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Contents

Introduction

1. Why the *Orthos Logos?*[1]

The fundamental motivation behind my decision to focus on the *orthos logos* for my dissertation project is the importance, despite the remaining ambiguity, of this concept in Aristotle's ethical context, particularly the teachings from *Nicomachean Ethics*.[2] Said importance is characterized by Aristotle's belief, as he says in the second book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, that the *OL* can determine the right action and that this right action builds the characteristic state of ethical virtue. In other words, the right action is in accordance with the *OL*; the virtuous state is formed by performing virtue-like action, which is, I argue, one kind of right action. By virtue-like action, I do not mean action that comes from a virtuous state, but rather action which comes from imitating truly virtuous action. To this effect, the *OL* determines both right action and also ethical virtue through determining the virtue-like action.

According to Aristotle, this ethical quandary aims at generating "good" people who possess virtuous states and perform virtuous actions (*EN* II 2, 1103b26-34； II 6, 1106b36-1107a2). This makes the *OL* vital and decisive for his ethical framework as a whole, but what the *OL* really is remains elusive—not only because the concept of *logos* is ambiguous, but also because Aristotle seems to abandon the subject entirely partway through the inquiry. In Book II 2, he raises the question of what the *OL* is and

[1] I use *OL* as an abbreviation for *orthos logos* in this paper, but the abbreviation of *OL* does not imply that *OL* is an entity nor a thing. It seems also possible that *orthos* is simply a modification of *logos*. If the latter is the case, it would be possible for Aristotle to qualify the same *logos* differently in other passages: e.g., as *alethê* in 1139a22-6. The wording of line 1138b20, *ho logos ho orthos,* indicates that this latter interpretation is likely correct.

[2] In this project, I mainly focused on the *Nichomachean Ethics*, while other related passages in *Eudeimian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia* are relatively briefly discussed. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted, "ethics" refers to *Nicomachean Ethics.*

mentions the moral function of the *OL* several times afterwards, paying considerable attention to the concept. At the beginning of Book 6, there is a brief reiteration of the function of the *OL* and again a question regarding its definition: he tells us that he will discuss the *OL*, including its definition or limit (ὅρος) (*EN* VI 1, 1138b34), but goes on to focus on intellectual virtue rather than the *OL* throughout the sixth Book, thus failing to provide the complete definition of the *OL* as promised, (or at least failing to provide it straight-forwardly.)

What is the *OL*? Why and how can the *OL* determine right action and ethical virtue? To this day, the answers to these questions remain obscure. Indeed, if Aristotle himself has not answered them, the soundness of his ethical framework is threatened as it remains unclear how one can perform right action and build ethical virtue. If Aristotle does have an answer but does not give it to us directly, (as is my argument,) then it is our task not only to fully define the *OL*, but to determine why Aristotle did not explicitly do so.

2. The State of Research: A Brief Overview

For centuries, commentators have disputed the nature and the content of the *OL* without reaching a satisfactory solution. There are two basic standpoints from which scholars typically address this problem: Some believe that Aristotle failed to present us with the definition of the *OL* as he had originally planned, and so given the importance of the *OL*, that he also failed to build a consistent ethical framework;[3] the other standpoint, more optimistically, asserts that Aristotle does define the *OL* but only insofar as it can be extracted and reconstructed from his ethics.

One of the most influential interpretations of the latter approach was presented by Cook Wilson (1912). He classifies the *OL* under the faculty of reason, i.e., the principle of the soul. In this sense, the *OL* can guide other faculties of the human soul such as desire or feeling. Furthermore, through moral training, the *OL* shapes the veracity of the faculty, i.e., "right" reasoning, through which moral learners are

[3] Ackrill (1974), pp. 339-59, also in Rorty (1980), pp. 15-34; Tugendhat (1993), pp. 239-49. Thanks to Klaus Corcilius for pointing this out.

instructed in rationality. Lastly, the expression of the *OL* becomes the law that good people obey. As Cook Wilson says, "[the law] is not here thought of as a mere rule, but as a rule in which reason expresses itself, with the implied opposition of reason to desire and appetite."(1912, p. 116) Cook Wilson's view is that reason, as a faculty of the human soul, is the root of these other two meanings: namely, reasoning or the activity of the faculty, and the law, or the expression or production of the faculty. His view can as such be called the "faculty view" in general, (although his interpretation of the *OL* contains a broader sense than the pure rational faculty by encompassing the activity and product of the faculty, as well.)

Later commentators have developed multiple interpretations based on their critiques of Cook Wilson's view. There seems to be a general consensus among them that the *OL* should be an activity or product of the rational faculty of the human soul, rather than of the rational faculty itself.[4]

Nevertheless, this consensus contains intricate and complex differences within varying interpretations of the *OL*. There are two opposing groups (which criticize each other rather severely, in fact.) The first insists that *OL* is a correct exercise of the rational faculty, i.e., right deliberation or reasoning which is the activity of the rational faculty, which I refer to here as the "revised faculty view". The other group favors the *OL* as a universal formulation, i.e., a defining rule, moral principle, or law that is the result or product of reasoning or deliberation, which I call the "rule view". In short, the revised faculty view takes the *OL* as the right reasoning or deliberation, while the rule view takes the *OL* as a rule that results from the reasoning. Each group contains many prominent thinkers: in the former group, there are Dirlmeier (*richtige Planung*), Urmson (right reason), Ursula Wolf (*richtige Überlegung*), Carlo Natali (*retta ragione*), and Roger Crisp (right reason), while the latter group includes Grant

[4] Actually, it is hard to find anyone who classifies the *OL* purely as a rational faculty. The first scholar to be criticized as a faculty-view supporter was Cook Wilson, who considers the *OL* a combination of faculty, exercise of faculty, and virtue of this faculty rather than a pure faculty. I discuss this point in detail later in this thesis.

(right law), Burnet (right rule), Ross (right rule or principle), Gauthier/Jolif (*droite regle*), and Dorothea Frede (*richtiges Prinzip*), among others.[5]

Yet another interpretation has emerged within the past twenty years based on critique of the two interpretations above: some scholars are not content with the *OL* being conceptualized as a universal rule, and insist that the *OL* consists of the right propositions about morally particular situations, e.g., "doing this thing today with these friends is 'generous'." Gómez-Lobo (particular practical proposition or particular proposition) and Sarah Broadie (right prescription) are particularly representative of this view.[6] I call this the "particularist view," and in later chapters when referring to such a proposition about particular situation, I follow Gómez-Lobo's definition of "particular proposition." (I also use "proposition view" as a general term which integrates the rule view and particularist view.) Klaus Corcilius has also supported this way of thinking in terms of the *OL*, by arguing that it is simply a placeholder for a particular description of one's action in given situation, and delivers no normative information for the moral agent; he further states that his interpretation does not preclude the function of the rule from the *OL*.[7] A detailed analysis of these interpretations can be found in Chapter 2.

3. Outline by Chapters

My interpretation would express sympathy for the viewpoint that the *OL* is the right reasoning or deliberation. Unfortunately, those who hold this view have given us neither an adequate argument to support their interpretations, nor a strong response to those who insist that the *OL* is propositional. I must point out that the proposition view also plays a positive role in my interpretation, namely, I insist that we cannot make good deliberation and decision for a concrete action without good understanding and application of rule or proposition.

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[5] Irwin uses "right reason" in his translation, but later explains that he leaves it open to the reasoning or rule view. See Irwin (1985), p. 423. This list is not comprehensive. Cf. Taylor (2006), pp. 65-6, Moss (2014), p. 182.

[6] A similar interpretation had already been suggested by I. M. Crombie (1962), pp. 539-40*;* Gómez-Lobo, 1995, p. 15-21; Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe translate it as "correct prescription".

[7] Special thanks to Corcilius for letting me read and draw inspiration from his unpublished paper on this topic.

In order to more carefully examine the influence of different views on my own interpretation, I will divide my research into an examination of different moral stages: the virtue-acquiring stage (moral learning stage) and virtue-acquired stage (moral learned stage or morally mature stage.) To defend this methodology, I argue that these two moral stages exist in *EN*, and further, that because they exist, the *OL* might (or might appear to) be different things for moral agents at different stages. This established, it is reasonable that I probe the definition of *OL* according to these two moral stages.

This work is structured as follows. In Chapter 1, I will analyze several texts related to the *OL* taken from *EN*, *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*), and *Magna Moralia* (*MM*)[8] in order to present a general overview, (though as mentioned above, the discussion mainly focuses on the texts from *EN*.) The textual analysis accomplishes two main tasks in the first chapter: 1) Justifying my division of the two moral stages for inquiry into what the *OL* is, and 2) sketching the moral features of the *OL* and problems within possible interpretations of the *OL*. In respect to the first task, I will not only argue the existence of the two stages and that the *OL* plays different roles in each stage, but also argue that the *OL* appears to be different things for different moral agents in these two different stages, even though it is one thing per se. In respect to the second task, I go on to analyze the concept of the *orthos logos* as a whole as well as the *logos* related to the context of the *OL*; I argue that according to the texts examined, the concept of *logos* in the *OL* is philologically open to the interpretations of both the rule view and the reasoning view rather than being limited only to the proposition view, as is claimed by the scholars in the proposition group (both universal and particular). In short, Chapter 1 focuses primarily on philological work and textual analysis.

