139.

⁸ Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), 212. Former Chinese ambassador to Cambodia Kang Maozhao regards this period in Chinese diplomacy as considerably harmful: "The Cultural Revolution wrecked all the great achievements in diplomatic relations. Our party and government had gone through 17 years of hard work in diplomacy... [but] China took 'the thoughts of Mao Zedong' as the sole basis of foreign relations... Our diplomatic strategy was increasingly curtailed, our friends became fewer and fewer, and China's international standing and image were greatly harmed." Kang Maozhao, 外交回憶錄, [Diplomatic Memoirs, *Waijiao huiyilu*]. Kang Maozhao, Kang Xizhong, Liu Shaohua, and Chen Benhong, eds. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 175-176.

⁹ Cheng Yinghong, "向世界輸出革命：文革在亞非拉的影響初探 [Exporting the Revolution to the World: A Preliminary Study on the Influence of the Cultural Revolution on the Regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Xiàng shìjiè shūchū géming: Wéngé zài yà fēi lā de yǐngxiǎng chūtàn]," in 毛主義與世界命[Maoist Revolution: China and the World in the Twentieth Century, *Máo zhūyì yǔ shìjiè mìng*]. Chen Yinghong, ed. (Hong Kong: Tianyuanshuwu, 2009). See also Julia Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and the International Image-Building in the People's Republic, 1949-1976," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (2015): 135-158.

¹⁰ James Chieh Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 158; John Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 117; and Alexander C. Cook, "Third World Maoism," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, Timothy Cheek, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 289.

guerre, short for *Politique Potentielle*), to visit China, and its mass translation and dissemination of *Quotations of Chairman Mao*; 2) the *content* of a “Maoist” program, consisting of several pillars of Mao Zedong Thought, such as people’s war, New Democracy, and applying Marxism-Leninism to concrete national realities; and 3) the *conditions* in target countries, such as shared semi-colonial, semi-feudal statuses, and the intended revolutionary intellectual *audience* of exported Maoism. All three ultimately tell the story of the third stage of traveling theory: the conditions of *reception* and, later, the subset problem of *adaptation*.

The process/condition of ideological export fits neatly with the second stage of Edward Said’s traveling theory (*transmission*), which is a helpful lens to look at the material covered in this chapter since Maoism, due to a host of historical circumstances surfaced in Southeast Asia.¹¹ The failure of the Soviet brand of salvation to ameliorate conditions in the colonial and semi-colonial worlds, and China’s lower stage of development, culminated in China’s emergence as leader of a Third World revolution with Mao Zedong Thought, or “Maoism” as we refer to it outside of a Chinese context, as its shining beacon. As Mao believed, the “correct” 思想 (ideology, *sīxiǎng*), when “applied to the international scene,” was the determining factor in a revolution’s success.¹² In a sense, then, “Maoism” emerged as a “liberation theology,” a response to the cycle of dependency that was grounded in concrete realities of the developing world (specifically in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia), where it arose as a practical alternative that could be marshaled into localized variants and used to reverse the trend of capitalist exploitation.¹³

Importantly, the CCP leadership did not pressure or force the *reception* and *adaptation* of Maoism in foreign countries. Mao’s China certainly pursued an ideologically charged foreign policy under the CCP’s aegis, but the goal was never to direct foreign revolutions from Beijing.¹⁴

¹¹ Edward W. Said, “Traveling Theory,” in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 230.

¹² Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 162-163; and “A Chinese Appeal for Third World Support,” (February 1965), *The People’s Republic of China 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey. Volume 2, 1957-1965: The Great Leap Forward and Its Aftermath*. Harold C. Hinton, ed. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980), 1027-1048.

¹³ Maoism’s strong moral overtones, aim to fight poverty at the source, emphases on practical application, resistance against oppression, and use of a “holy scripture” on which to ground itself within the confines of a universal paradigm, mirrors similar trends in liberation theology. Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation*. (London: SCM Press, 1974); and Gustavo Gutierrez, *The Power of the Poor in History*. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983).

¹⁴ Sophie Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 64; and Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 176. On larger trends in Sino-Cambodian relations at this time, see Kang Maozhao, 外交回憶錄, 177-226; Zhang Xizhen, 西哈努克家族 [Sihanouk’s Family, *Xīhānùkè jiāzú*]. (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenpian chubanshe, 1996); and Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu waijiao

Rather, in a manner reminiscent of the concentric circles of traditional Chinese 天下 (land under heaven/the world/China, *Tiānxià*) in which the emperor's 德 (virtuousness/morality, *dé*) transforms outside peoples into civilized people adopting Chinese ways, the “center of world revolution” never meant the “center from which orders are issued.”¹⁵ The “actual lighting of the prairie fire” was ultimately “left to the local single sparks themselves.”¹⁶ The exchange was *dialectical*; radicals in the developing world had considerable agency in their receptions and adaptations of Maoism, shaping and reshaping their imports in accordance with local situations and requirements. As this chapter shows, Mao Zedong Thought and the Chinese revolution were powerful sources of inspiration and ideological leadership since they offered a revolutionary roadmap to the world's marginalized peoples that, if followed, could direct them to state power.

“Red Evangelism”: Exporting China's Revolution

Students today don't get it. How futilely they seize upon words and letters for their understanding! They transcribe some dead old guy's words in a big notebook, wrap it up in three or five layers of cloth and don't let anyone else see it. They refer to it as the ‘profound meanings,’ and guard it with their lives. What blunderous blind idiots they are! What sort of juice do they expect from dried up old bones?¹⁷— Chan Buddhist Master Linji Yixuan (臨濟義玄, *Línjì Yìxuán*), Tang Dynasty

所有受到美国侵略、控制、干涉和欺负的国家要联合起来，结成最广泛的统一战线，反对美帝国主义的侵略政策和战争政策，保卫世界和平[All countries that are subject to US aggression should form the broadest possible united front to oppose the US imperialist policies of aggression and war and to safeguard world peace].—Mao Zedong, 13 January 1964 Statement in 人民日報 [*People's Daily*]¹⁸

In his 1965 “Long Live the Victory of People's War!” pamphlet, Lin Biao claimed that it was not the physical atom bomb that had the most power and was the most useful, but instead a

shipian, 中國外交概覽 [Overview of Chinese Diplomacy, *Zhōngguó Wàijiāo Gàilǎn*]. (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1987-2002, 1987).

¹⁵ Anna Louise Strong, *Letter from China* [Beijing], No. 56, (22 February 1968), 4. My thanks to Dr. Timothy Cheek for the comparison of Mao's Third World outreach to 天下 and 德.

¹⁶ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 159. On this balance, see Liu Shaoqi, 國際主義與民族主義 [*Internationalism and Nationalism, Guójiè zhūyì yǔ mínzú zhūyì*]. Beijing: Jiefangshe, 1949). Liu's statement, “Internationalism and Nationalism,” was included, along with the speech of Kao Kang and others, in a small volume under the same title, which became required reading for all CCP members.

¹⁷ Albert Welter, *The Linji lu and the Creation of Chan Orthodoxy: The Development of Chan's Records of Sayings Literature*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 158.

¹⁸ “毛泽东主席对人民日报记者发表谈话中国人民坚决支持巴拿马人民的爱国正义斗争 (Chairman Mao Zedong issues a statement to People's Daily: The Patriotic Chinese People Firmly Support the Just Struggle of the Panamanian People, *Máo Zédōng zhǔxí duì rénmin rìbào jìzhě fābiāo tánhuà zhōngguó rénmin jiānjué zhīchí bānámǎ rénmin de àiguó zhèngyì dòuzhēng*),” 人民日報 [*People's Daily*] (13 January 1964), 1.

“spiritual atom bomb.”¹⁹ Not more than a year later, Mao’s designated heir referenced the “spiritual atom bomb” metaphor again, but this time channeling Friedrich Engels’ argument that all technologies “are extensions of this hand-brain dyad, designed to carry out human purposes.”²⁰ Lin’s point in both instances was that Maoism, if “received and understood by the masses,” could provide a significant source of strength and “a spiritual atom bomb of infinite power,”²¹ which, if wielded by *other* countries as well as by Communist China, could smash American imperialism once and for all.²² The notion of thought as a weapon that humans must grasp to unleash its power certainly became a popular propaganda slogan—以毛澤東思想為武器，批判舊世界，建設新世界 (Criticize the old world and build a new world with Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon),²³ but how did the CCP “weaponize” Maoism? How did it make it accessible to the world’s revolutionary peoples?

This section argues that much like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) exported the *Avtomat Kalashnikova 1947* (or AK47, the famous automatic rifle) to support revolutionary struggles militarily, the CCP *exported* Maoism as a weapon to fight the enemies of socialism.²⁴ The CCP’s battle plan—its seizure of a leading role the Communist and nonaligned Movements—emerged at the 29-nation April 1955 Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia, a watershed moment in the maturation of the non-aligned and Afro-Asian movements. Its recruits and generals, meanwhile, were revolutionaries such as Pol Pot who visited Beijing and met leaders such as Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai, among other prominent CCP

¹⁹ Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!” (3 September 1965)

[https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/] (Accessed 7 May 2015).

²⁰ Frederick Engels, “The Part Played by Labor in the Transformation of Ape to Man,” (1876), [www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour/index.htm] (Accessed 7 May 2015), as cited in Alexander C. Cook, “Introduction: The Spiritual Atom Bomb and its Global Fallout,” *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History*. Alexander C. Cook, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 8.

²¹ Lin Biao, Foreword to the Second Chinese Edition of *Quotations from Mao Zedong* (16 December 1966). Full text of the official English translation is available at www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1966/12/16.htm (Accessed 7 May 2015), and quoted in Cook, “Introduction: The Spiritual Atom Bomb and its Global Fallout,” *Mao’s Little Red Book*, 1.

²² John W. Garver, *China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 196-197.

²³ Propaganda Poster Group (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin meishu chubanshe, 1966)

[<http://www.iisg.nl/rebels/en/content/57-little-red-book>] (Accessed 26 May 2015). *Yi Mao Zedong sixiang wei wuqi, pipan jiu shijie, jianshe xin shijie*

²⁴ Philip Killicoat, “Weaponomics: The Global Market for Assault Rifles,” *Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper*, No. 10 (April 2007): 1-23, on page 3. Killicoat references a Small Arms Survey from 2004 that states “[o]f the estimated 500 million firearms worldwide, approximately 100 million belong to the Kalashnikov family, three-quarters of which are AK-47s.” See *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

officials. Its weapon took the form of a portable and comprehensive booklet that contained Mao's most famous sayings: 毛主席語錄 (Quotations from Chairman Mao, *Máo zhǔxí yǔlù*), or more famously, the Little Red Book. This section thus details the CCP's three major efforts of Third World outreach, each of which corresponds to foreign policy shifts in Beijing: 1) China's Bandung-style effort in 1955, famously the "Spirit of Bandung," which, although directed by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (official PRC foreign policy guidelines until 1965), represents the PRC's first effort at Third World outreach; 2) the revolutionary approach, which entailed welcoming foreign revolutionaries and world leaders on official state visits; and 3) the radical-ideological approach, which emerged during the Cultural Revolution years (1966-1975) and involved the mass translation and dissemination of *Quotations of Chairman Mao*, that "Little Red Book," as a hallmark of its export of Maoism.

The Bandung Spirit—The 1955 Afro-Asian Conference

To combat imperialism of any type, there must be a significant alteration to the global status quo. Lenin once stated that "[t]he content of imperialist politics is 'world domination' and the continuation of these politics is imperialist war."²⁵ Mao was certain of Communist China's ideology and international role by the PRC's founding in 1949, but he neither discussed reaching out to the developing world to combat imperialism during the Yan'an years, nor did it feature prominently in Chinese foreign policy at that time.²⁶ Beyond Liu Shaoqi's declaration of "the universal value of Chinese revolutionary experience and its application to peoples from other colonies and semi-colonies,"²⁷ Mao iterated firmly that China's allegiance was strictly to the Soviet Union in foreign policy matters. Yet Chinese foreign policy shifted towards increasing its

²⁵ VI Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism and 'Imperialist Economism,'" *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin, Vol. 23, August 1916-March 1917*. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 35, quoted in Editorial Department of *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), *Chairman Mao's Theory of The Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 65.

²⁶ On the early years of CCP foreign policy, see Niu Jun, *From Yan'an to the World: The Origin and Development of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*. Steven I. Levine, trans, ed. (Norwalk, CT: Eastbridge, 2005).

²⁷ Niu Jun, "重建中间地带—中国亚洲政策的缘起(1949-1955年)" (The Reconstruction of the "Intermediate Zone": The Origins of China's Asia Policy, 1949-1955, *Chóngjiàn Zhōngjiān Dìdài--Zhōngguó Yàzhōu Zhèngcè de Yuánqǐ*), 國際政治研究 (季刊) 年第2期, [International Politics 2 (Quarterly), PRC] (2012): 61-80, on pages 69-70; Liu Shaoqi, "關於東亞民族革命運動策略問題給斯大林的報告 [East Asian Strategic Issues of National Revolutionary Movement Report to Stalin, *Guānyú dōngyà mínzú géming yùndòng cèlüè wèntí gěi sīdàlín de bàogào*]," (14 August 1949), CCP Literature Research Center, Central Archives series, (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, 2005), 51. Liu made this declaration at the November 1949 Asian and Australian Union Conference in Beijing, while Mao discussed a "prudent view on China's 'Asian' role" at the CCP Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. Wu Xiuquan, 我的歷程 [My Historical Journey, *Wǒ de lìchéng*]. (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1984), 61.

prestige outside its borders by the mid-1950s.²⁸ After an inwardly focused first stage (1949-1952) of uniting China and consolidating rule, and with the outbreak of the Korean War and India's growing interest in some, but not all, of Sino-Soviet ideas, Beijing sought to forge new ties with fellow Communist countries and nationalist revolutionaries throughout Asia.²⁹ In fact, in a secret agreement between Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin and CCP Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi on the "division of labor" for waging world revolution,³⁰ both decided that "while the Soviet Union would remain the center of international proletarian revolution, China's primary duty would be the promotion of the 'Eastern revolution.'"³⁰

The CCP outreach efforts to foreign Communist and nationalist leaders in Asia underscored the PRC's approach to the 26 April-20 June 1954 Geneva conference, where the Chinese delegation, which championed Stalin's policy of "peaceful coexistence,"³¹ showed its desire for international prestige by supporting the Viet Minh.³² Thereafter, the CCP proclaimed "sweeping support for revolution,"³³ promoting the Chinese experience of people's war under the helmsmanship of the proletariat as a guidepost for struggles throughout the colonial and semi-colonial world. A major motivating factor was the American counter-effort, which was based at the US Consulate in Hong Kong and was directed overseas through the United States Information Service (USIS, later United States Information Agency, or USIA) and various front

²⁸ Since 1922, Moscow had endeavored to assert Soviet authority over the interpretation of Marxist organization and ideology across the globe. Its long prevailing "two camps" strategy in which the world's dominant forces were the imperialist US-led camp and the socialist Soviet-led camp influenced the PRC's own approach during its early years (1949-1953). Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, 118.

²⁹ Niu, "重建中间地带," 67.

³⁰ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 6; Yang Kuisong, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and Nationalism: A Contradiction" Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, *The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations* (June 2005): 1-12.

³¹ "赴阿聯道經加爾各答施亞努王子指出：亞非應緊密團結，希望中印兩國循和平途徑解決邊界問題 (On Visit to United Arab Emirates via Calcutta: Urges Afro-Asian Solidarity in Hopes that China and India Will Resolve Their boundary Dispute through peaceful means, *Fù ā lián dào jīng jiā'ěrgèdá shī yà nǚ wángzǐ zhǐchū: Yà fēi yīng jǐnmì tuánjié, xīwàng zhōng yìn liǎng guó xún hépíng tújìng jiějué biānjiè wèntí*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (7 November 1959); and Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, 49, 119.

³² Chen Jian, "China and the Bandung Conference: Changing Perceptions and Representations," in *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the Asian-African Conference for the International Order*. Tan See Seng and Amitav Acharya, eds. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 132-135; Qiang Zhai, "中東 '特殊关系' 的形成 (1954-1965), (The Formation of the 'Special Relationship' between China and Cambodia, 1954-1965, *Zhōng jiǎn tèshū guānxì de xíngchéng*)," 南洋問題研究 [Southeast Asian Affairs], No. 1 (2013): 1-17 (especially on pages 1-3).

³³ AM Halperin, "The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model," *The China Quarterly*, No. 7 (July-September 1961): 1-16; and Robin DG Kelley and Betsey Esch, "Black Like Mao: Red China and the Black Revolution," *Souls* (Fall 1999):5-41, on page 4.

organizations that relied on schools, magazines, pamphlets, movies, and other forms of cultural production to safeguard American interests in the region.³⁴

Overseas Chinese communities across Southeast Asia, too, complicated CCP efforts to export Maoism there. The CCP's triumph in Mainland China had invigorated Chinese nationalism throughout the diaspora, including in Southeast Asia,³⁵ with ethnic Chinese constituting the majority of many major Communist Parties in Southeast Asia (Thailand and Malaysia, for instance).³⁶ Beijing, however, recognized the hazards of ethno-centric Communist Parties in the region, fearing that racial conflicts might emerge as a result. On the other end, in Indonesia, for instance, President Sukarno cautioned local Chinese not to side with the Communists for the same reason, stating that a social revolution may become a racial one if ever to occur.³⁷ The Communist victory had also placed a heavy burden on Southeast Asian Chinese, whose "sojourning traditions seem[ed] sinister and their loyalty more dubious" in non-Communist Southeast Asian countries.³⁸ After Jiang Jieshi's defeat, his Nationalist regime in Taiwan "embarked on an active courting of Southeast Asian Chinese" away from politics and involvement in potentially radical groups, specifically among the Malayan Chinese.³⁹ The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), for example, was an influential component of the anti-Communist National Front (Barisan Nasional).⁴⁰ Anti-Communist Cambodian President Lon Nol (លន់ នល់), who ruled the Khmer Republic after a 1970 bloodless coup, was ethnic Chinese and "admired Chiang Kai-shek" and valued the Nationalists' approach to "battling Communists."⁴¹

³⁴ Boonlert Khampitton, *USIA and Southeast Asia: A Case Study of US Overseas Information, 1965-1970*. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972). See also James R. Brandon, *Theatre in Southeast Asia*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 298-291.

³⁵ Jamie Mackie, "Introduction," in *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*. Anthony Reid, ed. (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1996), xxi. On pro-Communist overseas Chinese in Indonesia, see *Forty-one Red Hearts Are with Chairman Mao for Ever*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967). See also *Mao-Tse-Tung's thought Is the Invincible Weapon*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1968).

³⁶ Many ethnic Chinese "returned" to China to pursue higher education and reincorporated into Chinese society. See Glen Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*. (London: Routledge, 2014).

³⁷ Antara (10 November 1951); and Aneta (20 August 1951), as cited in David Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 147.

³⁸ Wang Gungwu, "Sojourning: The Chinese Experience in Southeast Asia," in *Sojourners and Settlers*, 10.

³⁹ Yen Ching-hwang, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond: Socioeconomic and Political Dimensions*. (London: World Scientific, 2008), 20. See also Chiang Kai-shek, *President Chiang's Message on KMT's 60th Anniversary*. (Taiwan: China Culture Service, 1954). Document courtesy of the Harvard-Yenching Library.

⁴⁰ Leo Suryadinata, *Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and China's Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), 8-10.

⁴¹ Thomas A. Marks, *Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang*. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 212-213. However, as William Skinkers notes, in Cambodia as in Thailand, "obstacles to assimilation on the part of the progeny of mixed marriages were either absent or so weak that full incorporation into indigenous society

An increasing sense of patriotism among overseas Chinese in the Philippines towards the Chinese Republic (1912-1949) translated into a “cultural, traditional, and sentimental tie” that linked them to China “in a national and political sense,”⁴² with many Chinese communities remaining anti-Communist thereafter. Such loyalty to the Republic remained intact after the Communists’ captured Beijing, as the Guomindang (GMD) rallied its loyalists across the world, especially in Indonesia, where “approximately 30 per cent of Chinese residents [of Indonesia] were reportedly pro-KMT [GMD].”⁴³ As Hong Liu describes, GMD outreach efforts to local Chinese in Indonesia culminated in a “dual structure in Indonesian Chinese society,” wherein pro-Communist organizations held China in an unrelentingly positive light, whereas pro-GMD ones lambasted the Communists as merely “Soviet Russia’s satellite” and a country that had “degenerated into slavery to the Slavic nation.”⁴⁴ Numerous ethnic Chinese also took a firm stance against Beijing for its designs to export Maoism abroad, especially in the wake of the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution. The failure of both programs, Jamie Mackie contends, “created disillusionment about the benefits of Communism had brought to China, especially among the commercially successful Chinese of the diaspora.”⁴⁵ Indeed, Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) member states’ prosperity ultimately brought increased wealth for many Southeast Asian Chinese communities, thereby curbing both a connection and desire to repatriate to China, which led the CCP to seek to take advantage of transnational Chinese networks for its own economic and ideological motives.⁴⁶

While China’s interest in Southeast Asia developed as a bulwark against American military and political pressure, scholars and period newspapers characterize this second foreign

occurred before any immediate system could be stabilized... for the descendants of a mid-nineteenth century immigrant, assimilation proceeded step-by-step in tandem with acculturation until—usually within two generations—the descendants *were* Thai or Cambodian.” William Skinner, “Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia,” in *Sojourners and Settlers*, 64.

⁴² Antonio S. Tan, *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1898-1935: A Study of Their National Awakening*. (Quezon City, the Philippines: RP Garcia Publishing, 1972), 214-291, quote from page 291.

⁴³ Hong Liu, *China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2011), 157, quoting Van Hassens, “The Campaign against Nationalist Chinese in Indonesia,” in *Indonesia’s Struggle, 1957-1958*. BHM Vlekke ed., (the Hague, the Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1959), 68.

⁴⁴ Liu, *China and the Shaping of Indonesia*, 158, quoting *Tiangsheng Ribao Shelun Xuanji* [Selected Editorials from the *Harian thien Sung Yit Po*]. (Jakarta, Indonesia: Harian Thien Sung Yit Po, 1951), 75-76. On anti-Communism in Chinese Indonesian networks, see Jamie Mackie, “Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia, 1959-1968,” in *The Chinese in Indonesia*. Jamie Mackie, ed. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), 82-138.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Mackie, “Introduction,” in *Sojourners and Settlers*, xxix; and Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 164.

policy stage (1953-1957) as the “Spirit of Bandung,” during which the CCP spearheaded a global outreach campaign that welcomed non-Communist membership.⁴⁷ Communist China’s pursuit of world peace was its principal aim throughout this brief but crucial stage of the CCP’s Third World outreach, which culminated in Beijing’s promotion of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Why did China pursue such a moderate form of diplomacy? Socialist development was still in its infancy in China, and China’s involvement in the Korean War and extensive land reform programs led the CCP to seek out new allies while taking the attention off itself as a catalyst for international tensions. The CCP formalized it as China’s official foreign policy in meetings with prospective allies such as Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu in 1954.⁴⁸ The Five Principles assured foreign delegates of China’s strict and unwavering adherence to the following five precepts: 1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) mutual nonaggression; 3) noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence.⁴⁹ According to a November 1956 PRC statement:

The socialist countries are all independent, sovereign states. At the same time they are united to the common ideal of socialism and the spirit of proletarian internationalism. Consequently, mutual relations between socialist countries all the more so should be established on the basis of these five principles. Only in this way are the socialist countries able to achieve genuine fraternal friendship and solidarity and, through mutual assistance and cooperation, their desire for mutual economic upsurge.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ George T. Yu, “China and the Third World,” *Asian Survey* 17, No. 11 (November 1977): 1036-1048, on 1037. Singaporean Newspaper *Life Daily* makes use of the popular term “Bandung Spirit.” See “在歡飲宴西哈努克親王會上一週總理講話對比國際力量越來越多人認識東風壓倒西風—帝國主義左右國察形勢的日子一去不返了中東友好合作順利發展是萬隆精神的勝利 (At a Banquet Welcoming Prince Sihanouk, Premier Zhou Enlai Talks About and Compares International Powers, How More and More People Recognize that the ‘East Wind Will Overwhelm the West Wind—Observes Imperialism and the Situation Around the Country, and How the Smooth Development of the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Upholds the Bandung Spirit of Victory, *Zài huān yǐn yàn xī hā nǚ kè qīnwáng huì shàng: Zhōu zǒnglǐ jiǎnghuà duìbǐ guó cā lìliàng yuè lái yuè duō rén rènshí dōngfēng yādǎo xīfēng—dìguó zhǔyì zuǒyòu guó chá xíngshì de rìzì yī qù bù fǎnlè zhōng jiǎn yóuhǎo hézuò shùnlì fāzhǎn shì wàn lóng jīngshén de shènglì*),” *生活日報* [Life Daily (Singapore)] (18 August 1958).

⁴⁸ Kang Maozhao, *外交回憶錄*, 41; Chen Jian, “China and the Bandung Conference,” *Bandung Revisited*, 134-135. Some believe that the Five Principles originated in Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno’s 1945 concept of *pancasila*, which formed the basis for many institutions after Indonesia’s formal independence after 1949. Henri Grimal, *Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires, 1919-1963*, trans. Stephan de Vos. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 190, 209-12.

⁴⁹ “Premier Chou En-lai’s Main Speech at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference,” (19 April 1955), in *China Supports the Arab People’s Struggle for National Independence: A Selection of Important Documents*. Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, ed. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), 9-19.

⁵⁰ “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” in *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 33-34.

Here, it is clear that Communist China recognized these nations as at once socialist *and* nonaligned. The CCP promised that it would support, but never interfere with, the domestic affairs of a developing nation.⁵¹ The main issue, though, remained the problem of allegiance. Could China lend its rhetorical and material support for nations that were socialist yet maintained formal relations with the imperialist United States, which China had fought in the Korean War? Or the Soviet Union, which was in the early years of de-Stalinization?

China was not alone in trying to address this problem, and determined to put its policy of peaceful coexistence into practice in April 1955 at the 29-nation Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia. China sent PRC Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Bandung to assist in charting a nonaligned, alternative course toward development among the leaders of the nonaligned world, with the dual-aim of increasing China's stature and guiding the Afro-Asian movements toward socialism. Zhou recognized the advantage of persuading newly independent nations of China's nonaggressive foreign policy, dispelling the notion that China was an enemy of peace, and he extended offers to meet with representatives of China's then-principal enemy, the United States, to resolve tensions in Asia more effectively. He brokered treaties with the formerly thinly veiled white man's club in Asia—the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)—reaching out to Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. He also ratified a treaty that guaranteed Indonesian 華僑 (Overseas Chinese, *huáqiáo*) the freedom to choose Indonesian citizenship over a Chinese one, which showed that Communist China was not trying to rope in the Chinese diaspora under Beijing's purview.⁵² Zhou's diplomacy at the Bandung conference is thus representative of “the entire moderate orientation of Chinese foreign policy between 1954 and 1957,” and aided in reforming the PRC's image into one of unconditional support for nonaligned nations regardless of their system of governance.⁵³

⁵¹ “中東兩國家總理髮表聯合聲明：柬埔寨奉行中立政策，應受到一切國家尊重 (Joint Statement by the Chinese and Cambodian Premiers: Cambodia's Pursuit of a Policy of Neutrality Should be Respected by Every Country, *Zhōng jiǎn liǎng guójiā zǒnglǐ fǎ biǎo liánhé shēngmíng: Jiǎnpǔzhài fēngxíng zhōnglì zhèngcè, yīng shòudào yīqiè guójiā zūnzhòng*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (25 August 1958); and “在歡飲宴西哈努克親王會上,” 生活日報 [Life Daily (Singapore)] (18 August 1958).

⁵² Xue Mouhong et al., 當代中國外交 [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, *Dāngdài zhōngguó wàijiāo*]. (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1988), 81-89; and Chen Jian, “China and the Bandung Conference,” *Bandung Revisited*, 134.

⁵³ Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, 49. Emphasis in the original. See also Pei Jianzhang, 中國人民共和國外交史 1945-1966 [Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1956, *Zhōngguó rénmin gònghéguó wàijiāoshǐ*]. (Beijing: Shijie zhishi Chubanshe, 1994), 148; Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's*

Importantly for this dissertation, one particular outcome of the Bandung Conference was the revitalization of Sino-Cambodian relations after several decades of dormancy.⁵⁴ China had recognized *Kampuchea* (Cambodia) as its own entity even though it was largely peripheral to China's concerns. But in Southeast Asian politics by the mid-twentieth century, China came to realize Cambodia's strategic importance.⁵⁵ Likewise, Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk (r. 1941-1955, then as Prime Minister of Cambodia, 1955-1970), who was a staunch Buddhist socialist and advocate for neutrality,⁵⁶ recognized that Chinese support could forestall Vietnamese and Thai adventurism.⁵⁷ Much like his predecessors, Sihanouk's primary goal as head of state was to safeguard Cambodia (1953, from France) from its more powerful neighbors. Although he permitted Vietnamese and Chinese forces to use Eastern Cambodia and Kampong

Foreign Policy. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 80; Michael Leifer, *Cambodia: The Search for Security*. (New York: Praeger, 1967), 63; David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: History, Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 80; and Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 96.

⁵⁴ For a comprehensive study of Sino-Cambodian foreign relations, see Chang Paomin, *Kampuchea between China and Vietnam*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 1985), 1-51; Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*; Kang, 外交回憶錄, 177-226; and Qiang Zhai, “周恩來與中柬合作關係的建立, 1954-1965年 (Zhou Enlai Establishes Cooperative Relations with Cambodia, 1954-1965, *Zhōu'ēnlái yǔ zhōng jiǎn hézuò guānxì de jiànli, 1954-1965 nián*), 南開學報 (哲學社會科學版) [Nankai Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 1 (2014): 24-32.

⁵⁵ Huang Xionglue, 柬埔寨史略 [A Short Survey of Kampuchea, *Jiǎnpǔzhài shǐlüè*]. (Shanghai: Zhengzhong shuju, 1947), 27-33; Li Changfu, 中國殖民史 [A History of Chinese Colonization, *Zhōngguó zhīmín shǐ*]. (Shanghai: Shangwu shuju, 1946), 74, 101; and Zhao Lingyang et al., eds. *Southeast Asia in Chinese Reign Chronicles, 1368-1644*. (Hong Kong: Xuejing Press, 1976), 16. On early Sino-Cambodian relations (China referred to Cambodia as 真臘 (Chenla) in its earliest exchanges), see Huang Xionglue, 柬埔寨史略, 27-33; and Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. John King Fairbank, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 58.

⁵⁶ Prince Norodom Sihanouk abdicated in favor of his father, Norodom Suramarit, in 1955, and assumed leadership of the very popular Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People's Socialist Community). Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930-1975*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 158-159. On his ideology, see Norodom Sihanouk, *Notre socialisme bouddhique*. [Our Buddhist Socialism]. (Phnom Penh: le ministère de l'information, 1965); Keith Buchanan, “Khmer Socialism,” *New Zealand Monthly Review* (July 1962): 5-6; and “在人大常委, 政協聯席會上演說: 西哈努克重申和平中立政策 (Sihanouk Reiterates Policy of Peace and Neutrality—Speech at the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the People's Political consultative Conference, *zài réndà chángwěi, zhèngxié liánxì huì shàngyǎn shuō: Xī hā nǚ kè chóngshēn héping zhōnglì zhèngcè*),” 廈門日報 [Xiamen Daily (Xiamen, China)], (24 August 1958). As for China's support for Cambodian neutrality, see 新華社 [Xinhua News Agency (Beijing)] (19 December 1960, and 3 May 1961); Harold Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*. (New York: MacMillan, 1967), 426; and Norodom Sihanouk and Bernard Krisher, *Charisma and Leadership: The Human Side of Great Leaders of the Twentieth Century*. (Tokyo: Yohan Publications, 1990), 82-83.

⁵⁷ Norodom Sihanouk, “Condense de l'allocution improvisée, prononcée par Samdech, chef de l'état, lors de l'inauguration de l'ouvrage d'art et de la route forestière de KG. Raing (Kratie), (Improvised Speech, Delivered by Samdech, Head of the State during the Art Inauguration and of Forest Road KG. Raing (Kratie),” (AKP, 28 September 1963), 1-2. See also Andrew Mertha, *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 21-22; and John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in *The Chinese World Order*, 1-14.

Som (កំពង់សោម, present-day Sihanoukville) for the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Second Indochina conflict, he made Cambodia's sovereignty the hallmark of his tenure and sought actively to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty at Bandung.⁵⁸ Importantly, the Chinese leaders' support of Sihanouk's neutral political stance was a significant change of course for them. Mao had famously disparaged the "illusion of a third road" and Liu Shaoqi had nothing but contempt for Jawaharlal Nehru, U Nu, and Sukarno, all of whom were neutral rulers who he viewed merely as "stooges of imperialism."⁵⁹ This all changed with Bandung, as Communist China realized the value of developing strong ties with Communist and non-Communist countries throughout the developing world. Central to this effort was Zhou Enlai, whose success as a charismatic representative of Mao's China helped to broker lasting ties between Beijing and its new allies.

Sihanouk met with Zhou Enlai at Bandung in a gathering that Sihanouk described years later as a friendship brought about by "destiny."⁶⁰ His official biographer, Julio Jeldres, recalled that amicable relations between China and the small Southeast Asian nation developed at Bandung and between Zhou and Sihanouk by extension, leading the Prince to establish formal cordial relations with the PRC and to visit China for the first time in 1956.⁶¹ By 1963, the Prince

⁵⁸ Mertha, *Brothers in Arms*, 21.

⁵⁹ Qiang Zhai, "China and the Cambodian Conflict, 1970-1975," *Searching for the Truth, Special Edition*, (July 2003): 15-31, on page 15; and Chae-Jin Lee, *Communist China's Policy Toward Laos: A Case Study, 1954-67*. (Lawrence, KS: Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1970), 31.

⁶⁰ Sihanouk and Krisher, *Charisma and Leadership*, 48. Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in particular, spoke favorably of Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's leadership. "陳毅副部長講話 (Vice-Minister Chen Yi's Speech, *Chén Yì fūzhǎng jiǎnghuà*)," 北京周報 [Peking Review] 8, No. 46 (1965), 4.

⁶¹ "西哈努克說 (Sihanouk Says)," 人民日報 [People's Daily] (16 July 1956); "中柬兩國 (China and Cambodia, *Zhōngjiǎn liǎng guó*)," 人民日報 [People's Daily], (28 August 1958); and "西哈努克親王 (Prince Sihanouk, *Xīhānùkè qīnwáng*)," 人民日報 [People's Daily], (11 September 1958); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu waijiao shipian, 中國外交概覽, 59; Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 68; and Osborne, *Sihanouk*, 103. On his 1956 visit, he met with Mao and received significant praise from him for his stance of neutrality. Qiang, "China and the Cambodian Conflict, 1970-1975," 15. Sihanouk visited China frequently while he was in power, including "five official visits to Beijing in eight years." S. A Norodom Montana, "Une politique... un chef (One Policy, One Leader)," in Ministère de l'Information, "Revue trimestrielle de l'Association d'amitié khméro-chinoise," No. 1 (January 1965): 1-47, page 46; and Zhang Xizhen, 西哈努克家族, 114; and Norodom Sihanouk, "Message de S.A.R. le Prince Norodom Sihanouk a la radiodiffusion chinoise (Message of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk via Chinese Broadcasting)," (Beijing 1956). National Archives of Cambodia Document, number unknown. A 1971 document of Sihanouk's visit to Shanghai details in full the program and the attendees of the event. "市革委會外事組: 接待柬埔寨國家元首西哈努克親王的計畫 (Shanghai City Revolutionary Committee of the Department of Foreign Affairs: Programs for Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, *Shì gé wěi huì wàishì zǔ: Jiēdài jiǎnpǔzhài guójiā yuánshǒu xī hā nǚ kè qīnwáng de jì huà*) 滬革外事 [Shanghai Office of Foreign Affairs (Shanghai, China)] 71, No. 021 (1971). Archive No. 13P2-1-1XP1-1. Reference No. C. 001/000034.

had cultivated a close friendship with both Zhou and Mao, and lauded Mao's regime for its land grants to poor farmers, access to free medical care and education, and protecting the rights of its people.⁶²

As for policy, Sihanouk was “pitched” the Five Principles in meetings with Zhou, Jawaharlal Nehru, and U Nu at Bandung, and he pledged his allegiance to them in the interest of safeguarding Cambodia's neutrality.⁶³ In February 1956, Sihanouk met with Zhou in Beijing where the Chinese Premier reminded the Prince of his commitment to the Five Principles. The meeting was a response to decisions by the US, Thailand, and South Vietnam to impose an economic blockade on Cambodia for its Beijing ties.⁶⁴ At the meeting's end, the two leaders pledged “commitment onto death to the Five Principles,”⁶⁵ ratified the Sino-Kampuchean Declaration of Unity and Friendship, and finalized an important economic assistance pact and a trade deal.⁶⁶ On 19 December 1960 in Beijing, Premier Zhou Enlai and Cambodian Council of Ministers President Pho Proeung signed the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-interference, which reiterated the Bandung Spirit of peaceful coexistence and stressed “mutual respect for

⁶² Norodom Sihanouk, “Comment nous voyons la Chine (How We View China),” *Neak Cheat Niyum* [The Nationalist (Cambodia)] (20 September 1963): 6-8, on page 7. National Archives of Cambodia Document, Box 689, ID6061. Also in Box 332, pages 1-19; and See also “王子號召農民學習中國經驗 (Prince Calls on Farmers to Study the Chinese Experience, *Wángzǐ hàozhào nóngmín xuéxí zhōngguó jīngyàn*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (7 January 1959); “‘柬埔寨現狀’ 周刊談中柬關係對我國解決農業問題辦法感到興趣 (‘Cambodia Situation’ Weekly Discusses China-Cambodia relations: Cambodia is Interested in Our Chinese Way of Solving Agricultural Problems, *Jiǎnpǔzhài xiànzhuàng’ zhōukān tán zhōng jiǎn guānxì duì wǒguó jiějué nóngyè wèntí bànfǎ gāndào xìngqù*) 參考消息 [Reference News (Beijing)] (1 February 1959). Sihanouk stated that China was “not a dragon clinging to other Asian countries,” and that its emphasis on improving its people's livelihoods was particularly commendable.

⁶³ Rahul Mukherji, “Appraising the Legacy of Bandung: A View from India,” *Bandung Revisited*, 168; and Nick Tarling, *Britain and Sihanouk's Cambodia*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2014), 12.

⁶⁴ Chang, *Kampuchea between China and Vietnam*, 17.

⁶⁵ “柬電台評中柬友好條約週年：中柬緊密友誼說明五項原則並未死亡 (Cambodian Radio Broadcast on Anniversary of Bilateral Treaty: Inseparable Sino-Cambodian Friendship United in Commitment to Five Principles onto Death, *Jiǎn diàntái píng zhōng jiǎn yǒuhǎo tiáoyuē zhōunián: Zhōng jiǎn jǐnmì yǒuyì shuōmíng wǔ xiàng yuánzé bìng mò sǐwáng*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (22 December 1961).

⁶⁶ “周恩來總離和山雲首相簽署中棉兩國聯合聲明堅決實現五項原則” (Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Sihanouk Sign a Joint Statement Resolutely Implementing the Five Principles, *Zhōu'ēnlái zǒnglǐ hé shān yún shǒuxiàng qiānshǔ zhōng miǎn liǎng guó liánhé shēngmíng jiānjué shíxiàn wǔ xiàng yuánzé*),” 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (28 November 1956). See also “中一柬兩國聯合聲明在金邊簽字 (Joint Statement Signed by China and Cambodia, *Zhōng yī jiǎn liǎng guó liánhé shēngmíng zài jīnbīan qiānzi*),” 今日新聞 [Today's News] (9 May 1960) on signing a joint statement; and Wang Taiping, ed., 中國人民共和國外交史 1957-1969 [Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1957-1969, *Zhōngguó rénmín gònghéguó wàijiāoshǐ*]. (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1998), 50.

both nations' sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”⁶⁷ The treaty provided the Prince with a formal written declaration that China “did not intend to intervene in Cambodian internal affairs,”⁶⁸ while subsequent deals insured that Cambodia would receive significant economic technical, and military aid (over US\$48 million between 1956 and 1963).⁶⁹ This total rivalled the American aid pledge of 800 million riels (roughly US\$20 million in 1963), and was regarded by Sihanouk as “the most precious aid to the Khmer nation” and “an answer to Cambodia’s vital needs.”⁷⁰ Though Mao, unlike Zhou Enlai, attempted to convert Sihanouk to Communism—Mao told him that he “deserve[d] to be a Communist”—the Prince’s rebuffs did not dissuade the Chairman from “effusively and fully support[ing]” Sihanouk against his rivals.⁷¹ By April 1964, China and Cambodia signed the first official aid agreement between the PRC and a non-Communist nation, which insured that Sihanouk would receive enormous quantities of Chinese arms and materials for years thereafter.⁷²

⁶⁷ *Traité d'amitié et de non-agression mutuelle entre le Royaume du Cambodge et la République Populaire de China*. (Beijing, 1965), 1-2. Quote from page 1; Julio Jeldres, “A Personal Reflection on Norodom Sihanouk and Zhou Enlai: An Extraordinary Friendship on the Fringes of the Cold War,” *Cross Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, No. 4 (September 2012): 52-64; and Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu waijiao shipian, 中國概覽 [China Overview, *Zhōngguó gàilǎn*]. (Beijing: Shijie zhizhi chubanshe, 1987), 59. On the treaty, which went into effect on 4 May 1961, see “中柬友好關係新的里程碑：中柬友好和互不侵犯條約生效 (Sino-Cambodian Friendly Relations Reach a New Milestone: The Sino-Cambodian Friendship and Nonaggression Treaty Goes Into Effect, *Zhōng jiǎn yǒuhǎo guānxì xīn de lǐchéngbēi: Zhōng jiǎn yǒuhǎo hé hù bù qīnfàn tiáoyuē shēngxiào*),” 廈門日報 [Xiamen Daily (China)] (4 May 1961).

⁶⁸ Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, “外交部聲明：柬埔寨和老撾 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Cambodia and Laos, *Wàijiāo bù shēngmíng: Jiǎnpǔzhài hé lǎowō*),” (Beijing, 23 April 1955). See also “中國正確執行柬中貿易協定 (China and Cambodia Finalize a Trade Agreement: Chinese Experts’ Approach will be Noninterference in Cambodian Domestic Affairs, *Zhōngguó zhèngquè zhíxíng jiǎn zhōng màoyì xiédìng*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (10 July 1964); and Osborne, *Sihanouk*, 96.

⁶⁹ Melvin Gurtov, *China and Southeast Asia: The Politics of Survival*. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 75; and Chang, *Kampuchea between China and Vietnam*, 21.

⁷⁰ His admiration for the Chinese model soon inspired a 1963 declaration that Cambodia “prefers to be on the side of the Chinese.” Norodom Sihanouk, “Condense de l’allocution improvisée par Samdech chef de l’état à Oudong [Kampong Speu] (Excerpt of Speech by Head of State at Oudong, Kompong Speu Province),” (French version, AKP, 21 September 1963), 1-2.

⁷¹ Sihanouk and Krisher, *Charisma and Leadership*, 82-83.

⁷² Kang, 外交回憶錄, 41-45; Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, eds., 周恩來外交文選 [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai, *Zhōu'ēnlái wàijiāo wénxuǎn*]. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990), 388; Pei, 中國人民共和國外交史, 147-152; “中國贈東軍事物資：移交儀式隆重舉行 (China donates Military Supplies to Cambodia, Ceremony Held, *Zhōngguó zèng jiǎn jūnshì wùzī: Yìjiāo yìshì lóngzhòng jǔxíng*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (16 March 1964); and JD Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 188. On the aid agreement, see Norodom Sihanouk, “Rapport de Samdech chef de l’état au peuple khmer (Report from Head of State Samdech Sihanouk to the Khmer People),” (5 October 1964), 1-5. National Archives of Cambodia Document, Box 689, ID6060; Norodom Sihanouk, “Communiqué commun du Royaume du Cambodge et de la République Populaire de China (Joint Communiqué of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the People’s Republic of

In terms of diplomacy and rhetorical support, Chinese leaders stressed repeatedly that this friendship was “eternal,” lauded Sihanouk’s resolute policy of neutrality, and reassured him that despite China’s allegiance to Communism, their relationship would remain “like that of a family.”⁷³ In fact, numerous issues of the Phnom Penh-based Chinese language newspaper 棉華日報 (Sino-Khmer Daily) echoed China’s firm stance alongside Cambodia, with statements such as “The hearts of the peoples of China and Cambodia beat together,” “The China-Cambodia friendship will be forever in bloom,” and most famously, “The China-Cambodia friendship is as deep as the sea.”⁷⁴ In fact, it was these pledges of friendship and unconditional support that inspired the formation of a Sino-Khmer friendship association, the *Association d’amitié khméro-chinoise*, abbreviated AAKC), in Paris (September 1964) with future CPK Maoists Hu Nim and Hou Yuon as its leaders. Indeed, these pledges of support came at an opportune time since Sihanouk had lost the American vote of confidence after endorsing the PRC to occupy China’s seat in the UN—a move that, in the aftermath of the Bandung Conference, served only to enunciate the growing Sino-Cambodian friendship.⁷⁵

As we have seen, China’s commitment to the “Bandung Spirit,” which entailed a genuine commitment to noninterference and Third World unity, situated the PRC as a diplomatic force. The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung was a rousing success for China, after which it broke out

China),” (Beijing: 5 October 1964), 1-6; and Xue Mouhong and Pei Jianzhang, eds., 當代中國外交 [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, *Dāngdài zhōngguó wàijiāo*]. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1990), 169-170.

⁷³ Zhang Xizhen, 西哈努克家族, 114. Liu Shaoqi echoed this sentiment. “劉少奇主席覆函施亞努元首指出：東人民反美鬥爭必 (Liu Shaoqi States in Reply Letter to Cambodian Head of State Sihanouk: The Cambodian People’s Opposition to US Imperialism Surely to Succeed, *Liúshǎoqí zhǔxí fù hán shī yà nǚ yuánshǒu zhǐchū: Jiǎn rénmin fǎn měi dòuzhēng bì shèng*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (29 March 1964); “總理金冊留言：強調中柬永遠友好 (Prime Minister Jin Ce : Emphasizes that China, Cambodia are Eternal Friends, *Zǒnglǐ Jīn Cè liúyán: Qiángdiào zhōng jiǎn yǒngyuǎn yǒuhǎo*),” 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (7 May 1960) on “eternal friendship” with Cambodia. On Cambodia’s reference to China as a “pure/honest friend,” see “柬友誼報選論迎貴賓：中國是我們純潔友邦給柬埔寨人民一溫暖 (Cambodian Friendship Report Welcomes Honored Guest: China is Our Pure and Warmest Ally, *Jiǎn yǒuyì bào xuǎn lùn yíng guìbīn: Zhōngguó shì wǒmen chúnjié yǒubāng gěi jiǎnpǔzhài rénmin yī wēnnuǎn*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (4 May 1960).

⁷⁴ “中柬人民的心跳動在一起 (The Hearts of the Peoples of China and Cambodia Beat Together, *Zhōng jiǎn rénmin de xīn tiàodòng zài yìqǐ*),” 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (10 May 1960); “讓中柬友誼之花永遠盛開 (Make the Chinese-Cambodian Friendship Flourish Forever, *Ràng zhōng jiǎn yǒuyì zhī huā yǒngyuǎn shèngkāi*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (7 January 1961); and “中柬友誼情深似海 (The China-Cambodia Friendship is as Deep as the Sea, *Zhōng jiǎn yǒuyì qíng shēn sì hǎi*) 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (11 May 1960).

⁷⁵ “西哈努克說 (Sihanouk Speaks),” 人民日報 [People’s Daily] (16 July 1956); “西哈努克說只有一個中國 (Sihanouk Says That There is Only One China, *Xīhānùkè shuō zhǐyǒu yīgè zhōngguó*),” 參考消息 [Reference News (Beijing)] (9 October 1961); and Justin Corfield, *Khmers Stand Up! A History of the Cambodian Government, 1970-1975*. (Clayton, Australia: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 32, Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), 21. See also Sihanouk, “Comment nous voyons la Chine,” 6-8.

of the US-imposed containment and increased its international prestige through new alliances. China as a source for diplomatic support and material aid in Asia broadened extensively, sustaining nationalist movements such as the Vietnamese and playing a significant role in their victories.⁷⁶ By the late 1960s, several Third World nationalist and Communist leaders turned not to Soviet style Marxism-Leninism, but to China for diplomatic support and material aid. Most crucially, the PRC's ameliorated stature in the international arena, and its leadership role within the nonaligned movement, led to Communist China's emergence as the preeminent source of inspiration for fledgling Communist movements, particularly in former French Indochina.

From Country to Country: Pol Pot Visits Beijing, 1965-1966

The next stage of exporting the Chinese revolution took the form of hosting revolutionaries from target countries with the goal of strengthening ties between the CCP and revolutionary movements. As Julia Lovell argues, Communist China's hosting of foreign representatives and revolutionaries "had a domestic as well as an international purpose... [the CCP] used the preparation for and execution of hosting duties to underscore at home the triumph of the revolution."⁷⁷ Accordingly, this section focuses on the importance of these visits through an examination of one in particular: Saloth Sar's (Pol Pot) visit to Beijing in December 1965 as a Vietnamese ally.⁷⁸ This section examines the circumstances that led to it, and how Sar's experiences there when Communist China was on the brink of the cataclysmic Cultural Revolution shaped how he confronted the dilemmas that his Communist movement faced.⁷⁹ His 1965 visit to Beijing initiated an infatuation with the faith Maoism that had risen meteorically

⁷⁶ Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 220-221, Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, 102, 105, 119, 123-124, Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 105, 127. Brady notes that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) "trained insurgent groups" from several countries, and "practiced 'benevolent trade' in this period: buying up large quantities of products from countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—often goods for which there was little demand—selling much-needed commodities at bargain prices." See also Philip Snow, "China and Africa," in *Chinese Foreign Policy*. Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 288.

⁷⁷ Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China," 135.

⁷⁸ Sar recalled in an interview with Philip Short that he had been "delegated by the Cambodian Communists to have a meeting with them [the Vietnamese]," after which he then visited China. Pol Pot, "Interview with Cai Ximei," (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: May 1984). See also Christoph Goscha, "Interview with Pham Thanh," (Hanoi: 10 June 1989); and Philip Short, "Interview with Ieng Sary," in Philip Short, *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*. (London: John Murray, 2004), 484n159 (in reference to the CCP members who hosted Pol Pot upon his December 1965 arrival).

⁷⁹ For a similar instance of a visit to China serving as an inspiration, see Abidin Kusno, "From City to City: Tan Malaka, Shanghai, and the Politics of Geographical Imagining," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 24, No. 3 (2003): 327-339.

within the CCP and would later characterize the widespread Maoist zealotry of the Cultural Revolution. In addition, Mao's ideas of greater unity through global realignment were presented to various Third World national leaders through visits by nonaligned heads of state as well as by leaders of Parties that opposed them.⁸⁰ Such visits were, however, not always a first resort; rather, in some instances China was a second or third option, as in the case of Pol Pot. As the Vietnamese Worker's Party (VWP, predecessor to the Vietnamese Communist Party) prioritized interests in their own civil war and struggle against US imperialism over Cambodian interests, China became a beacon of light guiding Pol Pot's fledgling freedom fighters out of the darkness.⁸¹ The trace on the evolution of Saloth Sar's thinking and revolutionary imaginings thus begins with forces that emanated from Beijing in the 1960s.

China's second period of foreign policy (1958-1965) marked a radical shift in Chinese relations with the Third World. On the domestic front, the CCP had embarked on significant efforts to break from the Soviet model with the "Chinese Road to Socialism," which was marked by earth-shattering policies such as the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes.⁸² Communist China's foreign policy reflected this desire to break out on its own, and the boldness that characterized this period translated into a vigorous foreign policy that both broke from and was inimical to the Soviet Union, especially after the Sino-Soviet dispute.⁸³ After Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, initiated an era of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union and suggested peaceful coexistence with the capitalist Western powers. Mao Zedong disagreed with this approach vehemently. He responded with "four major polemics against revisionism" (his 22 April 1960 "Long Live Leninism!" charged that their differences were ideological).⁸⁴ At the 16 July 1960 Bucharest conference, Sino-Soviet tensions escalated to a fever pitch when Soviet representatives told Beijing that the country's 1400 advisers and experts

⁸⁰ Anne-Marie Brady, *The Friend of China: The Myth of Rewi Alley*. (London: Routledge, 2002); Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China, in passim*; Bill V. Mullen and Fred Ho, *Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 100-101; Bill V. Mullen, "By the Book: Quotations from Chairman Mao and the Making of Afro-Asian Radicalism, 1966-1975," *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*. Alex C. Cook, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 245-265; and Matthew Johnson, "From Peace to the Panthers: PRC Engagement with Africa-America Transnational Networks, 1949-1979," *Past and Present* 218 supplement 8 (2013): 233-257.

⁸¹ David Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, Revised Edition*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 66-70; and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 126-127.

⁸² Knight, *Rethinking Mao*, 217-248.

⁸³ Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 13, 212-213.

⁸⁴ Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 7. Conveniently, Mao released this polemic on the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth.

in China were to leave due to “poor treatment” by Chinese handlers.⁸⁵ The Sino-Soviet dispute continued into the 1960s with Mao’s 1963 polemic in 人民日報 titled “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and Historical Lessons for the World,” which declared that Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was “revisionist.”⁸⁶ By September 1963, Mao proclaimed that China now recognized the Soviet Union as the chief threat to international stability and world peace, and that it was no longer allied to the Soviet camp.

Another environmental-situational factor was the ongoing first wave of decolonization.⁸⁷ The CCP’s break with the Soviets led it to discard the Bandung policy of Peaceful Coexistence, which had failed to deal a deathblow to American imperialism in East Asia, and become the leading force behind the struggling countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As the “First World” of US capitalism and the Soviet-led “Second World” of socialism fought for world hegemony, the “Third World” had often served as the “battleground and theater of operations... as the cannon fodder, barometer, and spoils of war over the fate of global modernity.”⁸⁸ While US military might had increased in East Asia, the European colonial powers could no longer maintain their iron grip on their Third World colonial holdings. Mao thus situated Communist China as the force to fill the void, establishing relations with the newly liberated nations to comprise an independent “third line.”⁸⁹ However, this move meant that the Chinese Communists

⁸⁵ Ilya V. Gaiduk, *Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy Toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 119.

⁸⁶ Mao Zedong, “Outline for a Speech on the International Situation,” (December 1959), 建国以来毛泽东文稿, 第八卷 [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, Volume VIII, *Jiànguó yǐlái máozédōng wéngǎo*], Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 599-603; “On Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World,” *People’s Daily and Red Flag* (14 July 1964); and “‘Khrushchev Revisionism’ as a Danger to China,” (14 July 1964) in *The People’s Republic of China 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey. Volume 2, 1957-1965: The Great Leap Forward and Its Aftermath*, 1270-1289.

⁸⁷ Yu, “China and the Third World,” 1037; and Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, 13-15.

⁸⁸ Arif Dirlik, “Spectres of the Third World: Global Modernity and the End of the Three Worlds,” *Third World Quarterly* 25, No. 1 (2004): 131-148, on page 131. Cook notes carefully that “The people of the third world did not necessarily share this view [that the underdeveloped third world is a passive object of a contested but nevertheless teleological history], instead seeing the postwar period as a global moment of anticolonial, anti-imperialist movements.” Cook, “Third World Maoism,” *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 288.

⁸⁹ Mao Zedong, 毛澤東外交文選 [Selected Writings of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs, *Máo Zédōng wàijiāo wénxuǎn*]. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1994), 506-507; and Mao Zedong, “There Are Two Intermediate Zones,” 387-388. Original quote: “我看中地有，一是，非，拉，是洲。日本，加拿大，美是不意的 [*Wǒ kàn zhòng dì yǒu, yī shì, fēi, lā, shì zhōu. Rìběn, jiānádà, měi shì bù yì de*].” As Mao urged, the countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa constituted “two intermediate zones”: the first consisted of the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while the second comprised the whole of Europe. Since both zones were in opposition of American imperialism, and Eastern European countries opposed Soviet hegemony, the solution was to form an alternative, nonaligned line. Mao Zedong, 毛澤東外交文選, 506-507; Mao Zedong, “There Are Two Intermediate

had to do more than merely support their newfound friends against the superpowers; they had to inspire them with the Chinese revolutionary success as a model.

But before China could play its hand in inspiring revolutionaries such as Pol Pot, changes brought about on the Indochinese peninsula would foreground China as an ideological wellspring. The 1945 August Revolution that followed the Japanese *coup de force* led to the reemergence of Indochinese patriotism and strong senses of social concern among Southeast Asian urbanites, many of whom later filled the ranks of the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian Communist Parties.⁹⁰ But upon seizing power in Hanoi, the Vietnamese Worker's Party (VWP) maintained the Indochinese Communist Party's (ICP, predecessor to VWP) mandate of a united movement under Vietnamese direction, echoing a 1934 document that stated that there was "no place for considering [a] Cambodian revolution on its own. There can only be an Indochinese revolution."⁹¹ VWP leader Ho Chi Minh iterated that "[t]he creation of a separate Party for each of the three states [Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos] *does not* prejudice the revolutionary movement in Indochina... the Vietnamese Party *reserves the right to supervise the activities of its brother Parties in Cambodia and Laos.*"⁹² The VWP decision awoke familiar demons for the

Zones," 387-388. As Zhou Enlai urged, China ought to join "all the forces in the world that can be allied with to combat colonialism, imperialism, and above all superpower hegemonism. We are ready to establish or develop relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." Zhou Enlai, "Report on the Work of the Government," (13 January 1975) *Documents of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*. [www.marxists.org/reference/archive/zhou-enlai/1975/01/13/htm] (Accessed 15 May 2015), as quoted in Cook, "Third World Maoism," *Critical Introduction to Mao*, 298.

⁹⁰ Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 230-231, 335-338; David Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial 1920-1945*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 371; David Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 14; and Pierre Brocheux and D. Hemery, *Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954 (From Indochina to Vietnam: Revolution and War in a Global Perspective)*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 315-316, 349-350.

⁹¹ Quoted in Milton Osborne, "Kampuchea and Viet Nam: A Historical Perspective," *Pacific Community* (April 1978): 249-263, on page 252. See also Nguyen Khac Huyen, *Vision Accomplished?* (New York: Collier Books, 1971), 220-222; Thomas Engelbert and Christopher E. Goscha, *Falling Out Of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930-1975*. (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University, 1995), 19; and Chris Goscha, "Annam and Vietnam in the New Indochinese Space," in *Asian Forms of the Nation*. Stein Tonneson and Hans Antlov, eds. (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon, 1996), 128-130. According to Engelbert and Goscha, the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam instead of proclaiming a "Republic of Indochina" was to avoid raising suspicion or frustration in neighboring countries. See also Bernard B. Fall, ed., *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-1966*. (London: Pall Mall, 1967), 127-129.

⁹² McAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, *Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-1985*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), 47; and quoted in Martin Stuart-Fox, *A History of Laos*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81; and Chang, *Kampuchea between China and Vietnam*, 10n40. See also George Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence*. Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 185-214.

Cambodian nationalists, who recalled the French favoritism of the Vietnamese in civil service positions in Cambodia (Cambodians felt “twice colonized” as a result).⁹³ Many members of the Cambodian branch (Khmer Revolutionary People’s Party, KPRP, predecessor to the Worker’s Party of Kampuchea, WPK), resented this subordinate designation.⁹⁴

The issue of Vietnamese helmsmanship over the larger struggles throughout Indochina arose again at the 26 April until 20 July 1954 Geneva Conference (during the climactic Battle of Dien Bien Phu, from 13 March -7 May 1954), intensifying the collective fears of many Cambodian revolutionaries that their eastern neighbors had their own designs for Cambodian lands. The first and most resonating salvo at Geneva came from the VWP delegation of Pham Van Dong and Ho Chi Minh, who refused to withdraw Vietnamese forces from Laos and Cambodia. They insisted that the Viet Minh (Indochinese Democratic Front), and not the Royal Governments of Cambodia and Laos, represented the two newly independent countries.⁹⁵ As the VWP programme declared, “the Vietnamese people must unite closely with the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea, and render them all-out in support in the common struggle against imperialism, in order to liberate Indochina... On the basis of the common interests of the three peoples, the Vietnamese are prepared to have long-term cooperation with Lao and Kampuchean peoples and to strive for the realization of *true unity* of the three peoples.”⁹⁶ Their notion of an independent Cambodia and Laos was therefore only true *in theoria*; *in praxi*, the VWP saw itself as the leaders of an “Indochina Federation” wherein directives flowed from Hanoi.⁹⁷

⁹³ David Henley, “Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism: Indonesia and Indochina,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, No. 2 (April 1995): 286-324, on page 296.

⁹⁴ Serge Thion explains that there were “traces of hurt feelings... The blame lies with the Vietnamese, who were always stronger.” Serge Thion, *Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Triangle*. (Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus, 1993), 54. Ethnic dimensions also played a major part in this rift between Cambodians and Vietnamese. See Milton Osborne, “Kampuchea and Vietnam,” 249-263; and David P. Chandler, *Cambodia before the French: Politics in a Tributary Kingdom, 1794-1848*. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1973). For a broader analysis of Khmer-Viet relations during this period, see Thu Huong Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc., Publishers, 1992); Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*; and Thion, *Watching Cambodia*, 48-76.

⁹⁵ Khieu Samphan, *L’histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position* [Cambodia’s Recent History and the Reasons Behind My Decisions]. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 62-65. Zhou and Pham met once again a decade later to discuss Cambodian involvement in the Second Indochina War. See “Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong,” (9 October 1965) in *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive*. Cold War International History Project Working Paper 22, “77 Conversations.”

⁹⁶ Reproduced in 新華月報 [New China Monthly (Beijing)] (April 1951), 1286-1289; Vietnam News Agency [Hanoi] (21 March 1951); and Chang, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam*, 10n39. Emphasis added.

⁹⁷ Stephen J. Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 65-66; and Thion, *Watching Cambodia*, 57. The idea of an Indochina Federation

In response, the Chinese representative at Geneva, Zhou Enlai, urged fervently that the Vietnamese recognize Sihanouk's Royal government of Cambodia along the lines of China's Five Principles to prevent the establishment of US military bases along China's southern flank.⁹⁸ Zhou stressed to Cambodian Prince Sihanouk, who was present at Geneva, the importance of Cambodia as a bulwark against an "Indochina Federation," and he reassured him that the PRC had his back even though he was non-Communist.⁹⁹ Zhou Enlai's "personal diplomacy" was successful, as Ho and Pham agreed to withdraw Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.¹⁰⁰ However, the Vietnamese Communists' recognition of the anti-Communist Sihanouk as Cambodia's one true leader,¹⁰¹ the December 1958 arrangement with him to use Cambodian territories for the "Ho Chi Minh Trail," and the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party's (KPRP) small membership and limited revolutionary base areas, clashed with the KPRP's desire to radicalize.¹⁰² As Pol Pot later recalled, the "authentic revolutionary struggle of our people... to wrest independence from the French imperialists... vanished into thin air with the 1954 Geneva Accords."¹⁰³

first emerged in meetings following WWII, with the premise that upon liberation from France, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would unite under one government. Cambodian nationalist leaders often believed that this idea forfeited their autonomy since the likelihood of a strong Cambodian representation was very slim. While the VWP discarded this idea in 1953, the CPK accused Vietnamese leaders of plotting to conquer Cambodia. Ministère des affaires étrangères, *Livre Noir: faits et preuves des actes d'agression et d'annexion du Vietnam contre le Kampuchea* [Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam Against Kampuchea]. (Phnom Penh : Dépt. de la Presse et l'information du Ministre des affaires étrangères, 1978), Chs. 1-2 in the original French version, pages 3-22 in the English version.

⁹⁸ Li Danhui, "日內瓦會議上中國解決印支問題方針再探討李丹慧 (Re-exploration on China's Policy of Solving the Indochina Issue at Geneva Conference, *Rìnèiwǎ huìyì shàng zhōngguó jiějué yìn zhī wèntí fāngzhēn zài tàntǎo lǐdānhuì*)," 中共黨史研究 [CCP History] 8 (2013): 27-41, on 39; Du Liangxin and Zhao Heman, eds., 越南老撾柬埔寨手冊 (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia Manual, *Yuènnán Lǎowō Jiǎnpǔzhài shǒucè*). (Beijing: Shijie chubanshe, 1988), 156; and Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, 48.

⁹⁹ Chang, *Kampuchea between China and Vietnam*, 16-18.

¹⁰⁰ Li, "日內瓦會議上中國解決印支問題方針再探討李丹慧, 27-41; Li Danhui, "冷戰年代的西哈努克親王—來自柬埔寨國家檔案館的影像資料 (Prince Sihanouk and the Cold War Era—Data from the National Archives of Cambodia, *Lěngzhàn niándài de Xīhānùkè qīnwáng—láizì jiǎnpǔzhài guójiā dǎng'àn guǎn de yǐngxiàng zīliào*)," 冷戰國際史研究 [Cold War International History Studies] 1, (2013):375-409; Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, xii-xiii, 48-53, 151; and Chang, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam*, 16.

¹⁰¹ Sihanouk declared in 1954 that his forces had arrested many Khmer Issarak members, including Siu Heng, who "revealed the names of all the Communist leaders." Hoang Tung, "Briefing by Hoang Tung, Secretary of Central Committee, Vietnam Communist Party, In Charge of Information and Propaganda," (June 1983), 1-5, on page 1. National Archives of Cambodia Document, D18101, Box 641.

¹⁰² Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, xiii, 120. Engelbert and Goscha state that in Cambodia, the Communists "had hardly any freedom for maneuver given Sihanouk's popularity, anti-communist stance, and the assiduousness of his police. The Cambodian communists were therefore... to wither on the vine." On page v.

¹⁰³ Pol Pot, "Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot, secrétaire du comité du parti communiste du Kampuchéa au meeting commémorant le 17^e anniversaire de la fondation du parti communiste du Kampuchéa et à l'occasion de la proclamation solennelle de l'existence officielle du parti communiste de Kampuchéa," (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 27 September 1977), 14-15; Pol Pot, *Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea: Speech*

The Vietnamese Communists reiterated this pro-Sihanouk line in a late 1964-early 1965 meeting between WPK delegation leader Saloth Sar and Vietnamese Communist General Secretary Le Duan in Hanoi, which pushed the Cambodian radical towards China for support.¹⁰⁴ The WPK's Central Committee sent Sar, who had schooled in organizational tactics of the Stalinist *Parti communiste français* (PCF) and had, at this time, toed the Soviet-influenced Vietnamese Communist line, to establish regular inter-Party relations and to agree on guidelines for the Cambodian Party's strategy during the Second Indochina War.¹⁰⁵ Sar presented a program of self-reliance and independence, and "asked for arms to use against Sihanouk."¹⁰⁶ Rather than an enthusiastic response, however, Le criticized it outright.¹⁰⁷ Le "showed an almost visceral insensitivity to Cambodian concerns," stressing that the Cambodian struggle ought to be part of an Indochina-wide struggle. He reminded Sar that the War had to end before the WPK could revolt, and lambasted his program for its "naiveté" "nationalist focus," which both "ran counter to Vietnamese interests."¹⁰⁸ Le concluded that Sar's program was a prime example of his "insubstantial, faulty Marxism," and was therefore "irrelevant."¹⁰⁹ The VWP decision convinced Sar to contact the Chinese through "secret organizations of overseas Chinese in Vietnam (north and south)... and with the Chinese embassy in Hanoi."¹¹⁰ Against Vietnamese desires, he left for Beijing with the hope that China would receive his program favorably and enthusiastically, since Chinese foreign policy had shifted from endorsing peaceful coexistence during the "Bandung Spirit" years to a more radical position that promoted world revolution.¹¹¹

by Pol Pot, *Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kampuchean Communist Party Delivered on September 29, 1977*. (Chicago, IL: Liberator Press, 1977), 18-19.

¹⁰⁴ Chang, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam*, 18-19; and Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, v.

¹⁰⁵ Hoang Tung," Briefing by Hoang Tung...", 1-2; Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930-1975. Second Edition*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 219; and Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, vi. See also Stephen Heder, *Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model. Volume I: Imitation and Independence, 1930-1975*. (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2004).

¹⁰⁶ Hoang Tung," Briefing by Hoang Tung...", 2.

¹⁰⁷ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 220; Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, vi; David P. Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 70-71; Short, *Pol Pot*, 157; and K. Viviane Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political Context: The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party's Historiography (1979-1991)," *Modern Asian Studies* 31, No. 4 (October 1997): 807-846, on page 839.

¹⁰⁸ Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, vi. See also Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 70; and Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History...", 838-839.

¹⁰⁹ Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, vi.

¹¹⁰ Hoang Tung," Briefing by Hoang Tung...", 2. Hoang states that he "[did not] know if they were in contact with them [the secret organizations]—I suspect it but we have no evidence (Sihanouk says they were)."

¹¹¹ Zhang Xizhen, 西哈努克家族, 154. Zhang alleges that Le Duan tried to prevent Sar from leaving for Beijing, by delaying the processing of his request for permission to enter China. Short, without reference to a particular source,

Sar arrived in Beijing and stayed at the 亞非拉培訓中心 (Asian, African, and Latin America Training Centre, *Yà fēi lā péixùn zhōngxīn*) just outside of the city.¹¹² The precise dates and length stay of Saloth Sar's 1965-1966 visit to Beijing are unknown.¹¹³ In accordance with the CCP's adherence to the Five Peaceful Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and its existing treaty of noninterference with Cambodia, the official Chinese line was that Sar ought to support Prince Sihanouk, who was an important strategic ally to the PRC. This meant that the CCP did not publicize the young Cambodian Communist's visit to Beijing, and the Chinese officials who met with Sar (David Chandler names CCP General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, Head of State Liu Shaoqi, and Kang Sheng) could not endorse the Cambodian Communist movement outright.¹¹⁴ Regardless of the secrecy that surrounded the trip, the CCP viewed it as within the bounds of its existing treaty with Sihanouk so long as any encouragement that they voiced for Sar was *sub rosa*.¹¹⁵ The Cambodian movement's inability to reciprocate any aid to China meant that any Chinese offer of material support would not violate its existing deal—the Cambodian Communists still responded to Hanoi, and the KWP was not yet in a position to offer fair exchange due to its limited base areas and small membership.

writes that Sar flew to Beijing alone while Keo Meas rested in Hanoi recovering from a gall-bladder condition. Short, *Pol Pot*, 159.

¹¹² Short states that Youqing Wang told him of the whereabouts of Saloth Sar's residence while he was in Beijing. Short, *Pol Pot*, 159, 484n159.

¹¹³ As Sihanouk's opponent, Sar did not state explicitly that his 1965 visit occurred until years later in an interview with the Communist Party of Thailand, and without a specific length of stay. Zhang Xizhen claims that Sar (沙洛特紹 in Zhang's book) was in Beijing by the autumn of 1965 and stayed for three months. Zhang Xizhen, 西哈努克家族, 154. David Chandler, by contrast, states that Sar spent as much as eleven months between 1965 and 1966 on his trip through Laos, Vietnam, China, and North Korea, arriving in Beijing in 1966 experiencing the "early phase" of the Cultural Revolution. Chandler, *Brother Number One...*, 66, 69, 71-77. Philip Short's contention that Sar landed in Beijing in December 1965 and "spent about a month there" coincides with the Vietnamese documents and Pol Pot's own later timing of his first Beijing visit. Short, *Pol Pot*, 159; Pol Pot, "Interview with Cai Ximei," (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: May 1984).

¹¹⁴“不同製度國家友好共處的範例：中柬友好和互不侵犯條約昨晨在金邊交換批准文書 (The Friendly Coexistence of Countries with Different Systems of Government a Model Example: China-Cambodia Friendship and Non-aggression Treaty in Ratified in Phnom Penh Yesterday Morning, *Bùtóng zhìdù guójiā yǒuhǎo gòngchǔ de fānlì: Zhōng jiǎn yǒuhǎo hé hù bù qīnfān tiáoyuē zuó chén zài jīnbīān jiāohuàn pīzhǔn wénshū*),” 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (3 May 1961); and Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 73-75. “Excerpts from the Document Entitled ‘Pol Pot Presents the Cambodian Party’s Experiences to Khamtan, the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Thailand: Informal Talks held in August 1977.’” Thomas Engelbert trans. [Hanoi: TVQDND, 1977], 23; and 柬埔寨人民的伟大胜利：热烈庆祝柬埔寨爱国军民解放金边 [The Great Victory of the Cambodian People: Patriotic Soldiers and Civilians Celebrate the Liberation of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, *Jiǎnpǔzhài rénmín de wěidà shènglì: Rèliè qìngzhù Jiǎnpǔzhài àiguó jūnmín jiěfàng Jīnbīān*]. (Beijing: Renmin dabanshe, May 1975). Official Chinese sources did not begin to identify the CPK until 1975, and even then, the focus was more on Lon Nol's regime. Such official documents make virtually no reference to Pol Pot.

¹¹⁵ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 210.

Sar's visit coincided with events in the PRC that left a lasting imprint on him. For instance, Sar experienced to some degree the rising tide of Maoist revival that came with the Socialist Education Movement (SEM), which placed primacy on curbing cadre corruption in rural areas and broadened previous campaigns to *include* rather than exclude peasants.¹¹⁶ Then there was Lin Biao, the champion of faith Maoist zealotry, who had released his seminal pamphlet "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" only months before Sar's arrival. While Vietnam was preoccupied with the war against American imperialism, Lin's lauding of the effectiveness and universal applicability of Mao's military strategy cast light on to a tried and true method to defeat a numerically and technologically advanced adversary. His emphasis on indigenous self-sustaining revolution "struck a sympathetic chord with Sar," as did Mao's emphases on permanent revolution, the role of subjective forces in waging struggle, and the inclusion of peasants into the revolutionary vanguard under the directorship of the proletariat.¹¹⁷ Mao's heir apparent also applied people's war macrocosmically to the entire world, wherein the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would "encircle the cities"—the first and second worlds—much like China had done by 1949.¹¹⁸ This application served to recognize smaller, underdeveloped countries like Cambodia as valuable actors in a global struggle against superpower domination. Cambodia thus had incredible potential if its movement could just get off the ground.

As for the CCP response to Sar's arrival, CCP members Deng Xiaoping, Mayor and First Secretary of the Beijing Committee of the CCP Peng Zhen, and Liu Shaoqi welcomed him with a warm reception.¹¹⁹ Sar likely spoke to his hosts through an interpreter since he did not speak Chinese. Mao apparently read a translated version of Sar's program and lauded it overall, calling his class analysis and assessment of Cambodian realities by-and-large correct.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 2, The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 218; and Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 125-126. China's foreign minister, Chen Yi, described the post-Great Leap retrenchment period as "very tense," and that after the Leap's failure "[t]here were very many chimneys from which no smoke came; factories [did not] have machines; our money had gone."

¹¹⁷ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 73.

¹¹⁸ Cook, "Third World Maoism," *Critical Introduction to Mao*, 290-291; and Short, *Pol Pot*, 159-160.

¹¹⁹ Despite their inclination to a bureaucratic Maoist approach, these officials still cited pieces by Mao and supported his "people's war" and "three worlds" theory that were prominent at this time.

¹²⁰ Christoph Goscha, "Interview with Pham Thanh," (Hanoi: 10 June 1989); and Ben Kiernan, "Origins of Khmer Communism," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (1981): 161-180, on page 178.

Alternate member of the CCP Politburo Kang Sheng even touted him as the “true voice of the Cambodian revolution,” implying that the Chinese Foreign Ministry supported “a reactionary prince” by keeping its ties with Sihanouk intact.¹²¹ A Vietnamese source states that Chinese officials supported his programme, stating that the “Cambodian Party, like any other Party, must deal with American imperialism immediately as well as when they widen the war in Indochina... Every Party, including the Cambodian Party, has the task of fighting American imperialism in order to preserve peace and neutrality... And if one desires to oppose the plots of American imperialists, including their plot to escalate [the war], then one must take hold of the peasantry.”¹²² Pol Pot recalled this vote of confidence in a 1977 interview: “Our Chinese friends whole-heartedly supported our political line, for they were then battling revisionism at a time when classes were struggling with each other at the international level... It was only when we [the Khmer Communists] went abroad that we realized that our movement was quite correct and that our political line was also fundamentally correct.”¹²³ CCP approval of Sar’s programme reinvigorated his sense of revolutionary worth. It was from then on that he pinned the Cambodian Communists’ star to Maoism instead of VWP’s course, and he returned to Cambodia in 1966 with “a few pieces of French translations of *Selected Works of Mao*” with the intent to plot his movement against Sihanouk’s Government.¹²⁴

In September 1966, Sar’s faith Maoist influence began to take shape in the form of some important changes that he put into effect within the WPK. In 1966 he officially changed the

¹²¹ John Byron and Robert Pack, *The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng—The Evil Genius Behind Mao—and His Legacy of Terror in People’s China*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 356-357. By endorsing Pol Pot, Kang “did more than express a desire to bring revolution to Cambodia: he advanced his own cause within the CCP leadership.” Madame Deng Yingchao, Zhou Enlai’s widow, “was so outraged by Kang’s meddling in Cambodian affairs that she told a Thai delegation to China in the early 1980s that Kang Sheng had been responsible for China’s backing of Pol Pot.” See also “人物介紹：波爾波特，喬森潘，英薩利 (Introduction: Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan, and Ieng Sary, *rénwù jièshào: Bō ěr bō tè, Qiáo Sēnpān, Yīng Sàlì*),” 東南亞研究資 [Southeast Asia Research] 1 (1979): 92-94, on page 92; and Jean Daubier, *A History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution*. (New York: Vintage, 1974), 37, 76, 259.

¹²² Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, 79-80n102.

¹²³ “Excerpts from the Document Entitled ‘Pol Pot Presents...’” 23; Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, 79; and Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History...,” 839n119.

¹²⁴ “Excerpts from the Document Entitled ‘Pol Pot Presents...’” 23; and Short, *Pol Pot*, 160. On Sar’s acquisition of a French-language Quotations, see Sacha Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges: de Paris à Phnom Penh, 1945-1979 » (PhD Dissertation, Université Paris X – Nanterre, 2001), 121. Ben Kiernan states that the CPK’s internal history, which it produced a few months after the revolt, attests to the Party’s sponsorship of the uprising: “‘Samlaut’ and ‘Pailin’ in Battambang, etc... show the great strength of our people under the leadership of the Party which dares fight and defeat the enemy.” Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 126n102. He references ប្រវត្តិបក្សសង្គ្រោះ (Short History of the Party), ទង់ក្រហម [Red Flag (Phnom Penh)] Special Issue (September-October 1967), 71. Khmer added by author in place of phonetic spelling.

WPK's name to the Chinese-influenced "Communist Party of Kampuchea" (CPK)—a name that remained in effect until the Party's dissolution in 1981.¹²⁵ The CPK also established two new journals that reflected his adherence to faith Maoism: 1) កងក្រហម ("Red Flag"), which was a Cambodian equivalent of the Great Leap Forward-era Chinese journal *Red Flag*; and 2) រស្មីក្រហម ("Red Light"), which borrowed its name from a Chinese student newspaper that emerged in France in the 1920s.¹²⁶ But perhaps the best indicator of this shift is a letter penned by Sar (most likely translated from French into Chinese by an interpreter, as Sihanouk had used in meetings with Chairman Mao) that he sent to Beijing in 1967:

Comrades, we are extremely pleased to report that in terms of ideological outlook, as well as our revolutionary line, that we are preparing the implementation of a people's war which has been moved towards an unstoppable point. Simultaneously, in terms of organization, there are also favorable circumstances, as well as for the execution of working affairs. Thus, we dare to affirm that: although there are obstacles ahead, we will still continue to put into effect the revolutionary work according to the line of the people's war which Chairman Mao Zedong has pointed out in terms of its independence, sovereignty, and self-reliance.¹²⁷

Here, Sar makes several Maoist precepts central to the Cambodian revolution, many of which he had certainly read about while a student in Paris (namely the 1951 French-language edition of Mao's "On New Democracy").¹²⁸ Yet his experiences in Beijing showed him firsthand the rewards of such theories if followed. As he recalled in a 1984 *Cai Ximei* interview, "[w]hen I read Chairman Mao's books, I felt that they were easy to understand."¹²⁹ Pol Pot seldom shied away from boasting of Democratic Kampuchea's "Chinese friends to the north" who "gave us [the CPK] the advantage" in the struggle against imperialism.¹³⁰ He valued the Thought of Mao

¹²⁵ "A Short Guide for Application of Party Statutes," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion*. Timothy M. Carney, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 106, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1977), 56; and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 190.

¹²⁶ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 219-224; Timothy Carney, "Cambodia: The Unexpected Victory," *Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 24; and Daubier, *A History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 226.

¹²⁷ Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, 80-81.

¹²⁸ Mao Zedong, *La nouvelle Démocratie* [On New Democracy]. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1951). Pol Pot's mentor in Paris, Keng Vannsak, recalled that "Au début nous étions très staliniens... nous nous tournés vers la China à la fin des années cinquantes car les russes jouaient la carte de Sihanouk et nous négligéent... Quand le monde a commence e critique Staline, on est devenue maoistes. (At the beginning we [the Cambodian *Cercle Marxiste*] were very Stalinist... We turned toward China in the late 1950s because the Russians were playing the Sihanouk card and neglecting us... When everyone began to criticize Stalin, we became Maoists)." Marie-Alexandrine Martin, *Le mal cambodgien*. (Mesnil-sur-l'Estrée, Phnom Penh: Société Nouvelle Firmin-Didot-Hachette, 1989), 105.

¹²⁹ Pol Pot, "Interview with Cai Ximei," (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: May 1984); Short, *Pol Pot*, 477n70.

¹³⁰ "Entretien Sino-Kampuchéen le 29 September 1977," (29 September 1977).

Zedong above all else, claiming that Mao Zedong Thought “is the most precious aid... Comrade President Mao never ceased his support to support our efforts [and] we express with deep emotion our respect for his and the CCP’s heroic and unswerving commitment to the international Communist movement.”¹³¹ The suppression of high-ranking left-minded government ministers in the wake of Samlaut notwithstanding, the CPK, now equipped with Maoism as its principal weapon, grew to become the preeminent revolutionary Party in Cambodia.¹³²

In sum, the 1965-1966 visit was an intellectual awakening for Sar, and his experiences there convinced him that Lin Biao’s faith Maoism could reverse the Cambodian revolution’s stagnation. Although Sar initially sought help from China as a reaction to Vietnamese paternalism, the visit to Beijing convinced him that Maoist China was *the* leading force of a worldwide Third World movement. Cambodia became an epicenter for China’s Third World outreach, as the hosting of foreign revolutionaries, regardless of whether they stood as national leaders or potential opposition forces, lent revolutionary credence to their just struggles against imperialism. In a 1977 issue of 人民日報 (People’s Daily), the resonating force of Saloth Sar’s visit and conversion to Maoism was loud and clear:

For us, the parliamentary road is not feasible. We have studied the experience of world revolution, especially the works of Comrade Mao Zedong and the experience of the Chinese revolution of the period that has an important impact for us. After assessing the specific experience of Kampuchea and studying a number of instances of world revolution, and particularly under the guidance of the works of Comrade Mao Zedong, we have found an appropriate line with China’s specific conditions and social situation for the realities of Kampuchea. Thus, our Party committee set the Party’s line, and this line was debated and approved by the first congress, held at Phnom Penh on September 30, 1960.¹³³

¹³¹ Pol Pot, “Allocution du Camarade Pol Pot, Secrétaire du Comité Central du Parti Communiste du Kampuchéa, Premier Ministre du Gouvernement du Kampuchéa Démocratique: Chef de la délégation du parti communiste du Kampuchéa et du gouvernement du Kampuchéa démocratique a l’occasion du banquet de bienvenue organisé en son honneur par Le Comité Central du Parti Communiste Chinois et le Gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine,” (28 September 1977), 8; and “Speech Made by Pol Pot, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, Prime Minister of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, At a Banquet Given in Honor of the Delegation of the Communist Party of China and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” (Phnom Penh, 5 November 1978), 1-19.

¹³² Mertha, *Brothers in Arms*, 22.

¹³³ “波尔布特同志在京举行记者招待会介绍了柬埔寨共产党光辉的战斗历程和柬埔寨人民在柬埔寨共产党领导下各方面所取得的伟大胜利柬埔寨党政代表团成员英萨利、温威和秀臣出席 (Comrade Pol Pot at a Conference Held in Beijing Describes the Great Victory in All Aspects of the Cambodian Communist Party and the Glorious History of the Cambodian People’s Struggle Under the Leadership of Communist Party of Cambodia, Delegates Ieng Sary, Wen

Here, Pol Pot identifies that he and his comrades had read Mao's works before the 1960 founding of the Party, though the actual date for its first congress was 1951—long before Pol Pot's turn to Communism.¹³⁴ Though antedating his 1966 visit, Pol Pot's interest in China and Maoism, which began in Paris, came together as he realized the stagnation of the Vietnamese-led KPRP/WPK. Although Pol Pot wanted revolution against Sihanouk, he had to obey his VWP superiors, who wanted the Prince's favor so that they could transport arms to guerrillas fighting in South Vietnam via Cambodian territory. Not unlike Hong Xiuquan, who had the "Taiping vision" after reading (and initially dismissing) Liang A-fa's *Good Words*, Pol Pot's 1966 visit to Beijing gave him the "dream" that would make Mao's ideas (as he read in Paris) important to him. Thereafter until the demise of Democratic Kampuchea, Pol Pot regarded Communist China and Mao Zedong as the brilliant beacons on world revolution.

A Revolutionary Bible: Quotations of Chairman Mao Goes Global

全世界無產者，聯合起來！(Workers of the World, Unite!)—Slogan added to *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* by the People's Liberation Army General Political Department, May 1964

This section argues that *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* evolved beyond its diminutive form to become a medium through which the Chinese revolution could spread outside China. The CCP sought to accelerate the Third World struggle against imperialism through the systematic translation (into more than sixty languages) and distribution of Mao's most resonant quotes and precepts in *Quotations*. The 1970s marked the triumph of practical matters in PRC foreign policy, with China establishing relations with First and Second World nations. However, the decline of Mao-centric radicalism in China did not curb Mao's appeal abroad.¹³⁵ But how? *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, the infamous "Little Red Book," was printed over one

Wei and Han Xiuchen in Attendance, *Bō ěr bù tè tóngzhì zàijīng jūxíng jìzhě zhāodài huì jièshàole jiǎnpūzhài gòngchāndǎng guānghuī de zhāndòu lǐchéng hé jiǎnpūzhài rénmin zài jiǎnpūzhài gòngchāndǎng língdǎo xià gè fāngmiàn suǒ qǔdé de wěidà shènglì jiǎnpūzhài dǎng zhèng dàibiāo tuán chéngyuán yīng sà lì, wēn wēi hàn xiùchén chūxí*," 人民日报 [People's Daily], (3 October 1977), 1; and Tribunal Populaire Révolutionnaire Siégeant à Phnom Penh pour le Jugement du Crime de Génocide Commis par la Clique Pol Pot-Ieng Sary, "Extrait du discours prononcé à la conférence de presse tenue à Pékin le 29-9-1977 par Pol Pot lors de sa visite en Chine et publié le 3-10-1977 par le *Renmin Ribao*," (August 1979, Document N. 2. 6. 04D).

¹³⁴ ဗျူဟာအစွဲအနွယ် [Revolutionary Youth], (September 1976), 3. On the Party's change of its founding date from 1951 to 1960, see David P. Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When Was the Birthday of the Party?" *Pacific Affairs* 56, No. 2 (Summer 1983): 288-300.

¹³⁵ Cook, "Third World Maoism," *Critical Introduction to Mao*, 299.

billion times between 1966 and 1971, and it became a comprehensive political guide in China during the high tide of the Cultural Revolution maelstrom.¹³⁶ As its popularity in China skyrocketed, *Quotations*' continued circulation made Maoism accessible to a new generation of revolutionary intellectuals and breathed life into Maoism even after the Chairman's death in 1976. Four factors explain this phenomenon: 1) extant methods to spread wisdom in China (the Confucian *Analects*, and later, the CCP's Propaganda Department 中宣部, which developed Bolshevik-style *Agit Prop*); 2) Communist claims to represent the absolute truth of a scientific world; 3) *Quotations*' ingenious physical format as a pocketbook; and 4) China's political environment during the Cultural Revolution.¹³⁷

But how do we explain the complex phenomenon of the global diffusion of *Quotations*? Communist China's export of the Chinese revolution became an increasingly important objective, as waves of decolonization throughout the Third World and de-Stalinization under Nikita Khrushchev were underway in the 1950s. Mao thus became "willing to present the PRC as an example with applications in other parts of the world," and the CCP's translation and spread of Maoist texts increased exponentially during the Cultural Revolution, thereby allowing for the introduction of Maoism to all the world's revolutionary peoples.¹³⁸ The spread of *Quotations* in particular constitutes one of, if not the most integral driving force behind the worldwide development of Maoism in various national movements, ranging from Paris to Phnom Penh to Manila to Jakarta. Its mass dissemination counters claims by Mao scholar/doyen Stuart Schram, who once stated that "to the extent that [Mao's] utterances reflect specifically Chinese interests and are clothed in language that is peculiarly Chinese, they may find little echo outside of China."¹³⁹ Indeed, the enormous translation and distribution endeavors reveals the exact opposite, as *Quotations* remains, with around 900 million copies published, one of the most printed books in the world.