[8] The authenticity of these three books, especially the *MM*, has been very controversial. Here, because I focus my discussion on *EN* alone, I will avoid this disputation. My basic standpoint is that I accept the currently popular views that *EN* and *EE* are genuinely Aristotle's work, and leave the problem of the authenticity of *MM* open. My discussion on the texts from *EE* and *MM* supplies only supplementary and auxiliary functions to my study of the *OL* in *EN*. For a more detailed discussion, the reader may refer to Schleiermacher (1835), Sprengel (1841; 1843), Susemihl (1884), Jaeger (1923), von Arnim (1925), Dirlmeier (1983; 1984), Rowe (1971; 1983), Kenny (1978), and Cooper (1973).

In Chapter 2, I focus on presenting the main interpretations of the *OL* in detail. To better facilitate subsequent investigation, I present both the interpretations and the arguments for them simultaneously. This chapter, similar to Chapter 1, serves a preparatory and expository function in the dissertation.

The next task is to examine my interpretation in comparison with the two most notable previous interpretations, right reasoning and proposition (again, both universal and particular,) to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each. I discuss the two moral stages separately in Chapters 3 and 4, and ultimately argue that my interpretation not only philosophically lends stronger interpretative force and merits than the other two, but also contributes to a comprehensive and consistent reading of Aristotle's ethical framework.

In Chapter 3, I argue that the *OL* is, per se, one thing, i.e. rational deliberation or right practical syllogism, but that in the virtue-acquiring stage (especially early on) it appears as a series of propositions for the moral learner such as a set of rules, commands, or orders; it also can appear a particular proposition, namely only a piece of the syllogism (maybe the major premise or maybe the conclusion of syllogism of virtuous people.) These propositions can tell moral learners explicitly what they should do, as the learners are not capable initially of understanding the moral reasoning of "the practically wise man" (*phronimos*);[9] they have not grasped the "why". I will go on to argue that one's ability for moral reasoning grows as moral reasoning matures. By "the mature form of moral reasoning," I mean the moral reasoning of *phronimos*, or the man possessing practical wisdom. In the later phases of moral learning, moral reasoning develops into a relatively mature state but does not yet reach a fully virtuous state—moral reasoning becomes an important part of moral decision and judgment as the learner better understands the *phronimos* concept, or, in effect, the learner employs moral reasoning to make right decisions and judgments but only *occasionally*. To this effect, I also define this relatively mature form of moral reasoning in learners as the *OL* in a fairly loose sense.

[9] I use masculine gender only because it is a literal translation of the masculine Greek word *phronimos*; the concept is fully gender-inclusive.

I identify the *OL* in the virtue-acquired stage as the right deliberation generated by *phronesis* in the last chapter (Chapter 4). Similarly to Jessica Moss (2014), I insist that Aristotle's identification of *phronesis* and the *OL* is an overstatement (or, again, a loose expression). I argue that in the virtue-acquired stage, this identification refers in actuality to the activity of *phronesis* and the *OL*.

First, Aristotle defines *phronesis* as an intellectual virtue which renders man capable of "good" deliberation (*euboulia*) and as a state existing with true *logos*. The meaning of true *logos* is obviously very close to the right *logos,* so I take this as a distinct sign of the relationship between the *OL* and good deliberation.

Second, I argue that the function of deliberation, namely to find the means for the end, is the same as the function of the *OL*: to determine virtuous actions in concrete situations. Virtuous actions are the means to achieve the noble end of happiness, i.e., e*udaimonia*; these means are determined via deliberation under the guidance of the ultimate end and are prescribed by the *OL* as well. The *OL* works also under the guidance of this ultimate end in the form of a practical syllogism. The major premise is the formulation of the noble end, while the minor premise is the perceived particular elements (which share the middle term with the major premise.) The conclusion is the action which should be done in a given situation. This action, for the fully virtuous person, will actually and necessarily be done. The non-fully virtuous person may only be aware that the action is correct, but not complete it. This practical syllogism can be associated with good deliberation (at least in the virtue-acquired stage.) Aristotle himself makes this identification several times, in fact.

The good deliberation or practical syllogism cannot only fit the function of the *OL* to determine virtuous action, but also provide an explanatory account for the action. This latter function is also the *OL* of the fully virtuous person. The rule view, I argue, overemphasizes the major premise of the practical syllogism and pays insufficient attention to the particular elements of concrete actions. The particularists fail to provide an adequate explanation for why the correct action should be done. The major premise of the syllogism provides us a final cause for the correct action, and the

practical syllogism in its entirety also includes the importance of the particular knowledge of correct actions.

Moral leaners may be unable to understand the reasoning of fully virtuous people, because they do not yet understand the "why". A command, a particular proposition, or the conclusion of the syllogism is better candidates for the *OL* than the reasoning form. Once reaching the point where they desire to know the "why", then the reasoning form begins to play a substantial role in their continuing moral education process.

There are notable challenges I must address when identifying and associating good deliberation with the practical syllogism. First, Aristotle also states several times that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is the action itself, not the decision to act. Second, deliberation, however, is likely not the (only) activity involved in particular situations. To know how to act in a particular situation, one needs perception to provide information. For this reason, the particularists would deny that deliberation can be the *OL*. Moreover, the example given in *EN* III 8, 1117a 17-22 speaks of courage when in sudden danger, which suggests that there is little time or space for deliberation in certain situations. In view of these problems, I first argue that the decision of fully virtuous people will actually and necessarily lead to an action. In the sense the conclusion of practical syllogism and decision of good deliberation could be identified. Then I argue that perception cannot simply be understood as sense perception; rather, it is perception trained by deliberation and moral principles. This perception, then, is influenced by reason. I call this kind of perception "moral perception," while Aristotle sometimes calls it "practical *nous*" (*EN* VI 8, 1142a24). In short, I will prove that in the virtue-acquired stage, the *OL* is the right or good deliberation generated by *phronesis.*

Chapter 1: Textual Analysis

In this chapter, I analyze texts related to the *OL* in order to fulfill two tasks: 1) justifying my division of two moral stages for the inquiry into the essential definition of the *OL*, and 2) determining the moral features of the *OL* and problems with possible interpretations of the *OL*. These two tasks cannot be undertaken completely separately, as they are somewhat interwoven. I discuss several passages from *EN*, *EE*, and *MM* in this chapter, but as discussed above, I mainly focus on *EN*. The interpretation of each passage will unveil several unique features and questions concerning the *OL*: The discussion of the first two passages justifies my division of the investigation into two distinct moral stages, (which, again, I call the "virtue-acquiring stage" and the "virtue-acquired" stage.) The discussion of the remaining passages reinforces my argument.

1. The Division of Moral Stages

I would like to begin with some questions from the opening passage of *EN* II 2, where Aristotle mentions for the first time in this work that we should perform our actions according to the *OL*.

(Passage 1)[10]

Τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω—ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

[10] Passages in this dissertation are marked numerically for ease of reference. The Greek text, unless otherwise noted, is from Bywater's Oxford Classical Text (OCT); Susemihl's Text is also referenced.

> Now, that we must act according to the *orthos logos* is a common [principle] and must be assumed—it will be discussed later, i.e., both what it is, and how it is related to the other virtues.[11](1103b31-34)

This passage consists of two parts: In the first part, Aristotle tells us that acting according to the *OL* is a common belief; the second part isthe promise Aristotle made that he would inquire into the nature of the *OL* and its relationship to the other virtues, (e.g., courage, justice, etc.). While the two parts are easily identified, the first contains several unclear elements—for example, in what sense was acting according to the *OL* a common belief accepted by the Greeks or the Academy at that time?[12] Despite this common belief, do they know exactly what the *OL* is? Action according to the *OL* might simply be an action that follows a very general moral precept that was commonly accepted, or the *OL* could be the moral reasoning process of moral agents according to each particular moral situation, in which each agent's purpose in acting according to the *OL* could differ. Some would believe this kind of action worthy of taking because it would profit them or bring them honor, while others would perform the action in order to build a virtuous state, (such as performing courageous actions to build bravery.)

These considerations raise two main questions: 1) what kind of action is Aristotle talking about in the context of the quoted passage? 2) What is the *OL*? Aristotle answers the first question in terms of acquiring ethical virtue, (which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter,) but, as discussed above, he does not answer the second very clearly; it would be fair to say that he recognizes the importance of the investigation or need for clarification of the second question, however, as he does indeed include it. The primary goal of this dissertation is to uncover the answer to this second question.

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[11] All of the English translations in this thesis, unless otherwise noted, are from the Revised Oxford Text (ROT) with occasional small revisions; for example, in translating this passage, as there is no Greek word for the "principle", I placed it in brackets. I also will make no attempt to translate the *orthos logos* into English.

[12] Some scholars (e.g., Burnet and Broadie,) think that acting according to the *OL* was commonly accepted in the Academy, but the use of the *OL* actually exists much earlier than the Academy (Herodotus II xvii 1; VI liii 2; VI lxviii 1; Thucydides II lxi 2). Here, I consider the *OL* a widely accepted concept beyond the scope of the Academy.

In addition to these two questions, there is another unclear point in the second part of the passage. Aristotle questions not only what the *OL* is, but also how it is related to the other virtues (πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς.) We might then question the Greek use of πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, leading us to a third question: Does the Greek vocabulary, which Aristotle includes in his question, imply that the *OL* is also virtue, or is he simply using the Greek phrase (τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς) in a loose, colloquial sense, without suggesting that the *OL* is necessarily a virtue?

I'll begin by addressing the first question: What action is in accordance with the *OL*? In the larger context (and within the same page) of Passage 1, Aristotle discusses the manner in which virtue is acquired, arguing that it is done through habituation; in other words, that doing a good action frequently is the way to acquire the corresponding virtue. By frequently doing just actions, moral learners acquire the virtue of justice; by doing temperate actions, moral learners acquire the virtue of temperance (1105b4ff). Aristotle thus concludes that the state of character of moral learners arises from similar actions, and so that doing right actions is crucial for moral learners. Examining the right way to act, which can lead to the corresponding states of character, is necessary for moral growth. I call this kind of action "character-building action". In effect, the building of good states of character is indirectly, through the right actions, determined by the *OL* (τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.)

As mentioned above, the answer to the second question—what is the *OL*?—is the overarching aim of this thesis, but examining the third question may help to elucidate the second question. The focus of the argument regarding the third question is whether we can infer from the Greek phrase (πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς) that the *OL* is also a virtue. Those who favor interpreting the *OL* as a virtue (Cook Wilson, for example) connect any discussion on this third question with another passage, (which is marked here as "Passage 2".)

Analyzing Passage 2 at this point provides another important benefit: The analysis of Passages 1 and 2, in fact, allowed me to organize this inquiry into what the *OL* is into two sections according to each of the moral stages (again, the virtue-acquiring stage and virtue-acquired stage.) Through analyzing Passage 1, I concluded that the building of good states of character is done through right actions and determined by

the *OL* (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). If Passage 2 can inform us that the virtuous state is also determined by the *OL* and that this determination departs somewhat from the virtue-acquiring stage, then it would be reasonable to make two separate inquiries.

Passage 2, which is from *EN* VI 13, where Aristotle identifies the *OL* with *phronesis* in the background to ethical virtue:

(Passage 2)

Ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν.

For it is not merely the state in accordance with the *orthos logos*, but the state that implies the presence of the *orthos logos*, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is *orthos logos* about such matters. (1144b26-28)[13]

Aristotle emphasizes here that ethical virtue is a state that is not just in accordance with the *OL* (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), but also is present *with* the *OL* (μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου.) According to this perspective, Aristotle identifies the *OL* alongside the *phronesis*.

Interpreting this passage comes with essentially two main challenges: First, determining how to understand the different and progressive relationship between κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου; and second, determining how to interpret the separate identification of *OL* and *phronesis*.

The main task in approaching the first challenge seems to be undertaking philological work to explain the use of κατὰ and μετὰ in Aristotle's context. First, though, it is important to note that in Passage 2, Aristotle describes virtue as a state—not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, but also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. In Passage 1, Aristotle emphasizes that character-building action, which occurs mainly in the virtue-acquiring stage, is simply κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. It is clear that the *OL* is involved in two different moral stages, i.e., the virtue-acquiring stage and the

[13] The ROT renders the sentence ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν "the state that implies the presence of right reason." In the Greek text there is no word for "imply", rather simply the verb ἐστιν.

virtue-acquired stage, and that the *OL* plays different roles in each moral stage (or has a different relationship with the moral states in each stage.) Virtue-building action is simply κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, while the virtuous state is not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, but also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. This means that when moral learners have acquired virtue, the *OL* is not only followed as a learner follows an order, but rather the *OL* must be present, which suggests a closer relationship between the moral agent and the *OL* than that of order-taker and order-giver. By this "close relationship", the *OL* likely does not function as an external imperative, but rather has been internalized into the character of the moral agent. This observation may also shed light on the second difficulty (i.e., the distinction between the *OL* and *phronesis*,) which I discuss in detail in Chapter 4.

Here, however, I would like to focus on the philological clarification of the latter sentence of Passage 2: ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. This clarification will further justify my use of the two moral stages throughout this thesis.

The Revised Oxford Text (ROT) renders the sentence as, "practical wisdom is right reason about such matters." In this translation, the phrase περὶ τῶν τοιούτων seems to modify the word *logos*. The translation seems to imply that there are *logoi* regarding many different topics: *logoi* on mathematics, *logoi* on insects, *logoi* on stones, etc. Not every correct *logos* constitutes practical wisdom, but only the correct *logos* about certain things—presumably, the correct *logos* about human action.[14] When applying the *OL* to ethical matters, as I argued above, the prior sentence certainly implies two moral stages: the virtue-acquiring stage (which is simply κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον,) and virtue-acquired stage (which is also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου.) If it is reasonable to think that there are many *logoi* about different topics, it would also be reasonable to think

[14] Thanks for Jacob Rosen for pointing this out to me. This reading is a very natural reading, and is similar to those taken by other translators. I do not think this reading is incorrect, but it does create at least two disadvantages for me: First, Passage 1 only mentions the *OL* generally, but not the ethical *OL*, i.e., it seems that there is a "general" *OL* .If we apply the general *OL* to the mathematical domain, it becomes the *OL* on mathematics; if we put the general *OL* toward insects, it becomes the *OL* on insects. Aristotle does not explicitly give us this idea, however. Second, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων is the plural form, so if it refers to ethical matters, it does not occur in the former sentence, rather only the singular form of ἕξις or ἀρετή. We might as such say that it refers to virtuous human actions, which also is most likely correct, but not made explicitly clear by Aristotle himself.

that there are different right *logoi* about human actions or states in the different moral stages—namely, the *OL* on human actions and states in the virtue-acquiring stage and that on the virtue-acquired stage. It might be that in the virtue-acquired stage, the *OL* is identified with *phronesis* without qualification, while the same cannot be true of the virtue-acquiring stage. Therefore, it is reasonable to focus this discussion on these two moral stages.

In addition, ἐστιν in this passage does not necessarily imply identification without qualification, even for the virtue-acquired stage; the *OL* and *phronesis* may be identified simply due to their shared function in terms of the moral state in the virtue-acquired stage, as both are the formal cause of virtue. If they were not identified without qualification, we would continue to probe the exact definition of the *OL*. Additionally, in the virtue-acquiring stage, it would be reasonable to ask whether this identification still exists: If it does, would this identification exist in the exact same sense as in the virtue-acquired stage, or would it be different? If there is no identification at all in the virtue-acquiring stage, then what is the *OL* in the virtue-acquiring stage?

If I am right so far, the above questions allow me to reasonably conduct my research in the following manner: to provide an overview of the *OL* in the ethical context, to determine what the *OL* could be, and then to examine the *OL* from the separate contexts of the virtue-acquiring stage and the virtue-acquired stage. Aristotle's question—what is the *OL*?—can be re-formulated here, then, as the following question: What is the *OL* in the virtue-acquiring stage and what is it in the virtue-acquired stage?

2. Moral Features of the *Orthos Logos*

In the sections above, I established the motivation behind my research focus and explained how I have organized this thesis according to analysis of Passages 1 and 2. Now, we can proceed to gather as much information as possible about the *OL* to identify what the *OL* exactly is and what kind of moral features the *OL* has.

2.1. Πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς

The discussion on whether we can infer from the Greek phrase (πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς) that the *OL* is also a virtue (Section 1, p. 14), is a good place to begin, as Passage 1, where said question arises, is the first in which Aristotle mentions the *OL* and seems to give us essential information or implications about identifying the *OL*.

Cook Wilson and several eminent scholars[15] are quite confident that the *OL* here is a virtue, primarily because they think that the last portion of Passage 1 (καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς) implies that the *OL* is itself a virtue; the nouns on both sides of the "other" (ἄλλας) should be in the same category. Passage 2 then tells us that the *OL* is identical to *phronesis,* which is a virtue. Accordingly, Cook Wilson and other scholars identify the *OL* as a virtue, and that virtue is *phronesis*.

This conclusion is premature, however, and critics have been quick to respond to it. Wilson's arguments can be rather easily challenged in the context of the ancient world in general, and in Aristotle's texts in particular. First, this implication from language cannot even be taken as a serious argument because it reflects linguistic habits. A. R. Lord provides a few notable examples: "Homer speaks of Nausicaa and her 'other' serving maids, of Athena apart from the 'other' suitors; Xenophon says there was no grass nor any 'other' tree; and Plato says that Socrates has been careless of business, family affairs, military offices, public speaking and 'other' magistracies."[16] We often place a noun from a different category than the previous nouns after the word "other" as simply a colloquialism found in everyday speech. However, Lord is also aware that in this case, ἄλλας is used without any article, while Aristotle uses τὰς ἄλλας with an article in Passage 1. Clearly, Lord does not find this an insuperable difficulty and claims that the *OL* is the "right rule", but unfortunately, does not give us any further explanation.

Nevertheless, I think that Lord is quite correct. Variations in the "ἄλλος" article (accusative plural versus nominative singular,) with similar usage as that shown in

[15] Cook Wilson (1914), p. 114; Dirlmeier (1956), p. 298. Burnet (1914) brackets the words after ὑποκείσθω in Passage 1, in order to avoid the implication that the *orthos logos* is a virtue, pp. 79-80.