¹³⁶ Fang Houqu, "毛澤東著作出版記使, 1949-1982年 (Recollections of Publishing Mao Zedong's Works, 1949-1982, *Máo Zédōng zhùzuò chūbǎn jìshǐ*)," [www.pubhistory.com/img/text/2/1062.htm] (Accessed 15 May 2015); and Leese, "A Single Spark," in *Mao's Little Red Book*, 23.

¹³⁷ Leese, "A Single Spark," in *Mao's Little Red Book*, 23. See also Melissa Schrift, *Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a Personality Cult*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001).

¹³⁸ Bourg, "The Red Guards of Paris, 473; and Xu, "Translation and Internationalism," *Mao's Little Red Book*, 76.

¹³⁹ Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. (New York: Praeger, 1969), 112.

The most crucial institution during this period that was responsible for the translation of Chinese works, Mao's *Quotations* and *Selected Works* included, was the Foreign Languages Press (FLP), whose task was to translate foreign works into Chinese and vice-versa. The principal distribution agency, meanwhile, was the International Bookstore (IB, a constituent part of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the China Cultural Council),¹⁴⁰ and it was responsible for distributing these works globally. Over the course of the Cultural Revolution, the FLP translated *Quotations* into more than a dozen languages (English, French, Spanish, Japanese, Russian, German, and Italian, among others) and the IB "sent copies to more than a hundred countries."¹⁴¹ Mao's *Quotations* was, in the eyes of Mao and the CCP, to serve as the primary "spark to start a prairie fire" of revolutionary movements that were inspired by the Chinese revolution.¹⁴² Its accessibility by dint of the FLP's translations and the IB's distribution ultimately allowed Maoism to traverse the barriers of developed/underdeveloped, thereby bringing Maoism to a global audience.

Indeed, there is no shortage of evidence that the CCP shipped foreign language copies of *Quotations* all over the world, and examples of the frequency of *Quotations* in other countries ranged from the benign to a direct effort on the CCP's behalf to inspire revolution. Chen Yinghong recalls that China exported to Singapore and Malaysia packages of children's snacks that included Mao's *Quotations* and stamps with Chairman Mao's image.¹⁴³ The IB, the PRC Embassy in Jakarta, Sino-Indonesian shop-owners, and Communist Party of Indonesia (*Parti Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) affiliates distributed translated PRC documents, including

¹⁴⁰ Cao, 中國國際圖書貿易總公司四十週年, 47, as cited in Xu, "Translation and Internationalism," *Mao's Little Red Book*, 83.

¹⁴¹ Xu, "Translation and Internationalism," *Mao's Little Red Book*, 76; and "國際共產主義運動史上的大事件, 無產階級文化大革命的新生," (The Big Event in the History of the Internationalist Movement and the New Victory in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, *Guójì gòngchǎn zhǔyì yùndòng shǐshàng de dà shìjiàn, wúchǎn jiējí wénhuà dàgémìng de xīnshēng*), 人民日報 [*People's Daily*] (2 July 1967). The International Bookstore was founded in December 1949 to establish "cultural exchanges between the new China and other countries." Cao, 中國國際圖書貿易總公司四十週年, 37.

¹⁴² Mao Zedong, "Letter to Lin Biao," (5 January 1930), *Mao's Road to Power, Volume III*. Stuart Schram ed., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1992), 234-246 (hereafter MRP); Mao Zedong, "給林彪同志的信(Letter to Lin Biao, *Gěi línbiāo tóngzhì de xìn*)," 毛澤東集第二卷 [Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume 2] Takeuchi, ed., (Tokyo: Suosuosha, 1970-1972), 127-142 (hereafter MZJ); Mao Zedong, "星星之火, 可以燎原 (A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire, *Xīngxīng zhī huǒ kěyǐ liáoyuán*)" 毛澤東集第一卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe chuban, 1952), 94-104 (hereafter XJ).

¹⁴³ Cheng Yinghong, 毛主義革命: 二十世紀的中國與世界 [Maoist Revolution: China and the World in the Twentieth Century, *Máo zhǔyì gémìng: Èrshí shìjì de zhōngguó yǔ shìjìè*]. (Hong Kong: Tianyuan Bookstore, 2008), 114.

Quotations.¹⁴⁴ *Pékin Information* also states that the Foreign Languages Press translated volumes I and IV of *Selected Works of Chairman Mao* (French “*Oeuvres choisies*”) into several languages and exported them in 1966.¹⁴⁵ In fact, Pol Pot lauded the French language *Oeuvres choisies* in a 1977 interview: “in this excellent situation, the publication of the fifth volume of *Selected Works of Chairman Mao* constitutes a political scope of events both for China and for world’s revolutionary peoples.”¹⁴⁶ Chinese cadres also offered instruction to guerrillas in small arms, explosives, and people’s war guerrilla tactics, and were “expected to benefit from Mao’s teachings, both by observing firsthand the model behavior displayed by Chinese technicians and also by reading for themselves from Mao’s *Quotations* (copies of the books, along with pins bearing Mao’s likeness, were reportedly distributed widely in Tanzania in the 1960s).”¹⁴⁷ Although the Foreign Languages Press and International Bookstore relied heavily on international trade connections to overcome existing political and spatial obstacles, both institutions were important players in China’s foreign affairs throughout the world, including Southeast Asia, by the latter part of the 1950s.

At the Cultural Revolution’s onset, the International Bookstore joined the Foreign Languages Press to “accelerate” the world revolution by providing an “invaluable contribution to socialist internationalism and to the development of global revolution” in the form of more Mao works and related propaganda, most notably his *Quotations*.¹⁴⁸ The sheer number of multilingual published materials from Beijing that it distributed abroad for virtually no cost helped to extend *Quotations*’ expansive footprint. The CCP’s intent to hasten the world revolution engendered the worldwide spread of the Thought of Mao Zedong in a portable, accessible format, and to teach revolutionaries young and old via this massive undertaking that China was the epicenter of the world movement.

¹⁴⁴ Liu Hong, “‘The China Metaphor’: Indonesian Intellectuals and the PRC, 1949-1965,” (PhD Diss., Ohio University, Athens, 1995), 218; and Maya HT Liem, “A Bridge to the Outside World: Literary Translation in Indonesia, 1950-1965,” Keith Foulcher trans., in *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian, 1950-1965*. Jennifer Lindsay and Maya HT Liem, eds. (Leiden, the Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2012), 172.

¹⁴⁵ *Pékin Information* 22 (30 May 1966), cited in Julian Bourg, “Principally Contradiction: The Flourishing of French Maoism,” *Mao’s Little Red Book*, 228. Bourg states that French translations of Russian editions had earlier been available,” and it is possible that these editions were the ones available to the French Communist Party (which had Pol Pot, Hou Yuon, and Khieu Samphan as members). Bourg, “The Red Guards of Paris,” 473.

¹⁴⁶ Pol Pot, “Allocution du Camarade Pol Pot...,” 4.

¹⁴⁷ Jamie Monson, *Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed the Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania*. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 26-28.

¹⁴⁸ Xu, “Translation and Internationalism,” *Mao’s Little Red Book*, 76.

One example of the power of Mao's *Quotations* initiating significant interest in Maoism was in Cambodia, where CCP-dispatched technical advisers "waved Mao's 'Little Red Book' and proselytized their Khmer coworkers."¹⁴⁹ While a Khmer version of Mao's *Quotations* was never published, a French language version (possibly the 1951 version) "abounded among high school students and younger Buddhist monks" in Cambodia.¹⁵⁰ China's "Red Guard Diplomacy"¹⁵¹ between October 1967 and May 1968 troubled the politically neutral Cambodian head of state, who in 1967 after the Samlaut uprising (prelude to the Cambodian Civil War, 1970-1975), held a press conference in which he criticized recent foreign and domestic policy shifts in Beijing. In a show of his turn to the right,¹⁵² the Prince spoke out against China's Cultural Revolution-motivated shift toward intervention in Cambodian affairs, particularly in supporting the Pol Pot-led CPK after 1965.¹⁵³ Sihanouk stated that China

has gone astray... our great friend is walking on the wrong path and making a great mistake on this false road... This state of affairs is not at all palatable. We say this not to criticize China. But if China continues its way, it will make the entire world turn its back; this would not be good. *It is inadvisable for China to intervene in the sovereignty of others.*¹⁵⁴

Indeed, *Quotations'* ubiquity in Cambodia irked Prince Sihanouk, who was shocked to find out that *Quotations* was popular in Chinese schools and monasteries alike.¹⁵⁵ He decried "subversive

¹⁴⁹ Short, *Pol Pot*, 179. On the presence of Chinese technical experts in Cambodia during this time, see, for instance, "中國正確執行柬中貿易協定：讚中國專家不介入柬內政的態度 (China and Cambodia Implement a Trade Agreement: Chinese Experts Will not Intervene in Cambodian Domestic Affairs, *Zhōngguó zhèngquè zhíxíng jiǎn zhōng mào yì xiédìng: Zàn zhōngguó zhuānjiā bù jièrù jiǎn nèizhèng de tàidù*)," 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (10 July 1964); "中國專家勘探發現柬埔寨友鐵礦 (Chinese Experts Discover Cambodia Has Iron Ore, *Zhōngguó zhuānjiā kāntàn fāxiàn jiǎnpǔzhài yǒu tiěkuàng*)," 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (13 July 1960); and "民族主義者周刊全文發表：中柬經濟技術援助混合航運公司 (Nationalist Weekly Full Text: Sino-Cambodian Economic and Technical Assistance Exchanged via Shipping, *Mínzú zhǔyì zhě zhōukān quánwén fābiào: Zhōng jiǎn jīngjì jìshù yuánzhù hùnhé hángyùn gōngsī*)," 棉華日報 [Sino-Khmer Daily (Phnom Penh)] (24 January 1961).

¹⁵⁰ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 347n33, citing interviews with Sok Pirun (January 1990) and Huy Huynh (February 1988); and Chander, *Brother Number One*, 73.

¹⁵¹ Sher, "Le parcours politique des khmers rouges," 122.

¹⁵² Mertha, *Brothers in Arms*, 22.

¹⁵³ Characteristic of this more radical period of foreign affairs was a diplomatic note that Beijing sent to the Chinese Embassy in Yangon, Burma, on 11 July 1967, which stated that Chairman Mao "is the very red sun that shines most brightly in our hearts and Mao [Zedong's] thought is our lifeline... Anyone who dares to oppose Chairman Mao and Mao [Zedong's] thought is hitting his head against a brick wall and inviting his own destruction." *Peking Review*, No. 30 (1967), 39.

¹⁵⁴ "Sihanouk Cautions CPR about Intervention: Excerpts of 80-Minute Speech by Prince Norodom Sihanouk during a Mass Demonstration on 13 September in Front of the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh," (Phnom Penh Domestic Service 0630 GMT, 13 September 1967). Emphasis added.

¹⁵⁵ Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 193; Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 79; and Justin Corfield, *The History of Cambodia*. (Santa Barbara, CA:

activities conducted by Sino-Khmer Communist elements within the AAKC and General Association of Students (AGEK).”¹⁵⁶ Beijing’s radical foreign policy shift during the Cultural Revolution only increased his concerns,¹⁵⁷ although Mao and his lieutenants were quick to patch things up with the Cambodian monarch by welcoming him on several friendly visits to his lavish Beijing residence throughout the late 1960s.

As the examples above have shown, *Quotations from Chairman Mao* became, in essence, a revolutionary bible in the 1960s. It was every bit as in fashion among radicals and leftist intellectuals as tie-dye shirts and bellbottoms were among Western youth in the 1960s and 1970s. The significant efforts undertaken by Beijing’s Foreign Language Press and International Bookstore to translate and distribute Mao’s *Quotations* transmitted Maoism effectively, as red books popped up in the most unlikely of places to incite the world’s revolutionary peoples. Maoist philosophy and strategy via the Little Red Book made concepts such as “democratic centralism, the critique of Confucian humanism, self-criticism, the ‘creative masses,’ [and] the pre-eminence of ideological struggle”¹⁵⁸ accessible for millions of people outside China for the first time. Through these translation and distribution efforts, Communist China positioned Mao Thought as essential wisdom, and China’s present position as a major Communist nation right at the center of the internationalist movement. But the CCP’s desire to provide spiritual and ideological aegis notwithstanding, the actual *content* that the Chinese Communists exported still needed to “speak” to the revolutionaries in other countries who turned to Maoism as a fount of revolutionary wisdom; it had to relate to the specific conditions of those national situations. Thus it is to the prominent features of exported Maoism that we now turn.

Part II—“A True Bastion of Iron”: The Content of Exported Maoism

As crucial as the CCP’s efforts to export Maoism were to the emergence of Maoist Parties outside China, the content of this exported Maoism formed an equally integral driving

ABC-CLIO, 2009), 59. See also Tong Dan, “西哈努克、波爾布特與中國,” (Sihanouk, Pol Pot and China, *Xīhānùkè, Bōěrbùtè yǔ Zhōngguó*), 黨史文匯 [Collected History of the Party, *Dǎngshǐwénhuì*] (2000).

¹⁵⁶ Sher, “Le parcours politique des khmers rouges,” 122.

¹⁵⁷ Julio Jeldres, “A Personal on Norodom Sihanouk and Zhou Enlai: An Extraordinary Friendship on the Fringes of the Cold War,” *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, No. 4 (September 2012): 52-64.

¹⁵⁸ Bourg, “The Red Guards of Paris,” 473.

force behind the ideology's reception. The previous section showed the ways in which Chinese foreign policy shifts coincided with hosting foreign would-be Maoists and mass translation and distribution enterprises to spread Maoism abroad. This section examines the ideological system inherent within exported Maoism. While the role of contradictions, developing self-reliance, and analyses of the classes in society were all themes that emerged in revolutionary intellectual circles and reappeared in their writings (as the subsequent chapter shows), this section highlights four defining components of the Maoist ideological system in the Southeast Asian case studies. These four elements are: 1) a revolutionary base, which emerged from a recognition that peasants had a significant revolutionary role to play under proletarian helmsmanship; 2) a military strategy (people's war) that could succeed if the revolutionary Party observed the mass line in a people's army to ensure that it had popular support (a united front from below rather than from above, so to speak); 3) a method by which to overcome imperialism and state military might (New Democracy); and most crucially 4) a method to apply Marxism-Leninism to concrete national realities, thereby making it normative.¹⁵⁹ In 1977 Pol Pot listed virtually the same components. He listed the following as components of Maoism that the CPK espoused:

1) the establishment of a Party and a solid leadership core; 2) the formation of a powerful united national front; 3) the solidification of a formidable revolutionary army; 4) an analysis of the classes of society; 5) contradictions; 6) practice; 7) the formation of revolutionary support bases for the campaign; 8) the role of the campaign and villages in the revolutionary struggle; 9) revolutionary violence; 10) the strategy of people's war; and 11) revolutionary culture, literature, and art.¹⁶⁰

In reference to the first component, Mao stressed the primacy of a proletarian-led revolution in which peasants held tremendous revolutionary potential. Mao regarded China's poor peasantry and agricultural laborers (nearly 70 percent of the rural populace) as the revolution's "biggest motive force" and "natural and most reliable ally of the proletariat."¹⁶¹ The Chairman's advocacy for a unified front of workers and peasants held significance since, in most

¹⁵⁹ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 160-161; Julian Bourg, "The Red Guards of Paris: French Student Maoism of the 1960s," *History of European Ideas* 31 (2005): 472-490, on page 473; Wolfgang Leonhard, *Three Faces of Marxism: The Political Concepts of Soviet Ideology, Maoism, and Humanist Marxism*. (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1974), 210-257; and Francois Marmour, *Le maoïsme: philosophie et politique* [Maoism: Philosophy and Politics]. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1976)..

¹⁶⁰ Pol Pot, "Allocution de Camarade Pol Pot..." 7.

¹⁶¹ Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution, and the Chinese Communist Party," (December 1939), *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 299; Mao Zedong, "中國革命與中國共產黨 (The Chinese Revolution, and the Chinese Communist Party, *Zhōngguó gé mìng yǔ zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng*)," 毛澤東集, 第七卷, *MZJVII*, Takeuchi ed., 125; and in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 606.

of the underdeveloped world (including the three case studies in this dissertation), the urban proletariat was numerically insignificant. Yet these predominantly agricultural economies held untapped revolutionary potential. As Lin Biao contended in his 1965 “manual for revolution by Communist Parties in the underdeveloped world”¹⁶²:

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called ‘the cities of the world,’ then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute ‘the rural areas of the world.’ Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people’s revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world’s population. The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people’s revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”¹⁶³

As the above passage shows, several key elements to Maoism, from its “deep emotional attachment to the rural ideal of ‘the unity of living and working’” to modern Chinese anti-urbanism (cities as centers of unproductiveness and foreign capitalist domination) are evident.¹⁶⁴ These features also characterized newly independent Asian countries in which a stark urban/rural divide had risen in tandem with capitalist development. Mao’s (and Lin’s) emphasis on incorporating peasants—who bore the brunt of this disequilibrium—into a mass movement resonated strongly with radicals who sought to reverse this mistreatment. Hu Nim, who was one of the Paris-educated CPK founders—and whose contribution to CPK Maoism is under analysis in the next chapter—devoted much of his doctoral dissertation to alleviating peasant exploitation and recognizing them as a demographic with great potential. His categories and definitions drew

¹⁶² Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 162. He references Donald Zagoria in particular, who argued that Lin’s article was “neither Fourth-of-July oratory nor a *Mein Kampf* design for China’s expansion... [the] statement is designed to tell *other* Communist Parties what *they* should do.” Donald Zagoria, “China and the Non-Western World,” *Diplomat*, (September 1966): 55. On FLP edition, see Xiaomei Chen, *Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 178n3.

¹⁶³ Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!”; Chen, *Occidentalism*, 3-4; and Cook, “Third World Maoism,” *Critical Introduction to Mao*, 289.

¹⁶⁴ Maurice Meisner, “Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 45 (January-March 1971): 2-36, on page 20; and Chen *Occidentalism*, 4. Chen mentions that Mao’s anti-urbanism shares certain similarities with Western intellectual tradition, namely Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion that cities were the “embodiment of all social evils and moral corruptions.” Some interesting similarities are apparent in Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) anti-urbanism, which also shares similarities with Rousseau. See also James Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide, and the Unmaking of Space*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 113-114.

directly from Mao's analysis of China's class structure and from his Report on the Hunan Peasants, arguing that land rent from sharecropping or paddy was "the direct exploitation by landed proprietors and rich peasants of the poorest stratum of the peasants."¹⁶⁵ But what method was most effective at empowering the world's marginalized peoples? The second component, Mao's military doctrine of people's war, encouraged the Third World "rise up like a fierce wind or tempest, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to suppress it."¹⁶⁶

People's war was perhaps the most influential part of exported Maoism. Before the Chinese Communists had seized state power and initiated China's socialist transition, Mao diagnosed China as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Chinese countryside, where landlordism crushed peasants beneath the boot-heels of crippling debt and landlessness. People's War was a strategy by which a numerically disadvantaged, limited, and people-driven force could use to bleed a technologically superior enemy dry. Mao described this strategy in a series of lectures between 26 May and 3 June 1938 at the Yan'an Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan:

In war, the profoundest source of mighty power lies within the popular masses.... the Japanese aggressor will be placed before our hundreds of millions of our people who have stood up. It will be like a wild bull crashing into a bed of fire—a single shout would be enough to give it a big scare, and this wild bull cannot fail to be burned to death. On our side, the armies ... must merge with the people, to make it so that, in the eyes of the popular masses, the army is seen as their own army. Such an army will have no match throughout the world, and merely fighting Japanese imperialism will hardly be a sufficient challenge for it.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Hu Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » (Thèse de Doctorat en Droit Public, Université Royale, Phnom Penh, 1965), 95; and Timothy M. Carney, "Continuity in Cambodian Communism: Introduction," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 14-15.

¹⁶⁶ Mao Zedong, "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan, (February 1927), *MRP II*, Schram, ed., 430; Mao Zedong, "湖南農民運動考察報告 (Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan, *Húnán nóngmín yùndòng kǎochá bàogào*)," 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 207; Mao Zedong, "湖南農民運動考察報告 (Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, *Húnán nóngmín yùndòng kǎochá bàogào*)," 毛澤東選集第一卷 *XJ I*, 13; Mao Zedong, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *SW I*, 23-24.

¹⁶⁷ Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," *MRP VI*, Schram, ed., 386; Mao Zedong, "論持久戰 (On Protracted War, *Lùn chǐjiǔ zhàn*)," 毛澤東集第六卷, *MZJ VI*, Takeuchi, ed., 139-140; Mao Zedong, "論持久戰 (On Protracted War, *Lùn chǐjiǔ zhàn*)," 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 478-479; and Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," *SW II*, 186.

People's war, he later contended, was to "Fight, fail, fail again, fight again... till their victory; that is the logic of the people, and they too will never go against this logic."¹⁶⁸ Such a struggle was, as Mao believed, a life-and-death struggle in which the need for revolutionary violence and the impossibility of settling dispute through means of parliamentary negotiation or a peaceful armistice was explicit. This proved compelling to revolutionaries in Southeast Asia for whom parliamentary options were not available, and who had confronted firsthand the limitations of non-violent resistance and/or collaboration with leading regimes. Much like the CCP shifted from a gradual bloc within takeover and Bolshevization to armed struggle after 1927, Communists in Cambodia and the Philippines, for example, identified revolutionary stagnation. The CPK made this shift towards armed insurrection after years of Vietnamese helmsmanship, whereas the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) broke from the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) and did the same.

Mao's military strategy of people's war took on a legendary character during the radical foreign policy years of the Cultural Revolution. It was at this time that Maoism won considerable appeal "as a military doctrine, as a way to mobilize peasant society for the goal of national liberation."¹⁶⁹ Lin Biao expounded that Mao's strategy "has been proved by the long practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord with the objective laws of such wars and to be invincible. It has not only been valid for China, it is a great contribution to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations, and peoples throughout the world... This is the great international significance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung."¹⁷⁰ But People's War was equally important as "a united front from below under the leadership of the Communist Party,"¹⁷¹ for it was the masses that granted a Party the advantage in struggle. As future CPK Foreign Minister and Maoist Ieng Sary stated,

¹⁶⁸ Mao Zedong, "丟掉幻想, 準備鬥爭 (Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle, *Diūdiào huànxǐǎng, zhǔnbèi dòuzhēng*)," 毛澤東集第十卷, *MZJX*, Takeuchi, ed., 320-321; Mao Zedong, "丟掉幻想, 準備鬥爭 (Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle, *Diūdiào huànxǐǎng, zhǔnbèi dòuzhēng*)," 毛澤東選集第四卷, *XJ IV*, 1376; Mao Zedong, "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle," *SW IV*, 428; and Mao Zedong, *Chairman Mao Tse-tung On People's War*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 9-10.

¹⁶⁹ Cook, "Third World Maoism," *Critical Introduction to Mao*, 289-290.

Mao Zedong, "On Guerrilla Warfare," (1937) [www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/index.htm] (Accessed 14 May 2015).

¹⁷⁰ Lin Biao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" In 1977, the Editorial Department of 人民日報 (People's Daily), reiterated this statement: "... the countries and people of the third world have immensely enhanced their unity in the course of struggle... many countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere have come to realize a profound truth through prolonged and arduous struggle against imperialism, namely, that a weak nation can defeat a strong and a small nation can defeat a big. This has meant a great emancipation of the mind and a big political leap for the entire third world." Editorial Department of *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 44.

¹⁷¹ Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice*, 161.

“the decisive factor of success, as our experience has shown, is man; the decisive weapon is *his high political consciousness* which makes it possible for him to get a clear picture of the real nature of the enemy and his fortes and foibles... We have taken many democratic measures to mobilize the poor peasants... to free them from old social structures and raise production.”¹⁷² People’s War is therefore equal parts military strategy, popular outreach, *and* socioeconomic reform, uniting the workers and peasants in a mass movement for change.¹⁷³

By the 1960s, the Chinese Communist revolution stood for many foreign revolutionaries, particularly in Cambodia and the Philippines, among others, as a proven strategy with which an underdeveloped and undermanned movement could win against a more powerful and advantaged opponent, such as a colonial or neocolonial force. Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) leader Jose Maria Sison, in particular, “remained committed to the concept of people’s war” well into the 1980s, viewing it as a useful “theory and practice of encircling the cities from the countryside over a protracted period of time.”¹⁷⁴ CPK Prime Minister Pol Pot, meanwhile, recognized that the peasants formed the fundamental force of the Cambodian revolution, but only when the CPK “went to work among the people secretly [did] the revolutionary content penetrate the people at the grassroots.”¹⁷⁵ In a 29 September 1977 address, he recalled that the CPK “made use of many different forms, in the manner of a people’s war.”¹⁷⁶ As CPK General Secretary Nuon Chea stated, “if we have planes, naval vessels, tanks and artillery but do not *adhere to the principles of people’s war* and the military lines of our revolutionary organization, we will not have an army as strong as the one [that] we had in the struggle against the US imperialists.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² Ieng Sary, “Kingdom of Cambodia National United Front of Kampuchea: Cambodia 1972,” (1 January 1970), 6-7. Documentation Center of Cambodia (Phnom Penh) Document, Number D24010.

¹⁷³ Chen Yungfa, “The Blooming Poppy Under the Red Sun: The Yan’an Way and the Opium Trade,” *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*. Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven, eds. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1995), xiii, 190, 238, 292-293; and Lucien Bianco, “Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937-1945,” *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, 175-180.

Emerita Dionisio Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*. Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, eds., (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997), 366-367, 369-370.

¹⁷⁵ Pol Pot, “Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot...,” 35-36; and Pol Pot, *Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea*, 29-30, 35. The “content” to which Pol Pot referred is the “class content, the content of the struggle to overthrow the exploiting classes.” See also Pol Pot, “Summary of the Talks with the Delegation of the Xinhua News Agency,” (Phnom Penh, December 1978), 15.

¹⁷⁶ Pol Pot, “Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot...,” 36; Pol Pot, *Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea*, 36.

¹⁷⁷ Nuon Chea, “Excerpts from Broadcast Extracts from Speech by Nuon Chea, Chairman of the People’s Representative Assembly Standing Committee and acting Premier, at 16th January Meeting Marking the Cambodian

An autonomous people's war was thus the most effective method for hinterland bases to overwhelm urban centers wherein the international capitalist forces that perpetuated inequality resided.

Mao's concept of "New Democracy" is the third component of exported Maoism, and represents the step from people's war to the process of socialist transition. Originally a speech that Mao delivered to cultural workers in Yan'an in 1940, "On New Democracy" emphasized the following: first, the Chinese revolution was part of the global revolution against imperialism and capitalism; second, national liberation was necessary since China was a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state; and third, China's revolution was a national revolution to establish a new nation and a new culture that differed significantly from past and foreign variants.¹⁷⁸ Mao elaborates in the following passages:

The historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution lies in its division into two stages, democracy and socialism, but the first stage is no longer democracy in general, but democracy of the Chinese type, a new and special type—namely, New Democracy... the Chinese revolution must be divided into two stages. The first step is to change the colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal form of society into an independent, democratic society. The second is to carry the revolution forward and build a socialist society. At present the Chinese revolution is taking the first step.¹⁷⁹

The people's democratic dictatorship is based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of the workers and the peasants, because these two classes comprise 80 to 90 percent of China's population. These two classes are the main force in overthrowing imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. The transition from New Democracy to socialism also depends mainly upon their alliance.¹⁸⁰

Here, Mao has revised the classic Marxist formulation of the stages of historical development, with the progression from semi-feudal, semi-colonial societies to New Democracy and, finally,

Revolutionary Army Anniversary," (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 17 January 1977), (FE/5415/B/1), National Archives of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Document, Box 689, ID 6093. Emphasis added.

¹⁷⁸ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," (15 January 1940), *MRP VII*. Schram, ed., 334; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論 (On New Democracy, *Xīn mínzhǔ zhǔyì lùn*), 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 151; also in revised from in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 626-627; and Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *SW II*, 343-344. See also Arif Dirlik, "The Discourse of 'Chinese Marxism,'" *Modern Chinese Religion II, Volume I: 1850-2015*. Vincent Goossaert, Jan Kiely, and John Lagerway, eds. (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2016), 306-307.

¹⁷⁹ Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," in *MRP VII*, Schram ed., 333; Mao Zedong, "新民主主義論," in 毛澤東集, 第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi ed., 150-151; and in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ*, 625; and in *SW II*, 342.

¹⁸⁰ Mao Zedong, "論人民民主專政 (On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, *Lùn rénmin mínzhǔ zhuānzhèng*)," 毛澤東集第十卷, *MZJ X*, Takeuchi, ed., 303-304; and Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," (30 June 1949), *SW IV*, 421.

to socialism. Membership was to be broad in the early stage, but upon the transition to a socialist one only the workers and peasants could form the mass movement's crux. Because of this reformulation, which outlined how a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country could establish socialism based on a mass movement, "New Democracy" became one of the pillars of the Marxist-Maoist canon and an essential feature of exported Maoism.

Some major adherents of Mao's "New Democracy" included Ho Chi Minh, Jose Maria Sison, and Pol Pot, all of whom regarded it as a foundational revolutionary principle. Ho Chi Minh founded the Viet Minh "on the basis of the principles set out in this [Mao's] speech," and Indochinese Communist Party Secretary General Truong Chinh prophesied a future in which "New Democracy [will] cover a continuous expanse reaching from Central Europe to [Vietnam's] Cape Camau."¹⁸¹ Sison believed that the new democratic revolution would succeed, whether in his lifetime or afterward, but stressed as Mao had done that a prerequisite was outreach to peasants, workers, and the petty bourgeoisie.¹⁸² In the same vein, the Cambodian *Cercle Marxiste* Maoists Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Pol Pot regarded New Democracy (*La nouvelle Démocratie*) as a comprehensive guide for revolution in a colonial or semi-colonial state.¹⁸³ Pol Pot later devoted much of a 1977 speech to recounting the CPK's "National Democratic Revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 1960-1975,"¹⁸⁴ detailing how the CPK moved from people's war to a new democratic revolution to toppling state power. Thus "New Democracy" had significant appeal as a process whereby a rural revolution, after protracted warfare, could initiate a socialist transition through two stages. This was a model of state building for revolutionary regimes.

The fourth component relates to the process whereby the ruling Communist Party applies Marxism-Leninism to the concrete realities of the nation and people, thereby completing it as a normative ideological system—making the cultural transition from import to local theory. As the second chapter showed, Mao proposed the notion of Sinifying Marxism, or "making Marxism

¹⁸¹ Short, *Pol Pot*, 70.

¹⁸² Jose Maria Sison and Ninotchka Rosca, *Jose Maria Sison: At Home in the World—Portrait of a Revolutionary*. (Greensboro, NC: Open Hand Publishing, 2004), 82, 211-212.

¹⁸³ Philip Short, "Interview with Ping Say, alias Sang, Chheang: Member of the *Cercle Marxiste* and the French Communist Party," in Short, *Pol Pot*, 477n70. The French language edition is Mao Zedong, *La nouvelle Démocratie*. (Paris: Editions sociales, 1951).

¹⁸⁴ Pol Pot, "Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot..." 16-67; and Pol Pot, *Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea*, 22-50.

Chinese,” in his October 1938 speech on the situation in China, titled “On the New Stage.”¹⁸⁵ To Mao, Marxism was only useful in a national form, not as an abstract, unapplied dogma. Mao developed the “Sinification of Marxism” further in “On New Democracy.”¹⁸⁶ Mao’s “Sinification” leaped from the pages of “New Democracy” to throw overdue light on the absolute necessity of uniting theory *and* practice and wedding Marxist-Leninist theory to concrete national conditions, thereby applying it to the realities of a nation and its peoples.¹⁸⁷

One of the major efforts by a non-Chinese Party to apply Marxism-Leninism to concrete national realities was in Democratic Kampuchea. Pol Pot’s Maoist-inspired 1977 speech reflects his exposure to and espousal of Mao’s notion of applying Marxism according to concrete national conditions:

In 1957 we created a committee in order to prepare the Party’s political line...[and it] studied and researched the history of our people’s struggle, summing up the positive and negative experiences in order to draw lessons which could help illustrate the Party’s line... In light of these experiences, the committee worked out a draft proposal for the Party’s political line, based upon Marxism-Leninism and the principles of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance, in order to be masters of our own destiny, *applying Marxism-Leninism to the concrete realities of Kampuchea and Kampuchean society.*¹⁸⁸

One of Pol Pot’s chief lieutenants, Ieng Sary, elaborated further on what exactly this entailed in Democratic Kampuchea: “[Education] is given entirely in Khmer. Freed from all harmful outside influences, it closely *links theory and practice in the particular conditions of our country.*”¹⁸⁹ This shows just how deeply influential Maoism was as an ideological system as it advocated the application of an exogenous thought to concrete local conditions, and the subsequent unity of theory and practice in all fields. Thus to make Marxism-Leninism familiar or congruent with contemporary norms through a Maoist approach entailed this process of determining theory through practice, from which the conditions, whether historical, social, or cultural, emerged as

¹⁸⁵ Mao Zedong, “On the New Stage,” (12-14 October 1938), *MRP VI*, Stuart Schram ed., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1992), 538-539 and Mao Zedong, “論新階段 (On the New Stage, *Lùn xīn jiēduàn*),” (12-14 October 1938), 毛澤東集, 第六卷, *MZJVI*, Takeuchi, ed., 260-261. See also Dirlik, “The Discourse of ‘Chinese Marxism,’” *Modern Chinese Religion II, Volume I: 1850-2015*, 305.

¹⁸⁶ Dirlik, “The Discourse of ‘Chinese Marxism,’” *Modern Chinese Religion II, Volume I*, 306.

¹⁸⁷ Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” *MRP VII*, Schram ed., 367-369; Mao Zedong, “新民主主義論,” in 毛澤東集 第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi ed., 201-203; revised in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 667-668; and Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy,” *SW II*, 380-381.

¹⁸⁸ Pol Pot, “Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot...,” 16; Pol Pot, *Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea*, 21-22. Emphasis added.

¹⁸⁹ Ieng Sary, “Cambodia 1972,” 11. Emphasis added.

building blocks of the revolutionary Party's body politic. Thereafter, the revolutionary Party could make the new ideology congruent with contemporary norms that its stage of practice revealed to it, thereby adding charismatic dimensions with rational-bureaucratic features (what Jowitt calls enmeshment) that it could marshal to recruit broad membership, particularly from "traditional" peasant communities.¹⁹⁰

In sum, exported Maoism consisted of useful parts that revolutionaries could interpret and apply in a whole range of different ways. Mao's emphasis on including rather than occluding peasants in the revolutionary vanguard base struck chords with radicals who lived and operated within the largely agrarian underdeveloped world. Strategies such as People's War and New Democracy, meanwhile, gave these same revolutionary intellectuals a "true bastion of iron" with which they could defeat their powerful opponents and effectuate a relatively rapid transition to a more equitable socialist system. Most importantly, Mao's Sinification of Marxism showed the ways in which to take this all of these experiences—the practice of revolution—and formulate a new theory that was grounded firmly in the norms that were specific to each revolutionary situation. In so doing, the new ideology, or ideological system, could appeal to a wider audience, which came to view the "peasant visionary" (though originally a social strata outsider) as the charismatic leader—a man who could inspire others because of agreed procedures, and ultimately, rally people to commit fully to his political initiatives.

We Are the Third World: The Conditions and Audience of Exported Maoism

This is an era of Mao Tse-tung, the era of world revolution and the Afro-American's struggle for liberation is part of an invincible world-wide movement. Chairman Mao was the first world leader to elevate our people's struggle to the fold of the world revolution.—Robert Williams, 1967¹⁹¹

毛主席是世界革命人民的大救星 (Chairman Mao is the great liberator of the world's revolutionary people, 1968)¹⁹²

The Third World is the main force in combating colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism. China is a developing socialist country belonging to the Third World.¹⁹³
— Zhou Enlai, Statement at National People's Congress of China, 1975

¹⁹⁰ Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993), 16-17.

¹⁹¹ Robert F. Williams, *Crusader*, No. 9 (1967): 1, quoted by Kelley and Esch, "Black Like Mao," 6.

¹⁹² Landsberger and Van der Heijden, *Chinese Posters*, 152. *Máo zhǔxí shì shìjiè gémìng rénmín de dà jiùxīng*.

In order to understand the conditions that underlay Maoism's reception in Southeast Asia, which was then part of the underdeveloped world, we should examine both foreign policy shifts in Communist China and what Mao meant when he used the term "Third World." Mao's Three Worlds Theory emerged in the early 1970s as relations between Beijing and Washington warmed, with Mao urging that Soviet social imperialism had supplanted American capitalist imperialism as the largest threat to global unity.¹⁹⁴ PRC foreign policy during this time took on a particularly radical tenor that reflected the domestic front during the Cultural Revolution. Although tensions between foreign policy moderates and radicals had calmed by the end of 1969, the early 1970s marked a renewed interest in guiding revolutions outside China.¹⁹⁵ Maoist China thus moved to establish strong relationships by granting "favorable loans and technical expertise for massive capital-intensive projects" to newly independent/underdeveloped nations.¹⁹⁶ But economic aid alone did not foster unity between China and its new allies, and it was in connecting Communist China to its prospective allies. Indeed, as George T. Yu suggests, we ought to understand China's outreach in the 1970s "in the positive context of the search for allies in support of a new international structure free from superpower domination."¹⁹⁷ One way to buck the superpower hegemony trend, as Mao suggested, was to form a broad front of nonaligned Third World nations that were committed, but unable, to pursue socialism in light of superpower intervention (whether by proxy or directly)—with China as the leader of this world movement.¹⁹⁸

An outgrowth of Mao's Yan'an writings and "intermediate zone" concept,¹⁹⁹ and a response to Soviet post-Stalin "revisionism," Mao's Three Worlds Theory realigned the nations of the world into politico-economic camps that were characterized by patterns of exploitation rather than by ideological affinity or diplomatic allegiance. Mao asserted that China "belongs to

¹⁹³ Zhou Enlai, "Report on the Work of the Government to the Fourth National People's Congress," (18 January 1975), *Chinese Politics: Ninth Party Congress (1969) to the Death of Mao (1976)*. James T. Myers, Jurgen Domes, and Erik on Groeling, eds. (Columbia, SC: university of South Carolina Press, 1989), 297.

¹⁹⁴ "On the Question of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds," *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and the Party Literature Research Center under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, ed. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 454; and Yu, "China and the third World," 1046.

¹⁹⁵ Lowell Dittmer, "China's Search for Its Place in the World," *Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective*. Brantley Womack, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 238; and Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, 76.

¹⁹⁶ Cook, "Third World Maoism," *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 296.

¹⁹⁷ Yu, "China and the Third World," 1046.

¹⁹⁸ Lin Biao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," (1 April 1969) [www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1969/04/01.htm] (Accessed 15 May 2015).

¹⁹⁹ Niu, "重建中间地带," 61-80.

the third world. For China cannot compare with the rich or powerful countries politically, economically, etc. [It] can be grouped only with the relatively poor countries.”²⁰⁰ He elaborated on the “Third World” in a 1974 interview with Zambian President Kenneth David Kaunda:

We hope the Third World will unite. The Third World has a large population!... I hold that the U.S. and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the Third World...The U.S. and the Soviet Union have a lot of atomic bombs, and they are richer. Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada, of the Second World, do not possess so many atomic bombs and are not so rich as the First World, but richer than the Third World. What do you think of this explanation?]²⁰¹

Here, Mao places the PRC firmly in the “Third World” alongside the world’s exploited peoples, listing its shared experience as a semi-colonial, underdeveloped country, and its successful resistance to imperialism and rapid transition to socialism as reasons for this alignment. He viewed the underdeveloped and exploited Third World as a rising tide, the world’s “villages” that will surround and overwhelm the First and Second World “cities.” As Mao claimed, the “east wind is prevailing over the west wind...the forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to forces of imperialism... all imperialists are like the sun at six o'clock in the afternoon and we are like the sun at six o'clock in the morning. Hence... the Western countries have been left behind and we now clearly have the upper hand.”²⁰² In his view, the war between imperialism and socialism was inevitable, for both the American-led capitalist-imperialist world and the Soviet-led socialist-imperialist world exploited the nonaligned Third World for their Cold War ambitions. Mao’s solution was therefore to encourage many revolutionaries to band together, and many did, “seiz[ing] on their designation as third world subjects to push for solidarity... [and for] many, Maoism provided the ideological underpinnings and a practical blueprint for their struggle[s].”²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Editorial Department of *Renmin Ribao* (People’s Daily), *Chairman Mao’s Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism*, 51.

²⁰¹ Mao Zedong, “On The Question of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds,” *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and the Party Literature Center under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, ed., (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 454.

²⁰² Mao Zedong, “Speech at a Meeting of the Representatives of Sixty-four Communist and Workers’ Parties,” (18 November 1957), 毛澤東文集, 第七卷, XJ VII. English translation by Michael Schoenhals, “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 ‘Moscow Conference’,” *Journal of Communist Studies* 2, No. 2 (1986): 109-126.

²⁰³ Cook, “Third World Maoism,” *Critical Introduction to Mao*, 297.

Unsurprisingly, one major condition that made Maoism appealing in the three case studies was the precisely this inequity of global capitalism, more specifically, underdevelopment, mass poverty, and the disaggregation of wealth. Our three case studies provide prime examples of pre-capitalist economies that had experienced the hazards of international market integration. To understand how this happened, French-Egyptian Maoist Samir Amin, who was CPK founder Khieu Samphan's colleague at Université de Paris, addressed the question "what caused this global socioeconomic inequality?" in his seminal 1957 doctoral dissertation. His thesis argued that pre-capitalist (Third World) economies were integrated forcibly into a world market by Euro-American capitalist imperialism chiefly to supply inexpensive labor in service to foreign interests. The principal contradiction of this international capitalist system was thus between monopoly capital as represented by the towns/cores, and the over-exploited rural masses of the peripheries.²⁰⁴ Underdeveloped economies were elements in this world capitalist economy, with Amin identifying capitalist cores as exploiting pre-capitalist peripheries through the process of structural adjustment to capital accumulation.²⁰⁵ Amin elaborates further:

[The] integration of pre-capitalist economies into a capitalist world market of commodity goods has not led to a rapid and complete replacement of the pre-capitalist structure with a new structure of a capitalist character; rather, this integration has led an original, limited, and particular development of capitalism, a new structure that pushes the structural elements of capitalism on those of a pre-capitalist nature.²⁰⁶

The augmented degree of [capitalist] inequality stems from the destruction of the handicraft industry, which [because of this destruction] deprives a considerable fraction of the population of its income (the income of the enterprise then concentrating in the hands of fewer artisans than contractors) and then results in the subsequent concentration of this income in the hands of ulterior enterprises.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁴ Samir Amin, « Les effets structurels de l'intégration internationale des économies précapitalistes: une étude technique du mécanisme qui a engendré les économies dites sous-développées » (Thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris, 1957), 9, 139-141; and Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 150. See also Karl D. Jackson, "Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge," in *Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death*. Karl D. Jackson, ed. (Princeton, N: Princeton University Press, 1989): 241-250, on page 246.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 1-4; Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 109; and Samir Amin, *Theory is History*. (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2014), 78. See also Dave Renton, *Dissident Marxism: Past Voices for Present Times*. (London: Zed Books, 2004), 188-198.

²⁰⁶ Amin, « Les effets structurels de l'intégration internationale des économies précapitalistes » 1.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 128.

Development and underdevelopment, as Amin notes, were therefore “sides of the same coin: capitalist expansion.”²⁰⁸ Small elites within the Third World, and more developed consumerist mass-market cores abroad, imported luxury goods that were produced through unsustainably cheap low-wage labor. This entrenched a “cyclical phenomenon” of exploitation of underdeveloped countries in which subsistence farmers and handicraftsmen experienced the brunt of an “imbalance between savings and investment, which was a form of the more general imbalance between the capacity for production and the company's capacity for consumption.”²⁰⁹ The solution to this quandary was not the Soviet model, which, due to its mass consumerism, was still a Western one, but rather China’s model since it had rejected outright the “models of consumption and labor organization” that were so endemic to capitalism.²¹⁰ For Amin, autarky was ultimately the ideal system for Third World economies, a proposition that, as the next chapter shows, was central to Khieu Samphan’s doctoral dissertation and, later, part of the blueprint for Democratic Kampuchea.

Cambodia, Philippines, and Indonesia

Importantly, the three cases studies—Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia—fall under the Third World rubric as Mao and Amin described; they were all newly independent countries (Cambodia from France in 1953, the Philippines from the United States in 1946, and Indonesia from the Netherlands in 1945), and all confronted problems of development after WWII. For Cambodia, the French colonizers from 1863 until 1953 had expressed the nation of Cambodia in terms of polarization: Cambodia’s *zenith* (its past history as the builders of Angkor) measured against its *nadir* (near annihilation and present state of French domination).²¹¹ As Penny Edwards states, the “colonial injunction to contemporary Cambodians was to detach themselves from the past and to live in the modern in a way that would allow the presentation of Angkor and other monuments as antiquity. This was linear identity without linear progression. There was only an Angkorean ancestral then and a colonial now, with a yawning abyss in

²⁰⁸ Amin, *Theory is History*, 77.

²⁰⁹ Amin, « Les effets structurels de l’intégration internationale des économies précapitalistes » 484-485.

²¹⁰ Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*, 109; and Amin, « Les effets structurels de l’intégration internationale des économies précapitalistes » 625-626.

²¹¹ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 12-13; David P. Chandler, “From ‘Cambodge’ to ‘Kampuchea’: State and Revolution in Cambodia, 1863,” *Thesis Eleven* 50, No. 35 (1997): 35-49; David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 6-9.

between.”²¹² We can also trace many Cambodian post-independence problems to French neglect, since the French *mission civilisatrice* held Cambodians in low regard merely “as children to be helped upward,” and Cambodia proper as a “colony of exploitation” that ought to “to pay its way, financed by the most onerous taxes in Indochina... to exist, economically, for the benefit of France.”²¹³ France’s administrative system in the Cambodia protectorate also guaranteed that very few Cambodians could enter into the civil service, since many Vietnamese from the French colony in South Vietnam (Cochinchina) filled most Cambodian service positions.²¹⁴ For instance, by 1920-21 there were only nineteen Khmer students at the Indochinese University of Hanoi.²¹⁵ French neglect also meant that by Cambodia’s independence in 1953 only 120,000 Cambodian children had access to Khmer primary schools, while 77,000 remained in “unreformed pagoda schools,”²¹⁶ and only one high school—*Lycée Sisowath*—operated in service to a kingdom of three million.²¹⁷ The combination of French total indifference towards developing sustainable infrastructures and educational facilities and its exploitation of Khmer labor paved the way for large socioeconomic gaps that plagued the country under Sihanouk’s reign.

The legacies of French neglect set the stage for Cambodia’s continued underdevelopment as it made the transition to an independent country after 1953. Future CPK Prime Minister Khieu Samphan linked Cambodia’s ongoing economic development issues to the strengthening of international integration within an American framework, which forced Cambodia to submit to a mechanism wherein agriculture and handicrafts became devalued, and its pre-capitalist structure, although fortified, was still firmly in a cycle of export production in service to foreign capital.²¹⁸ For this reason, the few privileged enough to attend the *Lycée Sisowath* and to study abroad in

²¹² Penny Edwards, *Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945*. (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 144.

²¹³ John Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor: King Sisowath and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’ 1904-1927*. (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 310-311.

²¹⁴ Henley, “Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism,” 296; Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor*, 248-249, 292.

²¹⁵ Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hemery, *Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954 (From Indochina to Vietnam: Revolution and War in a Global Perspective)*. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2011), 287.

²¹⁶ Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor*, 249 n123; Charles Bilodeau, “Compulsory Education in Cambodia,” *Compulsory Education in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam*. Charles Bilodeau, Somlith Pathammavong, and Le Quang Hong, eds. (Paris: UNESCO, 1955); and GH Monod, *Le Cambodgien* [The Cambodian]. (Paris: Editions Larose, 1931), 31-35., 18-19. By 1950 there was only one tertiary establishment, the *Institut National d’études juridiques et économiques*, at independence, and it offered only evening classes.

²¹⁷ Chandler, “From ‘Cambodge’ to ‘Kampuchea,’” 39.

²¹⁸ Khieu Samphan, « L’économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d’industrialisation » (PhD Dissertation, Paris: Université Paris, Sorbonne, 1959), 60-65.

France (“only a select few children of important families studied in France”),²¹⁹ including Samphan and, later, Pol Pot, sought out radical alternatives to bring about “self-conscious, autonomous development” (in Khieu’s words) to reverse Cambodia’s prostrate economic situation.²²⁰ As Pol Pot described in a 1977 speech:

[Notre] économie était par son essence, entièrement dominée par l’impérialisme. Il était de même pour la culture. Quant à la nature de la société et au mode de vie, ils étaient sous l’emprise impérialiste, notamment au niveau des milieu dirigeants. Nous avons défini le Kampuchéa d’alors comme étant un pays inféodé à l’impérialisme, un pays semi-colonial. Cette analyse devait permettre à chacun se se convaincre qu’il existait des contradictions. Le Kampuchéa n’était certes pas totalement dépendant, mais il l’était à moitié. S’il en était ainsi, existait-il des contradictions ? Assurément !²²¹

Cambodia’s position as a largely agrarian underdeveloped country, and the increasing socioeconomic gap between those urban-based intellectual elites and the majority rural workers (or lumpenproletariat) entrenched an urban/rural divide. Khmer revolutionaries theorized this emergent peasant disdain for the cities based on a Maoist perception that cities were “rabbit-warrens of vice, filth, corruption, and disease [and] symbolized all that was wrong with Cambodia and its rightful place in the universe.”²²² This perspective, although not representative of the whole country,²²³ examined peasant suffering through a Marxist-Leninist-Maoism lens to propose policies of anti-urbanization, agrarian, and industrial development on an autarkical model.

Much like Cambodia, the Philippines had a history of colonial exploitation and neglect, and was, after independence, confronting its own semi-colonial designation. After the US seized victory over Spain in 1898, the American colonial authorities grew fearful of developing

²¹⁹ Brocheux and Hemery, *Indochina*, 287.

²²⁰ Khieu Samphan, « L’économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d’industrialisation » 192.

²²¹ Pol Pot, “Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot...” 20-21; and Pol Pot, *Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea*, 24-25. Pol Pot’s point here is that Cambodia’s economy was a victim of imperialist exploitation, while its culture, the nature of Cambodian society, and lifestyles shared in this imperialist penetration. Here, he refers to Cambodia as a semi-colonial country wrought with contradictions due to dependency.

²²² Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 113; and Thanh Tin, “Notes of Discussion with Than Tin, Deputy Editor of Nhan Dan, Former Editor of Quan Doi Nhan Dan, War Correspondent, Colonel in the Vietnamese People’s Army, Two Talks,” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: 1 June 1983), 28-30.

²²³ William Willmott, “Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” *Pacific Affairs* (Summer 1981): 209-227, on page 224; and Ben Kiernan, “The 1970 Peasant Uprising in Kampuchea,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 9, No.3 (1979): 310-324. See also Kate Frieson, “The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea,” *Pacific Affairs* 61, No. 3 (Autumn 1988): 405-427.

educational facilities in which students had access to Western ideas.²²⁴ As HW Brands writes, the American educational philosophy “was paternalist, and tinged with the racism common at the time.”²²⁵ Colonial authorities supervised and limited the education of Filipinos, and this direct control manifested itself in the realm of politics as well. Under nearly fifty years of American colonial rule (albeit interrupted by the Japanese occupation during WWII) colonial officials dominated the national administration. Earlier efforts to incorporate Filipinos into the civil service notwithstanding—Spanish rule forbade Filipino posts above the municipal level²²⁶—American dominance was unquestionable. Direct US control was so pervasive that President Manuel L. Quezon’s Commonwealth government (Quezon won the 1935 Philippine Presidential election) was “directly and explicitly subject to the authority of the US government.”²²⁷ This trend continued after WWII, even in spite of the US recognizing Philippine independence in 1945. The US maintained its powerful influence over the Philippines via what future Maoist revolutionary José Maria Sison called “unequal treaties, agreements, and arrangements... [that] preserved US strategic dominance,” particularly through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).²²⁸ This ultimately meant that modern industry took a backseat to agriculture, and agricultural labor was (as Amin claimed) cheap, easily exploited, and unsustainable for much of the Philippines’ rural poor. American monopoly capitalism, Sison notes, exported surplus capital to encourage the production of raw material and the perpetuation of unilateral, unequal exchange of these materials with “US surplus commodities to extract superprofits,” thereby keeping the Philippines dependent on highly exploitative agricultural production.²²⁹

The integration of the Philippines’ semi-colonial, semi-feudal socioeconomic structure into the world capitalist system forced it to over-depend on commodity systems of production

²²⁴ Alfred McCoy, “The Philippines: Independence without Decolonization,” in *Asia: The Winning of Independence*. Robin Jeffrey ed. (London: MacMillan, 1981), 25.

²²⁵ HW Brands, “*Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*.” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 69. As General Arthur MacArthur stated, “the molding of men’s minds is the best means of conquest. Education, therefore, serves as a weapon in wars of colonial conquest...” Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Roskamm eds., *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance*. (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987), 45.

²²⁶ Stuart Creighton Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 46. See also Schirmer and Roskamm, *The Philippines Reader*; and Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor*, 248, citing Alfred McCoy, “The Philippines: Independence without Decolonization,” in *Asia*, 43.

²²⁷ Jose Maria Sison and Rainer Werning, *The Philippine Revolution: The Leader’s View*. (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 21.

²²⁸ Ibid, 21-22.

²²⁹ Ibid, 22-23.

of raw materials. Under the firm control of big compradors, landlords, and the “big bourgeoisie,” neither industrialization nor land reform occurred. The Philippines’ continued semi-colonial status, and increased Cold War intervention in the Philippines, prompted intellectuals such as Sison to study abroad, where, in the mid-1960s, Maoism arose as a prism through which to interpret those exploitative trends that prevented greater development and socioeconomic equity.²³⁰

In the Dutch East Indies, meanwhile, only a small fraction of Indonesians attended Western schools,²³¹ and the Dutch colonials justified underdevelopment by stating that the locals themselves were responsible. Snouck Hurgronje, the first director of education under the Dutch Ethical Policy (1901-1942), claimed that the “native population itself has not the slightest interest in the matter.”²³² The Dutch Ethical Policy reversed the previous Netherlands Indies trend of indirect rule, as the Netherlands took on the moral responsibility to modernize its colonial holding.²³³ This announcement marked a departure from regarding its colony as a region of profit (*wingewest*)²³⁴ and, unlike France, eschewed pursuance of a *mission civilisatrice*, yet it marked a substantial increase in colonial interference with agrarian workers’ affairs.²³⁵ Indeed, the increased Dutch presence in rural areas spurred the rise of a major labor cooperative, Sarekat Islam (SI), which rose to prominence during the Ethical Policy’s heyday and was a precursor organization to the PKI. Importantly, Sarekat Islam began as an organization to safeguard Javanese *batik* merchant interests against competition from Indies Chinese traders, and it won widespread popularity among villagers who were against the increase in colonial presence, especially in the countryside. SI’s popularity among the impoverished caught the eye of the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV), which, like other early Indies organizations, operated as an association to “promote various social, cultural, and economic interests.”²³⁶

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor*, 247. See also Anthony Reid, “Indonesia: Revolution without Socialism,” in *Asia*, 125.

²³² C. Snouck Hurgronje, “On the Fallacy of Mass Education,” *Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830-1942*. Chr. LM Penders ed. (St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), 166.

²³³ E. Aspinall and G. van Klinken, *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*. (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 38.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. (Sheffield, UK: Equinox, 2007), 8.

²³⁶ Ibid, xii, 22.

The ISDV and SI united their respective labor unions into the Revolutionary Socialist Federations of Labor Unions and sought Indonesian support irrespective of political alignment or comprehension of Communist tenets.²³⁷ PKI activist and Comintern official Tan Malaka explained this cooperation as follows:

... First of all I will speak about our experiences in the East Indies where we have cooperated with the Islamists. We have in Java a very large organization with many very poor peasants... Between 1912 and 1916 this organization [Sarekat Islam] had one million members, perhaps as many as three or four million. It was a very large popular movement, which arose spontaneously and was very revolutionary. Until 1921 we collaborated with it. Our party, consisting of 13,000 members, went into this popular movement and carried out propaganda there. In 1921 we succeeded in getting Sarekat Islam to adopt our programme. The Islamic League too agitated in the villages for control of the factories and for the slogan: All power to the poor peasants, all power to the proletarians! So Sarekat Islam made the same propaganda as our Communist Party, only sometimes under another name.²³⁸

The ISDV soon absorbed SI via the “bloc within strategy” under the PKI banner (1924), emerging thereafter as the leading voice of the disenfranchised and for true independence.²³⁹ While the failed 1926 revolt led the Dutch to outlaw the PKI, and it remained largely dormant (not as a unified Party *per se*) until after WWII, PKI members such as Tan Malaka spent time abroad, allowing them to see firsthand the socioeconomic inequality on a larger scale. Like with Pol Pot’s 1965 Beijing visit, Tan’s January 1932 visit to Shanghai revealed to him the systemic problems of colonial domination through built environments/social spaces, which informed how he viewed similar hazards in Indonesia—ones that his successors confronted in the post-independence years. The poor and oppressed Chinese of Shanghai, and the exploitative nature of colonial port cities, stood for him as parts of a larger global problem that capitalism had engendered, and it was through this lens that he would later view Jakarta in the years leading up to independence.²⁴⁰

The PKI’s re-emergence coincided with the Japanese triumph over the Dutch, and the Japanese mobilization of young Indonesian men during this time had the unintended

²³⁷ Ibid., 36, 43-44, 354.

²³⁸ Tan Malaka, “Communism and Pan-Islamism,” (1922) [<https://www.marxists.org/archive/malaka/1922-Panislamism.htm>] (Accessed 23 November 2015).

²³⁹ McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 155. From then until its failed revolt in 1926, the Party endorsed Marxist and Koranic teachings, viewing both as similar, and strove for freedom of religion by safeguarding the rights of Muslims to practice religion freely.

²⁴⁰ Kusno, “From City to City,” 329-334.

consequence of evoking the *pemuda* (or *sumpah pemuda*), a pledge of activism for Indonesian men under thirty.²⁴¹ Many of these young men, namely Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, and Sudisman, who were “all part of the *pemuda* efflorescence,” engaged in nationalist activity after independence,²⁴² rejuvenated the PKI in 1948 as a mouthpiece for the oppressed, and became vocal critics of Indonesia’s “semi-colonial, semi-feudal status.”²⁴³ As the Party’s 1953 programme made clear:

The position of the peasantry is no better than it was before. The peasant still suffers from a shortage of arable land at all. Some 20 percent of all cultivated area, the best and most fertile in the country, is held by colonizers. The different form of feudal exploitation, such as “polorogo,” labor conscription, etc, prevail to this day. The overwhelming majority of peasants are weighed down by usurer’s yoke and heavy taxes. The colonizers plantation owners and Indonesian landlords forcibly wrested from the peasant the land formerly belonging to the plantation owners but which had been cultivated by peasant since the Japanese occupation...The intelligentsia too has no prospects. Poor material conditions and difficult working conditions afford no possibility for fruitful work in the sphere of science and culture. The government does not uphold the interest of the poorly developed national industry and trade. Not only has the national bourgeoisie opportunity to broaden its activities and build new industrial enterprises; it is also unable to hold its existing position against the onslaught of foreign competitors.²⁴⁴

The Communists’ success in the post-independence period was evidently due to its willingness to reach out to Javanese villagers on a host of grievances, ranging from displeasure with the government to political fractures within the ruling Nationalist Party (PNI). The PKI soon represented the greatest force for realizing Indonesian socioeconomic reform, giving “attention to mass social welfare,” and calling for the “elimination of the gross inequities and bureaucratic vices that plague the country.”²⁴⁵ Mounting discontent among post-independence Indonesia’s desolate poor, who took exception to the so-called “fruits of independence and the performance

²⁴¹ Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*. (Sheffield, UK: Equinox, 2006), 30-33. See also Takashi Shiraiishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), xi; and Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946*. (Jakarta, Indonesia: Equinox Publishing, 2006), xi-xiii, 2-15.

²⁴² Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno*, 33.

²⁴³ Agitprop Department of the Communist Party of Indonesia, “Programme of the Communist Party of Indonesia: Adopted at the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia, March 1953,” (March 1953) [<https://www.marxists.org/history/indonesia/1953-ProgrammePKI.htm>] (Accessed 23 November 2015). See also Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno*, 40.

²⁴⁴ Agitprop Department of the Communist Party of Indonesia, “Programme of the Communist Party of Indonesia...”

²⁴⁵ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno*, 11-12, 20.

of the dominant parties,” led ultimately to a spike in PKI popularity and membership.²⁴⁶ Though the Communists turned to China in the lead-up to and after the 1965 September massacres when the Party was underground, its three-point program at the 1966 Fifth Party Congress of the Albanian Workers’ Party reflected a revitalized interest in drastic socioeconomic reform. It called for Party reconstruction “on Marxist-Leninist lines,” designed plans “to lead a long, armed struggle fused with the agrarian revolution of the peasantry in the countryside,”²⁴⁷ and called for the establishment of a united front of “all forces opposed to the right-wing generals” with an “alliance of the working class with the peasantry, under the leadership of the proletariat.”²⁴⁸ As PKI Propaganda chief and former PKI Politburo candidate member Jusuf Adjitorop proclaimed, the PKI now armed itself with “Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung,” with which it would “vanquish” Suharto’s *junta* and establish “people’s power.”²⁴⁹

In summary, the semi-colonial conditions in underdeveloped countries such as Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, paired with superpower exploitation, engendered the rise of exported Maoism in the 1960s as a system that could be used by revolutionaries in these countries to bring about significant reform in their otherwise stagnant and, in the case of Indonesia, nearly annihilated movement. The core ideas of Mao’s Three Worlds policy fit their needs, explained their experience, enabled them to imagine what to do, gave them a vocabulary to mobilize traditional peasants, and ultimately offered useful models for organizing an insurgency. Mao’s stress on the revolutionary potential of peasants allowed underdeveloped nations such as these to incorporate the vast majority of their populations into the revolutionary struggle against imperialism. People’s war provided a strategy that empowered technologically and numerically disadvantaged combatants to defeat superior foes, which was most resonant among the ongoing movements in Cambodia and the Philippines in the late 1960s-early 1970s. New democracy presented an alternative socialist modernist course that stood outside either American or Soviet purviews, which was central to the Cambodian Communists’ designs for their nation (as chapter four reveals in greater detail). Mao’ emphasis on normative adaptation of exogenous thought to concrete conditions meant that creative application was, unlike with Soviet

²⁴⁶ Ibid, 20-21.

²⁴⁷ “Greeting to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Workers’ Party from the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party,” *Radio Tirana* (4 November 1966). Also quoted in David Mozingo, *Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1949-1967*. (Singapore: Equinox, 2007), 255.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

Marxism-Leninism, requisite to the realization of Marxism-Leninism in a national setting, and this aspect left its mark on both the Cambodian and Philippine movements.

Though exported Maoism was marshaled by intellectuals in these countries due in large part to the limited resources available to the colonized peoples, decades of colonial neglect and suppression had pushed these revolutionaries to recognize the usefulness of Maoism as more than a mere dogma. Indeed, Maoism's components, or constituent parts, which included military and political strategies, as well as a strong emphasis on practical application and making Marxism-Leninism congruent with contemporary norms, allowed for creative adaptation rather than strict adherence to a Soviet-friendly line. In Cambodia, exported Maoism arose as a way to break free from a Vietnamese-directed line, and in intellectual circles, it stood initially as a useful lens through which to view Cambodia's post-independence underdevelopment and capitalist exploitation. Much of the same was true in the Philippines and Indonesia, as both countries had not reaped the benefits of insertion into an imbalanced international mass-market, and in the mid-1960s leading Communists found value in Mao's emphases on proletarian-led peasant mass movements and recognized his thought as the third sword of Marxism-Leninism. Intellectuals who would found the preeminent Communist Parties in the three case studies all self-identified their nations as semi-colonial and semi-feudal because of their respective forced exploitation by global capitalism. Thus Maoism surfaced among these men as a most effective *modus operandi* to cast out exploitative foreign interests, reform the respective socioeconomic systems, and develop the country on a more equitable and sustainable basis. The next few chapters shift our focus to Cambodia, where we will examine closely the process whereby Maoism first entered the Cambodian Communist intellectual thought stream. These chapters explore how three men—Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim—used Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and, later, Maoism (in Nim's dissertation) to make preliminary designs on what would become Democratic Kampuchea.

Concluding Remarks

As this chapter has shown, Chinese foreign policy shifts sowed the seeds of global interest in China as a model example with Maoism as a complete system with universal compatibility. Communist China's "Bandung Spirit" years placed it at the forefront of the nonaligned movement, and established new international relations, particularly with newly

independent countries such as Cambodia, wherein the PRC extended rhetorical support for national leaders and established genuine fraternal ties with them. The Sino-Soviet Split, however, marked a transition to China seeking actively to export Maoism outside its borders as a counter to the Soviets, who, in Mao's view, had become revisionist. This outreach involved inviting revolutionaries to visit Beijing, including men such as Pol Pot who were not national leaders. Such visits had the desired effect of inspiring foreign revolutionaries to espouse Maoism as a guiding ideological system for their own struggles, and in the case of the Cambodian movement, solidified the PRC as an important strategic ally. The 1970s radical stage of PRC foreign policy, meanwhile, amped up and intensified the Chinese Communists' effort to export China's revolution to the world. The CCP's systematic translation and diffusion of Mao's seminal writings through the Foreign Languages Press and International Bookstore put Mao's works in classrooms, backstreets, and intellectual circles throughout the developing world, thereby making Maoism accessible, relatable, and useful to non-Chinese throughout the globe.

In addition, Mao's identification of Communist China as a Third World and nonaligned country positioned it as a positive force that could help likewise countries break the cycle of dependency. Maoism as ideological system stressed peasant inclusion (rather than occlusion), a concrete military strategy, a two-stage process for socialist transition, and a process whereby Marxism-Leninism ought to be applied to existing conditions and norms, meant that Maoism stood as a normative system instead of an abstract dogma/theory. Since these men had little to no ties to their prospective peasant bases, they had to ground their ideologies in the contemporary norms of their countries—as Mao had done with his Sinification of Marxism. Altogether, these constituent parts allowed for revolutionary intellectuals in semi-colonial/semi-feudal countries to adapt it creatively and normatively. As the continued exploitation of the rural poor by forced inclusion into an imbalanced international market entrenched gaping social disequilibria, radical intellectuals came to regard Maoism as a theoretical lens through which to interpret inequality and as a method to reverse this imbalance. As subsequent chapters show, Maoism identified class difference and patterns of capitalist/imperialist exploitation in new and relevant ways, presenting an alternative ideological system in which one could develop socialism and strive for greater socioeconomic equity.

Chapter Four—The Origins of Cambodia’s Maoist Vision: Revolutionary

Intellectuals and Maoism, 1949-1975

It’s the well-behaved children that make the most formidable revolutionaries. They don’t say a word, they don’t hide under the table, they eat only one piece of chocolate at a time. But later on, they make society pay dearly. —Jean-Paul Sartre, *Les Mains Sales*, 1948¹

This chapter shifts our focus to Cambodia, the first case study of our analysis of Maoism in Southeast Asia, with production, transmission, and *reception* guiding us through the spread of Maoism across cultures.² The chapter argues that the intellectuals who founded Democratic Kampuchea (DK, 1975-1979)—Hou Yuon (ហ៊ូយុន), Khieu Samphan (ខៀវសំផាន), Hu Nim (ហ៊ូនីម), and Saloth Sar (សាឡុតសារ, aka. Pol Pot)—came to view Maoism as a guidepost for radical change during their studies in Paris in the 1950s because of its *fit* in the Cambodian /Third World context. As with Mao, these men were networked individuals in a situated, nationalist-internationalist thinking responding to crises of colonial/semi-colonial exploitation, underdevelopment, political corruption, and socioeconomic disequilibria by embracing Maoism. The Cambodian intellectuals, much like their Chinese and unlike their Western European or North American counterparts, experienced global capitalism as an alien hegemony.³ But Maoism was not merely grafted onto the Cambodian situation by these men. As the anti-capitalist doctoral dissertations and writings of the future DK founders reveal, their *reception* of Maoism was dialectical in nature; these radical intellectuals spoke back by adapting Maoism to “réalités concrètes.”⁴ Their *reception*, moreover, led to the production of a Cambodian Maoism by the Communist Party of Kampuchea’s (CPK) intellectual thrust that spoke to its present situation and struggle, specifically Cambodia’s political corruption, widespread poverty, and exploitation of rural workers by consumers in the cities. Thus contrary to Samphan’s recent claim that he,

¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, “Les Mains Sales (Dirty Hands),” in *No Exit and Three Other Plays*, Stuart Gilbert trans. (New York: Vintage, 1989), 158.

² Edward W. Said, “Traveling Theory,” in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 226-247.

³ Arif Dirlik, “Modernism and Antimodernism in Mao Zedong’s Marxism,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*. Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, eds. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997), 70.

⁴ Sasha Sher states that these avant-garde writings on Cambodian society, along with the 1976 Four Year Plan, represent the “only written texts on the [CPK’s] economic intentions for Cambodia” (Radio Phnom Penh “hardly gives much depth” on this aspect of the Party’s vision). Sacha Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges: de Paris à Phnom Penh, 1945-1979 » (PhD Dissertation, Université Paris X – Nanterre, 2001), 72.

Yuon, and Nim were mere “figureheads,” this chapter contends that these men were the architects for the Party’s ideology, with their French education and 1950s Paris as the intellectual world and Maoism as the ideology with the socio-contextual fit to Cambodia’s historical situation.⁵

To determine the degree to which Yuon, Samphan, Sar, and Nim were influenced by the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, we must trace their passages through spaces, both intellectual and geographic, transforming and transformed. Accordingly, the chapter consists of three sections that use the phases of *reception* and *adaptation* to take us through the Khmer intellectuals’ encounters en route to their Maoist awakening. The first section explains the *fit* between foreign theories of Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, and later, Maoism, and these Cambodian intellectuals by using the variables of textual language (impact/relational), historical circumstances (condition of reception), and the process whereby such materials became important to others (practical/normative). The second section explores the *intellectual adaptation* stage wherein the future CPK founders applied Maoism on paper. The third section brings us to their *practical* and *normative adaptations* of Maoism, which stand as their initial failed implementation and which became the preconditions for “អង្គការ”/“អង្គការបដិវត្តន៍” (“Organization” or “Revolutionary Organization, hereafter *Angkar*). Thus, to borrow from Penny Edwards’ description of Cambodian nationalism, the CPK’s Maoism was “never a single ‘movement,’ but a travelogue of diverse itineraries, the constellation and intersection of myriad journeys by individuals who... coined ideas of the modern Khmer nation and, through their travels... gave these ideas national currency.”⁶

⁵ Khieu Samphan, *L’histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 67-68. Stephen Heder, Karl D. Jackson, William Willmott, and Kate Frieson agree with Sher that Samphan’s share of responsibility for CPK policies was “great indeed” since the CPK held his analysis as “a valid guide to formulating rural policy for the entire country... [and] transformed the dissertation into a guide for the organization of the Cambodian revolution.” Karl D. Jackson, “Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge,” *Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death*. Karl D. Jackson, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 245-246; Stephen Heder, “Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan,” (Working Paper, Clayton, Australia: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 2; William Willmott, “Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party,” *Pacific Affairs* 54, No. 2 (summer 1981): 209-227, on 212, 216, 221; and Kate Frieson, “The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea,” *Pacific Affairs* 61, No. 3 (Autumn 1988): 405-427, on 422-423. James Tyner argues that the dissertation was “not a template,” but was “highly influential in subsequent policies of Democratic Kampuchea.” James Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide, and and the Unmaking of Space*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 113.

⁶ Penny Edwards, *Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 241.

The French Connection: Impact/Relational Reception and the Conditions of Maoism's Reception, 1949-1965

It was in Paris, not Moscow or Beijing, that in the early 1950s [Saloth] Sar and his companions laid down the ideological foundations on which the Khmer nightmare would be built. That this occurred was not... because their minds were warped by the Stalinist vision of the world... [of] the French Communists, the country's largest political Party; nor was it due to the influence of Mao Zedong, whose writings the Young Cambodians encountered in France for the first time. Stalin and Mao both had their part in the making of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea, So did the Vietnamese and the Americans. But *the foreign intellectual legacy which would underpin the Cambodian revolution was first and foremost French.*⁷—Philip Short, author of *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*

For decades, the highly secretive, seemingly amorphous CPK have eluded scholarly classification, declaring that “[w]e are not following any model, either Chinese or Vietnamese... the Cambodian situation does not fit any existing model and thus requires original policy.”⁸ Early descriptions of the CPK's program varied, characterizing it as “rabidly fascist,” a form of “medieval barbarity,” or that its apparent obsession with past glory and national-revival was the basis of its radical social transformation.⁹ More recently, scholars either foreground CPK nationalism,¹⁰ or state that it copied the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) blueprint.¹¹ An intriguing description that is most relevant for this study is that the CPK was far from *sui generis*,

⁷ Philip Short, *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*. (London: John Murray, 2004), 47. Emphasis added.

⁸ *Far Eastern Economic Review* (30 September 1977), 26; “*Der Spiegel* Interview with Ieng Sary,” (May 1977), reprinted in *News From Kampuchea* 1, No. 3 (August 1977): 1-3, and Roel A. Burglar, *The Eyes of the Pineapples: Revolutionary Intellectuals and Terror in Democratic Kampuchea*. (Saarbrücken, Germany: Verlag Breitenbach, 1990), 59. On the Party's self-identification as Marxists-Leninists, see Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: 1975-1982*. (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984), 288-289; and Timothy M. Carney, “Continuity in Cambodian Communism,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion*. Timothy M. Carney, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 106, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1977), 5.

⁹ Vasilkov described the CPK as fascist in Y. Vasilkov, “Kampuchea: The Maoist ‘Experiment’ That Failed,” *Far Eastern Affairs* 3, No. 21 (1979): 44-45. On the Party obsession with past glory, see Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and its People*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 185-188, 200-202; Edwards, *Cambodge*, 1-5; and Ben Kiernan, “External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology,” in *The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972-79*. Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 201.

¹⁰ Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930-1975*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 219-224, 259-268; and Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 25-27. Kiernan acknowledged more recently the CPK's commitment to a proletarian-led Marxist-Leninist revolution. Ben Kiernan, “Myth, Nationalism, and Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 3, No. 2 (2001): 187-206, on 196.

¹¹ Stephen Heder, *Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model. Volume I: Imitation and Independence, 1930-1975*. (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2004), 3; and Ian Harris, *Buddhism Under Pol Pot*. (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: DCCAM (Phnom Penh), Documentation Series No. 13, 2007), 49, 65.

anti-modern, or bereft of cultural and intellectual sophistication, but in fact “Maoist”/“hyper-Maoist.”¹² Supporters of this description identify similarities in rhetoric, revolution, and socioeconomic transformation, but they fail to explain how and why Maoism arose as a “fit” for the Cambodian context.¹³ The CPK was indeed Maoist, but we need a more thorough explanation of how and why Maoism and not, say, Soviet Marxism-Leninism, emerged among the CPK’s intellectual thrust. If we are to classify them more appropriately and accurately as Maoist, then we require a genealogy of Cambodian Maoism that begins with the social experiences of the would-be Maoists, delving deeply into their travels, encounters, and ever-shifting *weltanschauungen*. Here, we explain how the social experiences of Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Saloth Sar shaped their worldviews, and how their surroundings led them to regard Maoism as the *fit* to address Cambodian underdevelopment. The section analyzes first their colonial context—their situated-ness in an oppressed environment—and then examines how they engaged extant and foreign ideologies in their social and intellectual milieus, bringing us to their espousal of Maoism in the CPK’s Yan’an, 1950s Paris. We therefore observe the *impact/relational* and *conditions of reception* phases to uncover the important yet oft-overlooked link between the Cambodian Communist movement and French classrooms and intellectual circles in Paris during the 1950s. Their passages from the Cambodian countryside to provincial cores, and again to national (Phnom Penh) and transnational (Paris) epicenters, led to their reimagining of their world with radical thought informing a wholly new perception.¹⁴

¹² Stephen J. Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 13, 17, 39, 229; Henri Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar*. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2005), 5, 21, 185, 216, 340; Jackson, “Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge,” in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 241-250; Kenneth Quinn, “Explaining the Terror,” in *Cambodia 1975-78*, 219-223; and Frieson, “The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea,” 405-406. On the CPK’s “high” modernism, see Alexander L. Hinton, *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 48, citing James Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” *American Political Science Review* 66, No. 1 (March 1972): 91-113.

¹³ Many scholars assert that China was to blame for the CPK atrocities without explaining how or why. See V. Simonov, *Crimes of the Maoists and Their Rout*. (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1979); Wilfred Burchett, *The China-Cambodia-Vietnam Triangle*. (Chicago, IL: Vanguard Press, 1981); Kenneth M. Quinn, “Origins and Development of Radical Cambodian Communism,” (PhD Diss. University of Maryland, 1982), 180-215; and Daniel Snyder, “Life After Death in the Kampuchean Hell,” *Executive Intelligence Review* (September 1981): 19-31.

¹⁴ Short, *Pol Pot*, 19-21, 148; Ben Kiernan, “External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology,” in *The Third Indochina War*, 201; and Ian Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age: Cambodian Monks Under Pol Pot*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), 51-53.

Colonial Context: Language and Historical Situation

Integral to the social experiences of Yuon, Samphan, Sar, and Nim before their Paris arrivals was the nature of colonial rule in the French protectorate of Indo-Chine. Though born into a colonial rather than a semi-colonial setting, their early life experiences and education were, like Mao, shaped by local traditions (Theravada Buddhism, थेरवाद in Pali, meaning “the school of monk elders”) and foreign influences (French arts), as their country underwent significant changes under foreign domination. But most importantly, five factors in colonial *Cambodge* (Cambodia as a French protectorate) spurred a Cambodian national consciousness: 1) Space; 2) History; 3) Race; 4) Language; and 5) Nation. French efforts to at once protect Khmer lands, history, language, and culture culminated in the inception of a French construct of Cambodian nation-ness, which spurred a collective national consciousness that underpinned all four of the future CPK founders’ *weltanshauungen* before they boarded the SS *Jamaique* in Saigon and set sail for France in 1949. But this was not an *ex nihilo* phenomenon; as we will see, outside ideas entered new socio-cultural milieus, with its receptors engaging them dialectically.¹⁵

French efforts to preserve Cambodia as a geographic *space* that it could rule as a protectorate while “imposing nationalistic images of domination,”¹⁶ specifically French superiority over Khmer weakness, in effect, “manufactured” the Cambodian national consciousness that these men carried with them.¹⁷ Here, Thongchai Winnichakul’s concept of the geo-body—operations of the technology of territoriality that create nationhood spatially—allows us to see the French establishment of the 1867 *Cambodge* Protectorate as “creating” Cambodia as a discursive construct.¹⁸ Although the French established rigid boundaries to favor their colony in Southern Vietnam, *Cochin-chine*, they safeguarded a “Cambodian” territorial integrity by dint of the entrenchment of national boundaries.¹⁹ Prior to the French advent, the Cambodian

¹⁵ Anne Ruth Hansen, *How To Behave: Buddhism and Modernity in Colonial Cambodia, 1860-1930*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 2, 64.

¹⁶ Gwen Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 180.

¹⁷ See Edwards, *Cambodge*, 19-63. On “manufacturing,” specifically on Jesuit “inventions,” or “fictive roots” of, Confucius and Confucianism, see Lionel Jensen, *Manufacturing Confucianism*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997). See also Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹⁸ Thongchai Winnichakul. *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994), 16.

¹⁹ Milton Osborne, *The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 31-32; David Steckfuss, “The Mixed Colonial Legacy” in *Autonomous Histories*. LJ Sears ed. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 123-143; and John Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolour: King Sisowath and*

realm was a “sacralised topography of places looked after by local spirits (*mesa, nakta*) or places where sacred rituals were performed... it was an indigenous map of the whole realm before the map of modern geography was introduced.”²⁰ But centuries of territorial decline had reduced the kingdom’s territory significantly, as more powerful neighbors (Siam and Dai Viet) expanded into Khmer lands. King Norodom’s (1834-1904) request for French intervention in the 1860s as a final plea to prevent the total absorption of Khmer lands led to the French entrenchment of a Khmer domain’s boundaries, with *Cambodge* becoming a strategic buffer zone between independent Siam and French Indochina.

Next, French experts attempted to frame Khmer *history* in such a way that made it in need of French salvation. As French philosopher Ernst Renan once observed, “Forgetting, I would even say historical error, is an essential factor in the creation of a nation and it is for this reason that the progress of historical studies often poses a threat to nationality.”²¹ French aims to rescue Khmer history were indeed beset by a belief that its colonial subjects had “lost” or “forgotten” it. French historians’ and archaeologists’ fascination with Khmer art and culture were part of the *colons*’ “rediscovery” effort, which led inadvertently to Khmer-ness, under French construction, acting as a stand-in for anything that the French called *Cambodge*. French experts thus monopolized historical writing on the Khmer past, revived Khmer arts including the royal ballet, and built museums to house artifacts that the French viewed as signifiers of a once great civilization.²² Phnom Penh-born George Groslier (1889-1945), for instance, established in 1920 the *École des Arts Cambodgiens* (School of Cambodian Arts), which became the epicenter wherein French scholars could broadcast the “phantasmatic Indochina” fantasy that had captured the *colon* imaginary (the enormous collection of Khmer art in the *Musée national des arts asiatiques Guimet* is also testament to this).²³ French scholars flocked to the *École française*

the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’, 1904-1927 (Clayton, Australia: Monash University Asia Institute, 1996), ix; and Becker, *When the War Was Over*, 53-54.

²⁰ Thongchai, *Siam Mapped*, 24; and David P. Chandler, “Maps For the Ancestors: Sacralized Topography and Echoes of Angkor in Two Cambodian Texts,” in *Facing the Cambodian Past: Selected Essays, 1971-1994*. David P. Chandler, ed. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkwork Books, 1998), 15-44.

²¹ Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation? Text of a speech delivered at the Sorbonne on 11 March 1882,” in *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?* Ethan Rundell trans. (Paris: Presses-Pocket, 1992), 3.

²² David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 51; and Edwards, *Cambodge*, 145-165 For a similar phenomenon, see Arif Dirlik, “Born In Translation: ‘China’ In the Making of ‘Zhongguo,’” (Unpublished Paper, Presented at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, 24 February 2016).

²³ Panivong Norindr, *Phantasmic Indochina: French Colonial Ideology in Architecture, Film, and Literature*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).

d'Extrême-Orient in Hanoi for rigorous “rediscovering,” and in effect, re-inventing, of the Khmer past, which they unwittingly recast as a “Cambodian” one.²⁴

Reminiscent of the late Qing reformers’ articulation of Chinese racial identity as an extension of traditional lineage, with the “Yellow Emperor” as the “progenitor of the yellow race,” French experts’ linked—conveniently and anachronistically—the great “Khmer *race*” of the past with their *cambodgien* subjects, tracing Cambodian lineage ahistorically, staring backwards through time.²⁵ While there was little evidence of ethnic solidarity from as recently as the mid-nineteenth century (Khmer kings ruled through loose networks of non-territorial personal relationships), Cambodian nationalism began with French idealizations of the Khmer past.²⁶ At the core was Angkor Wat (អង្គរវត្ត, meaning “City Temple”) around which French archaeologists, naturalists, and explorers such as Henri Mouhot (1826-1861) and Étienne Aymonier (1844-1929) constructed a romanticized, idyllic Khmer past, and their own self-perception of greatness. Their mission was to awaken a civilization that was, in the French regard, “for centuries now... mentally retarded, more or less asleep.”²⁷ The result, however, was what Edwards refers to as a “temple complex”:

A dominant notion of Khmer nationhood... crystallized around the monuments of Angkor... To some Angkor was a pile of stones while to others it was the incarnation of Khmer ancestral achievement and contemporary potential. Both are primed responses loaded with the disappointment or realization of expectations. One way to understand this legacy and its ramifications is as a “temple complex,” where “complex” refers at once to the physical constellation of Angkor and to a group of associated ideas or impressions. Thus *colonialism’s legacy was the creation of “false” or induced memories rather than the recovery of memory.*²⁸

French aims to situate Khmer civilization as “unrivaled artists and innovators of the ancient world” alongside the Romans and the Greeks was emblematic of its own relish of “the abundant ornament” and view that the “monumental stonework revealed thoughts of eternity, suggesting

²⁴ Anthony Barnett, “Cambodia Will Never Disappear,” *New Left Review* 180 (1990): 101-125; Edwards, *Cambodge*, 39, 42; and Becker, *When The War Was Over*, 55.

²⁵ Frank Dikotter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 61-96. On the fetishization of Angkor, see Edwards, *Cambodge*, 19-39. See also Burglar, *The Eyes of the Pineapples*, 58-59.

²⁶ David Henley, “Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism: Indonesia and Indochina,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, No. 2 (April 1995): 286-324, on pages 306 and 312.

²⁷ Martial Merlin, *Conseil de Gouvernement de l’Indochine, Session Ordinaire de 1923*. (Hanoi: Imprimerie de l’Extrême-Orient, 1923), 13; and Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*, 199.

²⁸ Edwards, *Cambodge*, 242. Emphasis added.

the timelessness of true human nobility.”²⁹ In rebuilding Angkor Wat and its surrounding temples, the French protectorate falsely and strategically bestowed it with national meaning, linking present-day subjects and their identity to the city’s builders, and measuring Cambodia’s zenith (Angkor) against its nadir (recent degeneracy).³⁰ Angkor thus became centerpiece of Khmerness, the “*Kmae daem* [ខ្មែរដើម, Original Khmer].”³¹

As for *language*, the vernacularization of Khmer script is inseparable from protectorate officials’ efforts to shape a national Buddhism. While *Khmer* Buddhism is centuries old, *Cambodian Buddhism*, or Buddhism with national characteristics (a សាសនាជាតិ/ “*sāsana-jāti*,” meaning national religion) is a recent phenomenon.³² In the late nineteenth century, the “Khmer religious imagination,” as Anne Hansen notes, perceived the cosmos as a “morally constructed universe... with its multiple worlds, mov[ing] through cycles of decline that mirrored the contiguous decline and regeneration of adherence to the Dhamma.”³³ Khmer Buddhism at this time was centralized in theory (the sovereign granted patronage to the *Sangha*, Buddhist community), but decentralized in practice. Local *Sanghas* emerged around kings and were powerful variables in forming close-knit societies.³⁴ As Khmer lands declined, Buddhism was tied to the Siamese court of Oudong (Uttung). The French advent segued into a series of reforms from 1897 to 1920 to safeguard Khmer Buddhism from Siamese influence, unwittingly rendering it into a national Buddhism. Royal Library director (1925-1941) and Buddhist Institute founder (1930-1941) Suzanne Karpèles was central to establishing the French as “cultural custodians”³⁵ of a national Buddhism. By 1926, she had established *Kambuja Surya*, the first ever journal in

²⁹ Becker, *When The War Was Over*, 54. Architectural styles serve as a noteworthy example, as they blended fetishized features of Angkor’s dead past, and the new “embodiments of Indochinoiserie” that linked “*la nationalite francaise* and the ‘purely Cambodian style.’” Edwards, *Cambodge*, 62.

³⁰ Edwards, *ibid*; and David P. Chandler, “From ‘Cambodge’ to ‘Kampuchea’: State and Revolution in Cambodia, 1863,” *Thesis Eleven* 50, No. 35 (1997): 35-49.

³¹ Edwards, *Cambodge*, 2, 245. The name *kmae daem* is a pseudonym that Saloth Sar/Pol Pot used when he authored his first political writing “, “រាជាធិបតេយ្យឬប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ? (Monarchy or Democracy?),” ខ្មែរនិស្សិត ឬស [Khmer Student, No. 14] (August 1952): 39-47, signed “*Khmaer Da’em*.”

³² Alain Forest, “Buddhism and Reform: Imposed Reforms and Popular Aspirations,” in *People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power, and Morality in Cambodia Today*. Alexandra Kent and David P. Chandler, eds. (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2008), 19, 25-30 (On Thammayut); and Anne Ruth Hansen, “Modernism and Morality in Colonial Cambodia,” in *People of Virtue*, 40-41.

³³ Hansen, *How To Behave*, 20.