[16] A. R. Lord (1914), p. 1.

Lord's examples are found in works by Plato and other Greek writers. For example, Plato puts citizens and aliens together by phrasing it, "εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων" (*Gorgia*, 473 C); Xenophon puts hoplites together with other cavalries by saying, "τοὺς ἐν τῷ κατα λόγῳ ὁ πλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἱππέας" (*Hellenica*, 2. 4. 9).[17] It is also important to note that Aristotle himself does not explicitly define the term *logos* in his ethical works as "virtue", nor does he do so with the *OL*. The only passage that could plausibly be argued to imply that the *OL* is a virtue is Passage 2, where Aristotle identifies the *OL* with *phronesis*. This identification is not without qualification, howeve, it may be made only because they have the same function with regard to ethical virtue, as they make full virtue possible. Therefore, it is still not fully possible to determine whether the *OL* is a kind of virtue like *phronesis*, and as such, the two arguments that Cook Wilson provides are not adequate to prove that the *OL* is a virtue. The possibility of the *OL* as virtue is still left open, though, if we can prove that the use of ὁ ἄλλος in Aristotle's vocabulary consistently connects to the same categories.

I hope I have now provided the reader with a satisfying answer to the third question posed in Section 1 and a thorough discussion on Passage 1. Above, I also discussed very briefly the second difficulty inherent to Passage 2, i.e., how to separately identify the *OL* and *phronesis*. (Further discussion on this problem will be addressed in the detailed investigation of the two moral stages.) The first challenge in Passage 2, how to understand the difference and progressive relationship between κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, is the focus of the following subsection.

2.2. From κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον to μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου

Κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον literally means "according to the *OL,*" and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου means, "along with the *OL*." From the literal meaning alone, it is difficult to determine if it is a progressive relationship from κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον to μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, or, in other words, that μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου has a stronger meaning than κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. However, according to the context of Passage 2 and the above analysis of Passages 1 and 2, it is clear that μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου has a

[17] Many other examples are given by Raphael Kuhner & Friedrich Blass. *Ausführliche Grammatik Der Griechischen Sprache*, 3. Auflage.1966, Teil II, Erst Band, p. 275.

stronger meaning than κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, since Aristotle connects them specifically with "οὐ μόνον (not only)" and "ἀλλα (but also)". This is evident because Aristotle seems to demand more from the μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου than from κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, because the κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον represents the building of virtuous character, but the state of ethical virtue requires not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, but also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. The progressive relationship between these two phrases is acceptable here;[18] however, what does the progressive relationship of these two phrases refer to exactly?

Most scholars basically agree on the interpretation of this progressive relationship, with some slight differences; I agree with them. In terms of my specific argument, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον refers to the virtue-acquiring stage in Passage 1. Moral learners at this stage may merely have a basic idea of what is right and wrong (Burnyeat calls this basic knowing "the that",) without an understanding of what makes right and wrong (Burnyeat calls this "the why". I will discuss this distinction in detail in Chapter 3.) If the learner does not know "the why", he or she might perform character-building actions purely through a set of traditional precepts, moral rules, or any form of external instructions; the basic idea of right or wrong is not internalized. These external, prescriptive instructions could be the *OL*, but we cannot yet confirm that definition; this point will also be discussed further in Chapter 3.

It is essential to keep in mind, here, that moral learners perform their character-building actions without their own judgment of moral situations if they do not know "the that" or "the why" and only follow external instructions. Alternatively, then, moral learners who have acquired the "that" and "why" can indeed make correct decisions independently; but they may still perform wrong actions if their desires or emotions obscure the *OL*. Individuals at later stages of moral learning, namely those in the state μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, however, do not have this conflict between the *OL* and desire because the *OL* has integrated into the moral state. The result of the

[18] It is actually awidely accepted reading that μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου has a stronger meaning than κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (Dirlmeier (1956), pp. 472-3; Broadie/Rowe (2002), p. 383; Walter (1874), p. 145; Gottlieb (1994), pp. 275-90), so I consider this the traditional reading. J.A. Smith (1920) provides a non-traditional, and in effect, totally opposite reading of this point which was also accepted by Hardie (1968), pp. 236-9 and Irwin (1985), p. 349.

integration is harmony between the *OL* and desire.[19] In this harmonious state, a moral agent not only knows what the right action is, but also does what they know to be right without any inner conflict; by this I mean that the desireis to follow the *OL*, which is the state of ethical virtue. As Aristotle says in *EN* VI 2, "Moral excellence is a state concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true (τε τόν λόγον ἀληθῆ) and the desire right (καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν), if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts." (1139a22-6)

I will refrain from analyzing this complicated passage (or the concept of *prohairesis*) here, but do intend to show that for Aristotle, the virtuous state requires both parts: the *logos* and the desire to act in a right and consistent way. Aristotle thus admits that "continent" and "incontinent" people (*enkrates* and *akrates*) share the *OL* (1102b15). They know what is good and right, but their desire innately leads them toward doing wrong; ultimately, *akrates* gives in and acts unethically because his desire overcomes his reason, while *enkrates* acts ethically because his reason overcomes his desire. Neither *akrates* nor *enkrates* can be called virtuous, however, due to this inner conflict between right reason and unright desire.

I have now discussed the first difficulty of Passage 2, but the discussions above on Passages both 1 and 2 have still not brought us closer to a precise definition of the *OL*—it remains unclear whether the *OL* is a virtue, (i.e., *phronesis*,) or a set of moral rules, or whether the *OL* is the same or different in the virtue-acquiring stage compared to the virtue-acquired stage. It could be a set of moral rules in the virtue-acquiring stage which are then internalized as one entity, virtue, in the virtue-acquired stage. This possibility does not conflict with Aristotle's distinction of κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου; and if this is right for Aristotle, the *OL* is simply a placeholder for different things in different situations.

2.3. Ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ

Aristotle uses not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, but also ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ, ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει to express the fact that the *OL* determines the

[19] I provide a more comprehensive discussion on Aristotelian moral psychology in a Chapter 3, Section 2.

state of moral character. We may be able to glean more information from the precise usage of these phrases. In the definition of ethical virtue, for example, Aristotle more specifically states the relationship between ethical virtue and the *OL*.

(Passage 3)
Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν.

Virtue, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. (1106b36-1107a2)

In Passage 3, Aristotle does not expressly refer to the *orthos logos*, but instead simply to the *logos*; that said, it is widely accepted that *logos* here means *orthos logos*. (Passage 4, which can be found below, further confirms the identification between the *logos* in Passage 3 and the *OL*.) I will discuss this point later in this chapter in greater detail, but this statement of the identification justifies my focus on Passage 3 though it does not contain "the *orthos logos*" explicitly.

Returning to Passage 3: Aristotle tells us that to find the "mean" and "intermediate" is vital for ensuring virtuous states and virtuous actions; the *logos* determines the mean, which *phronimos* determines via the *logos*. It is important to note, here, that this interpretation is the result of two emendations of the manuscript from later commentators: First, where ὡρισμένη was emended as ὡρισμένῃ, and second, ὡς as ᾧ.[20] In the first emendation, if ὡρισμένη is utilized, the sentence means that state (ἕξις) is determined by the *logos*; if we use ὡρισμένῃ, the sentence indicates that the mean is (μεσότης). I would assert that either option may be correct, but that the middle state (μεσότης) to which ὡρισμένῃ refers gives us more specific information about virtue than the state in general (ἕξις), so ὡρισμένῃ seems to me better than ὡρισμένη. There is not much dispute about this emendation. The second emendation,

[20] Both of these emendations were made by both Alexander and Aspasius, and adopted by Bywater.

ὡς as ᾧ, however, seems less persuasive than the first.[21] Taking ᾧ here creates emphasis on the instrumental usage of the *logos* for *phronimos*, precisely, that *phronimos* determines the mean through or by the *logos*. If we take ὡς, conversely, the instrumental sense is much looser: *phronimos* determines the mean obliquely, or that *phronimos* determines the mean in the way of the *logos* determining the mean. According to this interpretation of ὡς, the *logos* is not necessarily the instrument of *phronimos*, but rather independent of the *phronimos*. Both options are reasonable. However, that which is preferable seems dependent upon the as-established meaning of the *logos* and the reader's understanding of *phronimos*.

So, Passage 3 tells us that the ethical virtue is a mean state (μεσότης) concerning choice, and that the *logos* can determine the mean (μεσότης). This implies that the *logos* serves as an ethical function for virtuous people, namely, that the *logos* can help the moral agent aim for the intermediate (μέσον) and avoid weakness in both actions and feelings; the *logos* tells the moral agent what is right to do as well as what is the appropriate reaction to his feelings.

In the remainder of this chapter, I address Aristotle's words in Passage 3 which tell us that the mean (μεσότης) is a consequence of the habitual choice of the intermediate (μέσον). A few lines before the Passage 3 Aristotle says: "Virtue (excellence) is a kind of mean, since it aims at what is intermediate," (1106b27-28). To be specific, it is the intermediate that is determined by the *logos*.[22] This creates two levels: 1) the first where the *OL* initially determines the intermediate of particular actions and feelings, and the mean state is built from frequently performing the right actions and

[21] Bywater and Burnet accept the ᾧ and Ross also brings this emendation into his translation, but many other scholars (e.g., Gomez-Lobo, Corcilius, Wilson in his early work,) prefer the ως. In the quoted translation of Passage 3, which is from Ross's revised translation of the ROT, "…by that principle by which…" replaces "…in the way in which…".

[22] Cf. Gomez-Lobo (1995), who asserts that both readings of ὡρισμένη and ὡρισμένῃ are unsatisfactory, claiming instead that the *logos* determines "the object of our choice or the intermediate relative to us" (pp. 16-7). I insist that it is more appropriate to say that the mean, rather than the intermediate, is determined by the *logos*. In the definition of "ethical virtue", Aristotle emphasizes the state of said virtue rather than one specific action that aims at the intermediate. The virtuous state is built by the frequent performance of good actions. Gomez-Lobo is not wrong, though, because if only actions that aim at the intermediate are determined by the *logos*, then the state of the mean that is built by these actions can yet be determined by the *logos*.

appropriate reactions. (Therefore, the mean state is also somewhat determined by the *logos*) and 2) a second after the mean state has been established, where the logos is internalized and incorporated into this virtuous state. The *logos* "determining" the intermediate means that the *logos* accompanies (or even is itself a part of) the virtuous state which drives the agent's particular actions and feelings in a given situation. Indeed, these two levels exactly correspond to the distinction between κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον and μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. In addition, the ethical function of the *logos* exists throughout both the virtue-acquiring stage and the virtue-acquired stage.

According to this normative force of the *logos*, many scholars have insisted that the *logos* should be translated und understood as a moral "rule", "principle", "norm", or even "plan". There are many very renowned names in this group, including Burnet (rule), Ross (rule or principle), Gauthier/Jolif (*regle*), Dirlmier (*Planung*), and others... I call this group the "rule-group" and their view the "rule-view". (I provide fairly cursory definitions of these viewpoints here, but will come back to analyze the rule-view and other varying interpretations in detail in Chapter 2.) In reference to the moral rule, the intermediate action can be made and the mean can be built accordingly; the moral rule is reached by the *phronimos* through deliberation, and then applied to a particular situation. The ultimate goal of the human search for happinessis best attained by virtuous actions, which aim for the intermediate between extremes, and these virtuous actions should follow such a rule.[23]

This does seem to be a promising interpretation. First, according to many in the rule-group and several other commentators,[24] the rule-view avoids the unresolved philological difficulty that continued to perplex Cook Wilson and others. (I will address this point in Chapter 2, as well.) Second, proponents of this rule-view (especially Ross and Gauthier/Jolif) are strongly influenced by Kantian moral theory, (which indeed has sizable influence on the history of philosophy as a whole.) Within such a wide and universal background, it seems rather easy to understand and accept the rule-view. Third, the rule-view simply aligns with common sense—our growth in

[23] Ross (1995), p. 229; plus a similar and even more subtle rule view espoused by Joachim (1951) in his influential commentary, p. 167.

[24] By "several other commentators," I mean mainly Gomez-Lobo and Corcilius.

moral capacity certainly takes place under the influence of many rules that have existed throughout the whole of history and across the globe (e.g., do not steal, do not kill.)

It is important to accept, before moving forward, that Aristotle's view might not be fully aligned with Kant's nor even be in accordance with common sense. The rule-view accordingly faces two major difficulties. First, Aristotle seems not to attach much importance to universal knowledge in ethical matters. A universal rule stated loosely is useless in a concrete moral situation (*EN* II 2, 1103b34-1104a11). Second, Aristotle does not explicitly or implicitly define the *OL* in terms of the rule or principle; rather, he defines it, (although with general lack of rigor,) as *phronesis,* an intellectual virtue.

In addition to these two difficulties, another issue is posed if placing the rule-view into question according to my two-stage theory. According to my argument, moral rules take effect in two types of people, namely, the moral learner and the *phronimos,* who has both ethical virtue and practical wisdom. The way that the rule takes effect in a person differs depending on which of the two stages he has reached, however: moral learners simply follow the rule, because they have neither yet developed decision-making skills or a firm internal foundation for performing virtuous actions—they are aware of "the that", but remain unable to possess "the why", and thus cannot aim at the intermediate by themselves. They build the mean state only according to consistently following the moral rule. *Phronimos*, on the contrary, does indeed cognize moral rules and apply and adjust them according to particular situations. According to this model, my question is how the moral learner can grow into *phronimos* simply through following moral rules: I'll call this the third difficulty.

Unfortunately, the rule-group seems to have failed to respond very effectively to these three difficulties despite their serious importance. Even if they can explain away these difficulties merely according to this normative force of the *logos*, it is still hasty to conclude that the meaning of the *logos* is "rule".

2.4. The σαφές Problem

We have now examined three important passages that inform us about the *OL,* but the precise definition of the *OL* remains elusive, again, as Aristotle does not give us a clear-cut definition. Another important passage, quoted at length below, can be found at the beginning of the sixth Book of the *Ethics*, where Aristotle reconsiders the question of the *OL* for the first time after posing it in *EN* II 2 (Passage 1).

(Passage 4)

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μη δὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. ἐνπάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπι τείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲνεὶ πεῖνο ὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ᾽ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.

Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates of (right) reason,[25] let us discuss this. In all the states we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who possesses reason looks, and heightens or relaxes (his activity) accordingly,[26] and there is a standard

[25] The ROT omits the translation of the word *orthos*, so I supplement it here.

[26] There is no word exactly corresponding to "his activity" in the Greek text. Most commentators (e.g., Grant, Burnet,) take this "activity" to be the kithara-player tuning the instrument; I agree that this is the most appropriate. Gauthier/Jolif take it as an archer metaphor, and Corcilius thinks both options are possible. I would apply Gomez-Lobo's critique on this point, in which he says: "In aiming at a target the bowman pulls back the string as far as possible whether the target lies close at hand or at a certain distance…. A weak shot is worthless" (1995), pp. 24-5.

> which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with right reason. But such a statement, though true, is by no means illuminating; for in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as right reason dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser—e.g. we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say 'all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art'. Hence it is necessary with regard to the states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it should be determined what right reason is and what is the standard that fixes it. (*EN* VI 1, 1138b18-34)

This passage again addresses the definition of "ethical virtue", as Aristotle tells us explicitly that the intermediate is determined by the *OL* (ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει.) At the same time, he emphasizes that just knowing to act according to the *OL* is a blank formula which must be filled in by real, significant content by *phronimos*. Aristotle's most famous example of this tells us that a patient just following doctor's orders does not master the art of medicine. At the end of Passage 4, Aristotle raises the question again, what is the *OL* and its *horos*?[27] This leads the reader to believe that Aristotle will discuss the definition of the *OL* below Passage 4, but he does not do so (again, at least not in any straight-forward manner,) instead leaping into the discussion of intellectual virtue. Only at the end of Book 6 does he identify the *OL* (exactly once) with *phronesis* in a limited sense. (I discussed this identification in Passage 2 as-quoted above.)

It is possible, I believe, to extend this question and answer to the entirety of Book 6 as an arrangement carefully planned by Aristotle instead of as a gap in information; in other words, Aristotle may precisely be delivering the answer to his question—what the *OL* is?—by insisting we understand what the *phronesis* is, and then by telling us

[27] Translators have different opinions on the meaning of this word. Some translate it as "definition", some as "mark". This will be discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3.

that the *OL* is *phronesis*. Basically, the word placement here suggests rather strongly that we should identify *phronesis* and *OL*.

Before we go so far, though, there are details in Passage 4 we should examine more carefully. At first, through Passage 4, the reader can fairly readily justify the *logos* in Passage 3 as the *OL*; to be specific, in Passage 4, the *OL* appears three times where Aristotle tells us that the intermediate is determined by the *OL* and once in form of the question, "what is the *OL*?" In addition to these instances, Aristotle also at one point uses *logos* simply, without *orthos*, in the phrase "the man who has the *logos*" (ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων). It is reasonable to extrapolate the *logos* in the phrase ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων to mean the *OL*, as the man who has this *logos* is said to be able to hit the moral "target" (τις σκοπὸς) through "heightening" or "relaxing". This target is the mark of the mean state (καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων), so this *logos* is related to the intermediate, or even determines the intermediate in the same manner as the *OL*. Indeed, the *logos* has the normative force that I called the "determining relationship" in Passage 3, so we can further confirm that the *logos* in Passage 3 is actually the *OL*.

There are two other details strongly deserving of the reader's attention in Passage 4 in terms of establishing the precise definition of the *OL*: The first concerns why the statement that knowing how to act according to the *OL* is a blank formula, i.e., that it is "not illuminating" (οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές)—I will call this the σαφές problem—and the second concerns the fact that Aristotle sometimes uses only *logos* to refer to the *OL* but occasionally explicitly uses the full phrase *orthos logos*. Does Aristotle mean that the *logos* itself contains the rightness, and that the *OL* is just a repetitive usage of the *logos*? Perhaps the *logos* is used by Aristotle shorthand for the *OL*, where only the *OL* has rightness while the *logos* itself is neutral (i.e., unable to determine right and wrong on its own), which I call the normative *logos* problem. The σαφές problem can be addressed solely through the text in Passage 4, but the normative *logos* problem can only be solved once we have determined the meaning of the *logos* in its ethical context. (Further discussion on this problem can be found in Chapters 3 and 4.)