³⁴ Forest, “Buddhism and Reform,” in *People of Virtue*, 17. Khmers initially embraced Mahayana (महायान *mahāyāna*, meaning “Great Vehicle”) Buddhism, which remained the most pervasive religious force until the Khmer Empire’s twelfth century apogee, the era of *Yaśōdharapura* (យសោវរ្ម័ន, Angkor Thom, meaning “Glory-bearing city”), during which it became the state religion. Harris, *Cambodian Buddhism*, 1-80.

³⁵ Edwards, *Cambodge*, 182, 188.

Khmer, and she launched several works by the Royal Library and the Buddhist Institute on Cambodian history, culture, and religion that gave rise to print culture in the protectorate. Karpèles' institutions also made sacred and modern Khmer texts available to a new generation of monks and laity, which was key to the association of Buddhism with Cambodian nationalism years later.³⁶ Other reforms that transformed Khmer Buddhism into national Buddhism was the re-education of monks (Cambodia's literati class) in Pali and Khmer classics, as well as in Buddhist norms that had long been corrupted by outside "superstitious" influences from Siam, and the secularization and renovation of *wat* schools.³⁷ Importantly, Buddhist monks did not simply espouse French reforms uncritically. Monks had considerable agency in their discussions with the French on issues and interpretations of ethics and morality in the Theravada Buddhist canon (in Pali), or in texts from nearby Siam, setting a precedent for intellectuals who, decades later, were dialogic with French notions of nationhood, achievement, liberty, and democracy.

Widespread notions of Cambodian nationalism soon followed, as French officials altered course by the 1930s with a mass literacy campaign to promote the Khmer language as the *lingua franca* of instruction and print media rather than French, which initiated Khmers' identification of a Khmer *nation*. While Cambodian nationalism differed from Vietnamese nationalism in that it did not crystallize around traditions of resistance against invaders, French mass literacy campaigns spread Khmer to its intellectual subjects. Whereas French experts such as Étienne Aymonier had perpetuated the *mythos* of a Cambodian "race of people perennially attached to the idea of not separating its own existence from that of the royal family [with] the king [as] the living incarnation, the august and supreme personification of the nation," emergent Khmer intellectuals could now spread their own thoughts about their identity.³⁸ The first novel in Khmer, ទន្លេសាប ("Great Lake") was published in 1938, while magazines such as ភ្នំពេញ,

³⁶ Ibid; and Becker, *When The War Was Over*, 55. On Buddhist monks as educators, see M. Magnant, « Notes sur les débuts de l'enseignement français au Cambodge (1863-1890) » *Revue Indochinoise*, Premier Semestre, (1913) : 454-469; Henri Russier, « L'enseignement élémentaire au Cambodge, » *Revue Indochinoise* (1913) : 409-420 ; Direction générale de l'instruction publique, *La pénétration scolaire en pays cambodgien et laotien*, (Hanoi: 1931), Ch. 1; Charles Bilodeau, "Compulsory Education in Cambodia," in *Compulsory Education in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam*. Bilodeau, Somlith Pathammavong, and Le Quang Hong, eds. (Paris: UNESCO, 1955); GH Monod, *Le Cambodgien*. (Paris: Editions Larose, 1931), 31-35; and Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age*, 35-42.

³⁷ Edwards, *Cambodge*, 166-182. See also Becker, *When The War Was Over*, 55-57. Hansen credits Siamese religious education, organization, and administration reforms of the Buddhist community under rulers Mongkut and Chulalongkorn for placing a lasting imprint on Khmer Buddhist modernism. Hansen, *How To Behave*, 1-3, 64-75 (on reforms) 85, 92-100 (on King Mongkut), 112-123.

³⁸ Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hemery, *Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954 (From Indochina to Vietnam: Revolution and War in a Global Perspective)*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 289.

(Angkor Wat/“temple city”) expressed Khmer nationalism for the first time in 1936. This trend gained more steam and, in some instances, virulence, in the lead up to WWII, leading to a larger sense of “We-ness,” as a Khmer reading public soon unified its own mass media “internally as a community but cutting it off from others.”³⁹ French and doing French things thus emerged as signifiers of status in a stratified colonial setting, and when *Lycée Sisowath*, a French language private school that offered secondary instruction in Khmer, opened in 1936, the protectorate’s best and brightest lined up to try and gain entry. It was at this private school for the protectorate’s elite that the young men who would form the intellectual thrust of the CPK would meet for the very first time.⁴⁰

As we have seen, a handful of so-called experts influenced the worldviews of indigenous intellectuals, with Khmer nationalists developing a sense of Cambodian national consciousness. As the French proselytized past Khmer greatness and tried to rescue Khmer culture from the dustbin of history, Khmers listened and engaged with these constructs, developing a “moral authority from old sayings fused with new meaning,” namely “We Khmers [ខ្មែរយើង],” and “masters of the country [ម្ចាស់ស្រុក].”⁴¹ Among these Khmer intellectuals who experienced first-hand the French construct were the four men who years later would spearhead the Cambodian Communist movement and who were standard-bearers of an authentic Khmer nationalism (Saloth Sar in particular stood out from his peers in this regard).

From Paddy to Paris: Intellectual Origins of the Cambodian Maoist Vision

The experiences of Yuon, Samphan, Nim, and Sar, in both Cambodia and in France, led them through intellectual spaces that shaped their *reception* of Maoism. First, their education in the French protectorate compelled them to turn their interest in the French arts into overseas studies. Second, these young men were swept up by a tide of avant-gardist thought and

³⁹ Henley, “Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism,” 293, citing Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983), 127. A side effect of this effort, however, was a portrayal of outsiders in a negative light for their cultural difference, which made Chinese and Vietnamese the outliers in an otherwise pure Khmer cultural realm. Ian Harris, *Cambodian Buddhism: History and Practice*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 277n20.

⁴⁰ Brocheux and Hemery, *Indochina*, 287; David P. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, 2nd Edition. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 13; David P. Chandler, *Brother Number One*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 12-13; Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 6-9; and Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolour*, 311.

⁴¹ Khoon Choy Lee, *Golden Dragon and the Purple Phoenix: The Chinese and Their Multi-Ethnic Descendants in Southeast Asia*. (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), 274.

progressive activities in Paris, developing revolutionary ideas while they were students. Third, their participation in Marxist reading groups meant that they read, learned, and debated in both French and Khmer what revolution and approaches to revolution meant to them on their terms, as Marxism-Leninism became a means by which they could liberate themselves and Cambodia more generally from the shackles of colonial oppression. Fourth, developments in Paris and crises in Phnom Penh drove them towards converting to Communism. Membership in the *Cercle Marxiste* and, later, the Stalinist *Parti Communiste Français* (PCF) gave them the brass tacks on the leftist canon and organizational structure. Now revolutionary intellectuals, they were convinced that Marxism-Leninism, and later, Maoism, could transform Cambodia from a corrupt monarchical state into a nation that served the people.⁴² Finally, Maoism became the dominant leftist trend among the Cambodian intellectuals by the mid-1950s, as decolonization and Soviet revisionism pushed alternative interpretations of Marxism-Leninism to the forefront. In different ways and to varying degrees, Mao's writings underpinned our four intellectuals' diagnoses of problems in Cambodia and informed their proposals for altering the country radically, as the next section endeavors to show through a close textual exegesis of the foundational national texts of DK.

Like Mao Zedong, two of the four intellectuals under analysis had rural upbringings that did not coincide with poverty (Khieu Samphan and Saloth Sar), whereas the other two, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, had humble origins. Yuon and Nim were both born in 1930 to mixed Sino-Khmer lineage; Yuon's father grew rice and tobacco on the Mekong River in Kompong Cham not too far from Nim's birthplace in Korkor.⁴³ Nim, meanwhile, was a talented student whose parents were landless, and after his father deserted the family, he took refuge in a *wat*.⁴⁴ Fellow Sino-Khmers Samphan and Sar, however, were from much wealthier stock, which afforded them considerable upward social mobility. Samphan was born on 27 July 1931 in Svay Rieng to a

⁴² Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapples*, 188.

⁴³ Ben Kiernan, "Interview with Ung Bunhuor (Hou Yuon's brother-in-law)," (Sydney, Australia: 21 November 1977). On Hu Nim's birthplace, see Hu Nim, "The Confession of Hu Nim, aka Phoas," Kok Thay Eng trans., (Tuol Sleng Prison, 2 May 1977). [http://d.dccam.org/Archives/Documents/Confessions/Confessions_Hu_Nim.htm] (Accessed 25 January 2016); and "Planning the Past: The Forced Confessions of Hu Nim, Tuol Sleng Prison, May-June 1977," Chanthou Boua, trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977*. David P. Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Chanthou Boua, eds, trans. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Center for International and Area Studies, Monograph Series 33, 1988), 227-317; and Documentation Center of Cambodia, "The Selected 31 Biographies of Khmer Rouge Leaders," (January 1996) EAO/CORKR, DCCAM Document, ID: D13969.

⁴⁴ Nim, "The Confession of Hu Nim"; DCCAM, "The Selected 31 Biographies of Khmer Rouge Leaders"; and Timothy Carney, "Biographical Sketches," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 64.

“middle ranking civil servant” and French colonial government judge Khieu Long and his wife Por Kong, who resettled in Kompong Cham after Khieu Long’s arrest for corruption.⁴⁵ Sar was born on 25 May 1925 to a wealthy landowning family in Prek Sbauv village near Kompong Thom, and while he later described himself as “the son of a peasant who in his childhood had to live a hard life and participate in agricultural work on his father’s land,” quite the opposite was true.⁴⁶ His family had the district’s largest property (nine hectares of rice land, draft cattle, and a tile-roofed house).⁴⁷ By dint of their family’s wealth, both Samphan and Sar would ultimately gain admission to the exclusive French-language schools to train to become civil servants.

Until well into the 1930s few Khmers had access to French education at any level in the protectorate, as the colonials favored Chinese and Vietnamese students almost exclusively for civil service education (by 1905 “no more than 5000 Khmer children were attending Protectorate schools”).⁴⁸ Under the puppet King Sisowath Monivong and the region’s true authority, the *Gouverneur Générale* and *Residents Supérieurs*, Cambodia was a colonial police state in every sense.⁴⁹ Thus by the 1920s, the Khmer majority was largely disconnected from ideas of European democracy, socialism, and the nation-state. But after years of favoring others for colonial administrative position, a new generation of Khmer elites was the benefactor of the French policy of cultural coexistence that emerged in the 1930s. Now, the protectorate’s best and brightest Khmer students, who were conveniently from the wealthiest families, had access to French classics.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Thu-huong Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1992), 43; Carney, “Biographical Sketches,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 63; Laura Summers, “Underdevelopment in Cambodia by Khieu Samphan,” *Indochina Chronicle* (September-November 1976): 1-27, quote from page 1; and Marie-Alexandrine Martin, *Cambodia: A Shattered Society*, Mark W. McLeod trans. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 163.

⁴⁶ Carney, “Biographical Sketches,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 62; and Nate Thayer, “My Education: How Saloth Sar Became Pol Pot,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (30 October 1997), 21. Sar mentioned in an interview that his parents wrote his birthday on the wall in his home, the month *bos*, and the year *chluv (ox)*. This date remained secret for years, known only by his closest surviving family members until Pol Pot gave the date.

⁴⁷ Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 45.

⁴⁸ Serge Thion, “The Cambodian Idea of Revolution,” in *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea*. David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, eds. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series No. 25, 1983), 14. Thion states that a lycée “was not established in Phnom Penh until the 1930s, but a handful of young aristocrats, like Sihanouk, generally was sent to Saigon or Hanoi to attend a lycée.”

⁴⁹ Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor*, vii, xii.

⁵⁰ Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor*, 309. Tully states that France’s “dual administrative system” and “poor educational system meant in practice that few Khmers enjoyed real power and responsibility... stunt[ing] the growth of a middle class and a skilled working class, especially among the Khmers.” See also Milton Osborne, *The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 31-32; and Henley, “Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism,” 286-324.

Despite their varied upbringings, Yuon, Samphan, Nim, and Sar received a French language education, an important factor in the “semiotics of status” in French *Cambodge* since all that was French for consumption, whether language, culture, or products, represented an elevated standing in the protectorate.⁵¹ Indeed, “language,” Philip Short contends, “forms the building blocks of thought. The Cambodian students spoke French; they had attended French schools; and they had grown up in a French colony. French was the prism through which they viewed the outside world.”⁵² Their worldviews were certainly evidence of this fact. All four gained admission to the prestigious *College Norodom Sihanouk*, a junior high school in Kompong Cham, where in 1942 a mere twenty students comprised its first class.⁵³ At *College*, a French education entailed immersion in French literature, which by dint of its emphasis on thought and achievement in the French revolution and the pillars of French nationhood—*liberté, égalité, fraternité*—influenced their perception of *Cambodge* as a nation (Cambodia). Rather than create dissidents, however, their teachers’ aim was, as the *Résidence Supérieure* described, to “create elites, assistants... with a view to a useful collaboration, to help in the moral and intellectual uplifting of the race, to augment its dignity and well-being, and to enrich their country by intelligent and sustained labor.”⁵⁴ But despite their best efforts, some developed strong nationalist sentiments through shared experiences as students reading French classics about revolution, romance, and emancipation. As Samphan recalled, he and Sar were “profoundly influenced by the spirit of French thought—by the Age of Enlightenment, of Rousseau and Montesquieu.”⁵⁵ The “comradeship of the classroom,” as it turns out, served the Khmer students “as a microcosm of the emergent nation” rather than as a bastion of an *ancien regime*.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Edwards, *Cambodge*, 62.

⁵² Short, *Pol Pot*, 47.

⁵³ Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 35. Tyner states that this cohort “included Saloth Sar. Others who attended would include Hu Nim, Khieu Samphan, and Hou Yuon, all of whom would become important Communist leaders.”

⁵⁴ Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolour*, 220, citing *Résidence Supérieure au Cambodge (RSC) 304*, M. Humbert-Hesse, « Rapport General sur l’Enseignement au Cambodge (Janvier 1923) » (10 Janvier 1923). Humbert-Hesse was the Director of Primary Education in Cambodia at the time. William Frederick describes French society in Indochina as “comparable to that in small-town bourgeois communities of France—rank-conscious, proud, and anti-intellectual... Frenchmen who lived very long in Indochina often became empty, narrow-minded members of a colonial task-force; in a sense they lost Europe but gained nothing in exchange.” William Frederick, “Alexandre Varenne and Politics in Indochina, 1925-1926,” *Aspects of Vietnamese History*. WF Vella ed. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1973), 101.

⁵⁵ *Le Monde* (31 December 1998), quoted in Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age*, 182n7.

⁵⁶ Henley, “Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism,” 293, citing Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 121-123.

Indeed, the centralized French educational system had the entire student body master the same curriculum. “History was taught with no adaptation to local conditions, so that future citizens and colonial subjects alike would identify with French history and with French political values,” Serge Thion notes.⁵⁷ This lasting legacy of the French remained long after independence, as a generation of *Lycée* and *College* students became *Francophone* and *Francophile*.⁵⁸ Importantly, we see a prime example of the irony of the French *mission civilisatrice*: French educators wanted to train Cambodians to become proper civil servants of a French domain, yet through immersion in French language and literature, young Cambodians learned about the greatness of liberty, equality, and fraternity, which inspired nationalist imaginings.⁵⁹ In fact, while *Lycée Sisowath* was established in 1935 by the author of “How To Be a Khmer Civil Servant,” RSC Sylvestre, its students were the first to develop nationalist ideas, with the first anti-colonial demonstrations occurring in 1936 and Buddhist demonstrations in the 1940s (later forming the ក្រុមប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ, Democrat Party).⁶⁰ In fact, future CPK Minister of Foreign Affairs Ieng Sary, with whom Sar would form a lasting bond while in Paris, attended *Lycée Sisowath* (where three of the four CPK founders attended secondary school), where he spearheaded the “Liberation of Cambodia from French Colonialism” group.⁶¹ The significance of *Lycée Sisowath* was that it brought together young minds—Yuon, Samphan, and Nim included—giving them, as Edwards describes, “a rare freedom of association and discussion, and helped to forge a sense of connection that was far from imagined in its physical immediacy.”⁶²

Saloth Sar, however, did not participate in this cohort, an intimation of the rebel he would become while in France. Whereas Yuon, Samphan, and Nim showed great promise and advanced to the *Lycée Sisowath*, Sar’s “ingratiating manner,” “fondness for sports,” and “apparent lack of ambition,” barred him from *lycée* admission.⁶³ In 1946, he enrolled at the *l’Ecole Miche*, a French-language Catholic school in Kompong Cham, where he worked alongside

⁵⁷ Thion, “The Cambodian Idea of Revolution,” in *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea*, 14.

⁵⁸ Norodom Sihanouk and Bernard Krisher, *Charisma and Leadership: The Human Side of Great Leaders of the Twentieth Century*. (Tokyo: Yohan Publications, 1990), 167. Krisher recalled that he “saw a counter girl in a bar reading Sartre and dreaming of a future trip to France.”

⁵⁹ Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapples*, 182-185; and Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 35.

⁶⁰ Edwards, *Cambodge*, 224. An editorial in *Le Khmer* states: “Old Cambodians saw a near future where all the posts in the French administration would be occupied by... graduates of the *Lycée Sisowath*.” “Une irréparable faute politique,” *Le Khmer*, (18 May 1936), 1.

⁶¹ Becker, *When The War Was Over*, 69.

⁶² Edwards, *Cambodge*, 224.

⁶³ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 51. On Yuon and Nim’s entrance to the *Lycée*, see Nguyen-vo, *ibid.*

underprivileged Cambodians in carpentry at the Russey Keo Technical School and, later, studied electricity at *l'Ecole Technique*.⁶⁴ He thus missed events in Phnom Penh where, following WWII, nationalists had forced Sihanouk to declare independence.⁶⁵ His improved grades eventually earned him a scholarship to the *École Française de radioélectricité* in Paris, which meant that a reunion with his *College Sihanouk* comrades was on the horizon.⁶⁶ Yuon actually joined Sar in boarding the *SS Jamaïque* in Saigon, embarking on a trip that took between a month and six weeks through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, arriving in Marseilles in September 1949 and taking the overnight train to Paris.⁶⁷

If we apply Benedict Anderson's concept of "pilgrimages" abroad as a defining feature of pre-nationalist elites to the Cambodian arrivals in 1949-1950, it is no wonder why Paris, where they pursued advanced degrees, initiated their transformation from nationalist intellectuals into radical ones.⁶⁸ A "precursor of CPK ideology," as Craig Etcheson notes, "resulted from the fact that as leading students in the Cambodian school system, the individuals who eventually emerged as members of the Central Committee of the CPK were among the Khmer youth sent to Paris for their postsecondary education."⁶⁹ But by their 1959 Paris arrival, Yuon and Sar were neither political, nor revolutionary.⁷⁰ Sar, for instance, favored the nineteenth century French poetry of Victor Hugo, Jean Rimbaud, Paul Verlaine, and Alfred de Vigny, and the works of eighteenth century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (his "favorite").⁷¹ Nevertheless, they

⁶⁴ Royaume du Cambodge, Ministère de l'Éducation, *Contôle des étudiants boursiers: Carnet 1*. (manuscript, n. d. ca. 1960, Echols Collection, Cornell University), N158; Pol Pot, "Interview du Camarade Pol Pot a la Délégation des Journalistes Yougoslaves en Visite au Kampuchéa Démocratique, 17 Mars 1978," (Phnom Penh: Département de la Presse et de l'Information du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères du Kampuchéa Démocratique, 1978), 21; Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 21; and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 29.

⁶⁵ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 10. Ieng Sary claims that Samphan was among this group in 1946. See *Le Courrier du Viet Nam* (Hanoi: 31 January 1972).

⁶⁶ Ben Kiernan, "Interview with Loth Suong," (Phnom Penh: 9 July 1980). See also Xu Yan, "波尔布特: '左祸' 的一面镜子 (Pol Pot: Reflection of a Left Disaster)," 百年潮, 第3期[Rising Tide, Issue 3, People's Republic of China], (2001): 218-228, on page 219.

⁶⁷ Royaume du Cambodge, *Contôle des étudiants boursiers*, N158; and Thomas Engelbert and Chris Goscha, *Falling out of Touch: A Study of the Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement, 1930-1975*. (Clayton, Australia: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash Asia Institute, 1995), 54. Kiernan, and Nguyen-vo date his arrival to October 1949 or 1950. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 51; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 119; Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 10; and Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*, 43. On Hu Nim's later arrival, see Nim, "Confession of Hu Nim."

⁶⁸ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 29-31.

⁶⁹ Craig Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 30.

⁷⁰ Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 65; Xu Yan, "波尔布特: '左祸' 的一面镜子," 219; and Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 89.

⁷¹ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 32. Chandler also indicates major influences on Sar's thinking remain the subject of debate since, aside from a references to Mao Zedong in his writings, he never mentioned any. On page 91n29.

recognized crises in Cambodia that required a response from its elites: non-agricultural economic life was an outsider-dominated affair; the French dual-administrative system favored Vietnamese; and dependence on France prevented economic modernization. Decades of French linkages between *cambodgiens* and the ancient Khmers had also developed in them a fear of cultural-national annihilation, which pushed some to seek out methods to save their nation, notably through Cambodian nationalist organizations.⁷²

While both men had left Cambodia to join dozens of Cambodian students in pursuit of degrees to obtain bureaucratic positions back in Cambodia—most of whom were neutral politically—they were acutely aware that Cambodia would never be independent under French or monarchist rule. Yuon and Sar joined the nationalist *Association des Étudiants Khmers* (AEK), which was founded in 1946, led by moderate democrats, and was politically neutral in seeking Cambodian independence. The AEK thus brought together students across a whole range of political orientations with a shared goal of educating themselves in ways to bring about national freedom, or at the very least, improve the situation back home.⁷³ They met at the *Pavillon de l'Indochine, Cité universitaire de Paris*, where it published the biannual ខ្មែរសិស្សិក (“Khmer Student,” or *Bulletin de l'Association des étudiants Khmers*).⁷⁴ Those who took an interest in politics supported the left-leaning, pro-independence Democrat Party, which had won a majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly, and their political views reflected an appreciation for Cambodian republican politician and pro-independence advocate Son Ngoc Thanh.⁷⁵ Initially, the Paris Group avoided raising eyebrows for fear of losing their bursaries, participating only in study sessions. The 1952 dismissal of the Democratic Party government, however, pushed Yuon and Sar, with their future CPK mainstays following suit later, activism and, later, joining more radical student associations.⁷⁶

To understand how and why Yuon and Sar became revolutionary turn, however, it is necessary to indicate the role played by radical currents of avant-garde thought, which, together with the setting of 1950s Paris, made impressionable students more receptive to radical trends. Indeed, Paris was where Yuon, Sar, and Samphan (in 1953) first encountered Marxism-Leninism

⁷² Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapples*, 188.

⁷³ Martin, *Cambodia*, 97; and Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 52.

⁷⁴ *Bulletin* reported on association proceedings and covered several Cambodia-related topics.

⁷⁵ See Son Ngoc Thanh, “Déclaration de Son Ngoc Thanh a/s d’un nouveau referendum le mettant en compétition politique avec Norodom Sihanouk,” (29 mai 1960); and Khul Sarin, “Son Ngoc Thanh tel que nous le connaissons,” *Courrier Phnompenhois* (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 12 June 1970).

⁷⁶ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 25; and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 57.

and Communism.⁷⁷ But it was shared experiences and “exegetical bonding” through the study of these Marxist texts in the illuminating city of Paris and against the backdrop of wars in Indochina and Korea—a period Jacques Vergès calls “the springtime of peoples”⁷⁸—that galvanized them as awakened agents of change. Here, intellectuals developed shared political views, establishing lasting bonds well into the heydays of the Communist movement, with students meeting regularly to debate politics, art, and philosophy, and Cambodia’s position in an ever-globalizing world.⁷⁹ Indeed, Paris after WWII was a rare meeting ground for the avant-garde, as Short describes:

Existentialism was the rage and St. Germain-des-Près at its apogee. Juliette Greco had become the emblem of an introverted, self-indulgent generation, parodied by the Young mime Marcel Marceau. Mey Mann recalled going late one night with a group of friends to a cellar club, where ‘everyone was dressed in black.’ It was *Le Tabou*, on the rue Dauphine, where Albert Camus, Alberto Giacometti, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and a certain Jean-Paul Sartre used to gather after the biggest bars closed... The Khmer Student Association’s [*Association des Étudiants Khmers*] magazine, *Khemara Nisut* [ខ្មែរនិស្សិត], caught the mood of the times—as viewed by Cambodians, at least—in a sketch lampooning the plight of a new arrival from Phnom Penh, who found himself surrounded by ‘policemen who gesticulate like opera singers,’ something called an ‘autumn’ [that] made the leaves turn red and fall, and ‘strange places [that] deafen you with bawdy, syncopated music, [where] lithe young adonises dislocate themselves, each more frantically than the next, in a kind of collective hysteria...[where you can] join a group of intense young men, wearing bow-ties and slicked-back hair, who are earnestly discussing whether ‘essence’ precedes ‘existence’ in the case of peas and gherkins, or should it be the other way around?’⁸⁰

Most important was not which “ism” young students espoused at this time, but instead the experiences of their discussions about them, through which they bonded as comrades. While Paris was host to a veritable *ménagerie* of all types of progressives, it was contact with others and shared experiences that engendered the inception of radical thought. And this was indeed the

⁷⁷ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 52. On Communism in Paris in the early 1950s, see Alain Besancon, *Une génération*. (Paris: Julliard, 1987); Jeanine Verdes Leroux, *Au service du Parti: le parti communiste, les intellectuels, et le culture (1944-1956)*. (Paris: Fayard, 1985); and Dominique Dessanti, *Les staliniens*. (Paris: Fayard, 1975).

⁷⁸ David Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 263-293. On Communism in Paris in the early 1950s, see Alain Besancon, *Une génération*. (Paris: Julliard, 1987); Jeanine Verdes Leroux, *Au service du Parti: le parti communiste, les intellectuels, et le culture (1944-1956)*. (Paris: Fayard, 1985); and Dominique Dessanti, *Les staliniens*. (Paris: Fayard, 1975). Vergès was active in student circles in the PCF at this time, and would serve as Samphan’s defense lawyer decades later during the ECCC trials against many of the CPK founders.

⁷⁹ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 27.

⁸⁰ Short, *Pol Pot*, 48, quoting ខ្មែរនិស្សិត ប្រាំបី [Khmer Student 8] (December 1949), 19-20.

case for the young Khmer intellectuals in Paris.⁸¹ As Sar recalled, “I came into contact with some progressive students... I often stayed with them, and little by little they influenced me.”⁸² Samphan also remembered that as a student in Paris he “was in the same situation as many students of our country. We debated the future of our people and ways of realizing our goals such as national independence, economic progress, and prosperity for everybody. Already at that time all my activities had been aimed at the fulfillment of these ideals.”⁸³ Whether it was the shared experience of living abroad, or their interpretation of radical thought within the context of rectifying their homeland’s ills, these men coalesced around *doing something* and that they could *do* it together, thereby becoming networked individuals in a situated thinking.

But how did they become Communists? Participation in the *Cercle Marxiste*, a secret cell within the AEK with links to the *Parti Communiste Français* (PCF)-established *groupes des langues* (ca. 1949), and which head Maurice Thorez endorsed, was one of four major pushes in this transformation: 1) readings Marxist texts in and how they became useful to their readers; 2) networking with Communists in Berlin; 3) corrupt politics at home that crushed the democratic process; and 4) the turn to Maoism as a means to effectuate real political change in Cambodia through revolution. First, among the Khmer intellectuals’ cohort was Keng Vannsak, a radical thinker and student mentor who had long held that Buddhism and Hinduism had contaminated the purity of Khmer culture, and who had ties to Parisian leftist circles.⁸⁴ Keng hosted student meetings at his *Rue de Commerce* (15^{ème} *arrondissement*) apartment to organize anti-monarchist nationalist reading groups in which students found value in Marxist readings insofar as they could be useful for obtaining independence.⁸⁵ Marxism thus did not emerge because of its theoretical value or advocacy of proletarian internationalism; rather, it was a means to an ends, a tool with which they could smash the French colonizers and gain independence.⁸⁶ One member in particular, Thiounn Mumm, who came from a prominent non-royal family, brought with him

⁸¹ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 27; and Martin, *Cambodia*, 96-97.

⁸² Pol Pot, “Interview with Cai Ximei,” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: May 1984). See also Xu Yan, “波尔布特：‘左禍’的一面鏡子,” 219.

⁸³ Christel Pilz, “Khieu Samphan: Giving Up on Socialism?” *Asia Record* (October 1980).

⁸⁴ Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 28, 543-544.

⁸⁵ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 543; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 119-121; Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 53; Martin, *Cambodia*, 97-98; Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 89-98, 119-121; and Short, *Pol Pot*, 51 (Vannsak’s address), 63-64.

⁸⁶ Anna Belogurova, “Communism in South East Asia,” in *The Oxford Handbook of The History of Communism*. Stephen A. Smith, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 236-251; and Alexander Vatlin and Stephen A. Smith, “The Comintern,” *The Oxford Handbook of The History of Communism*, 190-199.

the AEK's nationalist pro-Son Ngoc Thanh tendency.⁸⁷ As students, though, they became very suspicious of wealth and money, regarding wealth only as a card played by those who could afford it. In an August 1952 text written by an AEK member, "money and rank were regarded as potions that poisoned people and subjected them to the monarchy," and soon, the *Cercle* shifted further to the left.⁸⁸

The *Cercle* now encouraged doctrinaire discussions and reading ideologically tinged materials, consisting of individual cells and preaching strict adherence to clandestine operation. But through reading leftist texts in their language of choice, and by interpreting them through a local cultural lens, *Cercle* members were able to conceptualize a Marxism that *fit* with Cambodian realities. The *Cercle* met monthly, with members such as PCF operative Mey Mann recalling that it "secretly controlled the student movement from within...by Communist Party members whose... membership was kept secret" to protect them from reprimand.⁸⁹ A section of the PCF, the *Cercle* had its own Politburo and Secretariat, though it did not confer with the Vietnamese-led Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) because it feared harsh reprisal and disliked the Vietnamese students' parochial Indochina Federation proposal.⁹⁰ *Cercle* leaders in 1950-1951 were PCF members Rath Samueoun and Ieng Sary and included recent PCF recruit Yuon, Samphan (1953-1957), and Sar as participants. Sar, who held a low rank, recalled that he and his colleagues date the *Cercle's* foundation to July-August 1951, though Ieng Sary repudiated this claim.⁹¹ Sary and Sar had by 1951 abandoned their studies for politics, with Sary studying Stalin's works and techniques for organizational structures of the Communist Party closely. Yuon, however, continued his academic pursuit regardless of *Cercle* participation, earning an economics doctorate in 1955. Sary, Sar, and Yuon were in the same cell, which

⁸⁷ Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 46. As Tyner notes, Mumm's grandfather "amassed a fortune as minister of palace affairs... Mumm, moreover, studied at the University of Hanoi and, in 1946, was one of the first Cambodian students to travel to France for higher education."

⁸⁸ Sacha Sher, *Le Kampuchéa des « Khmers rouges »: essai de compréhension d'une tentative de révolution*. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004), 76.

⁸⁹ Steve Heder, "Interview with Mey Mann," quoted in Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 33. On discussion groups, see Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 119; David P. Chandler, "Interviews with Keng Vannsak and Thiounn Mumm"; and François Debré, *Cambodge: la révolution de la forêt*. (Paris: Club français du livre, 1976), 81.

⁹⁰ Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*, 43-44; and Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, 54.

⁹¹ Pol Pot, "Interview with Cai Ximei," (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: May 1984); Ieng Sary, "Interview with Adrian Maben," (Pailin, Cambodia, August 1999); Short, *Pol Pot*, 475-476n63; Thomas Engelbert, "Interview with Pham Van Ba," (Hanoi: 9 August 1989); Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, 54; Xu Yan, "波尔布特: '左祸'的一面镜子," 219; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 119-121; and Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 28-29, 33.

focused on the Communist canon. Upon Sar's return from Yugoslavia in mid-1950, where he worked in a "labor battalion" on the Zagreb highway, he joined Yuon and Sary in discussing Lenin's "On Imperialism," Marx's *Das Kapital*, "Dialectical Materialism," and *The Communist Manifesto*, Stalin's collected works, and Mao Zedong's *La nouvelle Démocratie* and *Lectures choisies des Oeuvres de Mao*.⁹² *Cercle* members contemplated these works in French, though they conversed in Khmer as well since some political terms lacked Khmer equivalents.⁹³ Importantly, however, *Cercle* participants did not merely *read* and *discuss* Marxism; rather, they interpreted Marxism through the lens of national culture, which for them was Khmer Buddhism. While the CPK later banned Buddhism and defrocked monks, in their Paris years as before, Buddhism was inseparable from Cambodian identity.⁹⁴

Second, in July/August 1951 Yuon, Sary, and Sar led an AEK representative youth delegation to the International Federation of Democratic Youth festival in East Berlin, which was their first exposure to the KPRP and news of resistance against the French in Cambodia. Once there, they met Viet Minh delegates who gave them "a number of Communist documents," including news on the latest from the Khmer Issarak and its leader Son Ngoc Minh.⁹⁵ They returned from the East Berlin festival with brochures, photographs of Son Ngoc Minh" (formerly Son Ngoc Thanh, adding Minh to his name as an homage to Ho Chi Minh), and "a sample of the Issarak five-towered flag."⁹⁶ By their return, Vannsak had left Paris, but his departure initiated even deeper bonds between Sar, Yuon, and Sary, with the *Cercle* relocating to Sary's hotel room

⁹² *Cercle* members read French-language editions. Mao Tsé-toung, *La nouvelle Démocratie*. (Paris: Editions sociales, 1951); or Mao Tsé-toung, *La nouvelle Démocratie*. (Beijing: People's Press, 1952). See Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 120; Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 26, 33; Short, *Pol Pot*, 50; Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age*, 53; Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 54, citing interviews with Keng Vannsak and Pierre Brocheux; Thiounn Mumm letter to the author (November 1988); and François Debré, *Cambodge: La révolution de la forêt*. (Paris: Club français du livre, 1976), 77-95. On French versions of Mao's works as *Cercle* materials, see Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 78, 121; and Short, *Pol Pot*, 64-65.

⁹³ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 32-33; and Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 91.

⁹⁴ Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age*, 53; and Short, *Pol Pot*, 65.

⁹⁵ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 35; and Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 91-92; Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 55; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 121; and Martin, *Cambodia*, 97-98. Son Ngoc Minh, whose real name was Son Ngoc Thanh, was openly critical of Sihanouk's political miscarriages. Son Ngoc Thanh, « Déclaration de Son Ngoc Thanh a/s d'un nouveau referendum le mettant en compétition politique avec Norodom Sihanouk, 29 mai 1960 » (Phnom Penh, 1960); and Khul Sarin, « Son Ngoc Thanh tel que nous le connaissons » *Courrier Phnompenhois* [Phnom Penh, Cambodia] (12 June 1970).

⁹⁶ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 55. Moderates: Vann Molyvann, Yem Sarong, Hang Tun Hak, and Tan Kim Huon. Right-wing: May Say, Long Pet, Douc Rasy, Douc Phana, Sam Sary, and Prom Tos. Communist: Ieng Sary, Saloth Sar, Thiounn Mumm, Khieu Samphan, Keng Vannsak, Sin Khem Ko, Hou Yuon, and Phung Ton.

on *Rue St. André des Arts* in 1952.⁹⁷ Yuon ascended to AEK leadership earlier in the fall, and connected the AEK to the internationalist *Union National des Étudiants de France* (UNEF) and, then, solidified the *Cercle*'s PCF ties. His rise signaled the *Cercle*'s seizure of the AEK from within (a bloc within strategy, so to speak), as PCF members split the AEK into moderate, right-wing, and leftist camps.⁹⁸ This fissure also led the AEK to augment its leftist political orientation, with members distributing *L'Humanité*, frequenting PCF cells, and expressing outright criticisms of the association's honorary president, King Norodom Sihanouk (r. 1941-1955). In one instance, AEK members decried Sihanouk's suppression of opposition Parties, demanding that he renounce his honorary title.⁹⁹ Sihanouk's continued disruption of the electoral process, both before and after Cambodia's 1953 independence from France, ultimately pushed the *Cercle* towards embracing Communism as its guiding principle.

Politics on the home front constitute the third major push of the Paris Group towards Communism. Three major developments constituted this push. First, Sihanouk dissolved the National Assembly in January 1949 and ruled by imperial decree, which angered a Democratic Party that had lobbied for a popular vote.¹⁰⁰ The tipping point for them was the January 1950 assassination of Democrat leader Ieu Kouess by an associate of Sihanouk's uncle, Norodom Norindeth, which left students with few political options. The Democrats continued their push for elections, which they gained in 1951, and anti-Sihanouk demonstrations in May 1952 among students in Cambodia gave indications that the monarchy could no longer ignore calls for reform. From Paris, Hou Yuon penned a letter in which he lauded the demonstrators' efforts, situating their protests in a global context: "These positive developments have become normal throughout the world, whether in the European countries or the Asian ones, and especially in the countries where independence is being sought."¹⁰¹ The second development was the French position on Sihanouk, which cast him as the only hope for political stability and, ultimately, infuriated the

⁹⁷ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 53.

⁹⁸ Marie Alexandrine Martin, "Interview with Keng Vannsak," (Montmorency, France, 10 November 1982).

⁹⁹ Martin, *Cambodia*, 98.

¹⁰⁰ On the AEK's support of the Democrats, see Saloth Sar, "រាជាធិបតេយ្យឬប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ? (Monarchy or Democracy?)," ខ្មែរនិស្សិតកម្ពុជា [Khmer Student 14], (August 1952), 39-47, on page 39. Translated version in *Khmers Rouges: Matériaux pour l'histoire du communisme au Cambodge*. Serge Thion and Ben Kiernan, eds. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1981). 357-361, on page 357. On the coup, see Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 63-66; Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 29; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 72, 121; and Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*, 43.

¹⁰¹ Hou Yuon, "Message from the Khmer Students' Association in France to all Students in the Khmer Land," (nd, np), as quoted in Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 121.

pro-democracy Paris group. As the French military commander General Pierre de Langlade declared, “Democracy had no hope [here]... The parliamentary experiment has failed... The Sovereign remains the only person capable of giving Cambodia political direction... [He is] heir to the ... mystique of the God-Kings, who for thousands of years have guided the destinies of the land... Everything in this country has to be done by the King.”¹⁰² Sihanouk thus had unchecked power, and again dissolved the Assembly on 15 June 1952 in a coup d’état.

Indeed, Sihanouk’s corruption pushed the Paris Cambodian intellectuals to embracing the Stalinism and dogmatism (and accompanying emphasis on clandestinity and organization) of the PCF. In response to Sihanouk’s coup, Keng Vannsak levied harsh condemnation in a 1952 issue of the AEK publication ខ្មែរនិស្សិត (Khmer Student), declared that:

We, Khmer students of the AEK, consider that Your Majesty has acted illegally... and that the policy of the Throne... will inevitably lead our Khmer Motherland into an abyss of perpetual slavery... In your message to the nation, [you said that] Cambodia faces ever greater dangers... What should the people think when Your Majesty’s Palace has become a lobby for dishonest dealings which place within your hands the riches of the country and the people?... Corruption in our country stems from the Throne and spreads down to the humblest officials. The French oppress the whole country, the King trades his Crown, the Palace and its parasites suck the people’s blood... These are the main causes of our country’s critical situation today... Your Majesty has sought to divide the nation in two: the royalists, and those who struggle for independence. [Your] policy is to set Khmers against Khmers...¹⁰³

Yet *Cercle* members realized the limits of theory (their two years of reading radical texts in Paris had not brought them closer to reform), and as Sihanouk disbanded the AEK in 1953, they took a radical turn, forming the pro-PCF *Union des Etudiants Khmers* (UEK) on 26 November 1953.¹⁰⁴ As Samphan, who assumed leadership of the UEK in 1957 and linked it to the KPRP’s Phnom Penh branch, recalled: “my studies as well as my experiences convinced me that the only way of implementing our ideals in general, and of building up our backward agriculture in particular, is socialism. Thus, I became a communist. I did so out of objective conviction and not out of daydreaming.”¹⁰⁵ Indeed, Sihanouk’s dissolution of the Democrat-led assembly in June 1952

¹⁰² Short, *Pol Pot*, 80.

¹⁰³ « Lettre de l’Association des Etudiants Khmers en France à Sa Majesté Norodom Syhanouk [*sic*], Roi du Cambodge » in ខ្មែរនិស្សិត ដប់បួន [Khmer Student 14] (6 July 1952); and Short, *Pol Pot*, 78. As Short notes, this issue was in handwritten Khmer. Short credits Ben Kiernan and Mey Mann for French versions.

¹⁰⁴ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 121. On UEK formation and date, see Martin, *Cambodia*, 99-100.

¹⁰⁵ Pilz, “Khieu Samphan: Giving Up on Socialism?” *Asia Record* (October 1980).

exacerbated the Paris Groups' radicalization, with students flocking *en masse* to join the PCF.¹⁰⁶ The PCF's appeal owed to General Secretary, Maurice Thorez, a charismatic orator who had developed a personality cult of his own, in a sense.¹⁰⁷ But in 1950 Thorez suffered a stroke and left the country for medical treatment. An intra-Party struggle for power culminated in purges, and many Cambodians in France, including Saloth Sar, were swept along by a Stalinist wave as the PCF's rigid disciplinarian line instilled in members a sense of purpose and direction.¹⁰⁸ Sar, Yuon, and Sary thus learned the effectiveness of staying out of sight and mind, especially in light of the French government's crackdown on scholarship student participation in Parisian leftist groups.¹⁰⁹ By 1952, Yuon, Sar, and Sary thus "vowed a lifelong commitment" to Communism, and never looked back.¹¹⁰

The fourth and final push was the process whereby these leftist intellectuals turned from the Stalinism of the PCF to Maoism, which began with a difference of opinion on how to effectuate actual change in Cambodia. As Keng Vannsak stated in an interview, "We wanted to take power and believed that we could do so only with popular support, which necessarily means violence. We opposed the PCF's view that we could come to power through universal suffrage."¹¹¹ Sar returned to Cambodia in 1953 to take up a regional cell secretary position in the Vietnamese-directed KPRP, yet frustration mounted among cadres, who tolerated rather than embraced Hanoi's helmsmanship over the Cambodian Working Bureau in eastern Cambodia, and awaited directives from Hanoi on what to do next.¹¹² In Paris, the PCF discarded Stalinism (alienated by Soviet revisionism and swept up in the tide of decolonization in France's former colonies), while Cambodian radicals had grown tired of Russian and Vietnamese support of their nemesis Sihanouk.¹¹³ As Vannsak, who had returned to Paris to finish his invention, the Khmer typewriter, elaborates: "At the beginning, we were very Stalinist... We turned toward China in

¹⁰⁶ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 8.

¹⁰⁷ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 25; and Maxwell Adereth, *The French Communist Party: A Critical History (1920-1984), From Comintern to "the Colors of France."* (Manchester, UK: University of Manchester Press, 1984), 231.

¹⁰⁸ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 33, 35.

¹⁰⁹ David P. Chandler, "A Revolution in Full Spate: Communist Party Policy in Democratic Kampuchea, December 1976," *International Journal of Politics* 16, No. 3, Cambodia: Politics and International Relations (Fall 1986): 131-149, on pages 132-133; Sher, *Le Kampuchéa des « Khmers Rouges »* 30; and Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 174.

¹¹⁰ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 28.

¹¹¹ Martin, "Interview with Keng Vannsak"; Martin, *Cambodia*, 99.

¹¹² Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 27-28; and Engelbert and Goscha, *Falling Out of Touch*, 54-55.

¹¹³ See Julian Bourg, "The Red Guards of Paris: French Student Maoism of the 1960s," *History of European Ideas* 31 (2005): 472-490.

the late 1950s because the Russians were playing the Sihanouk card and neglecting us... *When everyone began to criticize Stalin, we became Maoists.*”¹¹⁴ Why? One answer is because Soviet de-Stalinization and “revisionism” propelled many radical students in Paris toward looking to Communist China for answers to crises in Cambodia. The other is that Maoism provided an alternative; it was borne from the Chinese revolutionary experience, stressed practice over dogmatism, discarded the Eurocentrism inherent in Marxism-Leninism, and contained emancipatory features. Marxism’s “liberating possibility” only became a reality when “rephrased in a national voice, for a Marxism that could not account for a specifically national experience... replicated in a different form the hegemonism of capitalism [under the guise of universalism].”¹¹⁵ Accordingly, Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan (1953), and new arrival Hu Nim (1955) turned to Maoism to counter Sihanouk’s corruption. Yuon and Samphan pursued doctorates with a view to taking the political route to reforming their homeland with Maoism contextualizing Cambodia’s plight, while Nim joined them before returning to Phnom Penh to complete his own Maoist-inspired doctoral dissertation. As the subsequent section shows, these three works represent the beginning of the Cambodian intellectuals’ Maoist vision, and became the foundation on which the CPK built Democratic Kampuchea.

Intellectual Adaptation: Foundational National Texts, 1955-1965

[A]ll peasant rebellions [that] became revolutions, which turned from movements aimed at the redress of wrongs into movements to overthrow society itself, have been led and controlled by a revolutionary elite of non-peasant outsiders... intellectuals with peasant backgrounds were primarily intellectuals, representing the values of an urban culture.¹¹⁶—Roel A. Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapples*, 1990

In a 2004 book, Khieu Samphan stressed that he, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim were mere “figureheads” who played no serious roles within the CPK. He insisted that they simply “did not have any strength... our names are just the names of those who had no role in the direction of the movement, and likewise in its decisions, such as the forced evacuation of major centers, the

¹¹⁴ Martin, “Interview with Keng Vannsak”; Martin, *Cambodia*, 99; and Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 119. Emphasis added.

¹¹⁵ Dirlik, “Modernism and Antimodernism in Mao Zedong’s Marxism,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 70.

¹¹⁶ Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapples*, 182.

abolition of money, and collectivization of the country.”¹¹⁷ Yet if we look closely at their doctoral dissertations, which represent for Kiernan the “only in-depth academic analyses of the Kampuchean economy by Khmers at the time,”¹¹⁸ we discover quite the opposite: they were the theoretical architects of a Maoist vision that became Democratic Kampuchea. Several scholars have certainly shed light on this link, but there exists no extensive study of all three of their works and the connection to later CPK policies, and no previous effort has used these texts to track the evolution of the Paris Group’s ideological maturation.¹¹⁹ Add Saloth Sar’s 1952 essay and we have the foundational national texts of Maoist Cambodia. This forms the *intellectual adaptation* phase of the *reception* stage of traveling theory, wherein the ideas that the intellectuals received become the lens through which to view society at home, prompting the idea’s application on paper.

This section uses the writings by Sar, Yuon, Samphan, and Nim (the intellectual thrust of the CPK), each criticizing Cambodia’s exploitation, to highlight four important developments that pair neatly with likewise stages in Mao Zedong’s life and provide us with a genealogical textual roadmap to guide us through their ideological maturation. First, Sar’s article “Monarchy or Democracy” stands as a hallmark example of the Cambodian intellectuals’ pre-radical thought, and mirrors Mao’s 1919 “Great Union of the Popular Masses” in its stress on popular political engagement.¹²⁰ Far from the “nationalism painted red” that the Cambodian intellectuals held aloft during the mid-1950s, it reveals the inextricable link between man and nation in the Cambodian intellectuals’ vision. Second, in the economics doctoral dissertations by Yuon, Samphan, and Nim, we find the origins of the CPK’s Maoism. While not manuals for revolution *per se*, they proposed Maoist-inspired solutions to make Maoism speak to Cambodian realities (political corruption, rural/urban disequilibria, underdeveloped industries, and vanishing

¹¹⁷ Samphan, *L’histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*, 67-68. For a contrarian viewpoint, see Stephen Heder, “Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot: Moloch’s Poodle,” (Working Paper, Australia National University, September 1990), 1-7.

¹¹⁸ Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*, 44.

¹¹⁹ Sher, *Le Kampuchéa des « Khmers rouges »*, 207; and Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 64-88. English efforts tend to focus on Samphan’s dissertation exclusively. See Jackson, “Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge,” in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 241-250; Willmott, “Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party,” 209-227; Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 52-56; Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapple*, 182-188; Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 113; Etcheson *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 28-53; and Thomas Clayton, “Building the New Cambodia: Educational Destruction and Construction under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979,” *History of Education Quarterly* 38, No 1 (Spring 1998): 1-16. Ben Kiernan translated excerpts of Hou Yuon’s and Hu Nim’s dissertations, but does not discuss their Maoist influences. *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*. Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds. (London: Zed Press, 1982), 34-68, 69-86.

¹²⁰ Sar, “រាជានិយមក្រុងប្រាសាទស្រីសោយ?, 357-361.

handicrafts), and their Maoist-charged class analyses show a continuity between CPK programs in power and those of three leading Paris-based leftists of the 1950s and 1960s.¹²¹ Third, while only Nim’s work hints at national revolution, all agree with Mao’s prophecy in his Hunan Report that the prerequisite to national revolution is great change in the countryside, and echo Mao’s call: “Down with the Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry! All Power to the Peasant Associations!”¹²² Fourth, the three dissertations’ mutual emphases on state-directed autonomous development, the expansion of industry to support agricultural advancement, and ending semi-feudalism, semi-colonialism, and capitalist exploitation, reflect clear borrowings from Mao’s “On New Democracy” (1940) and move us closer to uncovering the pre-revolutionary radical vision of the men who founded Democratic Kampuchea. Importantly, each work captures the trace on the future CPK leaders’ thinking, from pre-radical nationalist (Sar) to Mao’s Stalin-influenced early writings and economic analyses (Yuon and Samphan) to the more pro-China and revolutionary bend of the Cultural Revolution (Nim).

A Great Union of The Cambodian People: Saloth Sar’s “Monarchy or Democracy?”

By the time of his Paris arrival in 1949, Saloth Sar was hardly the millenarian Communist he would become later in his career, and his 1953 departure from France meant that he was long gone by the time Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan finished their doctoral dissertations on Cambodia’s socioeconomic problems in 1955 and 1959, respectively.¹²³ But before he left, he wrote his first essay on politics, “រាជាធិបតេយ្យឬប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ?” (Monarchy or Democracy?), which the AEK included in ខ្មែរសិស្សិក (Khmer Student) in mid-August 1952. Sar wrote the article by hand—no Khmer typewriter existed yet—under the pseudonym ខ្មែរដើម (Original Khmer), a name that betrays a “racial-historical preoccupation” that traces its origins to the French construct of the Cambodian past.¹²⁴ Although the article hardly compares to the intellectual

¹²¹ Etcheson *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 51; and Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 240-246 (on Hu Nim). For a contrarian viewpoint, see Serge Thion, *Explaining Cambodia: A Review Essay*. (Canberra, Australia: Department of Political and Social Change, Division of Politics and International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1994).

¹²² Mao Tsé-toung, « Rapport sur l'enquête menée dans le Hunan à propos du mouvement paysan » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1955).

¹²³ Robert Olivier, “Le Protectorat français au Cambodge,” (Thèse de doctorat de 3e cycle, University of Paris, 1969), 320; and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 122.

¹²⁴ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 121. As Kiernan notes, other contributors signed as ខ្មែរសេរី (Free Khmer) or other names, reflecting a “definite modernist stance.” Vannsak stated that ខ្មែរដើម “was a term that was in common use. It simply meant ‘Old Khmer,’ or ‘Ancestor,’ and it conveyed the image of a Brahman. It had no

insight one finds in Mao's writings, it shares similar pre-Marxist ideological leanings, which for Sar, were Buddhism and democracy.¹²⁵ His piece is thus indicative of the democratic, pre-radical viewpoint of the Paris Group of intellectuals, calling for drastic political reform and greater safeguarding of the democratic process against corruption. It is for this reason that there is a parallel role in the reception of traveling theory in Sar's "Monarchy or Democracy" and Mao's "Great Union of the Popular Masses." Indeed, as Mao urged collective action against the dominant aristocracy and landowning elite for a more prosperous nation, so too did Sar, who criticized Sihanouk for his corruption and self-interested reforms.

At the time that Sar wrote this piece, he held a staunchly anti-monarchist viewpoint, as Sihanouk's coup d'état had frustrated and disillusioned the AEK. Accordingly, Sar's article betrays "Thanhist-Democrat" influences, "attack[ing] royalty vigorously and not[ing] that 'royal edicts will not affect the solidarity of students, which is growing daily.'"¹²⁶ Democracy, he believed, was the growing trend; it was "as precious as a diamond and cannot be compared to any other form of government."¹²⁷ Monarchy, by contrast, was a "*doctrine injuste*," as "infected as a putrid wound," and a system that "humanity must abolish... an absolute doctrine that exists only because of nepotism."¹²⁸ Sar's diatribe then turns to Cambodian kings, who he argues deceived the people through charismatic means and "lower[ed] the people's standards of living to that of an animal; the people are kept as soldiers [ពល] or a herd of slaves [ខ្ញុំកេ], made to work night and day to feed the king and his *seraglio* of courtesans."¹²⁹ Sihanouk, in particular, receives scathing criticism for dancing to the French colonialist tune instead of choosing the path of true Cambodian independence, as well as for compromising Buddhism's respected position in Cambodia by introducing ranks in the *Sangha*. Since Sihanouk had become a friend to

revolutionary significance... The idea was rather that of a sage." Philip Short, "Interview with Keng Vannsak," in Short, *Pol Pot*, 477n79. Kiernan contends that it was an homage to Vannsak, who stressed the purity of Khmer culture and the hazards of external influence. Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 28, 543-544. On "original culture," see Keng Vannsak, « Recherche d'un fonds culturel Khmer » (Thèse de géographie de 3e cycle, Université de Paris IV, 1971); and Keng Vannsak, « Tragedie d'un peuple, mort d'un culture » *Connaissance Cambodge* 2 (March 1977): 1-2.

¹²⁵ Short, *Pol Pot*, 79.

¹²⁶ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 64, citing David P. Chandler, "Interview with Keng Vannsak," (November 1986); and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 121-122.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Sar, "រាជានិយមក្រហមឬប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ?" ខ្មែរនិស្សិតដំបូង, 39, 41; and Sar, « Monarchie ou Démocratie? » in *Khmers Rouges*, 357.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 4. In the French version, Sar uses the word *sérail* in reference to the Ottoman Turkish palace and harem. He may have used this rhetorical device in service to his Buddhist moralist criticism of monarchy in Cambodia. I have used "seraglio" from the French *sérail* in reference to the King's entourage here. Sar, « Monarchie ou Démocratie? » in *Khmers Rouges*, 357-358.

imperialism and the enemy to instead of the protector of the people, religion, and knowledge, the only moral solution was to espouse a democratic system with strong Cambodian Buddhist moral overtones.¹³⁰ He thus draws from Buddhism and the French revolution, among other struggles against corruption, to call for political reform of Sihanouk's corrupt governance of Cambodia.

Sar's views on Buddhism and democracy form the article's crux. He places the democratic movement alongside some of the world's great revolutions, as Mao had done in a 1919 essay.¹³¹ The Robespierre and Danton-led French Revolution (both names appear in French in the original issue) is Sar's main historical reference, revealing that his French education in the classics was not yet *passé* in his thinking.¹³² He praises the French revolutionaries for "dissolv[ing] the monarchy and execut[ing] King Louis XVI,"¹³³ though he does not take the same radical stand against Sihanouk. In place of monarchy, democracy was the only worthy political system, since "the peoples of all countries are adopting it... [it] is like an unstoppable river down the mountain slopes."¹³⁴ Cambodia, he contended, ought to embrace democracy on moral grounds, with Buddha and former Cambodian Prince Sisowath Youthevong (ស៊ីសុវត្ថិ យុត្តិវង្ស, 1913-1947), who "abandon[ed] the monarchists to inculcate democracy for the Khmer people," as historical precedents.¹³⁵ Intriguingly, Sar tried to position himself as the mouthpiece of an authentically Cambodian perspective, with Cambodian Buddhism as the lens through which to view Cambodian moral and political decay and the historical material to situate democracy in Cambodian political culture.¹³⁶ He highlights moralistic grounds for his case for democratic reform, noting that the "Great Master Buddha had abandoned the monarchy to become a friend of the people," and that a democratic regime is the only way to "restore Buddhist moralism because our great leader Buddha was the first to have taught [democracy]."¹³⁷ Sar also highlights Buddhist monks' close ties to the Cambodian ruler (who granted the *Sangha* patronage) as giving

¹³⁰ Sar, "រាជាធិបតេយ្យឬប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ?" ខ្មែរនិស្សិតដប់បួន, 41-42; Sar, « Monarchie ou Démocratie? » in *Khmers Rouges*, 357-358; Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age*, 45; and Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 37.

¹³¹ Mao Tsé-toung, « La Grand Union des Masses Populaires » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome VI*. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1955).

¹³² Sar, "រាជាធិបតេយ្យឬប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ?" ខ្មែរនិស្សិតដប់បួន, 43; and Sar, « Monarchie ou Démocratie? » in *Khmers Rouges*, 358. In the original Khmer version, Sar writes "DATON" instead of Danton. Lenin and Stalin on page 43.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 43-44; and Sar, « Monarchie ou Démocratie? » in *Khmers Rouges*, 359.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 41-42; and *Ibid.*, 357-358. See also Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 37-38.

¹³⁶ Short, *Pol Pot*, 80.

¹³⁷ Sar, "រាជាធិបតេយ្យឬប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ?" ខ្មែរនិស្សិតដប់បួន, 41-42; and Sar, « Monarchie ou Démocratie? » in *Khmers Rouges*, 358-359. Also quoted in Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age*, 45. Sar credits Buddha for his devotion to democracy; a democratic regime constituted the "only regime that could safeguard Buddhism's profound values."

them a deep understanding of the Janus-faced *modus operandi* of monarchical rule.¹³⁸ He concludes his piece with a proposal for independence and democratic reform, expressing to the reader his belief that Sihanouk's corrupt politics and reliance on France to legitimize his position will force Cambodia to remain subservient.¹³⁹

Although Sar's first political writing does not astound in its complexity, it is a hallmark example of the Cambodian intellectuals' position at the time—anti-monarchist, deeply nationalist, and holding Buddhism as inseparable from national identity. Sar, like his cohort, eventually took his anti-monarchist fervor to a higher level upon realizing the limitations of promoting change in Phnom Penh from privileged settings in Paris. After joining the PCF, the Cambodian leftists broke from Buddhism, recognizing that it stood as a hindrance to their designs for real change in Cambodia. They also saw that “collective work on a unified basis” was required politicized peasants to function.¹⁴⁰ Sar thus returned to Phnom Penh to do just that, as he worked as covert operative within the KPRP while working simultaneously as a schoolteacher. His contemporaries, however, were still interested in changing the system from within as administrators in Sihanouk's government. At this stage, Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim were unwilling to return to Cambodia and take up arms against Sihanouk. But they were Marxists-Leninists by 1953 (and 1955 for Hu Nim), and they believed that the only solution to Cambodia's political problems lay not solely in domestic affairs, but in foreign ones as well. Thus it is to their doctoral dissertations that diagnosed systemic problems brought on by Cambodia's insertion into a highly exploitative global capitalist market that we now turn.

Countryside Surrounds the Cities: Hou Yuon's Doctoral Dissertation (1955)

Hou Yuon's PhD dissertation, which he defended at the Université de Paris on 14 February 1955, can likewise represent a CPK equivalent to Mao's 1926 “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” and 1927 “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,”

¹³⁸ David P. Chandler, “Songs At the Edge of the Forest: Perceptions of Order in Three Cambodian Texts,” in *At the Edge of the Forest: Essays on Cambodia, History, and Narrative in Honor of David Chandler*. Anne Ruth Hansen and Judy Ledgerwood, eds. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program Publication, 2008), 44.

¹³⁹ Sar, “រាជាធិបតេយ្យឬប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ?” ខ្មែរនិស្សិតដំបូង, 45-46; and Sar, « Monarchie ou Démocratie? » in *Khmers Rouges*, 360.

¹⁴⁰ Sher, « Le parcours politique des Khmers Rouges » 87.

from which it drew its dual emphasis on peasant emancipation and collective work.¹⁴¹ A PCF cell member in Paris, Yuon has received little recognition from scholars for his contributions to CPK thought.¹⁴² A man who “best understood Marxism” of his troupe, Yuon’s dissertation, together with Hu Nim’s a decade later, “provide[s] perhaps the most detailed and penetrating analysis of the Kampuchean rural socio-economic structure available.”¹⁴³ Importantly, his defense occurred at a time when Communist China had followed the Soviet Union’s prioritization of heavy industry, which brought to mind the Soviet Second Five-Year Plan’s response to peasant needs with Machine Tractor Stations (MTS).¹⁴⁴ Accordingly, Yuon’s work focuses on several crises in the Cambodian countryside, namely the exploitation of Cambodia’s economic structures by the global market and the peasant suffering that resulted from it.

This section examines five central themes in Yuon’s work that were informed by Maoism and that he applied in his dissertation: 1) the nature of Cambodia’s rural/urban; 2) state-centric autonomous national development and peasant voluntarism; 3) an analysis of Cambodia’s rural classes; 4) peasant organizations/“mutual aid teams”; and 5) the modernization of Cambodia’s productive forces free from usury and capitalist exploitation. He draws from Mao rhetorically, categorically, and theoretically, even without acknowledging it, to offer novel suggestions that provide us with a telling example of some of his ideological borrowings at the time; from his proposal for mutual aid teams to his emphasis on the state’s responsibility to free the nation from semi-colonial subjugation.¹⁴⁵ Both Mao and Yuon assess the status of the various classes in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society (Yuon uses Mao’s social categories and descriptive terminology) and conclude that the peasantry, whose wellbeing has been plagued by outside forces, is integral to national welfare. The primacy that Yuon places on the peasant question as a prelude to any changes, above all, reveals his Maoist inspired proposals: an agrarian policy that

¹⁴¹ Mao Tsé-toung, « Analyse des classes de la société chinoise » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1955); and Mao Tsé-toung, « Rapport sur l’enquête menée dans le Hunan à propos du mouvement paysan » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1955).

¹⁴² On purge of Hou Yuon, among others, see Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 314; and Manus I. Midlarsky, *The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 321-323.

¹⁴³ Kiernan, “Introductory Note,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 31. See also Sher, « Le parcours politique des Khmers Rouges » 85.

¹⁴⁴ Hou Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » (Thèse de Droit, Université de Paris, 1955), 228 ; and Sher, « Le parcours politique des Khmers Rouges » 84.

¹⁴⁵ Hou Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » (Thèse de Droit, Université de Paris, 1955), 7-25. Portions of Hou’s dissertation are in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds., *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*. (London: Zed Press, 1982), 35-67. I use the original French version, but cite similar quotes in the Kiernan translation where appropriate.

he modeled after CCP agrarian policy of the early 1950s; useful ways to triumph over seasonal limitations (especially in Asian nations) with will as a powerful variable; and emphases on emancipation, collective work and struggle against exploitation, and agricultural reform. These proposals underpinned many CPK initiatives a decade later, though Pol Pot took them to new and terrifying extremes in the DK period (Yuon's criticism of Pol Pot led to his execution in 1975).¹⁴⁶

Central to Yuon's argument for reform is his diagnosis of an unequal relationship and recommendations for its replacement with one that gave the poorer strata a fighting chance to improve their lot. In Cambodia, France had prioritized constructing its protectorate around a French-educated elite, with the economy structured to produce surpluses of rice and rubber. Colonial domination forced the gradual readjustment of political and social forces, wherein the collaboration of locally trained civil servants and increased authority of rural power brokers (គ្រូស្រុក, មេឃុំ) meant that French *colons* effectively could use a *nouveau elite*, and increase taxes and merchant agriculture, which, ultimately, sparked significant rural problems.¹⁴⁷ These colonial vestiges persisted after Cambodian independence in 1953 to reduce the Cambodian countryside, according to Yuon, to a semi-feudal state wherein agricultural sectors could not foster sustainable development on an equitable basis. He contends—paying homage to Mao's similar characterization—that despite growth in Cambodian commercial agriculture, and farmers producing more for export, national agriculture “is enmeshed in a dense network of feudal and pre-capitalist relations... [which] gives the Cambodian economy its semi-feudal and semi-colonial character.”¹⁴⁸

As for the first theme, Yuon tackles the stark urban/rural divide not unlike Mao before him, criticizing the unequal relationship between cores (cities) and peripheries (rural areas), with the urban areas standing as epicenters of market domination. Cambodia's agricultural sector, he

¹⁴⁶ Sher, « Le parcours politique des Khmers Rouges » 72, 83-85. Sher notes that Yuon was the “only one to oppose the evacuation of Phnom Penh.” He also opposed the evacuation of cities, forced collectivization, and the confiscation of property. Sher notes that Yuon cautioned Pol Pot shortly after the CPK takeover: “I do not give more than three years of existence to your regime.” Sasha Sher, “Communication personnelle de Suong Sikoeun,” (1 janvier 1999).

¹⁴⁷ Brocheux and Hemery, *Indochina*, 285.

¹⁴⁸ Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » 23-24. Yuon defines both semicolonial and semifeudal in the Maoist sense : semicolonial equates to capitalist exploitation and a staunch rural-urban divide, while semi-feudal means domestic exploitation of the lower classes by the higher strata, particularly nuanced in the countryside between landowners and usurers as exploiters, and poor peasants as exploited.

argues, supplied the cities with necessary commodities, but cities and market towns only consumed or exported rather than producing for the countryside. As he elaborates:

[T]here is... a two way circulation... of imports that flows from the great Cholon [Ho Chi Minh City] business houses and branches out into the whole country, first to the small wholesale houses that comprise the secondary arteries, and then to small retailers, whose thatch shops may even be established at the corner of two ricefield embankments, completing the arterial network. These arteries are common to both circulation systems: they convey imported products out to the most remote parts of [Cambodia's] countryside, but they also drain away all the paddy that remains in peasant and smallholder hands, and delivers it first to the small wholesale merchant in the provincial centre, and finally, due to the organization of transport, connects the entire wholesale rice trade to the shops of the big Cholon importers where the paddy is delivered for export, ending the circulation and closing the trade cycle...¹⁴⁹

The Cambodian market, moreover, was “such that the peasant is robbed when he sells his product and is held at ransom when he buys the products that he needs. All of [Cambodia's] commerce is *in the hands of foreign monopolies*, and there are *middlemen at every level of the organization and distribution of merchandise and credit*.”¹⁵⁰ This dual system of exploitation pillaged peasants at every level, thereby widening the gap of socioeconomic inequity in Cambodia's rural sector.

Agricultural yields, particularly in rice, were the lifeblood of the already rural poor strata, but what little living they could carve for themselves was erased by unequal rural/urban exchange and the absence of modern technology. Cambodian soil was poor and most impoverished peasants did not own their own land, thus they remained poor even while Cambodia's population spiked in the century's first fifty years.¹⁵¹ Landlords and wealthy farmers had forced poor peasants to depend on sharecropping, paying debts in kind, or selling their labor outright to make even the most modest ends meet. As Yuon describes:

Under agrarian capitalism, traditional agriculture of family farming tends to degrade, to ruin, and to liquidate for the benefit of the large capitalist exploitation... The cost and means of production are not the same as those of big capitalist producers... agricultural prices on the market do not allow small producers to keep [some of their product]. [Thus]

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 192-193 ; and Hou Yuon, “The Peasantry of Kampuchea: Colonialism and Modernization,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 59. Ben Kiernan trans.

¹⁵⁰ Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » 192. Emphasis added.

¹⁵¹ Kiernan, “Introductory Note,” *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 31-32, quoting Remy Prud'homme, *L'économie du Cambodge*. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), 75. Kampuchean yields did not increase significantly “beyond one tonne per hectare in the last half century,” as Prud'homme notes. See also Zhou Deshou, “柬埔寨王国经济建设情况 (The Kingdom of Cambodia's Economic Development, pinyin: Jiānpǔzhài wángguó jīngjì jiànshè qíngkuàng) 東南亞研究資料 [Southeast Asia Studies (PRC)] (1964): 43-44.

began the rural exodus, the country was depopulated, and the city now bustles with workers.¹⁵² ... As long as modern production technology does not... bring [peasants] greater advantages, landlords will maintain the feudal mode of production and the feudal social relations that provide [peasants] with substantial incomes in the form of principal dues, usurious interest, very cheap labor, and ... secondary dues... To liberate the peasant from this subjection and permit rapid technological progress in agriculture... requires an end to feudalism and semi-feudalism. The tiller must own his own field and be the master of the product of his labor so that the system of agrarian relations is completely free of feudal vestiges.¹⁵³

Market penetration had tied peasants' fates either to outsider interests, or to internal feudalistic enterprises, forcing them to rely on surpluses or paying usurers for land costs.¹⁵⁴ Peasants also could not increase productivity because their tools and techniques were "primitive and archaic"; rather than dismissing them as lazy or uncivilized, Yuon argued, the state should equip them with the proper materials to increase production and, vicariously, their standard of living.¹⁵⁵ Only then could they maximize production and minimize suffering among the poor peasants and semi-proletariat—the two lowest strata. Only then would they be free from repression and exploitation by foreign market dominance and landlord and/or rich peasant debt bondage.¹⁵⁶

Second, Yuon encouraged the state to intervene and insure the peasants' quality of life based on their requirements. One such way was to establish stations such as the MTS, not unlike those in the Soviet *kolkhozes*, to help facilitate peasant access to modern farming technologies and expertise. He elaborated on the central importance of technology in rural Cambodia, stating outright that Cambodia "cannot ignore modern technology, which must be applied in one way or another in agriculture" because modern technology brought farmers modern techniques that could augment their productive capacity and potential.¹⁵⁷ Cooperative tool use could ultimately reverse low production yields in rural Cambodia since it gave peasants "full use scientific and technological methods, and... increase[ed] the standard of living of the workers."¹⁵⁸

Third, as a counterbalance to foreign exploitation, Yuon proposed a Maoist voluntarist solution in which the peasants' working spirit would liberate Cambodia from dependency. Much

¹⁵² Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » 210.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 191-192.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 20.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 190-193.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 228.

¹⁵⁷ Hou Yuon, "Solving Rural Problems: A Socialist Programme to Safeguard the Nation," in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 139. Ben Kiernan trans.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 139.

like Mao's argument that the peasants were the key to national revolution,¹⁵⁹ Yuon contended that only the peasants could strengthen the national economy. "Agriculture, the whole economy of Cambodia, is his [the peasant's] life and his strength... The transformation of the semi-feudal and semi-colonial economy of Cambodia into *a prosperous national economy...*," he argued, "can only be done on the basis of modernization and technological development, relying on their [the peasants'] *immense potential strength both economic and human.*"¹⁶⁰ Here, Yuon foregrounds the will of the peasants as the determining factor in Cambodia's true sovereignty. Since farmers were familiar with organized and/or collective labor and accepted a labor organization "on the basis of a united leadership" that defends their interests, Yuon prophesied that peasants will "use the land rationally, start various crops on land that suits them," which he predicted will reverse their suffering.¹⁶¹ These comparisons notwithstanding, differences between Mao's and Yuon's text are present. In the case of peasant will and energy, for instance, Mao stressed political energy (and violent overthrow of oppressive rural order) while Yuon seems to regard peasant strength in terms of economic ability contributing to national economy. Yuon was, of course, still much more an economist-structuralist Marxist in the Soviet mold, on to which he grafts Maoist voluntarism. To overthrow the entire order in Cambodia, while Yuon may have supported this idea in private, was not present in his piece since he either believed in fixing the system from within through a "bloc within" strategy as per Lenin, or feared losing his Cambodian government bursary for such anti-government sentiments.¹⁶²

Fourth, is Yuon's class analysis. "A central aspect of a revolutionary ideology," as Willmott notes, "is the analysis of the society to estimate the revolutionary potential of its various classes."¹⁶³ This is evident in Yuon's use of Maoist class categories in identifying intrinsic class inequality in Cambodia's agricultural sector. He notes that his study of the first of the peasant classes in Cambodia, and is "delicate" because Cambodian agriculture is "entangled

¹⁵⁹ Mao Tsé-toung, « Rapport sur l'enquête menée dans le Hunan à propos du mouvement paysan » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*; and Mao Zedong, "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *MRP II*, Schram, ed., 433; Mao Zedong, "湖南農民運動考察報告," in 毛澤東集第一卷, *MZJ I*, Takeuchi, ed., 212; Mao Zedong, "湖南農民運動考察報告," in 毛澤東選集第一卷, *XJI*, 16; and Mao Zedong, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *SW I*, 24-25. See also Sher, « Le parcours politique des Khmers Rouges » 84.

¹⁶⁰ Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » 4. Emphasis added.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, 253.

¹⁶² See Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. (Jakarta, Indonesia: Equinox, 2006).

¹⁶³ Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party," 210.

in a dense network of feudal and pre-capitalist relations.”¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Yuon divides the Cambodian countryside into five social categories:

1) *les propriétaires fonciers* (landlords)—who hold land of ten and fifty hectares in size, form part of the feudal class, and rather than work the land, earn by renting, sharecropping, or employing debt bondmen; 2) *les paysans riches* (rich peasants)—landowners who own but do not work land, contain bourgeois connections, and have agricultural equipment and important working capital; 3) *les paysans-moyens* (middle peasants)—a strata that owns agricultural equipment, does not exploit the labor of others consistently, but do not themselves sell their labor (Yuon says that this class is part of the petty bourgeoisie); 4) *les paysans pauvres* (poor peasants)—the largest and most complex, it lacks agricultural equipment, some have no land at all, and many either rent land or are exploited by paying rent and interest on debts through selling their labor; and 5) *le semi-proletariat* (the semi-proletariat)—permanent agricultural workers who are partial tenants, poor peasants, landless peasants, and debt bondsmen from impoverished peasant families (all of whom are poor or exploited by usury).¹⁶⁵

Like Mao’s call for unity among the peasant classes, Yuon believed that the main solution to the unequal wealth, opportunity, and tools to cultivate lands was for peasants to organize in “mutual aid teams” in which all land and means of production was to be put towards the cooperative and used communally.¹⁶⁶ Yuon plucked this idea from the full corpus of Mao’s writings and not just his 1920s ones, though the dissertation stresses economic activity and not political upheaval in a mass, anti-government movement. By organizing into mutual aid teams, Yuon contended, the peasants will obtain real collective power and gain the “capacity and opportunity to defend and build their standard of living into one of happiness and dignity.”¹⁶⁷ Mutual aid teams—the union of all peasant groups into a cooperative, emancipatory effort to improve rural economic life—therefore required participation across socioeconomic lines.

Fifth, Yuon also echoes from Mao in urging the modernization of Cambodia’s economy, which began with peasant organizations lest they “have no power, and not have complete capacity to defend their standard of living.”¹⁶⁸ The more mutual aid teams, Yuon argues, the “more the mode of production is greater, and the harvest is abundant.”¹⁶⁹ As he describes:

¹⁶⁴ Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » 150-151.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 150-159. Yuon classifies these groups according to Mao’s stratification. Mao Tsé-toung, « Rapport sur l’enquête menée dans le Hunan à propos du mouvement paysan » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*.

¹⁶⁶ Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » 233-240, 250-253. Quote from page 252. Yuon is clearly borrowing from Mao Tsé-toung, « Analyse des classes de la société chinoise » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 250.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. See also Mao Zedong, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *SW I*, 25.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 253.

[While] private ownership of the means of production remains... the difference with the individual farm is that the work is done collectively. Each member of the group retains its individual operation; he may augment or discard his product as he wants. When he goes to work... with another member of the group, he brings with him his own tools. [Mutual aid teams] therefore pool production resources temporarily for the accomplishment of a specific job. Group participants are not paid ... At the end of the day, everyone goes home respectively in ... carrying with him his equipment. And the cycle continues under the same principle.¹⁷⁰

Evidently, Yuon believed that modern capitalism and semi-feudalism could be destroyed through collective production. Aid teams would be “semi-socialist” and “semi-mechanical,” whereby land, draft animals, and tools became shared properties and available for everyone’s use.¹⁷¹ Collective work by peasants to alter their subjugated status unsurprisingly mirrors Mao’s earlier statement that “nearly all of the peasants have gone into the peasant associations or have come under their command. It was on the strength of their extensive organization that the peasants went into action and within four months brought about a great revolution in the countryside, a revolution without parallel in history.”¹⁷² Importantly, the “peasant associations” of the Hunan Report were not mutual aid teams.¹⁷³ Yuon mixes in elements from the Hunan Report with Yan’an and later mutual aid team proposals in Mao’s writings. While Yuon does not state explicitly that his mutual aid teams owe their *raison d’être* to Mao, it is evident that the Chinese leader’s ideas on collective work influenced Yuon enough to put his faith in peasant organization and working spirit.

In line with Mao’s stress on self-reliance, Hou Yuon concludes his dissertation with a proposal for Cambodia to become economically self-sufficient. The complete abolition of feudal production, he argued, was *sine qua non* for land products to go to those who grow them. Only then could the “potential strengths of the campaigns [of national emancipation] are freed from feudal remnants and the vestiges of colonialism, establishing the necessary industrial conditions and bases for the country’s edification.”¹⁷⁴ He then presents three options, or avenues, for the

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 249-250.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 250. See also 210.

¹⁷² Mao Tsé-toung, « Rapport sur l'enquête menée dans le Hunan à propos du mouvement paysan » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*; and Mao Zedong, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” *SW I*, 25.

¹⁷³ See Mao Zedong, “Two Talks on Aid and Cooperation in Agriculture,” (October/November 1935) [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_36.htm] (Accessed 8 February 2017).

¹⁷⁴ Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » 273.

cultivation of the necessary capital to achieve his vision of an independent and strong Cambodia: 1) patriotic and liberated people could work strenuously to break the chains of feudal and semi-feudal relations; 2) normalized economic relations between all countries on the principles of equality and mutual interest, including the reestablishment of commercial relations with Communist China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; and 3) international aid organizations, with a view to improving the nation's agricultural development.¹⁷⁵ Yet in a final proposal, Yuon states outright that Cambodia “*must count principally on its own forces*. It has everything to gain in peace and everything to lose in war.”¹⁷⁶ Evidently, Yuon was inspired and influenced by the “voyage idée” from Mao but, as our model suggests, he modified it in ways that distinguish it (an *adaptation* that he would apply *practically* after returning to Cambodia). His approach, for instance, reflects the larger anti-colonial wave of that era, including influences from Mao who was staunchly anti-imperialist, though Yuon advocates for peace instead of violence, likely to avoid raising suspicion from his benefactors back home.¹⁷⁷

Yuon expanded on this proposal nearly a decade later in his book បញ្ហាសហគមន៍ (The Cooperative Question), which mirrors Mao's “On New Democracy” as it was a “blueprint for a ‘United Front’ between Communists and anti-imperialists.”¹⁷⁸ A united front against American imperialism, Yuon urged, was requisite for the development of a new type (cooperatives) with an emphasis on modernization. Sihanouk's modest socialist economic reforms (the rejection of US aid, growth of national capitalism, and improved conditions for farmers and workers) had spun off course, thus Yuon draws from Mao to identify both “the main contradiction... between the whole Khmer nation and the American imperialists” and an “internal contradiction” between oppressive and oppressed classes.¹⁷⁹ If unresolved, Mao and Yuon caution, these two contradictions would undermine any gains from Sihanouk's recent reforms. The solution to rural problems was, once again, to modernize the productive forces and to free the peasantry from usury and capitalist exploitation. Yuon called for a system of cooperatives, in which peasants and workers “combine their labor power, their enthusiasm, their wealth, and work cooperatively on

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 275-276.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 276. Emphasis added.

¹⁷⁷ Sher, *Le Kampuchéa des « Khmers Rouges »* 207.

¹⁷⁸ Ben Kiernan, “Solving Rural Problems: A Socialist Programme to Safeguard the Nation by Hou Yuon,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 134.

¹⁷⁹ Yuon, “Solving Rural Problems,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 136-137.

the basis of strict equality.”¹⁸⁰ He lists three types of rural cooperatives that could work within a larger socialist system: 1) Seasonal, permanent Labor Pools, in which peasants accumulate their labor power to work the land as a cohesive productive unit; 2) Production Cooperatives that accumulate labor forces in a much stronger and rigid organization than the Labor Pools; and 3) Common Property Cooperatives, which are the end goal, in which all tools were for the use of the common organization.¹⁸¹ Organization was the launching pad to his cooperative vision, since he believed that the masses required administration and leadership.¹⁸² Thus each of these proposals was to be state-assisted to “enable [cooperatives] to *leap forward in strength, for the leadership of the cooperatives to be truly in the hands of the people, and working in the people’s interests.*”¹⁸³ But Yuon stressed that these three types of cooperatives stood no chance of succeeding in improving peasants’ welfare without organization and financial backing: “to serve the interests of the people purely is hard,” Yuon stated, echoing Mao’s famous axiom 為人民服務 (To Serve the People, pinyin: *wéi rénmin fúwù*), but without its inherent optimism. The cooperatives, he concludes, would usher in an era during which city and countryside, industry, and agriculture will cooperate,¹⁸⁴ or the Khmer people would have to resort to armed struggle against the American imperialists whose pervasive influence prevented the rural poor from escaping their prostrate socioeconomic status and condition.¹⁸⁵

In sum, Yuon’s study reflects clearly his Maoist thinking of the time, which he maintained until the CPK purged him in 1975. He maintained throughout his life that peasants were Cambodia’s lifeblood, and devoted much of his academic and political life to identifying and proposing solutions to rural problems, many of which weighed down most heavily on the poorest strata. His dissertation brought to light many of the causes of peasant suffering: capitalist exploitation, foreign market dominance, usury, and a stark rural/urban divide. The solution for him was peasant organization in mutual aid teams and self-reliance. However, Yuon was a moderate amongst his peers, and would later become a victim of the CPK’s purges in 1975. That is not to say that he did not have very Maoist views; rather, Yuon presented ideas that, taken to their extreme by someone more radical, could alter Cambodia’s social, political, and economic

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 145.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 139-147.

¹⁸² Ibid, 151.

¹⁸³ Ibid, 155-160, quote on 156.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 164.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 137.

landscape drastically. Yuon's protégé Khieu Samphan was of such a mind; he expanded upon many of Yuon's proposals—and Mao's notion of self-reliance—with his suggestion for a temporary commitment to autarkical development to resuscitate light industry and handicrafts in Cambodia. As it turned out, Samphan's ideas had a lasting imprint on the Cambodian Communist movement. Once in power, the CPK shut the country out from the rest of the world, maintaining relations only with Communist China and North Korea. It is for this reason that Samphan's dissertation, along with Yuon's earlier work, is so integral to uncovering the origins of the CPK's Maoist vision.

Measures of Autarky: Khieu Samphan's Doctoral Dissertation (1959)

Future DK Prime Minister Khieu Samphan denies to this day that his dissertation shaped DK's economic program, despite his senior position in the CPK's Central Committee when it launched the "Super Great Leap Forward."¹⁸⁶ Scholars believe otherwise, arguing that Samphan's dissertation influenced Pol Pot's class analysis, provided the "basic lines" for his economic policy, and that the "parallel between [Samphan's] analysis and that of Mao Zedong is obvious."¹⁸⁷ Samphan's economic sciences dissertation, which he wrote at *l'École Supérieure de Commerce de Montpellier* and defended to the Faculty of Law at the Université de Paris in 1959, introduces five key Maoist-driven proposals that Pol Pot implemented years later: 1) semi-autarkical industrial development; 2) recognition of Cambodia's exploitation by global capitalism and its reverberations in the rural sector; 3) the identification and elimination of structural inequality; 4) the expulsion of foreign-owned businesses and the erasure of luxury commodities; and 5) Cambodian state-directed industrial development initiatives, which also link intricately with his proposal on semi-autarky. Samphan's goal was thus to frame Maoist-charged solutions for Cambodia's economy and to industrialize not as a mere extension of advanced capitalist countries, but to benefit Cambodia's people and diminishing industries.¹⁸⁸

Before discussing his major points, we ought to examine the main influence on Samphan while he was writing his dissertation. A rising intellectual trend that emerged in the 1950s as a

¹⁸⁶ Serge Thion, *Explaining Cambodia: A Review Essay*. (Canberra, Australia: Australia National University, Department of Political and Social Change Working Paper Series, No. 11, 1994), 12 ; and a personal communication (n.d.) from Steve Heder. On the CPK's Four Year Plan, see Party Center, "The Party's Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977-1980," in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 37-119.

¹⁸⁷ Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party," 212-214.

¹⁸⁸ Khieu Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » (Thèse des Sciences Économiques, Université de Paris, 1959), 9, 13, 73, 90.

response to post-independence problems faced by the Third World shaped his position significantly, which explains why he viewed Maoism as a *fit* for his framework. Importantly, his fellow colleague in the Parisian anticolonial Communist milieu and fellow PCF member Samir Amin (born in Cairo in 1931), a French-Egyptian Maoist thinker who studied at the nearby *Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris* (Sciences Po), then at the *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques*, was a proponent of such a view.¹⁸⁹ Amin became a Maoist when Maoism was a popular alternative among anticolonial Marxists in mid-1950s Paris.¹⁹⁰ By Samphan's arrival, Amin was writing the "the most systematic expression" of underdevelopment theory ("center-periphery relations").¹⁹¹ Amin's 1957 economics dissertation (Université de Paris) argued that developing world economies were "delayed"; exploitation by the global market for their resources, both human and natural, prevented forward progression and forced them into a "cyclical phenomenon." Farmers and handicraftsmen suffered mightily, as market inclusion transformed poor countries into "peripheries" from which wealthy countries, or "cores," could take what they wanted. He concluded that autarkical development not unlike Communist China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957, "Little Leap") suited developing world economies in its rejection of systemic capitalist exploitation.¹⁹²

On Samphan's Maoist proposals, first, he echoes Amin's advocacy for temporary autarky to recoup small industry and handicrafts in "semi-colonial, semi-feudal Cambodia."¹⁹³ Indeed, many of Amin's insights reappear in his analysis, from trade imbalance and slowed growth in developing countries to their orientation toward light industry and external, foreign-dominated transfers of national wealth. Even the Argentine case study that Amin used finds its way into Samphan's fourth chapter in reference to the viability of forced autarky as a method to

¹⁸⁹ Vickery, *Cambodia*, 266-267, for a contrarian view. He describes Samphan's alternative path to Cambodian development as "specifically not revolutionary," and that it sought to "disrupt through economic change, not violence."

¹⁹⁰ Philip Arestis and Malcolm C. Sawyer, eds. *A Biographical Dictionary of Dissenting Economists*. (Northampton, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000), 1. Amin began at the *Lycée Français du Caire*.

¹⁹¹ Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970); and Samir Amin, "Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 1 (August-November 1974): 9-26.

¹⁹² Samir Amin, « Les effets structurels de l'intégration internationale des économies précapitalistes: une étude technique du mécanisme qui a engendrer les économies dites sous-développées » (Thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris, 1957), 1-9, 139-141, 484-485; and Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 109, 150. By the 1970s Amin regarded the CPK as "greater Marxists" than the Vietnamese and Chinese, due namely to its value for post-independence Africa, Soviet and Vietnamese "peasant politics," and the CPK's "proper treatment of peasants in its revolution." Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 83.

¹⁹³ Samphan « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 193.

industrialize.¹⁹⁴ Samphan uses this and other case studies to urge for a total reconfiguration of Cambodia's economic structure in service to its industrial and developmental needs mainly to curtail the country's unfavorable external exchange and reliance on imported industrial materials. Thus while Samphan's Maoism was second-hand (through Amin) and he makes no explicit reference to Mao, the Chinese leader's ideas are *in passim* throughout this foundational national text, from Samphan's thesis, class analysis, and rhetorical homages, to his emphasis on state-direction, self-reliance, and autarkical autonomous development. On the latter, Samphan contends that withdrawal from the global capitalist market was a prerequisite to true Cambodian independence.¹⁹⁵ He notes that during WWII when temporary forced autarky reduced foreign competition, handicraft enterprises enabled the country to regain its economic strength. Though he cautioned that outright autarky was "inconceivable for a small country like Cambodia," he suggests instead that it could combine a state-controlled economy with "coordinated industrialization efforts" with other countries to fill the small domestic market and to enable industrial specialization.¹⁹⁶ Once again, the state would accelerate this development by permitting national industry to acquire necessary equipments. Expanding trade with socialist countries to accomplish this small domestic market expansion was therefore preferable.¹⁹⁷

Second, Samphan's thesis contends that Cambodia was part of a larger, systemic capitalist order in which its economic and industrial fate was inextricable from outsiders. Industrialization, or lack thereof, is the focus, noting that nineteenth century contact with France and its subsequent domination of Cambodia had installed a unilateral relationship of colonial exploitation and, after independence, the perpetuation of commodity and capital production for export and outside profit.¹⁹⁸ He examines the contemporary roots of this problem, describing Cambodian agriculture in the 1950s as "precapitalist" because of its low productivity, minimal industrial output, and overall dependence of its agricultural sector on poor peasants. The decline of handicrafts and the entrenchment of precapitalist structures in the Cambodian countryside was the result, as landlords and usurers took advantage to maximize their profit through external domination. American aid, too, reinforced Cambodia's market dependency rather than offering a

¹⁹⁴ Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 118. See also Samir Amin, *L'avenir du maoïsme*. (Paris: Editions de minuit, 1981), 90 ; and Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 82-83.