In respect to the σαφές problem, let's first look at what follows the σαφές sentence. The γὰρ indicates that Aristotle himself explains the lack of σαφές. He says:

> καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προς φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων.
>
> for in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as right reason dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser—e.g. we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say 'all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art'.(1138a26-32)

Aristotle tells us here that in all other pursuits, not only in ethics, to say one is acting according to the *OL* is an empty (i.e., blank) formula. Some scholars infer from this σαφές problem that the *OL* must be a very specific proposition applied to any particular situation.[28] In the medicine example, as mentioned above, simply knowing that the doctor's orders are correct does not make one a doctor, though taking the medicine prescribed will heal one's illness; further, knowledge of medicine does not make the doctor a healer, but only successful application of said knowledge to heal patients. Other scholars believe that Aristotle does not tell us what the *OL* is, but rather tell us that there are many kinds of *OL*s (e.g., *OL* in the medical arts, *OL* in the theoretical domain, etc.,) that the ethical *OL* is but one of them,[29] and that the task of Book 6 is merely to separate the ethical *OL* from the other kinds of *OL*. Aristotle does not tell us what the ethical *OL* is, or maybe does not have to tell us, since we can or must appeal to the *phronimos* to determine how to act; the advice that *phronimos* provides is, then, the ethical *OL*. Similarly, within the medical domain, if one wants to be healed correctly one must appeal to the doctor, and the prescription the doctor gives is the medical *OL*.

[28] See Gomez-Lobo (1995), p. 26.

[29] E.g. Broadie/Rowe (2002), p. 359.

I believe the options mentioned above are all plausible, but not all are necessarily and directly supported by the passage. Consider the medical example again: for a patient, a concrete and particular prescription is the best *OL* for recovering health. If strictly interpreting the analogy between medical matters and ethical matters, then we can infer that the ethical *OL* given by *phronimos* is also very concrete and particular for a given moral situation. But we cannot ignore the fact that the prescription given by the doctor can be generated only if the doctor has been well trained. This means, presumably, that the doctor has possessed the systematic medical knowledge and enough healing experience. So the *OL* might be a complex of deliberative process which involves both universal and particular knowledge, when some patients would ask *why* they should take certain medicine (or certain actions,) and the doctor must give explanation why he gives such and such prescription.

By extension, moral learners might just simply follow a specific order of moral people. But they are essentially different from most patients, since moral learners desire to become moral people, while most patients do not want to be doctor at all. When moral agents have the best possible and most mature reasoning capacity, they would ask why they should perform such and such actions. The only way to convince them to take a certain action is to tell them "the because", not only "the that". The *OL* for them, then, is no longer the particular proposition preferable for describing the whole reasoning process involving both universal and particular knowledge.

There do naturally are subtle differences between ethical matters and medical matters that may influence the understanding of the ethical *OL*. We must, as such, keep asking what the differences are to maintain the analogy between medical matters and ethical matters and to distinguish the ethical *OL* from the medical *OL* appropriately. The text does not provide us with these answers, in other words, the σαφές problem still does not lead us to an accurate definition of the *OL*.

2.5. The *OL* in *Akrates* and *Enkrates*

In the seventh Book of the *EN*, the *OL*, sometimes only the *logos*, is set in opposition to appetite and feelings (pleasure) in the discussion of the *akrasia*. Aristotle

determines that in virtuous men, the *OL* and desire work harmoniously while in *enkrates*, appetite struggles with the *OL* but ultimately obeys it, and in the *akrates*, appetite disobeys the *OL* (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον).[30]

(Passage 5)

ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ

The universal opinion is present in us restraining us from tasting, and there is also the opinion that everything sweet is pleasant, and that this is sweet (now this is the opinion that is active,) and when appetite happens to be present in us, the one opinion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads us towards it (for it can move each of our bodily parts;) so that it turns out that a man behaves incontinently under the influence (in a sense) of reason and opinion, and of opinion not contrary in itself, but only incidentally—for the appetite is contrary not the opinion—to right reason. (1147a31-b3)

It is very difficult to understand and interpret the content of this passage, but it is quite clear that it provides the following set of syllogistic forms.

Form 1: We should restrain us from all sweet things,
This is sweet,
So I should not take this.

Form 2: All sweet things make us pleasant,
This is sweet,
So I want to take it.

[30] For other texts related to the *OL* see 1147b31, 1151a12, and many places only with *logos* that have likely the same meaning as *OL* (1145b14, 1151b10).

Facing this particular situation, the individual may reason in one of two different ways (potentially simultaneously,) namely "Form 1" and "Form 2". Form 1 involves loaded rational and correct guidance for the moral agent, and Form 2 shows where desire can force the agent to make the wrong decision. If one struggles to make the choice between the correct guidance (Form 1) and the desire (Form 2), but ultimately acts rationally, he is a "continent" person (*enkrates*) according to Aristotle; if he struggles but ultimately gives in to desire, he is "incontinent" (*akrates*). If he has no struggle (even though desire exists with the *OL*,) and directly and firmly follows the *OL*, he is virtuous. If he has no such correct guidance, but rather thinks that all sweet things are good to take and follows purely his desire, he is vicious.[31]

Different interpreters take different parts of Form 1 as the *OL*. The rule-view group assert that the universal rule is the *OL*; the particularists that the conclusion of Form 1 is the *OL*. Each standpoint has merits but also serious disadvantages, which I discuss at length in Chapter 2. Further, I argue that the complete Form 1 is the *OL* (see Chapters 3 and 4.)

2.6. Related Texts in *EE*

The general philosophical function of the *OL* in *EE* is the same as that in *EN*, namely, that *OL* determines right actions and virtuous states. 1222a9 is the first occurrence of the phrase in *EE*, where Aristotle defines virtue as state of character which causes man to perform the best possible actions. The virtuous state is the best state, a middle point between excess and deficiency relative to the agent and concerned with pleasure and pain. This best state and the best action which is generated by this state are in accordance with the *OL* (κατὰ τὸν λόγον). We see this passage paralleled in the virtue-definition passage in *EN* (Passage 3). A few lines later, in 1222b7, Aristotle repeats this point: the virtuous state is the middle state concerned with emotions neither in excess nor deficiency; this state is in accordance with the *OL*. In addition to this, Aristotle also raises the questions of what the *OL* is exactly and what its limit (ὅρος) is, which are essentially identical to the questions posed in Passage 4 from

[31] See also *EN* VII 8, 1151a7 "ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως) τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν".

EN.[32] The apparent difference here is that the *OL* is not as directly identified with *phronesis* as in the *EN*.

Other passages in *EE* are also quite deserving of our attention, particularly those where Aristotle does not use the *OL*, but instead simply *logos* (though the meaning in these cases is most likely the same as the *OL*,) as indeed these passages seem able to shed light on the meaning of the *OL*. Below, I analyze two passages from *EE* in effort to further support my argument.

(Passage 6)

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος.

For motion is continuous, and action is motion. In all cases the mean in relation to us is the best; for this is as knowledge and reason direct us. (1220b27-29)

This passage tells us also that the mean (*to meson*) relative to us is directed by *logos*. This information echoes the Passage 3 in *EN* discussed above, in that the logos here is presumably the same as the *OL*. But here Aristotle makes an interesting point by placing *logos* together with *knowledge* (ἡἐπιστήμη), suggesting that the *logos* and knowledge have the same function—to direct us toward the intermediate. The usage here implies that the *logos* is likely a product or deliverance of the reasoning process, in the same way that knowledge is the product of the *epismetikon* of our soul. If the function of reason is similar *de facto* to knowledge, we can expect that "reason" demands an "explanation". The entire syllogistic form can be perfectly loaded into this explanatory function, but constitutes only speculation based on the juxtaposed position of the concepts knowledge and *logos* in Passage 6. In short, we need further evidence to prove that *logos* contains the explanation for reason in the form of syllogistic process.

[32] Another similar usage of the *OL* in *EN* and *EE* is connected to the concept of *akrasia*, where the *OL* is opposed to the desire. In the virtuous man, the *OL* and the desire are in harmony, while in *akrates* and *enkrates*, desire does not cooperate or even works against the *OL* (παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). See *EN* VII 1, 1145b14; 3, 1147b1; 4, 1147b31; 8, 1151a12; 9, 1151b10; *EE* 1227b14-20.

The passage below also describes the *OL*'s function, this time only with the word "*logos*", which seems therein to mean an explanatory statement or articulated formulation:

> (P assage 7)
> ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει κατορθοῦσι, δῆλον. οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος [ἡ] φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί οὕτως πράττει, οἳ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ τί κατορθοῦσι.
>
> For that they do not succeed through wisdom is clear, for wisdom is not irrational but can give a reason why it acts as it does; but they could not say why they succeed. (1247a14-16)

This passage determines the *phronesis* is not irrational in contrasting with fortune (or desire, or gain,) but rather it is λόγον ἔχειν; this *logos* is the reason the agent completes the correct action at the present moment. Here, the phrase λόγον ἔχειν is used to characterise *phronesis*, fairly similarly to Passage 2 in the *EN*, where *phronesis* is identified with the *OL*. *Phronesis* in this *EE* passage contains the *logos* as an explanatory statement in regard to the moral agent's action.[33] This explanation can also exist in the form of a reasoning process or a syllogism, however, including statements or propositions related to the action.[34]

2.7. Related Text in *MM*

The way Aristotle characterizes the *OL* in *MM* seems somewhat different from that in the *EN* and the *EE*. The *OL* in *MM* is also connected to virtue and virtuous action, similar to the *EN* and *EE*, but it is not explicitly said to determine the intermediate between excess and deficiency[35]and is also not any more directly identified as belonging to the *phronesis* in relation to ethical virtue in *MM*.[36]

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[33] Cf. Sandra Peterson (1988), pp. 240-1.

[34] The parallel passage in *MM* 1207a2-5 seems to confirm the reasoning process view, where Aristotle uses *nous* and the *OL* together to contrast against fortune.

[35] Theseparallel passages are in *MM* I 9 and *EE* 1222b7; in the latter the *OL* appears, while in the former the *OL* does not appear.

[36] Cf. Richard Walzer (1929); G.C. Amstrong (1947).

There are, nevertheless, also many passages (most in Book II 6) which provide us similar information as *EE* and *EN*. Before we proceed to the particularly striking passages from *MM*, I'd like to briefly review the conceptual similarities in *OL* between *MM* and the other two books of ethics.

In many places in *MM* II 6, Aristotle discusses the *OL* in the context of pairs of concepts: namely *enkrates* and *akrates*, *akrates* and *akolastos*, *sophron* and *enkrates*, and *phronimos* and *akrates*. Both the *enkrates* and *akrates* have the *OL*, but only the *enkrates* obeys the *OL* while the *akrates* does not (ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὁ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγω ἀπειθῶν, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὁ πειθόμενος καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀγόμενος·1202a10-14). The *akolastos* (intemprate) does not possess the *OL* at all (ἔστι τοί νυν ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς ἀγαθὸν ἔχων τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα· ὁ δὲ ἀκόλαστος οὐκ ἔχει.1203a13-15). Both *enkrates* and the temperate have the *OL*, but the *enkrates* has a "bad appetite" (i.e., struggles with the *OL*,) while the intemperate does not (ἔστιν δὲ σώφρων ὁ μὴ ἔχων ἐπιθυμίας φαύλας τόν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ὁ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχων φαύλας τόν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν·1203b16-19). The *akrates* knows the *OL*, while the *phronimos* not only has knowledge of the *OL* but also uses it to understand his particular situation (ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοιοῦτος [τις] οἷος εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ διεψεῦσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος τοιοῦτος ὁ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ὀρθῷ ἕκαστα θεωρῶν. 1204a5-8) and to take the best action indicated by the *OL* (ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι οὐχ ᾧ ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος μόνον ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ᾧ καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον φαινόμενα βέλτιστα. 1204a11-12).

According to the discussion above, then, it is quite sensible to define the *OL* as "right deliberation", "right reasoning", or even "right planning". There are three main reasons which justify this conclusion: 1) Aristotle also explicitly ascribes deliberation to the incontinent *(akrates)* and the continent *(enkrate)* in *EN* in a way that functions identically to the *OL* here (1151a7). 2) It is more reasonable to say that the *OL* is the inner rational activity of soul, in contrast with the appetitive activity (i.e., desire) existing in the *akrates* and *enkrate* (but not in the intemperate at all,) than as an external principle or rule in these individuals, as the intemperate can also work under any formulation of such external rules or principles. 3) The *OL* is an instrument

phronimos uses to read particulars and prescribe best possible actions: A universal rule or principle can also be applied to the particular, not directly as an instrument, but rather through the instrument presumably via reasoning or deliberation. Accordingly, the candidate definition for *OL* here is "right reasoning" or "deliberation".[37] This is only a strong possibility, however, which cannot absolutely exclude other possible interpretations (e.g., the proposition view).

Next, let's examine someparticularly remarkable passages of *MM* which seem to say something different. The first passage, in which the *OL* appears for the first time in *MM*, puts the *OL* in contrast with natural impulse and natural virtue:

> (Passage 8)
> αἱ δὲ δὴ μετὰ λόγου οὖσαι τελέως ἀρεταί εἰσιν ἐπαινεταὶ ἐπιγινόμεναι. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ αὕτη ἡ ἄνευ λόγου χωριζομένη μὲν τοῦ λόγου μικρὰ καὶ ἀπολειπομένη τοῦ ἐπαιν εῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν προστιθεμένη τελείαν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀρετήν. διὸ καὶ συνεργεῖ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου ἡ φυσικὴ ὁρμὴ πρὸς ἀρετήν. οὐδ' αὖ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ πάνυ τελειοῦται τῷ εἶναι ἀρετὴ ἄνευ τῆς φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς. διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν λόγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅ φελος εἶναι πράττειν τὰ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια, μὴ εἰ δότα καὶ προαιρούμενον τῷ λόγῳ. διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔφη λόγον εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν τὰ καλά, τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ὀρθῶς μὲν οὐδ' οὗτοι. Πράξαι μὲν γὰρ ἄντις τὰ δίκαια προαιρέσει μὲν οὐδ εμιᾷ, οὐδὲ γνώσει τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλ' ὁρμῇ τινιὰ λόγῳ, ὀρθῶς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (λέγω δέ, ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς κελεύσειεν, οὕτως ἔπραξεν)· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ τοιαύτη πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐπαινετόν. ἀλλὰ βέλτιον, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν, τὸ μετὰ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὸ καλόν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐπαινετόν.
>
> Now, this natural excellence which is unaccompanied by reason, so long as it

[37] Another popular interpretation of the *OL*, namely the *OL* as the particular proposition of the practical syllogism, is also possible here, though grammatically awkward. (In addition, I systematically refute this position in a later chapter.)

> remains apart from reason, is of little account, and falls short of being praised, but when added to reason and choice, it makes complete excellence. Hence also the natural impulse to excellence co-operates with reason and is not apart from reason. Nor, on the other hand, are reason and choice quite completed as excellence without the natural impulse.
>
> Hence Socrates was not speaking correctly when he said that excellence was reason, thinking that it was no use doing brave and just acts, unless one did them from knowledge and rational choice. This was why he said that excellence was reason. Herein he was not right, but the men of the present day say better; for they say that excellence is doing what is good in accordance with right reason. Even they, indeed, are not right. For one might do what is just without any choice at all or knowledge of the good, but from an irrational impulse, and yet do this rightly and in accordance with right reason (I mean he may have acted in the way that right reason would command); but all the same, this sort of conduct does not merit praise. But it is better to say, according to our definition, that it is the accompaniment by reason of the impulse to good. For that is excellence and that is praiseworthy. (1198a4-a21)

Here, again, Aristotle connects the *OL* or *logos* to knowledge and rational choice, which function to direct the natural impulse and create complete virtue with the natural virtue. Indeed, *logos*, knowledge, and the rational choice are employed as quasi-synonyms by Aristotle. He criticises the Socratic identification between *logos* or knowledge and virtue, stating that *logos* and knowledge are necessary conditions for complete virtue, but alone are not sufficient; virtuous actions must take place in accordance with the *OL* (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). What is only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, however, is likewise insufficient. Virtuous action must also be done willingly and with rational choice (*prohairesis*) rather than simply from irrational impulse or ignorance κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

In summary, this passage insists that virtuous action can be done if and only if the agent has knowledge (i.e., *OL*) of the action, as well as the relevant particulars about

the situation, and choses to follow said knowledge/*OL* voluntarily or "prohairetically".

Within such context, the *OL* can be defined as the rational statement or explanation as to why the action is right and virtuous, which serves to persuade the agent against his irrational impulse. This statement or account very likely can exist in the form of a reasoning process into which the explanatory element is loaded. The emphasis on *prohairesis* tells us that moral agents understand the *OL* and deliberatively apply the *OL* into their particular situations, in other words, that the propositional deliberation on how and why to act itself *is* the *OL*.

The most salient formulation of the *OL* is articulated at the beginning of II 10:

> (Passage 9)
> Ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὀρθῶς πράττειν εἴρηται μέν, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δέ. ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν· ἀλλ' ἴσως ἄν τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν ἐρωτήσειεν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τί ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ ποῦ ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος; ἔστιν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὅταν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐνεργεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν. τότε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ἔσται κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.
>
> But about acting rightly in accordance with the excellences something indeed has been said, but not enough. For we said that it was acting in accordance with right reason. But possibly one might be ignorant as to this very point, and might ask, 'What is acting in accordance with right reason? And where is right reason'? To act, then, in accordance with right reason is when the irrational part of the soul does not prevent the rational from displaying its own activity. For then the action will be in accordance with right reason. (1208a5-a12)

After the *OL* is utilized to establish his theory of virtue at length in previous chapters, questions regarding what acting in accordance with the *OL* is and where the *OL* is, somewhat strangely, are reintroduced here by Aristotle. He seems to give an implicit answer to this question with an adverbial, temporal (or conditional) clause: When the

activity of the non-rational part of the soul does not impede rational activity, then the action is in accordance with the *OL*. In Aristotle's context, the action is issued by the non-rational part of the soul (e.g., desire, feeling) in tandem with the rational part, thought. When these two parts work in a right and harmonious condition, a virtuous action can be accomplished; this condition is described here as the antecedent of acting in accordance with the *OL*.