¹⁹⁵ Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 212-213.

¹⁹⁶ Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 128.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 127; and Sher, *Le Kampuchéa des « Khmers Rouges »* 208.

¹⁹⁸ Charles H. Twining, "The Economy," in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 111-112.

way to industrialize autonomously. In line with Yuon and Mao, Samphan diagnoses that the persistence of Cambodia's "semi-colonial, semi-feudal" state is capitalist imperialism, which prevents national industries, small industry, and handicrafts from flourishing through consumer demand.¹⁹⁹

Third, Samphan categorizes Cambodia's rural classes using Maoist categories to identify groups that are oppressed or oppressors. Among the 85% of Cambodia's population (this percentage is repeated by Pol Pot in a 1977 speech), he wrote, were the following four groupings: 1) poor smallholders (30 % of the population, hold less than two hectares, or 20% overall, of arable land); 2) middle peasants (60 % of rural landowners, hold two-to-seven hectares, 40% of the national paddies); 3) wealthy peasants (more than seven hectares); and 4) landlords, (10 % percent of the population, hold ten hectares or more, and with wealthy peasants own 40 % of land).²⁰⁰ Here, similarities between his and Mao's analyses in the Hunan Report are apparent, yet the complexity of the rural classes set Cambodia apart from others:

Middle peasants... numerically the largest group (60 percent)... hold on to a major share of the cultivated land (about 40 percent). In this respect, Cambodia differs from its neighbor, Vietnam [where] big landlords own the overwhelming majority of lands, while poor peasants, numerically more important, have only a tiny portion of the cultivated land area. In Cambodia, middle peasants own their own agricultural implements and work animals. But more often than not, they lack operating capital. They obtain it from village usurers who are also large landowners or traders. They are thus unable to escape the grasp of these people. Property ownership is no more than the appearance of ownership for a substantial number of middle peasants. Interest rates that attain 200 to 300 percent per annum amount in practice to cheating them out of all their labor product just as if they were working the land of usurers. Belief in such "ownership" alone makes them hold on as best they can under the most difficult circumstances while waiting for "better times." Usurers, landlords, and traders have every interest in perpetuating this belief; they see no need to expropriate land for reasons of insolvency.²⁰¹

Middle peasants were so preoccupied with rising interest rates (some two-three hundred percent/annum) that the product of their labor fell into the hands of usurers or landlords. Thus, peasant families grew rice to pay off property charges and debt, with surpluses addressing direct

¹⁹⁹ Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 7-30, 28-64, 73, 90. See also Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 52; Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party," 214; and Carney, "Continuity in Cambodian Communism," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 13.

²⁰⁰ Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 47-50.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 48.

subsistence needs and not for profit.²⁰² Usury thrived on peasant poverty, thereby preserving Cambodia's semi-feudal and semi-colonial status and preventing significant industrial innovation. Because of these factors, Cambodia's countryside remained locked in a semi-feudal mode of production, with no signs of change.²⁰³

Fourth, Samphan's staunch criticism of the global capitalist market also mirrors Mao's own critique of foreign and consumer goods production. Domestic industries, Samphan argues, were "nipped in the bud by the competition of foreign goods, market development, and capitalist production, which he links to the production of export crops. The choice of crops and their production are subordinated over the years by world price fluctuations of different agricultural products."²⁰⁴ Rubber plantations were, specifically, loci of capitalist agriculture; whereas small family farms had existed previously, rubber plantations were owned by big outsider capitalist corporations that made extensive use of employee capital (17,000 workers approximately, by his estimation).²⁰⁵ As Samphan elaborates:

Each of these companies in turn belongs to a large "international unit." The *Compagnie du Cambodge* [Cambodia Company] belongs to a Franco-Belgian firm *Financière des caoutchouc*, a big "international unit" that also owns rubber plantations in South Vietnam, Malaysia, and Equatorial Africa French, and in Indonesia, along with a coffee plantation, etc. The Mekong Rubber Company belongs to the *Compagnie Générale des Colonies*. The amalgamated plantations at Mimot belong to the Bank of Indochina.²⁰⁶

Here, he pinpoints the imperialist French, whose hasty market integration of the Cambodian economy relegated it to an afterthought to be exploited at their will. In his view, French colonialism, American imperialism, and foreigner-controlled "capitalist networks" had caused the Cambodian economy to languish considerably.²⁰⁷ The systemic problem of consumer goods

²⁰² Ibid, 8. Alex Hinton credits this system for perpetuating a "false consciousness" wherein peasants simply got by through visions of improved socioeconomic standing down the road, rather than taking a stand against disenfranchisement. Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 54.

²⁰³ Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*, 44. Many of these moneylenders were ethnic Chinese, and they became targets in DK for it. On anti-ethnic Chinese violence in DK, see Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 288-296, 458; Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 54; and May Mayko Ebihara, "Svay, a Khmer Village in Cambodia," (PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Columbia University, 1968), 579-580. See also Penny Edwards, "Imagining the Other in Cambodian Nationalist Discourse before and during the UNTAC Period," in *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-Keeping*. Stephen R. Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1996), 50-72. Samphan deals with this directly, shifting blame from overseas Chinese to international integration. Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 77-78.

²⁰⁴ Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 8.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 9.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 9-10.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, 8-10, 28.

production (the non-productive commercial sector) by the handicraft industries, and the lack of productivity among certain groups of workers and industries in the country, was another significant problem in Samphan's view since it profited only the unproductive sector and entrenched poor peasants' suffering further.²⁰⁸ Rather than devoting time to their craft, handicraftsmen now manufactured "luxury" goods such as cigarettes and carbonated drinks, which were "totally beyond the reach of the peasant masses."²⁰⁹ He saw rice alcohol distilleries in this light, as they "owe[d] their prosperousness to the systematic poisoning of the population," while the development of real estate investments instead of improving the peasants' lot had engendered tertiary industries to thrive in place of primary and secondary ones (commerce alone engrossed 40 % of the gross national product by Samphan's account).²¹⁰ This was not sustainable for a developing country, thus Samphan criticized heavily (and rightly) its continuation in post-independence Cambodia.

But while many of Samphan's points are persuasive, his dissertation is not without fault. Samphan's contention that nearly 94 percent of Phnom Penh-based workers and 96 percent in Kompong Cham City were unproductive is erroneous.²¹¹ Samphan hated cities, which he believed were "unproductive sites populated by individuals who contributed nothing to society, but in return, capitalized on the exploitation and oppression of the rural-based peasants."²¹² The individualism of foreign businesses, which had no loyalty to developing the Cambodian economy paired with the reprioritization of luxury goods over handicrafts and light industry to reduce individuals' opportunities.²¹³ As he argued:

... the abstract principle of free trade conceals the actual absence of liberty for national entrepreneurs and the exclusive liberty that is enjoyed by foreign businesses. Friedrich List... rebuked the liberal school essentially for reasoning as if the world were composed of isolated individuals producing and exchanging goods in unfettered freedom. *But this state of affairs is by no means done.* In practice, individuals are grouped in nations in which prosperity is associated closely. The fact that a nation might prosper does not mean that each of its constituent members enjoys wealth... But it is certain that individuals cannot separate their fate from that of the nation to which they belong. If the nation

²⁰⁸ Twining, "The Economy," in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 112.

²⁰⁹ Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 13.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13, 73.

²¹¹ Jean Delvert, *Le paysan cambodgien*. (Paris: Mouton, 1961), 519; and Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 57, 73. See also Hinton, *Why Did They Kill ?*, 54-57; Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party," 209-227; and Frieson, "The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea," 422-425.

²¹² Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 113.

²¹³ Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 16.

declines, they will more more less suffer the consequences. If the nation develops, they might have greater opportunities to improve their lot. *The fundamental fact that economists ought to take into consideration is not the individual, but the nation...* No nation can industrialize, however, within a system of free trade.²¹⁴

Samphan's vision for Cambodia was therefore to develop outside of foreigner-dominated affairs. To realize this vision, agricultural product was necessary as the main driver to generate capital ("Cambodia should specialize in agriculture") since it was "impossible for an underdeveloped country to improve significantly its industrialization" within this system.²¹⁵ The capital generated by the state for the sale of agricultural product or surpluses could then support the development of light industry and resuscitate waning handicrafts industries. Thus like Yuon, he stressed the centrality of the state in spearheading this development initiative. The responsibility of industrialization, he concludes, "ought to be in the hands of the state, whose policy must translate into rigorous control of relations with foreigners and a planned effort of structural reform."²¹⁶

Fifth, and reminiscent of some of the major points in Mao's "On New Democracy," Samphan urged the state to reorient demand towards domestic products and for it to prevent "camouflaged" investments, suggesting instead reduced quotas on imports. State investment in the productive sectors in the Cambodian economy—small industry, agriculture, and handicrafts—could reverse its industrial fortunes.²¹⁷ Small industry and national crafts, as well as organizing production and supply cooperatives, which increase labor productivity, he contends, can satisfy domestic demand, and succeed without significant investment.²¹⁸ He states further:

... we believe ways can and must be found to bring out their [higher income classes] contributive potential by attempting to transform these landlords, retailers, and users into a class of industrial or agrarian capitalist entrepreneurs. An effort will be made to deter them from unproductive activities and to encourage them to participate in production. In the city, an effort will be made to transfer capital from the hyperactive commercial sector into more directly productive sectors. In the countryside, there will be a struggle... in usury and rents. We have already seen how usury and rents divert revenue from land improvement, irrigation and drainage, or rational use of agricultural equipment. Direct struggle for reductions in rents and usury and the prospect of industrialization, for which *the state must take initial responsibility*, includes landlords [who must] "reorganize"

²¹⁴ Ibid, 112-114.

²¹⁵ Ibid, 120-123.

²¹⁶ Ibid, 192.

²¹⁷ Ibid, 13-14, 80, 130.

²¹⁸ Ibid, 108, 114, 126, 185.

their property, gradually to replace outmoded techniques of cultivation with capitalist methods involving the use of capital and salaried workers.²¹⁹

Cambodia's domestic industries required state initiatives to reroute them from serving outsider interests almost exclusively; a "state monopoly [or nationalization] of foreign trade of the main export products," namely rubber, rice, and corn, was therefore paramount for Cambodia's industrialization.²²⁰ He calls for all of Cambodia's sectors to contribute to this reconfiguration in bringing about true independence and true democracy.²²¹

In his concluding remarks, Samphan makes a final plea: "We [Cambodians] believe that Cambodia must and can industrialize. It must industrialize because agricultural specialization that is premised on a foundation of international integration places unacceptable limitations on overall development of its economy. If otherwise, can the people ever expect that national independence will accompany an improvement in their standard of living?"²²² Here, we see once again his advocacy for autonomous development through state intervention. Specifically, his argument for cooperative farming under the impetus of a state-controlled production initiative mirrors Mao's proposals in "On New Democracy," in which the future Mao called for the state to seize all banks and monopolies, whether banks, railways, or airlines ("the main principle of the regulation of capital)," until China was free from capitalism.²²³ Samphan's concept of mutual aid teams (*équipes d'entr'aide*) also reflects his Maoist leanings. He envisioned mutual aid teams as units

... where instruments, the land, and the products of labor remained private property, but were implemented by a collective working method that corresponds fully to the current state of mind of the Khmer peasant. It is not uncommon for our farmers to organize into teams of several families to help each other in the work of planting or harvesting, all in the midst of melodious songs... This effort to organize production more rationally must be supported morally, technically, and financially, by the state... The organization of mutual aid teams and cooperatives will by nature increase efficiency gradually and help to clear new land and [greater] irrigation...²²⁴

²¹⁹ Ibid, 113-114. Emphasis added.

²²⁰ Ibid, 108.

²²¹ Twining, "The Economy," in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 112.

²²² Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 192.

²²³ Mao Tsé-toung, *La nouvelle Démocratie*. (Beijing : People's Press, 1952), 9. [http://communisme-bolchevisme.net/download/Mao_Tsetoung_La_democratie_nouvelle.pdf] (Accessed 14 April 2016). See also Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 78.

²²⁴ Samphan, « L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation » 176-177.

Evidently, Samphan believed in the voluntarist spirit of the Cambodian semi-proletariat, arguing fervently that Cambodia “can industrialize because it has no vicious cycle of poverty that cannot be broken by conscientious human effort.”²²⁵ Industrialization, however, had to be a state-run initiative in which control of foreign relations and a thoughtful effort at structural reform formed the pillars. Thoughtful development of the Cambodian economy therefore implied an active leadership of Cambodia’s various social forces, and leadership “that can be neither bureaucratic, nor administrative... [it] must ally with a broad democracy and rely on broad mass support.”²²⁶

In essence, Samphan’s dissertation provides a preliminary link to the would-be founders’ Maoist vision. We find some of the inspirations behind what the CPK took to new and grotesque extremes years later: the challenges of rural poverty, capitalist exploitation, lack of industrialization, and unproductive industries. His class analysis and assessment of the peasant situation became a hallmark of Pol Pot’s DK, and Samphan played the role of right hand man for the last years of its existence. Like Yuon, Samphan argued that Cambodia ought to depend solely on its own resources to develop from an agrarian to an industrial economy, mirroring Mao’s own calls for self-reliance in the 1930s.²²⁷ Like Mao, Samphan opposes a return to ancestral modes of production; rather, he envisions a new Cambodia in which industrial development and a collective economy were the foundation for “an entirely new, modern, productive communal society.”²²⁸ Samphan also uses Maoist class categories (like Yuon before him, and Hu Nim six years later) to segment the Cambodian peasantry according to a combination of Mao’s categorization and his 1930-31 data. On Cambodian industries and development, Samphan proposes a radical restructuring of the economy and industries to extirpate the “semi-feudal and semi-colonial country” from a unilateral system of unequal exchange. Thus while his dissertation swears allegiance to Sihanouk and avoids calling for outright rebellion against him, we do find in Samphan’s critique of economics under Sihanouk’s stewardship with the use of Maoism as a theoretical and practical lens to righting so many of the economic wrongs of colonialism and capitalist imperialism.²²⁹ His work proved highly influential to other Cambodian scholars who sought to address Cambodia’s problems of industrialization, and only a short time after his

²²⁵ Ibid, 192.

²²⁶ Ibid, 192.

²²⁷ Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 52.

²²⁸ Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 113; and Sher, « Le parcours politique des khmers rouges » 72.

²²⁹ Samphan, « L’économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d’industrialisation » 42-44. Alex Hinton and William Willmott have both stated the same in reference to Samphan’s groupings of rural classes. Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 54; and Willmott, “Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party,” 210, 214-215.

defense, another future CPK founder took up the mantle, improved upon Samphan's procrustean case studies, and put Mao's ideas and programs at the center-stage of his vision for Cambodia. It is to Hu Nim, the most openly Maoist of the three Khmer intellectuals, that we now turn. For it was Nim's work, which lauds China openly, that represents the pro-China stance that had been subtle in previous studies.

A Maoist Peasant Analysis: Hu Nim's Doctoral Dissertation (1965)

Hu Nim provides us with a rare blend of perspectives in his 1965 PhD economic sciences dissertations. Although he studied in Paris (1955-1957), and was a contemporary of Yuon and Samphan (he met the former in 1955), he completed his degree in Cambodia at the *Université Royale de Phnom Penh* (សាកលវិទ្យាល័យភូមិន្ទក្នុងពេញ, formerly Royal Khmer University) while working as Under-Secretary of State in Sihanouk's cabinet.²³⁰ Despite Sihanouk co-opting Nim and other leftist officials after crushing the Democrat and socialist Pracheachon (ក្រុមប្រជានុរ, "People's Group")²³¹ Parties, Nim's dissertation reflects his fervidly Maoist position, which crystallized after his trip to Beijing in 1965.²³² While Yuon and Samphan had returned to Cambodia to work in politics, Nim served as acting vice-president of overtly Maoist *Association d'Amitié Khméro-Chinoise* (AAKC, established in 1961),²³³ that is, until Sihanouk disbanded it in 1967, citing Chinese interference.²³⁴ Nim's ties to a Maoist organization might explain why William Shawcross described his 1965 dissertation as a "detailed Maoist analysis of the peasant problem."²³⁵ This section continues the trace on the Paris Groups *intellectual adaptation* of

²³⁰ "Planning the Past: The Forced Confessions of Hu Nim," in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 237.

²³¹ The Pracheachon was, for most of its existence, a legal front for the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), the forerunner organization of the CPK. Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*, 48; and Dmitry Mosyakov, "The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives," (Working Paper, Yale University Genocide Studies Program, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2000), 3.

²³² At this stage, Nim voiced significant praise at "our National Leader, the Honorable Sihanouk" for for his unshakeable commitment to "active neutrality," and identifying the nation's "constant concern" with democratization. See Hu Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » (Thèse de Doctorat en Droit Public, Université Royale, Phnom Penh, 1965), 385.

²³³ Hou Yuon was acting First Secretary General-Adjoint in May 1961, whereas Hu Nim was merely a councilor at this stage. « La naissance de l'Association D'amitié Khméro-Chinoise » in « Revue trimestrielle de l'Association d'amitié khméro-chinoise » No. 1 (January 1965): 1-47, on page 15. On its Maoist character, see pages 39-40, 45-47.

²³⁴ Carney, "Continuity in Cambodian Communism: Introduction," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 14-15. On Maoist nature of the AAKC, see Ministère de l'Information, « Revue trimestrielle de l'Association d'amitié khméro-chinoise » No. 1 (January 1965): 1-47.

²³⁵ William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 242, 246.

Maoism through an examination of how Nim used Mao's categories and definitions from his analysis of rural class structure to identify and correct Cambodian economic problems.²³⁶ It explores four main features: 1) identification of Cambodia's ongoing exploitation in an unequal global market; 2) favorable appraisals of Communist case studies, including Mao's China; 3) a Maoist class analysis to identify and correct unequal land distribution in the rural sector; and 4) harnessing the semi-proletariat for systemic changes to the Cambodian agricultural economy. As we will see, Mao's original work on peasants, which Nim references explicitly, his denunciation of exploitation by state monopoly capitalism and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and calls for government seizure of the economy, all guided Nim's study and shaped his vision for Cambodian society.²³⁷

First, Hu Nim expands upon Samphan's contentions that Cambodia's economy was oriented exploitatively around foreign interest. He urges state seizure of foreign trade and finance, arguing that autonomous development and agricultural cooperatives could replace private sectors and modernize Cambodia's economy. Nim supported state-sponsored planning mechanisms and specialized state economic organizations, state-directed private trade and industry, industry-supported agricultural development, and consumer goods production instead of manufacturing luxury commodity goods. In his view, valuable foreign exchange was essentially "wasted" in its dependence on imported goods for a modest number of urban elites. Cambodia's agrarian structure, meanwhile, remained dominated by a minuscule percentage of rural elites, which eliminated any chance for poor peasants to improve their lot.²³⁸ He identifies usury as a major hindrance to development, with the "sale of green crop on credit" contributing to it.²³⁹ As he elaborates:

²³⁶ Mao Tsé-toung, « Sur le problème de la coopération agricole » (Beijing : Editions en langues étrangères, 1956) ; and Li Fou-Tchoun, « Rapport sur le Premier Plan quinquennal pur le développement de l'économie nationale de la République Populaire de Chine » (Beijing: Editions en langues étrangères, 1956). Others that go unreferenced but influenced his views : Mao Tsé-toung, « Analyse des classes de la société chinoise » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1955); and Mao Tsé-toung, « Rapport sur l'enquête menée dans le Hunan à propos du mouvement paysan » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1955).

²³⁷ Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 410 ; and Hu Nim, "Land Tenure and Social Structure in Kampuchea," in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*, 69-86.

²³⁸ Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 52; and Twining, "The Economy," in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 112-113.

²³⁹ Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 92 ; and Nim "Land Tenure and Social Structure in Kampuchea," in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*, 77.

For most peasants, these sorts of loans are for the purpose of daily consumption, to bridge the food gap or even to celebrate religious festivals or family occasions. The loans are difficult to repay, and the debts accumulate so much that one day the peasant is obliged to abandon his plot of land to the merchants, which explains further the increased number of landless peasants and debt bondsmen... At each sale of agricultural produce, a multitude of middlemen from the bottom to the top—shopkeeper, individual collector, miller, transporter, small wholesaler, exporter—take out exorbitant profits so that a very tiny portion of the sale value at the last exchange goes to peasants.²⁴⁰

Above, we see many similarities with Mao's 1927 Report, which claimed that "[w]hen they [peasants] buy goods, the merchants exploit them; when they sell their farm produce, the merchants cheat them; when they borrow money for rice, they are fleeced by the usurers; and they are eager to find a solution to these three problems."²⁴¹ Nim, likewise, suggests that cooperatives in which peasants could establish their own credit system and work for mutual benefit will free peasants from debt bondage, sharecropping, and payment in kind, thereby raising their standard of living. If the landlords and wealthy peasants had to rely on their own productive labor, and the vast majority of peasants could prosper without the "Sword of Damocles" constantly dangling above their heads, then the countryside would serve the majority of Cambodians, and the nation as a whole could move towards autonomous development.

Second, Nim explores several case studies of public economic services in developing and socialist countries wherein models, stages of development, and cooperatives in North Korea, China, and North Vietnam are noteworthy. He lauds North Korea for its "shining example of a successful scientific socialist path based on the principle of 'self-reliance' and close economic cooperation between the countries of socialist camp," which in five years moved from zero cooperatives to one large, self-reliant cooperative per district.²⁴² He credits North Korea's industrial success to the "active workers' spirit of the Korean people."²⁴³ Likewise, Nim commended China for its communes, which were "larger than cooperatives, developed a diversified economy of their own, and were at the same time the basic administrative unit."²⁴⁴ Economic public services in China, he argues, were a function of the degree of its systematic socialization. He identifies the First Five-Year Plan as indicative of how the CCP worked

²⁴⁰ Ibid, 92-93 ; and Ibid, 77-78.

²⁴¹ Mao Tsé-toung, « Rapport sur l'enquête menée dans le Hunan à propos du mouvement paysan » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*.

²⁴² Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 51, 53-54.

²⁴³ Ibid, 52.

²⁴⁴ Twining, "The Economy," in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 112.

towards the realization of its general line and socialist edification. He also praises the “realist spirit” of Chinese leaders, who “know best how to combine ‘uncompromising revolutionary spirit and practical and scientific creativity... all measures are and will be taken [by the CCP leaders] to ensure that the socialist road overcomes capitalism, which is to say, expanding the state’s role continuously as leader of the national economy... The practical spirit, the desire to respect concrete conditions, led Chinese leaders to adopt the method of rectification of the style of work.”²⁴⁵ Since 1960, Nim notes, the CCP had realized that there was no need to follow the Soviet model any further, that it must distance itself from the Soviet link of industry to agriculture (and vice-versa), and to depend on its own resources to become self-reliant.²⁴⁶ This recognition marks yet another example of Nim’s vocal admiration for Mao’s economic transformation of China.

Third, Nim identifies the “structural evolution of the Cambodian economy,” in which a disproportionate amount of the country’s agricultural land and wealth concentrated in the hands of a small number of farmers.²⁴⁷ He employs Maoist class categories, but draws from a more substantial statistical base than Yuon and Samphan, using 1962 figures that throw into sharp relief Cambodia’s unequal land distribution. He argues that problems in Cambodia’s rural sector were the largest in Cambodia. He divides Cambodian landowners according to their land sizes and overall yields: 1) landed proprietors, who owned more than ten hectares of land and depended on exploitative practices; 2) wealthy peasants, who owned land, but depended on wage labor, living on land holdings that were \pm five hectares; 3) middle peasants, who possessed two-to-five hectares on which they worked without help, renting land to sustain themselves; 4) poor peasants, the great majority, who owned little-to-no land (1-2 hectares depending on region) or held small holdings at the expense of the necessary tools to work it, sustaining themselves through sharecropping; and 5) agricultural wage-earners, who held no land and depended on selling their labor to maintain a modest existence (6.6 percent of the population, or 156,7000

²⁴⁵ Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 46, 48. Four crucial factors allowed for it to succeed: 1) the consolidation and development of socialist collective property for the people; 2) the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture, with primacy placed on heavy industry; 3) the strengthening of centralized management into a more complete and effective agency; and 4) increasing socialist accumulation funds and devising plans for its maximization.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, 48-49. As Twining notes, Nim “observed that since 1960 the Chinese had decided that industry must serve agriculture... [and] that North Vietnam agricultural cooperatives had succeeded due to the enthusiasm of the peasantry and the energy of its new cadres.” Twining, “The Economy,” in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 112.

²⁴⁷ Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 51.

people by Nim's 1962 census figures). As Nim determines, over 250,000 families (30.7% of all farming households) had just 126,800 hectares of land (merely 5.18% of total cultivated area in 1962 by his account). A mere four percent of the population, meanwhile, held four hectares or more, for 21.45 percent of land. Even more stark, though, was the enormous percentage of Cambodia's farming population with virtually nothing, which exceeded fifty percent.²⁴⁸ Cambodia's population increase meant that the actual number of small holders increased from 669,000 families in 1956 (92 percent of 727,000) to 718,000 in 1962 (86 percent of 835,000). Several causes, from rice lands expansion, deficient tenure records, and major discrepancies between figures for land owned and land actually sowed, and other statistical anomalies, made it more difficult to ascertain the situation.²⁴⁹ Nim thus argued that the 1962 census figures on renting and sharecropping "did not accurately reflect the situation since many of the very small landowners had to rent land or sell their labor in order to subsist, and estimated that as much as 25 percent of agricultural families rented or were sharecroppers."²⁵⁰

Fourth, Nim delves deeply into the nature of land tenancy with particular emphasis on the semi-feudal nature of Cambodia's rural economy. He notes that the land rent system, which depended on sharecropping or rent in kind (paddy before rice planting), constituted direct exploitation by landlords and wealthy peasants of Cambodia's poorest and entrenched a semi-feudal mode of production, which, for Nim, was a broken system. It initiated two conflictual agrarian phenomena of concentration and fragmentation (both of which occur in developing countries) perpetuated Cambodia's agrarian problem. Concentration, Nim explains, is an agrarian structure in which a minority of landowners possesses almost all of the land, whereas fragmentation, or the dispersion or scattering of plots, occurs when a majority of smallholders possess small plots of land.²⁵¹ "Concentration" Nim argues, is "accompanied by high exploitation: small owners, poor farmers, and farm employees work for the prosperity of the big landowners," while fragmentation brings about two major problems of lower productivity and hindered innovation.²⁵² Importantly, in Cambodia the two conflictual phenomena combine:

²⁴⁸ Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 69-86, 88, 96-98.

²⁴⁹ Carney, "Continuity in Cambodian Communism: Introduction," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 15.

²⁵⁰ Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 96; and Carney, "Continuity in Cambodian Communism: Introduction," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 15.

²⁵¹ Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 83, 95.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 83-84.

The agrarian structure in Kampuchea is mixed, that is to say, both fragmented *and* concentrated. It is true that parcellization dominates in all the riverbank land and the fertile rice-growing regions, but for more than a decade there has been a marked tendency toward concentration, not only in the newly opened areas, but also to a limited extent in the fragmented regions themselves.²⁵³ ... Concentration, if it is not speculative, can play a role in increasing production, providing the opportunity to apply scientific and technical progress. But because of Kampuchea's weak development of capitalism, this tendency exists only for speculation (the sale of land tenancy, sharecropping, etc.). This agrarian structure still varies from one region to another. If concentration is in progress in certain rice-growing provinces like Battambang, fragmentation and the dispersal of holdings is increasing in the riverbank regions, and these are the most fertile regions with the highest population density.²⁵⁴

The "parcellized structure" presented serious problems to development and innovation in Cambodia's rural sector. Concentration without intervention added to the majority of peasants' struggles, with the agrarian structures pairing with social structure of rural life to "compound the obstacles to modernization and the development of agriculture."²⁵⁵ Nim cautions that the state must not force this reform on its peasants; rather, since peasants were attached to their lands, the state ought to persuade them that this reform was in their best interest and, by extension, in the interest of the nation. Nim believed that if peasants understood fully the aims of "mutual help and cooperative groups" then they would support agricultural reforms and cooperatives, for mutual aid was "the only way to escape the individual poverty cycle."²⁵⁶

Here, we see a connection to Mao, who addressed a similar problem regarding the semi-proletariat (semi-owners and owner-peasants) in 1926. As he argued, semi-owner peasants are "every year... short of about half the food they need, and have to make up this deficit by renting land from others, selling part of their labor power, or engaging in petty trading... they borrow at exorbitant rates of interest and buy grain at high prices; their plight is naturally harder than that of the owner-peasants' who need no help from others."²⁵⁷ Alongside the proletariat, the semi-proletariat, poor peasants, and lumpenproletariat constitute the most revolutionary groups and are therefore more likely to support widespread industrial and agricultural reform and revolution.

²⁵³ Ibid, 85.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, 89; and Carney, "Continuity in Cambodian Communism: Introduction," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 15.

²⁵⁵ Nim, Ibid, 92.

²⁵⁶ Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 100, 296, quote from 296; and Twining, "The Economy," in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 113.

²⁵⁷ Mao Tsé-toung, « Analyse des classes de la société chinoise » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1955).

How to harness this potentially revolutionary vanguard force remained the subject of intense debate, that is, until Mao proposed the “new-democratic state under the joint-dictatorship of [the] several anti-imperialist classes”—an idea from which the Paris Group drew to propose state-directed autonomous development *and* mutual aid teams. Nim’s conclusion does just that, echoing Mao’s own assessment of the peasants, and for the state to “carry the highest possible level of political consciousness of the masses.”²⁵⁸ Here, too, as Mao’s homage to Marx reveals, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.”²⁵⁹ Any state initiative must recognize the peasants’ social being as a conduit for positive change in Cambodian society rather than perpetuate the status quo. Nim considers it a “decisive importance” to train Cambodian, not foreign, executives, and establishes as another priority a policy of self-reliance to answer the “primacy to the national accumulation.”²⁶⁰ No longer could the state ignore its poorest strata, or favor stuffing its own coffers at the expense of its populace. Otherwise, Nim concludes, the “negative impact” of the exploiting forces within the current economic system may “plunge the country’s economy into devastating crisis, [and] sharpen the contradictions among workers, peasants and feudal classes, landlords, and capitalists. The only solution [is] revolution.”²⁶¹

In sum, these men drew from the wellsprings of Mao’s Yan’an works to both diagnose and correct Cambodia’s errant developmental course and its myriad problems in rural Cambodia.²⁶² Their dissertations share in their assessment of the various agricultural classes, within which semi-feudalism (usury, debt bondage, dependence on sharecropping, payments in kind) was the norm. Yuon highlighted systematic market exploitation, proposing mutual aid teams (“people’s communes” by another name) and a state-run initiative to establish them. Samphan went further, calling for Cambodian economical structural reform to resuscitate the industrial sector, monitor the import-oriented market, and end its exploitation through semi-

²⁵⁸ Mao Tsé-toung, « Rapport sur l'enquête menée dans le Hunan à propos du mouvement paysan » in *Œuvres choisies du Mao Tsé-toung, tome I*. (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1955).

²⁵⁹ Mao Tsé-toung, *La nouvelle Démocratie*. (Paris: Editions sociales, 1951) ; or Mao Tsé-toung, *La nouvelle Démocratie*. (Beijing : People’s Press, 1952), quoting Karl Marx, “Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*,” in *Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Eng. Ed, Volume I*. (Moscow, Foreign Languages Press, 1958), 363.

²⁶⁰ Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » 386-388.

²⁶¹ Nim, “The Confession of Hu Nim.”

²⁶² Sacha Sher, *Le Kampuchéa des « Khmers rouges »: essai de compréhension d'une tentative de révolution*. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004), 207; Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 113; and Clayton, “Building the New Cambodia,” 5.

autarky. Nim's piece, lastly, reflects openly Maoist leanings, but whereas the others do not reference Mao or Maoism *ad* Samir Amin, Nim quotes Mao unequivocally, praising the CCP's Little Leap. Yet none of their works, which are useful *intellectual adaptations* of Maoism, represent an outright call to arms for a Communist revolution; they still believed in reforming the country by legal-political means, taking up political posts within the Cambodian government wherein they initiated the *practical adaptation* of Maoism proposals from within.

Comme la Paille Desséchée dans les Rizières: The Practical and Normative Adaptations of Maoism, 1966-1975

The Cambodian race is of noble origin. It is not afraid of death, when it is a question of fighting the enemy, of saving its religion, and of liberating its fatherland.
—Cambodian Communist spokesman, 1951²⁶³

We come now to the *practical* and *normative adaptation* phases of *reception*. The first constitutes putting theory into practice, whereas the second is the process whereby to vernacularize a foreign idea to make it speak to a broad audience and to concrete realities in a specific setting. Here, we examine efforts by the Paris Group to *practice* Maoism and, after their respective failures, to *adapt* it *normatively* into the political line of the newly named CPK, which in 1967 launched a Communist struggle wherein they won over workers and peasants alike. *Practical adaptation*, however, occurred differently among the Paris Group: Sar became a revolutionary in 1953; Yuon, Samphan, and Nim took the legal-political route, opting to collaborate with Sihanouk rather than topple his regime. All *failed* in the face of Sihanouk's repression, which in 1967 forced the politicians to flee to the *maquis* (bands of rural Cambodian Communist guerrillas) and join Sar. In the midst of the destructive Cambodian Civil War (1967-1975), the bureaucratic Maoism of Yuon, Samphan, and Nim synthesized with Sar's recently acquired "faith Maoism" (from his Beijing trip in 1966) to form a harmonious "whole": a Cambodian Maoism that spoke to the concrete realities of the Cambodian Communist movement.²⁶⁴ The Party implemented this normativized Cambodian Maoism in DK. But before realizing this vision, there was the problem of fixing a broken system one way (reform) or another (insurgency).

²⁶³ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (28 November 1951), as quoted in Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, 182-183.

²⁶⁴ យុវជនបដិវត្តន៍ (Revolutionary Youth), (September 1976), 3.

Cambodia's political climate complicated any sort of vision that Yuon, Samphan, Nim, and Sar had when they left Paris at different times in the 1950s. Rather than undergo political and ideological training as Communist cadres upon their return, these patriotic intellectuals were charged by their Vietnamese "big brothers" with petty tasks such as kitchen work and transport, and were occluded from the 1954 Geneva conference.²⁶⁵ Afterward, Sihanouk guaranteed the young Cambodian nation's first free elections in 1955, abdicating the throne to his father, King Suramarit, to found the *Sangkum Riyastr Niyum* (សង្គមរាស្ត្រនិយម, "Community of the Common People," 1955-1970), which swept the elections.²⁶⁶ Sihanouk's promise was empty; he suppressed and bribed leaders of the ខ្មែរក្រហម: ("Liberated Khmers," *Issarak*) and 自由高棉 ("Free Khmers"), targeting leftists such as Yuon and Nim for positions in his Royal Government to cement his position as the national father of sorts. The Communist movement suffered greatly: The Vietnamese-backed Pracheachon Group lost the 1955 elections and went underground;²⁶⁷ and Son Ngoc Minh's KPRP, the "Communist backbone" of the *Issarak*, lacked a clear political line. After Suramarit's death in April 1960, Sihanouk declared himself as the "permanent, neo-monarchical" Head of State, which caused an irreparable schism between his loyalists, the aristocracy, and democratic intellectuals.²⁶⁸ He then set out to tighten his grip on power, exacting harsh repression on leftists and shuttering left-wing newspapers. Communists thus operated clandestinely, with Sar operating from the *maquis* and Yuon, Samphan, and Nim working as Communist operatives in the Pracheachon within the *Sangkum* cabinet.²⁶⁹ To Yuon and company, any hope for political reform had to come by operating within Sihanouk's government, whereas Sar set out to remove him outright.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁵ Democratic Kampuchea, "'Half a Century of Expansionist and Annexationist Designs of Hanoi,' Press Release of the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations," No. 077/80 (30 September 1980), 2; and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 123. Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 12-13; and Mosyakov, "The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists," 2-3. As years passed, the story of the Vietnamese "betrayal" at Geneva gained currency as an "unrighteous betrayal of the Cambodian revolution." Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 238.

²⁶⁶ Michael Vickery, "Looking Back at Cambodia, 1942-76," in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 96-99; and Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 8.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 131-133, 152; Mission du Front National du Kampuchea, "Bulletin d'Information," (11 August 1972), cited by Carney, "Continuity in Cambodian Communism," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 3.

²⁶⁸ Laura Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Series, 1979), 10.

²⁶⁹ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 113, 118, 192-193.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 95. Chandler notes that the "only segments of the Cambodian elite not favored as candidates were women, recalcitrant Democrats, and members of the outgoing assembly."

From Page to Paddy: Practical Adaptation

The return of Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim to Cambodia marked the beginning of a “new generation” of Cambodian politics. These French-educated leftists brought with them new perspectives from their encounters in the “radical ferment” of postwar Paris.²⁷¹ Yuon was the first to return from Paris (1956) after completing his doctorate and accepting a position as Director and French instructor at the private *Lycée Kambuboth*, where he hired several left-wing teachers and worked alongside Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary.²⁷² Yuon was also an active Pracheachon Communist, that is, until Sihanouk co-opted him (along with Samphan) into his *Sangkum* to counterbalance the Rightists within the National Assembly. Though never to be more than a “token force” in Sihanouk’s master plan to play “supreme arbiter” between left and right, such inclusion meant that both could use their political positions as elected officials (both won seats in the 1958 election) to put their theories into practice.²⁷³

At this time, Yuon was a Communist who was “open” about his support for Sihanouk, even though it was insincere.²⁷⁴ Prime Minister as of 1955, Sihanouk had adopted a Buddhist socialist stance at this time, and while his frequent visits to China and meetings with Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai had instilled in Sihanouk a desire to transform Cambodian society, he was profoundly obstinate towards genuine structural changes.²⁷⁵ He instead relied on his overwhelming popular support among peasants as Cambodia’s *devārāja* (Cult of the God-King) to insure re-election.²⁷⁶ As Yuon remarked, the “Popular Socialist Community of the ex-king Norodom Sihanouk” was merely a “political representative” of the wealthy minority, and despite its name, was staunchly conservative and vehemently anti-Communist.²⁷⁷ Accordingly, the

²⁷¹ Vickery, “Looking Back at Cambodia, 1942-76,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 96.

²⁷² Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 177; and Martin, *Cambodia*, 158.

²⁷³ Short, *Pol Pot*, 129; and Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 58.

²⁷⁴ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 55.

²⁷⁵ Sihanouk wrote *Notre socialisme bouddhique* (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Ministère de l’information, 1965) in which he synthesizes Buddhist norms with socialist features. On China trips, see Norodom Sihanouk, « ‘Pour nous, Cambodgiens, la Chine est bien notre amie numéro un...’ Déclaration de Samdech Chef de l’Etat à son départ de Pékin au terme de sa Vème Visite à la République Populaire de Chine, le 6 Octobre 1964 » (“For Cambodians, China is our Number One Friend...”) Declaration of the Head of State on the Occasion of his departure from Beijing after his Fifth Visit to the People’s Republic of China, 6 October 1964) in « Revue trimestrielle de l’Association d’amitié khméro-chinoise » No. 1 (January 1965): 1-47, on page 8.

²⁷⁶ On *devārāja* and Khmer history, see George Coèdes, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*. Susan Brown Cowing trans, Walter F. Vella, ed. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1968), 97, 99-101.

²⁷⁷ Yuon, « Le paysannerie du Cambodge et ses projets de modernisation » as quoted in Vickery, “Looking Back at Cambodia, 1942-76,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 97. Chandler states that Sihanouk’s “tirades against communism were prominent in the 1958 election campaign.” Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 57.

Sangkum was replete with “former corrupt and vagabond government officials.”²⁷⁸ Because of this overwhelming representation of Sihanouk loyalists and hard-line conservatives, the Party echoed its charismatic leader’s anti-Communist stance:

The constant progression of communism throughout the world is undeniable, and I cannot see what will stop it and make it retreat... The Western conception of Democracy seems to me the only one that is worthwhile from the viewpoint of the human condition, of human right and freedoms. Its superiority resides in the fact that it places Man at the summit, while Communism reduces him to the state of a slave to an all-powerful State.²⁷⁹

Sihanouk’s cooptation of his leftist rivals was a ruse; though co-opted leftists enjoyed some freedom, they were under close supervision and direction.²⁸⁰ A dynamic presence in Cambodian politics at the time, Yuon took advantage of his position, however limited, to put his dissertation’s theories in service to the lives of his rural constituency, especially since the government had the power to improve their lot. Although he was elected to the National Assembly controversially—he had a court case pending against him for “fomenting an illegal strike”²⁸¹—he became Minister of Commerce and Industry within Sihanouk’s cabinet.

Yuon pushed consistently for reform. Between 1958 and 1963, he occupied many different ministerial posts, including one as Minister of the Economy, undertaking a relentless political struggle to effectuate real change in the rural sector.²⁸² Repression against leftist politicians was ruthless, yet he reached out to peasants, including in one instance in Saukong when he defended them against an absentee landlord’s seizure of their lands.²⁸³ This incident aside, Yuon soon realized that democracy was a façade in Cambodia. “One can no longer say anything without risk of being thrown into prison and tortured,” he remarked, and no doubt, he experienced it firsthand whenever Sihanouk launched into a tirade against him.²⁸⁴ Yet Yuon, ever the devoted public servant, did not forestall *Sangkum* efforts to nationalize specific industries in the early 1960s, though he was certainly wary of them.²⁸⁵

²⁷⁸ “Planning the Past: The Forced Confession of Hu Nim,” in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 239.

²⁷⁹ Short, *Pol Pot*, 130.

²⁸⁰ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 181; and Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, 192-193.

²⁸¹ Short, *Pol Pot*, 129.

²⁸² Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 181, 204.

²⁸³ Ben Kiernan, “Interview with Ung Bunhuor,” (Sydney, Australia, 21 November 1977).

²⁸⁴ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 216. See also Ministère de l’Information, *Les Paroles de Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk*. (Phnom Penh: January-March 1965), 165-166.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 206.

Testament to his commitment to Cambodia was his 1964 book បញ្ហាសហករណ៍ (The Cooperative Question), which outlines his Maoist political vision despite its “insincere” pro-Sihanouk rhetoric.²⁸⁶ A guidebook for socialist transition, បញ្ហាសហករណ៍ urged the socialist and conservative *Sangkum* branches to form a united front against US imperialism.²⁸⁷ Yuon lauded Sihanouk’s neutrality and opposition to US adventurism, regarding his late 1963 domestic reforms (“the royal form of nationalization”) for their establishment of “means to build up the national economy in the interests of the people.”²⁸⁸ But Yuon still opposed the revolutionary route to rectify the peasant problem: “We must understand that class conflict should be resolved by a method that will not damage the unity of the nation against the American imperialists.”²⁸⁹ Never afraid to speak his mind, especially when it was in opposition to policies that were in contravention to peasant interest, Yuon won re-election in 1962, while his understudy in Paris, Khieu Samphan, joined him and became a Member of Parliament in the National Assembly that same year. Along with Samphan and Nim, Yuon was re-elected in the September 1966 by a large margin (78 percent of the vote in his Kompong Cham electorate).²⁹⁰ Though Sihanouk had promised not to interfere, he feared the Paris Group’s mounting popularity, and published toxic polemics on Cambodian Communism during their campaigns. He threatened to bring each member before a military tribunal, which escalated into threats of outright execution. Yuon fled to the countryside immediately to join Saloth Sar in the *maquis* in 1967.²⁹¹

As for Khieu Samphan, he was the last of the Paris Group to return to Cambodia (1959), completing his doctorate, and seeking to join Yuon on the political route to fix Cambodia’s problems of development from within the *Sangkum*. He worked as a covert member of the Phnom Penh City Committee of the Pracheachon, which entailed recruiting students,

²⁸⁶ Ibid, 209; and Kiernan, “Solving Rural Problems,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 134.

²⁸⁷ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 57.

²⁸⁸ Kiernan, “Solving Rural Problems,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 134. On Sihanouk’s neutrality, see Norodom Sihanouk, “Cambodia Neutral: The Dictate of Necessity,” in *Conflict in Indochina*. Martin Gettleman, Susan Gettleman, Lawrence Kaplan, and Carol Kaplan, eds. (New York: Random House, 1970), 236-241; and William E. Willmott, “Cambodian Neutrality,” in *Conflict in Indochina*, 248.

²⁸⁹ Yuon, បញ្ហាសហករណ៍, 11.

²⁹⁰ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 232-233. The results in the seventy-five electorates in which more than two candidates were running showed that only eleven earned an absolute majority; four of the decisive winners—Hu Nim, Hou You, Douc Rasy, and Khieu Samphan—had all been targeted by Sihanouk as enemies of the regime. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 154.

²⁹¹ Norodom Sihanouk, *L’Indochine vue de Pékin: Entretiens avec Jean Lacouture*. (Paris: Editions du seuil, 1972), 90; FBIS (24 April 1967); and Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 165-166.

professionals, and fellow intellectuals. At the same time, he taught at *Lycée Chamroeun Vichea*, a private high school.²⁹² Samphan made for a great teacher, as one of his students recalled:

He was always punctual and there were no jokes in his lessons, but he was a good teacher who won our respect. He would insist on our homework being done on time and we obeyed him even though he never punished us... He used to say, "I can't understand why the trees are planted in the countryside but they fruit in the capital," by which he meant that the hard work of the farmers turned into wealth for the city people... His clothes were simple and he drove a rusty old sky-blue Mobyette. We used to laugh about the noise it made, like a tubercular cough... He dressed like a peasant, with sandals instead of shoes. His house was simple and small. In all these things he was setting an example. Above all, he disliked the corruption of the capital.²⁹³

Indeed, Samphan was "free of the subjective mentality," an ardent critic of the monarchist politics of Sihanouk (who saw him as an "irredeemable troublemaker"), a man of the people, and a shrewd political mind.²⁹⁴ Unsurprisingly, in September 1959 Samphan founded the French-language biweekly leftist newspaper *l'Observateur*, which skyrocketed to popularity among Phnom Penh intellectuals, and was, as Short describes, "plainly subversive" yet "so carefully written that it was hard to establish seditious intent."²⁹⁵ Sihanouk even praised it for its "fairness in recognizing that the progress we have sponsored is without precedent in our history."²⁹⁶ *l'Observateur* was therefore Janus-faced; it "unctuously flattered the Prince's person while perfidiously deploring the social ills that resulted from his policies."²⁹⁷ It soon became the mouthpiece for Samphan's radical ideas, many of which were outgrowths of his dissertation proposals. He wrote extensively on the hazards of US imperialism, the successes of Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union, and decried the work and living conditions of the urban poor.²⁹⁸

²⁹² Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 185; and Short, *Pol Pot*, 132.

²⁹³ Someth May, *Cambodia Witness: An Autobiography of Someth May*. (New York: Random House, 1986), 88. Former Vietnamese People's Army War Correspondent Thanh Tin described Samphan similarly as "anti-intellectual" since he thought that the West was a "diseased society," dressed like a peasant, and lived an austere life. Than Tin, "Notes of Discussion with Than Tin, Deputy Editor of Nhan Dan, Former Editor of Quan Doi Nhan Dan, War Correspondent, Colonel in the Vietnamese People's Army, Two Talks," (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: 1 June 1983), 28.

²⁹⁴ Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*, 1-19; Short, *Pol Pot*, 134; and Heder, "Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan," 1-4.

²⁹⁵ Short, *Pol Pot*, 132-133; and Carney, "Biographical Sketches," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 63.

²⁹⁶ "Discours de S.A.R. le Prince Norodom Sihanouk au IX Congrès National le 19 février 1960," *Principaux discours, messages, allocutions, déclarations, conférence de presse et interview de son altesse royale le prince Norodom Sihanouk, Année 1960*. (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Edité par le Ministère de l'information, 1961), 53. See also Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 188-189; and Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*, 9.

²⁹⁷ Short, *Pol Pot*, 133.

²⁹⁸ Carney, "Biographical Sketches," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 63; and Short, *Pol Pot*, 141.

As chief editor of the newspaper, Samphan met with prominent leftist figures, which angered Sihanouk. At a May 1960 press conference in Phnom Penh, for instance, Samphan asked Sihanouk's friend and CCP Premier Zhou Enlai about the "objective conditions" that propelled the united front toward realizing national unity, and likewise, the Great Leap Forward in China's economy.²⁹⁹ Though we do not know whether Zhou's answer satisfied Samphan, he remained a vocal critic of Sihanouk's political and economic miscarriages, even to the point of receiving threats and physical attacks. Disparagement drew significant backlash from the center; Sihanouk ordered the assassination of the editor-in-chief of the *Pracheachon*, and detained most of the staff of Communist newspapers.³⁰⁰ An August 1960 attack on Samphan orchestrated by Sihanouk's Minister of Security left him assaulted, undressed publicly, berated, and photographed—an event that William Shawcross describes as "not the sort of humiliation that men forgive or forget."³⁰¹ Thereafter, Sihanouk crushed the Phnom Penh leftists, and had Samphan detained and questioned for his supposed "anti-monarchy and pro-Communist attitudes" in early 1960.³⁰² Sihanouk then sought to split the intellectual opposition to his rule by "red-baiting" Samphan, especially after an article in *l'Observateur* claimed "fascist forces aligned with imperialism were sowing 'confusion' in the body politic."³⁰³ Sihanouk viewed such an allegation as a threat, thus he railed against *Sangkum* leftists, and deployed state security services to arrest, detain, and interrogate editorial staffs of so-called "Communist" newspapers, including Samphan.³⁰⁴ Sihanouk shuttered *l'Observateur* that year, founding his own private press. Samphan's colleague Hou Yuon then hired him as a teacher at *Lycée Kambuboth*, but his tenure was short-lived, as Cambodia's growing economic problems prompted Sihanouk to reach out to experts reluctantly, including Samphan, for guidance in implementing his national development plan.³⁰⁵ Samphan, accordingly, pursued a political post of his own, one with which he hoped to bring to life his Maoist proposals for development.

²⁹⁹ "Premier Chou En-lai's Press Conference in Phnom Penh," *Peking Review* (17 May 1960), 32. Also quoted in Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, 51.

³⁰⁰ Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*, 9.

³⁰¹ Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 243. On the assault of Samphan, see Heder, "Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan," 3; Short, *Pol Pot*, 133; Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*, 9; Carney, "Biographical Sketches," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 63-64.

³⁰² Carney, "Biographical Sketches," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 63.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁴ Summers, *ibid.* See also *Réalités Cambodgiennes* (12 August 1960), 8.

³⁰⁵ "Discours à l'inauguration de l'école modèle de Prasaut (Svay-Rieng)," (16 August 1961), in *Principaux discours*, 226; and Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*, 12.

In 1962, he joined Sihanouk's *Sangkum* and ran for Parliament as a candidate for Secretary of State for Commerce, a post that he held from October 1962 to July 1963 (he was re-elected in 1966).³⁰⁶ He supported Sihanouk's opposition to US imperialism in South Vietnam, but opposed much of the autocrat's politics and vision. He joined the 77-member National Assembly in May 1962 as a representative of Kandal province and, later, as Trade Secretary,³⁰⁷ reuniting with Yuon and Nim, who both won seats in Kompong Cham. According to Laura Summers, "Khieu Samphan's views on the economy were well known... It was also apparent that [his doctoral dissertation]... was something of a policy blueprint for the new government."³⁰⁸ However, Cambodia's economic situation was too poor to recover using a semi-autarkical approach. Samphan called for austerity measures and reform of Cambodia's economic structure, appealing to Cambodians' national responsibility to work together across class lines towards a solution.³⁰⁹ Yet his 1963 proposed budget drew significant backlash from *Sangkum* members and the *Phnom Penh Presse*. Though Samphan, Yuon, and Nim were re-elected in September 1966, persistent threats from Sihanouk and the dominance of the rightists in the elections spelled the end of their *Sangkum* careers.³¹⁰

The second to return (1957) but the last to receive his PhD degree, Hu Nim worked in the Customs Department in a law office for three months, and then shifted his focus to politics. He reluctantly followed Yuon's example and joined the *Sangkum* on 30 December 1957, recognizing that to be a Member of Parliament "one had to become a member of the Popular Socialist Communist [*Sangkum*] first."³¹¹ He won a seat in the National Assembly in 1958 (and again in 1962 and 1966) as a representative of a district in Kompong Cham province, and worked for two leftist newspapers, *Réalités Cambodgiennes* and ប្រជាជនសេរី (Free People), as well as Sihanouk's private newspaper, ជាតិវិធម៌ (The Nationalist).³¹² After the Democrat Party dissolved that year, Nim veered further to the left, embracing a socialist political stance that would push him to become a revolutionary in 1967.

³⁰⁶ Carney, "Biographical Sketches," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 64.

³⁰⁷ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 197; and Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*, 19.

³⁰⁸ Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*, 12. Prime Minister Prince Norodom Kantol, for instance, presented a series of reforms that mirrored major parts of Samphan's dissertation.

³⁰⁹ *Réalités Cambodgiens*, (1 February 1963), 7.

³¹⁰ Summers, "Translator's Introduction," in Samphan, *Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development*, 14-19.

³¹¹ "Planning the Past: The Forced Confessions of Hu Nim," in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 238.

³¹² *Ibid*, 238; and Nim, "Confession of Hu Nim."

Before his fleeing to the *maquis* in 1967, though, Nim was an integral part of several *Sangkum* governments, holding the ranks of Undersecretary of State at the Prime Ministry (April–July 1958), Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior for Parliamentary Relations (July 1958–February 1959), and Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Justice (February–June 1959).³¹³ He nevertheless had little mobility to initiate the kind of change that his Communist contemporaries envisioned. Yet he developed a loyal following among his Kompong Cham constituency, and through his ties to leftist newspapers, cultivated his reputation as a leftist. In fact, as a representative of ប្រជាជនសេរី he earned the chance to travel with a delegation to the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe, which, he said, “gave the delegations a chance to see with their own eyes socialism in practice.”³¹⁴ As he recalled, “[m]y leftist activities... were that the more activities I engaged in with socialist countries’ embassies, especially China, North Korea, and North Vietnam’s, the warmer I felt.”³¹⁵ Indeed, his reputation as a leftist preceded him; even Ho Chi Minh promised him a warm welcome in Hanoi if Sihanouk’s threats became more severe.³¹⁶ Nim spent a month in Communist China in 1965 before the Cultural Revolution’s maelstrom of Maoism, returning to Cambodia with the Chinese Communist view that the Soviet Union was revisionist.

Mao’s popularity in Cambodia during the mid-to-late 1960s, however, distressed Sihanouk who, after nearly a decade of singing Chairman Mao’s praises (Sihanouk once referred to him as the “great venerated guide of the Cambodian people”), had come to regard China’s foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution as a significant disruption.³¹⁷ Fearful that Nim and other leftists were plotting to usurp his leadership, he “became distressed by news that the Little Red Book was popular,” and imprisoned or ordered the execution of pro-Chinese students.³¹⁸ Sihanouk also became suspicious of Chinese journals, which declared that “all Cambodian

³¹³ Carney, “Biographical Sketches,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 64.

³¹⁴ “Planning the Past: The Forced Confessions of Hu Nim,” in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 238.

³¹⁵ Nim, “Confession of Hu Nim.”

³¹⁶ *Ibid*; Carney, “Biographical Sketches,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 64; and Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 204. See also Martin, *Cambodia*, 109; and Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 174.

³¹⁷ On foreign policy during the CR, see Sophie Richardson, *China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 64. On Sihanouk’s pro-China stance, see Norodom Sihanouk, “Comment nous voyons la Chine (How We View China),” *Neak Cheat Niyum* [The Nationalist (Cambodia)] (20 September 1963): 6-8, on page 7. National Archives of Cambodia Document, Box 689, ID6061. Also in Box 332, pages 1-19; and “Message de S.A. R. le Prince Norodom Sihanouk à la radiodiffusion chinoise,” (1956), National Archives of Cambodia Document, Box 689, ID unknown, pages 1-2.

³¹⁸ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 83.

workers' "believed in Chairman Mao," while Zhou Enlai's plea for Chinese "to display their pride of the Cultural Revolution and their love for Chairman Mao" caused many Sino-Khmers in Phnom Penh to mimic the Cultural Revolution's fervor and pro-Maoist proselytizing.³¹⁹ Aware of the Beijing link to leftist intellectuals in Paris and Phnom Penh, Sihanouk urged Communist China to cease "meddling in internal affairs."³²⁰ Sihanouk removed Nim from his post and severed ties with him. No longer bound by his political duties, Nim developed strong feelings of admiration for Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam, expressing his praise in the French-language newspaper *La Dépêche*. As he once declared: "US imperialism and its stooges are not all happy to see a close a friendship between Cambodia and China. But this is a good thing. Future developments will further prove the correctness of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's thesis that the East wind is prevailing over the West wind. The anti-imperialist forces of the East are bound to defeat the imperialist forces of the West."³²¹ He ultimately made regular visits to China and, at Beijing's urging, founded the Maoist AAKC, within which he worked first as an officer in 1964, then President in 1967 during the most repressive salvos of Sihanouk's anti-left crackdown.³²²

Despite the maelstrom of anti-leftism in Cambodian politics, Nim still believed that he could reform Cambodia's economy and its citizens' social welfare from within the National Assembly. He rejoined the government from August to October 1962 as Secretary of State for Commerce while he pursued his PhD at the *Université Royale de Phnom Penh*. As recounted on his writings at this time:

I wrote extensively about the failure of economic reform in Cambodia. I had credible evidence and data to support my argument. Sonexsim, for example, had lost 700 million riel [Cambodian currency] annually in the exportation of rice since that state organization was formed. I argued that this resulted from the existing exploiting economics system and its relationships of production. I pointed out the current statistics [that] showed confiscation of land by a small number of the feudal landlords and capitalists, resulting in land shortages for farmers, tax burdens, and the losses of Sonexsim, which fell upon the workers and peasants. I concluded that negative impact of the exploiting characteristics

³¹⁹Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 169.

³²⁰ Ying Bing and Shi Zeliang, "柬埔寨現代史略 (Modern History of Cambodia, pinyin: *Jiǎnpǔzhài xiàndài shǐlüè*)," 東南亞研究資料 1 [Southeast Asian Studies (People's Republic of China)] (1983): 92-112, on page 106. Sihanouk blamed the rise of radicalism on China: "[I]f... Mao Zedong's thought is used to prepare Khmer Communism, that is unacceptable... How can Cambodia alone become a lackey of China?" Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 170.

³²¹"Premier Chou on Sino-Cambodian Friendship," *Peking Review* (22 October 1965).

³²² *Ibid.*

of the current economic system would not only cause failure and plunge the country's economy into devastating crisis, but also sharpen the contradictions among workers, peasants, and feudal classes, landlords, and capitalist.³²³

Evidently, Nim recognized the myriad flaws under Sihanouk's helmsmanship, putting theory into practice in 1965 by siding with oppressed Kampuchea Krom residents with ties to the Communist Khmer Worker's Party and joining a "Complaint Commission" that handled land disputes over claims and confiscations. He also pressed his fellow Assembly members to sever all ties with the US, which he viewed as imperialist. Far from influential within the conservative *Sangkum* after 1966, Nim felt the pressure more than ever, as the Chinese Cultural Revolution had caused Sihanouk to repress Communist sympathizers. After Sihanouk targeted him specifically through "increasingly threatening invective," Nim fled to the *maquis* in October 1967 to join his Paris cohort in the Communist movement.³²⁴

By 1967, the political route to reforming Cambodia was all but dead. Sihanouk had grown paranoid by the 1966 elections because of the popularity of Yuon, Samphan, and Nim. He accused China and pro-China officials (Yuon, Samphan, and Nim) of fomenting it, stating, "At present I find that China has made a serious change because she has given up peaceful coexistence and the five principles. China had changed her policy since the Cultural Revolution. There have been a number of Khmer who aid China.... The most dissolute and dishonest is Hu Nim."³²⁵ Right-wingers and commercial representatives within the National Assembly, too, remained ever recalcitrant, repealing policies proposed by the Paris Group. Afterward, Yuon had lost a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly over his unwillingness to toe the Sihanouk line, which culminated in his resignation. Samphan lost the confidence of both the Assembly and the government, and conceded that there was nothing to salvage from the "unreformable" state.³²⁶ Sihanouk grew increasingly angry with all three popular ministers who had exposed for all to see the broken nature of the National Assembly. He responded by threatening the lives of Yuon and Samphan; in particular, his diatribe at a conference at Meru Terrace against both men for their supposed role in fomenting the March-April 1967 Samlaut Rebellion pushed them to

³²³ Carney, "Biographical Sketches," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 64.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/2600/A3/3, as quoted in Kiernan, "The Samlaut Rebellion, 1967," in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 181. Chinese writers, however, remained resolute, insisting that renewed Sino-Cambodian relations would "give the gift of struggle." Zhang Xizhen, 西哈努克家族 [Sihanouk's Family, pinyin: *Xīhānùkè jiāzú*]. (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenpian chubanshe, 1996), 161.

³²⁶ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 204-205.

flee secretly to the *maquis* to join their Communist brethren in his fight to seize power.³²⁷ Announcement of their disappearance led many to speculate that they had been killed by Sihanouk's order, which turned their loyal supporters against the autocratic Sihanouk.³²⁸ Their popularity as representatives of the marginalized prompted widespread mourning; in Kandal province, more than 15,000 students gathered at temples to grieve the "martyrdom of Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan."³²⁹ Hu Nim, meanwhile, reiterated that his loyalty was to the Head of State, rebuffing allegations that he and other leftists played a role in peasant unrest. Sihanouk responded with his usual vitriol, using his conservative National Assembly to spew venom towards the former Minister. He branded Nim as a Communist, pro-China sympathizer, and urged that he join his fellow reds in the countryside, which he did, fearing for his life. Thus began the legend of the "Three Ghosts": ostracized yet popular leftist ministers who reappeared in 1970 as leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.³³⁰

The Revolutionary Route: Saloth Sar Becomes Brother Number One

Before Yuon, Samphan, and Nim had undertaken their political routes to reform, the career revolutionary, Saloth Sar, was the first Paris Group member to return to Cambodia and become an active player in the clandestine movement against Sihanouk. Upon his 1953 return from France, he joined Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) guerrillas in eastern Cambodia, and became active in the KPRP and Pracheachon.³³¹ Pham Van Ba, a Vietnamese cadre in charge of Sar's cell, recalled that the Vietnamese approved of his participation because of his PCF membership. Sar joined the KPRP urban committee, achieving the rank of Secretary in a regional Party cell and, with the KPRP move from armed insurrection to urban political recruitment, he sought to wrest control of the Party from the Vietnamese to spearhead a Cambodia program.³³² But the KPRP was out of sorts at the time. Party leader Son Ngoc Minh held the position from an office in Hanoi, and the otherwise weak leadership forced the Vietnamese Communists to search

³²⁷ Nim, "Confession of Hu Nim.," Ieng Sary, "Kingdom of Cambodia National United Front of Kampuchea: Cambodia 1972," (1 January 1970), 16-17. DCCAM (Phnom Penh) Document Number D24010; and Kiernan, "The Samlaut Rebellion, 1967," in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, 181.

³²⁸ Sihanouk, *L'Indochine vue de Pékin*, 90; and Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 166.

³²⁹ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 167.

³³⁰ Amitav Ghosh, *Dancing in Cambodia, At Large in Burma*. (Bangalore, India: Orient Longman Ltd., 1998), 48; Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book*, 28; and Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 68, 73.

³³¹ Wilfred P. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970-1975*. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), 29.

³³² Mosyakov, "The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists," 5.

for “experienced KPRP cadres whom they could trust.”³³³ By 1956, the new KPRP Central Committee appointed Tou Samouth as head of the KPRP urban committee, and Sieu Heng as leader of the rural committee in Svay Rieng, thereby dislocating both leaders from the hotbeds of activity against North Vietnamese-friendly Sihanouk. In so doing, the Vietnamese disarmed the KPRP for their movement against Sihanouk. The Party met again in 1957 to carve out a new line, but the situation was still very bleak for the Cambodian movement. The Vietnamese had told them to wait, and they had neither the right leadership nor membership to put movement into motion.³³⁴ Fortunately, the 1958 defeat of the Pracheachon caused radicals and KPRP members alike to lose their patience with the Party’s ineffective line.

Their ranks decimated (Pol Pot recalled that 90% of the urban and rural revolutionary forces were killed, arrested, recanted, or surrendered)³³⁵ the KPRP elected to revise its strategy at a secret congress in a Phnom Penh railway station on 28-30 September 1960, one that would shape the Party’s course for the next fifteen years.³³⁶ The secret congress represents a “rectification campaign” of sorts in that future Party leaders downplayed Party history before Sar’s rise to power, and in an exemplary act of historical revisionism, made 1960 the official Party’s founding date.³³⁷ Twenty-one Cambodian Communists attended to revise the Party line, with participants agreeing to rename the KPRP the Worker’s Party of Kampuchea (WPK). Sar and his Paris Clique of future CPK founders (and government officials at this time) Yuon, Samphan, and Nim, had excelled in the Party’s urban committee, and seized control of the KPRP’s Central Committee in 1960. Sar, Yuon, and Nim (President of the State Presidium Samphan was then under arrest) ultimately adopted a strategy of “combined political and armed struggle” in developing a revolutionary army.³³⁸

³³³ Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*, 49-50.

³³⁴ Pol Pot, « Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot, secrétaire du comité du parti communiste du Kampuchéa au meeting commémorant le 17^e anniversaire de la fondation du parti communiste du Kampuchéa et à l’occasion de la proclamation solennelle de l’existence officielle du parti communiste de Kampuchéa, » (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 27 September 1977), 16.

³³⁵ Ibid, 17. Typical of Party histories, Pol Pot’s speech occluded mention of the CPK’s Vietnam ties.

³³⁶ Ibid, 18; and Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 112.

³³⁷ David P. Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When Was the Birthday of the Party?” *Pacific Affairs* 56, No. 2 (Summer 1983): 288-300.

³³⁸ Ministère des Affaires Étrangères du Kampuchéa Démocratique, *Livre Noir : Faits et Preuves des Actes d’Agression et d’Annexion du Vietnam Contre le Kampuchéa* [Black Paper : Facts and evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea]. (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Département de la Presse et l’information du Ministre des affaires, étrangères, 1978), 36. On Samphan’s arrest, see Pol Pot, “Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot,” 18.

Sar seized this opportunity to jump-start his rise to Party leadership. He won support by giving surety that his assessment of Cambodia's present situation and strategy for political struggle ought to form the basis of a national-democratic revolution against Sihanouk. "Our own experiences taught us that we must adhere to the principles of independence, national sovereignty, and self reliance, basing ourselves on the experiences of our own revolutionary movement, in order to determine our concrete political line," he urged.³³⁹ The KPRP thus resolved its longstanding issues of determining its strategic line of the national democratic revolution, finalizing its constitution, and elected Central Committee's members, with Sar's leadership at a national level.³⁴⁰ By the 1963 Party Congress, Sar was KPRP General Secretary, winning popularity among his Committee members because he defended the Party line that Cambodian Communists should pursue their agenda first, and have their own "special policy on basic matters of revolutionary struggle, theory, and tactics."³⁴¹ Tou Samouth's mysterious death at the hands of Sihanouk's secret police in 1962 and Sieu Heng's unpopularity paved the way for the Paris Group as the KPRP movement's chief executors. Sar, Yuon, Samphan, and Nim could now initiate Party operations and establish a youth corps, or "secret defense units," whose responsibility was to safeguard cadres from Sihanouk's anti-Communist task forces.³⁴² However, Sihanouk included Sar among the thirty-four subversives that he wished to join the *Sangkum* government, which was no genuine effort to recruit progressives, nor was it a reward for political acumen. Rather, it was a warning sign that the urban-based movement must relocate outside the capital.³⁴³ Sar fled to Kratie and Kompong Cham, and for the next seven years he and his cadres hid, "moving from makeshift camps in eastern and northeastern Cambodia" from where they prepared for a "peasant revolution... to fight a guerrilla war against the Prince [Sihanouk]."³⁴⁴

But how did a group of French-educated elites with no rural connections break from the shackles of Hanoi's helmsmanship and launch a nation-wide insurgency against Sihanouk? The

³³⁹ Pol Pot, "Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot," 17-18. See also Mosyakov, "The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists," 5-6.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

³⁴¹ "ប្រវត្តិសាស្ត្រសង្ខេបនៃបក្សបដិវត្តន៍កម្ពុជា (A Brief History of the KPRP—The Vanguard of the Working Class and All the People of Kampuchea)," (Phnom Penh, 1984), 6; To Kuyen, "The CPRP as Avant-Garde of the Kampuchean People," *Cong Shang* [Vietnam] (1983): N11-12; and Ben Kiernan, "Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement," in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1980*, 253.

³⁴² FBIS, "After 1961 We Began to Organize Secret Defence Units," (19 January 1977), H3; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 193-194; Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 60-61; Nguyen-vo, *Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict*, 50-51; and Mosyakov, "The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists," 5.

³⁴³ Carney, "Biographical Sketches," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 62.

³⁴⁴ Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 64.

answer did not present itself when Sar visited Hanoi, but he found it in Beijing in 1966; the Cambodian Communists were to break Vietnamese orders to wait until Vietnam had defeated the Americans, and made Maoist strategy central to their movement to swallow the cities from the countryside. This was no small task. In a country where the King is a god among peasants and urbanites alike, recruitment among a largely peasant population required that the newly named Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK, in 1966) rework its strategy from the ground up. The Party would have to make Maoism *speak* to Cambodian peasants, who for too long had received the short end of the stick, for it to be received and mobilized as a unifying force. This was the final stage of *normative adaptation* to plant traveling ideas firmly in Cambodian society—or at least enough of it to propel the CPK to power. Increasing peasant unrest in the province of Battambang provided such an opportunity.

Réalités Concrètes : Normative Adaptation

The 1967 Samlaut Rebellion signaled the beginning of the Cambodian Communist movement to seize power, even though Sar and his colleagues played no direct role in fomenting it.³⁴⁵ As Sar recalled: “[i]n Battambang Province in March-April 1967 an armed uprising took place... However, at that time our Party asked that this be postponed for a while in order to examine and sum up the state of the contradictions and the possibility of the use of arms.”³⁴⁶ The people, he insisted, had started it, as the CPK Central Committee “had not yet decided on a nationwide armed insurrection. The people in Battambang did it first, since the movement of the peasants’ struggle was indefensibly fluid.”³⁴⁷ It did not matter who was responsible for Samlaut; rather, its significance was of most concern, as the CPK regarded it as the moment for which it had waited for many years, as their opportunity to capitalize on peasant unrest to propel their movement

³⁴⁵ Ben Kiernan and Donald Kirk regard the Samlaut rebellion as the first salvoes of the Cambodian Communist movement. Kiernan argues that Samlaut represents the “baptism of fire for the small but steadily growing Cambodian revolutionary movement,” whereas Kirk sees it as “a prelude, in a microcosm, of the conflict that would sweep across the country three years later.” Ben Kiernan, “The Samlaut Rebellion, 1967-1968,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1980*, 166; and Donald Kirk, *Wider War: The Struggle for Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos*. (New York: Praeger, 1971), 78. Sihanouk blamed the Khmer Communists for the disturbances. Samphan organized a demonstration against government collections of rice surpluses from poor peasants. Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 66. The Samlaut rebellion occurred because of “local grievances against injustice and social change, corruption, and ham-fisted government behavior.” Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 166. Osborne agrees with Chandler: Samlaut was “more an outbreak of largely spontaneous resistance to government actions than the first orchestrated challenge from the radicals.” Osborne, *Sihanouk*, 191.

³⁴⁶ វង្សបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag, unknown number] (August 1975), as quoted in Kiernan, “Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1980*, 255.

³⁴⁷ BBC *Summary of World Broadcasts* (5 October 1977), FE/5632/C/3.

forward. Before a revolution could get underway, however, the Communists—whose membership now included the other Paris Group members—had to penetrate into peasant society so that their vision could speak to local grievances and, ultimately, mobilize them against the state. This was no small order, especially with the complications that came with launching a movement that had only recently decided on Sar’s helmsmanship and had elite leftists as leaders.

The CPK’s *normative adaptation* of Maoism, to render Maoism into something that spoke to people, began with Sar’s return from Beijing in 1966 as a faith Maoist and the subsequent arrival of his bureaucratic Maoist colleagues in the *maquis*. The flight of the leftist, Paris-educated group, too, brought an intellectual component to the fledgling Party, as these men had *adapted* Maoism on paper as a *fit* for Cambodia while in Paris. As they capitalized on peasant fervor that arose with Samlaut, the meeting of the two strands (Sar’s faith Maoism and the managerial Maoism of the former ministers) into a single cohesive Cambodian Maoism under Sar’s leadership led the CPK to mobilize peasants. CPK leaders spoke in a political language of traditional society and a rational-bureaucratic language of modernizing states, as Mao had done in Sinifying Marxism. As Hinton describes, the CPK “combined new and old into ideological palimpsests, sketched upon the lines of cultural understandings, at once transforming and transformed.”³⁴⁸ Its “national democratic revolution” thus represents the adaptation of Mao’s Yan’an canon (and, vicariously, the Cambodian intellectuals’ dissertations for that matter).³⁴⁹ But how exactly did the CPK rally peasants to its revolutionary cause?

Growth in CPK support stemmed from its peasant outreach, which consisted of efforts to make its ideology speak to rural cleavages and grievances. The Second Indochina War and the fallout of the US secret bombings of Cambodia during Operation Menu (18 March 1969-26 May 1970) played their part,³⁵⁰ and the Party received a significant boost when in 1970 the deposed Sihanouk, whose reverence among peasants was substantial irrespective of his corruption, lent his support for the CPK. Yet the Party’s capitalization of rural problems, about which they had

³⁴⁸ Alexander L. Hinton, “Oppression and Vengeance in the Cambodian Genocide,” in *Genocide by the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice*. Nicholas A. Robins and Adam Jones, eds. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 85.

³⁴⁹ ឧបដានគំរូដ៏រុងរឿង [Revolutionary Flag, No. 11] (11 November 1976), 76. DCCAM (Phnom Penh) Document, Number D21419.

³⁵⁰ William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust, and Modern Conscience*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985). By 1969, US forces had conducted 454 covert missions in Cambodia, which increased to 558, and then 1,885 by 1972. Estimates of Cambodian casualties of the 1969-1973 bombing campaigns “run as high as 150,000.” Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 69. See also Kenton Clymer, *Troubled Relations: The United States and Cambodia since 1870*. (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007), 137.

theorized in Paris and fought for from political or revolutionary posts, allowed them to penetrate into peasant society despite their elite origins. Sihanouk certainly helped in this regard; several campaigns throughout the 1960s, including the resettlement of landless peasants in Battambang and the exploitative *ramassage du paddy* (which established a lucrative rice export industry that only benefitted merchants) had worsened many peasants' lot.³⁵¹ The CPK recognized their plight, and sought to "give leadership to the movement" and "suspended temporarily the armed struggle in Battambang until the whole country could complete its preparations."³⁵² As Sar elaborates in a particularly Maoist fashion:

We proceeded according to the line that we traced for ourselves already. We needed to keep the *principal contradictions* in sight at all times. The principal contradictions were with *imperialism* and the *feudal, landlord system*, which we had to combat. As to the *secondary contradictions*, they had to be resolved by reciprocal concessions that allowed the union of all the forces against imperialism, particularly American imperialism, and the system of the feudalists, landlords, and reactionary compradores.³⁵³ ... Our policy had to be correct, that is to say, our reasons were founded. *We had to make sure they could understand those reasons.* It was equally important for our policy to *conform with their interests for them to give us their support.* We talked to them, had meetings with them. Sometimes they agreed with us, sometimes they did not. We came back again and again. First they did not see the true nature of American imperialism. But over time, they came to view it increasingly clearly and united with us to combat it, to win independence, peace, and neutrality.³⁵⁴

The CPK's approach to recruiting peasants shared much in common with Mao's during the Chinese Civil War. As Mao mobilized peasants on a range of grievances and exploited every possible cleavage as a way to build popular support, so too did the CPK, whose cadres "live[d] in the midst of the people, in close touch with them, like them, and serve them heart and soul."³⁵⁵ Both assessed their country as backward, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal states that bore the brunt of an agonizing war of imperialist aggression, and carried confidence in persevering against all odds by way of self-reliance and the people's indomitable revolutionary spirit. For the

³⁵¹ Kiernan, "The Samlaut Rebellion, 1967-1968," in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1980*, 166-195; Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 66-68; and Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 164.

³⁵² Pol Pot, "Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot," 38-39.

³⁵³ Ibid, 30. Emphasis added.

³⁵⁴ Ibid, 30-31. Emphasis added.

³⁵⁵ Sary, "Cambodia 1972," 5.

CPK as with the CCP, it was necessary that the national revolution based itself in the “*réalités concrètes* [concrete conditions]” in the country.³⁵⁶

To “sell” its Maoist vision to Cambodians, the CPK needed to pitch it to ordinary people in a way that tapped into local frustrations while also selling its vision of a modern nation. This meant that it ought to spark “class ardor and fury” among workers and peasants by marshaling their Maoist class analysis into something that “tapped into preexisting feelings of dissatisfaction, unrest, anger, and spite,” thereby instilling revolutionary political consciousness.³⁵⁷ This entailed portraying itself as the genuine representative of the workers and peasants, which it did via radio broadcasts and speeches. During the Party’s struggle against the right-wing deposer of Sihanouk, Lon Nol (1970-1975),³⁵⁸ it broadcast via secret radio its devotion to the workers and peasants. “In Cambodia’s history of struggle,” a May 1971 broadcast stated, “Cambodian workers and peasants constituted a basic force in which Cambodian workers were always the most advanced, most valiant, and most active vanguard.”³⁵⁹ Another asserted that the CPK was a “Party of the workers and representative of the interests of the people and... of the nation and youth.”³⁶⁰ Though the Party later stressed that the peasants, who (echoing Samphan’s assessment in 1959) constituted 85% of the nation’s populace, was the vanguard force, this earlier proclamation represents one of the earliest and few remaining evidences of CPK avowal of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Speeches on the frontlines or in the camps were equally effective, especially when given by the Party’s charismatic intellectual thrust. CPK candidate member Ith Sarin remembers that at a 10 May 1972 mass meeting in *Kat Phlouk* primary school in Tonle Bati, “Mr. Hou Yon [Hou Yuon] gave a two-hour speech [that] was much applauded.”³⁶¹

The Party also tried its hand at politicization. On 23 March 1970, Sihanouk formed the *Front uni national du Kampuchéa* [National United Front of Kampuchea, FUNK, រណសិរ្សប្រជាជាតិ

³⁵⁶ Pol Pot, “Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot,” 70-71. See also Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” (1930) in *SWIL*, 305-315.

³⁵⁷ Alexander L. Hinton, “A Head for an Eye: Revenge in the Cambodian Genocide,” *American Ethnologist* 25, No. 3 (August 1998): 352-377.

³⁵⁸ Serge Thion, “Journal de marche dans le maquis,” in *Khmers Rouges*, 43-97.

³⁵⁹ FBIS *Daily Report*, No 86 (4 May 1971).

³⁶⁰ “បក្សកុម្មុយនីស្តកម្ពុជានិងបញ្ហានិងយុវជននិងយុវនារីបដិវត្តន៍កម្ពុជា [The Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Problem of Young Men and Women of Kampuchea] យុវជននិងយុវនារីបដិវត្តន៍ទី១ [Revolutionary Youth, No. 2] (August 1973), as quoted in Carney, “Continuity in Cambodian Communism,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 1.

³⁶¹ Ith Sarin, “Nine Months in the Maquis, US Embassy, Phnom Penh trans.,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 34.

កម្ពុជា] and endorsed the CPK’s struggle against Lon Nol,³⁶² which positioned the Party well to portray itself to their would-be supporters as a national front protecting sovereignty. Sar also emphasized that the principal contradiction was in fact between the landlords and the peasants, thus Party leaders believed that peasants would endorse the CPK program of “independence-mastery [ឯករាជ្យភាព-ម្ចាស់]” and espouse its guiding Maoist ideology through “‘seepage’ [ការជ្រាប],”³⁶³ which sought to turn ordinary people into extraordinary revolutionaries. The CPK carried out “intensive agitation work” among the peasants, organizing them into “patriotic peasants’ associations” and document reading groups.³⁶⁴ Through this, the Party hoped to feed peasant hatred of corrupt urbanites, the evil feudal lords, and the oppressive US imperialists. Party promises to restructure all of Cambodia’s relations of production to destroy feudalism and end exploitation of the peasants and workers also helped convince many to lend their support to the CPK, with leaflets concentrating on succinct, simplified descriptions of the core themes of the dissertations by Yuon, Samphan, and Nim. One leaflet explained to peasants that feudalists and capitalist enemies “live in affluence at the expense of the working class and the masses,” who “live in misery, bled by them.”³⁶⁵ An issue of Party newspaper យុវជននិងយុវនារីបដិវត្តន៍កម្ពុជា (Revolutionary Youth) identified these same classes as regarding youths from the rural poor as merely a “source from which they can suck out their interests in the most delicious manner and as a major source of strength to perpetuate their oppression and protect their treasonous state power.”³⁶⁶ The CPK also reached out to the Buddhist *Sangha*, which often served as a link between periphery and core, spiritual and mundane. As Ieng Sary noted in a 1972 pamphlet, monks “have been the only literates,” held tremendous appeal among peasants, and represent a cultural nexus of power in the countryside.³⁶⁷ Cambodia’s history, Sary continues, was replete with “heroic feats against colonial rule creditable to the ‘achars,’ who are former Buddhist monks... in our revolutionary war of national and popular liberation, they take an active part in

³⁶² Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*, 219. It is worth noting that many Cambodians lent their support to the CPK movement because of Sihanouk’s overthrow. In conversation with Theara Thun, a fellow historian of Cambodian intellectual history, he stated that residents of Kompong Cham, including members of his extended family, supported the CPK because of Sihanouk’s overthrow, and hoped that the Communists would restore him to power after the defeat of Lon Nol. Personal Communication, Association of Asian Studies-in-Asia Conference, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 27 July 2017.

³⁶³ Hinton, “Oppression and Vengeance in the Cambodian Genocide,” in *Genocide by the Oppressed*, 87.

³⁶⁴ Sary, “Cambodia 1972,” 8; and Sarin, “Nine Months in the Maquis,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 51.

³⁶⁵ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 231-232.

³⁶⁶ “បក្សកុម្មុយនីស្តកម្ពុជានិងបញ្ហានិងយុវជននិងយុវនារីបដិវត្តន៍កម្ពុជា,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 31.

³⁶⁷ Sary, “Cambodia 1972,” 13-14.

the mobilization of the patriotic forces... the Buddhist monks fight stubbornly out of ardent patriotism.”³⁶⁸ Support from Buddhist monks joined with the Party’s ability to posit itself as the Party of the desolate poor to give the CPK legitimacy in Cambodia’s rice regions. The Party’s ranks ultimately swelled with fed-up peasants who subscribed to the millenarian Maoist vision that the Party leaders preached to them.

Besides political indoctrination and politicization, the CPK leadership adapted Maoism to contemporary norms in the same way that Mao “Sinified” Marxism: it infused Maoism with the personal charisma of the Paris Group and couched a Maoist vision in Cambodian peculiarities. The central pillar of Cambodian Maoism was the notion of the Party as the *Angkar*. As Sarin recalled, the CPK referred to itself as the “revolutionary organization,” or the “Organization (*Angkar*)” as early as March 1971,³⁶⁹ using it to play down Party leadership of the revolution to stress collective involvement.³⁷⁰ Hinton describes *Angkar* as constituting a CPK “ideological palimpsest linking high-modernist thought, communist ideology, and local understandings to idealize a new potent center.”³⁷¹ Indeed, the term *Angkar* itself held resonating significance:

Angkar ... [means] “organization” but includes an array of connotations not captured by the English word. *Angkar* is derived from the Pali term *anga*, meaning “a constituent part of the body, a limb, member,” and proximately from the Khmer term [អង្គ], which has the primary meaning of “body, structure, physique; limb of the body” but is also used to refer to “mana-filled” objects such as monks, royalty, religious statuary, or Siva lingas... Thus *Angkar* can be properly glossed as “the organization,” but it also connotes a structure that orders society, a part-whole relation... and an organic entity that is infused with power.³⁷²

Whether or not peasants responded to the notion of a benevolent organization because of these links, the Party made its intentions clear. At the center of the powerful, human will-driven Party machine would be the *Angkar*, which cared for all, as a national *pater familias*. As Party slogans reveal, it was true that the CPK leadership “sold” itself as such: អង្គការជាមាតាបិតារបស់មហាកុមារី និងយុវជនយុវនារី (“The *Angkar* is the mother and father of all young children, as well as all

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ FBIS *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific*, IV, No. 54 (19 March 1971); and FBIS *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific*, IV, No. 183 (20 September 1976). Only in September 1976 did the *Angkar* espouse Marxism-Leninism publicly as its ideology. Pol Pot, “Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot,” 16.

³⁷⁰ Ith Sarin, ស្រឡាញ់ស្រឡាត់ [Sympathy for the Khmer Soul]. (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1973), 56.

³⁷¹ Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 126-127.

³⁷² Ibid, 127, quoting TW Rhys Davids and William Stede, *The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary*. (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1992), 6; and Robert K. Headley, Jr., Kylin Chhor, Lam Kheng Lim, Lim Kah Kheang, and Chen Chun, *Cambodian-English Dictionary*. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1977), 1314.

adolescent boys and girls”) and អង្គការថ្នាក់មេបងប្អូនពុកម៉ែ (“The *Angkar* tenderly looks after you all, brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers) lend credence to this self-perception.³⁷³

Evidence also suggests that while not sharing the same conceptual terrain as Maoism in the Party’s thinking, it nonetheless mobilized Buddhism rhetorically to draw people in and establish codes of conduct.³⁷⁴ As Angeliki Kanavou and Kosal Path acknowledge, most CPK cadres were “only nominally acquainted with Marxist ideology,” and were still far more *au fait* with Buddhist norms and practices, notably “subjecting oneself to self-scrutiny” (a comfortable fit with Mao’s 自我批評, or self-criticism).³⁷⁵ One such example of allusions to self-scrutiny is the CPK slogan “ធ្វើខុសត្រូវទីតៀនកសាងខ្លួនដោយខ្លួនឯងត្រូវដាក់ទណ្ឌកម្មខ្លួនឯង” (“Criticize yourself first, then punish yourself if you committed an error”).³⁷⁶ Indeed, CPK leaders “invoked existing local frames of knowledge,” both authors continue,” that allowed them to relate such external and unfamiliar ideology to their cadres and the masses.”³⁷⁷ Buddhism was the primary extant cultural wellspring from which CPK propagandists drew inspiration, with slogans such as “ចិត្តជាដទេវទត្តមាត់ជាដេវតា” (“Your heart is like Devadatt’s, your mouth like a *tevada*”), which refers at once to the story of a cruel prince in Buddha’s life and angels in Buddhist mythology.³⁷⁸ Studies by Hinton and Eve Zucker show that Khmer Buddhist notions of face and honor figured prominently in Party propaganda and practice. The Buddhist concept of the self-restraint and detachment from material possessions, including personal property, was a useful way to ground abstract Marxist ideas in terms that everyday Cambodians could grasp. Self-control and mindfulness provided additional cultural norms with which to shape how the CPK wanted its cadres and people to behave in owing their complete allegiance and devotion to the Party. In line with Cambodian notions of revenge informed by Buddhism, cadres meted out punishments on offenders disproportionately and more violently (“A Head for an Eye,” as Hinton terms it) to

³⁷³ Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 107-108.

³⁷⁴ See Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age*, 43-63, for an in-depth analysis of the link between Buddhism and Communism in CPK theory and practice.

³⁷⁵ Angeliki A. Kanavou and Kosal Path, “The Lingering Effects of Thought Reform: The Khmer Rouge S-21 Prison Personnel,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 76, No. 1 (February 2017):87-106, on page 91.

³⁷⁶ Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 92.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 92, citing, Alexander L. Hinton, “Why Did You Kill?: The Cambodian Genocide and the Dark Side of Face and Honor,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 57, No. 1 (1998): 93-122, on page 115; and Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of “Brainwashing” in China*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 422.

³⁷⁸ Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 203.

save face, whereas cadres sought to preserve or gain face for their own advancement within the Party.³⁷⁹

Once the Communists took Phnom Penh in 1975, Democratic Kampuchea, as the country would become, was to be governed as one big cooperative or mutual work team, which Yuon, Samphan, and Nim proposed (in lesser terms) in their dissertations. The whole country, in fact, was to be state-centric so that it could cast off the shackles of foreign exploitation. As Sary described during the resistance, the prices of goods “are set according to the principle that business transactions should benefit the population, the resistance, and the traders who must not seek exorbitant profits at the expense of others. To facilitate price control, we have been extending the network of supply and marketing cooperatives. All these measures have made it possible to stabilize the prices of commodities.”³⁸⁰ Unproductive industries would not remain; only rice and water, the Cambodian lifeblood that coursed through the veins from its beating heart, the Mekong River Delta. Beneath the glossy veneer of the all-loving *Angkar* was something truly insidious: the Party claimed omnipresence and omniscience as a display of its awesome might. Indeed, Michel Foucault notes that the “perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything.”³⁸¹ Although the Party assumed a faceless character when it took power, it would supervise everything and exercise its disciplinary power by way of total invisibility. This was the motivation from its terrifying slogans អង្គការដៃគូកម្ពុជាស្រស់ (“The *Angkar* has [the many] eyes of the pineapple”) and អង្គការដឹងប្រវត្តិរបស់អ្នកហើយ! (“Comrades, the *Angkar* already knows your entire biography!”).³⁸² Though some recognized Khieu Samphan and his colleagues Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, by the 1970s no one in the country could identify the CPK leader since it ruled collectively and in secrecy. Yet its omnipresence, as it displayed through the total supervision of its people, actually augmented the Party’s central authority.³⁸³ Through this combination of the CPK leadership’s personal charisma, contemporary norms, and Maoist analyses from the intellectual thrust’s dissertations, the Party portrayed itself as peasant visionaries despite its leadership’s elite origins. Upon penetrating into rural society,

³⁷⁹ Alexander L. Hinton, “A Head for an Eye: Revenge in the Cambodian Genocide,” *American Ethnologist* 25, No. 3 (August 1998): 352-377; Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 45-95; and Eve M. Zucker, *Forest of Struggle: Moralities of Remembrance in Upland Cambodia*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), 100-102.

³⁸⁰ Sary, “Cambodia 1972,” 10.

³⁸¹ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Modern Prison*. Alan Sheridan trans. (New York: Pantheon, 1977) 173.

³⁸² Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 112-113, 136.

³⁸³ Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 154.

the Paris Group turned the tides on Lon Nol and captured Phnom Penh, applying once again useful tenets of Maoism's ideological system (people's war and New Democracy).

Conclusion

A comprehensive genealogy of the CPK's Maoism from its origins in Paris to the streets of Cambodia's cities to the rice paddies of the countryside is a long and winding road that at once stares backwards to account for social experiences (*impact/relational reception*), and forwards to connect radical ideology to its brutal *implementation*. The men who became Maoists took different routes to their radicalization, yet they were not *déracinés*, as each showed, in varying degrees and at different times, a commitment to alter the nation's course without total erasure (*practical adaptation*: Sar through democratic reform, Yuon, Samphan, and Nim through peasant outreach). They did not agree monolithically in the same kind of Maoism either, as Yuon, Samphan, and Nim favored Mao's socioeconomic analysis and Yan'an canon in their *intellectual adaptations* whereas Sar cared little for the dense texts and preferred what he saw *in practice* in China. Yuon, Samphan, and Nim had tried and *failed* to put their dissertations' proposals into practice (*practical adaptation*), joining with Maoist convert Sar in 1966 to initiate the *production* of Cambodian Maoism (*normative adaptation*).

Indeed, Sar's 1966 return from China before the outbreak of the Samlaut Rebellion coincided with the Paris Group's break with Sihanouk, and soon combined bureaucratic and faith Maoisms to form the ideological basis of the CPK's armed struggle. Sar's return in 1966 as a faith Maoist convert signaled the beginning of his transformation from failed student to "Brother Number One," a name that he held before his 1977 "big reveal" that the *Angkar* was in fact the CPK, and he was its mysterious (and insidious) leader. But before he and Samphan went down in infamy as genocidal leaders of a Maoist human experiment, they were passionate students who cared genuinely about liberating their motherland from exploitation and painstakingly went about identifying problems and providing solutions. Yuon and Nim, in particular, had tremendous acumen when it came to peasant grievances since they had lived that life before. Sar and Samphan were charismatic orators who had proven their worth either politically or on the revolutionary front. The realization of their Maoist vision after 17 April 1975—the day that they captured Phnom Penh—was sadly the beginning of a four year project that would set the already downtrodden country back several decades, and cost nearly a third of its people their lives.

Chapter Five—“We Must Combine Theory and Practice”: The Implementation of Cambodia’s Maoist Vision, 1975-1979

A (true) Brahman goes scatheless, is free from sorrow and remorse though he have killed father and mother, and two kings of the warrior caste, though he has destroyed a kingdom with all its subjects. –The Dhammapada XXI:294¹

The previous chapter examined the rise of the Cambodian intellectuals who founded the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) to political relevancy, and tracked their transformation from apolitical students to progressive activists to politicians and revolutionaries. Here, we place the spotlight on the “អង្គការ” (“Organization” hereafter *Angkar*), the Party in power, whose leaders—the intellectuals from chapter four (the Paris Group)—made the transition from Communist insurgents who had led the Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF, the military wing of the CPK) to implementing their Maoist vision. Their capture of state power had been unexpected,² and even with the “great victory of the Cambodian people,” as Mao termed it in celebration, several complicating factors stood in the CPK’s way of actually brining its political vision into practice.³ Such obstacles ranged from intra-Party disunity over how to govern Democratic Kampuchea (DK, 1975-1979) to how to deal with Phnom Penh’s swollen population (from less than 600,000 residents before 1970 to nearly two million after 1970) to exposing potential enemies among the people.

¹ Irving Babbitt, trans., *The Dhammapada*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936; and New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1965), 45, as quoted in Craig Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 27.

² Dr. Vann Hay (វ៉ាន់ហៃ aka. R. Boeung Decho), a member of the National Sports Delegation under President Lon Nol and witness to the Communist Party of Kampuchea’s (CPK) move to capture Phnom Penh, recalled that he “did not see how we could lose the war against the Reds. The Khmer Rouge [nickname for CPK] did not even have to take Kampot, so how could they capture Phnom Penh?” D. Vann Hay (D. Boeung Decho), « De la Terreur à l’Espoir : Le Dramatique Exode du Cambodge Récits Authentique d’un Rescapes du Drame Khmer— Journal autobiographique sans titre de M. le docteur Vann Hay relatant l’évacuation de Phnom Penh en avril 1975 par les Khmers Rouges (From Terror to Hope: Authentic Stories of a Survivor of the Khmer Drama and Cambodian Exodus—Untitled Autobiographical Journal by Dr. Vann Hay Recounting the Khmer Rouge Forced Evacuation of Phnom Penh in April 1975)» (Phnom Penh : 1974, National Archives of Cambodia, Document Box 684), 6.

³ “Great Victory of the Cambodian People: Warmly Congratulating the Patriotic Cambodian Armed Forces and People on the Liberation of Phnom Penh and All Cambodia,” (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), 2-3. On Pol Pot’s speech in China, in which he thanked Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for supporting the CPK’s struggle, see “在中共中央，國務院舉行的歡迎宴會上，波爾布特書記講話 (Secretary Pol Pot Gives a Speech at the Welcoming Banquet held by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council, *Zài zhōnggòng zhōngyāng, guówùyuan jǔxíng de huānyíng yànhuì shàng, bōěr bùtè shūjì jiǎnghuà*) 人民日報，新華社 [People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency (China)] (29 September 1977); and Pol Pot, « Allocution du Camarade Pol Pot, Secrétaire du Comité Central du Parti Communiste du Kampuchéa, Premier Ministre du gouvernement du Kampuchéa Démocratique, à l’Occasion du Banquet de Bienvenue Organisé en son Honneur par le Comité Central du Parti Communiste Chinois et le Gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine » (Beijing : 28 September 1977). National Archives of Cambodia, Box 685.

The chapter draws from confidential CPK leadership documents, Party magazines, and official pronouncements by Party leaders to argue that the same political processes—*consolidation, economic reconfiguration, and social transformation*—that characterized Mao’s *implementation* of his thought in Communist China marked the CPK’s *implementation* of its Maoist vision. It thus tracks the *implementation* stage of the CPK’s Maoism, a stage in our traveling theory triad that contains phases that guide us through the CPK’s rule of Democratic Kampuchea (DK, 1975-1979).⁴ Once again, we identify three genealogical rather genealogical subset phases: *consolidation, economic reconfiguration, and social transformation*. Kenneth Jowitt’s concept of the Leninist response, notably Leninism’s three major status-like features, guides us through the chapter’s sections. These three variables are: 1) a tendency to distinguish between insiders (members of the Party) and outsiders; 2) the placement of power in the hands of cadres whose central personal role is emphasized, particularly during the initial developmental phases of Leninist regimes; and 3) an emphasis on the security and protection of belonging to a closed, well-bounded group.⁵

Accordingly, we begin with the *consolidation* phase, which began with the gradual dissolution of collective leadership, many of whom became “outsider” seemingly overnight, and the “Pol Pot Group’s” rise to Party helmsmanship. Pol Pot’s 1976 “Microbes Speech,” and changing of the Party’s founding date to 1951, in particular, signaled his rise to uncontested Party leadership and, thereafter, the CPK’s move to targeting “enemies boring from within”⁶: those who disagreed with his policies. The three variables are also present in the *economic reconfiguration* and *social transformation* phases of *implementation*, which do indeed overlap, as the dissertation’s second chapter acknowledges. Our second part explores *economic reconfiguration* in the form of the “Super” Great Leap Forward (មហាសោកស្តោក, 1977-1980), a rapid agriculture-driven industrialization program that the CPK launched in 1977 to “leap from a people’s democratic revolution to a socialist revolution, and quickly build socialism.”⁷ The final part analyzes the CPK’s program of *social transformation*, which French Catholic missionary to

⁴ Edward W. Said, “Traveling Theory,” in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Edward W. Said (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 226-247. See also Timothy Cheek, “Chinese Socialism as Vernacular Cosmopolitanism,” *Front. Hist. China* 9, No. 1 (2014): 102-124, on page 106.

⁵ Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, 16.

⁶ Microbes Speech: “Report of Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political Tasks of 1976,” Chandler trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 182-212.

⁷ “The Party’s Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All fields, 1977-1980,” (Party Center, July-August 1976) Chanthou Boua trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 49. Hereafter “Four-Year Plan.”

Cambodia Francois Ponchaud coined as “Year Zero”—outdoing the French Revolution’s *An I* of the *calendrier révolutionnaire*.⁸ This entailed a total restructuring of Cambodian rural life in the haphazard pursuit of a pure socialism, and an intra-Party purge that was similar to the CCP’s Socialist Education Movement (SEM) in its emphases on “cleanliness” in terms of politics, organization, ideology, and economy, and on following the peasant example.⁹ The three phases of *implementation* and its underlying variables ultimately show how the CPK’s Maoism as *implemented* in the DK years (1975-1979) differed significantly from the *intellectual, practical, and normative adaptations* that chapter four analyzed closely. As the Party encountered difficulties in realizing its vision, and as its own leadership coalesced around Pol Pot, the nature of Party politics, thinking, and policy became guided by the more fanatical and faith-based *Polpotism*.

Several policies, though more extreme than processes in Communist China, were the norm in Communist states that Pol Pot and his Paris Group coterie “admired.”¹⁰ We shall see remarkable parallels in the process, if not in the context and results, of the CPK’s efforts and earlier models of Mao’s of which Pol Pot and his Paris colleagues were only too aware. Yet instead of mimicking processes in Communist China, the CPK’s efforts represent its leaders’ attempts to apply similar ideological and organizational techniques in a comparable Asian agricultural society under “national dependency.”¹¹ Marked departures from Mao’s implementation of his thought in China are indeed identifiable, as the processes in DK sought the same goals and carried more weight than rhetorical similarity; rather, these processes were outgrowths of applying Maoist implementation to the concrete realities of Cambodia, regardless of their obvious deviations. In several instances, Pol Pot’s regime *rejected* Maoism in implementation not unlike Mao’s own rejection of key points in Stalinism and the the Soviet model of authoritarian total governance in pursuance of what he called a “Chinese road to socialism.” As the Party Center of Paris Group Maoists shattered, more managerial ideologues

⁸ Francois Ponchaud, *Cambodia: Year Zero*. (New York: Henry & Holt, 1978).

⁹ *Ibid*, 46-47.

¹⁰ David P. Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 3. Chandler and Kiernan mention that the “howling wilderness” of CPK policies “can be traced directly to the ideas and policies [that] these men and women set down first on paper and then into motion in Kampuchea in the second half of 1976... few people will agree that [the disaster] was accidental.” David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, “Preface,” in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, xiii.

¹¹ Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 43-49.

were sublimated by the more radical faith Maoism of the charismatic and, ultimately vitriolic, Pol Pot Group (Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan), which by 1976 established the “rationalist-apocalyptic” *Polpotism*.¹² Thereafter, as Ben Kiernan describes, “The Organization, a small circle, kept its secrets.”¹³

Consolidation: Securing Party Leadership, Eliminating “Microbes,” and the Rise of Brother Number One

From ancient times onward, Cambodian leaders have been constantly suspicious of one another. This doubt has led to... merciless killings between them. Those who are in the process of holding power never trust those who work with them, always fearing: “The person is inclined to quietly try to seize... authority! That person will try to secretly kill me in order to take over my position!... When a person thinks in this panicked manner and stops trusting a person, if one of his subordinates inflames his suspicions a little bit, telling the leader that a colleague or longtime friend has in fact betrayed him, the leader will find a pretext to accuse this colleague or friend of doing something bad so that the person can be killed and discarded.—Bun Chan Mol, ប្រតិកម្មខ្មែរ (Cambodian Character)¹⁴

This section examines the means by which the CPK *consolidated* its leadership, both before and after its capture of Phnom Penh in 1975. The CPK’s *consolidation* of its leadership, the section contends, consisted of five main stages, or events: 1) centralizing leadership within the Central Committee; 2) evacuating the cities; 3) re-orienting Party history around the leader, Pol Pot; 4) identifying enemies and dehumanizing them; and 5) crushing dissent among Party leaders. Our three variables of distinguishing between insiders and outsiders, empowerment, and belonging to a closed group guide us through these five events. We begin by exploring the CPK’s intra-Party factionalism before the Communists seized state power, followed by Pol Pot’s seizing of leadership for himself with his clique of Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea as chief lieutenants

¹² Robert Jay Lifton, “Foreword,” in Alexander Laban Hinton, *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), xxii. Ben Kiernan states that Pol Potism contains eight characteristics stemming from the following issues: 1) the national question (“The Politics of Perfect Sovereignty”); 2) race (Khmer purity); 3) class struggle (along the lines of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism); 4) the economy (the primacy of agricultural production precluding industrial development); 5) political methods (social atomization and collective leadership-turned-absolute rule by his loyalists); 6) traditional institutions (namely collective responsibility and punishment); 7) Party organization (absolute control by CPK Central Committee); and 8) political philosophy applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete realities of Kampuchea). Ben Kiernan, “Myth, Nationalism, and Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 3, No. 2 (2001): 187-206, on pages 192-196.

¹³ Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 33.

¹⁴ Bun Chan Mol, ប្រតិកម្មខ្មែរ [Cambodian Character]. (Phnom Penh: Kehadtan 79, 1973), as quoted in Hinton, *Why Did They Kill*, 116.

(tendency to distinguish between insiders and outsiders). Next, we examine Pol Pot's changing of the Party founding date from 1951 to 1960, which cut out nine years of history during which the Paris Group's contributions to the actual revolution on the ground were hidden (granting power to members whose individual role is accentuated). Pol Pot's 1976 "Microbes Speech" and anti-intellectual purges both sought at once to consolidate Party rule and crush intellectual opposition, which we analyze closely through his speech transcript. The third variable of our model, protection of a small group, applies to Pol Pot's formation of an inner circle (the Pol Pot regime) of yes men. Two of the Party's chief architects, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim (examined in part three), as well as Pol Pot's colleague Keo Meas (also examined below), were purged and killed because of their dissenting views on the *implementation* of the CPK's Maoist vision. The punishment of "enemies boring holes from within the ranks of the revolution"¹⁵ thus signaled the beginning of "The Pol Pot Regime" (emphasizing the protection of belonging to a closed group).

First, the CPK's *consolidation* of its leadership antedated the capture of state power on 17 April because the consolidation of one faction over competing ones marked intra-Party politics, and this continued in one form or another throughout its nearly four years in power. Later, when he was CPK Central Committee Secretary in 1977 Pol Pot reflected on the Party's 1960 First Congress, during which "the errors committed [in our struggle] *were rectified* in the course of the work *to better organize, consolidate, and constantly enlarge our forces.*"¹⁶ But an increased quantity in forces did not coincide with increases in quality, as shortages of qualified medium and lower level cadres and the limits of working within the pro-Sihanouk Front [the *Gouvernement royal d'union nationale du Kampuchéa*, រាជរដ្ឋាភិបាលរួបរួមជាតិកម្ពុជា] constrained Party organization and its approach to cadre recruitment.¹⁷ Indeed, despite its claims of liberating

¹⁵ "Revolutionary Male and Female Youths Go On Constant Mighty Offensives and Defend Our Great Magnificent Leap Forward," យុវជននិងយុវនារីបដិវត្តន៍ប្រាំពីរ-ប្រាំបី [Revolutionary Youth, Issue 7-8 (Phnom Penh)] (July-August 1977), 6. Documentation Center of Cambodia, Document Number D21402. See also "Learn from the Political, Ideological and Organizational Experiences in Fulfilling the Party's 1977 Revolutionary Duties in order to Impel Forward Victoriously the Implementation of 1978 Duties," ទង្វើបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag, Special Issue (Phnom Penh)] (December-January 1977- 1978): 1-46, on pages 6-7; and "The Party's Re-Adjusted Orientation for Fulfilling 1978 Duties in the Days to Come," ទង្វើបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag, Special Number (Phnom Penh)], (May-June 1978), 1. Documentation Center of Cambodia, Document Number D17469.

¹⁶ Pol Pot, « Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot, secrétaire du comité du parti communiste du Kampuchéa au meeting commémorant le 17^e anniversaire de la fondation du parti communiste du Kampuchéa et à l'occasion de la proclamation solennelle de l'existence officielle du parti communiste de Kampuchéa » (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 27 September 1977), 33. Emphasis added.

¹⁷ Timothy M. Carney, "Continuity in Cambodian Communism," in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion*. Timothy M. Carney, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Data Paper

“75 to 80% of the country by 1970-1971,” the Central Committee oversaw a tenuous structure that failed to reach all levels of administration.¹⁸ Even high-ranking Central Committee members doubted that their aspirations were possible because of the shortage of men who met their description, and with full CPK membership requiring several years of education and training, the Party needed to loosen its restrictions.¹⁹

On leadership, CPK Minister of Foreign Affairs Ieng Sary stated that for the revolution to succeed, “it is indispensable that at each echelon there be a leadership core composed of men who are *firm on principles* and who *know how to apply our political line in concrete national conditions creatively and with precise aims.*”²⁰ The “leadership core” that Sary described was the Paris Group, which occupied high posts in the Central Committee and, despite no Party congresses between 1963 and 1971,²¹ directed CPK affairs as the invisible *Angkar*. The CPK Central Committee had relied on “collective leadership through committees for their territorial

No. 106, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1977), 8. On US bombings, see David P. Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When Was the Birthday of the Party?,” *Pacific Affairs* 56, No. 2 (Summer 1983): 288-300, one pages 294-295.

¹⁸ « Interview du camarade Pol Pot, Secrétaire du Comité Central du Parti Communiste du Kampuchéa, Premier ministre de gouvernement du Kampuchéa Démocratique a la délégation des journalistes yougoslaves en visite au Kampuchéa Démocratique » (17 March 1978) (Phnom Penh : Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea), 11. Former DK Head of State Khieu Samphan elaborates : “It... should be noted...that, for the years 1971-1972, to overcome the serious rice shortage and to strengthen their bargaining position for the settlement of conflicts of interests with the Vietnamese communists, the [CPK] had already begun to develop agricultural cooperatives in the regions they were in control.” Khieu Samphan, *L’histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*. (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 74.

¹⁹ Ith Sarin, ស្រឡាញ់ស្រឡាត់ខ្មែរ [Sympathy for the Khmer Soul]. (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1973), 62, 73. Sarin recalled that he and his companion were part of an accelerated, advanced stage of candidacy at the time. Timothy Carney, “Interview with Ith Sarin,” (Phnom Penh: June 1973). On recruitment, the Party “used its youth organization, the Alliance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea [សម្ព័ន្ធយុវជនកម្ពុយនីស្តកម្ពុជា] as [a] cutting edge and prime source of recruitment into the Party itself. Youth came to be the Party’s right arm under its direct control; the Party educated, watched, nourished, and built youth as the central force in the revolutionary movement of each era and as the central force for future national construction.” “បក្សកម្ពុយនីស្តកម្ពុជានិងបញ្ហានិងយុវជននិងយុវនារី បដិវត្តន៍កម្ពុជា [The Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Problem of Young Men and Women of Kampuchea] យុវជននិងយុវនារីបដិវត្តន៍ទី១ [Revolutionary Youth, No. 2] (August 1973): 19. Training occurred over “two or three weeks at remote centers. Returning youngsters fiercely condemned religion and custom, rejected parental authority, and showed a militant attitude with marked confidence in mechanical weapons and a rejection of the mystical... they ceased working the family plot and instead worked on those fields under direct youth association control.” Kenneth Quinn, “The Khmer Krahom Program to Create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia,” *US Department of State, US Consulate Can Tho (Vietnam)* (19 February 1974): 17-18; and Carney, “Continuity in Cambodian Communism,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 10.

²⁰ *Le Monde* [Paris] (15 January 1972). Emphasis added.

²¹ Chandler, “A Revolution in Full Spate,” in *The Cambodian Agony*, 177. On the absence of CPK Party congresses, Chandler cites a personal communication with Ben Kiernan. Chandler also notes that Vorn Vet’s 1978 confession mentioned that “many policy decisions flowing from the 1971 congress were amended, cancelled, or initiated by the Party center after the congress had adjourned.” On page 179n10.

administrative units.”²² But collective leadership meant that the Party’s Central Committee contained several competing factions that had different ideas about implementing the Party vision once it had obtained power. While the CPK’s official political line was Marxist-Leninist, there is some debate over the ideological affiliations of the factions at work within the CPK.²³ Craig Etcheson argues that six groups comprised the *Front uni national du Kampuchéa* (FUNK), a CPK front organization for deposing Lon Nol during the 1967-1975 Cambodian civil war: 1) the Stalinists, led by Saloth Sar (aka Pol Pot), Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Son Sen, among others; 2) the Internationalists; 3) members of the old Khmer Issarak anti-French movement; 4) former Pracheachon members; 5) Maoists, including Hu Nim, Hou Yuon, and Phouk Chhay; and 6) pro-Sihanouk and pro-Vietnamese members.²⁴ The two most important factions, the Stalinists and the Maoists, contained men who formed the intellectual and operational thrust of the CPK. Ben Kiernan, however, places Pol Pot in a Maoist-inspired “national chauvinist faction,” and places Hu Nim in the student-led “Cultural Revolution group,” which subscribed to “mass democracy.”²⁵ Though both experts describe the CPK factions differently, it is possible that membership in one faction did not necessarily mean occlusion from another.²⁶

As such, the CPK was nowhere near intra-Party unity, and had to confront this very issue upon capturing Phnom Penh. The formal genesis of DK did not begin until 1976 since it spent

²² Carney, “Continuity in Cambodian Communism,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 8; *Le Monde* [Paris] (June 1973); and Ith Sarin, ស្រងេព្រះប្រាសាទភ្នំពេញ, 71-74. Orders flowed from the Central Committee, to the Region [ក្រុង]; then the Sector [or Zone, គំបន់], the District [ស្រុក]; the [township/commune ឃុំ] and finally to the [hamlet ភូមិ].”

²³ Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930-1975. Second Edition.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 241; and Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, xi.

²⁴ Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 164. . Pol Pot’s group, he states further, were “committed to the maintenance and extension of Party discipline, rapid and sustained rustication, and autarky. These elitists, the core of the CPK Central Committee, exhibited anti-Vietnamese, antimonarchist, and revanchist tendencies.” The Maoists, however, placed primacy on Cambodia’s peasants, “favored partial rustication and limited autarky... [and] exhibited anti-imperialist and democratic tendencies, but no firm tendency toward the Vietnamese.”

²⁵ Ben Kiernan, “Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981.* Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds. (London: Zed Press, 1982), 228-229.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 229. As Kiernan notes, “some leaders managed to transcend” these ideological lines, and “as people reacted to various events, their views were subject to changes.” He provides the cases of Khieu Samphan, who before 1975 “shared perspectives with both the Pol Pot group and the Cultural Revolution supporters,” and Hou Yuon, who “drew on both the latter and the third, Vietnam-influenced tendency.” Samphan ultimately sided with Pol Pot and survived, whereas Hou Yuon voiced dissent and the Party executed him in 1975. See also Kenneth Quinn, “Explaining the Terror,” in *Cambodia 1975-78: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 219-223, 234-235.

much of its first year in power putting together a functioning administration.²⁷ The CPK Central Committee thus ordered all Cambodia's district and region secretaries and regional military representatives to attend a five-day meeting to "receive the plan distributed by the Center" and, after the meeting, to go about "implement[ing] the plan."²⁸ While no documents from the meeting survived DK, some accounts detail the content of the 20 May 1975 meeting.²⁹ Political Commissar of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Eastern Division Sin Song recalled in a conversation with his superior, Chhouk (Region 24 CPK Secretary), that Pol Pot had made eight proposals:

- 1) Evacuate people from all towns;
- 2) Abolish all markets;
- 3) Abolish Lon Nol regime currency and withhold the revolutionary currency [in print];
- 4) Defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice;
- 5) Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top leaders;
- 6) Establish high [superior]-level cooperatives throughout the country, with communal eating;
- 7) Expel the entire Vietnamese minority population;
- and 8) Dispatch troops to the borders, particularly the Vietnamese border.³⁰

Above, we find several features that would characterize the CPK's transformation of Cambodian society. All Vietnamese, for instance, became *personae non gratae* overnight, though most had fled the country by 1976. Indeed, differentiating "us" from "them," as in, labeling insiders and outsiders, was crucial in obtaining Central Committee support. In the CPK ranks, this entailed the ouster of most of the now heavily distrusted veterans of the pro-Vietnamese Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (purged by 1976).³¹ To the Paris Group, the ex-KPRP members represented the old guard, an *ancien regime* of Cambodian Communists whose past loyalty to DK's chief rival, Vietnam, made their allegiance to the Party suspect.

But before addressing the next course of action, the end of the Cultural Revolution and arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976 effectively cut off many pro-Cultural Revolution members

²⁷ Laurence Picq, *Beyond the Horizon: Five Years with the Khmer Rouge*. (New York: St. Martin's 1989), 45; and Mertha, *Brothers in Arms*, 23. Initial meetings were held at the abandoned main railway station and at the Silver Pagoda within the Royal Palace, where leaders slept on cots or on the floor.

²⁸ Heng Samrin's 1991 Account, as quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 55.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ben Kiernan, "Interview with Sin Song," (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: 12 August 1980). Ret, a Battalion Commander from the Northern Zone who attended the meeting, said that "eleven points" were discussed, but his colleagues, recalled only the leadership's call to "kill Lon Nol soldiers, kill the monks, [and] expel the Vietnamese population" and its opposition to "money, schools, and hospitals." Ben Kiernan, "Interview with Kun Chhay," (Kompong Svay, Cambodia: 16 October 1980). Mat Ly, a CPK district committee member in Region 21, attended the meeting and added: "close schools, close hospitals, and 'uproot spies root and branch.'" Ben Kiernan, "Interview with Mat Ly," (21 January 1986). Chea Sim, CPK Secretary of Ponhea Krek district on the Vietnam border and a member of the Region 20 Committee, confirms Sin Song's list. Ben Kiernan, "Interview with Chea Sim," (1991). All as quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 55-59.

³¹ Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea," 288-300.

within the CPK hierarchy from external support. Thus the *Angkar* began to shift away from collective leadership as Central Committee members who were once colleagues were divided on political lines and thought. Fear among Central Committee members that the revolution was veering towards a pro-Chinese or pro-Vietnamese agenda, or that Pol Pot wanted more extreme measures that alienated his more moderate Maoist colleagues, are possible reasons for the rift. We do not know due to the secrecy of the CPK and the destruction of many of its records, but it could be both. Characteristic of the shift away from collective leadership was the growing secrecy among factions within the secretive *Angkar*. Hu Nim, the CPK's future Minister of Propaganda and Information, defined "the Organization" as "Brother No. 1 and Brother No. 2," both of which were secret titles held by Pol Pot and CPK Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea, respectively.³² Indeed, secrecy had been a pillar upon which the CPK built its foundation—it was the "basis" of the revolution, as a 1976 issue of ទង្កបដំរីក្លាន់ (Revolutionary Flag) stated, and its existence remained a secret from the people it sought to govern (and did) until September 1977.³³ While Central Committee members certainly supported keeping the Party secret, Nim's recollection that even high-ranking leaders "remained in the dark" on policy decisions such as the order to evacuate the cities, is indicative of shifting allegiances and leadership coalescing around particular personages.³⁴ The tables had turned, and now Pol Pot and his loyalists, as Etcheson notes, "directed the entire revolutionary organization. [Pol Pot] held the dossiers. He controlled the ministries [and]... saw to it that there was no deviation from the line fixed by the High Organization in the name of the people."³⁵

Second, the CPK moved to insure its *consolidation* by evacuating all of Cambodia's major cities and relocating all people to the countryside to work in collective farms and irrigation canals. The Central Committee called for the evacuation of the cities because "there was not

³² "Planning the Past: The Forced Confessions of Hu Nim, Tuol Sleng Prison, May-June 1977," Chanthou Boua, trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 276.

³³ ទង្កបដំរីក្លាន់ [Revolutionary Flag], (September-October 1976), 27, as quoted in Chandler, "A Revolution in Full Spate," in *The Cambodian Agony*, 166.

³⁴ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 33.

³⁵ Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 177. On Pol Pot's rank, see Democratic Kampuchea, "Biography of Pol Pot, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea," (Phnom Penh: September 1978), 5. In a 1991 interview, Heng Samrin recalled that Nuon Chea "was the one who did the consciousness work, the propaganda... Only the very special documents would be introduced by Pol Pot... As a rule Pol Pot spoke little, and about broad general principles: lines, vanguard views, socialism, Great Leaps Forward, great whatever... While [Nuon Chea] was speaking the two of them were right there together presiding side by side, but only Nuon Chea spoke about the documents. Pol Pot was the listener. Pol Pot did not offer many personal opinions." Heng Samrin quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 58.

enough food to feed the people,” but its calls for the abolition of money, markets, and Buddhism, and for local leaders to increase the size and scale of cooperatives so that the leadership had “a more centralized character,” were at the root of the decision.³⁶ The forceful evacuation of the cities was an enormous undertaking and representative of the CPK’s drive to consolidate its authority over the country.³⁷ It ordered everyone out of the cities “to transform the country thoroughly at once” and outside the “breeding grounds for counterrevolution,” as the guerrillas had not fought for seven years “to take office as city councilors.”³⁸ To make such a massive undertaking feasible, the Party proceeded with a two-pronged attack in which displacing bodies from the city came with displacing old mindsets. At a series of meetings on 20-24 August 1975, the Central Committee “decided that it was essential to condition the consciousness of the people so that their thinking would become indistinguishable from the revolutionary authorities.”³⁹ The Party thus split society into two social classes: the មូលដ្ឋាន (base people, or old people—those who had lived in CPK cooperatives); and the “17 April Group” (ពួកដប់ប្រាំពីរមេសា; new people, city dwellers, intellectuals, and professionals).⁴⁰ To consolidate most effectively, Party leaders believed that the people who it evacuated from the cities must be “absorbed into collectives, with the ‘base people’ at the core, the ‘new people’... on the periphery, and the CPK managing the functions of the collective.”⁴¹ The now-emptied cities, which had swollen to over two million refugees in flight, were now the center from which the CPK issued its decrees.

³⁶ Samphan, *L’histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*, 69-70. Pol Pot said the same in an interview with Yugoslav journalists: “The first reason was... ensuring the food supplies of millions of inhabitants in cities ... in the cooperatives, we could feed them because there were rice fields, instruments of production, and all anyone could need.” « Interview du camarade Pol Pot » 9-14. See also Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 192. On village cooperatives, see Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 58-59.

³⁷ Andrew Mertha, *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 23.

³⁸ David P. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia, 2nd Edition*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 256-257.

³⁹ “Meeting Minutes of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea,” (9 October 1975), DCCAM Document, Number D00677.

⁴⁰ Henri Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar*. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2004), 11. According to Teap, a cadre who worked at a subdistrict office in DK, described a letter that the office had received from Grandmother Yit’s district headquarters in mid 1977: “The letter instructed us to smash internal enemies—Chams, Vietnamese, capitalists, former Lon Nol workers, intellectuals, and CIA agents.” A village leader also recounted how during meetings at the subdistrict office cadres received instruction on “a plan to seek out former soldiers, teachers, doctors, and civil servants from the old regime. They conducted this research and took many people away to be killed.” Joan D. Criddle and Teeda B. Mam, *To Destroy You Is No Loss: The Odyssey of a Cambodian Family*. (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 153-154. Also quoted in Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 154.

⁴¹ “Meeting Minutes.”

Third, the CPK's *consolidation* proceeded with three major transformational events that signaled the rise of Pol Pot and *Polpotism*: 1) Pol Pot's semi-retirement and return to revise Party history around himself; 2) his 1976 "Microbes Speech"; and 3) his elimination of Paris Group Maoists Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, both of whom voiced dissent over the Party's consolidation. First, while Pol Pot had held the rank of Secretary of CPK Central Committee since the Party's Third Congress in September 1971 and occupied the role of Chairman of the Party's Military Committee, two days after a report of Mao's demise on 9 September 1976 made its way to Cambodian airwaves he stepped down "to take care of his health."⁴² As former DK head of state Khieu Samphan recalls, "It seemed to me, at least during these early months that the responsibilities [of our Party] weighed essentially on Pol Pot, and his health suffered from it."⁴³ It is also possible that the Party sacked Pol Pot and elected Nuon Chea to replace him as Prime Minister (appointed in 1976). Another possible reasoning behind the "retirement" was for Pol Pot to draw potential enemies into the open—"reculer pour mieux sauter" (to draw back to make a better jump) as David Chandler describes in his evaluation.⁴⁴ Yet Pol Pot was not out of the CPK picture, and sure enough, he unseated Nuon Chea almost immediately and intensified the Party's internal purges. Pol Pot was back as CPK Prime Minister, since Nuon Chea had overseen the rise of a "group favorable to Vietnam, in coalition with supporters of China's radicals," though Nuon survived and even became a Polpotist mainstay.⁴⁵ Subsequently, as Samphan describes, Pol Pot "represented the historical leader who was never wrong when it came to making important decisions... [though] during expanded sessions of the Permanent Bureau... nothing approaching fear was apparent... meetings were informal; they were more like a family reunion."⁴⁶

Next, Pol Pot moved to re-orient the Party history around the Paris Group's leadership, particularly himself, by changing the Party's founding date to align with its leadership's involvement, which began with the 1960 meeting in Phnom Penh. "By changing the Party's birthday," Chandler argues, "Pol Pot and his colleagues were cutting themselves off from nine

⁴² United States, Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], (29 September 1976), as quoted in Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea," 296.

⁴³ Samphan, *L'histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*, 79.

⁴⁴ Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea," 297.

⁴⁵ Ben Kiernan, *Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial, and Justice in Cambodia and East Timor*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 207. See also Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 176.

⁴⁶ Samphan, *L'histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*, 77.

years of Cambodian history (1951-1960) to which their own contributions had been ambiguous, subordinate, or non-existent.”⁴⁷ As Pol Pot’s 1977 speech on Party history stated, the 1950s were a decade of disorganization during which a three-front effort (legal political organization, leftist newspapers, and the clandestine struggle)⁴⁸ failed because of the absence of a clear-sighted political line of independence, national sovereignty, and self-reliance. As Pol Pot claimed in his speech:

Last year we informed people attending the big meeting on 30 September 1975 that our Party was twenty-four years old. Previously, we had celebrated this day as the twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, and twenty-third anniversaries, right up to the twenty-fourth. Now we celebrate the sixteenth anniversary of the Party, because we are making a new numeration. What rationale is there for this? The revolutionary organization [អង្គការបដិវត្តន៍, *Angkar Padevat*] has decided that from now on we must arrange the history of the Party into something clean and perfect, in line with our policies of independence and self-mastery.⁴⁹

In so doing, previous Vietnamese patronage to the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) and Pracheachon group was thrown into the dustbin of history despite the internationalist continuities that the CPK propounded so openly about in the years before seizing state power. The *Angkar*’s leadership could now claim both authenticity and *sui generis* status over its revolution, regardless of the legitimacy of such claims.⁵⁰ Those who still desired to celebrate the years of fraternal relations with the Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP, then Vietnamese Communist Party, VCP) became targets for purging under the leadership of the Pol Pot Group of Pot, Nuon Chea, and Ieng Sary (and later, Khieu Samphan).

Pol Pot’s new Party history in his 1977 speech made his role in the Cambodian Communist movement inextricable, and he endeavored to have the entire the Party leadership coalesce around his charismatic Party and against “enemies.” A way to accomplish a type of “exegetical bonding” over this revisionist Party history was by bringing the Party out into the

⁴⁷ Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea,” 290.

⁴⁸ Pol Pot, « Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot » 12-14. See also Timothy Carney, “The Unexpected Victory,” *Cambodia 1975–1978*, 17.

⁴⁹ បដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag, Special Issue (Phnom Penh)] (September-October 1976), 4; and Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea,” 289.

⁵⁰ On Vietnamese support for the KPRP, see “Summary of Annotated Party History, Written by the Military-Political Service of the Eastern Zone,” US Government Translation of a Captured Document, Echols Collection (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Library, 1973). On KPRP growth and dissolution, see Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea,” 290-291.

open, which the speech did for the first time.⁵¹ The *Angkar* was announced by Pol Pot to be the Communist Party of Kampuchea, which he described as “just and clairvoyant,” a “correct Marxist-Leninist Party” and a “genuine revolutionary proletarian Party.”⁵² This claim was consistent with its earlier self-perception as Marxist-Leninist and proletarian, as an earlier summary of Party history states:

The conditions for the formation of the Party in our country were not different in principle from those of the revolutions [that] formed the world’s Marxist-Leninist parties... all followed the same principle of revolution, that is, the people’s revolutionary movement; and the people are the workers (in the industrial countries) or farmers (in the underdeveloped agricultural countries). The formation of the Party was certainly according to Marx and Engels’ ‘Declaration of the Communist Party,’ Lenin’s disciples’ party, the Great October Socialist Revolution, China’s people’s democratic revolution, and revolution throughout the world.⁵³

So why did this forthright Marxist-Leninist Party, with its clear-sighted political line, remain in the shadows? Pol Pot explained that the Party remained secret because “[b]ringing the Party into the open caused problems for the security of the central leadership... our enemies were trying to defeat us, using every method at their disposal.”⁵⁴ Neither Pol Pot nor any of the Central Committee hierarchs explained what they meant by “enemies” explicitly until 1978 “when all enemies became generically Vietnamese.”⁵⁵ By keeping this classification ambiguous, Pol Pot and his Central Committee could consolidate power further “under the pretext of class struggle,”

⁵¹ On exegetical bonding in Yan’an, see David Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 263-293.

⁵² Pol Pot, « Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot » 5. Also in British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC SWB), “The Situation in Cambodia: Speech by Pol Pot,” (Phnom Penh: Home Service 2327 GMT, 28 September-1 October 1977). FE/5629/C2/1. National Archives of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Box 689, ID: 6093.

⁵³ Eastern Zone Military Political Service, *Summary of Annotated Party History*. (September 1973), 1-37, as quoted in Kiernan, “Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*, 232. We arm the [cadres] with an understanding of dialectical materialism to enable them to analyze things and to understand the ideological standpoints of the Party... We rely mostly on our own assessments of class struggle. This is more concrete. Some of our cadres... request foreign documents, claiming we neglect the study of Marxism-Leninism. But we tell them that Marxism-Leninism develops by means of the struggle of the people; our experiences are genuine Marxist-Leninist documents. Nuon Chea, “Statement of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to the Communist Workers’ Party of Denmark,” (July 1978), 45-61, on page 52. [<https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/denmark/kr.pdf>].

⁵⁴ US, FBIS (2 October 1977), Reporting on Pol Pot’s Speech on 28 September 1977. See Pol Pot, « Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot »; See also Chandler, “A Revolution in Full Spate,” in *The Cambodian Agony*, 168.

⁵⁵ Chandler, “A Revolution in Full Spate,” in *The Cambodian Agony*, 169; Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 425; Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Murder*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 43; and Jennifer S. Berman, “No Place Like Home: Anti-Vietnamese Discrimination and Nationality in Cambodia,” *California Law Review* 84, No. 3 (1996): 817-874, on page 834n147.

whereby enemies of any stripe who opposed the Party line in general, and Pol Pot in particular, had to be eliminated.⁵⁶

Fourth, the CPK Central Committee’s defining who “enemies” were constituted part of its larger effort to consolidate its position as national savior and to define outsiders who the Party could blame for Cambodia’s ills. As chapter three discussed, CPK cadres participated actively in political indoctrination to “correct” their incorrect or individualist thought.⁵⁷ The CPK leadership also brought intellectuals forward, whether forcefully or through public displays (“*Angkar* needs you,” on survivor recalls hearing) to confess their crimes of soft living or issues that they may have towards the Party.⁵⁸ The CPK’s instrument to locate and eliminate “enemies” was its internal security apparatus សន្តិសុខ (hereafter *Santebal*, meaning “Keeper of the Peace”), which the Central Committee established in 1971 at a Special Zone on the outskirts of Phnom Penh and which CPK leaders put under the charge of Pol Pot loyalists Vorn Vet and Son San.⁵⁹ *Santebal* also ran the CPK’s prison camps, in which many “enemies” were forced by cadres to write their life histories and confess their crimes (all were fabrications, in whole or in part).⁶⁰ Anyone could feasibly be a traitor to the Party and fall under the indiscriminate title of “enemy.” As former Ministry of Foreign Affairs translator Laurence Picq recalled:

The scope and number of accusations of plots against *Angkar* was dizzying. The whole family of the accused—brothers, sisters, cousins, nephews, wives, children (even

⁵⁶ Howard J. DeNike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J. Robinson, eds. *Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary*. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 545.

⁵⁷ Karl D. Jackson, “The Ideology of Total Revolution,” *Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death*. Karl D. Jackson, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 77-78; and Daniel Bultmann, *Inside Cambodian Insurgency: A Sociological Perspective on Civil Wars and Conflict*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015), 125, 162.

⁵⁸ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 227. A 1975 CPK radio broadcast ordered “all ministers and generals to come to the the Ministry of Information at once to organize the country.” You Kim Lanh, a technician, stated that all Lon Nol officers and officials received orders to write down their personal biographies, and then the Party detained them at Monorom Hotel where they were later executed. Francois Poncheaud, *Cambodia: Year Zero*. (New York: Henry and Holt, 1978), 28-29. See also Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 80; Alexander Laban Hinton, “Oppression and Vengeance in the Cambodian Genocide,” in *Genocides by the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice*. Nicholas A. Robins and Adam Jones, eds. (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2009), 93; and Gina Chon and Sambath Thet, *Behind the Killing Fields: A Khmer Rouge Leader and One of His Victims*. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 15.

⁵⁹ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, xxix, 315; and David P. Chandler, *Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), *in passim*. See also Henri Locard, “State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) and Retribution (1979-2004),” *European Review of History* 12, No. 1 (March 2005):121–143; and Michelle Caswell, *Archiving the Unspeakable: Silence, Memory, and the Photographic Record in Cambodia*. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 8-9. The name *Santebal* is a portmanteau for សន្តិសុខ (security) and គណៈប៉ូលីស (police).

⁶⁰ On S-21 and its head, Kaing Kek Iev (aka. Comrade Duch), see Alexander Laban Hinton, *Man Or Monster? The Trial of a Khmer Rouge Torturer*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

newborns)—were charged with the same crime. In addition, all who had approached these traitors, from near or afar, were considered part of the networks organized by the accused. To have been at a meal or a meeting or even to have smiled while shaking hands was proof of complicity... Angkar congratulated itself on its understanding, audacity, and will to wipe out all the traitors for the good of the people. This provoked laudatory comments from the combatants: “Angkar must truly love the people to turn in cadres it had patiently trained over the years. Long live Angkar, which protects us against foreign plots.”⁶¹

Enemies could be anyone, and were often the invisible scapegoats that the Party blamed for its own myopic policies and first year failures. These “enemies,” who had committed “certain abuses,” had prompted the Party leadership to make several changes after 1975, from returning to smaller cooperatives to establishing regular rest schedules, increasing rations, and recalling technicians to run the factories in the cities.⁶²

The identities of enemies such as intellectuals and those with ties to Lon Nol⁶³ was clear, with the CPK orienting its efforts to identifying and eliminating other class enemies: capitalists (businessmen); intellectuals (foreign or domestically trained); professionals (especially bilingual ones); and any remaining Lon Nol soldiers, police, or government employees.⁶⁴ In early 1977, for example, the CPK targeted and purged pro-Cultural Revolution intellectuals such as Touch Phoeun (Comrade Phim) and Koy Thuon (Comrade Khuon), who had called for greater democracy along the Chinese model of mass democracy. This “cultural revolution group” of intellectuals were teachers, and as Alexander Hinton states, they “continued to exert a strong influence within the Party” to that point.⁶⁵ The Party had annihilated any threat of intellectual

⁶¹ Picq, *Beyond the Horizon*, 97-98. Also in Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 147.

⁶² Samphan, *L'histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*, 72-73.

⁶³ Dy Khamboly, David Chandler, and Wynne Cougill, “A History of Democratic Kampuchea,” *DCCAM* (2007): 1-42, on page 27.

⁶⁴ Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 86. CPK efforts to expose intellectuals, who the Party viewed as a danger to its rule, extended overseas to the expatriate Cambodian communities in France, Canada, and the US. Nearly a thousand returned, after which the CPK either detained and re-educated or tortured and killed them. See “A Camp Called Boeung Trabek,” *Phnom Penh Post*, (19 January-1 February 2001); “Translation of S-21 Torture Documents, 7/9/2000,” *DCCAM*, Document Number D17186; Marie-Alexandrine Martin, *Cambodia: A Shattered Society*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 198-201, 323-325; and Peter Maguire, *Facing Death in Cambodia*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 98-99.

⁶⁵ Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 148, citing Roel A. Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapple: Revolutionary Intellectuals and Terror in Democratic Kampuchea*. (Saarbrücken, Germany; Fort Lauderdale, FL: Verlag Breitenbach, 1990), 20; Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 61; Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 164; Steven R. Heder, “Racism, Marxism, Labeling, and Genocide in Ben Kiernan’s *The Pol Pot Regime*,” *South East Asia Research* 5, No. 2 (1997): 101-153, on page 126; Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 352; and Martin Stuart-Fox, *The Murderous Revolution: Life and Death in Pol Pot’s Kampuchea Based on the Personal Experiences of Bunheang Ung*. (Chippendale, Australia: Alternative Publishing Cooperative, 1985).

opposition to the CPK from without, as those few survivors who kept their lives had to hide their knowledge and skill-sets from the *Angkar*'s “many eyes of the pineapple” (អង្គការដៃគូកម្ពុជា).⁶⁶ Since former officials and Lon Nol officers were largely out of the picture by 1976, CPK leaders began to focus on internal enemies, a decision that Kaing Kek Iev (កាំង ហ្គេកអ៊ីវ, aka. 江玉耀 *Jiāng Yù'ào*, or more famously Comrade Duch), the one-time head of the CPK's internal security branch at S-21, recalled, was orchestrated by Pol Pot. The change was formalized by the CPK at a 30 March 1976 meeting.⁶⁷ But the elimination of internal enemies remained a major problem facing the Party, prompting Pol Pot to deliver an infamous (and vitriolic) speech on 20 December 1976 at a Party school in the former French embassy that has since gained recognition as the “Microbes Speech.”⁶⁸

Pol Pot used his “Microbes Speech” to liken internal enemies to microbes, and enemies as boring from within the Kampuchean revolution to derail its path pure socialism, both of which were rhetorical devices to dehumanize the enemy and foreground the Party as a national doctor of sorts. Here, Robert Jay Lifton's analysis of Nazi doctors sheds useful light on the purpose of such dehumanizing rhetoric. Nationalist leaders often refer to the nation as the body and the people as its vital organs, thus when a group of people becomes a problem, it is often recognized by the leader as infectious. The “integrity of the organic body of the folk, the collectivity, people, or nation as embodiment of racial-cultural substance” thus becomes the driving force behind the use of medical terminology to diagnose the harmful elements and restore health to the national body.⁶⁹ CPK propagandists used numerous bodily metaphors to encourage cadres to direct their

⁶⁶ On hiding one's profession, Pin Yathay, an engineer by training, recalls that survived by hiding his profession: “One day, in Veal Vong forest in Pursat province, the village chief held another boring political meeting. He made propaganda that... Angkar requests specialists, well-educated people, and former government military commanders, doctors, engineers and students to be registered in a special list. About forty people raised their hands, including former soldiers who had hidden their identity for a long time. I was undecided, but managed to control myself and not raise my hand. After that we never had any information from those people.” Pin Yathay, *Stay Alive, My Son: A Real Tragedy in the Khmer Rouge Regime*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 100. The slogan “Angkar has as the many eyes of the pineapple” boasted of the Revolutionary Organization's (CPK's) omnipresence and omniscience. Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 128; and Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book*, 110-114 (113 for quote).

⁶⁷ Hinton, *Man Or Monster?*, 104. As Hinton notes, the CPK document “Decision of the Central Committee Regarding a Number of Matters [aka. 30 March 1976 Decision] illustrated the DK chain of command, which was strictly vertical, as orders flowed from top to bottom, with no horizontal communication allowed. At the apex, ‘Pol Pot was the one who initiated the idea,’ Duch explained. ‘Son Sen implemented it... Nuon Chea was the one who would do the follow up.

⁶⁸ Stephen R. Heder, “Interview with a Member of the DK Water Transport Unit,” (Sa Keo, Cambodia: 9 March 1980), as cited in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 336.

⁶⁹ Robert Jay Lifton, *Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide*. (London: Basic Books, 1988), 46.

“seething hatred of the enemy” and “burning enthusiasm.”⁷⁰ The Party fomented peasant resentment of wealthier classes to induce cadres to “want to eat the flesh and sip the blood” of DK’s adversaries.⁷¹ One popular slogan claims that anyone who “opposes the Party’s policies and does wrong with his arm, his arm shall be taken” while whoever “does wrong with his leg, his leg shall be taken.”⁷² Another called for cadres to “never allow the worm to gnaw at your bowels,” as if to suggest that the enemy was vermin that housed itself within the national body and, thus, needed to be exterminated for the national body to return to a state of health and cleanliness. Metaphors soon became action, as cadres often pushed bodily harm—targeting specific parts of it, too—as a symbolically loaded form of punishment in a “spectacle” to enforce discipline.⁷³ Public executions became the norm in the CPK’s exercising discipline in its Zones. Particularly grotesque forms of public execution, most notably human liver eating,⁷⁴ were all part of CPK disciplinary efforts to instill among its beleaguered populace a need to be hypervigilant, hyperproductive, and hypersubservient lest they displease the all-seeing *Angkar*.⁷⁵

As for another aspect of Pol Pot’s speech, the CPK leader appointed himself as the “national doctor” in diagnosing the problems that had stalled the CPK movement. He claimed that there was a “sickness inside the Party,” that “treacherous elements” and “ugly microbes” are doing “real damage” and “rot us from within.”⁷⁶ As he described further:

⁷⁰ “Another Step in Our Cooperative Victories,” ទង្គបដ៏ក្នុងជ្រាតិរ [Revolutionary Flag 7 (Phnom Penh)] (July 1978): 1-8, on page 2. Michel Foucault calls this “a political operation.” Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 53.

⁷¹ “Another Step in Our Cooperative Victories,” ទង្គបដ៏ក្នុងជ្រាតិរ [Revolutionary Flag 7 (Phnom Penh)] (July 1978): 2. See also Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 74; and Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 195.

⁷² Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 211.

⁷³ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Modern Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan. (New York: Pantheon, 1977).

⁷⁴ On CPK cadre practices of liver eating, see Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, xv, xxii, 34, 77, 276-296, 325, 335; Alexander Laban Hinton, “Anthropologies of the Khmer Rouge, Part II: Genocidal Bricolage”, *Yale Center for International and Area Studies Working Paper Series*, (September 1998): 12-31; and Kathleen Gough, “Roots of the Pol Pot Regime in Kampuchea”, *Contemporary Marxism*, No. 12/13, *Southeast Asia* (Spring 1986): 14-48, on 47n64.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 34. Corporal punishment brands the criminal with “infamy,” as Foucault puts it. Public killings deploy “before all eyes an invisible force” of the sovereign or state, and its goal is to convey the “dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his [sic] strength.” To establish the “absolute right and exclusive power of the sovereign,” the procedure of torture must “brand the victim with infamy” and the execution “must be spectacular.” Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 25, 34-35. In Khmer culture, to punish someone in life was in line with the torments that the person would face in the afterlife. See Bonnie Brereton, *The Phra Malai Legend in Thai Buddhist Literature*. (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State University Press, 1994) 200, 205; and Frank Reynolds and Mani Reynolds, *Three Worlds According to King Ruang: A Thai Buddhist Cosmology*. (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1982) 61-67, 76-78.

⁷⁶ “Report on Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political Tasks of 1976,” in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 183-184; and Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 147.

In 1976... speaking only of internal matters, while we are engaged in a socialist revolution, there is a *sickness inside the Party*. We cannot locate it precisely. The *illness* must emerge to be examined... We search for the *microbes within the Party* without success. They are *buried*. As our socialist revolution advances, however, seeping more strongly into every corner of the Party, the army and among the people, we can locate the *ugly microbes*. They will be pushed out by the true nature of the socialist revolution... If we wait any longer, the *microbes* can do real damage... They will rot society, rot the Party, and rot the army... Do not be afraid to lose one or two people of bad background... Driving out the treacherous forces will be a great victory... Everyone must be verified...⁷⁷

The only solution, he contended, was “digging down to unearth the roots,” that is, targeting and exposing Party members who worked actively against the Party’s political line and program.⁷⁸ The speech also lists CPK forerunners, the Pracheachon group, among others, as traitors who the Party had to arrest, and from these arrests came “documents,” notably the Tuol Sleng confessions of “traitors.” The Party, Pol Pot claimed, had discovered that “treacherous, secret elements [still seem to be] buried inside the Party” and that “enemies ha[d] tried to defeat [the CPK] using every possible method.”⁷⁹ Only the Party Center could rectify this problem since it alone understood the correct political line, which “provided the key means of ensuring the demise of [internal] enemies” and to defend DK while using the laws of dialectical materialism to “resolve the contradictions in society.”⁸⁰

Fifth, and lastly, the CPK *consolidated* itself by casting out dissenters, which by Pol Pot’s ascension to Party supremacy, was anyone who either disagreed with him, or voiced even the slightest criticism of his policies. Under Pol Pot, political consciousness may contain contradictions, yet this extended to everyone from the Party *outward*. Party members who took a firm stance against the “Draconian policies” that the Pol Pot Group stood behind firmly “were killed” alongside “high-ranking officials of the Khmer Republic.”⁸¹ The Central Committee, which by the time of the “Microbes Speech” had fallen under Pol Pot’s aegis, was therefore the only correct interpreters of its “*clean* political line” and even among the chief architects of DK

⁷⁷ “Report on Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political Tasks of 1976,” in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 183-186. Emphasis added. Also quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 336.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 182, 210.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 185, 204.

⁸⁰ “Sharpen the Consciousness of the Proletarian Class,” វង្សបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag (Phnom Penh)] (September-October 1976), translated in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 279-287, on page 287.

⁸¹ Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea,” 295.

there were those who lacked this “cleanliness.”⁸² Indeed, within the Party dissent voices emerged over the Party’s implementation of its political line, which cast them as outsiders in need of rectification, specifically Paris Group member, former *Association d’Amitié Khmero-Chinoise* (AAKC) Executive Board Member (along with Hu Nim), and CPK Minister of Cooperatives Hou Yuon. As the previous chapter showed, Yuon and Nim (discussed below) were immensely popular government ministers in Sihanouk’s government in the late 1950s-early 1960s before fleeing to the *maquis* and joining the clandestine Communist movement in 1967. Even after the 1975 CPK takeover, both held considerable sway among cadres, and were highly regarded by Central Committee members enough to remain prominent and even occupy ministerial posts within the CPK. To *de-legitimize* them was therefore integral to the CPK becoming Pol Pot’s regime. Fortuitously for Pol Pot, these men—both devoted Maoists with ties to Pol Pot that dated back to his earlier revolutionary career—were also outspoken critics of his policies, and would soon meet their end for it.

Perhaps the most famous victim of Pol Pot’s ire was his former Paris Group colleague and fellow CPK founder Hou Yuon, who never shied away from voicing his criticism of the breakneck pace with which the *Angkar* was implementing its Maoist vision in the liberated zone cooperatives. In the midst of the war against Lon Nol (1970-1975), he “dare[d] to scold” Pol Pot, and accused the Central Committee of appointing him merely as a “puppet minister.”⁸³ Yuon’s outspokenness had indeed rubbed Pol Pot and his fellow leaders the wrong way, and it led to Yuon’s 1971 “re-education” at a CPK base on Chinit River (Camp K6), though his popularity among peasants after years of outreach earned him clemency and re-instatement in the Central Committee with the post of Minister of the Interior, Communal Reform, and Cooperatives. He could not contain his criticism for long, though, and this time a mere “re-education” was long off the table for the forthright Yuon. In 1975, Yuon opposed the Central Committee’s decision to evacuate “nearly four million people” from the cities to the countryside.⁸⁴ The Party’s

⁸² “Cleanliness” was central to Pol Pot’s vision for DK, as this chapter discusses below. He once stated in a 1977 Central Committee address that “loose morals make the good and clean social environment in every unit become bad... We must resist this situation because it affects tradition (our society used to be good and clean).” Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 551; and Alan S. Rosenbaum, *Is the Holocaust Unique?: Perspectives on Comparative Genocide* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), 225.

⁸³ Khatharya Um, *From the Land of Shadows: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Cambodian Diaspora*. (New York: NYU Press, 2015), 280n53, quoting Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came To Power*, 329.

⁸⁴ Chandler, “A Revolution in Full Spate,” in *The Cambodian Agony*, 168.

justification for the total evacuation of the cities, as CPK Deputy Secretary of Region 21 Ouch Bun Choeunn recalls, was fourfold: “1) The city people have had an easy life, whereas the rural people have had a very hard time; 2) the city people were exploiters; 3) The morality of the cities under Lon Nol was not pure and clean like in the liberated areas; 4) The city people shirked productive work.”⁸⁵ While this was indeed the Party propaganda line, the real reasons varied from the Central Committee fearing enemy agents hiding among the urban populace to transferring the swollen population to the collectives “so that we could feed them, as the collectives had rice fields.”⁸⁶ Regardless of the true motivation to relocate all urbanites to Cambodia’s countryside, Hou Yuon believed that such an extreme measure was in contravention to the Party’s commitment to achieving socialism in stages, as Mao had done beforehand. Indeed, the decision to evacuate all urban centers irked Yuon. He voiced vocal opposition to it at great risk to himself, reportedly saying aloud, “It’s Berlin!” upon entering his sector of the city.⁸⁷ As fellow CPK member and future de facto leader of Cambodia, Heng Samrin, recalled, “[he] struggled against it. He got up and said that it was not the right situation to evacuate the people from the cities. At that time, Pol Pot accused Hou Yuon of not agreeing to implement the Center’s plan.”⁸⁸ Now having established himself on two occasions as a vocal critic of the Party’s plan in general, and his contemporary Pol Pot, in particular, he was a marked man who was soon to “disappear forever.”⁸⁹

While we do not know for sure how CPK executioners killed Hou Yuon, there are accounts by French journalist Jean Lacouture and a CPK cadre named Ros Kann, and a

⁸⁵ Ben Kiernan, “Interview with Ouch Bun Choeunn,” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: 20 September 1980).

⁸⁶ Stephen R. Heder, “Interview with a Region 13 Cadre,” (8 March 1980). Quote from « Interview du camarade Pol Pot, Secrétaire du Comité Central du Parti Communiste du Kampuchéa, Premier ministre de gouvernement du Kampuchéa Démocratique à la délégation des journalistes yougoslaves en visite au Kampuchéa Démocratique » (17 March 1978) (Phnom Penh : Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea), 9-10. See also Alexandra Kent and David P. Chandler, “Introduction,” in *People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power, and Moral Order in Cambodia Today*. Alexandra Kent and David P. Chandler, eds. (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2008), 7; and Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 154-155.

⁸⁷ Martin, *Cambodia*, 158.

⁸⁸ Ben Kiernan, “Interview with Heng Samrin,” (1991), as quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 32-33. Samrin was “interested to hear of Yuon’s stance, partly because Yuon had recently congratulated Samrin’s troops on the capture of Neak Leung,” as Kiernan gleaned from his 1991 interview.

⁸⁹ Ben Kiernan, “Interview with Nou Mouk,” (Oudong, Cambodia: 26 August 1981). According to Kiernan, Mouk recalled that in 1974 a “company commander named Mat” informed him that Hou Yuon “had opposed the proposed evacuation of the capital. (Later, Mat was himself arrested and jailed with the Khmers who had returned from Hanoi. He later died). Kiernan notes that earlier, Hou Yuon had “opposed destruction of people’s houses,” which he learned from his interview with the commander of the zone army. Ben Kiernan, “Interview with Heng Teav,” (Phnom Penh: 14 January 1986), as quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 33n10.

confidential CPK report that confirmed that the Party had ordered his murder in 1975.⁹⁰ Lacouture recalls that Yuon opposed some of the Central Committee's suggestions, notably Pol Pot's abolition of Buddhism, and was thus "killed by one of his bodyguards a few days after the capture of Phnom Penh, as he was departing on a motorcycle from a public meeting where he had criticized the plan to turn pagodas into stables."⁹¹ An unnamed CPK cadre from Kompong Cham, by contrast, noted in 1975 that Yuon criticized the Party's evacuation of the cities at a congregation of cadres near the Mekong River at Prek Po, "and was applauded by the crown... [but] after leaving this meeting, Hou Yuon was shot dead by a CPK squad, and his body was thrown into the Mekong."⁹² In spite of the shroud of mystery around Hou Yuon's death, his was the first of three high profile deaths among CPK Central Committee members—two more are discussed below—and one of two Party founders and intellectual architects of DK to die by Pol Pot's order (Hu Nim was the other). This ultimately signaled the new order in Pol Pot's CPK, as anyone who dared to criticize the Party's implementation risked arrest, torture, and execution. Pol Pot's CPK was now, as Timothy Cheek describes the Chinese Communist Party climate after the Great Leap, that of an "alcoholic father (drunk with supreme power)."⁹³

This section has suggested that the process of traveling theory and Leninist response to national dependency that we saw in China emerges again, albeit in localized form, in Cambodia. In recounting the first phase, *consolidation*, of implementation of a new order in Cambodia, it is perhaps worthwhile to review in what ways the Cambodian experience echoes or parallels the earlier Chinese model that they were copying so consciously. In this way we can also begin to identify the specific characteristics of the Cambodian experience of adopting a foreign ideology to respond to the effects of imperialism. First, Pol Pot's "retirement" due to health reasons and his subsequent crushing of his critics is not unlike Mao's own ousting of Peng Dehuai and return to leadership, which we explored in chapter two. Second, Pol Pot's reorientation of Party history around his own contributions mirrors Mao's own emphasis of his own contributions during Yan'an Rectification. Pol Pot followed Mao's example by making himself and his Party's

⁹⁰ The notebook of Eng Hei, alias Ly, a CPK *Santebal* (security) cadre, 18 August 1978. The notebook states that "In 1975 we [*Santebal*] killed "the contemptible Hou Yuon." As quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 61n125.

⁹¹ Jean Lacouture, *Survive le peuple cambodgien!* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 117.

⁹² Ben Kiernan, "Interview with Ros Kann," (Surin, Cambodia: 3 March 1979). Kann said, according to Kiernan, that he was "told of this in Kompong Cham Province by a CPK cadre named Pen Kimsruong, among others, who disapproved of what was happening and advised Kann to flee." Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 61n124.

⁹³ Timothy Cheek. *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 219.

contributions inseparable from the history of Communism in the country. Third, not unlike Mao earlier “poisonous weeds” metaphor,⁹⁴ Pol Pot’s “Microbes speech” described enemies as contagions that, if they were to spread, would endanger others, most importantly the Party and its quest for socialism. This echoes Mao’s statement that “We are against poisonous weeds of any kind, but we must exercise caution in discerning what is really a poisonous weed and what is really a fragrant flower... we must learn to distinguish carefully between flagrant flowers and poisonous weeds... with correct methods.”⁹⁵ Fourth, the CPK sought to identify and eliminate opposition within the Party, as Mao had done with his Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist Rectification Movements. The “Peng Dehuai” of the Cambodian movement was Hou Yuon. Reminiscent of Wu Han’s (吳晗) infamous theatre play 海瑞罷官(Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, pinyin: *Hǎi Rui Bàguān*) in which the dutiful Ming official Hai Rui criticized the emperor’s corruption—an allegory to Peng Dehuai’s own purging by Mao at Lushan⁹⁶— Hou Yuon’s ouster occurred because he dared to challenge the august and supreme “emperor” Pol Pot.

In summary, the CPK’s *consolidation* of power through the implementation of its brand of Maoism, like in China, concerned both its own internal consolidation of rule among Central Committee leadership and its consolidation of power within the country that it governed. Collective leadership disintegrated into the hands of the Party’s more extreme personalities—the Pol Pot Group—while managerial Maoists such as Hou Yuon and, later, Hu Nim and CPK mainstay Keo Meas, were purged. Outside the Party ranks, the Communists expunged DK of its intellectuals, professionals, pro-Vietnamese cadres, and virtually all of its ethnic minorities. National revivalism became the cornerstone of this break from the harmonious bureaucratic and faith strands that had made the Party “work” during the revolutionary struggle. People who

⁹⁴ Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” (27 February 1957), in *Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*. Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 164-165.

⁹⁵ Ibid. See also Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” (27 February 1956) in *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976: January 1956-December 1957*. Michael Y. M. Kau, and John K. Leung, eds. (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1992), 333.

⁹⁶ Clive Ansley, *The Heresy of Wu Han: His Play “Hai Rui’s Dismissal” and its Role in China’s Cultural Revolution*. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 83-95. See also Tom Fisher, “‘The Play’s the Thing’: Wu Han and Hai Rui Revisited,” in *Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China*. Jonathan Unger, ed. (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 9-45; Rudolph Wagner, “‘In Guise of a Congratulation’: Political Symbolism in Zhou Xinfang’s Play Hai Rui Submits his Memorial,” in *Using the Past to Serve the Present*, 46-103; and Mary G. Mazur, *Wu Han, Historian: Son of China’s Times*. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).

voiced their dissent found themselves at S-21, dead, or both), while the entire populace now toiled in massive, heavily monitored labor camps in the Cambodian countryside.

The quest for a pure socialism, which Mao had warned both Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan—in separate conversations—not to pursue in light of China’s own mistakes in pursuance of the same,⁹⁷ became the myopic, singular focus of Pol Pot’s regime. To achieve it, however, meant that the Party had to deliver on its promises of radical industrial development, economic revival, and socio-structural reorganization. While relocating the people to the countryside and eliminating kinship and traditional relationships began the process, the country was in a self-imposed, autarkical isolation. The Party thus sought to follow in the footsteps of Stalin and Mao with a Four-Year Plan of its own, but as the following section shows, it contained neither an earnest commitment to industrial development (besides rhetorical commitments), nor the amelioration of DK’s living standards. Indeed, from 1976 on, DK became an isolated gulag in which the Party was omnipresent *and* omniscient, yet the Party’s shortsighted and overtly flawed economic policies led the body count to skyrocket to new and grotesque heights.

Economic Reconfiguration: “A Great Leap Beyond All Reality”⁹⁸

Our slogan is “Always Constantly Carry Out the Most Powerful Storming Attacks via a *Great Leap Forward* and *Amazing Great Mass Movement*.” Storming attacks with a great mass movement does not mean that some individuals here and there are carrying out storming attacks in his sector or that. Carrying out storming attacks with a great mass movement means militantly giving systematic orders, nourishing the forces, and organizing [both] effectively. In terms of results the 1977 mass movement was strongly effervescent.—*Revolutionary Red Flag* (1977)⁹⁹

⁹⁷ “Mao Zedong and Pol Pot,” (21 Beijing 1975), in “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977,” Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonneson, Nguyen Vu Tungand, and James G. Herschberg, eds. (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, Working Paper, 1998), 191-192; and Norodom Sihanouk, *War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia*, Mary Feeney trans. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 86.

⁹⁸ This comes from the CPK slogan “មហាសោកដ្ឋានៈមហាហោះរំលង (The Super Great Leap Forward, this is a big leap beyond all reality).” Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 72.

⁹⁹ “Learn from the Political, Ideological and Organizational Experiences in Fulfilling the Party’s 1977 Revolutionary Duties in order to Impel Forward Victoriously the Implementation of 1978 Duties,” វង្សបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag, Special Issue (Phnom Penh)] (December-January 1977-1978): 1-46, on page 44. Emphasis added.

អង្គការមហាលោកផ្លោះមហាអស្ចារ្យ (With the *Angkar*, we shall make a Great Leap Forward, a prodigious Great Leap Forward”—CPK slogan¹⁰⁰

This section has a dual purpose in examining the *economic reconfiguration* phase of the CPK’s *implementation* of Maoism. First, it examines the “Super” Great Leap Forward and the ramifications of its failure. Second, the section explores the ongoing *transformation* of the CPK’s Maoism during the “Super” Great Leap, namely the Party’s intensified effort to scapegoat and eliminate outsiders for the Plan’s shortcomings. To accomplish both ends, it examines closely a secret, unpublished Party Center document, “The Party’s Four Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977-1980,” specifically the first two parts, which outline Party designs for agriculture and industry, building socialism in its industrial sector, and developing a revolutionary culture and education. The section then delves into the CPK’s targeting and destroying of *Others* who were not solely class enemies, which signaled the shift towards affixing “nationalist revivalism on a socialist organization.”¹⁰¹ Here, Pol Pot blamed “race enemies” (a central trait of the faith Maoism of Pol Pot and his clique) such as Vietnamese, Muslim Chams, ethnic Chinese, and “Khmer Bodies with Vietnamese minds” for the Plan’s shortcomings.¹⁰² The faith Maoism of the Pol Pot Group, as the section shows, centered on himself and his thought, which was characterized by vitriolic notions of ethno-chauvinism and racial purity and stands as a rupture from our Traveling Theory-Leninist Response model. Unlike Mao, Pol Pot placed the Vietnamese front and center as enemies of the state, and he sought out several means to denigrate, dehumanize, and ultimately eradicate them from DK.

While the name “Super Great Leap Forward,” the CPK’s nickname for its “Four Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977-1980,” is an obvious rhetorical homage to Mao, there was so much more to the Party’s program than owing its name to its Chinese antecedent. Scholarly assessments on the “Super” Great Leap tend to cluster around four lines of interpretation. First, Etcheson, for example, describes it as “the most rapid and comprehensive

¹⁰⁰ Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 70. Locard notes that this slogan was “[w]ithout a doubt... the most often heard slogan during the Khmer Rouge era.” Yet the word “forward” is only implied. As he states, “the motto could, without changing a single word, become a counter-slogan, indicating that the Khmer Rouge regime meant literally ‘a super great leap’ indeed., but not into progress but into darkness of a delirious utopia.”

¹⁰¹ Kiernan, “Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” in *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea*, 228.

¹⁰² On Chams, a Muslim ethnic group in Southeast Asia that are scattered throughout the region, particularly in Kompong Cham province in Southern Cambodia as well as in Southern Vietnam. See Philip Taylor, *Cham Muslims of the Mekong Delta: Place and Mobility in the Cosmopolitan Periphery*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007).

collectivization ever witnessed” since the CPK “nullified the existing social structure, and created *ex nihilo* a ‘socialist’ infrastructure.”¹⁰³ Second, Margolin focuses on degrees of Maoist influence, arguing that Pol Pot was faithful to the Chinese Great Leap Forward “beyond all hope and reason.”¹⁰⁴ While Chandler holds that Cambodia’s “puritanical cultural policies” had most likely filtered through “policies of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,” themselves inspired by similar movements in the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ The third, by contrast, acknowledges that Mao’s Leap influenced the CPK’s variant, but that as Locard argues “fierce nationalist pride incited them to go even beyond the wildest schemes of the Great Helmsman... [which] entailed complete ruralization and sweeping destruction of the old society... [and] leaping abruptly into absolute Communism.”¹⁰⁶ The “Super Great Leap,” this line holds, was in fact a haphazard quest to upstage China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam in achieving pure communism in one fell swoop.¹⁰⁷ Fourth, Jackson contends that it is “patently obvious” that Mao’s economic reconfiguration program in Communist China “was never carried to the extremes reached in Democratic Kampuchea,” as Mao neither attempted to evacuate all of the nation’s cities, nor sought to “elevate bloodshed to a national ritual.”¹⁰⁸ This section posits the “Super” Great Leap as a totalistic effort by the CPK to situate its revolution as the purest in world history, one that had leaped successfully into Communism without any necessary preliminary stages. As a 1977 Party Center document that outlined the Plan’s stated goals proclaims:

Our revolutionary movement is a new experience, and an important one in the whole world, because we do not perform like others. We leap from a people’s democratic revolution to a socialist revolution, and quickly build socialism. We do not need a long

¹⁰³ Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 211.

¹⁰⁴ Jean Louis Margolin, “Cambodia: The Country of Disconcerting Crimes,” in *The Black Book of Communism*, 627.

¹⁰⁵ David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 245. Yet, as Stuart Schram notes, the “chiliastic vision which inspired Mao’s policies during the Great Leap Forward did not imply any lessening of his commitment to development. The very slogan ‘steel as the key link!’, which Mao made peculiarly his own in these radical years encapsulated the view of quantitative economic growth as a central and dynamic factor in revolutionary change.” Although “the new latifundia which Mao created at the time of the Great Leap Forward brought the peasants widespread misery rather than the promised collective prosperity and happiness, the successive phases in agrarian policy from 1946 onward destroyed the old landlord economy and thus laid the foundations for the emergence of a system of peasant smallholdings in the 1980s.” Stuart Schram, “Mao Zedong a Hundred Years on: the Legacy of a Ruler,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 137 (March 1994): 125-143, on pages 131, 140.

¹⁰⁶ Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 69.

¹⁰⁷ Nayan Chanda, “When the Killing Had to Stop,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (29 October 1976), 21.

¹⁰⁸ Jackson, “Ideology of Total Revolution,” in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 244-245.

period of time for the transformation. Ours is a new experience, and people are observing it. We don't follow any book. We act according to the actual situation in our country.¹⁰⁹

Yet the “Super” Great Leap was anything but; countless thousands died, industry did not grow, and agricultural production, particularly year-round rice cultivation, became the driving thrust behind the Leap's success or failure.¹¹⁰ All shortcomings were because of “agents,” and not because of the outlandish production quotas that the CPK Central Committee, by now Pol Pot's clique, had set.

To begin, the 1977-1980 “Super” Great Leap Forward, which Central Committee leaders designed after convening at a three-day meeting in late August 1976, was the CPK's answer to Cambodia's lingering underdevelopment crises. Much like its Chinese predecessor, the “Super” Great Leap sought to triple national agricultural production within a year via the collectivization of industry and agriculture and the establishment of high production quotas for agricultural output.¹¹¹ CPK strategists pursued “crash agriculturalization” and “crash collectivization” akin to Mao's Leap, and both of which, as Ben Kiernan notes, Mao had abandoned after the Great Leap in China.¹¹² The “Super” Great Leap, moreover, sought to expand upon the CPK cooperatives that were in place before the Party's seizure of state power. It drew heavily from the foundational national texts of DK, which CPK founders and ideological architects Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim composed when they were students. As Samphan recalled:

The revolutionary orthodoxy, as it was such in the years of my studies in Paris, distinguished several levels of cooperatives. For those cooperatives of a ‘higher level,’ the harvest was not destined or intended to be shared, but instead stored in common warehouses while daily life in collectives entailed that each member received the same diet and food rations. In light of the failure of Soviet state farms (*sovkhoses*), I thought to myself that such organizations could not work in Cambodia, and if Khmer Rouge leaders sought to establish ‘higher level’ cooperatives, it had to be only for the purpose of

¹⁰⁹ “Four-Year Plan,” 49.

¹¹⁰ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 246.

¹¹¹ Chandler, “A Revolution in Full Spate,” in *The Cambodian Agony*, 168. The original plan was to take over a decade to achieve these goals, as former CPK Secretary of the Eastern Zone Chea Sim recalled in 1991: “Nuon Chea said that building socialism in Kampuchea consisted of two parts, agriculture and industry. He said agriculture would be modernized in ten to fifteen years by scientific methods, by preparing irrigation dams and canals all over the country. And the dams had to be started in the coming year, 1976. Industry would be modernized in a similar period of ten to fifteen years.” Kiernan, “Interview with Chea Sim,” (1991), as quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 58.

¹¹² Ben Kiernan, “External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology,” in *The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79*. Odd Arne Westad, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 196-200.

experimentation. To encourage farmers to accept handing over the entire product of their labor to the ‘cooperative,’ a lengthy explanation of patient work was well needed. Yet should we give them concrete proof that this mode of production improved their living conditions significantly?¹¹³

Evidently, how to implement this restructuring of CPK-run cooperatives, and expanding upon it on a national level, were major obstacles for Party leaders. Communist China presented an alternative to the failed Soviet template, and indeed, Mao’s “Little Leap” of 1956 received glowing praise from Hu Nim in his dissertation (see chapter four). Merely mimicking China’s successes was not on the table for a Pol Pot-led CPK. It, too, had failed, and replicating this failure was not in the game plan for a Cambodian programme.

To right the wrongs of Mao’s Leap, however, the CPK sought to go even further by closing all national markets, abolishing currency, collectivizing everything from fields to meals, and encouraging a highly supervised and rigorously disciplined way of life.¹¹⁴ Others who had attempted such a sweeping industrialization policy, the Party believed, had failed to eliminate wholly the vestiges of capitalism because they had not gone as far as was necessary:

The people customarily eat whatever they like to eat, so long as they have the money. In the socialist part of the world at present the problem has been posed that too strong an emphasis on collectivization leads to a disappearance of the individual or family nourishment. That’s why they allow some privateness and still use money. As we see, *this path doesn’t completely repress capitalists*. They already have socialism as the base, but they haven’t gotten clear from the capitalist framework; China and Korea are examples... Within this group the capitalist and private sectors are in the process of daily strengthening and expanding their base in every aspect... we organize collective eating... and drinking...¹¹⁵

As a “pure” socialist movement with total collectivization, Pol Pot proclaimed that this course was to “become a precious model for the world’s people, the world’s revolutionary movement, and the international Communist movement.”¹¹⁶ It did replicate the “tournament system” that characterized the Great Leap in China, as the CPK awarded the “Honorary Red Flag” to

¹¹³ Samphan, *L’histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*, 75.

¹¹⁴ Alex C. Cook, “Third World Maoism,” in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*. Timothy Cheek, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 302-303.

¹¹⁵ “Four-Year Plan,” 107.

¹¹⁶ BBC SWB, (1 October 1977), FE 5629/C2/1 ff.

particular zones that met or exceeded their quotas.¹¹⁷ But not unlike in the Chinese case, this promoted, unconsciously, the falsification of production quotas. The CPK's designs, meanwhile, were outside the realms of possibility without a catastrophic toll on the laboring populace, and unlike Mao, who halted his own Great Leap due to its disastrous consequences, the CPK stressed, amid widespread starvation and endemic disease, that its present situation of revolution "is excellent in all fields."¹¹⁸

A confidential CPK document, "The Party's Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977-1980" (1976), outlines the Party's approach to addressing the country's various needs in the realms of agriculture, industry, and culture and education. The first part discusses building socialism in agriculture by addressing several problems that the people under the CPK's stewardship had to solve quickly. The problems that stood in the way of achieving the Party's two main objectives—raising the people's living standard and increasing capital from agriculture—were maximizing rice production in rice-growing areas, governing rations, solving the "water problem" to "gain mastery over water" (to meet the three-ton per annum per hectare quota), and developing energy, chemicals, industrial crops, and tools.¹¹⁹ But how? As an issue of *ឧត្តមសិរីក្រឹត្យ* (Revolutionary Flag) explained:

Our experience has been that some places are constantly on the attack and that the people are therefore without worry and constantly have healthy, beaming faces. Some places, however, are not constantly on the attack but are only on the attack two or three months a year. They wait for the season to arrive. If we are constantly on small-scale attack we will constantly have something to put in our pots and be able to maintain our produce in granaries.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ "The Letter Presenting the Honorary Red Flag of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to All Cadres, Combatants, and Peasant People in the Cooperatives in Prasaut District, Kampong Tralach Leu District, and Tram Kak District," *ឧត្តមសិរីក្រឹត្យ* ប្រាំមួយ [Revolutionary Flag 6 (Phnom Penh)] (June 1977): 4-9.

¹¹⁸ Pol Pot, « Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot » 76. Also quoted in Cook, "Third World Maoism," in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 303.

¹¹⁹ "Four-Year Plan," 51-95. See Tables 1-37 on these issues. Quote from page 89. See also "Letter of Honorary Red Flag from the Communist Party of Kampuchea's Central Committee to Male and Female Cadres and All Cooperative Farmers in the Districts of Prasot (Eastern Zone), Kampong Tralach (Western Zone), and Tram Kak (Southwest Zone)," *Honorary Red Flag Letter to the Central Committee*. Chanthan Phok trans. (1977)[https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/0044684600446883_E3_135_EN.TXT.pdf] (Accessed 22 August 2016).

¹²⁰ "Further Raise the Quality of the Party Leadership in order to lead in Defence Duties and the Duties of Continuing the Socialist Revolution and Building Socialism," *ឧត្តមសិរីក្រឹត្យ* [Revolutionary Flag, Special Number (Phnom Penh)] (October-November 1977): 47-74 in original; 1-27 in translation, on page 18.

In the northwest, we must constantly attack the Steung Posat and the Steung Sankae, and attack 100-200 hectares here and there. If we attack Posat in this manner, 3000 hectares presents no difficulties. It is the same with the Steung Chinit: we must start attacking it now, attacking after the harvest, without waiting for early next year. This would be a big waste of water, because it would both disappear into the ground and run-off.¹²¹

Nation-wide initiatives to maximize rice production—“If we have rice, we can have it all”¹²²—became the program’s foundation. Such an intensified mass cultivation was a lofty ambition, especially in light of Cambodia’s poor soil and limited traditional growing seasons. One wonders why the CPK leadership neglected expert advice on this issue, as the Leap soldiered on despite shortages in virtually every area. Amid rice, water, and food shortages, the Leap continued, with propagandists encouraging malnourished and overworked Cambodians to “make a prodigious Great Leap Forward,” increase production “by leaps and bounds,” and to achieve a “big leap beyond all reality.”¹²³

Pol Pot, however, was completely out of touch with realities on the ground. He claimed over Radio Phnom Penh that Cambodians “are happy to live in the present Democratic Kampuchean society under the most correct, most clear-sighted leadership of our revolutionary organization the CPK because *they are building the country with their own hands*, having eliminated slavery, and working as the masters of the water, land, country and revolution.”¹²⁴ Other CPK leaders, too, ignored actual conditions.¹²⁵ Men and women could not return to their homes, had to subsist on meager rations while Party leaders ate to their hearts’ content, and even marriages were officiated by the omnipresent CPK. As an issue of ទង្វើបដិវត្តន៍ (Revolutionary Flag) explained that, “if one proceed[ed] to allow the people to go back to eating at home... then we are on our way to privatism,” and indeed, “privatism” posed a threat to the CPK’s collective and socialist systems that it had fought strenuously to implement.¹²⁶ Frustrations mounted in silence, as the Party’s iron-fisted rule and pervasive surveillance of all workers in their collective Zones

¹²¹ Ibid, 20.

¹²² « Interview du camarade Pol Pot » 3. See also “Learning from Our Four-Year Plan,” ទង្វើបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag, Special Number (Phnom Penh)] (October-November 1977): 113-128 in original, 1-3 in translation, on page 1; and “កម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យឈានទៅមុខ Kampuchéa Démocratique en Marche,” 10-11.

¹²³ Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 72.

¹²⁴ Radio Phnom Penh, (3 June 1976) in FBIS *Daily Broadcasts Asia and the Pacific*, (24 June 1976).

¹²⁵ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 245.

¹²⁶ “Learn from the Political, Ideological and Organizational Experiences in Fulfilling the Party’s 1977 Revolutionary Duties in order to Impel forward victoriously the Implementation of 1978 Duties,” ទង្វើបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag, Special Issue (Phnom Penh)] (December-January 1977-1978): 1-46, on page 24. See also “Four-Year Plan,” 108.

prevented, for the most part, a nation-wide resistance to Party policies (though local resistances by Cham Muslims did occur).¹²⁷

The second part of the covert Party Center document, meanwhile, focuses on “Socialism in the Industrial Sector,” which entailed operating light and heavy industry to avoid foreign dependency.¹²⁸ The CPK believed that China, North Korea, and the USSR had failed because they had placed primacy on heavy industry, so DK must rely on its own line in accordance with the Cambodian situation. As the Party’s plan stated:

The experience in other countries is that they take heavy industries as the base, as in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Korea. In the USSR and Eastern Europe their industry has a firm base but agriculture is weaker. In Korea they turned back to agriculture in time after they had made heavy industry and have resolved the problem the best. The Chinese were first concerned about heavy industry but later on turned back to agriculture and light industry. Now light industry has advanced while heavy industry and agriculture also have a firm base. In North Vietnam there are also a number of heavy industries but they are not firm yet. Light industry also has no strong base and neither does agriculture... Turning to us, we stand on our situation and our direction. Our economy stands on agriculture now...we must divide the capital we have earned through agriculture into two: first for light industry and second for heavy industry.¹²⁹

Importantly, while Mao had opted to “take agriculture as the basis” after the Great Leap Forward,¹³⁰ the CPK made agricultural production, in effect, the sole pillar of its “Super” Great Leap:

In the effort for national reconstruction, our Party bases itself on the concrete conditions in the country. Ours is a backward agricultural country, which has been devastated by the destructive war of aggression waged by US imperialism... [W]e rely on the powerful revolutionary spirit, experience, and creative ingenuity of our people. We take agriculture as the basic factor and use the fruits of agriculture to build industry to rapidly transform Kampuchea from a backward agricultural state into a modernized one. We also intend to rapidly transform the backward, agricultural Kampuchea into an industrialized country by standing firmly on the principles of independence, initiative, and self-reliance.¹³¹

“We only have to earn capital from agriculture,” the document declares, since there simply was not any capital due to the abolition of money and markets and the forced isolation of DK from

¹²⁷ David Hutt, “Revealing Cambodia’s Secret Khmer Rouge Resistance,” *Southeast Asia Globe* (17 March 2016), [<http://sea-globe.com/cambodia-khmer-rouge-resistance-cham-uprising/>] (Accessed 26 January 2017).

¹²⁸ “Four-Year Plan,” 97. See Tables 50-56, on pages 98-106.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹³⁰ Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Volume II: The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 119, 171.

¹³¹ Pol Pot, « Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot » 70-71.

the rest of the world.¹³² If the cities were “always waiting around for support from the countryside, that would be a very heavy burden,” an issue of វត្តមាន (Revolutionary Flag) states clearly.¹³³ Although there were factories under the supervision of CPK figures including Ta Mok that the Party either co-opted or repurposed for the production of other goods, such as soap, this did not represent a significant effort to build up Cambodia’s industry and create the urban proletariat that it had long argued was a prerequisite for industrialization.¹³⁴ The same document acknowledges DK’s deficiency in this area: “compared to other countries, in industrial terms, we are extremely weak.”¹³⁵ Since industry was weak, the technology was also weak, thus Cambodians had to earn capital from agriculture exclusively. The result was Cambodia’s beleaguered populace slaving for sixteen hours a day under tight supervision and with meager rations, with thousands upon thousands perishing from malnourishment, disease, and extra-judicial killings by cadre supervisors.

How did this “Super” Great Leap fail so tremendously? Environmental factors contributed significantly, as in 1977 a combination of poor engineering and a one hundred-year flood devastated crop sizes to twenty-to-twenty-five percent less than the previous year’s level, which had been “subsistence,” while daily consumption “dropped to a dangerously low 125 grams of rice [if] compared to 200-300 grams per day in 1976.”¹³⁶ These disasters paired with poor government planning and unreasonable quotas to wreak havoc on DK’s overworked populace (reminiscent of the Chinese Great Leap). By setting reasonable production quotas, reducing punishments for lower producers, and approaching its program with less rigidity, it is possible to imagine the “Super” Great Leap as less of an abject disaster and with far less of a human cost. To date, however, no evidence that Party Central entertained a gradualist or less intensified approach exists.¹³⁷ Its architects’ uncompromising emphases on total self-reliance and breakneck speed, as it turns out, present two of the best explanations for the Plan’s failure.

¹³² “Four-Year Plan,” 97-98.

¹³³ “Learn from the Political, Ideological and Organizational Experiences in Fulfilling the Party’s 1977 Revolutionary Duties in Order to Impel Forward Victoriously the Implementation of 1978 Duties,” វត្តមាន [Revolutionary Flag, Special Number (Phnom Penh)] (December-January 1977-1978), 23.

¹³⁴ Mertha, *Brothers in Arms*, 49-50.

¹³⁵ “Four-Year Plan,” 46.

¹³⁶ Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 214; and Karl D. Jackson, “Cambodia 1978: War, Pillage, and Purge in Democratic Kampuchea,” *Asian Survey* (January 1979): 83.

¹³⁷ David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, “Preface,” in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, xiii, xvi.

Indeed, the CPK's plan was characterized by autarky for which Khieu Samphan had advocated in his 1959 doctoral dissertation (and which was present in the Chinese Great Leap).¹³⁸ Party leaders, especially Pol Pot, pushed autarky, mass collectivization, and state-directed modernizing initiatives, to extreme heights, seemingly to outdo all previous rapid industrialization programs.¹³⁹ Top officials were adamant that DK had "leaped from a people's democratic revolution into socialism,"¹⁴⁰ with Khieu Samphan boasting that DK "will be the first nation to create a completely Communist society without wasting time on intermediate steps."¹⁴¹ As one Party Center document claims:

[Our] situation is completely different from other countries... when China was liberated in 1949, the Chinese prepared to end the people's democratic revolution before they prepared to carry out the reforms leading to socialism. A long period of time was required. In 1955 they started people's communes. Take the example of Korea, liberated in 1945. Not until 1958 did they establish cooperatives throughout the country; at that time, cooperatives consisted of between twenty and thirty families. After liberation, it took them a long time to reach socialism. They did not carry out a genuine socialist revolution until 1958. They needed fourteen years to make the transition. North Vietnam did the same. Now a similar situation applies in South Vietnam. They need a longer period of time to make the transition.¹⁴²

The Party's frenzied evacuation of the cities and abolition of currency and markets were what Pol Pot viewed as the determining factors in achieving pure socialism. "Our socialism is characterized by its speed... Compared to other countries, in terms of method we are extremely fast," a Central Committee excerpted report declared.¹⁴³ Previous efforts, by Mao or otherwise, had failed because they had not gone far enough to eradicate capitalist vestiges. As an anonymous CPK official reflected: "the Vietnamese revolutionary method was 'very slow,' and

¹³⁸ Khieu Samphan, «L'économie du Cambodge et ses problèmes d'industrialisation» (Thèse des Sciences Économiques, Université de Paris, 1959), 82-83, 193. See chapter 4. Etcheson notes that the Super Great Leap took Samphan's dissertation's proposals to new extremes. Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 212-213.

¹³⁹ See chapter 4.

¹⁴⁰ "Four-Year Plan," 46.

¹⁴¹ Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, 86. Also quoted in Jackson, "Ideology of Total Revolution," in *Cambodia 1975-1978*, 63. Mao, in particular, was spellbound by the CPK's boldness in implementing its much more radical program for socialist transition. In 1975, Mao and Le Duan, one of Vietnam's top political figures, met and Mao asked whether Vietnam, were the country ever to attempt such a feat, could follow suit and do the same. Le Duan responded merely by shaking his head, to which Mao agreed: "No. We couldn't do it either." Mao Zedong, "Transcript of Mao's Meeting with Le Duan," (Beijing: 24 September 1975), as quoted in Philip Short, *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*. (London: John Murray, 2004), 300.

¹⁴² "Four-Year Plan," 46.

¹⁴³ "Excerpted Report on the Leading Views of the Comrade Representing the Party Organization at a Zone Assembly," វង្សបដិវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag] (1976), Ben Kiernan trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 29.

‘it took a long time to sort out the good from the counter-revolutionaries.’ Khmer methods do not require a large personnel, and there are no heavy charges to bear because everyone is simply thrown out of town... The Khmers have adopted the method which consists in *overturning the basket* with all the fruit inside... The Vietnamese did not tip over the basket, they picked out the rotten fruit. This is the Great Leap Forward of the Khmer revolution.”¹⁴⁴ DK was thus “already a socialist society, both in the countryside and in the cities,” where all goals were and had always been collective.¹⁴⁵

As in Communist China, where the Great Leap Forward’s failure initiated the rise of faith Maoism, the “Super” Great Leap’s multifarious shortcomings led to the rise of “Pol Pot-ism”: a faith Maoism of a CPK-type that stressed national characteristics as determining factors and the *Otherness* of outsiders as reasons for delays in socialist edification. Indeed, Duch described the Party’s thought not as Maoist, *per se*, but rather as “Pol Potist,” since under Pol Pot’s leadership the ideology became centered on him. After all, Pol Pot was the career revolutionary who had abandoned his studies in Paris to join the clandestine movement, and who had crushed the intellectual criticism of Hou Yuon and Hu Nim in consolidating his leadership. Only one Paris Group member, Khieu Samphan, had survived such purges, and only by dint of his blind obedience to Pol Pot (despite his consistent denial of doing such).¹⁴⁶ As for the “national characteristics” dimension of Pol Pot-ism, Pol Pot urged Cambodians to rely on antiquated methods of irrigation digging and rice cultivation as part of an intensified effort to rely only on their own forces.”¹⁴⁷ The necessary capital to create such an expansion was inconsequential; “[o]ur *natural characteristics*,” a CPK document urged, “have given us great advantages compared [to] China.”¹⁴⁸ Cambodian *natural characteristics* were therefore the real motive forces that propelled the “Super” Great Leap.

What exactly were these national characteristics? Unlike Mao, who applied Marxism-Leninism to China’s particular national context without the abandonment of Marxian

¹⁴⁴ Ponchaud, *Cambodia: Year Zero*, 70, quoting a CPK official in ប្រទេសជាតិ [Nation]. (10 June 1976).

¹⁴⁵ “Four-Year Plan,” 45.

¹⁴⁶ Samphan, *L’histoire récente du Cambodge et mes prises de position*, in passim. See also Doreen Chen, “Presentation on Khieu Samphan’s Role Features the Late King Father Norodom Sihanouk,” *Cambodia Tribunal Monitor* (31 January 2013) [<http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/2013/01/31/presentation-on-khieu-samphans-role-features-the-late-king-father-norodom-sihanouk/>] (Accessed 30 November 2016).

¹⁴⁷ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 245.

¹⁴⁸ “Four-Year Plan,” 46. Emphasis added; and Kate Frieson, “The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea,” *Pacific Affairs* 61, No. 3 (Autumn 1988): 405-427, on page 421.

universals,¹⁴⁹ Pol Pot appeared to stress the national character of Khmers, an inherent *Khmerness*, which made them capable of incredible feats. An infamous CPK slogan that the Party broadcast over Radio Phnom Penh epitomized this emphasis on the superiority of *Khmerness*: “During more than 2000 years, our people have lived in complete destitution and the deepest despair... If our people could build Angkor Wat, they are capable of doing anything.”¹⁵⁰ But as Thongchai Winichakul shows, such concepts, whether *Thai-ness* or otherwise, have “never been (and never will be) clear,” thus the domain of what a particular “*nation-ness*” constitutes and its accompanying power relations represent “an arena over which different interpretations from various positions struggle to gain hegemony.”¹⁵¹ For Pol Pot, *Khmerness* was cultural purity, superiority, and accomplishment—owing in part, at least, to his French education that had impressed upon him these themes in relation to the French Revolution. The purity element no doubt traces its origins to his former mentor Keng Vannsak’s work in Paris in the early 1950s, as Keng had long advocated that Buddhism and Hinduism were outsider religions that, by dint of their localization in Khmer lands over several centuries, had absorbed and deformed the purity of Khmer cultural forms.¹⁵²

As the first section showed, the CPK’s search for “agents” was intensified with the dissolution of collective leadership and the rise of Pol Pot. “By the end of 1976,” Hinton notes, “paranoia... was pushed to its extreme by economic failures, possible dissent, and (real and imagined) plots and coups,” while as Picq recalls, “everything one said or did became political at this time.”¹⁵³ Indeed, the CPK targeted class enemies from the onset, and like Mao, was ruthless in its repression of intellectuals. For instance, in early 1977 the CPK Central Committee attacked a coterie of intellectuals who advocated for more democracy and who had criticized the “Super” Great Leap.¹⁵⁴ Yet the Party was adamant that internal agents remained an omnipresent threat to

¹⁴⁹ Nick Knight, *Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong’s Thought*. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 199.

¹⁵⁰ FBIS, Asia-Pacific Daily Reports, (4 October 1977) H25 and 26, as quoted in Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 32. Pol Pot held Angkor Wat as the quintessence of *Khmerness*. According to Elizabeth Becker, excavations by the French of Angkor Wat “revealed that Cambodia had once been a great and powerful empire, rich in agricultural resources and conquered territory.” Becker, *When the War Was Over*, 109.

¹⁵¹ Thongchai Winnichakul. *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994), 9.

¹⁵² Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 28-29, 543-544.

¹⁵³ Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 146.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 148.

its socialist revolution. As former CPK military commander Chea Sim recalled in his discussion with Nuon Chea in a 1991 interview:

[T]o achieve the construction of socialism progressively and advance all together in the set period, we must take care to carefully screen internal agents... in the Party, in the armed forces, in the various organizations and ministries in the government, and among the masses of the people. We have to carefully screen them, Nuon Chea said... [T]he line of carefully screening internal agents [will] improve and purify, in order to implement the line of building socialism that it advances to modernization by new scientific technology.¹⁵⁵

Indeed, during the “Super” Great Leap, as the CPK leadership confronted drastic production shortages of its lofty collectivization program, it opted to blame *Others* instead of its own mismanagement for the cataclysm. Pol Pot accused the the Vietnamese of infiltrating DK and causing that famine that the “Super” Great Leap had wrought on the populace: “To say millions died is too much... Vietnamese agents were there. There was rice, but they didn’t give rice to the population... My conscience is clear... If we had not carried out our struggle, Cambodia would have become another Kampuchea Krom.”¹⁵⁶ Here, Pol Pot’s post mortem reveals that he was suspicious of Vietnamese designs to seize Khmer lands, hence his mention of Kampuchea Krom, which had experienced vast Vietnamese settlement in the seventeenth century under Khmer king ជ័យជេដ្ឋាទ័ព (Chey Chetha II, 1576-1628) and became part of Vietnam after French colonization.¹⁵⁷ While ethnic Chinese and Muslim Chams were also targets of mass killing—the former targeted by the CPK for their ties to cities and the entrepreneur class and the latter forced by cadres to eat pork on pain of death¹⁵⁸—the Vietnamese were the eternal enemy who Pol Pot had set his sights on eradicating wholly. The anti-Vietnamese character of Pol Pot-ism is thus the

¹⁵⁵ Ben Kiernan, “Interview with Chea Sim,” (1991), as quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 58.

¹⁵⁶ Nate Thayer, “My Education: how Saloth Sar Became Pol Pot,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (20 October 1977), 21. See also Chirot and McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All?*, 87.

¹⁵⁷ *Livre Noir: Faits et Preuves des Actes d’Agression et d’Annexion du Vietnam contre le Kampuchéa* [Black Paper : Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea]. (Phnom Penh, Cambodia : Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, 1978), 6-7.

¹⁵⁸ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 2, 462. Kiernan states that Muslim Cham urbanites received particularly harsh treatment due to their urban origin (as “new people”) and CPK cadres deliberately kept them in isolation. As Stephen Heder notes, Cham deportees “were last on the distribution lists, first on the execution lists, and had no political rights.” Stephen R. Heder, *Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance*. (Bangkok, Thailand: Chulalonghorn University Press, 1980), 6. On the treatment of ethnic Chinese in DK, see Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 188, 235, 250, 288-296. On ethnic Chinese in Cambodia, see William Willmott, *The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia*. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1970); and William Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia*. (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1967).

most pronounced feature of his faith brand of Maoism, and speaks to Kiernan’s assessment of the CPK under Pol Pot as hell-bent on national revival.

On anti-Vietnamese features in Pol Pot-ism, Philip Short notes that this was no recent trend among many Cambodians’ thinking. Cambodians, he argues, had “a national inferiority complex which took refuge in dreams of ancient grandeur.”¹⁵⁹ Nowhere was this more evident than in Pol Pot’s memory, as his experiences as a student under the French, then under the Vietnamese as a revolutionary, had always relegated him to the periphery of larger designs. In the dissertation’s fourth chapter, we discussed Saloth Sar’s/Pol Pot’s time as a student in Paris and the role of Keng Vannsak in organizing the *Cercle Marxiste*. Keng’s doctoral dissertation on “Original Culture,” which regarded Buddhism and Hinduism as foreign contaminants on the purity of Khmer culture, influenced Pol Pot to the extent that he took it upon himself to publish under the pseudonym ឃ្លាតដើម (Original Khmer).¹⁶⁰ This paired with his negative experiences with Vietnamese leftists, who at Geneva “sold out” the Khmer movement and in Hanoi had told him that his Khmer programme was unsophisticated, to instill in him a vitriolic hatred of the Vietnamese, which soon extended to all of Cambodia’s ethnic minorities. Rather than the “embedded enemy boring holes from within the ranks of the revolution,” these *visible* enemies posed as impediments to socialist development and, thus, had to be removed by the Party to realize its vision of socialist utopia.¹⁶¹ In Pol Pot’s mind, Khmers were pure and “full of goodwill,” whereas the Vietnamese, whom he called “Yuon,” were evil and “perfidious.”¹⁶²

Despite CPK participation with Vietnamese Communists during the movement to take state power,¹⁶³ the former “brothers in arms” were now the CPK leadership’s scapegoat, with “Yuon”—a name “given by Kampuchea’s people to the Vietnamese since the epoch of Angkor”

¹⁵⁹ Short, *Pol Pot*, 25.

¹⁶⁰ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 28-29, 543-544.

¹⁶¹ “Revolutionary Male and Female Youths Go On Constant Mighty Offensives and Defend at Great Magnificent Leap Speed,” យុវជននិងយុវនារីបដិវត្តន៍ជ្រាន់ក្តី-រៀនច្រាន់ [Revolutionary Youth, Issue 7-8 (Phnom Penh)] July-August 1977, 4. Documentation Center of Cambodia, Document Number D21402.

¹⁶² *Livre Noir*, 18-19, 21.

¹⁶³ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 71. Tan Hao, a resident of Region 11 of the CPK Zones, recalled this cooperation in an interview with Kiernan: “the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese cooperated with each other. Some of the local people liked the Vietnamese a lot, because they did many good things... They visited from house to house, and occasionally called the people to meetings and taught them about the use of medicine and how to do injections. They didn’t kill anybody; they liked the Khmer people like their own people. They liked the ethnic Chinese too.” Ben Kiernan, “Interview with Tan Hao,” (4 October 1979), as quoted on page 71.

meaning “savage”¹⁶⁴—now meant the “life and death foes and most dangerous to our party, people, and revolution.”¹⁶⁵ Clashes between the CPK military and the neighboring Vietnamese and Thai militaries had begun as early as 1975 (DK forces invaded Phú Quốc island on 1 May 1975, for instance),¹⁶⁶ with the CPK even calling out for a full-scale attack to defeat all fifty million Vietnamese inhabitants by May in 1975:

So far, we have succeeded in implementing this slogan of one against 30; that is to say, we lose one against 30 Vietnamese. Thus, our losses are one-thirtieth of the Vietnamese losses. Using these figures, one Cambodian soldier is equal to 30 Vietnamese soldiers. Then how many Vietnamese are equal to 10 Cambodian soldiers? The answer must be 300. And 100 Cambodians are equal to 3,000 Vietnamese. And 1,000,000 Cambodians are equal to 30,000,000 Vietnamese. We should have 2,000,000 troops for 60,000,000 Vietnamese. However 2,000,000 troops would be more than enough to fight the Vietnamese, because Vietnam has only 50,000,000 inhabitants. We don't have to engage 8,000,000 people. We need only 2,000,000 troops to crush the 50,000,000 Vietnamese, and we would still have 6,000,000 people left. We must formulate our combat line in this manner, in order to win victory. This is the combat line to be implemented on the battlefield.¹⁶⁷

Though a period of peace began the following year,¹⁶⁸ tensions rose once again, as the Party came under Pol Pot's helmsmanship in 1976.¹⁶⁹ After several attempts to display each respective

¹⁶⁴ *Livre Noir*, 9n1.

¹⁶⁵ “Pay Attention to Sweeping Out the Concealed Enemy Boring from Within Even More Cleanly,” ទង្របដីវត្តន៍ គ្រវង់ត្រីវ [Revolutionary Flag 7 (Phnom Penh)] (July 1978): 1-4, on page 1. Documentation Center of Cambodia, Document Number D14579.

¹⁶⁶ An issue of *Revolutionary Flag* describes the CPK's assessment of the Thai as follows: “The Yuon are the ones who are in strongest and deepest contradiction with us. The Thai are also in strong contradiction with us, but of a more immediate quality... The contemptible Thai military has risen to state power and penetrated our land over and over again. It keeps its mouth shut about penetrating our land. But whenever we counterattack and drive it back to its territory, it screams and shouts. It uses border strongholds and stepping stones for attacking us... Its strategy is to cut off the road [to Bangkok]... There are... contradictions between the people and the ruling class [of Thailand]. There are contradictions within the ruling class. There is a perennial state of coup d'état. Their contemptible soldiers are even carrying out coups d'état against themselves... The Thai reactionaries therefore possess not forces with which to attack us and worry us. Their situation is one of weakness: they are politically weak within the country, weak in terms of foreign policy and weak militarily. The situation of the Thai revolution is very good. It has a lot of capital in terms of subjective conditions and good objective conditions.” “Learn from the Political, Ideological and Organizational Experiences in Fulfilling the Party's 1977 Revolutionary Duties in Order to Impel Forward Victoriously the Implementation of 1978 Duties,” ទង្របដីវត្តន៍ [Revolutionary Flag, Special Number (Phnom Penh)] (December-January 1977-1978), 10, 12, 18.

¹⁶⁷ Democratic Kampuchea, “Cambodia's Strategy of Defense Against Vietnam,” (15 May 1975) [http://www.dccam.org/Archives/Documents/DK_Policy/DK_Policy_Cam_Defence_VN.html] Accessed 2 December 2016).

¹⁶⁸ Stephen J. Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 94. In July 1976, Radio Phnom Penh proclaimed the “militant solidarity and friendship between peoples of Democratic Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam grow constantly greener and sturdier.”

¹⁶⁹ Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia*, 94-98.

Party's willingness to work together peacefully, whether through laudatory salutes or the establishment of the Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh City air link, the CPK leadership had a falling out with Pham Van Dong and Le Duan of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). As Stephen Morris notes, Le and Pham were wary of Pol Pot's Maoist and pro-China position, regarding his clique as a group of "bad people" who threatened the VCP's genuine Marxist-Leninist movement in the former French Indochina.¹⁷⁰ In response, DK launched a purification program "by which they aimed to eliminate the Vietnamese in their own version of a 'final solution.'"¹⁷¹

By the time that the CPK's announced itself to the world in 1977 with Pol Pot as its leader, the seething hatred of the Vietnamese boiled over and became the most defining feature of Pol Pot-ism. A 1978 document, for instance, dehumanizes the Vietnamese as "running dogs" and links them with the vaunted CIA and the Soviet KGB (likely as a jab against their allegiance to Moscow).¹⁷² What was the motivation behind such accusations? Pol Pot believed that the Vietnamese wanted to incorporate Cambodia forcefully into an Indochina Federation in which VCP Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and General Secretary Le Duan (the latter of whom Pol Pot reviled from his 1965 exchange) would dictate the affairs for all former Indochinese states. As an issue of *វង្សបដិវត្តន៍* (Revolutionary Flag) displays clearly:

All of this expansion and development (វង្សបដិវត្តន៍) with respect to organizing has been performed on the basis of a maximum spirit of independence/ master/self-support... in the great mass movement to attack and smash the *aggressive, expansionist, territory-swallowing, genocidal Yuon enemy* and in the great mass movement to *sweep cleanly away* the concealed enemies boring from within who are CIA agents, *Yuon running dog agents* and KGB agents, cooperatives throughout the country have played an important

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 96.

¹⁷¹ Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War After the War*. (London: Harcourt, 1986), 86. See also Jennifer S. Berman, "No Place Like Home: Anti-Vietnamese Discrimination and Nationality in Cambodia," *California Law Review* 84, No. 1 (May 1986): 817-874.

¹⁷² As an issue of *Revolutionary Flag* charged: "The Yuon are making two attacks... First, an attack from the outside: In December [1978], the enemy attacked us in a big way. This attack was a nationwide attack... Second, the attack from inside: Military, Political, and Economic... Now the Yuon are furthermore in contradiction with China. This is a Soviet political and military strategy. Now that the quarrel is overt, they don't dare to withdraw forces from the North to attack Kampuchea. They cannot withdraw in division strength. They can only withdraw some cadres from here and there... They cannot press-gang forces from the South, either. They have been in economic difficulties for a long time now, and now the Chinese have also cut aid. According to the Yuon, the Chinese have cut 72 projects, and this makes more difficulties for the Yuon... Our voice is of independence and self-reliance. As for the Yuon, they now no longer have independence: their voice is the voice of the Soviets." "Learning from Important Experiences in the Fulfillment of the Party's first Semester 1978 Political Tasks," *វង្សបដិវត្តន៍* [Revolutionary Flag, Special Issue (Phnom Penh)] (May-June 1978): 6-7, 18.

leading role in carrying out activities fulfilling their missions, bringing about a strategic victory for the nation, the people, the Party and the revolution.¹⁷³

Indeed, Party propagandists emphasized that the Vietnamese worked alongside the “CIA and their agents, the KGB and their agents,” and characterized them as “*territory-swallowing Yuon and the running dogs*” who must be vanquished “throughout the whole Party, throughout the whole army and throughout the people.”¹⁷⁴ The last part here—throughout the people—is noteworthy because of the Party’s continued employment of bodily metaphors since the 1976 “Microbes Speech.” Revolutionary “cleanliness,” ultimately, became the rule of the day, and all outsiders, however real or imagined, had to be “clean” or became an enemy of the CPK.

To play on the most base level of its own beleaguered populace, Party propagandists (especially Pol Pot) rewrote history to demonize the Vietnamese even further as DK’s eternal enemy. This represents one key difference in the working out of our Traveling Theory model *cum* Leninist Response in Cambodia, as Mao was a committed historical materialist and the CCP under his helmsmanship never went off on a *race* or *nationality* in the way that Pol Pot went after the Vietnamese. One document, the *Livre Noir* (Black Paper, by DK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), decried past Vietnamese rulers for having made a “sordid use of girls” to trick Khmers into trusting them—a reference to Chey Chetha again as a victim of Vietnamese treachery—and for inhumane treatment of Khmer laborers in the nineteenth century building of the Vinh Te Canal.¹⁷⁵ The Vietnamese “have often resorted to these sordid methods consisting of selling their girls in order to achieve their annexationist ambitions... and today do not hesitate to carry out the same repugnant methods,” the *Livre Noir* alleged.¹⁷⁶ As for a supposed Vietnamese cruel nature, the *Livre Noir* posited the Vietnamese had an inherent “evil nature,” a negative attitude toward Cambodians, and an overarching “desire to destroy Cambodia and its people.”¹⁷⁷ Thus despite the

¹⁷³ “Another Step in Our Cooperative Victories,” ទង្របដីក្នុងច្រវាវីរ [Revolutionary Flag 7 (Phnom Penh)] (July 1978): 1-8, on pages 1-2. Emphasis added.

¹⁷⁴ Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), “Treatment of the Vietnamese,” [https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/crime-sites/treatment-vietnamese] (Accessed 30 November 2016), quoting ទង្របដីក្នុង [Revolutionary Flag (Phnom Penh)] (April 1977).

¹⁷⁵ Chandler notes that the harsh conditions “probably helped to ignite the 1820 rebellion which broke out nearby and may have included former prospective workers on the canal.” David P. Chandler, “An Anti-Vietnamese Rebellion in Early Nineteenth Century Cambodia: Pre-Colonial Imperialism and a Pre-Nationalist Response,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 6, No. 1 (March 1975): 16-24, on page 18. See also Tran Van Hanh, “Inscription de la Montagne de Vinh Te,” *BSEI*, No. 48(1904) 20-45.

¹⁷⁶ *Livre Noir*, 6.

¹⁷⁷ Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 216. See also *Livre Noir*, 1-93. The document reads: “[T]o maintain vigilance, Kampuchea’s people have kept alive two phrases in their mind. The first one says: “Be careful not to spill the

fact that only about forty-one thousand Vietnamese still inhabiting DK during the CPK reign, the Party under Pol Pot's lead placed the blame for their own mismanagement squarely on this inhuman, treacherous, and historic enemy of the Cambodian people.

In sum, the “Super” Great Leap Forward's aim from the onset was similar to that of the Chinese version in its pursuit of industrializing the country from an underdeveloped one into an industrialized one, but the CPK drew on only the most radical extremes and ignored several realities on the ground. The Party's vision of establishing a “self-sufficient state free of foreign intervention” and “eras[ing] any barriers to the revolution” isolated the shell-shocked country and prevented it from generating sufficient capital to achieve the program's lofty industrialization goals.¹⁷⁸ The CPK stressed its own character as the cause for its leap to pure socialism, and eventually abandoned industrialization in favor of year-round agricultural development.¹⁷⁹ The Party seemingly did not know, or ignored purposefully, that Cambodian soil was among the poorest in Asia and the country lacked either mineral or industrial wealth.¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the CPK under Pol Pot's helmsmanship was certain that it could modernize the country's industry through the aggressive cultivation of rice and solving the “water problem” by building a network of dikes, canals, reservoirs, and irrigation pumps without modern tools.¹⁸¹ In areas where the Chinese version had failed—rich peasant and Party intellectual resistance and

master's tea!” It recalls the barbarous crime committed by the Yuon in 1813 during the digging of the Vinh Te canal. The Yuons buried alive the Khmer people up to their necks and used the latter's heads as a stand for a wood stove to boil water for their master's tea. As they burned and suffered, the victims shook their heads. At that moment, the Yuon torturers said to them, “Be careful not to spill the master's tea.” *Livre Noir*, 9.

¹⁷⁸ Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 116. A secret CPK document does concede that the Party received some outside help: “We have no assistance from outside for industry or agriculture... For us, at present, there is some Chinese aid, but there isn't very much compared [to] other countries. This is our Party's policy.” “Four-Year Plan,” 47.

¹⁷⁹ The absence of steel in the Cambodian Great Leap was striking. There was apparently no effort on behalf of the Party leaders to recognize that iron ore or coal were non-existent resources. Jean Louis Margolin, “Cambodia: The Country of Disconcerting Crimes,” in *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, and Repression*. Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, and Jean Louis Margolin, eds., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 627. See also Jean-Louis Margolin « Le Cambodge des Khmers rouges : de la logique de guerre totale au génocide » *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire*, No. 77 (January-March 2003): 3-18. A CPK pamphlet emphasized repeatedly the Revolutionary Organization's commitment to industries, and contains several pictures of happy workers operating modern machinery despite the CPK's overt commitment to agriculture as the basis. “កម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យណាងទៅមុខ Kampuchéa Démocratique en Marche,” (August 1977), National Archives of Cambodia, Document No. B685, 1-58.

¹⁸⁰ Ponchaud, *Cambodia, Year Zero* 86; and Remy Prud'homme, *L'économie du Cambodge*. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), 75. Kampuchean yields did not increase significantly “beyond one tonne per hectare in the last half century,” as Prud'homme notes. See also Zhou Deshou, “柬埔寨王国经济建设情况 (The Kingdom of Cambodia's Economic Development, pinyin: *Jiānpǔzhài wángguó jīngjì jiànshè qíngkuàng*) 東南亞研究資料 [Southeast Asia Studies (PRC)] (1964): 43-44.

¹⁸¹ “Four-Year Plan,” 51-89. Quote from page 89.

directing rural development from cities—the “Super” Great Leap sought to succeed and outdo. For, as one secret CPK document proclaimed, “we have a different character from them. If we examine our collective character, in terms of a socialist system, *we are four to ten years ahead of them*. We have new relations of production; *nothing is confused*, as it is with them.”¹⁸²

But by 1977, it was clear to Pol Pot that his Party’s errors in calculation had resulted in innumerable casualties. The rice yield was particularly low, the “Super” Great Leap was anything but “Super” or “Great,” and the total casualties caused by starvation, overwork, and disease numbered in the hundreds of thousands.¹⁸³ Unlike Mao, who ultimately acknowledged that his Party had made mistakes with the Great Leap, Pol Pot was unwilling to admit this failure. Instead, he blamed the failings of his disastrous regime on a broad swath of enemies, ranging from class enemies to “Vietnamese provocateurs.”¹⁸⁴ Their revolutionary “character” made them enemies of the DK state and, thus, had to be eliminated. “Character,” indeed, marked a major trend in the Party’s Maoism, as those outsiders who did not possess this feature became the scapegoats for the “Super” Great Leap’s plenitude of failures. Much like in China, *Others* were to blame for the emergence of negatives tendencies, with the glorious *pater familias*, Pol Pot for DK, emerging as the standard-bearer of personal achievement and exemplary practice. As the subsequent section shows, Pol Pot’s vision for the *social transformation* of his people led to some significant departures from Maoism.¹⁸⁵ Some of which include his view that DK consisted solely of workers and peasants (rather than Mao’s analysis, which informed Hu Nim’s 1965 assessment, among others) and that monks, religion, elites and anyone with ties to monarchy had to be eliminated instead of “saving the patient” (Pol Pot did not value United Front traditions).¹⁸⁶ Pol Pot also took a particularly vitriolic stance towards DK’s neighbors and former anticolonial allies, the Vietnamese, who became the quintessential Khmer evil and the prime target for the realization of his slewed vision from greater DK, which entailed reclaiming “lost” Khmer lands

¹⁸² Ibid, 46.

¹⁸³ Ervin Staub notes that by 1976, “an estimated 80 percent of the population suffered from malaria.” Staub, *The Roots of Evil*, 192.

¹⁸⁴ Terry McCarthy, “Vietnamese Flee ‘Cleansing’ by Khmer Rouge: History is Repeating Itself as the Cambodians Turn on their Traditional Scapegoats”, *The Independent*, [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/vietnamese-flee-cleansing-by-khmer-rouge-history-is-repeating-itself-as-the-cambodians-turn-on-their-traditional-scapegoats-1452803.html], 2 April 1993. (Accessed 18 March 2017).

¹⁸⁵ Hinton, *Man or Monster?*, 114.

¹⁸⁶ Mao Zedong, 整頓學風黨文風 (Rectify the Party’s Style of Work, *Zhěngdùn dǎng de zuòfēng*), 毛澤東集卷第五卷 [Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume VIII, *Máo Zédōng jí dì bā juǎn*]. Takeuchi Minoru, ed., (Tokyo: Hokuboshe, 1970-1972), 84.

in South Vietnam.¹⁸⁷ This vehement racialized hatred, which was distinct from earlier examples, extended to his own populace, as workers who did not produce satisfactorily or who had conflicted with their cadre overseers became “Khmer bodies with Vietnamese minds.” The result was CPK program that was hell-bent on the complete erasure of Khmer society as it had existed before the CPK takeover, wherein Buddhist monks, non-Khmers of all types, and anyone with pre-revolutionary thought and tendencies became targets for summary execution.

Social Transformation: “Year Zero” and Beyond

Our CCP, if it makes mistakes, it must take responsibility and fix them. We want to raise a point with you: do not strive to be more active in order to get to the final stage of Communism. You want to be careful, because on the road to Communism there are many dangerous steps... If you ignore prudent and thoughtful methods, then you will certainly bring a catastrophe upon the people... Our China committed this mistake, and I want to advise you [not to repeat it].—Zhou Enlai, 26 August 1975¹⁸⁸

The Draconian rules of life turned Cambodia into a nation-wide gulag, as the Khmer Rouge imposed a revolution more radical and brutal than any other in modern history—a revolution that disturbed even the Chinese, the Cambodian communists’ closest allies. Attachment to home village and love of Buddha, Cambodian verities, were replaced by psychological reorientation, mass relocation, and rigid collectivization. —Sydney Schanberg, *New York Times* journalist who experienced the CPK takeover, 1980¹⁸⁹

This section shifts to the CPK’s *social transformation* during the DK years, examining three dimensions of what the Central Committee referred to as *Year Zero* in the following order: 1) the widespread re-education of *new people* (ប្រជាជនថ្មី, urbanites) in the ways of the *Old People* (មនុស្សពាស, aka. “base people,” ប្រជាជនមូលដ្ឋាន, rural villagers who had lived in CPK liberated zones) to eliminate capitalist/imperialist tendencies; 2) the total erasure of Cambodia’s cultural institutions to create a void that the Party sought to occupy; and 3) the elimination of Party theorists who questioned Pol Pot’s leadership in an even more violent take on SEM-style intra-Party rectification. Here, the section seeks to paint a fuller picture of the CPK’s *implementation* of its chiliastic vision in

¹⁸⁷ Former Cambodian leader Norodom Sihanouk recalled that in a conversation with Pol Pot, the CPK leader asserted that “if there are sugar palm trees, the soil is Khmer.” Since there were these types of trees in Chaudoc and Ha Tien, “we must occupy.” Norodom Sihanouk, “Speech at the Asia Society,” (New York: 22 February 1980).

¹⁸⁸ Yang Mu, 西哈努克國王 [King Sihanouk, *Xihānùkè Guówáng*]. (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 188-189.

¹⁸⁹ Sydney Schanberg, “The Death and Life of Dith Pran: A Story of Cambodia,” *New York Times Magazine* (20 January 1980), 44.

the realms of society and culture, with Pol Pot leaving his imprint, however virulent, on each stage of Cambodia's societal overhauls. It examines the final part of the covert Party Center document "The Party's Four Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, which is titled "The Fields of Revolutionary Culture, Literature, and Art of the Worker-Peasant Class in Accordance with the Party's Proletarian Standpoint." The section's goal is to capture the CPK's designs for a revolutionary "new" culture to replace the "olds" that it, like the CCP during the Cultural Revolution, viewed as a hindrance to revolutionary progress. It also continues to track the transformation of the Party's ongoing shift towards the faith Maoism of the Pol Pot Group.

Not unlike when the French revolutionaries abolished the monarchy and declaration of *An I*, the CPK sought to restructure all of society according to its own greater design for achieving pure socialism. *Year Zero* indeed borrowed its namesake from the French Revolution, which was an early influence on the would-be Maoists before their studies in Paris, and from the Socialist Education Movement and Cultural Revolution in seeking to penetrate all levels of society. As chapter two showed, Mao had sought to crush corruption and "capitalist tendencies" in the rural communes with the SEM rectification movement. As the prelude to the Cultural Revolution, the SEM soon extended to the CCP ranks, and later, became a full-fledged campaign to "破四舊立四新" (Destroy the Four Olds and Cultivate the Four News, *Pò Sìjiù Lì Sìxīn*), wherein the "Four Olds" (四舊, *sì jiù*)—old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas—were replaced with a new revolutionary culture.¹⁹⁰ The CPK's quest to "[c]ontinue the struggle to abolish, uproot, and disperse the cultural, literary, and artistic remnants of the imperialists, colonialists, and all of the other oppressor classes," mirrored Mao's campaign, albeit in a much more extreme way, as virtually *all* pre-revolutionary institutions became targets for erasure.¹⁹¹ The Party ranks, too, were targets, as the chapter's first section showed. "To overturn the basket"—the basket symbolizing Cambodia society in this instance—the CPK chose "only the fruit that suited them perfectly."¹⁹² This meant that "olds" such as authority figures, cultural

¹⁹⁰ Mao Zedong, "Directives Regarding the Cultural Revolution," (1966-1969) [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_84.htm] (Accessed 11 January 2017). See also Wen Chihua and Bruce Jones, *The Red Mirror: Children of China's Cultural Revolution*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

¹⁹¹ "Four-Year Plan," 113.

¹⁹² Ponchaud, *Cambodia: Year Zero*, 70.

symbols, *new people* who the Party deemed were unfit for reform, and *Others* (notably the Vietnamese) were, in CPK view, “*nul profit*” and “*nulle perte*” (no profit and no loss).¹⁹³

After the CPK evacuated every urban center in the country, it confronted the problem of identifying and eliminating potential “enemies,” which were hidden from CPK view while in the swollen cities. While central to the evacuation’s greater design, transforming Cambodian society in accordance to the Party’s Maoist vision was perhaps the most powerful motivation for relocating the entire populace to the countryside. As Hinton notes, the CPK’s ideology was significantly “less appealing to most wealthy, educated urbanites,” who the Party labeled uniformly as “oppressors” and whose comparatively comfortable living and disregard for the struggles of the Cambodian peasant made their compassion for rural suffering virtually non-existent in Party leaders’ view.¹⁹⁴ The major question for the CPK was, “what to do with the ‘*new people*’?” Were they worthy of Mao-era save the patient-style rehabilitation? Or, to borrow from the Party parlance, were they “unclean” in thinking and action?

Much like in the CCP’s SEM, wherein corrupt rural cadres and Party members with capitalist tendencies were sent-down to work alongside the peasants and reform through labor, so too did the *new people*, who, once relocated, were to labor strenuously as the peasants had done before the Communist seizure of power. Initially, the CPK preferred, at least rhetorically, reforming *new people* through labor; to be “comrade ox” and think only of labor and following Party instructions without hesitation.¹⁹⁵ CPK propagandists declared individualism as a disease, while undertaking strenuous efforts to stress the importance of the collective. The CPK attacked the “chronic diseases of Khmer bureaucrats,” notably “officiousness, authoritarianism, and affecting the lifestyle different from that of the peasant.”¹⁹⁶ Former CPK cadre Ith Sarin recalled that this widespread attack extended to all Party levels regardless of rank, and was often at the crux of self-criticism sessions:

All personnel of the “Angkar,” including military and ordinary peasants, engage in weekly criticism and self-criticism sessions aimed to root out ‘individualistic, personal’ character traits. Cadre also perform[ed] required manual activities such as chopping

¹⁹³ Soizick Crochet, *Le Cambodge*. (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1997), 115. Emphasis added.

¹⁹⁴ Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 76.

¹⁹⁵ Cook, “Third World Maoism,” in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*, 302-303. On “comrade ox,” see Pin Yathay, *Stay Alive, My Son*, 171; and Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 222.

¹⁹⁶ Carney, “Continuity in Cambodian Communism,” in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea*, 11.

firewood and helping out during the agricultural cycle, all the while carefully watching each other for non-revolutionary behavior in eating, drinking, talking, late-rising, etc. This combination of criticism/self-criticism for all and manual activities for the cadre aims to build proper socialists and prepares the cadre to endure future hardships... Cadre-building concentrated on forcing 'Angkar' officials to 'study from the people to become like the people.'¹⁹⁷

The model of behavior and action that the CPK leaders admired, though neither Pol Pot nor Central Committee mainstay and former Head of State Khieu Samphan had ever experienced an inkling of it, was the ways of the *old people*, the rural workers who had lived in the CPK liberated zones during the movement. *Old people* constituted Cambodia's poorer strata and were the target audience for many of the Party's millenarian promises for upward social mobility, improved living standards, and national redemption. Yet as the CPK grew increasingly suspicious of internal "enemies," *new people* became even more expendable, and indeed, suffered mightily throughout the DK era. *New people* often received considerably less food while CPK cadres were more willing to execute them for misdoings, while cadres often reminded them that old society, which had afforded them a carefree and easy life, was long gone. This was Democratic Kampuchea, and no longer would the sufferings of the rural poor at the hands of consumerism, Cambodia's declining handicraft industries, and usury that came with the nation's capitalist exploitation, go unchecked.¹⁹⁸

In the CPK's self-aggrandizement as "an almost divine, 'clear-sighted,' 'enlightened' entity," Hinton contends, it was "revamping Communist ideology in terms of local idioms that ideally would be more meaningful to the population. Like the Buddha, *Angkar* was an enlightened and all-knowing center from which power radiated. Like the Bayon [បាយ័ន, a twelfth century state temple of Khmer ruler Jayavarman VII] *Angkar* was an *axis mundi* that encompassed all the lands, seeing everything with its many eyes. Like Jayavarman VII, *Angkar* was a dominant ruler whose power flowed outward, providing comforting shade to the masses it controlled."¹⁹⁹ Indeed, to transform all *new people* into "comrade ox," the CPK enforced with an iron fist a rigorous disciplinary regimen that blended long and hard workdays with total supervision. Discipline is power, "a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of

¹⁹⁷ Ith Sarin, ស្រឡាញ់ស្រីកម្ពុជា [Sympathy for the Khmer Soul]. (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1973), 48.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 86.

¹⁹⁹ Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 29.

instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of applications,” as Foucault notes.²⁰⁰ Such an “exercise of discipline,” Foucault notes further, “presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of power.”²⁰¹ The CPK’s omnipresence as the secretive *Angkar* (its name until Pol Pot’s “big reveal” in 1977), which slogans described as an all-seeing entity that “has the many eyes of a pineapple” (អង្គការក្រៃកម្ពស់បានជាមើលមិនឃើញប្រជាជន),²⁰² ultimately enforced a culture of “hypervigilance” and strict obedience to Party-designated behavioral and thinking norms.²⁰³ Pol Pot, in particular, drew from Mao’s “blank page” metaphor, referring to young cadres as “soft clay” that was ready to be molded into whatever the Party apparatus required, or as “newborns” that are bereft of filth and want.²⁰⁴ *Year Zero*, as it turns out, was for DK’s young and the *old people*, whose minds were not stained by the corruption, consumerism, and comfortable dalliances of pre-revolutionary Cambodia. “This is the year zero... and nothing has gone before,” Haing S. Ngor (genocide survivor and actor) stated in his portrayal of Dith Pran, a fellow CPK victim and survivor, in Roland Joffé’s critically acclaimed 1984 film *The Killing Fields*.

On revolutionary culture, an issue of ទង្វើវត្ត (Revolutionary Flag) announced that those in the CPK ministries and offices “must be clean, particularly in the various leadership level ministries and offices. The requirement of political and ideological cleanliness is a prerogative requirement.”²⁰⁵ At the core of revolutionary cleanliness was the elimination of “old roots,” which, as another article stated, “it is imperative to whip-up the people to sweep more of them clean and make things permanently clean.”²⁰⁶ The Party thus went about designing a “new” revolutionary culture in a 1977 document, with an entire section devoted to its construction. In the first section, the document outlines the Party’s twofold approach to establishing a

²⁰⁰ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 215.

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, 170-171.

²⁰² Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 112-114. Quote from page 114.

²⁰³ Daniel Bultmann, *Inside Cambodian Insurgency: A Sociological Perspective on Civil Wars and Conflict*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015), 98. See also Peg Levine, *Love and Dread in Cambodia: Weddings, Births, and Ritual Harm Under the Khmer Rouge*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2010), 210.

²⁰⁴ Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, 143-144. See also Colin Flint and Scott Kirsch, *Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 60-62.

²⁰⁵ “Learn from the Political, Ideological and Organizational Experiences in Fulfilling the Party’s 1977 Revolutionary Duties in Order to Impel Forward Victoriously the Implementation of 1978 Duties,” ទង្វើវត្ត [Revolutionary Flag, Special Number (Phnom Penh)] (December-January 1977-1978), 11.

²⁰⁶ Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), “Treatment of the Vietnamese,” [https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/crime-sites/treatment-vietnamese] (Accessed 30 November 2016), quoting ទង្វើវត្ត [Revolutionary Flag (Phnom Penh)] (April 1977).

revolutionary culture. First, it states that the CPK will “abolish, uproot, and disperse the cultural, literary, and artistic remnants of the imperialists, colonialists, and all of the other oppressor classes,” which it viewed as “olds” in DK that could derail its quest to pure socialism.²⁰⁷ Second, the document elicits that the Party will “strengthen and expand the building of revolutionary culture, literature, and art of the worker-peasant class in accordance with the Party’s proletarian standpoint,”²⁰⁸ a clear homage to Mao’s emphasis on proletarian culture.²⁰⁹ How did the Party nurture revolutionary culture, political awareness, and consciousness among the workers and peasants? As the document outlines, the Party sought to undertake several procedures, including educating and nurturing the people in “politics and consciousness for them to grasp and submerge themselves in the task of building socialism to a concrete plan, for them to see the possibility of a bright future in terms of their living standards and those of the country.”²¹⁰ The “worker-peasant masses” would also hear only revolutionary songs and poems that “reflect good models in the period of political/armed struggle and in the revolutionary war for national and people’s liberation, in the period of national-democratic revolution, and... describe good models in the period of socialist revolution and the building of socialism.”²¹¹ The CPK’s goal, ultimately, was to immerse DK’s populace in a revolutionary culture that held the Party and nation as the pinnacles of revolution and socialist edification as the goal that it was working to achieve through mass collective labor.

In the realm of education, meanwhile, the CPK pursued a programme of “half study, half work for material production.”²¹² Accordingly, education under the CPK took the following form:

In our educational system there are no examinations and no certificates; it is a system of learning through the collective and in the concrete movement of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism in the specific bases especially the cooperatives, factories, and military units... [The people must learn] the history of the revolutionary struggle of the people, the revolutionary struggle for the nation, the revolutionary struggle for democracy, the revolutionary struggle for socialist revolution, and the struggle to build socialism... [and] the Party’s politics, consciousness, and organization... We must choose (people with) backgrounds that adhere to the revolutionary movement and have

²⁰⁷ “Four-Year Plan,” 113.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Mao Zedong, “新民主主義論 (On New Democracy),” in 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi, ed., 147-206.

²¹⁰ “Four-Year Plan,” 118.

²¹¹ Ibid, 113

²¹² Ibid.

the quality to grasp the Party's educational line and are able to apply it concretely and continuously strengthen and expand their own capacity in the concrete movement.²¹³

Indeed, instruction in DK entailed organizing “listening sessions” wherein cadres and workers alike would listen to state-controlled *Radio Phnom Penh* broadcasts via “loud speakers for all important places and mobile work brigades,” and would watch “[f]ilms of the revolutionary movement's present and past, especially the present.”²¹⁴ From 1977 onward, the Party pledged through this document, only people with “clean backgrounds,” which meant Party-approved class origins, could serve as instructors of the CPK's messianic message and revolutionary goals of independence-mastery, pure socialism, and national sovereignty.²¹⁵ The issue, however, was that the traditional educators of the country—Buddhist monks—were “olds” in DK and, thus, of no further use to the CPK in realizing its vision. The Party therefore went about eradicating the Buddhist *Sangha*, which it viewed as impeding socialist development and revolutionary progress.

The Khmer realms' traditional intelligentsia, Buddhist monks and nuns were perhaps the most significant “old” that the CPK sought to erase from DK. Ironically, many of the CPK's policies are identical to and possibly informed by Buddhist practices, as Ian Harris has argued, and the Party had once politicized and mobilized monks for its own designs.²¹⁶ Pol Pot even acknowledged that monks were a cog in the CPK's moving revolutionary wheel:

As for tactical forces, they [monks] are the prominent people from the feudal aristocracy, the comprador capitalist class or the landlord class, who are willing to struggle to some extent against the enemy. We tried to unite all these people. Samdech Penn Nouth and Samdech Sihanouk, Samdech supreme Patriarch Chou Nath of the Mohanikay Buddhist Order and the Samdech Supreme Patriarch of the Thumavuth Buddhist Order are

²¹³ Ibid, 114.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid, 117-118. The document states further: [T]here must be: 1) good political work; 2) Good consciousness work; 3) Good organizational work; 4) Absolutely implement the Party's revolutionary authority over the counter-revolutionaries; 5) Implement democracy well for the worker-peasant people in order to strengthen and expand their belief in the revolution, and stir up the great mass movement strongly and continuously; 6) Build up concretely, according to background—build workers and peasants, and build various class layers who are taking up lives as new peasants or workers [including] intellectuals, petty bourgeois, capitalists, feudal landlords, [and] former government officials.”

²¹⁶ Ian Harris, *Buddhism in a Dark Age: Cambodian Monks Under Pol Pot*. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2013), 43-44. However, Harris argues that whereas in some areas this Buddhist influence was “explicit” in others “it led to the inversion of customary Buddhist modes of praxis.” On page 63. For a deeper analysis, see Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, in *passim*.

prominent people whom we strove to rally. We rallied everybody. Our line was right and we applied it correctly.”²¹⁷

In DK, however, CPK soldiers now targeted Buddhist monks and nuns for extermination. The process of cultural erasure began almost immediately in 1975 when the CPK officially abolished Buddhism along with Islam.²¹⁸ Soldiers then ransacked and razed Buddhist temples—estimates state that more than one-third of Cambodia’s 3,300 *wats*²¹⁹—and defiled and destroyed Buddha statues, as well as burned sacred Buddhist relics and texts.²²⁰ In the countryside, cadres pushed monks away violently from their usual study of classical scriptures and practices of meditation and towards “productive” labor, with cadres defrocking and murdering thousands of Buddhist monks between 1975 and 1979.²²¹ Cadres also murdered monks who refused to disrobe and relocate to the fields instantly, and all head ecclesiastics were dead within the first few years of Party rule.²²² Indeed, “[c]ountless Buddhist monks,” Chanthou Boua states, “met their demise at the hands of the [CPK],” which in a 1975 Central Committee document boasted that “90 to 95 percent” of monks were dead, Cambodia’s monasteries were now “largely abandoned, and the “foundation pillars of Buddhism... have disintegrated... [and] will dissolve further.”²²³ By the regime’s fall in 1979, upwards of sixty-three percent of the country’s *Sangha* (Buddhist community) had died via starvation, overwork, of summary execution, and ninety percent of Cambodia’s Buddhist literary history had vanished or was destroyed.²²⁴

Party plans to cleanse the country of “olds” extended to the Party hierarchy, as the Pol Pot Group sought to purge all leading figures who held tenaciously or even tenuously to a now

²¹⁷ Pol Pot, « Discours prononcé par le camarade Pol Pot » 31.

²¹⁸ Edward Kissi, *Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia*. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 68.

²¹⁹ Thomas Banchoff, *Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 131.

²²⁰ Chhean Kong, “On Buddhism and Psychotherapy,” in *Not Just victims: Conversations with Cambodian Community Leaders in the United States*. Sucheng Chan ed., Audrey U. Kim, int. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 77.

²²¹ Banchoff, *Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics*, 131. “Of the sixty thousand Buddhist monks only three thousand were found alive after the Khmer Rouge reign; the rest had either been massacred or succumbed to hard labor, disease, or torture.” Sydney Schanberg, *Beyond the Killing Fields: War Writings*. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2010), 2. See also Craig Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005), 68.

²²² Judy Ledgerwood, “Ritual in 1990 Cambodian Political Theater,” in *At the Edge of the Forest: Essays on Cambodia, History, and Narrative in Honor of David Chandler*. Anne Ruth Hansen and Judy Ledgerwood, eds. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2008), 204.

²²³ Chanthou Boua, “Genocide of a Religious Group: Pol Pot and Cambodia’s Buddhist Monks,” in *State-Organized Terror: The Case of Violent Internal Repression*. P. Timothy Bushnell, Vladimir Schlapentokh, Christopher Vanderpool, and Jeyaratnam Sundram, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 221-240. Quote from page 236.

²²⁴ Ledgerwood, “Ritual in 1990 Cambodian Political Theater,” in *At the Edge of the Forest*, 204.

outdated brand of Cambodian Maoism in an effort to galvanize the CPK ranks. “A strong Party,” one CPK document reads, “means the plan [Four Year Plan] will be fulfilled well...The Party must grasp it firmly so all over the country (we) must build up the Party... [which] must grasp the Plan in general, and must grasp the annual, trimester, and semester plans. So it is not just the Centre but [also] the Party throughout the country.”²²⁵ Thus any forces at work that might jeopardize the “strong Party” and, by extension, the Zone and District levels, were targets for elimination. As the chapter’s first section discussed, dissenting CPK leaders soon found themselves at S-21, and many became victims of falling on the wrong side of Pol Pot’s favor. One such victim was Keo Meas (កែវមេស, 1926–1976),²²⁶ a high profile Central Committee member who was on the wrong side of the CPK’s internal factionalism. A devoted Maoist and ex-ambassador to Communist China for the former GRUNK (*Gouvernement Royal d’Union Nationale du Kampuchéa*, រាជរដ្ឋាភិបាលប្រជាជាតិកម្ពុជា), Meas had traveled with Pol Pot (then Saloth Sar) on his 1965-1966 travels through Hanoi en route to Beijing, though Meas fell ill and did not join him in the Chinese capital.²²⁷ Now an official in the CPK Central Committee, Meas’ advocacy for close ties with Communist China and “applying Mao Zedong Thought to the Kampuchean situation” had led Pol Pot’s faction to consider him “traitorous” to DK,²²⁸ even though Pol Pot credited Mao and his thought in a eulogy the exact same year and again a year later in Beijing.²²⁹ Nevertheless, Pol Pot’s faith Maoist loyalists were hell-bent on weeding out the old “microbes,” including those who still held aloft the banner of Mao Zedong Thought.

²²⁵ “Four-Year Plan,” 116-117. A United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia Report (1999) cited the following as evidence that the CPK targeted Buddhist monks: “The Khmer rouge’s intensely hostile statements towards religion, and the monk hood in particular; the Khmer Rouge’s policies to eradicate the physical and ritualistic aspects of the Buddhist religion; the disrobing of monks and abolition of monk hood; the number of victims; and the executions of Buddhist leaders and recalcitrant monks.” Thomas W. Simon, *The Laws of Genocide: Prescriptions for a Just World*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2007), 104.

²²⁶ On Keo Meas’ political and revolutionary career, see Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 52-53, 79-82, 118-131, 153-201, 280-318, 359.

²²⁷ Philip Short notes that Pol Pot went to Beijing alone since Keo Meas stayed put in Hanoi to nurse a gall-bladder infection. Short, *Pol Pot*, 159. See also Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 297. On Meas’ Pracheachon connection, see Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 164; and Sorpong Peou, *Intervention & Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 113n73.

²²⁸ Stephen R. Heder, “Khmer Rouge Opposition to Pol Pot: ‘Pro-Vietnamese’ or ‘Pro-Chinese,’” in *Reflections of Cambodian Political History*. Stephen R. Heder, ed. (Canberra, Australia: Australia National University, Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 239, 1991), 8, quoting Keo Meas’ documents dated 25 September 1976.

²²⁹ Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea,” 296. On his 1977 visit, see “在中共中央，國務院舉行的歡迎宴會上，波爾布特書記講話 (Speech at the Welcoming Banquet Held by the CPC Central Committee and the

A hallmark example of Keo Meas' pro-Maoist stance and the CPK's changed attitude towards pro-China elements are a series of letters that Meas wrote during his imprisonment at S-21 (Tuol Sleng) prison in 1976. A 25 September 1976 letter that Meas penned to Pol Pot declared openly that the CCP course "was a correct one upon which we could rely as a fall-back, and that if we didn't fall back on it, we would be unable to detach ourselves from Viet Nam and the Soviets."²³⁰ Another letter, from 30 September, lauded China as the "greatest friend of the Kampuchean people" and the "large and reliable rear fallback of the Kampuchean and world revolution."²³¹ The CPK in particular and the Khmer revolution on whole, he argued, ought to rely on the CCP "in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism... stand[ing] firmly on [our] own forces with independence and mastery and by deciding our national destiny ourselves" since both the Chinese revolution and Mao Zedong Thought were forerunners to the Cambodian revolutionary movement.²³² As his last letter before his execution stated:

I have done nothing but try to learn from the lessons of the Kampuchean revolution and from the implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat by all Parties holding power, both the lessons of their mistakes and what they have done right, in order to avoid completely their mistakes and establish good praxis, so that they revolutionary state power will not be able to change color, and so that the capitalists and the revisionists will not be able to raise their heads again. I have in particular examined the lessons of the Communist Party of China, of Chairman Mao's analysis of the resolution of problems...

Meas' devotion to his ideological forebear remained resolute even while facing down his own demise. He declared, according to Stephen Heder, that he was "preparing slogans" as last rites before his death, among which was "Long Live Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought!"²³³ The CPK cadre who was charged by Pol Pot's security force to carry out the execution replied with a comment that was characteristic of the Pol Pot regime, one that stressed uniqueness and disavowed any link to Communist China or Mao: "This contemptible Mao who got the horrible death he deserved was worthless. You shouldn't think, you antique bastard, that the Kampuchean

State Council),” 人民日報, 新華社 [People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency (China)] (29 September 1977); and Pol Pot, « Allocation du Camarade Pol Pot » (Beijing : 28 September 1977). National Archives of Cambodia, Box 685.

²³⁰ Heder, "Khmer Rouge Opposition to Pol Pot," in *Reflections of Cambodian Political History*, 8, quoting Keo Meas' documents dated 25 September 1976.

²³¹ Ibid, quoting Keo Meas' documents dated 30 September 1976.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid, 9-10, quoting Keo Meas' documents dated 7 October 1976. Also in Ben Kiernan, "External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology," in *The Third Indochina War*, 206. See also Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea," 288-300.

Party has been influenced by Mao. Kampuchea is Kampuchea.”²³⁴ Meas was executed by CPK order at Tuol Sleng in 1976.²³⁵

Another Maoist intellectual Central Committee member to die because of a disagreement with Pol Pot was CPK founder and then-DK Minister of Propaganda Hu Nim, who, like Yuon and Meas, had ties with China and was openly Maoist. His 1965 dissertation, leadership role within the AAKC, and close connection to the PRC embassy in Phnom Penh,²³⁶ are just a few examples of his pro-Chinese stance, though like his peers, ideological inspiration was not at conflict with a commitment to the CPK and DK. But despite his prominent role within the Party as one of DK’s architects and a high-ranking minister (Hu Nim served as CPK spokesman during the 1975 Mayaguez incident) he, too, became a victim of Pol Pot’s purges.²³⁷ By late 1976, a CPK cadre by the name of Prum Samma (ជ្រុំសាម៉ា) had drawn Nuon Chea, “one of the most devoted followers of Pol Pot,” to suspect him.²³⁸ Samma had been a vocal critic of some of the Party’s procedures, most notably some avoidable deaths, the Party’s wide-scale evacuation of Cambodia’s cities, and the CPK’s “insistence on constantly ‘intensifying class struggle,’” which to him only added rather than eliminated enemies.²³⁹ By 10 April 1977, the CPK Central Committee ordered Hu Nim’s arrest and detainment at S-21 because of this testimonial by Samma, who, the Party believed, implicated Nim as a potential agent working to derail the CPK revolution.

²³⁴ Ibid, 9-10, quoting Keo Meas’ documents dated 7 October 1976; Kiernan, “External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology,” in *The Third Indochina War*, 206; and Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea,” 288-300.

²³⁵ Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, 420.

²³⁶ See chapter 4. Sources: Hu Nim, « Les services publics économiques au Cambodge » (Thèse de Doctorat en Droit Public, Université Royale, Phnom Penh, 1965), *in passim*. On his ties with China, see « La naissance de l’Association D’amitié Khméro-Chinoise » in *Revue trimestrielle de l’Association d’amitié khméro-chinoise*, Ministry of Information, No. 1 (January 1965): 15; and “Planning the Past,” Chanthou Boua, trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*.

²³⁷ Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and its People*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 197.

²³⁸ Dmitry Mosyakov, “The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives,” in *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*. Susan E. Cook, ed., (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 67. On page 54 of the Yale Genocide Studies Program edition.

²³⁹ Stephen R. Heder and Brian Tittmore, “Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge,” (Washington, DC: War Crimes Research Office, Washington College of Law, American University and Coalition for International Justice, 2001), 83n373. [<https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/khmerrouge.pdf>]. (Accessed 18 March 2017).

What was the reason for his sentence? Not unlike Hou Yuon and Keo Meas, Hu Nim had some reservations about CPK policies.²⁴⁰ Nim allegedly urged the CPK leadership to reverse its decision to abolish all currency, and noted in his confession that Northwestern Zone Secretary Nhem Ros and comrade Sao Phim agreed with his critical stance on the Party's pursuit of self-reliance without adequate machinery to improve production.²⁴¹ As Hu Nim, quoting Nhem Ros, described further:

'Now for this year 1976, the Party has assigned us the task of achieving three tons [of paddy] per hectare throughout the whole country. As for the Northwest... the Party has assigned us four tons per hectare.' I [Hu Nim] asked brother Nhim, 'So xan you fulfill the Organization's plan?' Nhim immediately replied: 'How can we [fulfill the Great Leap's Plan] if there is no solution to the problem of machinery? We cannot. This is not my fault, it's the fault of the Standing Committee.'²⁴²

Evidently, Hu Nim is voicing his own criticism of the Party's program through the voice of someone else, as Chandler has noted previously.²⁴³ A reading of Nim's 1965 doctoral dissertation supports this hypothesis since Nim made machinery and peasant access to tools essential to Cambodia's agricultural development, and he lauded China's "Little Leap" for its amelioration of China's light industries.²⁴⁴ To include this critique in his "confession" was, among other examples, a veiled attempt to push his own voice through the thicket of what the CPK wanted him to confess. Hu Nim was indeed every bit the "dedicated revolutionary" in spite of his criticisms, and until his death he was willing to accept his Party's decision to execute him.²⁴⁵

Importantly, Hu Nim's S-21 "confession" allows us to peer through the dense fog of CPK ideology and practice and uncover the extent to which Pol Pot went to discredit rivals and legitimize his helmsmanship.²⁴⁶ While Nim composed the confession under significant duress

²⁴⁰ Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapple*, 120.

²⁴¹ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, 351; and Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 64-65.

²⁴² "Planning the Past: The Forced Confessions of Hu Nim, Tuol Sleng Prison, May-June 1977," Chanthou Boua, trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 293. Also quoted in Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 65.

²⁴³ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 65.

²⁴⁴ See chapter 4. On Nim's praise for China's Little Leap, see Nim, «Les services publics économiques au Cambodge» 46-49.

²⁴⁵ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 64.

²⁴⁶ "Planning the Past," Chanthou Boua, trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future. in passim*, especially 311-313. See also Heder and Tittlemore, "Seven Candidates for Prosecution," 83n373. For more on Hu Nim's confession, Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 64; and James Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide, and the Unmaking of Space*. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 145-146.

and months of torture, it does tell us some valuable details about the Party's turn from the amorphous *Angkar* that was characterized by collective leadership and a harmonious balance of Yan'an (Paris Group) Maoists and faith (Polpotist) Maoists to the faith Maoist-based Polpot-ism. For instance, as Chandler notes, the "confession" is indicative of a violent turn in CPK policy vis-à-vis its membership in 1977 and 1978—a period during which numerous purges occurred—and represents "a classic case of scapegoating by the Party Center."²⁴⁷ Indeed, as Hu Nim "confesses," "I am a counterfeit revolutionary, in fact I am an agent of the enemy, the enemy of the people, and the nation of Kampuchea, and the Communist Party of Kampuchea. I am the cheapest reactionary intellectual disguised as a revolutionary."²⁴⁸ Even more representative of this is his outright admitting to fraudulence and revolutionary malpractice, with which Nim concludes his confession:

During my life, over the twenty-five years that have passed (1952-1977) I gave myself over very cheaply into the service of the enemy's activities. Strong private property habits imposed on me by the feudal and capitalist classes and the imperialists, suppressed me and made me become an enemy agent. I served the...CIA and the American imperialists who have now been shamefully defeated, and I have received my present fate. Over the past month and a half I have received a lot of education from the Party. I have nothing to depend on, only the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Would the Party please show clemency toward me[?] My life is completely dependent on the Party. If there is anything wrong with this report, would the Party please show clemency[?]²⁴⁹

Not unlike the CPK's earlier effort to alter the 17 April people's consciousness *in toto*, the transformation of convicted Party officials, now branded the regime as enemy agents/microbes, also had to be total. Here, Nim gives us a glimpse of this line of policy. The Pol Pot Group required that its enemies were total frauds, capitalists, CIA agents, and/or working with the confounded Vietnamese, although the opposite was true. By isolating rivals such as Hu Nim, who had committed so much to the Cambodian Communist vision, Pol Pot was able to entrench himself as the uncontested commander of DK. Thereafter, the CPK adopted a new constitution (5 January 1976), which made "Democratic Kampuchea" Cambodia's official name. The Central Committee, meanwhile, established a Representative Assembly and held its inaugural Plenary Meeting (11 to 13 April), at which Pol Pot became DK's Prime Minister, a post that Khieu

²⁴⁷ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 65.

²⁴⁸ "Planning the Past," Chanthou Boua, trans., in *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, 240. Also in Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia*, 145.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 317. Also in Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, 65.

Samphan had occupied previously (he did, however, become President of the State Presidium).²⁵⁰ Both changes ultimately solidified Pol Pot and his loyalists as the driving ideological force behind DK, and with his rivals/critics expunged, it was only a matter of time before the CPK's gruesome leader—the invisible “Brother Number One”—launched one of history's most myopic economic development plans and brutal genocides.

In essence, the CPK's *social transformation* was one of total upheaval within the Party Center and without. Entire cities were laid bare, as millions were forced by CPK soldiers on a death march to rural collectives, where they were to work strenuously for most of their remaining days. This included Buddhist monks, who the Party outlawed and forced to abandon their study of scriptures in favor of toiling alongside the peasantry. Party leaders, too, were not exempt, as former colleagues became enemies seemingly overnight. To voice dissent became a death sentence, and onetime comrades turned on each other with Pol Pot standing firmly atop the Party leadership. He had the reins now, and could direct the revolution in whichever direction he so chose. Polpot-ism soon became the rule of the day; though he lacked the intellectual acumen and fastidiousness of his Paris colleagues, he was the charismatic ruler whose career as a revolutionary gave his vision credence among a coterie of believers and followers. His vitriol towards the Vietnamese who had shunned him preyed upon lingering fears of total annihilation, which the French had sown in the Khmer mindset for decades and which informed Pol Pot's *weltanschauung*. As top officials and experts died, the CPK soon found itself soldiering on absent the novel premises on which it based its Maoist vision—peasant emancipation, ameliorated living standards, and industrial development. The people, by contrast, were now *totally dependent on the Party*, and their living standards were nowhere near improved and the country no closer to industrialization. An estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died during the DK years, and after a foolhardy attempt to reclaim lost territory in Southern Vietnam failed mightily, the Vietnamese counterattack finally ousted Pol Pot from power, after which he and his loyal band of CPK cadres fought along the Thai-Kampuchean border until the 1993 armistice.

²⁵⁰ Philip Short, *Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare*. (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 288.

Conclusion

To conclude, in the Cambodian case we see many of the same processes and subset phases of *implementation*—*consolidation*, *economic reconfiguration*, and *social transformation*—on full display, albeit in much more gruesome forms, as part of a concerted yet horribly grotesque attempt to pursue an alternative modernity as a response to the crises of capitalist imperialism. Indeed, the phases of *implementation* converged in Cambodia as they did in Communist China as a response to modernization. Pol Pot implemented his faith Maoist vision (calling on unquestioning loyalty and faith in whatever pronouncement the Supreme Leader offered), which his 1965-1966 visit to Beijing had inspired, for DK at the expense of his former colleagues, consolidating his rule and centrality to Cambodian Communism in a manner reminiscent to Mao’s Yan’an Rectification (chapter two).²⁵¹ The Party under his aegis also implemented its radical vision of economic reconfiguration, which, like the Great Leap in China, failed spectacularly in its quest to surpass all other rapid industrialization efforts. But unlike in China, where the Leap ended prematurely and Mao “retired” temporarily due to its failure, Pol Pot pursued the rapid cultivation of agriculture at the total expense of industrial production, accepted no wrongdoing, and instead blamed outsiders, both within DK and without. CPK propagandists dehumanized *Others*—nowhere in Mao’s Chinas do we see an ethnic dimension to *Othering* extra-Party enemies— which the CPK leaders under Pol Pot viewed as a justifiable prerequisite to socialism’s edification. This was a particularly unfortunate aspect of Pol Pot’s “talking back” to Maoism, a regrettable Cambodian localization of Maoism that nonetheless reflects their agency in the process of adaptation. The total overhaul of Cambodian society as it had existed before DK was also part of the radical Party vision, with “olds,” as per the Cultural Revolution rhetoric, excised by the CPK as hindrances to its revolution.

Importantly, the subset phases of the CPK’s *implementation* yields us with useful insight toward understanding more fully the problem of ideas in practice across cultures. Mao Zedong Thought exported, as Maoism, contained many useful tenets that had universal applicability in that they were malleable according to setting and situation. Pol Pot witnessed some of these ideas in practice when he visited Beijing in 1965-1966, and his encounter with a Mao-centric Communist China on the cusp of the Cultural Revolution left an imprint on his thinking that he

²⁵¹ For fuller description of faith Maoism, see Introduction, page 10.

would seek to reproduce, and even outdo, in DK. Yet while we find many of the same phases of Mao's *implementation* in DK, the actual form of the CPK's programs differed significantly according to what its leaders viewed as concrete realities. Why was this so? As Chandler argues, the CPK's revolution "did not destroy so many people or fail because it was too Marxist-Leninist or because it was not Marxist-Leninist enough, although Marxism-Leninism in DK was a blunt instrument and a destructive weapon. Rather, the Cambodian revolution crashed to the ground because of the persistence of so many counterrevolutionary ideas among rulers and ruled, so much poor leadership, and so much counterrevolutionary behavior."²⁵² The Pol Pot regime's turn against ethnic minorities and haphazard deviations from Marxism-Leninism-Maoism are indeed unmistakable, and the rejection of Maoism by Pol Pot is clear (especially with the execution of Maoist stalwarts Yuon, Nim, and Meas). The Cambodian Communists did have moderate voices who, were it not for the extreme personality of Pol Pot and his fiery hatred of foreigners, may have provided a moderating voice as a riposte to the ethno-chauvinism that came to characterize *Polpotism* and drive the genocide that claimed nearly two million lives. The rejection of Maoism by Pol Pot is, in fact, very Maoist, as Mao had broken from applying the Soviet model of state socialism of Stalin's era in China. Not unlike Mao's pursuit of a "Chinese road to socialism," which entailed *implementing* Mao Zedong Thought, Pol Pot's effort to achieve pure socialism for DK meant *implementing* his *Polpotism* in (brutal) practice.

²⁵² Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 237.

Part Three—Maoism in the Coral Triangle

Chapter Six: Maoist China and Communism in the Philippines and Indonesia

The glory of saving a country is not for him who has contributed to its ruin... The school of suffering tempers the spirit, the arena of combat strengthens the soul.—José Rizal (1898)¹

A Marxist who wishes to arrive at a *conclusion*... as a guide for action in Indonesia today has to base these conclusions on premises obtaining in Indonesia right now. These premises are the *reflexion* of all factors in present Indonesian society: the technology and the economy, the sociopolitical structure, and the culture and psychology of the Indonesian people.—Tan Malaka, ex-PKI activist and ex-Comintern agent²

In this chapter, we shift to the Philippines and Indonesia, two large island nations where similar phases of *reception* and *adaptation* of Maoism occurred. Post-independence issues of underdevelopment and socioeconomic inequality had prompted disenchanted intellectuals in both countries to question the so-called benefits of “modernization.” The first of two radicals under analysis, an avowed Maoist, is Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) leader José Maria Sison (1939-, aka. Amado Guerrero, the “Mao Zedong of the Philippines”).³ The second is *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) leader Dipa Nusantara (DN) Aidit (1923-1965), who sought to *fit* Marxism-Leninism to the Indonesian situation. Like Mao and the Cambodian Paris Group before them, Sison and Aidit were networked individuals in a situated thinking responding to crises. In applying the genealogical method to their social experiences, travels abroad, exposures to radical thought, and attempts to grapple with ideas from without, we see that they experienced similar forces at work, from their adolescences in colonial/semi-colonial settings to their radical turns to Communism.

As before, the phases of *impact/relational reception*, *conditions of reception*, and *practical* and *normative adaptation* guide us through our chapter, which consists of three sections that examine such phases at work. First, we consider *impact/relational reception* by

¹ José Rizal, *El filibusterismo* [The Subversive, aka. *Reign of Greed* in English translation] Charles Derbyshire trans. (Manila, the Philippines: Philippines Education Society, 1911), 358-360.

² Tan Malaka, “The Birth and Growth of the Republic of Indonesia,” in *From Jail To Jail, Volume III*. Helen Jarvis trans. (Athens OH: Ohio University Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, 1991), 67. Emphasis added by Jarvis.

³ Emerita Dionisio Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*. Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, eds. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997) 365; and Alfredo B. Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction*. (Manila, the Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), 131.

examining Sison, whose name is inseparable from any discussion of the development of the CPP, by tracing his transition from scion of the feudal elite to student activist to full-fledged Communist.⁴ We then analyze Aidit's experiences and encounters in the Dutch East Indies and exposure to Marxism in the lead-up to Indonesian independence, culminating with the formation of the "pemuda efflorescence" that became the leadership of the PKI.⁵ Second, we explore each radical intellectual's *intellectual adaptation* of Marxism-Leninism, or in Sison's case, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, through textual exegesis of writings, speeches, and congress reports.⁶ Third, we investigate the process whereby the radical intellectuals' theories became important to others through *practical* (putting ideas into practice) and *normative* (making ideas congruent with local norms) *adaptations*. While Sison's *adaptation* entailed violent struggle against the ruling government, Aidit sought instead to "Indonesianize" Marxism-Leninism via alliances between its base classes and the national bourgeoisie, and between itself and the ruling anti-imperialist and not anti-Communist *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI, Indonesian National Party) of Sukarno, from 1951 through the era of *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy, 1957-1966). In both cases, radical intellectuals experienced a period during which they sought out new forms to express their political consciousness, whether abroad or in cosmopolitan centers in their own areas, and confronted the realities of the developing world, which pushed them toward radicalism. While their paths diverged, Sison and Aidit were part of extended networks of likeminded persons who sought to engage with Maoism as part of their efforts to make the foreign "speak," all the while *speaking back* in a dialectical engagement with radical thought from without.

Impact/Relational Reception and Conditions in the Philippines and Indonesia

We begin by explaining how the social experiences of Sison and Aidit shaped their respective worldviews. Their experiences in colonial settings and schools, their passages from hinterlands to study in metropolises, and in Sison's case, time abroad, led them to regard Marxism as a critical lens through which to interpret post-independence crises. Our factors of language,

⁴ Distor, "Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines, in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*, 365.

⁵ Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 33-34

⁶ Amado Guerrero, *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines*. (Oakland, CA: International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979); Amado Guerrero, *Victory to Our People's War: Anti-Revisionist Essays by Chairman Amado Guerrero, Communist Party of the Philippines*. (Montreal, QC: Red Flag Publications, 1980; and Amado Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*. (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Pao, 1971).

historical circumstances, and impact on others guide us through their interactions with radical thought streams, and help us to contextualize their encounters in terms of their lasting effect on shaping their political consciousness. The case of Sison (1939-) provides an example of an intellectual who studied abroad to gain knowledge).⁷ Though he grew up in an elite land-owning family family and studied in Catholic private schools in Manila, he was soon to “discover” Marxist works while at the University of the Philippines, a “base for activists reaching out to other universities and colleges throughout the country,” in late 1958.⁸ During his time in Jakarta, his recognition of global structural inequality became more pronounced, pushing him to ground Maoism in Philippine realities. DN Aidit and his cohort of Sudisman (1920-1968), Muhammad Hatta Lukman (1920?-1965), and Njoto (1925-1965), by contrast, did not study abroad as students, but they traveled as well, moving from hinterlands to major centers in the Dutch East Indies where they met influential figures who shaped their worldviews. Aidit and his comrades shared common experiences under Japanese occupation, developing a strong commitment to both revolution and a free Indonesia.⁹ Such experiences included joining Japanese-sponsored youth organizations during the Pacific War, encountering Marxists who influenced them, and ultimately converting to Marxism and resuscitating the PKI.¹⁰ As the younger generation of nationalists, they opted for peaceful collaboration with as opposed to armed struggle against Sukarno due to their experiences in the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949).¹¹ Sison and Aidit thus made passages from provincial cores to national ones, culminating in their recognition

⁷ For a similar journey by Tan Malaka, who visited Shanghai, see Abidin Kusno, “From City to City: Tan Malaka, Shanghai, and the Politics of Geographical Imagining,” *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 24, No. 3 (2003): 327-339, on pages 327-328. See also R. Mrazek, “Tan Malaka: A Political Personality’s Structure of Experience,” *Indonesia* 14 (1972): 1-49, on pages 4-5.

⁸ José Maria Sison and Rainer Werning, *The Philippine Revolution: The Leader’s View*. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1989), 12.

⁹ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 35-36.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 35-36.

¹¹ “Marxisme-Leninisme dan Pengindonesiannya (Marxism-Leninism and its Indonesianization),” *Harian Rakjat* [People’s Daily (Indonesia)] (25 February 1964), as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 337. Aidit once described four features of Indonesian Communism: 1) the united national front; 2) the combination of patriotism and proletarian internationalism; 3) the tactical concept of progressive, middle-of-the-road and die-hard forces; and 4) to combine struggle among the peasants and workers with the struggle to integrate the apparatus of the state with the revolutionary struggle of the people. “Djadilah Komunis jang Baik dan Lebih Baik Lagi,” *Harian Rakjat* [People’s Daily (Indonesia)] (11-12 June 1964), as quoted in in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 337. Mortimer notes that the first three “were [not] unique to the Indonesian Party, but the fourth contained a kernel of truth.” Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 337.

of what Rebecca Karl has identified as a “shared world stage” among Asian revolutionaries wherein their countries’ plight was part of a global phenomenon of capitalist exploitation.¹²

Colonial Context: Language and Historical Situation

We begin by examining the colonial and semi-colonial spaces that provide us with our first two phases of *reception: impact/relational* and *historical conditions of reception*. To link the encounters of Sison and Aidit with colonial settings in colonial schools, and in major cities and classrooms wherein they first read Marxist works, we analyze first the *impact/relational* phase of the *reception* stage in our triad of Edward Said’s “traveling theory,” which consists of the processes of *production, transmission, and reception*. Social experiences before a conversion to Marxism were shaped by colonial (and semi-colonial) surroundings and these experiences in turn shaped their interest in and reception of Marxism—not unlike with Mao and the Cambodian Paris Group. Thus something must be said the nature of colonial rule in Spanish, then American colonial Philippines, and in Dutch colonial East Indies, to understand the experiences shaping the young Sison and Aidit.

In Spanish colonial Philippines (1521-1898) by the Industrial Revolution, the colony’s inclusion in the global market by dint of its natural resource richness had been a boon for European settlers on the islands, which prompted increased migration to the colony in search of wealth. Over time, as Benedict Anderson has shown, creoles who spoke the same language as the metropolises formed an emergent political community that took advantage of pre-existing conditions such as print-capitalism to imagine nationalism.¹³ But Spain’s appointment of *peninsulares* (landed Iberians) in civil administration posts irked the *criollos*, who wanted a greater say in local affairs.¹⁴ The decline of autocracy and the Catholic Church in Spain signaled major shifts were on the horizon in its overseas colonies. The 1868 *La Gloriosa/Sexenio Democrático* (aka. the Glorious Revolution) in Spain ended in Queen Isabela II’s deposition and the establishment of a Republican government under General Francisco Serrano, which coincided with a major influx of pro-liberal materials arriving in the Philippines. Another influx,

¹² Rebecca Karl calls this a recognition of a “shared world stage with other peoples and countries” that were dealing with a “temporal/spatial problem inherent in a modern global history.” Rebecca Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 198.

¹³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983), 47-65.

¹⁴ Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 86.

however, was in the number of European friars settling there, which, served to consolidate power in the hands of friars in the Philippines.¹⁵ At the nexus of these three currents was future national hero José Rizal (1861-1898), who derided the friars' obstinacy and "satirized mercilessly" both the Jesuits and Dominicans in his written work.¹⁶ Rizal's words inspired many to take up arms against the ruling Spanish in the 1896 Philippine Revolution, including fellow *La Liga Filipina* (The Philippine League) founder and Philippine revolutionary Andrés Bonifacio (1863-1897). As we will see, the legacy of the Revolution was not lost on a young José Maria Sison, who grew up with stories of great nationalists that instilled in him a profound feeling of association with the Philippines' past champions of independence.¹⁷

In the Dutch East Indies (*Nederlands(ch)-Indië*, 1800-1949), meanwhile, the colonists' mapping of its colonial territories had the effect of defining nationhood in territorial terms, which Thongchai Winnichakul calls the "geo-body."¹⁸ "Indonesia" came into being very gradually, coinciding with colonial expansion from the seventeenth century onward, with only Java falling under direct Dutch control before 1850 (other regions such as Borneo and Dutch New Guinea enjoyed measured autonomy until the beginning of the twentieth century).¹⁹ However, Dutch delineation of its colonial holding's boundaries, while not inventing an Indonesia, tied it to a territorial space and reality.²⁰ The Dutch fashioned "Indonesia" (a name that was invented in the 1850s by a British geographer and then picked up by nationalists in the 1920s so that they could have a name separate from the Dutch term Indies) into a highly centralized administrative territory, and defined its boundaries as a singular unit in maps and textbooks. An "Indonesian nation" thus emerged "coeval[ly] with the borders of the colonial state... created by the Dutch, just as the French created Indochina."²¹ And like the French, colonial research endeavors to explore the past inhabitants of the Indies, notably on Majapahit (1293–1527), a thalassocratic empire that emanated from Java, gave rise to conceptualizations of a "Greater Java," though

¹⁵ Ibid, 67-68.

¹⁶ Benedict Anderson, "The First Filipino," in *The Specter of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World*. (London: Verso, 1998), 229. On Rizal's criticism of friars, see Rizal, *El filibusterismo*; and José Rizal, *Noli Me Tangere* [Touch Me Not]. (London: Penguin Classics, 2006).

¹⁷ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 5-7.

¹⁸ Thongchai Winnichakul. *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994), 6.

¹⁹ David Henley, "Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism: Indonesia and Indochina," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, No. 2 (April 1995): 286-324, on page 287.

²⁰ Merle Calvin Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia, 2nd Edition*. (London, Macmillan, 1993), 147; and Henley, "Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism," 289.

²¹ Ibid, 287, 289. Quote from 289.

the Dutch-established territorial borders was “accepted, appropriated, and finally turned against its creators.”²² Dutch-educated Indonesians soon became the standard-bearers of an integrated nationalism in which hundreds of ethnic groups across thousands of islands comprised a singular Indonesian nation (“unity in diversity,” so to speak) as opposed to the exclusive nationalisms that emerged in French Indo-chine.²³

In the Philippines, the US victory in the Spanish-American War (April-August 1898) led to the island nation’s cession to American control in December 1898 via the Treaty of Paris, with American annexation and subsequent establishment of the United States Military Government of the Philippine Islands (1898-1902). Before the treaty’s ratification, however, Philippine nationalists and US forces clashed in the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), which carried the banner of the earlier anticolonial struggle since 1896.²⁴ Ardent anti-imperialist and renowned American author Mark Twain criticized the US war against men who had fought alongside the Americans against the Spanish less than a year earlier, calling out their deception of and broken promises to Filipinos. He stated that:

True, we have crushed a deceived and confiding people; we have turned against the weak and the friendless who trusted us; we have stamped out a just and intelligent and well-ordered republic; we have stabbed an ally in the back and slapped the face of a guest; we have bought a Shadow from an enemy that hadn’t it to sell; we have robbed a trusting friend of his land and his liberty; we have invited clean young men to shoulder a discredited musket and do bandit’s work under a flag which bandits have been accustomed to fear, not to follow; we have debauched America’s honor and blackened her face before the world.²⁵

Such deception was to continue. The American victory led to outright occupation and the dissolution of the First Philippine Republic (1899-1901), and over the next few decades, the US governed the Philippines as an unincorporated territory for its strategic value in the Pacific. The 1902 Philippine Organic Act formalized the Insular Government, which remained in place until 1935, but the US determined who would serve as Governor General.

²² Ibid, 288-289, 315. Quote from 289.

²³ Ibid, 286-324. For more on Indonesian nationalism, see Benedict Anderson, “Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future,” *Indonesia*, No. 67 (April 1999): 1-11.

²⁴ Donald H. Dyal, Brian B. Carpenter, and Mark A. Thomas, *Historical Dictionary of the Spanish American War*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 258.

²⁵ Mark Twain, “To The Person Sitting in the Darkness,” (1901), in *Classics of American Political and Constitutional Thought, Volume II: Reconstruction to the Present*. Scott J. Hammond, Kevin R. Hardwick, Howard Leslie Lubert eds., (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2007), 270.

But to acquire a colony was vastly different from administering it. US policymakers began the process of training locals for administering the Philippine colony. As US President William McKinley had described earlier, the American attainment of the Philippines was “a gift from the gods,” and since “they [Filipinos] were unfit for self-government... there was nothing left for us [Americans] to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them.”²⁶ US policymakers co-opted Spanish schools and began what one historian described in 1925 as “one of the boldest experiments in human enlightenment.”²⁷ In line with other colonial powers that had prioritized education in their European tongues, instructors would use an American curriculum and English was to be the language of instruction to improve communication between Filipinos via a vernacular, with American officials regarding English linguistic acumen as “an essential step in making them capable of nationality.”²⁸ To become English literate, “Americanized Filipinos” became what Jeremi Suri describes as a “microcosm of American efforts in the Philippines as a whole—mutual dependence and constant adjustment for mutual benefit.”²⁹ But as with French efforts in Indo-chine, English instruction spurred national identity among its student populace.³⁰ American political and economic intrusion also prompted students to use their education towards winning independence, with upward social mobility becoming the goal of acquiring English language skill, as it remained the gateway to entrance into the civil service.

American efforts to train locals notwithstanding, the nature of American rule over the Philippines was of political intrusion and economic interference. Colonial officials dominated the national administration to safeguard American dominance in important colonial bureaucratic

²⁶ William McKinley, “Decision on the Philippines,” (1900)

[http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=1257] (Accessed 25 February 2017). See also Gen. James Rusling, “Interview with President William McKinley,” *The Christian Advocate* (22 January 1903).

²⁷ George S. Counts, “Education in the Philippines,” *The Elementary School Journal* 26, No. 2 (1925): 94-106, on page 94. See also Alfred McCoy, “The Philippines: Independence without Decolonization,” in *Asia: The Winning of Independence*. Robin Jeffrey ed. (London: MacMillan, 1981), 25.

²⁸ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 120. American Governor General of Philippines (1909-1913) Cameron Forbes wrote that his predecessors “had not encouraged the general learning of Spanish, perhaps from a fear that general education and a common language would give the Filipinos too much cohesion.” W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), 169.

²⁹ Jeremi Suri, *Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 114. See also Julian Go and Anne L. Foster, *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 137.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 120; and Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 121. As more Filipinos entered the civil service, a common language that was separate from that of their colonizers became increasingly important. Local presses favored Manila’s language, Tagalog, though the debate over a “national language” remained a hotly contested issue well into the waning years of US colonization.

posts.³¹ The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), in particular, was under US control, while military bases such as Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base—the largest American overseas military bases—secured US dominance.³² Even the land fell under US purview: by 1903, the US had purchased 165,922 hectares of friar estates for just over seven million dollars with the ultimate goal of repurposing it for Filipino cultivator use that, President Taft believed, might quell potential revolts.³³ Instead of following through on this stated goal, US officials sold more than half of the land to business interests, which forced many cultivators back into tenancy, but this time to *hacenderos* (landlords). US officials also did not address the issue of taxation that, Filipinos hoped, would be addressed by the American reform of the Spanish taxation system.³⁴ The widespread problem of inequitable taxation, landlordism, and semi-feudalism became targets for later critics, namely Sison, to criticize the post-independence underdevelopment of the Philippines. Direct US colonial rule thus meant the direct control of Philippine administration, economy, and lands, with all local officials subjected to US authority.³⁵

Much was the same in the Dutch East Indies, where the ruling Dutch treated its colony as a *wingewest* (colony for profit).³⁶ The Dutch colonial administration governed along rigid racial and socioeconomic lines; colonial elites lived separate from locals and, at the turn of the century, urbanization developed among Dutch settlers an urge to “fortify themselves” like insecure travelers.³⁷ The Dutch Ethical Policy (1901-1942), while ending indirect rule, initiated a new Dutch commitment, or “moral obligation,” to regarding its colony as a locus for modernization.³⁸

³¹ Stuart Creighton Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 46. See also Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm, eds., *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance*. (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987); and Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor*, 248, citing Alfred McCoy, “The Philippines: Independence without Decolonization,” *Asia—The Winning...*, 43.

³² José Maria Sison and Ninotchka Rosca, *José Maria Sison: At Home in the World--Portrait of a Revolutionary*. Greensboro, NC: Open Hand Publishing, 2004), 6.

³³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 122.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 122-124; and David Reeves Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 55.

³⁵ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 21-22. See also José Maria Sison, “The Economic Emancipation Movement Against US Imperialism,” (1966), in *Struggle for National Democracy. New Edition*. José Maria Sison, College Editors Guild of the Philippines, eds. (Quezon City, the Philippines. Progressive Publications, 1972), 129-141; and José Maria Sison, “Land Reform and National Democracy,” (1966), in *Struggle for National Democracy*, 142-165.

³⁶ E. Aspinall and G. van Klinken, *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*. (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 38.

³⁷ Rudolf Mrázek, *Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 55.

³⁸ Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 157.

It sought to improve Indonesians' living standards and ready them for work in the colonial civil service administration in the name of "native welfare" (subjugated *colonis es* under the aegis of Dutch *colons*).³⁹ The Ethical Policy succeeded in bringing in locals to handle local matters—an improvement on Dutch indirect rule via extant social structures—yet Indonesians soon recognized the growing settler population and their designs to command the economy. The Ethical Policy also interfered with agrarian workers' affairs, prompting many to seek out local representation, with one labor cooperative of Javanese *batik* traders, *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (SI, Sarekat Islam), occupying such a role and, later, figuring prominently in the PKI's rise.⁴⁰

The Dutch expansion of Western-style education was at the center of The Ethical Policy.⁴¹ Colonials knew the importance of a local workforce to safeguard Dutch commercial interests, and committed themselves to educating locals as "a major means to 'uplift' the natives to guide them to modernity and to 'association between East and West.'"⁴² As in other colonial nation-building experiments, though, only a small fraction of locals attended Western schools, and in the Dutch East Indies, upward social mobility through access to a Western-style education did not alter the firm racial divide: "natives were natives, however well educated," Shiraishi notes,⁴³ Indeed, the Dutch defined who was who in its stratification of Indies society.⁴⁴

Despite firm fault lines between *colon* and *colonis es*, the experiences of Indonesians in Western-style schools gave rise to a sense of "generational solidarity" as *kaum muda* (the young), and their exposure to a European curriculum differentiated them from those who attended non-Western schools.⁴⁵ Dutch-educated Indies students soon developed in classrooms what Benedict Anderson calls "a deep horizontal comradeship,"⁴⁶ which arose as students felt bound to a shared territory, future, and course. They learned Dutch, about the Dutch world, and came to

³⁹ Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 157.

⁴⁰ Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. (Sheffield, UK: Equinox, 2007), 8; and Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, "Dutch Expansion and the Imperialism Debate," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 25, No. 1 (March 1994): 91-111, on page 93.

⁴¹ Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 28.

⁴² *Ibid.* On nineteenth century Dutch efforts to educate European settlers in the Indies, see Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 114-124.

⁴³ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 30. On the Indonesia/French Indochina comparison, see John Tully, *Cambodia Under the Tricolor: King Sisowath and the 'Mission Civilisatrice' 1904-1927*. (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 247; and Henley, "Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism," 286-324. See also Anthony Reid, "Indonesia: Revolution without Socialism," in *Asia*, 125.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 320. On the decline of Javanese nationalism, see pages 313-315.

⁴⁵ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 30.

⁴⁶ Benedict Anderson, "Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future," *Indonesia*, No. 67 (April 1999), 1-11, on page 5.

identify *Dutchness* with modernity. Once again, the Dutch had created something that the *colonis ees* could use against them: education in Dutch, a gateway to “doing the modern things that the Dutch did,” created a collective identity that galvanized classroom comrades and turned them into nationalists.⁴⁷

We will see how colonial contexts, which both Sison and Aidit experienced firsthand in their situated-ness in an oppressed environment, of these shared histories shaped both young men into nationalists, then activists. As we have seen above, colonial spaces in which settlers opted to train locals to govern their metropolises’ holdings paved the way for emergent nationalist identities, and had the adverse effect of tying peoples to a finite geographic territorial bound across thousands of islands and hundreds of ethnicities and language groups. Colonial officials’ *mission civilisatrice* also tied *colon* identity and language to that which was “modern,” especially in the Dutch Indies case. By the first half of the twentieth century, young Filipino and Indonesian men were schooled in English and Dutch, respectively, and would soon use their schooling in the classics, and in Aidit’s case, experiences in Japanese-run political organizations, to challenge long-entrenched systems of oppression. Structural inequality, post-independence underdevelopment, political corruption, and rural plight, as we will see, stood as the “crises” to which they would respond by taking a radical turn.

Intellectual Origins

Jose Maria Sison

Now we shift to the intellectuals whose lives and thoughts were shaped by such colonial and semi-colonial spaces, and which provide us with our first two phases of *reception: impact/relational* and *conditions of reception*. We begin with Jos  Maria Sison, whose exposure to radical texts (*impact/relational reception*) and his time abroad in Jakarta in 1962 awoke him to socioeconomic inequality in the Philippines, whereas the conditions whereby such inequality became starker instilled in him a desire to respond by turning first to Marxism-Leninism, then to Maoism (*conditions of reception*). This section uses such phases to track the “four important nodes” of animism, Roman Catholicism, liberalism, and Marxism in Sison’s intellectual and political development until the late 1960s, which he characterized as “the same course of

⁴⁷ Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 30, 32-35; and Robert, Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia: A History*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xxiii-xxiv, 314-318.

development as the history of thought in the West and in the Philippines.”⁴⁸ As we will see, Sison participated in radical study circles—notably the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP), and studied in Jakarta before returning and founding the *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM, Patriotic/Nationalist Youth) in November 1964 and, later, becoming a Communist and initiating the Maoist cult within the Philippines.⁴⁹

We can see the *impact/relational* stage of *reception* in Sison’s biography in his early life experiences with family, which revealed to him his nation’s structural inequalities, false independence, and widespread devotion to Catholicism and extant belief systems. José María Canlás Sison was born in 1939 in Cabugao, Ilocos Sur in Northern Luzon, to a Spanish-speaking Sino-Filipino⁵⁰ landlord class family that was the major feudal presence in his hometown.⁵¹ As a child in Ilocos Sur, Sison recalls his regular exposure to local superstitions, notably concerning ghosts and spirits, though he admits that he “did not go through the phrase of polytheism if [one] can concede the idolization of saints does not amount to it.”⁵² Sison was a Catholic, had his catechism at age eight, and stories “about hell... drove the fear of God and belief in God into my innocent heart and soul and my restless body.”⁵³ As he got older, he came to recognize problems around him that religion or Manichean camps of altruistic good and unconscionable evil could not solve: his family’s postwar economic difficulties. WWII had ravaged the family wealth, and paired with the increasing cost of sending family members to study in Manila and the US for higher education, the Sisons had resorted to selling off their lands to wealthy peasants and merchants. In fact, from his early childhood Sison’s parents encouraged him to become a lawyer

⁴⁸ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 17.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 1-35; Patricio N. Abinales, “José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution: A Critique of an Interface,” *Kasarinlan* 8, No. 1 (1992): 6-81, on pages 10-16; and Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines, in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 366-369. For Sison’s speech on the founding of the KM, see José Maria Sison, “Kabataang Makabayan Founding Speech,” (1964), in *Struggle for National Democracy*, 14-26.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 2-3; and Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 6-7.

⁵¹ Ibid, 1; Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 5-6; and Fidel Ramos, “Kinship and Encounters with Fidel V. Ramos,” [<https://josemariasison.org/kinship-and-encounters-with-fvr/>] (Accessed 28 February 2017).

His father, Salustiano Serrano Sison, the son of a *gobernadorcillo* (municipal chief executive), had the largest estate in the region, and whose combined family combine (of the Serrano-Sison family) was a major political and economic force in Ilocos. Such a position meant that political candidates, notably Floro Crisologo, frequented the Sison estate during campaigns for re-election, which, along with stories of the younger Sison’s great-grandfather, introduced José to the importance of feudal values.

⁵² Ibid, 17.

⁵³ Ibid.

so that he could prevent the family estate from land fragmentation caused by the post-WWII emergence of a rural bourgeoisie, and “revive the fading feudal glory of the family.”⁵⁴

While Sison’s upbringing was one of comfort, his social milieu in elementary school comprised of students whose parents had suffered mightily at the hands of feudalism, which, he says, he used to counterbalance his father’s stories of their hardworking great-grandfather who had amassed his fortunes doing much of the same.⁵⁵ These two conflictual perspectives—one of feudal ties and success and the other of poverty and struggle against imperialist conditions—helped to shape Sison’s nationalism. Indeed, Sison describes this period in his intellectual development as one of “spontaneous” materialism and “practical” atheism, with exposure to “spontaneous attitudes and bourgeois populist tirades against the rich and in favor of the poor”⁵⁶ fueling his hatred of the Americans. Sison’s father told him stories about feudal heroes and, on occasion, non-feudal ones, notably of *summa cum laude* and *maxima cum laude* achiever Claro Mayo Recto,⁵⁷ who had mastered Spanish and, by the 1950s, had “espous[ed] the anti-imperialist line in the national political scene”⁵⁸ by questioning Philippine-US relations.⁵⁹ Yet Sison’s father also regaled to him “scare stories” about the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* (Huks, or People’s Liberation Army) fighting to replace rather than remove the private landlords in Central Luzon, though he later reversed course in speaking favorably of the Huks’ “program of land for the tillers.”⁶⁰ A *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP, est. 1930 under trade unionist Cristiano Evangelista)-affiliated anti-Japanese army, the Huks, had become heroes for their resistance to Japanese imperialism and formed the PKP people’s army.⁶¹ In line with his desire to find a counterbalance, Sison listened to favorable portrayals of the Huks from his barber, a Communist sympathizer. Such stories instilled in him a critical stance towards feudalism, and from his

⁵⁴ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵⁷ On Recto’s writings, see Claro Recto, *The Recto Reader: Excerpts from the Speeches of Claro M. Recto*. Renato Constantino ed. (Manila, the Philippines: Recto Memorial Foundation, 1965).

⁵⁸ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 6.

⁵⁹ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 7.

⁶⁰ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 6-7. On the rise of the Huks, see Eduardo Lachica, *Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt*. (Manila, the Philippines: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971).

⁶¹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines.*, 160-162; and Kenneth Fuller, *A Movement Divided: Philippine Communism, 1957-1986*. (Diliman, Quezon City, the Philippines, University of the Philippines Press, 2011), 3. On the Huk Army’s organization, see Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines*, 29-34. The authors describe the Huks as “overwhelmingly peasant.” On the PKP’s formation, growth, and programs, see Kenneth Fuller, *Forcing the Pace: The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, From Foundation to Armed Struggle*. (Quezon City, the Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2007).

father's tales of Recto, a sense of nascent anti-imperialism and awareness of the problems of rural workers in stories about the Huks, though he admits that it was "only by hindsight."⁶² Nevertheless, Sison admits that he "absorbed some anti-imperialist and antifeudal notions from [his] pre-high school years and had developed positive feelings of patriotism and sympathies for the oppressed and exploited," which resurfaced during his high school years in Manila.⁶³

Sison's education, which began at a local public school and then continued at an American Jesuit high school in Manila, was when his nascent feelings crystallized into deeper anti-imperialist sentiments and, later, into an interest in Marxism. "It was in my high school years," Sison remembers, "that I would start to consciously grapple with problems regarding the relationship of consciousness and matter, of knowledge and practice, and of science and religion. I argued with my teachers and must have sounded so heretical to them that they graded me low in religion."⁶⁴ But before this inquisitive nature came to bear, Sison was initially to follow his father's plans: study in journalism, go to law schools, attend Harvard University, and return to Ilocos Sur to wed into a wealthy family and become a *trapo* (Filipino portmanteau for **traditional politician**, which in Tagalog means "dustcloth").⁶⁵ Sison recalls that his father insisted that he follow this career trajectory, which "project[ed] not just his [father's] own ambitions, but a composite picture of me [Sison] from the outstanding features of national political leaders."⁶⁶ In particular, Sison's father referenced Recto and modern trade union founder Isabelo de los Reyes to stir up a personal ambition that, eventually, motivated Sison to perform well in his classes.⁶⁷

In 1950s the Philippines, education in Roman Catholic institutions continued under American aegis,⁶⁸ and constituted an early influence on Sison as he clashed with his staunchly anti-Communist Jesuit and Dominican educators that would set him up for his conversion to Marxism. Though he later disavowed Roman Catholicism, Sison's encounters with friars, both

⁶² Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 7. See also Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 8. While Recto was his college-days hero, Sison criticized his nationalist industrialization from a standpoint of "national democratic struggle," arguing that genuine agricultural development would follow an agrarian revolution. Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines*, 89.

⁶³ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 7.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

⁶⁵ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 6; and Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 4-5.

⁶⁶ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 8.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

⁶⁸ V. R. Cardozier, "Public Higher Education in the Philippines," *International Review of Education* 30, No. 2 (1984): 193-198.

positive and negative, actually jolted his interest in Marxism.⁶⁹ He attended *Ateneo de Manila* (*Pamantasang Ateneo de Manila*) at age twelve, and after his transfer/expulsion, the Dominican friar-run *Colegio de San Juan de Letran* (*Dalubhasaan ng San Juan de Letran*, or *Letran* colloquially).⁷⁰ He discovered immediately that his Jesuit teachers were anti-left, and warned students of the dangers of Communism “*ad majorem Dei Gloria* or *ad nauseum*.”⁷¹ Sison recalled that during his time at *Ateneo* he “heard [his] Jesuit teacher ridicule Andres Bonifacio... as a mere thug from Tondo; and Claro Mayo Recto as a crazy Communist!”⁷² Despite his teachers’ efforts to nip interest in Marxism in the bud, curiosity in a counterbalance led Sison to mine the bibliographies of anti-Communist texts that quoted Marx and Engels and, then, read them.⁷³ “I read an anti-Communist book that was then supposed to be the best written from a Christian philosophical point of view,” Sison recounts, but the book “made the mistake of quoting long passages from Marx and Engels [that] made more sense to me than the criticisms.”⁷⁴ He quickly became fascinated in and sympathized with workers’ plights, which led him to apply to the University of the Philippines (UP, formerly the *Universidad de San Tomas*), an institution that his teachers had labeled as “a breeding ground for the devil” because it “sheltered the most volatile student body in the Philippines.”⁷⁵

Before delving into Sison’s university years, however, it is important to track the *conditions of reception*, which included a prevailing political climate on campus at UP, and in the Philippines more broadly, during the early 1950s that made the university a hotbed of progressive activities and would inspire Sison to travel to gain knowledge. PKP leaders José and Jesus Lava had failed in their leadership of an armed revolutionary movement, and the Party turned on Huk membership by 1955 to redirect the Party towards legal struggle. The Government outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines (again; first in 1932) in 1957,

⁶⁹ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 7; and Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 4-9.

⁷⁰ Abinales, “José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution,” 11. Sison was either expelled or transferred from *Ateneo*. Abinales notes that he was expelled for protesting against his Jesuit instructors, and he moved to *Letran* for the remainder of his secondary school education. Rosca describes it as a transfer. Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 7.

⁷¹ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 8.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷⁵ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 9; and Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 367. On UP’s name change see, Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*, 93.

with the Anti-Subversion Law (Republic Act 1700), which came into effect on 20 June, forcing Communists underground. Subsequent government repression followed in the wake of this failed uprising and, accordingly, sought increasingly to curtail Marxist student activism at universities.⁷⁶ By the late 1950s, anti-US voices in the Philippine Senate, notably Sison's father's hero Claro Recto, had become vocal critics of the continued American interference in Philippine affairs, and as such, was a target of efforts to discredit him.⁷⁷ Yet McCarthyism, which had fallen out of vogue in the US, was alive and well in the Philippines, with seemingly everyone linked tenuously to progressivism were regarded by those in public office as a potential Communist.

Indeed, our second phase of reception, the *conditions of reception*, continued when Sison enrolled at the University of the Philippines in Manila in 1956, a location that emboldened him to cast away his personal ambition to become a lawyer, and instead become an activist and, later, a Communist.⁷⁸ His first decade as a Marxist, Ninotchka Rosca notes, "endowed the Philippine Left with characteristics which remain to this day."⁷⁹ He majored in English literature and graduated in November 1959, recalling that UP provided a setting for him to make the transition from elite student with a penchant for questioning the established order to radical intellectual. Indeed, the anti-Catholicism that had grown from his experiences at Jesuit and Dominican secondary schools transformed into existentialism and, then, liberalism and nationalism.⁸⁰ It was also at UP that Sison, who had dabbled in "progressive liberal[ism]" through reading anti-imperialist speeches by Recto, essays by Teodoro Agoncillo and Cesar Adib Majul, and Vicente Sinco, began to study Marxist works more regularly and intently.⁸¹ He soon realized that UP had earned its reputation for holding a "monopoly on student rebellion" in the country, noting the clashes between liberals and religious conservatives on campus, which "paralyzed the UP Student Council from 1958 onward."⁸² He began publishing his written works, including anti-imperialist musings, in UP publications as a way to channel his increasing frustrations with the

⁷⁶ Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines*, 54-55.

⁷⁷ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 13-14.

⁷⁸ Abinales, "José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution," 12.

⁷⁹ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 18.

⁸⁰ Abinales, "José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution," 12.

⁸¹ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 11; and Abinales, "José Maria Sison and the Philippine Revolution," 13.

⁸² Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 10. See also Distor, "Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines," in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*, 367.

Philippines' political status quo and the atmosphere of suspicion that government crackdowns had engendered.

Sison's writings and increasing shift towards more progressive thought streams led him to meet regularly with Marxists José Langsang, Renato Constantino, and Francisco Nemenzo Jr., as well as with radical artist Amado V. Hernandez. Such encounters led him to closer readings of the Marxist classics, with him "discover[ing]" Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, Engels' *Anti-Duhring*, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, and most importantly, Mao Zedong's *Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society*, in UP's library and among his friends' private collections.⁸³ As Sison recalls:

It was in the University of the Philippines, where, on my own initiative and through self-study, I grew rapidly on the scientific kernel of bourgeois empiricism and rationalism and the democratic kernel of liberal political philosophy; cast off all sorts of medieval and bourgeois metaphysics; ripped away the veil of liberalism from the face of modern imperialism and the local exploiting classes; and finally arrived at the most comprehensive, consistent and thoroughgoing philosophy—Marxism-Leninism—and the program of new democratic revolution.⁸⁴

His impassioned reading of these text was soon followed by efforts to organize informal reading groups at UP, in which he and his fellow students studied these works alongside articles on the Huk rebellion.⁸⁵ These informal intellectual study circles increased Sison's radicalism, culminating in his formation of SCAUP, a leftist "parody of the UP Student Catholic Action (UPSCA)" with Sison as chairperson. This leadership position ultimately granted him the requisite credentials to lead "a much bigger and decidedly more militant organization—the KM [*Kabataang Makabayan* (KM, Patriotic Youth)]" later on.⁸⁶

We have seen thus far how Sison shifted from his feudal upbringing to liberal advocate to Marxist advocate. Yet another aspect of our phase of the *conditions of reception* is the radical turn as a response to crises; Sison's Marxist turn entailed increased involvement in likeminded

⁸³ Abinales, "José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution," 13.

⁸⁴ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 18. Also quoted in Abinales, "José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution," 12.

⁸⁵ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 11.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 11. Second quote from Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines*, 89. See also Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 11; Abinales, "José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution," 13-14; and Distor, "Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines," in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*, 367-368.

organizations, especially in regards to the SCAUP, even as he began his career at UP as a professor. Under his helmsmanship, SCAUP became a “premier campus organization” that granted an “anti-imperialist and antifeudal content to the mass action” to combat the anti-subversive Committee on Anti-Filipino Activities (CAFA) of the Philippine Congress.⁸⁷ SCAUP became the chief organization for student civil liberties demonstrations,⁸⁸ and even became a *Cercle Marxiste* of sorts, with progressive students meeting regularly, though informally, to study the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist canon closely. As Sison recounts, SCAUP “propagated the general line of national democratic revolution; provided cover for [discrete] Marxist study; attracted students capable of leading other student organizations and/or taking the editorship of student publications; and prepared them for the revolutionary struggle outside the university.”⁸⁹ As CAFA’s repression intensified, however, Sison discontinued his membership in SCAUP, abandoned his post at UP, and joined the *Lapiang Manggagwa* (LM, Worker’s Party), which marks his official entry into the world of Communist operations. In LM, Sison conferred with the PKP peasant action group, whose members joined him in “transform[ing] the labor movement into a political force on the basis of a common programme.”⁹⁰ This work connected him to the Philippine-Indonesian Friendship Association and union work with the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), which in 1961 granted him a six-month bursary to study Bahasa Indonesia and literature in Jakarta.⁹¹

Three major “pushes” led Sison to embrace Maoism. Sison’s time in Indonesia, the first “push,” was particularly important in his ongoing ideological transformation since it was, as Sison described, “a Mecca for Southeast Asian intellectuals in the 1950s and early 1960s.”⁹² Indonesia was an independent, anti-imperialist nation with one of the world’s largest Communist Parties—the PKI (the subject of our next part)—in operation. Here, without government repression or the fear of imprisonment (until 1965, that is), Sison studied several examples of

⁸⁷ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 12.

⁸⁸ Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 368; and Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 11-12.

⁸⁹ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 11-12.

⁹⁰ Rosario Torres-Yu, “The Philippine Trade Union Movement, 1953-73: In Search of Working Class Consciousness,” *Diliman Review* (January-February 1983): 66-67. Also quoted in Abinales, “José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution,” 15. See also Francisco Nemenzo, “The Philippine Labor Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Democracy,” (Presentation at the Conference on Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 20-29 April 1988), 15.

⁹¹ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 13; and Abinales, “José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution,” 15.

⁹² Abinales, “José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution,” 15.

independence struggles and consulted an “enormous amount of Marxist-Leninist classics and current literature,” while developing “good relations” with PKI members.⁹³ Most notably, Sison, who Alfred Saulo states, “had the makings of a new [DN] Aidit,” actually met the man himself in 1962, a meeting that connected him to the PKI and led him to contact the Chinese.⁹⁴ As Francisco Nemenzo Jr. notes, Sison “undertook training” in Jakarta, while another source alleges that he was “spotted and recruited” by Maoists with China ties, and even tutored in Maoism by a PKI cadre named (Oloean) Hutapea.⁹⁵ A China connection was also particularly important since just a few years before Sison left for Jakarta, Manila’s Vice-Mayor Jesus Marcos Roces visited Beijing (1958), which spurred interest in Communist China among Filipinos and exposed them to China’s radical transformation. The outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution after Roces’ visit sparked further interest among Filipino progressives, especially among *Manileño* students.⁹⁶ By Sison’s time at UP, Chinese materials were pervasive, including translated copies of Mao’s *Quotations*, and his contacts during his time in Jakarta, and frustration with the Communist movement (specifically its erroneous general line) back home, pushed China to the forefront in his thought. He soon became not only a “great admirer” of Mao Zedong by his own admission, but also a believer that Mao Zedong Thought was the “highest development of Marxism-Leninism” and the “guide” to the people’s revolution.⁹⁷ KM soon became the outlet for pro-Maoist enthusiasm, wherein cadre youths studied Mao’s works and voiced *writ large* criticisms of American imperialism.⁹⁸

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines*, 89; and Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 371.

⁹⁵ First quote from Kenneth Fuller, “Interview with Francisco Nemenzo Jr.,” as quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 58. Second from Muhammad Abdul Hassan, “But Which Communist Party?,” *Daily Express*, February 1985. On Sison’s Maoist tutoring, see Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 58. On Hotapea’s later involvement as a Central Committee member who advocated for Mao-inspired self-critique and armed guerrilla struggle in the rural areas, namely Blitar in Eastern Java (crushed in 1968), see Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 55.

⁹⁶ Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 367-368; and A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia, Challenge to American Policy*. (New York: Harper, 1960), 330. See also A. Doronilla, “The Transformation of Patron-Client Relations and its Political Consequences in Postwar Philippines,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 16, No. 1 (March 1985): 99-116; and Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 297-300.

⁹⁷ Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 366; and José Maria Sison, “Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!,” (26 December 1968), 1-39, on page 19. [<http://www.philippinerevolution.net/cgi-bin/cpp/pdocs.pl?id=recte;page=01>] (Accessed 16 March 2017).

⁹⁸ See Sison, “Kabataang Makabayan Founding Speech,” (1964), in *Struggle for National Democracy*, 14-26.

A second “push” was his entry into the PKP, which led him to found KM as a Maoist-leaning bloc within the PKP. Secretary-General Jesus Lava wanted Sison to join the Party, though Lava’s status as a person in flight complicated a one-on-one rendezvous. Sison thus met with a representative of Lava’s camp (his nephew), after which Sison was designated as secretary for youth in the PKP.⁹⁹ Yet the PKP had not held congress since 1946 and had failed to cement a clear position on the use of violence in its struggle, which irked Sison, who criticized the PKP for its nepotism and lack of a general line.¹⁰⁰ Sison subsequently founded KM in 1964, a political group of “ideological zealots cultivated in... the University of the Philippines” that encouraged both men and women to participate irrespective of socioeconomic class, and wherein Sison served as national chairman and, later, as head of the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN).¹⁰¹ As Nemenzo Jr. describes, KM fast-tracked Maoism as an attractive alternative to the PKP’s absentee political line and general strategy:

[KM’s] expectations of revolutionary behavior differed from the bureaucratic authoritarian style of the old [PKP] cadres. They were more daring and innovative, whereas the latter tended to be overly concerned with how the government might construe their intentions. Moreover, the fresh recruits had a better grasp of the Marxist classics and the Maoist adaptations, while the old cadres derived their theoretical knowledge almost exclusively from Joseph Stalin’s *Foundations of Leninism*.¹⁰²

KM was a new *avant-garde* while the PKP was still an old guard. KM activists, Emerita Distor notes, “visited a farming village in Central Luzon wearing Mao caps and badges proclaiming the contents of the ‘Little Red Book’ (*Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*) like fundamentalist preachers.”¹⁰³ This “new guard” within the PKP was a tidal wave of radical fervor that, under Sison’s lead (Sison famously occupied numerous leadership roles within the PKP), clashed with the Lava’s commitment to legal-political instead of armed struggle of a broad united national

⁹⁹ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 13.

¹⁰⁰ Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 101.

¹⁰¹ Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 366-368, quote from 366; and Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 14. MAN gained widespread support among students, labor and peasant leaders, and a host of other nationalistic urbanites. However, MAN’s overly urban focus, lack of a clear plan of action, and Sison’s split with the PKP led to its collapse. Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 31-33, 62.

¹⁰² Francisco Nemenzo, “Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement,” in *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia*. Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani, eds. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 75. Also quoted in Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 366.

¹⁰³ Distor, “Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong’s Thought*, 366.

front as advocated by Mao. The KM eventually split, with PKP leaders accusing Sison of having a “one-man leadership” agenda with the KM at his back.

Sison’s tenure with the PKP on thin ice, and factionalism within the Party apparatus on the horizon, he soon broke with the pro-Soviet Lava brothers (Jesus and José), which prompted his expulsion from both the KM and PKP in 1967 and pushed him closer to China.¹⁰⁴ No longer bound to the Lavas’ oversight, Sison found Mao’s emphasis on revolutionary violence and adapting Marxism-Leninism to concrete conditions as striking and, ultimately, essential alternatives to a passive legal-political route to state power. He visited China multiple times and delivered a lecture on 6 March 1967 in which he lambasted PKP errors. Sison used the lecture to credit Mao for his record of having “inherited, defended, and developed Marxism-Leninism and [for having] brought it to a higher and completely new stage.”¹⁰⁵ Mao’s Thought, Sison continues, “is Marxism-Leninism in the present era when imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is marching toward world victory.”¹⁰⁶

The final “push” towards Maoism was politics on the homefront, where right-wing kleptocrat Ferdinand Edralin Marcos (1917-1989) had assumed presidency in the Philippines in 1965. Marcos’ rise meant that Sison was positioned well to become the “prime initiator of the Maoist cult within the Philippine Communist movement.”¹⁰⁷ As Marcos’ repression, corruption, and delusion prevented the amelioration of Filipinos’ standard of living—Marcos’ family and loyalists lived comfortably and perpetuated cronyism and nepotism—progressives flocked to read Marx, Lenin, and Mao, with visiting China to train in Maoist-style military training.¹⁰⁸ Free from PKP constraints, Sison consolidated progressives such as the Young Turks, a “progressive Liberal Party” that took an interest in his advocacy for a peasant army along the lines of Mao’s People’s Liberation Army in China decades earlier. He also connected with Huk leader Bernabe Buscayno (aka. Commander Dante), which led the Huk revolutionaries to form much of the *Bagong Hukbong Bayan* (National People’s Army, NPA, 1969) and the reconstituted CPP (a

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 368. His expulsion may have also been the result of Sison’s plans to form a secret faction within the PKP to capture leadership and redirect the Party towards Mao Zedong Thought. Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 40-49, 58-62. Sison notes Francisco Lava Jr. self-elected himself as general secretary at a 1967 exclusive meeting: “Lava Jr. had himself ‘elected’ . . . as if the position were a family heirloom.” Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 46.

¹⁰⁵ José Maria Sison, “National Democracy and Socialism,” in *On National Democracy*. José Maria Sison, ed. (Quezon City, the Philippines: Aklatang Gising Na, n. d.), 45. Also quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 42.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid; and Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 14.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid; and Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 59-60.

faction that broke from the Lavas' PKP, 1968).¹⁰⁹ The NPA, as it turns out, would carry the CPP's New Democratic Programme, which was overtly Maoist:

Armed with the invincible Mao Tse-tung Thought, the NPA [National People's Army] has emerged after shedding off the counter-revolutionary revisionist errors of the [Jose and/or Jesus] Lava and Taruc [Pedro Taruc-Sumulong] and other sources of modern revisionism and opportunism "Left" and "Right." It combats within its ranks the purely military viewpoint, ultrademocracy, disregard of organizational discipline, absolute equalitarianism, subjectivism, individualism, the ideology of roving rebel bands, and putschism.¹¹⁰

Sison, who published under the pseudonym "Amado Guerrero" (Beloved Warrior), now had an army to challenge Marcos and bring real change to the Philippines.¹¹¹ But his army, and Party more generally, needed to heed Mao's words on adaptation, that is, to apply the foreign theory to national realities. Thereafter, Sison wrote his most seminal ideological texts, which became a "Little Red Book" in terms of theoretical value and mass readership during the Philippine movement (our focus in section two): *Philippine Society and Revolution* (1971) and *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines* (1969). If we pair these foundational Maoist texts with his political speeches, we discover Sison's significance as both a critic of the PKP general line under the Lava brothers and as a vocal advocate of using Mao Zedong Thought to guide the national democratic movement.

Not only is Sison's experience comparable to Aidit's, as we will see, we ought to recognize how this compares to our core example of the Cambodian Maoists, which we see usefully through the lens of "traveling theory." Like the Khmer students studying in Paris during the 1950s, as the following section shows, Sison and Aidit passed through geographic, cultural, and intellectual spaces, with many ideas pushing them in one direction or another

¹⁰⁹ Distor, "Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines," in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*, 368; and Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 295-296. On the founding and history of the CPP, see Sison, "Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!," 3-10. On the NPA, see *The Basic Rules of the New People's Army*, an appendix to Lachica, *Huk*, 317-325; and Jeffrey M. Riedinger, *Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 55-60.

¹¹⁰ José Maria Sison, *People's War in the Philippines*. (Mansfield Depot, CT: Philippines Research Centre, 1974), 41. Also quoted in Distor, "Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines," in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*, 369.

¹¹¹ Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 69; and Galileo C. Kintanar, Pacifico V. Militante, and J. Augustus de la Paz, *Lost In Time—From Birth to Obsolescence: The Communist Party of the Philippines, Book One, 1930-1972*. (Quezon City, the Philippines: Truth and Justice Foundation Inc., 1999), 56.

(*impact/relational reception*) en route to espousing Marxism-Leninism (and Mao Zedong Thought in Sison's case. Their respective experiences in a host of organizations—the Cambodian Paris Group in student organizations and Aidit in Japanese-backed political organizations—positioned them well to critique the litany of corrigible political crises at home, and made them realize at once the hazards of post-independence development and the limits of mere overtures to national sameness. A proper guide to action—Marxism-Leninism (and Maoism for the Paris Group)—arose as the primary and most attractive alternative to addressing these problems most effectively.

Aidit

One man who met Sison was DN Aidit. While the future PKI leader never “turned” Maoist, he nevertheless grappled with domesticating Marxism-Leninism in his homeland and according to its specific national conditions.¹¹² Aidit helped to reform the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and, like Sison, found value in China's Communist model, though he did not embrace it as a blueprint for his Party or nation. In Aidit's early biography we will once again see the stages of “reception” of exogenous theory along with the particulars of the Indonesian context. In Aidit's case, we see his political consciousness develop as he passed through Japanese-sponsored political organizations, had interactions and encounters with both his comrades and other radicals, including Marxists, and, as Indonesian politics failed to ameliorate the workers' and peasants' condition, finally “converted” to Communism. Ahmad Aidit (later DN Aidit, 1923-1965), was born on 30 July 1923 on the island of Belitung, off the eastern coast of Sumatra, to an ethnic Malay family. His father worked as a state official in the forestry service and, later entered politics. Aidit moved to Jakarta (at that time Batavia), where he attended *Hollandsche Inlandsch School* and *Middestand Handel School*, where he received an education in Dutch with a view to entry into the commercial sector.¹¹³ Though he and his future PKI comrades (Sudisman, Lukman, Njoto) attended different schools, they comprised the “*pemuda*

¹¹² David Mazingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 111-113. On this decision, Aidit stated that it was due to small membership and opposition by PKI leaders to pursue the *New Road* resolution. See DN Aidit, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), 18-19; and Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 57-58.

¹¹³ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 33-34. Mortimer credits Ruth McVey for this information on 34n6.

efflorescence.”¹¹⁴ Their shared experiences and devotion to national liberation, as well as their passages from peripheries to cores, propelled them to the forefront of radical politics in the waning years of Dutch colonial rule and after.

The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1942, however, ended their schooling and shifted them towards the warm embrace of political activism. For Aidit, five key features characterized his experiences during the Japanese occupation and tempered his *impact/relational* reception, for it was in such spaces that the *conditions of reception* made radical thought an attractive option. These five features were: 1) exposure to Japanese propaganda and training in Japanese-style political activism; 2) adherence to Marxism and the illegal PKI;¹¹⁵ 3) close contact and shared experiences with his fellow *pemuda* youths; 4) lessons in nationalism; and 5) association with Sukarno.¹¹⁶ The Japanese occupation gave a “great psychological shock” to locals, stripping away the false veneer of Dutch cultural and racial superiority and laying bare that Asians could indeed be masters of this world.¹¹⁷ The Dutch “relied on whiteness and the mystique of *zakelijkheid* [businesslike efficiency],” but the Japanese “promoted a countermyth of violence, physical prowess, and extraordinary spiritual power.”¹¹⁸ They displaced traditional values and authorities and, by virtue of the Imperial Japanese Army’s “divide and conquer” strategy, no unified anti-Japanese effort materialized.¹¹⁹ Yet the decision to mobilize young Indonesian men had the consequence of evoking the *pemuda* pledge of activism for Indonesian men under thirty, invigorating youths and fostering a comradeship that galvanized Aidit, Sudisman, Lukman, and Njoto as independence-minded comrades.¹²⁰ Aidit, in particular, participated in nationalist activity in 1939 as leader of the inclusive *Persatuan Timur Muda* (Association of Youth of the East). He also came into contact, and later joined, the left-wing nationalist and Communist-influenced youth organization *Barisan Gerindo* (Gerindo Front,

¹¹⁴ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 33.

¹¹⁵ On the rise of the PKI before its suppression, see McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 34-75.

¹¹⁶ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 36.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

¹¹⁸ Benedict Anderson, “Japan: ‘The Light of Asia,’” *Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays*. Josef Silverstein ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series No. 7, 1966), 20-21. Quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 31.

¹¹⁹ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 32.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 32-33. For biographical snapshots of Lukman and Njoto, see pages 39-40. See also Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 121-123; Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 9; and Henley, “Ethnogeographic Integration and Exclusion in Anticolonial Nationalism,” 293.

Gerakan Rakjat Indonesian, Indonesian People's Movement). *Gerindo* leader and wartime Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin had claimed in 1948 allegiance to Communism, and he was one of Aidit's earliest progressive contacts in *Gerindo* and spurred his nascent nationalism (*impact/relational*).¹²¹

Work within Japanese-sponsored youth organizations soon put Aidit in touch with radicals who would influence him, and provide us with another aspect of his *impact/relational reception*, as new encounters and reading new materials shaped his worldview further. *Angkatan Muda* (Young Generation, est. mid-1944) was once such organization, which led to him conferring with the PKI. *Angkatan*, as Anderson describes, was an organization for "controlling undesirable elements among the youth... who were known or suspected of having 'illegal' connections or who were persistently and openly hostile to the Japanese and at the same time influential among their comrades."¹²² While the Japanese monitored suspected troublemakers like Aidit, *Angkatan* grew steadily, crystallizing into a tight-knit group of colleagues.¹²³ Aidit turned such connections into membership in the *Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia* (New Generation Hostel of Indonesia), a "political training school" in which he received a "nationalist education" and wherein "Sukarno had given him his first training in Marxism."¹²⁴ This soon led to affiliation with the illegal PKI, a once-devastated Communist Party that by the Japanese occupation maintained its anti-Fascist commitment and held a small membership.¹²⁵ Rather than pushing for power, it sought broadened participation and de-emphasized ideological rigidity.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Ibid, 38-39. See also George M. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), 272-273.

¹²² Benedict Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-45*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesian Project, 1961), 51-52. Also quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 35.

¹²³ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 35-36

¹²⁴ Ibid, quoting *Harian Rakjat* [People's Daily (Indonesia)] (13 March 1965). Sukarno found harmony between Islam and Marxism in a 1926 publication. Sukarno, *Nationalism, Islam and Marxism. KH Warouw and PD Weldon, trans.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1970). Aidit's colleague Sudisman was also a *Gerindo* affiliate, and participated in the anti-Dutch nationalist movement. He became a member of the illegal PKI during the Japanese occupation and participated in anti-Japanese student movements until his 1942 arrest (released in September 1945). "Biographical Note," in "Analysis of Responsibility: Defence Speech of Sudisman, General Secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party at His Trial Before the Special Military Tribunal, Jakarta, 21 July 1967," Benedict Anderson, *trans.* (Melbourne, Australia: Works Co-operative, 1975), 1.

¹²⁵ "Biographical Note," in "Analysis of Responsibility," 1; and McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 155. On the PKI's formation and failed 1926 revolt, see McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*.

¹²⁶ Ruth McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in *Communist Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties*. A. Doak Barnett ed. (New York: Praeger, 1963), 149,

The *conditions* of Aidit's *reception* of Marxism emerged during his engagement in nationalist organizations, as he encountered Marxist influences therein.¹²⁷ He recalled that he was "aware of Marxist influence in [Gerindo] but did not acquire more than a vague notion of Marxism until the war years."¹²⁸ Indeed, the Japanese occupation pushed youths to the left, Aidit included. He was drawn particularly to Muhammad Jusuf, a "Marxist with mystical tendencies... [and from] whom Aidit borrowed a copy of Marx's *Das Kapital* in Dutch."¹²⁹ But importantly, Marxism (as before) could not merely be grafted onto the Indonesian situation; rather, it had to speak to concrete realities. As ex-PKI member and Comintern agent Tan Malaka (1897-1949) once stated:

The conclusions that a Marxist reaches in Indonesia today will differ from those reached by Marx and Lenin. Even if the terms are similar, the content may not be. What does remain constant for all Marxists, in all times and place, is the following: first, the dialectical *method* is used in solving and understanding the *social problem*; second, the materialist approach is used in interpreting, understanding, and constructing theory concerning social *phenomena*; and third, the investigation and solution of the problems of society and the positions and actions resulting from the conclusions reached are imbued with a revolutionary and progressive spirit.¹³⁰

Marxism soon became inseparable from Aidit's socioeconomic assessment of the Indies, a scope through which he would interpret post-independence crises and the problem of adapting Marxism-Leninism. Aidit joined the illegal PKI in 1943, meeting Lukman and Sudisman, forming a respected triumvirate of *pemuda* colleagues.

Another *condition* of his *reception* was membership in the illegal PKI, which, although not guaranteeing a smooth path to Party leadership by the *pemuda* group, threw into sharp relief the obstacles that Aidit and company had to surmount to become major Communist players. The PKI was firmly under the aegis of an old guard of established Communists, namely Tan Ling Djie, Alimin, and Ngadiman Hardjosubroto, all rigid dogmatists who lacked creative insight.¹³¹

citing Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 275. On Sudisman, see Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 217; and Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 40.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 332.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 35. See also Justus van der Kroepf, "Lenin, Mao, and Aidit," in *Polycentrism: The New Factor in International Communism*. Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, eds. (New York: Praeger, 1962), 197-218.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Tan Malaka, "The Birth and Growth of the Republic of Indonesia," in *From Jail To Jail, Volume III*, 67-68. Emphasis added by Jarvis.

¹³¹ Benedict Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), 172-179, as cited in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 37-38; and Frank Cibulka, "The Coalition Strategies and

Aidit bided his time, working diligently within the Party organization and, eventually, ascended to the PKI Central Committee in 1947.¹³² He also occupied the position of delegate to the Republican parliament and became a full member of the PKI Politburo in 1948, the year during which PKI leader Musso (1897-1948) returned from his exile in the Soviet Union and spearheaded the Madiun Uprising in East Java after the fall of the Amir Sjarifuddin Harahap (1907-1948) government.¹³³ Madiun, however, devastated the PKI ranks, forcing it to rely heavily on coalitions with other political organizations.¹³⁴ As its alliances disintegrated due to splits and desertion, extra-parliamentary means to confront the ruling government became an afterthought. The Party's failure to declare a clear political line or stance on national revolution ultimately translated into the Communists wielding little power and failing to attract broad support.¹³⁵

If one can glean a positive outcome from the Party's decimation after Madiun, it was that the PKI was open for new leadership. Aidit, who claimed to have spent 1949-1950 in China but likely remained in Jakarta—was by 1951 a serious candidate for PKI leadership.¹³⁶ The *pemuda* group's emergence under Aidit's leadership (the "Aidit group," as Mortimer calls it) signaled a major shift in the PKI; their camaraderie and shared experiences translated into a tight-knit and cohesive leadership group.¹³⁷ Aidit and company ousted the old guard mainstays, and appointed via election a new five-person Politburo that included the *pemuda* with Aidit as leader. The PKI

Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party: A Prelude to Destruction," in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*. Trond Gilberg, ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 288.

¹³² Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 38.

¹³³ Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 254. The Madiun Uprising, however, obliterated much of the PKI, with many Madiun combatants either detained or executed by the Indonesian government, and a core of 10,000 surviving members thereafter. On Madiun, see Rudi Kreutzer, *The Madiun Affair: Hatta's Betrayal of Indonesia's First Revolution*. (Townsville, Queensland, Australia: James Cook University, South East Asian Studies Committee, 1981). See also DN Aidit, "We Accuse 'Madiun Affair,'" in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*. DN Aidit, ed. (Jakarta, Indonesia: Demos, 1963), 103-135.

¹³⁴ Ruth McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in *Communist Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Government s and Parties*. A. Doak Barnett ed. (New York: Praeger, 1963), 149.

¹³⁵ McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in *Communist Strategies in Asia*, 150.

¹³⁶ John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement & Suharto's Coup d'état in Indonesia*. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 125. See also Hong Liu, *China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2011), 277-278; and Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 332. The Madiun Uprising began in September 1948 as a haphazard attempt at launching a Communist revolution, and the Indonesian army suppressed the Musso-led movement rather swiftly.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, 40.

subsequently recruited new blood into the Party ranks, as membership skyrocketed from 7,000 in 1952 to 150,000 in 1954, by Mortimer's estimation).¹³⁸ The old guard, Aidit claimed, had

relied too heavily on "European popular-front terms," and were thus "too little aware of the potentialities of the Indonesian revolution itself, and too inclined to regard the Communist Party as the representative of the proletariat alone: hence their failure to see that the PKI could and should assume the leadership of the national revolution itself, that it could and should appeal directly to Indonesian masses instead of losing itself in a welter of allied organizations."¹³⁹

Indeed, the Aidit group's takeover of the PKI signaled that they were to be the implementers of Musso's "New Road" strategy. Aidit and company had ushered in increased membership, an enlarged trade union federation (*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*, SOBSI, Central All-Indonesian Workers Organization, founded in 1947), expanded Party mass organizations in *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BNI, Indonesian Peasants' Front), *Gerwani* (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*, Indonesian Women's Movement), and *Pemuda Rakjat* (Worker's Youth).¹⁴⁰

The old guard, realizing that the PKI had to be led at that time by the *pemuda* backed down to the Aidit group, which now had no internal opposition by the PKI's Fifth Congress in 1954. Now, it could take the lead in addressing the post-independence quandaries of inequality that the 23 August-2 November 1949 *Konferensi Meja Bundar* (Round Table Conference, RTC) in The Hague had failed to rectify, notably Indonesia's continued underdeveloped, semi-feudal, and semi-colonial status and the ramifications of this status among those hit hardest, the rural

¹³⁸ Ibid, 41-42. Robert Alexander estimates that the PKI grew from 7,910 members in 1951 to 2.5 million by early 1963, a year by which it had become an "apparently powerful organization." Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 253. Aidit said in 1963: "The progressive organizations of the revolutionary masses have also grown rapidly. Of the 4 million organized workers, 1.2 million joined the All-Indonesian Central Organization of Trade Unions SOBSI)... The peasant movement has made very encouraging progress... the membership of the Indonesian Peasant Front has risen from 4.6 million to 6.3 million. The People's Youth and the Indonesian Women's Movement each have 1.5 million members." Aidit, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, 57.

¹³⁹ McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in *Communist Strategies in Asia*, 150.

¹⁴⁰ Olle Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia*. (London: Zed Books, 1984), 74; and McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in *Communist Strategies in Asia*, 154-155. The Aidit group encountered openly anti-Communist rightists taking virtually all leftist positions in government legislatures. The Indonesian people, too, were not yet the politicized masses that the PKI sought, and the ruling government was disunited. Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1957-1963*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), 29; George M. Kahin, *Major Governments of Asia*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958); and Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).

sector.¹⁴¹ Aidit's approach, which he outlined in his report and the PKI ratified in its 1954 Fifth Congress, will form the crux of the following section.

This section has sought to show how Aidit's social experiences in the Dutch Indies and then under Japanese colonization led him to link up with radically-minded young men who would form the intellectual thrust of the PKI (*impact/relational*). He came to recognize his situation, like those of other Indies locals, as one of oppression, and despite Dutch endeavors to turn locals into civil servants to oversee their colony it had the effect of tying Indies identity to a territory and Dutch-ness to modernity. The Japanese mobilization of young men revitalized nascent nationalist sentiments, and pledged many Javanese to committing to Indonesian nationalism (and independence). But as in our other case studies in Southeast Asia, independence did not coincide with economic and industrial development, and the rural sector remained entrenched in a highly exploitative semi-feudal state. The nature of both colonial and post-independence semi-colonial eras in Indonesia (*conditions of reception*) paired with Aidit's encounters with radicals in Japanese-backed organizations to propel him towards more progressive thought streams, most notably Marxism-Leninism. His *reception* of Communism and quest to "Indonesianize" it to *fit* the nation's specific historical reality and conditions would serve as the hallmark example of his *adaptations* of Marxism-Leninism, which we explore in the subsequent sections.

In summation, José Maria Sison and DN Aidit passed through several spaces, geographic and intellectual, en route to their eventual conversion to Communism. Not unlike the Cambodian Paris Group, Sison came from a wealthy landowning elite family—what Sison and Aidit both would describe as "feudal"—with strong ties to local powerbrokers, admired national heroes, and viewed liberalism favorably at the earliest stage. As he surrounded himself with progressive people in radical spaces, however, he, too, leaned further to the left (*impact/relational*). Government repression pushed him ever further, and after his time in Indonesia, where he connected with Communists who held transnational ties, he converted to Communism (*historical conditions*). Aidit, likewise, passed through several spaces on his way to "finding" Communism.

¹⁴¹ On the RTC, see *Round Table Conference Results*. (The Hague, The Netherlands: n.d.), 7-78; Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 224-225; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 437-443; and Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945-1965*. (The Hague, The Netherlands: Mouton & Co, 1973), 60-71.

Unlike his Khmer counterparts, however, he experienced Japanese occupation and the ongoing fight for Indonesian independence. Yet like them, his encounters in varied political organizations and with a host of characters who influenced him forged a strong comradeship with his peers that remained intact until the 1965 Anti-Communist massacres. He rose to the rank of PKI Secretary General and surrounded himself with his *pemuda* colleagues to deliver a shot in the arm to the then-stagnant Communist Party. He did not take a Maoist turn *per se* upon his assumption of Party leadership, and as the subsequent section shows, he sought to find ways in which Marxism-Leninism could speak to Indonesia's conditions without violence. Thus, we now turn to the *intellectual adaptations* of Marxism-Leninism (and Mao Zedong Thought for Sison), which, while failing in the end, brought them closer to their *practical* and *normative adaptations* whereby they produced their own variants of this "traveling theory" that appealed to broader publics in their home societies.

Intellectual Adaptations: Re-established Communist Parties under New Direction

Sison's Intellectual Adaptation of Maoism

Here we focus on José Maria Sison's efforts to apply Marxism-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought to the Philippine revolution on paper, as he made novel suggestions for its utility in framing the Communist movement's failures thus far and its need to reconstitute as a Maoist Party that has shed dogmatism and embraced creative application. Sison's 1968 speech and subsequent writings on the Philippines' socioeconomic and political character and military tactics for the Philippine revolution highlight how he envisioned, at least on paper, *adapting* Maoism *intellectually* to the Philippine situation. His body of work, which we examine closely, represents the Philippine Maoist canon, and yields five features of Sison's *intellectual adaptation* of Maoism, many of which are similar, if not the same, that appeared in both the Cambodian and, as we will see below, the PKI's own efforts. Although his *intellectual adaptation* failed, it prompted further *adaptations* in later years. Thus our focus on *intellectual adaptation* allows us to track Sison's uses of Maoism in service to the Philippine Communist revolution that he hoped to set into motion and to make his experience more comparable with the experience and efforts of self-avowed Marxists and Maoists in Indonesia and Cambodia. These Maoist features, which guide us through his *adaptation*, are: 1) a class analysis and assessment of the Philippines as semicolonial and semifeudal; 2) a broad national united front of workers and peasants led by the

working class; 3) armed struggle, or people's war, in the new democratic struggle against US imperialism; 4) Maoist-style rectification and scathing critiques of the Lavas' PKP leadership; and 5) applying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought creatively to the concrete practice of the Philippine revolution.¹⁴²

But how and why did Sison opt for an overtly Maoist course for the Philippine Communists? Once he had broken with the Lava-led PKP, José Maria Sison established the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an alternative Communist Party to the Moscow-friendly PKP, and an organization that Sison founded on the theoretical foundation of "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought," the "microscope and telescope of the Philippine revolution."¹⁴³ On 26 December 1968, Sison and his loyalists held an official "Re-establishment Congress" in which they resuscitated the CPP (under the banner CPP-Mao Tse-tung's Thought), and anointed Mao Zedong Thought as the Party's guide to self-criticism and rebuilding.¹⁴⁴ The choice of Mao Zedong's birthday as the re-establishment date, and the NPA's founding on 29 March 1969—47 years to the day of the Huks' establishment—had a dual purpose. First, it signaled the CPP's shift away from the Soviet line of the PKP, which Sison lambasted as nepotistic, impotent, and revisionist above all. Sison's 1968 opening speech, for instance, repudiated the Lavas' erroneous political line, including their "ideological errors" of subjectivism, dogmatism, and empiricism, and presented the now reconstituted CPP's main tasks of Party-building, armed struggle, and forming a national united front.¹⁴⁵ Second, the choice of dates tied the res-established Party to the original CPP, as the new Communist Party was to enmesh continuity with rupture in learning from past mistakes to reach a higher level of revolutionary awareness and leadership.¹⁴⁶ The CPP grounded its political line in accordance

¹⁴² Sison expands upon these five features in Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 128.

¹⁴³ Amado Guerrero, "Mao Zedong and the Philippine Revolution: Statement by Amado Guerrero, Chairman, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines," (18 September 1976), *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)] (Organ of the Communist Party of the Philippines Central Committee), 30.

[<https://emaotism.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/philippines0001.pdf>] (Accessed 16 March 2017).

¹⁴⁴ Sison, "Rectify Errors, Rectify the Party!," 1. For more on the Re-establishment Congress and CPP theory, see Katherine Weekley, *The Communist Party of the Philippines, 1968-1993: A Story of Its Theory and Practice*. (Quezon City, the Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2001); and Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 295; and William Pomeroy, "Maoist Disruption in the Philippines," *Political Affairs* (April 1972): 30-33.

¹⁴⁵ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 51.

¹⁴⁶ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 20.

with the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, with the teachings of “Comrade Mao Tse-tung” guiding the new democratic revolution.¹⁴⁷

First, Sison assessed Philippine society as “semi-colonial and semi-feudal,” exploited unevenly by the “three historical evils” of US imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat capitalism.¹⁴⁸ On imperialism, the most imposing, Sison charges that despite the Philippines’ nominal independence, American economic, political, cultural, and military interests sublimated local ones, with the “clearest evidence that the Philippines is still a colony” located in US-dominated colonial economic enclaves and the presence of US military bases. US monopoly capitalism through “unequal treaties and one-sided privileges,” he charges, combined with “thought control”—US reliance on Churches, cleric-run schools, the broader educational system, and the media to “superimpose imperialist culture onto the people”¹⁴⁹—to violate national sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁵⁰ US imperialism thus perpetuated the Philippines’ status as a “Third World” nation, a claim that bears striking similarity, almost verbatim, to Mao’s Three Worlds Theory.¹⁵¹ Yet for Sison, US imperialism was on the verge of collapse, and socialism was on the rise throughout the developing world. American and Soviet imperialism were, by his assessment, “in deep crisis,” whereas Communist China had “consolidated itself as an iron bastion of socialism and the world proletarian revolution by carrying out the epochal and great proletarian Cultural Revolution and by holding aloft Mao Tse-tung thought to illuminate the road of armed revolution throughout the world.”¹⁵² The solution is, as Sison urges, to follow China’s

¹⁴⁷ Sison, “Rectify Errors, Rectify the Party!,” 1-2.

¹⁴⁸ Amado Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*. (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Pao, 1971), 113; and José Maria Sison, “The Economic Emancipation Movement Against US Imperialism,” (1966), in *Struggle for National Democracy*, 129. Sison describes Philippine society today as “semi-colonial and semi-feudal,” since imperialism, “the monopoly stage of Western capitalism,” though waning, “retain[ed] the feudal system.” Feudal structures were Spanish innovations: “from the *encomienda*—the large administrative united [the Spanish] used to integrate large areas of land, an organizational advance from the *barangay* or the confederation of *barangay* of pre-Hispanic times.”

¹⁴⁹ José Maria Sison, “Towards a National Democratic Teacher’s Movement,” (1968), in *Struggle for National Democracy*, 240.

¹⁵⁰ Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 114. Unequal treaties include: The Laurel-Langley Agreement (Revised Bell Trade Act 1954); The US-RP Military Base Agreement (1947); The US-RP Military Assistance Pact (1947); Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (1951); The US-RP Mutual Defense Pact (1951); The Agricultural Commodities Agreements; and Agreements Pertaining to Culture and Education. See Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 123-133.

¹⁵¹ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 179-181.

¹⁵² Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 75, quoting the CPP’s “Program for a People’s Democratic Revolution,” in *Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt*, appendix.

example and launch “an armed national revolution to assert Philippine independence” guided by Mao’s strategy of people’s war.¹⁵³

The Philippines’ semifeudal character, meanwhile, owed to American capitalist exploitation, which perpetuated a feudal mode of production. Foreign monopoly capitalism and domestic feudalism intertwined, with the former insuring the latter’s continuity, and in so doing, prevented what Sison calls a “natural economy of self-sufficiency” that benefited the peasant majority. Instead, foreign monopoly capitalism instilled a cash economy in which most peasants were in “feudal bondage” in perpetuity.¹⁵⁴ The coeval nature of both foreign monopoly capitalism and the entrenchment by US-friendly classes of a feudal mode of production effectively pauperized the rural sector, as it became a large capitalist farming network for export crops production to suit foreign business demands exclusively. As he describes in a 1966 speech:

... only US firms are now in a financial position in the Philippines to invest in Philippine agriculture, as our own Filipino industrialists are themselves credit-starved (now much more in the case of old-style landlords!) because of decontrol and other restrictive conditions, the process of land monopolization would become detrimental to the entire Filipino people.. US firms and subsidiaries are even under instruction now by the US government to prevent the outflow of dollars from the US by getting credit from local sources in the Philippines.¹⁵⁵

Sison also blames the state for effectively handing over license to foreign corporations, most often American ones of local comprador bourgeoisie industries with US ties, to exploit national resources and cheap labor in the rural sector for profit. This unequal system of capitalist exploitation and consumer goods production that serviced only foreigners and the wealthiest people effectively “manipulate[d] local backwardness for the purpose of having cheap labor and cheap raw materials from the country.”¹⁵⁶

On the exploitative nature of semi-feudalism, Sison drew inspiration from Mao’s 1926 essay “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,”¹⁵⁷ which he references in his 1971

¹⁵³ Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 114.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 114-115.

¹⁵⁵ Sison, “Land Reform and National Democracy,” (1966), in *Struggle for National Democracy*, 157.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 238-239. According to Sison, corporative ties include Bancom, Ayala House investments, San Miguel corporation, Atlas Consolidated, Bislig Bay Lumber, Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, Nutritional Products, Coca-Cola Export Corporation, Phelps Dodge, Central Azucarera de Don Pedro, FGU Insurance Group, and several national banks. See page 115.

¹⁵⁷ William Pomeroy, “Maoist Disruption in the Philippines,” *Political Affairs* (April 1972): 30-35. Sison published this book through a “Chinese Maoist publishing house in Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao.”

Philippine Society and Revolution. Here, his analysis of the classes represents the most thoroughgoing classification of the nation's socioeconomic strata.¹⁵⁸ Of the five main groups, the landlord class comprises "the most backward and reactionary class" and the "main obstacle in the political, economic, and cultural development of the Philippines."¹⁵⁹ Its core feature, Sison states, is that it owns large concentrations of land, does not engage in production, and exploits peasants through arbitrary land rent and usury. The middle bourgeoisie consists of the pro-imperialist Comprador Big Bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, and may play a significant role in the revolutionary movement if the CPP monitors it closely.¹⁶⁰ The petty bourgeoisie, which Sison calls the "lowest and most sizeable" of the bourgeoisie, consists of the intelligentsia, government officials, small businessmen, and handicraftsmen.¹⁶¹ Next, and most complex, is the peasantry, which Sison breaks into rich (or rural bourgeoisie, 5% of the rural population, landowners and exploiters of poor peasants), middle (or rural petty bourgeoisie, 15-20% of the rural population, semi-self sufficient and occasionally exploitative), and poor (semi-proletariat, 75-80% of the rural population, largely landless and exploited).¹⁶² Lastly, the proletariat (15% of the total work force, approx. 1.8-2 million people) is the leading force of the Philippine revolution and "the standard-bearer of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought."¹⁶³ This class was to lead the peasantry under the aegis of the CPP, since only the working class had what Sison called a "comprehensive grasp of materialist philosophy, political economy, social science, people's war, Party building, and the great proletarian cultural revolution."¹⁶⁴ Thus to defeat imperialism, feudalism, and semifeudalism, Sison concludes, the CPP must lead the proletariat and peasantry in a large-scale agrarian revolution.¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁸ Sison credits Mao's 1926 "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" and 1927 "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan"—the "result of concrete social investigation and study of historical forces in the course of revolutionary struggle"—for guiding the CPP's own analyses. Guerrero, "Mao Zedong and the Philippine Revolution," 13.

¹⁵⁹ Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 235-236. For more on Sison's assessment of the landlord class, see pages 235-238. See also Sison, "Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!," 32.

¹⁶⁰ Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 240-242.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 242-243.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 250-256.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 260. See also Guerrero, "Mao Zedong and the Philippine Revolution," 14-15.

¹⁶⁴ Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 260. Sison credits the CR for "loft[ing] high Marxism-Leninism of the present era, Mao Tsetung Thought, and [for] transform[ing] the People's Republic of China into an iron bastion of the world proletarian revolution." He describes Mao Thought as "an invincible ideological weapon [with which] to defeat imperialism, revisionism, and all reactionism." On pages 232-233.

¹⁶⁵ Sison, "Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!," 32.

Second, Sison urges the CPP to form a broad national united front.¹⁶⁶ One of the three basic tasks, or “weapons” of the Philippine revolution, was a broad national united front.¹⁶⁷ But how might the CPP draw in workers and peasants to the Party’s united front? Sison believes that all oppressed peoples of the Philippines, whether young men and women or the disenfranchised and despondent poor working and peasant classes, would come to recognize that an agrarian revolution was a “just revolutionary cause” in their collective interests.¹⁶⁸ The CPP thus ought to “to tap all positive forces in the armed and legal fronts against the enemy... expand the influence of the revolutionary armed forces, isolate the enemy and its die-hard elements and recruit the broad masses of the people to the side of the people's democratic revolution.”¹⁶⁹ In fact, he argued in speeches in 1966 and 1968, respectively, that an alliance of the workers and peasants with the national bourgeoisie had historical precedents in the recent Philippine past:

[T]he worsened conditions of the peasantry in our *barrios* [after the fall of the First Philippine Republic]... produced peasant mass protest organizations. These unified in 1922 in the *Confederacion de Apareceros y Obreros Agricolas de Filipinas* [Confederation of Philippine Agricultural Workers and Sharecroppers], which was broadened and renamed two years later as *Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas* [KPMP, National Association of Philippine Peasants]. The KPMP... demanded agrarian reforms [and] called for national independence... In 1930, the leaders of this peasant organization consequently united with the *Katipunan ng mga Anakpawis ng Pilipinas* [Confederation of Workers of the Philippines] for the purpose of creating a worker-peasant political alliance under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines... [which] made these two classes more capable of conducting their own class struggle and the national struggle... [against] liberal democratic pretensions of US imperialism and its local agents.¹⁷⁰

[Our] Party first experienced a united front policy when it opposed fascism during the days of the Popular Front. But... the powerful influence of the petty bourgeoisie within the Party started to corrode the revolutionary will of the Party in a subtle way. After the war, the Democratic Alliance was put up as a formal unified front organization. But this alliance served only to support Right opportunism and allowed some bourgeois

¹⁶⁶ See chapter four, 211-213. For more on the united front in China, see Lyman P. Van Slyke, *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967).

¹⁶⁷ Sison, “Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!,” 2; and Guerrero, “Mao Zedong and the Philippine Revolution,” 14-19. Mao had identified the united front as one of the three “magic weapons” of the Communist Party in a December 1935 essay. Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism,” (1935) in *Mao’s Road To Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1949. Volume V—Toward the Second United Front, January 1935-July 1937*. Stuart Schram, ed. (Armon, NY: ME Sharpe, 1999), 96. See also Mao Zedong, “共產黨人發刊詞 (Introducing the Communist, *Gòngchǎndǎngrén Fākāncí*) in 毛澤東集第七卷 [(MZJ)], Minoru, ed., 69-84, especially on pages 74-76.

¹⁶⁸ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 76-77, 108. Quote from 108.

¹⁶⁹ Sison, “Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!,” 37.

¹⁷⁰ Sison, “Land Reform and National Democracy,” (1966), in *Struggle for National Democracy*, 148.

personalities to assume the leadership. The Party practically carried the sedan chair for them... During the Jesus Lava leadership, no genuine united front could be built because of the failure to build a strong people's army and legal mass organizations...¹⁷¹

Indeed, Sison encouraged the inclusion of supplementary revolutionary forces from the urban-based petty and national bourgeoisies to fight alongside the broader worker and peasant forces, albeit under the CPP's watchful gaze.¹⁷² The CPP was therefore to base the national united front on an alliance of the working class and the peasantry under Communist Party leadership, which may include "other progressive classes and strata in Philippine society."¹⁷³

Third, Sison, who was alienated by the PKP's continued advocacy of a legal parliamentary struggle, stressed that Mao's military strategy of people's war, which the CPP had launched in early 1969 in Tarlac, Central Luzon, was the "only method possible to end the armed oppression of the people by the reactionary state... of the big comprador-landlord class."¹⁷⁴ He stressed that the nation's predominantly peasant population (85%)¹⁷⁵ had suffered mightily under boot heels of imperialist exploitation and, thus, had the most to gain from launching a people's war as part of a broad national united front. But unlike Mao, Sison combines people's war with New Democracy. Sison's *Specific Characteristics of People's War* (1979) describes the Philippine revolution as "continuous" with protracted people's war—and encircling the cities from the countryside—occurring in two stages with the proletariat leading and the CPP operating as its "vanguard detachment": 1) the national democratic stage; and 2) the socialist stage.¹⁷⁶ "Agrarian revolution is the solution" to defeating feudalism and semifeudalism, the twin evils of socioeconomic inequity in the rural sector, as Sison notes.¹⁷⁷ It was therefore imperative for the poor peasants to join with the proletariat in a national united front, for "the stronger this alliance is in the course of the people's war, the stronger is the desire of the urban petty bourgeoisie [and

¹⁷¹ Sison, "Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!," 25.

¹⁷² Ibid, 25. Sison cautions that while the CPP national united front must be open to the "middle forces" of reactionary classes, including them in the broad mass movement will mean that the Party must remain vigilant in monitoring potential enemy ranks from diverting the popular movement. The development of genuine cooperation within the national bourgeoisie was the Party's responsibility and, thus, the Party apparatus ought to be strong in the event that a reactionary bourgeois class decided against active participation in the united front. On page 38.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 37.

¹⁷⁴ Guerrero, *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines*, 2-4, quote from page 2. For more on the CPP's espousal and adaptation of Mao's tactic of people's war, see Amado Guerrero, *Victory to Our People's War: Anti-Revisionist Essays by Chairman Amado Guerrero, Communist Party of the Philippines*. (Montreal, QC: Red Flag Publications, 1980), especially pages 66-92.

¹⁷⁵ Guerrero, *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines*, 3-4.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 3.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 4-5.

the national bourgeoisie] to join the national united front and take active part in revolutionary work.”¹⁷⁸ Thus in Sison’s view, Mao’s tactic of people’s war was as instrumental a galvanizing force in uniting the national front as it was a strategy to defeat a numerically and more technologically advanced opponent.

Yet Mao’s tactic of people’s war was not useful to the Philippine struggle in abstract, for Mao had warned of the hazards of endorsing abstract foreign theories without concrete practice. Sison urges the Party to consider the Philippines’ specific conditions, namely that the country was a small mountainous archipelago consisting 7,100 islands and islets over 299,404 square kilometers (115,600 square miles),¹⁷⁹ and apply it concretely in line with the first stage of the national democratic revolution.¹⁸⁰ As Sison elaborates:

From the great treasury of Marxism-Leninism, we draw basic principles and historical lessons to shed light on the people’s war that we are waging. But they are of general value; they are a general guide to our action. To rest content with them, without integrating them with our concrete practice, is to turn them into lifeless dogma. To dispense with them is to engage in blind action... *we must integrate theory and practice in the conduct of people’s war. The universal theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought must be applied to the concrete conditions of the Philippine revolution...* [W]e must consider [our] specific conditions as that our people’s war is in line with the national democratic revolution of a new type; that we need to wage a protracted war in the countryside; that we are fighting in a mountainous archipelago; that the enemy is big and strong while we are still small and weak; that a fascist dictatorship has arisen amidst a political and economic crisis of the ruling system; that the country is dominated by one imperialist power and thus there is a unified armed reaction, except in southwestern Mindanao; and that US imperialism is on the decline in Asia and throughout the world and world revolution is advancing amidst the general crisis of the world capitalist system unprecedented since the end of World War II.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 4.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 7-13.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 2.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 1-2. Emphasis added. Sison quotes Mao throughout this text, most importantly on page 31 when he recites the following from a 1970 essay: “Innumerable facts prove that a just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little support. A weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big... if only they[the people] dare to rise in struggle, take up arms and grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country. This is a law of history.” Mao Zedong, “People of the World, Unite and Defeat the US Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs,” (23 May 1970) [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_86.htm] (Accessed 10 April 2017). See also See Mao Zedong, “On Practice: On the Relation between Knowledge and Practice, between Theory and Reality, between Knowing and Doing,” *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*. Nick Knight, ed., (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1990), 148; Mao Zedong, “實踐論 (On Practice, *Shíjiàn lùn*),” 毛澤東集補卷第五卷 [Supplements to Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, Volume V, *Máo Zédōng jí dìwǔjuǎn*]. Takeuchi Minoru, ed., (Tokyo: Suosuosha, 1983-1986), 234; and Mao Zedong, “論持久戰,” in 毛澤東集第六卷, *MZI VI*, Takeuchi, ed., 49-149, especially 51-54.

To accomplish this goal, Sison encourages “centralized leadership and decentralized operations, which meant that Party leaders would instruct its cadres for Party work in Northern and Southern Luzon and the Visayas, while placing primacy on preparing the people in the CPP’s purview in the right places to make a people’s war most successful.”¹⁸² There, the Party “rooted itself deeply among the masses of workers and peasants,”¹⁸³ establishing liberated areas in which the NPA set up and waged the protracted struggle against the “Marcos fascist gang.”¹⁸⁴ Though the NPA endured major setbacks in its efforts, its “geographical sweep,” as Ken Fuller terms it, was rather extensive by the 1980s and included nearly six thousand fighters and relied on well over one hundred thousand locals to keep them afloat in their struggle.¹⁸⁵

Fourth, the CPP’s *Program for a People’s Democratic Revolution*, which the Party adopted in its “Re-establishment Congress,” calls for the Party to launch a “rectification movement” not unlike the model of Mao’s of the 1940s.¹⁸⁶ This “First Great Rectification Movement” (FGRM), which the would-be CPP leaders launched before the Re-establishment Congress in 1967, formed the basis for the reconstituted CPP and upheld Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles in repudiating revisionism.¹⁸⁷ The Re-establishment Congress constituted part of this First Great Rectification Movement, namely because it levied criticism of the old Party, the PKP, and its revisionist leaders, the Lava clique. A Second Great Rectification Movement (SGRM) followed thereafter, which “saved the Party from destruction by incorrigible

¹⁸² Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 109; and Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 266.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Guerrero, *Specific Characteristics of People’s War in the Philippines*, 32.

¹⁸⁵ Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 275; and Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 295-296, quoting Andy McCue, “In Philippines, Communist Army Grows as government Policy Dismays Farmers,” *Wall Street Journal* (2 November 1982), 32. On the CPP-NPA’s later obstacles, see “Statement of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee on the Twelfth Anniversary of the Re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)], (26 December 1980).

¹⁸⁶ On the CPP *Program*, see Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 67-83. For a contrarian assessment of the CPP’s *Program* not unlike his negative position in *A Movement Divided*, see Kenneth Fuller, *Forcing the Pace*. (Quezon City, the Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2007), Ch. 2. According to Gregg Jones, only eleven CPP members bothered to attend the “Re-establishment Congress,” Sison and ten of his closest associates, whereas a twelfth, Rodolfo Salas, “walked away in silent protest” because Sison had proposed forming an alliance with a Huk bandit. Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 17. According to Francisco Nemenzo Jr., “[f]our participants recalled... that Amado Guerrero [José Maria Sison] alone was brimming with optimism; the rest nursed a sense of futility [since they] could hardly believe that their rag-tag army of student activists would grow into a serious guerrilla force.” Francisco Nemenzo Jr., “Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement,” in *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia*. Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani, eds. (Hampshire, UK: Gover, 1984), 80.

¹⁸⁷ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 127. See also Nemenzo Jr., “Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement,” in *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia*, 80.

opportunists and revisionists” as Sison recounts.¹⁸⁸ Not unlike the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to salvage the gains of the revolution and socialist edification, the SGRM sought to stay the course of the Philippine revolution while also re-invigorating the Party institution itself. Sison ultimately credits the SGRM for “saving the Party and the revolutionary movement” while simultaneously “inspiring, guiding, and revitalizing them for a full decade.”¹⁸⁹ While Sison credits the SGRM for leading the movement to several victories, the FGRM deserves credit for setting the stage for the Party to establish its clear political line and guiding ideological precept as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.

A seminal document of the CPP’s FGRM, Sison’s 1968 speech “Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party,” stresses rectification as central to the CPP’s revolutionary movement.¹⁹⁰ Weary of “revisionism” (or “Right Opportunism” and “black bourgeois line”) within the PKP ranks, Sison urges that the CPP follow Mao’s example in uniting the Party around his thought.¹⁹¹ “As the nucleus of proletarian dictatorship,” Sison urged, the CPP “must consolidate itself through the process of rectification... [and] a profound and systematic self-criticism as basis for a rectification movement.”¹⁹² As he elaborates in further detail:

Mao Tsetung Thought is the highest development of Marxism-Leninism in the present world era of the impending collapse of imperialism and the world triumph of socialism... [It] is the supreme guide in analyzing and summing up the experience of the Communist Party of the Philippines... [which] has been committed from the very beginning to Marxist-Leninist theory and its creative application to the concrete conditions in the Philippines in fighting US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism... [O]ur Party is consequently committed to the theory and practice of Mao Tsetung Thought... Mao Tsetung Thought now guides all proletarian revolutionary movements that are inflicting mortal blows on US imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction.¹⁹³

Since the Lavas brothers’ reign had fallen victim to “subjectivism... in the form of dogmatism and empiricism,” as well as “sentimentalism” (the Lava brothers occupied leadership positions through familial ties), the CPP had to become in both theory and practice a genuine Marxist-Leninist Party guided by Mao Zedong Thought.¹⁹⁴ CPP rectification, in turn, was to uphold Mao

¹⁸⁸ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 127.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 127-128.

¹⁹¹ Sison, “Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!,” 13-14.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 2, 8.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, 19-20.

Zedong Thought, which had united theory with practice and allowed for creative adaptation according to concrete national realities, as the Party's guiding ideology.¹⁹⁵ From the speech, it is clear that Sison upheld Mao's thought with noteworthy devotion, as if to subscribe to the Chairman's *modus operandi* and spirit *in toto*. By heeding Mao's advice to apply universal theory to particular conditions, the CPP could then guide the revolution to the promised land of state power.

Sison's strident critique of the Lavas's leadership brings us to an important point that is worthy of note as part of a complete historical explanation for Sison's position: the inner party struggle of the PKP. Raymond Wylie's treatment of similar fractures within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during Yan'an Rectification (1942-1944) may yield some helpful insights. Wylie's approach, which is an "analysis of the ideological and political process that gave rise to the concept of Mao Tse-tung's thought," takes Mao's ideology seriously and acknowledges his contributions.¹⁹⁶ But it succeeds most of all by accounting for the dark side of intra-Party machinations by looking unflinchingly at the power politics side of things, notably Mao's life-and-death fight for Party helmsmanship with Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming. Idealism and power went hand-in-hand, with Mao feeling constrained by his own limitations and accomplishments as a Marxist theoretician (at this earliest stage), yet outlasting his rivals by solidifying key alliances with men such as Chen Boda, who contributed significantly to Mao's lionization. Their collaboration made central the importance of shaping and even monopolizing ideas, and dissenting views of potential rivals turned them into targets of purging during Yan'an Rectification.¹⁹⁷ Sison's case was very much the same: as Sison tried to coalesce the Party around his political vision and theoretical canon, those who endorsed the legal-political line to state power and/or supported Moscow became wholesale revisionists and, thus, were in contravention to the Philippine movement's revolutionary goals.

¹⁹⁵ Sison, "Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!," 10, 13; Guerrero, *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines*, 1-2, 4; and Guerrero, "Mao Zedong and the Philippine Revolution," 16-17. Sison mentions several essays from Mao's Yan'an Canon: "On Practice" (1937); "On Contradiction" (1937); "Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art" (1942); "Reform Our Study, Rectify the Party's Style of Work" (1941); and "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing" (1942). Such works, Sison notes, "served as materials in the great rectification movement in Yanan that strengthened the Party on the eve of the Seventh Party Congress, the Japanese defeat, and the civil war launched by the US-Chiang-clique." See also Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 80.

¹⁹⁶ Raymond F. Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Chen Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980), 4.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, *in passim*.

Reminiscent of Lin Biao's "faith Maoist" praise of Mao's thought, Sison concludes his "Rectify" speech by lauding Mao's contributions to Marxism-Leninism and world proletarian revolution, describing it as an invincible "spiritual atom bomb." The underlying meaning that Lin placed behind this metaphor was that if people embraced and understood Maoism, both within China and without, then it could form the *deus ex machina* type of weapon to resist and defeat imperialism.¹⁹⁸ Sison echoes Lin in the following passage from his 1968 speech:

All the nuclear weapons and all the military technology of US imperialism cannot frighten us. Although our fraternal people, the Chinese people, have the atom bomb for the defense of the revolutionary peoples, what is more important for all fighting peoples is the human factor, the surging forces of the masses under the inspiration of Mao Tsetung Thought and under the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party. Mao Tsetung Thought is their spiritual atom bomb. They are bound by the spirit of proletarian internationalism in the world proletarian revolution and in the international united front against US imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction.¹⁹⁹

Here, Sison praises Mao Zedong Thought and urges the CPP, accordingly, to hold aloft the banner of Mao Zedong Thought to smash the reactionary and authoritarian Marcos regime and begin the transition to socialism, which will liberate the disenfranchised and productive classes. US imperialism and all reactionaries are thus "paper tigers" for Sison, who like Lin before him viewed human will as the determinant factor in the struggle between capitalism and socialism, Communism and revisionism. Sison concludes that the CPP "will surely triumph" and "will achieve people's democracy first and socialism next" with Maoism lighting the way.²⁰⁰

Thus far, we have covered four features of Sison's *intellectual adaptation*. The fifth and last feature leads into what would become his *practical and normative adaptations*, his calls to integrate Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to the concrete national realities and specific conditions of the Philippines and its revolutionary movement. This feature is important because it echoes Mao's stress on the primacy of rendering Marxism-Leninism congruent with Chinese conditions, which became his version of the "Sinification of Marxism," and represents Sison's

¹⁹⁸ Lin Biao, Foreword to the Second Chinese Edition of *Quotations from Mao Zedong* (16 December 1966). Full text of the official English translation is available at www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1966/12/16.htm (Accessed 7 May 2015), and quoted in Alex C. Cook, "Introduction: The Spiritual Atom Bomb and its Global Fallout," in *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1. See also John W. Garver, *China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 196-197.

¹⁹⁹ Sison, "Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!," 39.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

rhetorical commitment to *adapting* Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought creatively.²⁰¹ While Sison did not refer to this process as the “Filipinization” of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, his call for the CPP to “constantly strive for the integration of Mao Tsetung Thought and revolutionary practice in order to achieve thoroughgoing victory” certainly owes its *raison d’être* to Mao.²⁰² Sison acknowledges that the Party adhered to Marxism-Leninism and studied extensively the Marxist-Maoist canon to gain insight on shaping a successful Philippine revolution.²⁰³ But as Sison declares, “[n]either the CPP nor I am attracted to foreign revolutions as models for uncritical copying or aping.”²⁰⁴ He elaborates further:

A Communist Party can be successful in revolution *only if it correctly applies the universal theory of Marxism-Leninism on the concrete conditions of a country*. The revolutionary theory is the guide to the analysis of the history and circumstances of the Filipino people and to the formulation and taking of a revolutionary course of action... The victories [that] the [Communist Party of the Philippines] had won are due to its own concrete analysis of concrete conditions, revolutionary work, and reliance on the Filipino people. The CPP continues to consider Mao Zedong as one of the great Communist leaders and thinkers, and owes to him its comprehensive and profound understanding of the new democratic revolution in a semicolonial and semifeudal society, especially the theory of people’s war for seizing political power, and subsequent socialist revolution, especially the laying down of its foundation. Who can deny the greatness of Mao as the Communist thinker and leader who led hundreds of millions of people to victory in the Chinese revolution—a revolution of great significance to the rest of mankind?”²⁰⁵

For Sison, Mao’s unity of theory with practice and close attention to applying foreign theory to national realities made him an expert Marxist-Leninist theorist, and his synthesis the example that the CPP ought to follow. Sison emphasizes the *universal* nature of Mao Zedong Thought, which was itself a domestication of Marxian universals: “Mao Tsetung Thought is not simply the integration of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. It is a

²⁰¹ On Sinitification, see Mao Zedong, “論新階段 (On the New Stage, *Lùn xīn jiēduàn*),” (12-14 October 1938), 毛澤東集, 第六卷, *MZJVI*, Takeuchi, ed., 260-261; and Mao Zedong, “新民主主義論,” in 毛澤東集第七卷, *MZJ VII*, Takeuchi ed., 201-203; revised in 毛澤東選集第二卷, *XJ II*, 667-668.

²⁰² The “Filipinization” in relation to Marxist principles comes from Epifanio San Juan Jr., *US Imperialism and Revolution in the Philippines*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), xxvi. Quote from Sison, “Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!,” 1.

²⁰³ Sison and Werning, *The Philippine Revolution*, 51.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 181..

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 50. See also pages 181-183. Sison gave a similar speech in 1968: “[W]e must apply the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought on the concrete practice of the Philippine revolution; in party rebuilding, in developing the armed struggle and in utilizing the national united front to achieve the people’s democratic revolution. What we need to rebuild in the Philippines today is a proletarian revolutionary party that is armed with Mao Tsetung Thought. The Philippine revolutionary movement cannot possibly advance without moving ahead with the theory and practice of the world proletarian revolution.” Sison, “Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!,” 28.

further development of Marxism Leninism as a universal theory.”²⁰⁶ Thus the CPP movement was to follow Mao’s model, though this time with Maoism as part of the tripartite foreign theory that it would apply to the national situation and conditions befitting the Philippine revolutionary movement. The constitution and meaning of concrete conditions so that the CPP could *adapt* Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to reach a wider base is the subject of analysis in our final section. This same problem confronted the Indonesian Communists during the Aidit group’s efforts to *adapt* Marxism-Leninism to suit its political reality and its nation’s concrete conditions. As we will see, it confronted the very real issues that plagued post-independence Indonesia, but without a fervid commitment to opposing violently the man in power (Sukarno) with whom it instead hoped to collaborate.

PKI Fifth Congress Report and Resolution

The PKI resurfaced in a non-Communist state, and participated actively within the Indonesian parliament. Its membership was willing to work alongside the anti-imperialist PNI government toward figuring out where to go from there—a problem that Robert Elson describes as “not just [a problem] on the composition of the state but, more important, on what the state should be and do.”²⁰⁷ The Aidit group maintained its commitment to reforming Indonesian society and correcting the RTC’s shortcomings. It thus envisioned wedding Marxist-Leninist universals to the concrete conditions of the Indonesian historical situation, which meant discarding dogmatism and pursuing creative application. While acknowledging having read Mao, Aidit sought to do this independently of a Maoist course, and in line with the Party’s opposition to violent anti-government struggle. Here, we focus on the PKI’s March 1954 Fifth Congress program and resolution, a “unified declaration”²⁰⁸ that contained Aidit’s report and a PKI resolution that addressed post-independence Indonesia’s socioeconomic character and proposed

²⁰⁶ Guerrero, “Mao Zedong and the Philippine Revolution,” 30.

²⁰⁷ Robert Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia: A History*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 153. Also quoted in Liu Hong, *China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965*. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2011), 130. Sukarno earned favor among PKI leaders for hosting the monumental 18-24 April 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, though they differed on policy quite significantly. Jennifer Lindsay, “Heirs to World Culture 1950-1965: An Introduction,” in *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian, 1950-1965*. Jennifer Lindsay and Maya HT Lim, eds. (Leiden, the Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2012), 9.

²⁰⁸ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 43. Mortimer outlines four features of such a document: 1) it establishes the Party’s fidelity to Marxist-Leninist principles; 2) it forms the point of reference for all future policy initiatives; 3) it becomes a reference guide for Party instruction to bond members through exegesis to the leadership’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and correct application of it to national conditions; and 4) it serves as a defense against critics, both within and without. On page 42.

a national united front of workers and peasants to build the PKI into a nationwide mass organization. It represents the clearest example of the PKI's *intellectual adaptation* of Marxism-Leninism in the Aidit era.²⁰⁹ We examine four crucial features of that intellectual adaptation that, while not owing to Mao exclusively, mirror his proposals: 1) the analysis of Indonesia's socioeconomic character and assessment of the peasant question; 2) the proposal for a broad united front of workers and peasants (worker-peasant alliance as Mao had called it) in which the national bourgeoisie could participate; 3) a proposal to build the PKI into a nationwide mass organization with a commitment to proletarian internationalism and peaceful establishment of a people's democratic government; and 4) to apply Communism to the particular conditions of Indonesia—an "Indonesianization of Marxism."²¹⁰

First, the PKI leadership used the Fifth Congress to present its official political line as an anti-imperialist Communist Party that would place importance on work among the peasants. At the time of the Congress, like other Indonesian political Parties, the PKI was urban-based, and accordingly, their message's resonance among rural workers paled in comparison to among the workers.²¹¹ But in determining that the Round Table Conference (RTC) had been at best a façade because the *Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations, *Masjumi*) government of the Republic of Indonesia (1949-1950) effectively "sold out" to Dutch commercial interests, the PKI inserted the peasant question into its agenda.²¹² The continuation of Dutch "political prerogatives" and Dutch domination over free Indonesia's "modern sector" prevented Indonesia from industrializing and developing its economy (a mirror image of Cambodia after independence), which kept the rural sector locked in a feudal mode of

²⁰⁹ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 42-65. See also Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1957-1963*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), 29-34. The PKI's decisions, which affirmed the PKI's political line *under new management*, set the tone for the Party's firm stance against imperialism and the façade of the RTC resolutions. On Guided Democracy under President Sukarno, see Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, 1966); and Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).

²¹⁰ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 42-65; and Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 213. Aidit spoke of "Indonesianizing Marxism-Leninism" in 1961. DN Aidit, *Perkuat Persatuan Nasional dan Persatuan Komunis!* [Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity!]. (Jakarta, Indonesia: 1961), 24, as quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1957-1963*, 47.

²¹¹ McVey, "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in *Communist Strategies in Asia*, 155.

²¹² Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 44, 52.

production.²¹³ Aidit's report regarded this imperialism and feudalism "as insuperable barriers without whose destruction no progress whatsoever was possible."²¹⁴ As he describes further:

The main enemy of the Indonesian people... is Dutch imperialism. Therefore, the united national front must be directed, in the first place, at liquidating Dutch imperialism and not at liquidating all foreign imperialisms in Indonesia at one and the same time... But, in the event of American and other imperialisms giving armed support to the Dutch colonizers and their Indonesia hirelings, then the struggle must be directed at all imperialisms in Indonesia.²¹⁵

The fight against imperialism occupied a position of central importance in any PKI basic tasks and, fortunately for the Aidit group, the PNI leader Sukarno shared in this stance. Thus the present task of the PKI was to analyze the problems of the Indonesian state's development and identify the ongoing systemic issues that bureaucratic bourgeois capitalism had perpetuated across all strata in Indonesian society.²¹⁶

As in other semi-feudal and semi-colonial Southeast Asian countries like Cambodia and the Philippines, the ousted colonial power dominated major industries by propping up consumer goods production for foreign demand while peasants toiled in the countryside and handicrafts vanished.²¹⁷ Many Indonesians, including non-Communists, had long been aware that the RTC resolutions neither ended foreign companies' control of Indonesia's export and import, foreign estate agriculture, and oil industries, nor addressed the peasant question.²¹⁸ As Aidit described in a 1953 article:

²¹³ Aidit, "The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia," (1953), in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 267, as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 44. "Dutch imperialism," Aidit argues, "succeeded in preserving its control over Indonesia... [Its] foreign and foreign trade policies are controlled by the Dutch government... Vital economic resources still remain in the hands of imperialist countries."

²¹⁴ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 52.

²¹⁵ Aidit, "The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia," (1953), in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 254-255, as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 55.

²¹⁶ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 55. Sukarno's view, however, was much more conciliatory; he held that the US had helped to pave the way for Indonesian independence through pressuring the Dutch, and believed that US aid in the forms of loans and investment were not off the table. This clashed with the PKI view, but it did not push for power because of Sukarno's leniency. Aidit even subscribed to Sukarno's *Marhaenisme*, the PNI's vaguely Marxist, anti-imperialist, and pro-socialist ideology. Michael Leifer, *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia. 3rd Edition*. (London: Routledge, 2001), 181.

²¹⁷ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 40-43; Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 71-72, 77-78; and Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 44-45. See also DN Aidit, "Haridepan Gerakan Tani Indonesia (The Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement)," *Bintang Merah* [Red Star (Indonesia)] (July 1953), 332-340.

²¹⁸ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 32.

The situation of the peasants... is no better than it was in the past. Serious and important remnants of feudalism are still extant in Indonesia... [which are]: the right of the large landlord to monopolize the ownership of lands... worked by the peasants, the majority of whom cannot possibly own land and are therefore forced to rent land from landowners under any and all conditions; the payment of land-rents to the landlords in the form of commodities, which... comprise a very great majority of the yield of the harvest of the peasants resulting in misery for most of the peasants; the system of land-rent in the form of work on the lands of the landlords, which places the majority of the peasants in the position of slaves; and., lastly, the accumulation of debts, which strangles the majority of the peasants and places them in the position of slaves to the landowners.²¹⁹

Aidit claims that *true* independence had not yet been realized, as semi-feudal and semi-colonial vestiges solidified inequality in the countryside. For real independence, Aidit urges, the PKI had to eliminate the semi-feudalism that had survived and thrived (through outdated productive methods and disenfranchising poor peasants) since Indonesia's independence.

While Aidit's analysis mirrors Mao's 1926 "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," it was the Party's later analysis in 1963—when it had, as David Mozingo points out, become the "strongest single political force in Indonesia"—that took more of a Maoist-light stance in its analysis of the rural classes.²²⁰ PKI leaders identified problems of fragmentation and concentration—not unlike Hu Nim did in his 1965 doctoral dissertation—to argue that the Party ought to "root the peasants' struggle amongst the landless and the poor peasants."²²¹ In both the Fifth Congress and the 1963 revisions, the solution to semifeudalism was, in Aidit's words, to establish a "government of the people, of democracy" in place of the "state power" of the feudalists and compradors tied to foreign capital.²²² To realize this aim, the working class had to assume the leadership of the larger masses and "wage a struggle to improve its living standard ...

²¹⁹ DN Aidit, *The Selected Works of DN Aidit, Volume I*. (Washington DC: US Joint Publication Research Service, 1961), 82, as quoted in Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 71. See also Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1957-1963*, 33; and Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 44-45. Hindley identifies the following trends in Aidit's class analysis in the rural sector: 1) continued monopoly rights of the large landowners, which prevented peasants from owning land and had to rent land on the landowners' terms; 2) payment in crops and land rent in kind, so that the majority of peasants remained in cyclical poverty; 3) payment of land rent in labor on the landlords' land [sharecropping], which relegated into serfdom; and 4) heavy debt-bondage of most peasants, which placed them as slaves vis-à-vis the landowners. See also DN Aidit, "Haridepan Gerakan Tani Indonesia (The Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement)," *Bintang Merah* [Red Star (Indonesia)] (July 1953), 332-340.

²²⁰ Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 213.

²²¹ Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 188, citing Rex Mortimer, *The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform, 1959-1965*. (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 1, 1972), 22.

²²² DN Aidit, "PKI Program," in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 94, as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 45.

[and] support the struggle of the peasantry for land... the struggle of the national bourgeoisie against foreign competition... of the whole Indonesian people for national independence and democratic liberties.”²²³ Aidit’s report and, by extension, the PKI resolution, had thus made it clear: the Party would strive diligently and persistently for *true* independence, which meant improved living standards for the Indonesian working class and peasantry.

Second, the PKI program proposed the establishment of a broad “united national front,” a mass organization in which the anti-imperialist and antifeudal classes of Indonesia (proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie) could establish a people’s democratic government.²²⁴ Two major influences on the PKI’s proposal are worthy of note. Former PKI leader Musso (1987-1948) provides the first major influence, with his analysis of the Indonesian situation and the Chinese experience that, even after his death in the wake of the Madiun Affair, guided the resurgent PKI’s united front.²²⁵ Indeed, as Mortimer notes, Musso’s *New Road*, a 1948 PKI report that “bore the stamp of Moscow’s thinking at the time, foreshadowed many of the propositions [that were] contained in the congress decisions,” notably obtaining power through peaceful means and through a worker-peasant alliance.²²⁶ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) serves as the second major influence on the PKI resolution or, more specifically, Aidit’s report. Aidit rejected Mao’s insistence on armed insurrection, yet approved of his emphasis on fighting subjectivism, and under his helm, Chinese writings became standard reading in PKI educational programs.²²⁷ Nevertheless, the PKI continued the tradition of borrowing from varied Marxist materials for an Indonesia program that maintained rather than deviated from a commitment to proletarian internationalism.²²⁸

As for the united national front itself, it was to be a worker-peasant alliance. Aidit was clear from the onset: while claiming that the “agrarian revolution is the essence of the People’s

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid, 45-46.

²²⁵ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1957-1963*, 47.

²²⁶ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 50-51.

²²⁷ Aidit, “The Road to People’s Democracy for Indonesia,” (1953), in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 273-274, as cited in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 51.

²²⁸ Hindley notes that brochures and pamphlets, as well as “*Bintang Merah* [Red Star] contained Mao Tse-tung’s *Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War* in serialized form during the later part of 1950, and during the first part of 1951 the translated works included Stalin’s *Theory* and *The Foundation of Leninism*, Mao Tse-tung’s *On Eradicating Liberalism in the Party*, and Hong Ha’s *The Victory of the Vietnamese People and Its Army*,” were circulated among PKI members. Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 72. See also Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 288.

Democratic revolution in Indonesia,” theirs was not to be a peasant revolution in the Chinese mould.²²⁹ “Only a national united front... on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, led by the working class,” Aidit charges, will it be possible to establish a people’s democratic government.²³⁰ Aidit encouraged national bourgeoisie involvement, namely with the PNI and its advocates,²³¹ because in his view, foreign imperialism affected all strata in Indonesia.²³² There were, however, some reservations on uniting the productive classes of Indonesian society with their potential oppressors. One concerned the compradors themselves, as represented by its principal rivals, the Islamic *Masjumi* Party and the PSI.²³³ Another apprehension was, as Aidit (in 1953) and Lukman (in 1959) caution, was its ambivalent political position and/or allegiance:

Unity with the national bourgeoisie is getting closer and closer... [but] the alliance of workers and peasants is still not strong... the Party does not have strong foundations. At this stage, the Party must fight resolutely against the right deviation [that] gives exaggerated significance to unity with the national bourgeoisie and underestimates the significance of the leadership of the working class and of the alliance of workers and peasants. There is a danger of losing the Party’s independent character... of its merging itself with the bourgeoisie.²³⁴ The wavering and double-pronged character of the national bourgeoisie is... explained by the fact that, on the one hand, they are oppressed by the imperialists, and on the other, they themselves exploit the working people. Their weak economic position, which naturally results in their weak political position, adds still more to their wavering attitude. Still... the vacillation inherent in the national bourgeoisie is not fatal. [So long as] there are strong progressive forces, plus a Party program [that] takes into account the interests of the national bourgeoisie, a correct style of work, and the possibility of directing a well-aimed blow at the imperialists and their stooges at home, [they] can remain... in the united front anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle.²³⁵

Such concerns notwithstanding, Aidit acknowledges that a national united front was not without precedent and, in fact, had succeeded in the past and reified the PKI’s “correctness” in advocating for this union of workers, peasants, and the like. He lists the PKI’s involvement in

²²⁹ Aidit, “The Road to People’s Democracy for Indonesia,” (1953), in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 252-253, as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 46.

²³⁰ DN Aidit, *Perkuat Persatuan Nasional dan Persatuan Komunis!* [Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity!] (Jakarta, Indonesia: 1961), 24, as quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1957-1963*, 47.

²³¹ Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 50.

²³² Aidit, “The Road to People’s Democracy for Indonesia,” (1953), in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 268-269., as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 47.

²³³ Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 50-51.

²³⁴ Aidit, “The Road to People’s Democracy for Indonesia,” (1953), in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 268, as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 47-48.

²³⁵ MH Lukman, “A Correct Party Policy Guarantees a Strong United Front,” *World Marxist Review* 2, No. 8 (August 1959): 80, as quoted in Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 293-294.

both the Wilopo (1952) and Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953) Cabinets as examples. For the current incarnation to ultimately triumph, it had to follow the example that the Ali government set by not aligning with either of the “ultra-reactionary” alternatives, the *Masjumi* and *Parti Socialis Indonesia* (PSI, Indonesian Socialist Party), which were the targets of the united front.²³⁶

Third, the Congress announced that one of its basic tasks was to build the PKI into nationwide organization of “a broad, mass character” without resorting to violent means.²³⁷ This entailed expanding Party membership from 165,000 by the 1954 Congress to a “mass Party of a Lenin type” by the program’s implementation, which, in effect, meant that the PKI had to end its urban-centrism and reach out to Indonesian peasants.²³⁸ In so doing, the Party had to maintain its forthright and unshakeable commitment to proletarian internationalism yet maintain the Aidit leadership’s opposition to armed struggle. An elaboration of the PKI’s endorsement of Sukarno is Aidit’s theory of “A State with Two Aspects”:

[T]he state power of the Republic of Indonesia is a contradiction between two opposing aspects: The first aspect is... the interests of the people. The second aspect is... the interests of the people’s enemies. The first aspect is embodied in the progressive attitude and policy of President Sukarno, which enjoys the support of the CPI [PKI], and other sections of the people. The second aspect is embodied in the attitude and policy of the rightists and diehards; they are the old and established forces. Today, the popular aspect has become the main aspect and plays a leading role in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia... it guides the course of the political development in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia.²³⁹

Evidently, Aidit took the peaceful path to a people’s democratic government seriously.²⁴⁰ For the PKI, the prevailing conditions made class agitation a risky enterprise, whereas nationalist agitation—that Indonesia was not *truly* free—resonated well across social and political strata.²⁴¹ The PKI struggle was therefore to be a “struggle *within*, not for one *against*, the constituted

²³⁶ Aidit, “The Road to People’s Democracy for Indonesia,” (1953), in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 268, 256, as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 48. See also page 60.

²³⁷ Aidit, “PKI Program,” in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution*, 97, as quoted in Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 48.

²³⁸ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 49.

²³⁹ Aidit, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, 42.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 50, 58.

²⁴¹ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 52.

Republic... as the heirs of what had been accomplished, not as its destroyers.”²⁴² This remained in place as the Aidit group’s official line until its brutal evisceration in 1965.

Fourth, and most important, the Fifth Congress stressed the “Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism,”²⁴³ which mirrors Mao’s 1938 “Sinification of Marxism” in seeking to apply general theory to the concrete situation and conditions. As with the Chinese leader, this arose in Indonesia in the context of defeating imperialism and feudalism.²⁴⁴ Initially, the Aidit group drew from a broad swath of Communist theories and experiences of Communist movements, notably the Chinese example, and took those elements that it considered useful for the Indonesian situation.²⁴⁵ Aidit acknowledges one such source in the following passage:

The campaign launched by our Party in 1952 to study the articles by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, ‘*On Practice*’ and ‘*Oppose Liberalism Within the Party*’ and the article ‘*On the Mass Line*’ by Comrade Liu Shao-chi, was of very great significance in the effort to raise the ideological level of our Party. The same is also true of... the pamphlet by Lenin “*Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder*,” ... “*The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*,” “*Report to the 19th Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*,” and Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s “*On Contradiction*.” All these will raise further the ideological level of our Party.²⁴⁶

In so doing, they understood their duty to apply theories to specific realities without either the abandonment of the original theory’s universality, or the disregard of Indonesian conditions that they understood better than did overseas thinkers. “We Indonesian Communists are not dogmatic in the application of Marxist-Leninist teachings; *we are creative. Marxist-Leninist theory is only a guide, the decisive thing in our policy [is] the concrete situation in Indonesia*,” Aidit stated in 1957.²⁴⁷ The concrete situation to which Aidit refers was the continued presence of imperialism

²⁴² Ibid, 58.

²⁴³ DN Aidit, *Perkuat Persatuan Nasional dan Persatuan Komunis!*, 24, as quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1957-1963*, 47.

²⁴⁴ Mao Zedong, “論新階段 (On the New Stage, *Lùn xīn jiēduàn*),” (12-14 October 1938) 毛澤東集第六卷 [*Mōtakutō setto*, Works of Mao Zedong, Volume VI (hereafter *MZJ*)], Takeuchi Minoru, ed., (Tokyo: Beiwangshe, 1970-1972), 260-261.

²⁴⁵ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 30. The PKI drew from Stalin’s theses on the national bourgeoisie as a domestic bourgeoisie that opposed imperialism and feudalism, and Mao’s analysis of the comprador bourgeoisie. See Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 50-51.

²⁴⁶ DN Aidit, “The Road to People’s Democracy For Indonesia: General report to the Fifth National Congress of the CPI, March 1954,” [<https://www.marxists.org/history/indonesia/1954-AiditTheRoad.htm>] (Accessed 19 February 2017).

²⁴⁷ *Review of Indonesia* (March 1957), 3, as quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 30. Emphasis added. Mortimer describes the PKI’s application as “involve[ing] curious and intricate exercises in reconciliation,

and feudalism, which prevented true Indonesian independence and occluded the working class and peasantry from a livable wage and standard of living. Thus to “Indonesianize” Marxism-Leninism was, as Aidit urges, to “hold fast to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and creatively determine the policy, tactics, form of struggle, and form of organization of our Party on the basis of the concrete situation in our country.”²⁴⁸

It is worth noting that while the Aidit group drew from several materials and did not owe to one Marxist theory over others, the Fifth Congress resolutions parallel likewise proposals by Mao in his Yan’an writings. In fact, one scholar believes that Aidit himself had applied Mao’s elementary analysis of Chinese society to explain Indonesian society, whereas his own work influenced Sison’s 1968 “Program for a People’s Democratic Revolution,” which the CPP adopted at its “Re-establishment Congress” that year.²⁴⁹ Another contends that Aidit and Mao both “used Marxist-Leninist analytical tools and studied the experience of foreign Parties... [yet] each of the leaders was deeply imbued with the atmosphere of his own country, and used his own assessment of the local situation as the principal basis for defining a strategy designed to bring his Party to power.”²⁵⁰ For instance, the Aidit leadership devised policies in accordance with objective factors and in accordance with the Indonesian situation.²⁵¹ While acknowledging outside Communist Parties’ experiences as providing useful insight on an Indonesia-specific strategy, the Aidit leadership held that, as in China, the particularity of the Indonesian struggle meant that certain measures had to be devised in line with addressing concrete realities there. “[T]he most important thing for the Indonesian Communists,” Aidit contends, “is the problem of welding the general truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution itself.”²⁵²

While Mao’s analyses of the classes in Chinese society in his Yan’an canon did not inform the PKI’s own assessment exclusively, PKI leaders endeavored to address the peasant

but never the mechanical adoption of a course of action that appeared to be contradicted by their own requirements.” Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 52.

²⁴⁸ DN Aidit, *Perkuat Persatuan Nasional dan Persatuan Komunis!* [Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity!]. (Jakarta, Indonesia: 1961), 24, as quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1957-1963*, 47-48.

²⁴⁹ Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 75, citing Alex Magno, “Imposter,” *Philippine Star* (11 September 2007).

²⁵⁰ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 31.

²⁵¹ *Ibid*, 30.

²⁵² DN Aidit, “Revolusi Oktober dan Rakjat-Rakjat Timur (The October Revolution and the Peoples of the East),” *Bintang Merah* [Red Star (Indonesia)] (October-November 1957), 383, as quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 30.

question, pervasive landlordism, and ongoing rural plight.²⁵³ As Justus Van der Kroepf notes, “Aidit’s technique (like Mao’s) within the context of the multi-stage revolutionary concept, has been essentially to employ both approaches at the same time, to seek active collaboration ... in parliament and other organs of government with other ‘patriotic,’ ‘anti-imperialist,’ or ‘anti-feudal’ organizations for the purposes of developing and completing ‘the national democratic’... revolution.”²⁵⁴ And as Hindley notes further, Aidit’s analysis of the Indonesian petty bourgeoisie, meanwhile, is “an almost direct translation of sections of the analysis of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie contained in Mao Tse-tung’s *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*—though Aidit added fishermen and the urban poor to the definition.”²⁵⁵ The Aidit group’s proposal for a broad national united front, which was effectively a worker-peasant alliance against imperialism and feudalism, also echoes Mao’s likewise proposal,²⁵⁶ though the PKI front drew primarily from its leadership’s own experiences and in line with the prevailing social conditions in Indonesia. Yet Mao’s “attempt to complement elitist cadres with good contacts and collaboration with the masses” influenced to some considerable degree the PKI’s approach to peaceful democratic work, and it is ultimately useful to identify this China connection even though the Party did not avow it as its guiding ideological beacon.²⁵⁷ Such similarities notwithstanding, it is our analytical model that reveals the most important links, as Aidit, like Mao, sought to ground a foreign theory in national conditions and *adapted* it on paper to suit certain peculiarities for which the Chinese, or European context before, did not account.

Practical and Normative Adaptations

In this last section, we examine the two stages of *adaptation*: first, *practical adaptation*, which is to put theory into practice to ground it in a specific context; and second, *normative adaptation*, to make a foreign idea congruent with particular norms so that it may speak to a constituency outside the original persons or group that initially received the idea. In the case of

²⁵³ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 30.

²⁵⁴ Justus Van der Kroepf, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*. (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1965), 151.

²⁵⁵ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 42. According to Hindley, the edition that Aidit had read was from 1954: Mao Tse-tung, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” in *Selected Works III*. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954), 90-92. Aidit’s position was a change from earlier PKI programs, which occluded the petty bourgeoisie from the revolution.

²⁵⁶ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 30-31; and Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 51.

²⁵⁷ Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 267. For more and clergymen PKI-CCP connections, see pages 166, 188, 234-246, 261-267.

the Philippines, it was a prerequisite to the CPP's revolutionary success that its guiding ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought spoke to concrete national realities and the Party base of disenfranchised peasants. As Edicio de la Torre, a Catholic priest and Maoist convert, stated in 1986, "Marxism-Leninism had to become Chinese to transform China. Similarly, Maoism must become Filipino if it is to be effective in the Philippines."²⁵⁸ Accordingly, Sison went about doing just that, applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, specifically Mao's strategies of people's war and new democracy, to the archipelago's particular terrain and the socioeconomic conditions that Sison's new democratic revolution sought to reverse (the first, *practical*, aspect of what we call the Filipinization of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought). His Party also sought to draw more people into the CPP ranks by reaching out to progressive-minded Catholic priests, which constitutes the second (*normative*) part of Filipinization. In this section we will see the mechanisms of first practical and then normative adaptation in Sison's adaptation of people's war to the Philippine movement's realities and geographic limitations and the CPP-NPA's decision to rally Catholic priests to its cause. We will; also see such mechanisms in Aidit's two-pronged united front, whereby the PKI worked alongside the ruling PNI and develop into a broad mass organization in which even class enemies could participate actively. Our ultimate goal here is to display both Communist leaders' efforts to apply Marxism-Leninism (and Maoism for Sison) to concrete realities in practice, and then, upon encountering setbacks, to adapt it creatively in the *production* of a new type of Marxism-Leninism (or Maoism) that spoke to their respective realities and norms.

As for the Indonesian example, Aidit sought to domesticate Marxism-Leninism in the PKI's own experiences in the country. But unlike Sison, his Party worked *with* the ruling bourgeois government and anti-Communist Parties and a broad mass of social groups to defeat imperialism. The PKI thus combined its united front from above (coalition with the ruling PNI and anti-Communists) with one from below (the broad masses) in its skillful Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism. This ultimately positioned the PKI on the cusp of state power. Yet the 1965 30 September Movement, which led Suharto and his Armed Forces to blame the Communists for the six generals who were killed in an abortive coup, resulted in the PKI ranks'

²⁵⁸ Edicio De la Torre, *The Philippines: Christians and the Politics of Liberation*. (London: Catholic Institute of International Relations, 1986), 9.

near-total decimation.²⁵⁹ Thereafter, Sudimsan, the lone survivor of the core five members of the PKI Poliburo, proposed armed struggle along Maoist lines.²⁶⁰ The section tracks Sison's application of Maoism to the Philippine revolutionary experience (*practical adaptation*), and moves to the Party's endeavors to make its ideology congruent with contemporary norms (*normative adaptation*), including recruiting priests into its ranks. The section then shifts to the two-front struggle of the PKI, and ends with the Party's destruction in 1965 at the hands of the Indonesian Armed Forces and its few surviving members' calls to pursue an overtly Maoist course.

The CPP's Filipinization of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought

We examine both forms of *adaptation* in this section, leading up to Sison's marginalization within the CPP as it succumbed to factionalism in the late 1980s. The section demonstrates the actions and analytical usefulness of *practical* and *normative adaptation*, in particular, and the development of Said's "traveling theory" in general, by highlighting Sison's and the CPP's creative application in practice of what Sison had adapted intellectually in his earlier written canon. Sison initiated the *practical* and *normative adaptations* of Maoism, with the former entailing that Mao's twin-strategies of people's war and new democracy were applied to the concrete national realities of the Philippines, whereas the latter meant that Maoism was made to speak to people outside of the CPP purview. The combined CPP-NPA achieved this by reaching out to and politicizing Catholic priests, whom the Party leadership echelons hoped may persuade the masses to resist Marcos' dictatorial rule. As we will see, Sison's *adaptations*, like Mao's dictum of *theory-practice-theory*, entailed practicing a theory to glean knowledge of what else to do to make a foreign theory or idea congruent with contemporary conditions and norms.

To begin, it is important to recognize the political climate in which the CPP movement would *adapt* Maoism to Philippine conditions. Four years after the CPP's Re-establishment

²⁵⁹ Sukarno estimated that 87,000 people had been killed by Suharto's forces, whereas other estimates are as high as half a million dead, with hundreds of thousands placed under arrest as political prisoners. Robert J. Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*. (London: Praeger, 1999), 253. For a larger and more in-depth study of the PKI's violent repression and a post-mortem of the massacres, see Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*. See also Cibulka, "The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party," in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 293, 297-303.

²⁶⁰ Sudisman, *Otokritik Politbiro CC PKI* [The Self-Criticism of the Poliburo of the PKI's Central Committee] (September 1966) [<https://www.marxists.org/indonesia/indones/1966-SudismanOtoKritik.htm>] (Accessed 23 February 2017). My thanks to Dr. John Roosa for pointing me towards this source. Sudisman mentions Mao Zedong and his works on a few occasions.

Congress, the CPP struggle was underway. The Sison-led CPP spearheaded the urban-based movement, which it named the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1971,²⁶¹ whereas its military wing, the Buscayno-directed NPA, guided the agrarian revolution in the Philippine countryside. As part of its urban revolution, the CPP—armed with Chinese weapons that it had obtained in 1971—orchestrated the 1972 Plaza Miranda bombing in Manila to push the Marcos government to react with harsh reprisal.²⁶² It succeeded, as President Ferdinand Marcos suspended habeas corpus in 1971 and issued Presidential Proclamation 1081 (PP 1081), which imposed martial law in 1972.²⁶³ Two periods of NPA activity following Marcos’ declaration of martial law help us to understand more fully Sison’s *practical adaptation* of Maoism in the Philippines: 1) 23 September 1972 until the mid-to-late 1970s, during which the CPP’s protracted people’s war suffered many setbacks and forced Sison back to the drawing board; and 2) the “Mindanao” period, from 1977 to the mid 1980s, when the CPP had some success, that is, until internal purges divided the Party permanently. During the first period, the urban-based CPP placed primacy on the armed struggle in the countryside, which was the NPA’s revolutionary jurisdiction and consisted of around a thousand guerrillas.²⁶⁴ *Ang Bayan* (The People), the CPP’s official Party journal, states that the Party’s primary base area in Northeast Luzon, which it chose because it was far from Marcos’ reach, was to establish a mass base via an “agrarian revolution,” entailing the “free distribution of land, the lowering of ground rent, and the establishment of marketing cooperatives.”²⁶⁵ Importantly, the CPP’s people’s war in Luzon was still, as Sison describes, “a fledgling, still growing wings, talons, and beak, while its enemies, the Armed

²⁶¹ Riedinger, *Agrarian Reform in the Philippines*, 56.

²⁶² Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 263; and Gregg Jones, “Ex-Communists Party Behind Manila Bombing,” *The Washington Post* (4 August 1989) [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/04/ex-communists-party-behind-manila-bombing/b987c165-4f26-4609-aeb5-cd05134c0cec/?utm_term=.d0cb148bf92c] (Accessed 9 May 2017). The article alleges that Sison had “calculated that Marcos could be provoked into cracking down on his opponents, thereby driving thousands of political activists into the underground... mak[ing] use of a large influx of weapons and financial aid that China had already agreed to provide.”

²⁶³ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 23, 110.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; and Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 262. See also *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)](10 December 1972), as quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 262. The NPA directive that the “People’s Army is the Party’s principal form of organization and should be built as such,” reflects that the NPA was taking the reins of leadership of the revolution, as Justus Van der Kroepf suggests. Justus Van der Kroepf, “Philippine Communist Party Theory and Strategy: A New Departure?,” *Pacific Affairs* 48, No. 2 (Summer 1975):181-198, on page 184.

²⁶⁵ *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)](January 1985), as quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 258. As Fuller notes, “the influence of the gun often had to be involved to make the landlords lessen the rate of exploitation.” Initially, the CPP-NPA began conducting “social investigations,” which Fuller describes as “depth surveys that allowed the CPP and the NPA to draw up a program of activity for a province or area based on an objective picture of the social structure, balance of class forces, etc.”

Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was full grown, numbering tens of thousands and was backed by the strongest power in the world and in human history, the US.”²⁶⁶ Marcos pursued an aggressive course to stamp out the Communists in both the cities and the countryside, and with the right to habeas corpus null and void, Marcos’ police forces were able to detain interrogate anyone without proper judicial warrants and due processes.²⁶⁷ The early years of the national liberation struggle were thus lean years, and the Party suffered numerous setbacks, incurred heavy losses in personnel to deaths and desertion, and was on the brink of failure.²⁶⁸ Sison soon realized the hazards of overconcentration of CPP-NPA forces solely in central Luzon, where AFP forces could surround and overwhelm them from its numerous military bases, and determined to expand the movement into other regions and provinces.

The CPP leadership acknowledged that it had made a major mistake in allowing the CPP-NPA to “remain confined within the enemy encirclement for a number of years,” and determined that it ought to take this new information and apply it concretely to further protracted warfare practice.²⁶⁹ The CPP-NPA thus relocated to Isabela province, Cagayan, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino, Kalinga-Apayo, and Ifugao, while shoring up its forces in Northern Luzon. While CPP-NPA efforts to expand the protracted people’s war elsewhere in the Philippines failed outright in some places (Negros, for instance) or did not propel the movement to where its leaders wanted it to

²⁶⁶ Ibid, 22.

²⁶⁷ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 110. The NPA, in particular, bore the brunt of the damage during Marcos’ forays into the countryside to engage the Communists. As *Ang Bayan* describes, the NPA guerrillas “experienced a lot of difficulties and sustained heavy casualties... The enemy repeatedly assaulted our initial guerrilla fronts with the result that almost all of these were reduced in size, and there were even a few we had to completely leave temporarily. In more extensive parts of the countryside, we were just starting to open guerrilla zones under extremely difficult conditions... Quite a few of our guerrilla units were wiped out... Nevertheless, we were gradually able to gain a foothold in many areas, including Mindanao.” “Statement of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee on the Twelfth Anniversary of the Re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)] (26 December 1980), as quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 257.

²⁶⁸ Jones, *Red Revolution*, 89. See also Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 21. The NPA’s development encountered the most difficulty between 1971 and 1974, the first years of martial law. In Camarines Sur province, for instance, NPA forces consisted of only nine guerrillas, seven rifles, and “one peso in funds.”

²⁶⁹ *Ang Bayan* states that AFP offensives in 1971-1972 (7000 government troops), and between September 1972 and March 1976 were particularly impactful on the CPP-NPA. The first assaults “displaced 50,000 people from Isabela. *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)](January 1985), as quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 258. *Our Urgent Tasks* (1976) criticized the “dogmatist” errors of the CPP, since “no attempt was made [by the CPP] to investigate concrete conditions.” It also criticized the CPP’s “haphazard” formation of barrio organizing committees in the countryside, often with no attempt to consolidate or to form mass organizations.” Through overdependence on what the document describes as “a mere committee dominated by unreliable but prestigious personalities [often the first contacts made in the barrio],” the CPP had “spawned commandism,” a charge that Sison levied at the Lavas a few years earlier. See Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 266.

be,²⁷⁰ Sison's 1979 publication of *Specific Characteristics of Our People's War* and the NPA's subsequent success in Mindanao signaled a turning point.²⁷¹ The Party had to *adapt* Maoism further to suit the concrete realities of this movement, which entailed taking what the CPP-NPA had learned from its failures and revising its strategy in accordance with two main factors of the Philippine reality: 1) its archipelagic terrain; and 2) its predominantly Catholic base in the countryside that had suffered under Marcos' corrupt regime.²⁷²

First, Sison wrote *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines* (1979) during the second period of CPP-NPA activity under martial law, which Fuller credits for the CPP's "break with the mechanical application of [the] Chinese experience to Philippine conditions."²⁷³ The Party's commitment to establishing liberated areas from which to launch the new democratic movement now shifted to adapting the revolutionary movement to the nation's geographical peculiarities.²⁷⁴ Sison urged in *Specific Characteristics* that the movement do away with liberated areas in favor of strategic "base areas" and "guerrilla zones,"²⁷⁵ which, he argued, was in line with the new democratic movement to surround the cities from the countryside. As he states further:

The weakest link of enemy rule lies in the countryside. The worst of oppression and exploitation is carried out among the peasant masses by the reactionaries. And yet the countryside is so vast that enemy armed forces cannot be spread thinly or cannot but abandon vast areas when concentrated at certain points. The countryside is therefore the fertile grounds for the emergence and growth of Red political power—the people's army, organs of democratic political power, mass organizations, and the Party. There can be no wider and better area for maneuver for our people's army and for our type of warfare...

²⁷⁰ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 22; and Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 258, citing *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)] (January 1985). Sison wrote *Preliminary Report on Northern Luzon* on this last zone, which housed "three guerrilla companies, five guerrilla platoons, and several local militias, at the time the largest NPA force anywhere in the archipelago... amount[ing] to anywhere between 120 and 420 guerrillas." *The Basic Rules of the New People's Army*, in Lachica, *Huk*, 317-325.

²⁷¹ Benjamin Pimentel Jr., *Edjop: The Unusual Journey of Edgar Jopson*. (Quezon City, the Philippines: KEN Incorporated, 1989), 247. See also Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 261.

²⁷² *Ang Bayan* claimed that the "seeds [the CPP] planted in the early years grew larger and stronger; we regained our losses and quickly surpassed in quantity and quality the initial forces [that] we had deployed. Our full-time guerrilla force more than doubled in number, our high-powered rifles increased more than fourfold; and the total area of our guerrilla fronts increased many times over." *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)] (26 December 1980), as quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 264-265.

²⁷³ Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 265.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ Guerrero, *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines*, 7-9. Also in Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 296, citing Amado Guerrero, *Características Específicas de Nuestra Guerra Popular*, CORES (M/M), LRP (MI), n.d. (1974), page 9. See also Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 266-267.

There is no doubt that fighting in an archipelagic country like ours is initially a big disadvantage for us. Since the central leadership has to position itself in some remote area in Luzon, there is no alternative now and even for a long time but to adopt and carry out the policy of centralized leadership and decentralized operations. We must distribute and develop throughout the country cadres who are of sufficiently high quality to find their own bearing and maintain initiative not only within periods as short as one or two months... but also within periods as long as two or more years, in case the enemy chooses to concentrate on an island or a specific fighting front and blockade it.²⁷⁶

In line with Sison's call above, the Party sought to establish itself in areas where it could continue its people's war struggle from a position of strategic advantage. After years of setbacks and heavy losses, the CPP-NPA achieved its hallmark success in the province of Mindanao.²⁷⁷ Though initially the Party's Mindanao-based cadres operated as an "informal *barkada*," or gang, than as overseers of a base area, the Party's transfer of Manila-based cadres such as Edgar Jopson paired with Mindanao's social context.²⁷⁸

Mindanao's poverty was widespread and state repression was disproportionate, which made it easier for the CPP-NPA's Maoism to *fit*, or fulfill, a social need. In Punta Dumalag, for instance, the CPP-NPA established what William Chapman describes as a "model Communist village, a kind of Philippine commune":

The killing days were over, for no longer did the [Marcos] government's attempt to interfere and the NPA contingent had moved on to other battles. The revolution had come and conquered and then marched on, leaving behind this quiet, self-contained enclave of outwardly satisfied converts. There were other communities like it scattered around the country, outposts where the Manila government's writ no longer ran, but none fit as neatly [as did] the CPP's definition of success. And so when the journalists came to this far corner of Mindanao it was there that the Party delighted in displaying its handiwork.²⁷⁹

Here, the Party leaders believed, the "agrarian revolution" had succeeded in restoring peace and order to those who had bore the brunt of Marcos' violent hand. Unfortunately, gains such as these were not to remain forever, as the Philippines' geographic character, which had complicated the CPP-NPA's efforts to establish liberated zones, made it difficult to near

²⁷⁶ Guerrero, *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines*, 5-6, 7.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 280.

²⁷⁸ Patricio N. Abinales, "When A Revolution Devours Its Children," in *The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986*. Patricio N. Abinales ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1996), 173, 176; and Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 283-296.

²⁷⁹ William Chapman, *Inside the Philippine Revolution: The New People's Army and Its Struggle for Power*. (New York: Norton, 1987), 144.

impossible to hold onto its base areas. Nevertheless, the Party's ranks swelled with new membership, and by 1984, the NPA alone claimed fifty-nine guerrilla fronts, and a vast people's army that just a year earlier had nationwide representation and particularly strong presence across most provinces in mainland Mindanao.²⁸⁰ The Party also seized upon the Federation of Free Farmers' (FFF) radical wing to set up democratic organizations among peasants in Mindanao and established guerrilla zones after the end of martial law.²⁸¹

Socioeconomic conditions and government repression help us to tell part of the tale of how the CPP's Maoism *fit*. The second phase of the CPP's *adaptation* of Maoism—*normative adaptation*—was its outreach to the Catholic Church and its politicization of priests, which allowed its ideological pillars to enmesh with contemporary norms in a predominantly Roman Catholic country and, thus, become transcendent.²⁸² While Friedrich Engels described religion as “nothing but the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces,” the CPP used Christianity to connect its guiding ideology of Maoism to the masses.²⁸³ Indeed, CPP leaders sought to forge a collective identity among both impoverished and progressive Christians who, it hoped, might join the movement against Marcos, and Catholicism was integral to most Filipinos' framing and understanding of their social reality.²⁸⁴ Accordingly, the Communists pursued a partnership (of convenience) with the Church, setting up in several Philippine cathedrals where powerful orators and men with deep connections to their respective communities served as major voices for the protection and promotion of human rights.²⁸⁵ Mobilizing the Church was key in both organizing and politicizing the poor, who formed the majority of the CPP-NPA base. The Philippine Communists marshaled Church support,

²⁸⁰ *Ang Bayan* [The People (the Philippines)] (October 1983), as quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 275.

²⁸¹ Jennifer Conroy Franco, *Elections and Democratization in the Philippines*. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2001), 81-82; and Riedinger, *Agrarian Reform in the Philippines*, 61-67.

²⁸² On Catholicism in the Philippines, see William Larousse, *A Local Church Living for Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Relations in Mindanao-Sulu, 1965-2000*. (Rome, Italy: Gregorian Biblical Bookshop, 2001).

²⁸³ Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Duhring*. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959), 435. Also quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 236.

²⁸⁴ Anne Harris, “The Theology of Struggle: Recognizing Its Place in Recent Philippine History,” *Philippine Journal of Third World Studies* 21, No. 2 (2006): 83-107, on page 84. Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani describe collective identity as a “recognition and the creation of connectedness... a sense of common purpose and shared commitment to a cause.” Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction*. 2nd Edition. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 21.

²⁸⁵ Harris, “The Theology of Struggle,” 84; and Abinales, “José Maria Sison and the Philippines Revolution,” 37.

welcomed priests into its ranks, and appointed clergymen to prominent positions within both the CPP and the NPA.²⁸⁶

Indeed, the CPP-NPA's recruitment of priests was crucial to its goal of *adapting* Maoism *normatively*. Edicio de la Torre, a Roman Catholic priest and Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) chaplain who left the seminary, converted to Maoism and joined the CPP in 1971, did so because he believed that "Maoism must become Filipino," which mirrors Sison's own effort to domesticate Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought in the Philippine reality.²⁸⁷ De la Torre regarded Maoism as a contemporary "moral guide" for students and clergymen.²⁸⁸ Indeed, as Patricio Abinales notes, "China, Mao, and the Cultural Revolution were beacons of just society. China attracted not only radicals but [also] journalists, politicians, and even the Manila elite."²⁸⁹ He quotes a "Sinophile" convert as stating that he had bore witness to the "socialist future" in the Chinese example, and that he thought that such a model "ought to work in the Philippines."²⁹⁰ De la Torre believed this position fervently. To him, Mao's experiences during the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War and protracted struggle that ultimately repelled Japanese imperialism had appeal for the Philippine situation. Mao had defended his country and sought to improve the standards of living of his nation's impoverished peasantry and proletariat. De la Torre particularly admired Mao's "blank page" metaphor in relation to peasants: "Peasants are the most revolutionary precisely because they are blank, and therefore malleable; rural bases should be the first targets because they offer the best chances of building a radically new society; the

²⁸⁶ Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 235.

²⁸⁷ de la Torre, *Touching Ground, Taking Root*, 100. Also quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 232-233. As he stated in a 1971 lecture: "[W]e cannot deny that as of now, the systematic categories and historical outlook of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought have been responsible for clarifying the problems and prospects of liberation in the Philippines... Amado Guerrero's *Philippine Society and Revolution*... is right now the only systematic guide for further analysis of Philippine society."

²⁸⁸ Edicio de la Torre, "The Challenge of Maoism and the Filipino Christian," in *Ground, Taking Root*. Edicio de la Torre ed. (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986), 61-71. In an interview with Fuller, de la Torre stated that in his time "[y]ou would have... people who really got mad at Marcos and the military precisely for this reason—that they were creating conditions for people to rebel and the rebellion was not just to be against Marcos and the military, but even the bishops would have to go. There was very clearly enlightened self-interest of a section of the elite—from the middle class and the middle clergy." Kenneth Fuller, "Interview with Edicio De la Torre," as quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 225.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 27, citing Armando S. Malay, Jr. "Random Reflections on Marxism and Maoism in the Philippines," in *Marxism in the Philippines*. (Quezon City, the Philippines: Third World Studies Center, 1984), 45-67. Abinales states further: Maoism's "populist rhetoric—the mass line—augured well with the need for relevance, which was felt by these two sectors of the Philippine intelligentsia."

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

seizure of cities is the last stage of the revolution. Internationally, China leads as the ‘poor and blank’ socialist nation.”²⁹¹

De la Torre also recognized the importance of Churchmen in Philippine society, and believed that it was a sacred duty to use the pulpit to decry injustices and defend the disenfranchised poor. By 1971, he took advantage of his position as a priest and community leader to “[use] the pulpit to popularize Maoist ideology.”²⁹² As he stated in a 1971 speech:

When Churchmen speak or preach the social doctrines of the Church, they usually mean telling the rich that they are doing injustice to the poor. But to tell the poor that they are [the ones who are] unjustly treated—this they consider agitation, not preaching. It is against this attitude that Archbishop [Helder] Camara warns us: “if we omit this—the expression recalls the sin of omission—then tomorrow their eyes will be opened without us and against us.”²⁹³

He was not alone. Organizations such as the Christians for National Liberation (CNL), which was headed by the CPP, and major Christian figures like Cardinal Jaime Lachica Sin (辛海梅, *Xīn Hǎiméi*, 30th Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila) committed themselves to a new way of “being church” while living alongside the Philippines’ desolate poor.²⁹⁴ They also exposed and denounced human rights violations, and spearheaded the La Tondeña workers’ strike spurred a nationwide labor stoppages in 300 workplaces from October 1974 to January 1975.”²⁹⁵

Another Maoist convert was Father Frank Navarro, an NPA leader in Mindanao, who believed that he could do more from his position of power as a priest than merely preach the gospel. Navarro and other priests thus moved from the pulpit to the peasant associations and Party proper, and used their knowledge of and immersion in Christianity to trace links between Marxist concepts and religious notions. As Mao had done, he too sought to wed theory with practice:

I was never really contented with my parish work. The people were poor, but I was not involved in truly solving the causes of their poverty. Armed struggle is the highest form of service. One offers not only his time, money, or effort. He offers his life. If lay people

²⁹¹ de la Torre, *Touching Ground*, 70.

²⁹² de la Torre, *The Philippines*, 9.

²⁹³ de la Torre, *Touching Ground*, 21.

²⁹⁴ Harris, “The Theology of Struggle,” 84. See also Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 110.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 110-111.

can offer their lives, how much more a priest who has been trained to give his total being to service?²⁹⁶

In fact, as early as the 1970s, Philippine priests and other clergymen had taken to Marxist analytics to conceptualize and frame the nation's underdevelopment and political repression under imperialism and, more specifically, Marcos' dictatorial rule.²⁹⁷ Navarro, for example, did not see a contradiction between dialectical materialism and worshipping God: "Science has not proven that there is a God. But neither has it proven that there is no God. Some key goals of Marxism and Christianity are similar. Both aspire to total liberation. The only difference is that Marxism is more scientific, this-worldly, while Christianity is other-worldly and idealistic."²⁹⁸

To sum up briefly what occurred to the CPP-NPA movement after martial law ended in 1981 and the end of Marcos' tenure in 1986, the Party succumbed to internal factionalism that, after many years, resulted in Sison's forced un-affiliation with the Communists. At one time, Distor notes, Filipino Communists had looked on the "Mao Zedong of the Philippines" not unlike a "redeemer who would free the people from all [of] the social, political, and economic ills [that] they had been unjustly experiencing." Sison's "prophetic convictions and favorable political situations," she continues, positioned him so favorably among some cadres within the CPP that it was "unimaginable to be critical" of him during the heydays of the Marcos dictatorship.²⁹⁹ Yet the rise of the "Rejectionists," an anti-Sison group of CPP leaders and officials, rose to push against Sison and his loyalists, the "Reaffirmists," and years of infighting and factionalism ensued.³⁰⁰ After his exile to the Netherlands in 1986, where he resides presently,³⁰¹ Sison wrote about his experiences as a Communist and his vision for a truly independent Philippines, which provided this chapter with much of its primary sources on the man himself.

This section has endeavored to show how the CPP under Sison both applied Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to Philippine conditions (*practical adaptation*) and adapted it to

²⁹⁶ Ibid, 233, as quote in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 240.

²⁹⁷ Harris, "The Theology of Struggle," 87.

²⁹⁸ Pen Guerrero, "Ministry in the Mountains," *Liberation* (April-May 1987): 8-10, as quoted in James B. Goodno, *The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises*. (London: Zed Books, 1991), 232. Also quoted in Fuller, *A Movement Divided*, 239-240.

²⁹⁹ Distor, "Maoism and the Development of the Communist Party of the Philippines," 365.

³⁰⁰ Abinales, *The Revolution Falters*, 10, 17, 24-42.

³⁰¹ Sison and Rosca, *José Maria Sison*, 224-226.

render it important beyond those who initially received it (*normative adaptation*). The mechanical application of Maoism during the CPP's early years in directing the people's war had yielded important truths about the movement's limitations: the Philippine terrain and population both had to be accounted for by the Party, which meant further creative adaptation was necessary strategy were the movement to triumph. The CPP moved outside Luzon and into Mindanao, where it experienced one of its few success stories. It also drew in priests who were politicized by the horrid conditions of their rural Churchgoers, which allowed the CPP to reach out to religious people who would otherwise ignore the CPP message. While exile and factionalism effectively ended Sison's tenure as intellectual thrust and guiding force of the CPP movement, we have seen here the ways in which he and his Party were able to carve out a place in the Philippines. They succeeded in creating this space not just for Maoism, but also for a Filipinized Maoism—one that took into account the land and people—without the abandonment of Maoism's universality.

A United Front from Above and Below: The PKI's Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism

We now shift to these same *adaptations* by the PKI, ending with the Indonesian Communists' 1963 turn to China and push for power. The national united front period (1951-1965) reveals that the PKI leadership had coalesced firmly around Aidit. A unified Party with a clear leader, the PKI proceeded with its political strategy of the "Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism."³⁰² But what constituted "Indonesianization" to this cohesive Party leadership? A buzzword or catchphrase to highlight its independence from Moscow?³⁰³ The PKI's distinctiveness was contingent on its *adaptation* of Marxism-Leninism to Indonesian conditions, and its leadership had determined in its Fifth Congress that armed struggle could not succeed in Indonesia. An archipelagic island nation, it lacked a large hinterland for protracted warfare, and shared no border with a friendly superpower, both crucial to Mao's victory.³⁰⁴ Unlike the CPP, the PKI did not attempt to wed Marxism-Leninism with local cultural norms in its *normative*

³⁰² Cibulka, "The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party," in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 285.

³⁰³ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 336. Mortimer continues: "The theoretical poverty of the concept of an Indonesianized Marxism-Leninism in no way lessened its significance for the PKI, since its main function was to express the independence and self-esteem of the Party's leadership. The interest of the PKI in maintaining the appearance of unity in the international Communist movement had a similar function in enhancing the Party's popular appeal and promoting internal solidarity within its ranks." On page 337.

³⁰⁴ Justus M. Van Der Kroepf, "Indonesian Communism under Aidit," *Problems of Communism* 7, No. 6 (November-December 1958): 15-23, on page 18.

adaptation; Islam was passé, as Musso and Alimin had rejected such a notion previously and the comprador-friendly *Masjumi* Party had long established Islam as its platform.³⁰⁵ Aidit viewed the PKI at once as part the Indonesian national and international Communist movements, with itself as the sole determinant of its program.³⁰⁶ The “Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism” therefore constitutes a *practical* and *normative adaptation* in accordance with the PKI Fifth Congress resolutions: a united front from above (*practical adaptation*) whereby the PKI participated in parliamentary cooperation with the ruling PNI and, later, with Sukarno during the Guided Democracy era, as part of its legal political struggle; and a united front from below (*normative adaptation*) whereby the PKI made Marxism-Leninism speak to the conditions of workers, peasants, and the national bourgeoisie. While combined fronts ultimately positioned the PKI to vie for state power, its leaders’ decisions to act on it more radically ultimately spelled the PKI’s end.³⁰⁷

The national united front period consists of two interrelated yet distinct eras during which the Party cooperated with the ruling PNI (united front from above). The first was the immediate post-Fifth Congress period when the PKI forged a close alliance with the PNI (1951-1959), a partnership that Communist leaders framed as consistent with its class struggle. A “natural ally” for the PKI by the end of its Fifth Congress, the PNI stood as the only prominent nationalist political organization in the country that was both non-sectarian and open to collaboration with Communists. Sukarno’s willingness to work alongside Communists effectively positioned rather favorably a Party whose leaders would see PKI membership grow to become the largest non-ruling Communist Party in the world (1.5 million members to its name by 1959).³⁰⁸ The nature of cooperation with the PNI was beneficial for both Parties: for the PKI, it gained national legitimacy and immunity from federal crackdowns. In the 1955 and 1957 elections, the PKI scored landmark gains for a non-ruling Communist Party, winning 16.4% (nationally) and 37% (in Java), respectively. It had gained a considerable foothold in Java, with estimates that the

³⁰⁵ Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, “Marxism, Modernity, and Revolution: The Asian Experience,” in *The Dynamics of Transculturality: Concepts and Institutions in Motion*. Antje Flüchter and Jivanta Schöttli, eds. (Dordrecht, the Netherlands, Springer, 2015), 30.

³⁰⁶ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 329-330.

³⁰⁷ Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 291.

³⁰⁸ DN Aidit, “Ideological Work in the Communist Party of Indonesia,” *World Marxist Review* 2, No. 7 (July 1959): 24, as cited in Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 292.

Communists attained nearly ninety percent of its total electoral support for the 1955 election in Java alone.³⁰⁹ The PKI's success owed largely to its doctrinal flexibility, with the Aidit group endorsing Sukarno's state philosophy of *Pañcasīla* (literally "Five Principles," 1945), including conceding to "Believe in One God" (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) despite the Party's Marxist-Leninist foundation.³¹⁰ While this caused a stir among hardliners and loyalists, it courted new support from otherwise disinterested Indonesians.³¹¹ PKI endorsement secured extra support for government cabinet confirmations, and sure enough, the Aidit group was true to its word, supporting "every Indonesian cabinet after 1951."³¹² By 1957, Sukarno even selected PKI members to occupy seats in the National Council.³¹³

The Guided Democracy era (1959-1965), the second period of the united front from above, threatened to undo this highly effective political relationship. Sukarno broke with his Vice President Hatta and with the Muslim *Masjumi* Party to restore the 1945 constitution and end parliamentary democracy.³¹⁴ Sukarno's power play was a shock to PKI leadership, which had designed its united front strategy at its 1954 Fifth Congress on the premise that parliamentary democracy would remain in place unabated.³¹⁵ Sukarno's "death blow" to parliamentary democracy notwithstanding, he remained popular across the country for his personal charisma, patriotic devotion to Indonesia, anti-imperialism, especially vis-à-vis the successful 1962 campaign in Irian Jaya, and for his 1963 confrontation policy regarding British-influenced Malaysia.³¹⁶ As for the PKI leadership, although it was irked that Sukarno had just

³⁰⁹ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 66; and Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 222-229.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 66-67.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

³¹² Cibulka, "The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party," in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 295. The sole exception was the *Masjumi*-led Harahap cabinet of 1955-1956. The alliance with Sukarno also entailed support for the new Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, a PNI member who needed PKI endorsement to win the post against fierce competition from both the Socialist and *Masjumi* Parties. Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 254-255.

³¹³ In April 1962, Aidit reported that about 50 percent of the Communist had been removed from the provincial and local councils. DN Aidit, *Satu Fikiran—Satu Hati—Satu Tudjuan* [One Thought—One Heart—One Goal]. (Jakarta: 1962), 57, as cited in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 288, 356n26.

³¹⁴ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 65.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

³¹⁶ Roosa, *Pretext For Mass Murder*, 4. As Roosa states further: "Sukarno had been the nation-state's only president... his charisma, eloquence, and passionate patriotism [meant that] he remained widely popular amid all the post-independence political turmoil and economic mismanagement. By 1965, his hold on the presidency was unrivaled. It is testimony to his popularity that both the [30 September] movement and Major General Suharto justified their actions as a means to defend him. Neither side dared appear disloyal to the president." See also Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 53-54.

abolished a system that had been somewhat beneficial to it, it decided to “accommodat[e] its united front strategy to fit the context of Sukarno’s National Front” of 1960.³¹⁷ To do so, the PKI framed Sukarno’s 1945 national revolution as an incomplete bourgeois-democratic stage that required Communist support to succeed.³¹⁸ As Aidit stated at the 1961 PKI Seventh National Congress:

The democratic revolution, which began in August 1945, has not been completed as [of] yet. The following democratic sections of society are interested in carrying the revolution forward: the workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and the national bourgeoisie, which have joined forces to form a National Front. Their interests are represented by the three political forces: the Nationalists [led by Sukarno], the religious groups, and the Communists. The cooperation of these democratic Parties, which we call in our country NASAKOM (NAS—Nationalists; A—religious groups; KOM—Communists), is of paramount importance for the development of the revolution. The reactionary forces in Indonesia are the imperialists who still preserve considerable footholds in the country, the landlords, the compradors, and the bureaucratic capitalists who have strengthened their position in recent years. The struggle between the supporters and enemies of the revolution is... waged in the economic, political, military, and cultural fields. The reactionaries, who have suffered a number of setbacks, still represent a grave danger to the revolutionary gains.³¹⁹

Evidently, the PKI’s united front from above took on a pro-PNI character, a hallmark example of the Party’s *practical adaptation* of Marxism-Leninism in its “Indonesianization.” After all, “Indonesianizing Marxism-Leninism,” Aidit said, meant that the PKI must hold “fast to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and *creatively determining the policy, tactics, form of struggle, and form of organization of our Party on the basis of the concrete situation in our country.*”³²⁰

Its greatest rival no longer in the picture, the PKI now feared the very real danger of the Indonesian military, which made an alliance with Sukarno all the more crucial.³²¹ It “hewed steadfastly” to pinning its star to the PNI, supporting Sukarno against dissenting voices.³²² For

³¹⁷ Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 297; and Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 66.

³¹⁸ Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 297

³¹⁹ DN Aidit, “Party Building and Mass Work,” *World Marxist Review* 5, No. 9 (September 1962): 29, as quoted in Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 289-290.

³²⁰ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 37. See also page 48. Emphasis added.

³²¹ Robert Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 58; and Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 296-297.

³²² Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 66.

instance, the Party sided with the Provisional People's Consultative Conference in endorsing and ratifying Sukarno's *Manipol* (lit. "Political Manifesto") speech on Independence Day in 1959, with Aidit describing it as "an important event in the Indonesian people's revolutionary struggle, for it meant that the concept of the basic questions of the Indonesian revolution had been accepted, and embodied in an official document of the state."³²³ Thereafter, the PKI insured its position by cozying up to Sukarno, whose protection was a necessary shield from the "strongly *prijaji* (aristocratic-bureaucratic)" Indonesian Armed Forces.³²⁴ For this reason, the Party leveraged its advantageous position close to Sukarno for its own political advancement, notably on issues of domestic (Irian) and foreign (Malaysia) crises.³²⁵

As for the PKI's united front from below, its *normative adaptation* of Marxism-Leninism, it consisted of the Communists reaching out to workers, peasants, and what its leaders called the "national bourgeoisie" to bring them into the Party in meaningful ways. The previous section discussed what the PKI envisioned the national united front to be. Here, it is worth examining the method by which the Party sought to draw such people in and indoctrinate them towards the PKI's political line. As Aidit explained, the PKI's recruitment of new members "was necessary to enable [the Party] to carry out its tasks and win victory for the people... [We] realized that a Party with big membership would be a decisive actor in achieving victory."³²⁶ Its challenge as a proletarian-led Party that stressed an alliance of the workers and peasants, though, was to draw in the national bourgeoisie without abandoning its earnest commitments to the underclasses. For if the PKI could not grow beyond its stronghold in Java and foothold among Indonesian workers and peasants, then it could never truly succeed in implementing its vision.

One way to reach the broadest mass of would-be supporters was to downplay the Party's doctrinal rigidity, and to foreground that its interests in ameliorating the living conditions of all non-reactionary classes was steadfast and resolute. As Aidit describes in the following passage:

³²³ Aidit, *The Indonesian Revolution*, 83, as quoted in Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 255.

³²⁴ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 66; and Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 214. Quote from Mozingo, who described the generals' motive for suppressing the PKI as a "vested socioeconomic interest in the status quo."

³²⁵ Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 215.

³²⁶ Aidit, "Ideological Work in the Communist Party of Indonesia," 24, as quoted in Cibulka, "The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party," in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 292.

The [PKI] has advanced the theory that there are three forces existing in Indonesia, namely, the progressive force, the middle force, and the diehard force... the Party's line towards these forces is to develop the progressive force, unite with the middle force, and isolate the diehard force. While uniting with the middle force, the Party also conducts struggles against it. The Party unites with the middle force... to oppose imperialism and feudalism. But the Party struggles against this middle force if it wants to weaken the independence of the Party and of the working people's movement or if it wavers in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism.³²⁷

Yet another method to draw in further support was a large network of PKI-affiliated front organizations over which the Party controlled outright. After a 1959 resolution to increase PKI influence in the rural sector, the Party-controlled *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (Peasant Front of Indonesia, BNI) expanded to include over four million members.³²⁸ Due chiefly to the Indonesian Armed Forces' relative weakness in rural areas, by the early 1960s the BNI had delivered on the Party's promise to aid the poorest peasants in the rural sector.³²⁹ As Hindley describes, agricultural techniques in Indonesia "were primitive, the internal market was shrinking as agricultural production declined and the relative prices of manufactured goods increased, and industrialization was impossible so long as 70 percent of the population remained too poor to afford industrial goods."³³⁰ Though the Party recognized the hazards of pressing a general land reform campaign in the countryside, where Aidit himself had "rejected class warfare," the Party developed radicalism through encouraging disenfranchised peasants to take over state lands, that is, until the PKI eased up in 1965.³³¹

Agitation among the peasantry was part one of a three-pronged attack with which the PKI increased its membership and transform the Party into a broad national untied front. Its largest source of support, the Indonesian working class—Aidit numbered six million as PKI affiliates with half a million employed gainfully in the 1950s—had endured widespread exploitation and declining living standards due in no small part to foreign industries dominating the business

³²⁷ Aidit, *The Indonesian Revolution*, 69, as quoted in Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*, 255.

³²⁸ *Harian Rakjat* [People's Daily (Indonesia)] (30 April 1962), as quoted in Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 214.

³²⁹ See Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 276-328. On the PKI's land reform, see Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 33.

³³⁰ Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 33. Rural agitation began in 1951 with the PKI Agrarian Program. See See PKI, "Program Perubahan Tanah dan Tuntutan kaum Tani (Program of Land Change and Peasants' Demands)," *Bintang Merah* [Red Star (Indonesia)] (December 1951), 8, as quoted in Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 33.

³³¹ Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 214-215.

sector. The PKI also increased its hold on SOBSI, the nation's largest trade federation (3.5 million members in 1965), and directed front organizations such as *Pemuda Rakjat* (People's Youth), *Gerwani* (Women's Movement), *Universitas Rakjat* (People's University, UNRA), and *LEKRA* (Institute of People's Culture) to rein in 105 million affiliates across Indonesia.³³²

The Indonesian Communists' rapid growth and political emergence as a highly influential player on the national political scene notwithstanding, it had not brought about the people's democracy that it had envisioned at its 1954 Congress. While the PKI had "never been seriously committed to, or under the influence of, a Maoist-type revolutionary strategy,"³³³ two major events prompted its leadership to turn to *China* and *elements of Maoism* from 1965 onward as part of a concerted effort to take state power: 1) its decision to side with Communist China during the Sino-Soviet rift; and 2) militancy in the countryside and its alleged ties to the 30 September Movement. On the PKI's China turn, the Aidit group's stance toward the Sino-Soviet split had been primarily to assert its own independence and influence in the world Communist movement.³³⁴ This did not mean that Aidit and his comrades had not seized the opportunity to visit their allies to learn from their experiences in socialist edification. Aidit traveled to China in 1959 and 1961 to visit a model commune. He received "the full propaganda treatment," during which his CCP handlers "explained all the great transformations that had taken place in the preceding two years."³³⁵ In Beijing in September 1963, for instance, Chinese delegates gave him a full welcome, and lauded him as "a brilliant Marxist-Leninist theoretician" and "close friend

³³² Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 149, 38; Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia*, 39; and Cibulka, "The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party," in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 292, 294.

³³³ Mazingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 253.

³³⁴ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 330.

³³⁵ Julia Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and International Image-Building in the People's Republic," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (December 2015): 135-158, on page 153. Lovell notes that Aidit's "Chinese minders in 1959 and 1961 deftly concealed the true nature of the Commune system—terror starvation, cannibalism—and reinforced Aidit's respect for the Maoist experiment." A CCP report of Aidit's visit stated that he was "very satisfied," and said to his minders that "You can see that the changes over here [over the past two years] are huge... I am delighted... I wish you ever greater success in the future." 北京市檔案館 [Beijing Municipal Archives, *Běijīngshì dǎng'ànguǎn*], "重點外賓在京參觀 (The Visits of VIP Foreign Guests to Beijing, *Zhòngdiǎn wàibīn zàijīng cānguān*)," Document Number 102-001-00190, as quoted in Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China," 153.

and comrade in arms of the Chinese people [whose] theoretical generalizations... are of vital educational experience to us.”³³⁶

While the PKI's commitment to its distinctness in the world Communist movement remained resolute, “a gradual and cumulative process” shifted PKI allegiance towards the Chinese Communists, namely for their internationalism and criticism of Soviet revisionism, and later, with its membership in flight following the brutal 1965-1966 Anti-Communist massacres, embracing Maoist methods overtly.³³⁷ Before the PKI's decimation, the Party leadership endorsed the Moscow line. But by the 1960s, the Soviets had veered far off course, most notably for siding with a non-Communist nation against Communist China in the India-China dispute, and backing away from its commitment to Cuba in the fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis.³³⁸ Far from embracing Maoism as a response to Soviet revisionism, the Aidit leadership criticized the Soviet Union for its blunders while committing the PKI to its own autonomy and a peaceful transition. The PKI drew from China at this period, for Mao's overtures to a united Third World and criticism of the Soviets for “socialist imperialism”³³⁹ resonated with an Aidit group that viewed the PKI within the broader Third World and international fight against imperialism. Thus they drew only from China what it needed theoretically, whereas in application, it committed itself to its independent course that its leaders based on Indonesian realities (lacking military power and rural base areas as a rearguard).³⁴⁰ The PKI's stance would change, however, after

³³⁶ Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 217-218, quoting “Speech by Politburo Member Peng Zhen,” *New China News Agency* [Beijing (PRC)] (4 September 1963); and “Speech by Alternate Politburo Member Kang Sheng,” *New China News Agency* [Beijing (PRC)] (2 September 1963). On PKI praise for Communist China after the September 30th fallout, see Jusuf Ajtorop, *Integrasi Kekuasaan Politik dan Sistem Hukum dengan Revolusi di Tiongkok Rakjat* [The Integration of Political Power and Law with the People's Revolution in China]. (Jakarta, Indonesia: Jajasan Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Baperki, 1964), 14, as cited in Hong, *China and the Shaping of Indonesia*, 97.

³³⁷ Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 216, citing Donald Hindley, “The Indonesian Communists and the CPSU Twenty-Second Congress,” *Asian Survey* 2 (March 1962): 20-27; and McVey, “Indonesian Communism and China,” in *China in Crisis, Volume II: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*. He Bingdi and Tang Tsou, eds. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 369-377.

³³⁸ Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 218.

³³⁹ Mao Zedong, “Outline for a Speech on the International Situation,” (December 1959), 建国以来毛泽东文稿, 第八卷 [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, Volume VIII, *Jiànguó yǐlái máozédōng wéngǎo*], Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 599-603; “On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World,” *People's Daily and Red Flag* (14 July 1964); and “‘Khrushchev Revisionism’ as a Danger to China,” (14 July 1964) in *The People's Republic of China 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey. Volume 2, 1957-1965: The Great Leap Forward and Its Aftermath*. Harold C. Hinton, ed. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980), 1270-1289.

³⁴⁰ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 330. Mortimer provides an example: “Although [the Aidit group] adopted many Chinese political slogans and styles... [they] were at pains to distinguish their own political

General Suharto's widespread search-and-destroy of Communists in the wake of the 30 September Movement (in which the Armed Force implicated Communists for the abortive coup) forced Maoist radicalization among the surviving leaders.

Before the PKI was decimated by the military, its leaders had flirted with, and even followed up on, militancy in the rural sector and vying for state power thereafter. From 1963 on, the PKI determined that because broad appeals to nationalism to rein in the national bourgeoisie did not insure the Party's longevity on the political scene, militant action in the countryside was necessary for its united front strategy to work. It devoted several years to building up pro-PKI fervor among peasants, but no true class struggle had occurred, and living conditions did not improve. Aidit thus initiated a "campaign of unilateral actions (*aksi sepihak*)" to encourage peasants to seize lands and the PKI apparatus to put into realization the government's 1960 land reform laws.³⁴¹ While *aksi sepihak* was only a partial success—the Party eased up in 1964 because of "counterrevolutionary mass actions"—the PKI had succeeded in agitating the peasant base, and achieved "quasi-governmental status," as Sukarno valued the PKI by his side and relished its support of him.³⁴² Now was the time to make a power play of its own: the PKI lobbied for, and won, Sukarno's approval to form a "fifth force" of armed workers and peasants in what constituted effectively a people's militia. The Aidit leadership "sold" this pitch to Sukarno as added defense to guard against imperialism, and in light of Indonesia's confrontation policy regarding Malaysia, it made sense to buttress the Armed Forces and police with added might. Yet anti-Communist factions, specifically the generals within the Armed Forces itself, began to speculate whether the PKI was plotting to usurp the PNI leadership via a coup d'état.³⁴³

After speculating, the Armed Forces decided to act on its suspicions after 1 October 1965. In the early morning, six generals (most notably Lieutenant General Achmad Yani) were

situation from that which had confronted the Chinese Party leaders on their road to power and to prevent anything like an uncritical devotion to Chinese Communism growing up in their ranks." On page 334.

³⁴¹ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 276-277. Mortimer describes the *aksi sepihak* campaign as a "unique facet of the PKI's drive to power, in that it was the only major struggle [that] the Party precipitated outside the confines of the united front alliance." He continues: "the campaign was not intended to mark a break with the overarching strategic guidelines drawn up by Aidit; rather, it was to serve as a demonstration of the PKI's mass power and the legitimacy of its claims to full participation in government." See also Cibulka, "The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party," in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 294.

³⁴² Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 225-226. On *aksi*, see Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 277-296, 325-326.

³⁴³ Cibulka, "The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party," in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 298-299. On the 30 September Movement, see Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, *in passim*.

kidnapped and executed by the “30 September Movement,” a band of self-proclaimed Sukarno loyalists (led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung) who had done so to “protect the president from a clique of right-wing army generals who were plotting a coup d’état.”³⁴⁴ General Suharto took command over the Armed Forces and launched a brutal counterattack that disbanded the 30 September Movement and catapulted him into the national spotlight, as he used the abortive coup to launch a “creeping coup d’état” of his own that culminated in Sukarno’s deposition and his assumption of state leadership.³⁴⁵ But who was to blame for this abortive coup that had removed Indonesia’s beloved leader? Suharto’s *ex post facto* version, of course, blamed the Communists, and what occurred thereafter was a genocidal campaign launched by the Armed Forces against the PKI. Between 100,000 and 500,000 PKI members, or those suspected by Suharto’s thugs of possessing Communist sympathies, died in the 1965-1966 massacres, including most of the PKI leadership (Aidit was arrested and executed in central Java on 22 November 1965, Lukman and Njoto thereafter).³⁴⁶

In the wake of the Armed Forces massacres, the few remaining PKI officials embraced a Maoist course, which it would formulate based on its present situation and its need to resist those who had taken arms against its members. The Party now in shambles, Marxism-Leninism officially outlawed in Indonesia, and much of its leadership murdered extra-judicially, those who survived Suharto’s violent repression either fled to Tirana, Albania, where they spoke on behalf of what remained of the decimated PKI (Jusuf Aditjorop), or engaged in a Maoist-style people’s war and called for self-criticism (Sudisman).³⁴⁷ As Sison had done in criticizing the PKP for its fatal errors, PKI Politbureau member and exile Aditjorop, who was in Beijing before the coup, lambasted the Aidit leadership for its cooperation with Sukarno that, he believed, corrupted the Party’s core commitment to class struggle. Aditjorop’s self-criticism documents presented a three-point program: 1) reconstruction of the PKI on Marxist-Leninist lines; 2) preparation for a prolonged armed struggle in the rural areas; and 3) the formation of a united front of workers and peasants, including non-reactionary classes of the national bourgeoisie, to form a mass

³⁴⁴ Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 3.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁴⁶ Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 299. See also Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 255.

³⁴⁷ McVey states that the PKI establishment of its exile Party committee began with the Fifth Party of Labor of Albania (PPSh) Congress) in November 1966. McVey, “Indonesian Communism and China,” in *China in Crisis, Volume II*, 390.

movement to oppose the generals.³⁴⁸ But unlike before, when the PKI leaders did not avow adherence to Maoism overtly or covertly, this time Aditjoro stated openly that the PKI embraced “Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung,” which it would use to crush the Suharto-Nasution clique.³⁴⁹

Sudisman, by contrast, called for a Maoist self-criticism in which the PKI would admit its grievous errors in political line and strategy, and engage in guerrilla struggle the Indonesian countryside. He founded an underground Party cell in Central Java between 1966 and 1967, which he linked to the CCP in Beijing and to Aditjorop’s China-based PKI exiles and which came to constitute a Delegation of the PKI Central Committee. Sudisman also renounced Aidit’s earlier “state with two aspects” approach, for the legal parliamentary struggle had veered the Party off-course from its commitment to class warfare and achieving a people’s democracy.³⁵⁰ The solution, he urged, was to adopt a Maoist course, “follow the road of the Chinese revolution... [and] inevitably adopt... the people’s armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution, which, in essence, is the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat.”³⁵¹ While the Sudisman troupe followed through on its plan to initiate such a struggle in Eastern Java under the leadership of PKI Central Committee member Hutapea, Sudisman’s 1966 arrest, and the movement’s failure to gain any ground led to its end. Suharto suppressed it in 1968, the same year that the imprisoned Sudisman was executed.³⁵²

A Petite Summing Up and Preliminary Comparisons

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the workings of *reception* and *adaptation* in the Indonesian and Philippine cases. This not only helps us to understand better what happened—the

³⁴⁸ “Greeting to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Workers’ Party from the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party,” *Radio Tirana* (4 November 1966).

³⁴⁹ Ibid; and Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 255. Communist China came to support the reconstituted PKI, endorsing the Party’s new course along a Maoist revolutionary line in July 1967, nearly three months after Sukarno had been deposed by Suharto. “People of Indonesia, unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime,” 紅旗 [Red Flag, *Hóngqí* (PRC)] No. 11 (7 July 1967): 14-17, as cited in Mozingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia*, 257.

³⁵⁰ Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 55; and Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 300.

³⁵¹ *People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1968), 32, as quoted in Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*, 301.

³⁵² Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism*, 55. For Sudisman’s defense plea and testimonial before trial, see Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*, 140-143.

nature and outcomes of revolutionary efforts led by Sison and Aidit—but helps us to compare Indonesian and Philippine experience with Cambodian as well as Chinese Maoist examples. My goal throughout has been to offer a more useful analysis of revolution in South East Asia in general and the operations of self-proclaimed Maoists in those revolutions: how they parallel and differ from the Chinese Maoist experience and from each other. The experiences of Sison and Aidit as intellectuals who fostered international ties as they passed through spaces and participated in political organizations and the nature of their settings as colonized/semi-colonized spaces gives their reception of Marxism-Leninism (and Mao Zedong Thought for Sison) its social context. For both networked individuals, Marxism-Leninism became an attractive alternative and historical force due mainly to the social setting in which it emerged, for both Indonesia and the Philippines—like Cambodia and Republican China—confronted the real dangers of hasty integration into a global capitalist market of cyclical exploitation. The language of Marxism-Leninism as a sound critique of capitalism spoke to these men in ways that liberalism (for Sison) or broad appeals to nationalism (Aidit) did not do fully. This was so because it placed imperialism as the main culprit for all of the post-independence crises that had marked politics, societies, and economies in their developing world settings. As they came to discover, independence was not *true* so long as capitalism perpetuated the countries' exploitation and doomed the working peoples to lives of poverty. Both Sison and Aidit thus sought to take Marxism-Leninism (and Maoism for Sison) and apply it to concrete realities in the Philippines and Indonesia, respectively.

But as we have seen, their initial *intellectual adaptations* failed, which pushed both men to go deeper in applying Mao's dictum of *theory-practice-theory* so that they could correct corrigible errors and reach a greater mass of oppressed persons by making comprehensible their socioeconomic alienation in transcendent terms rather than abstract Marxist ones. Such entailed the *practical* and *normative adaptations* of Marxism-Leninism, wherein both Sison and Aidit applied their *intellectual adaptations* creatively, recognized their limitations, and then went further and broader to turn their respective Communist Parties into united front mass organizations. Sison used his surroundings to guide this adaptation, and opened up the Party ranks to Catholic priests who, like the CPP, sought justice for the oppressed peasants and workers. Aidit did not channel Islam, Indonesia's most represented religion, and instead took the country's political situation to guide its dual-united front approach. While the Party failed to

seize power, and was destroyed in the wake of the 1965 massacres, it had succeeded in “Indonesianizing” Marxism-Leninism.

To conclude, our two Southeast Asian case studies have yielded useful confirmations of our present approach to the problem of ideas such as Maoism traveling across cultures. All of our examples, whether Chinese, Cambodia, or our cases here, provide us with intellectuals responding to crises by taking a radical turn. They did not embrace Marxism-Leninism or, later, Maoism, in abstraction; rather, they engaged with it dialectically to make it apply to them and the concrete problems, crises, and socioeconomic conditions that marked their nations in an ever-globalizing world (*impact/relational*). The nature of homefront politics propelled them closer to radical thought streams, with Mao Zedong Thought emerging as the most malleable and practice/results-driven approach to applying Marxism-Leninism in a largely underdeveloped Asia. Political corruption characterized Cambodian, Philippine, and Indonesian politics after independence, while capitalism imperialism essentially kept colonialism alive in these states as exports productions and consumer goods production tailored to suit wealthy urbanites and foreigners perpetuate rural plight and stratified the peasantries of our three examples (*conditions of reception*).

To respond to similar crises in China, Mao “Sinified” Marxism-Leninism, thereby setting a precedent for his Cambodian, Indonesian, and Philippine readers (and would-be subscribers) to approach Marxism-Leninism and, later, Maoism creatively, applying foreign thought to peculiar conditions that the original thought may not have spoken to fully. In all cases, such adaptations and applications entailed marked departures and ruptures (the DK regime in Cambodia, chief among them). Rhetorically at least, the Communists under analysis regarded their struggle as part of a broader global movement against imperialism, as did Mao before them. They also recognized that imperialism and feudalism worked hand-in-hand to keep the rural strata divided starkly between haves and have-nots. But the cases were very different from 1920s China, or Industrial Revolution era Europe, so the Cambodian Paris Group, Sison, and Aidit all tried to *adapt* Marxism-Leninism (and Mao Zedong Thought) in their writings. Upon failing to implement them to their satisfaction, they returned to the drawing board to re-strategize, using their findings to inform further *adaptations*. The results varied, yet are important in recognizing just how difficult—and variegated—applying foreign theory to extant conditions turns out to be:

the Paris Group seized state power, but collective leadership disintegrated and Pol Pot re-oriented the Party around himself and killing minorities; the PKI carved out its place in Indonesian politics until its brutal suppression by Suharto; and the CPP fought unsuccessfully to capture power, yet had minor victories in Mindanao, recruited Churchmen to join its ranks, and remains in operation today.

Conclusion

We return to Xi Jinping's 2014 speech "Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought,"¹ which opened this dissertation. If there is, as Xi said so fervently, "*no such thing in the world as a development model that can be applied universally*, nor is there any development path that remains carved in stone,"² how then has the Chinese experience emerged in so many countries? Whether Xi acknowledges or not, alternative development models and ideological systems that do away with doctrinal rigidity and instead encourage creative adaptation do indeed exist, and this dissertation has endeavored to show that Maoism is one such a model and system. We have used the triad of Edward Said's "traveling theory" to guide us through the *production* of that ideological system (Mao Zedong Thought in China), its *transmission* to other countries as Maoism, and its *reception* by progressives who would either become Maoists, or engage with Maoist thought critically. Xi's current effort to extend Chinese soft power (search for allies) and serious hard power (People's Liberation Army Navy, a blue water navy), as well as to posit Communist China as the leader of a world liberation movement, does in fact represent an important outgrowth of this *production, transmission, and reception* effort, albeit it somewhat different ways. While Mao Zedong championed the idea of exporting the Chinese revolution to the world, he, too, was not the first to encourage the notion that the Chinese experience had universal applicability and lessons for all of the world's peoples.³ The notion of exporting the Chinese experience outside China is a continuous theme in modern Chinese history, not limited to Maoism, and as Xi's speech suggests, it will continue to remain so under his helmsmanship and beyond.

Xi Jinping is offering a Chinese model, albeit with the proviso that it should not be treated as an unchanging "universal." It is worth re-visiting the three components that Xi

¹ Xi Jinping, "Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought," in *The Governance of China*. (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2014), 27-33.

² Xi Jinping, "Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought," 31. Emphasis added.

³ Guomindang (GMD) factional leader 胡漢民 (*Hú Hànmín*, 1879-1936), who delivered a 1929 lecture and published an essay on exporting the Chinese revolution, is but one example. See Hu Hanmin, "民族國際與第三國際 (International of Nationalities and Communist International, *Mínzú Guójì yǔ Dìsānguójì*)," in 胡漢民事跡資料匯輯第四冊 (The Works of Hu Hanmin, Volume IV, *Hú Hànmín Shìjī Zīliào Huìjī Dìsìcè*). Hu Hanmin ed. (Cunhui xueshe, Xianggang: Dadong tushu gongsi, 1980), 1395-1401, esp. pages 1400-1. As cited in Anna Belogurova, "The Chinese International of Nationalities: the Chinese Communist Party, the Comintern, and the Foundation of the Malayan National Communist Party, 1923-1939," *Journal of Global History* 9 (2014): 447-470, on page 451.

mentions in his pronouncement to clarify just what he is proposing. The first component, Mao's reinvigoration of the saying "to seek truth from facts [實事求是, *Shíshìqíúshì*]" reflects the *reception* of "traveling theory" in Mao's thought. Maoism is, as the dissertation has endeavored to show in chapters one, two, and three, is itself a product of the same tri-partite process of "traveling theory." Mao's formulation reflects the Janus-faced nature of his reception of foreign thought. With "seek truth from facts," Mao drew on this classical phrase from his Confucian teachers to convey the empirical spirit of Marxian historical materialism and Leninist practical administration.⁴ Thus it is important to track the three stages of *production*, *transmission*, and *reception* to understand more fully not only how ideas travel, but how individuals receive them in a dialectical engagement with that idea or thought, and ultimately reinvest or revivify it with new signification.

Our Southeast Asian case studies likewise shed light on this complex interplay between the universality of Marxism-Leninism and the social experiences of political actors—including their education in colonial schools, in the language of the *colons*, and travels abroad to gain knowledge—to temper how they *received* and *adapted* according to their present situations. As progressive students, they forged networks both at home and abroad and came to recognize shared features with other developing world countries (notably capitalist exploitation, semi-colonialism/semi-feudalism, and political corruption), which contributed significantly to their sense of situated-ness. The Cambodian Paris Group studied the French classics in French language schools, then pursued advanced degrees in the *avant-garde* hotbed of 1950s Paris. Their studies led some (Pol Pot and Ieng Sary) to become revolutionaries, whereas others (Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim) became Maoist theorists and politicians who would serve as the intellectual thrust of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). José Maria Sison also traveled abroad to gain knowledge after years in English-language Catholic schools, leading him to Jakarta, where he met Dipa Nusantara (DN) Aidit and made some contacts with Chinese Communists and, eventually, converted to Maoism. He soon broke with his Communist colleagues in the Soviet-aligned *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP) to form a re-constituted Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) with Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding precept.

⁴ This theme in Mao's thought has been covered extensively in the literature. See Frederic Wakeman Jr., *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973); Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Zedong*. (New York: Praeger, 1969); and Maurice Meisner, *Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait*. (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).

Aidit, while not traveling abroad, moved to Batavia as a student where he studied Dutch in Dutch schools. When the Japanese captured Indonesia, he participated actively in Japanese-run political organizations, and eventually joined with several colleagues who would form the Aidit group of *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI). In all of these cases, as the dissertation has shown, these experiences and encounters both at home and abroad shaped how they *received* and *adapted* foreign radical thought to suit what each of these intellectuals viewed as the concrete conditions and realities in their respective polities.

The second foundational element of Mao Zedong Thought that Xi Jinping lists is the mass line (群眾路線, *qúnzhòng lùxiàn*), which he describes as “the Party’s lifeline and fundamental principle... the people are the creators of history.”⁵ In fact, the mass line is, as Mark Selden defines, the “discovery of *concrete methods for linking popular participation* in the guerrilla struggle with a wide ranging community attack on rural problems.”⁶ Indeed, the CCP applied the mass line to mobilize people on a whole range of grievances, thereby exploiting every possible cleavage, whether social, economic, political, or other, as a way to build popular support.⁷ The mass line is particularly important since Mao’s approach to Marxist analysis of society places primacy on practice, for it is “the resolution of contradictions in material life *as experienced by individuals* that drives Maoist dialectics (the reality of contradictions in the world and how to face them).”⁸ The second pillar of Maoism thus represents Mao’s *intellectual adaptation* of Marxism from Eurocentric theory into a practical system to address on a genuine

⁵ Xi Jinping, “Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought,” 29. Xi’s stressing of popular support and the Party’s need to maintain its loyalty to the people brings to mind Mao’s saying 為人民服務 (“to serve the people,” pinyin: *wèi rénmin fúwù*).

⁶ Mark Selden, *The Yanan Way*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 276. Emphasis added.

⁷ Chen Yungfa, “The Blooming Poppy Under the Red Sun: The Yan’an Way and the Opium Trade,” in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven, eds. *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), xiii, 190, 238, 292-293; Stephen Averill, “The Origins of the Futian Incident,” in Saich and van de Ven, eds., 76, 80-81; Lucien Bianco, “Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937-1945,” in Saich and van de Ven, eds., 175-180; Timothy Cheek, “The Honorable Vocation: Intellectual Service in CCP Propaganda Institutions in Jin-Cha-Ji, 1937-1945,” in Saich and van de Ven, eds., xvii, 190, 238; Kathleen Hartford, “Fits and Starts: the Chinese Communist Party in Rural Heber, 1921-1936,” in Saich and van de Ven, eds., 144-170; Philip C.C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 32, 293; Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942*. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), 38-39, 42-43, 88-117, 120-157, 215, 243; Prasenjit Duara, “Elites and the Structures of Authority in the villages of North China, 1900-1949,” in Joseph Escherick and Mary Backus-Rankin, eds. *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 261-281; and Stephen Averill, “Local Elites and Communist Revolution in the Jiangxi hill Country, in Escherick and Rankin, eds., 282-304.

⁸ Timothy Cheek, “Mao, Revolutionary, and Memory,” in *A Critical Introduction to Mao*. Timothy Cheek ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13.

level the multitude of issues that rural workers and peasants faced in their daily lives (one facet of a larger “system of Maoism,” which was central to the dissertation’s first part).

Mao’s *intellectual adaptation* of Marxism-Leninism to fit the concrete conditions of the Chinese revolution brought to light for other would-be Maoists the primacy of creative application according to a revolution’s particular situation. Cambodian Paris Group members Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Hu Nim all engaged with Maoism in their economics dissertations. While these ideas ultimately failed when all three were politicians in Cambodia—Sihanouk’s repression forced them out of their ridings by 1967—they would engage with Maoism yet again as full-fledged guerrillas and, then, whence in power in 1975. José Maria Sison, too, engaged with Maoism in an effort to fit it to the Philippine movement’s present situation. His 1968 speech “Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party” and 1979 publication *Specific Characteristics of Our People’s War* shows how he sought to “Filipinize” Maoism in both theory and practice, with particular attention to the CPP political line (of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought) and its military strategy to resist Ferdinand Marcos (people’s war). Aidit, while not an avowed Maoist, also engaged with Mao’s works in his quest to “Indonesianize” Marxism-Leninism, which ultimately entailed a two-pronged united front strategy that took into account Indonesia’s socioeconomic and political situation without armed struggle as a centerpiece to PKI grand strategy.

The third and final component of Xi Jinping’s speech, China’s independence and its central role in continued adherence to *socialism with Chinese characteristics*, iterates some of Mao’s most important contributions during the “Yan’an Period” (1936-1948).⁹ Mao’s notions of self-reliance, or as Xi phrases it, to “follow our own path...to go our own way,” is intended to recall China’s uncompromising position vis-a-vis its own independence.¹⁰ Xi then quotes Mao directly: “‘Facts’ are all the things that exist objectively, ‘truth’ means their internal relations, that is, the laws governing them, and ‘to seek’ means to study.’ [Mao] also used the metaphor ‘shooting the arrow at the target,’ that is, we should shoot the ‘arrow’ of Marxism at the ‘target’ of China’s revolution, modernization drive, and reform.”¹¹ With this rhetorical homage, Xi

⁹ See Selden, *The Yanan Way*, 79-94, 121-136, 177; Arif Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 78-86; and Raymond F. Wylie, “Mao Zedong, Chen Po-ta and the ‘Sinification of Marxism,’” *The China Quarterly* 79, No. 1 (September 1979): 447-480.

¹⁰ Xi Jinping, “Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought,” 31.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 27, citing Mao Zedong, “Reform Our Study,” in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Volume III. English Edition*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 22. Xi paraphrases the original quote: “the relation between

reinforces the fact that to be practical, an ideology or idea requires concerted and careful application, which, consciously or unconsciously, brings to light the complex interplay of extant and foreign, universal and particular. This interplay is at the crux of the *normative adaptation* phase of *reception*. As the Cambodia, Philippine, and Indonesian case studies show, Communists sought to render Marxism-Leninism (and Maoism) congruent with contemporary norms in their respective polities, which entailed, in essence, making abstract terms and ideas transcendent by linking them to real-life grievances and concepts that their would-be constituents understood and on which they might mobilize. Leninist organizations like the CCP, CPK, CPP, and PKI combined charismatic-impersonal with status/ classificatory features, with each led by a charismatic leader who was able to oscillate between revolutionary commitments and the organization's need to recruit new members from a strata that orients itself culturally and socially along status (or traditional) lines.¹² Whether faint allusions to Buddhist norms in CPK slogans, recruitment of Catholic priests by the CPP in rural Philippines, or disavowing armed struggle and working alongside the ruling government in Indonesia, these radical intellectuals found ways to reach new groups of people in their larger efforts to create mass national Parties.

While only the cases of China and Cambodia provide us with examples of the *implementation* of Maoism in this dissertation, something must be said of this stage of our revised model (*reception, adaptation, implementation*). In both instances, the charismatic leader *consolidated* rule around himself and his thought, enacted sweeping *economic reconfigurations* to combat widening social inequality and post-independence issues of underdevelopment, and initiated drastic—and even cataclysmic—*social transformation* programs to crush potential enemies and salvage the so-called gains of the revolution. The China and Cambodian cases, this dissertation has found, fit neatly together, especially since Mao's *implementation* of his vision in Communist China influenced the CPK and its vision for Democratic Kampuchea (DK) so heavily. But as we found in our fifth chapter, the Cambodian case provides us with an example of *continuity with rupture*: Pol Pot *consolidated* rule around himself and his thought, but

Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese Revolution is the same as between the arrow and target... The arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to hit the target of the Chinese Revolution... If it was otherwise, would we want to study Marxism-Leninism?" Mao Zedong, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," (February 1941), in *Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, Volume VIII—From Rectification to Coalition Government, 1942-July 1945*. Stuart Schram and Timothy Cheek, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 25-26.

¹² See Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 13-14. See also Timothy Cheek, *Propaganda and Culture in Mao's China: Deng Tuo and the Intelligentsia*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 10-13.

eliminated his former Paris Group colleagues for even the slightest dissent to his policies; his *economic reconfiguration* program, the “Super” Great Leap Forward, never made an progress in industrializing DK, and instead focused entirely on aggressive agricultural cultivation; and his program of *social transformation*, which we know colloquially as *Year Zero*, sought to erase all prior history, non-Khmer ethnic peoples, and those who the Party deemed as “new people” or “Khmer Bodies with Vietnamese Minds” from DK. Thus, while the processes of *implementation* occurred in both the China and Cambodia cases, and the former case inspired the latter, the way that their *implementations* played out took on the characteristics and features of their respective leaders, whose charismatic personalities tempered their visions’ realization in actual policies.

Importantly, our expanded Saidian model has allowed us to see Maoism not in isolation, but as part of a dialectical process with encounters and experiences shaping how intellectuals received, practiced, and adapted it, and how and why they marshaled such *productions* into something that spoke to people beyond tight-knit intellectual circles. It has been this study’s assertion that our expanded Saidian model, though likely to receive more polishing through time, positions us well to track the genealogies of Maoism’s emergence outside China and to highlight how and why some ideas travel, are received, adapted, and implemented in some places, in certain ways, and produced the outcomes that have been under analysis. It has also allowed us to recognize social experiences and lived culture as moderating variables that help to explain why certain ideas emerge and where, as well as why those ideas took root among groups in crises. While the networked intellectuals under examination took different routes to their radicalization, and did not always engage Marxism-Leninism and/or *Maoism* in the same way, they nevertheless regarded it as worth engaging and, in some instances, embraced its core features. The processes of syntheses between cultural and political forms and theories from outside China, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, thus deserve considerable attention as we continue to explore the phenomenon of traveling ideas, especially radical ones, in eras of modernization/globalization.

To conclude, we return to Philip Kuhn’s findings regarding the origins of Hong Xiuquan’s (洪秀全, 1814-1864) Taiping vision. As Kuhn concludes, the “perfection of the ‘fit’” between the words of Liang A-fa and the nature of Hakka society was what ultimately led to the Taiping vision’s reception outside of Hong’s immediate social milieu, yet the “imperfection of

the ‘fit’” with Chinese culture, namely the novel Christian elements, initiated such a change.¹³ The same is true to some degree with Maoism, as radical intellectuals from Southeast Asia in our case studies engaged with Mao’s works, yet did not become full-fledged Mao advocates initially. It was when crises became so unavoidable, and their engagements with Mao ultimately failing, that Maoism became the shining beacon to guide Communist movements to state power. The “imperfection” of Maoism’s fit in their respective societies, too, prompted further engagement with Maoism, leading ultimately to significant *adaptation*, as we have seen even in Mao Zedong’s case with his engagement of Marxism-Leninism in the Chinese revolution. Thus, the “perfection” of Maoism’s fit to fill in the ideological and practical gaps for Southeast Asian radicals such as Pol Pot, Sison, and Aidit helped them to make sense of their own country’s plight at the hands of global capitalist exploitation and to recognize a shared situation across Third World nations. But as with the Taiping vision, it was that the imperfection of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism’ fit—its need to be *adapted practically* and *normatively*—that led to the *production* of new variants, whether Kampucheanized, Filipinized, or Indonesianized, according to the realities of their situations.

¹³ Philip Kuhn, “Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-Cultural Dimensions of a Chinese Rebellion,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, No. 3 (July 1977): 350-366, on page 366.

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