There are two possible readings of the definition of the *OL* as-provided in this passage: First, that the harmonious condition itself is the *OL*, and second, that the *OL* is the wider genus of this harmonious condition. The first is the most natural reading in this context, as it reflects the answer directly given after the question of what it is to act in accordance with the *OL* and where the *OL* is, i.e., acting in accordance with a harmonious state in one's soul. The second reading does not give an answer to this question, but rather only exhibits the harmonious state as the part of the *OL*, leaving no answer to the definition of the *OL* overall.

If the first reading is correct, the meaning of the *OL* in II 10 actually differs from the meaning of the *OL* in II 6.[38] In II 6, as discussed at length above, it is most likely that the *OL* means right reasoning or right deliberation standing in opposition to desire and feeling. (It is possible, though less likely, that it means a proposition, and not at all possible that it means any sort of state.) Yet in II 10, the *OL* is rather clearly defined as a harmonious state which includes not only rational activity but also desire, feeling, and obedience. If the entirety of this analysis is accurate, then we have created (at least) two different meanings for the *OL*. One possible rationalization for this is that these passages had different authors,[39] which is outside the scope of this thesis. Another possibility is that the first reading is completely fallacious—that the *OL* is something else in Aristotle's mind. Because the primary concern of this thesis is the *OL* problem in *EN*, and also due to the complexity of the authenticity and editorial problems of *MM*, my discussion of what the *OL* is in *MM*, (and especially in *MM* II

[38] A very similar viewpoint is held by Karl Bärthlein (1963), who insists the meaning of the *OL* is different in these two sources and defines the *OL* as an "*objektiv richtiges* (*und daher*: *maßgebendes*) *Verhältnis der Seelenteile zueinander*". He goes on to argue that the *logos* encompasses the meaning of the harmonious relationship between different parts of the soul, different classes of friends, *polis*, etc..

[39] Bärthlein (1963), for example, believes that II6 was written by another author.

10,) must end here.

In this chapter, I analyzed several pieces of text directly related to the *OL*. During said analysis, I also identified and justified my research method; namely, that I seek to define the *OL* at it exists at two different stages: the virtue-acquiring stage and the virtue-acquired stage. During the textual analysis, I also sketched the moral features of the *OL*, most importantly that the *OL* determines right action and ethical virtue. This definition reflects a two-fold demand in the moral agent: Finding, then reaching the intermediate of the action and feelings. The *OL* instructs moral agents what or how they ought to do in a given situation, while also regulating the agent's desire and feeling according to what is appropriate.

Aristotle's general formulations, such as κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ, and ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, do not make clear the manner in which the moral agent must determine right action and ethical virtue. Moreover, Aristotle himself emphasizes that merely knowing that one should act according to the *OL* is not whatsoever illuminating. He seems to imply that the moral agent is tasked with obtaining specialized knowledge for each particular situation; the question of how to synthesize this specialized knowledge remains open. Does this specialized knowledge exclude the reasoning view? Is this specialized knowledge a universal rule, or should it be tailored precisely to individual situations, (e.g., pay back debt to some particular person now and here, rather than pay back debt in general?)

It is a challenging endeavor indeed to determine whether *OL* is a virtue, a universal rule, or a particular proposition based solely on textual analysis.There is no satisfactory answer that will come readily. Scholars have kept the issue under debate for some time, and hold fast to their respective points of view. In the next chapter, I present the most notable interpretations of the *OL* and analyze various existing arguments regarding said interpretations in detail to provide the reader with sufficient background knowledge to understand my own interpretation.

Chapter 2: Primary Interpretations

In this chapter, I will present and analyze the main interpretations of the *OL*. The analysis of related texts in the first chapter should have effectively built a foundation for further examining these various interpretations and their respective arguments. I will focus on the four interpretations mentioned previously: 1) The *OL* as a rational faculty, an interpretation proffered by Cook Wilson; 2) the *OL* as a (set of) universal rule(s), which was developed based on criticism of Cook Wilson's interpretation; 3) the *OL* as a particular proposition, which was developed based on criticism of the rule view *and* the faculty view; and 4) the *OL* as rational activity qua piratical reasoning or deliberation, which is considered a revised version of the faculty view. These four interpretations do not exhaust all possible readings of the *OL*, however, they are likely the most influential interpretations (and further, they are the most closely related to my own interpretation.)

My interpretation is highly sympathetic to the revised faculty view, which makes it all the more important to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of these four interpretations. (I intend to ultimately prove that the revised faculty view is more advantageous than the other three.) In this chapter, I mainly examine the arguments dialectically to show the pros and cons of each argument and preliminarily establish the basis for my own, though I avoid introducing my doctrinal commitment to this examination too hastily; my own interpretation borrows several aspects of the proposition view, as discussed in detail after sufficient explanation in later chapters.

1. Cook Wilson's View

Wilson's interpretation of the *OL* heavily influenced later researchers on this topic. First, he asserts that the terms *OL* and *logos* refer to the same concept and that Aristotle uses them interchangeably, thus, that the *logos* and the *OL* both have

normative force. Cook Wilson explores three levels of meaning for the normative force.

He first argues that the *logos* (i.e., *OL*) can regulate the appetite or feeling. In this sense, the *logos* is the faculty of reason, which is the principle of the soul. The textual support he relies on for this argument is two passages from I 7, 13,[40] and especially the seventh Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle uses the *logos* and *OL* interchangeably.[41] Also pertinent is the text at VI 2, 1139a32, προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, which, Cook Wilson believes implicitly identifies *logos* with nous and *dianoia*. Second, in moral training, the *logos*/*OL* delivers rational instruction to the moral learner. In this sense, *logos*/*OL* means reasoning, or precisely, right reasoning, for which Cook Wilson cites *EN* X 9 as evidence.[42] Third, the *logos*/*OL* is described as the ordinance of reason or the expression of reason. We can call this "law", but this law, Cook Wilson says, "is not here thought of as a mere rule, but as a rule in which reason expresses itself, with the implied opposition of reason to desire and appetite." (1912, p. 116) The textual evidence for this level of meaning comes from 1180a21.[43] He hypostatizes *logos* into reason and anthropomorphizes reason itself, then proposes translating the *logos*/*OL* as personified Reason, which has the advantage of including all three levels of normative meanings.

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[40] I 7, 1098a4, ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ; I 13, 1102b14, τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ.

[41] For a few examples, see VII 3, 1147b1, ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ; 1145b14, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον; 1147b31,τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐναύ τοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς; 1151a12, ἐπεὶ δ' ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειντὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὃ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐ μετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὔ; 1151b10, οἳ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν.

[42] 1179b3, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς; I179b16, τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; b 23, ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει; b26, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν; 1180 a4, οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ; a10, τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν.

[43] ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.

Cook Wilson goes on to argue that there are many passages providing evidence of the use of personification, e.g., in VI 1, 1138b19 and VI 2, 1139a23, "*logos* or *orthos logos* is represented as speaking (the voice of Reason in us)"[44]; in VII 6, 1149a25 and X 9, 1179b26, "it is something listened to or disregarded"[45]; in I 13, 1102b14, "*logos* encourages like a person"[46]; and in III 5, 1114b29, 1119b11 and IV 5, 1125b33, "*logos* is represented as issuing commands."(1912, p. 114)[47] He concludes that "in all the passages reviewed *logos* means Reason in one of three senses: either 1) reason as the faculty of reason, or principle of reason in the soul, or 2) reason as reasoning, or 3) reason as what is reasonable, in the sense of the deliverance of reason—reason as ordaining the moral law, reasoning as inculcating it, or the moral law itself as a form of reason."(1912, p. 117)

Cook Wilson's argument is that reason qua faculty is a vehicle which interconnects the three normative aspects. The rational faculty can generate exercise or activity which creates a production, namely, an articulated formulation or expression of reasoning. His position is generally labelled the "faculty view" accordingly, although his interpretation certainly has a wider sense than the pure positing of a faculty. Based on his hypothesis of the identity shared between the *logos* and the *OL*, he unifies all three normative meanings of the *logos*/*OL* in his translation, the personified Reason.

This is very comprehensive and inclusive, but also very problematic thinking. As mentioned above, many later interpretations were borne from criticism of Cook Wilson's view. Before we proceed to a discussion on these criticisms, I have questions of my own regarding Cook Wilson's interpretation.

It creates a weak argument to judge the *logos* and *OL* according to merely the

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[44] *EN* VI 1, 1138b19, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει. VI 2, 1139a23, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν.

[45] VII 6, 1149a25, ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ; X 9, 1179b26, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν.

[46] I 13, 1102b14, τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ.

[47] III 5, 1114b29, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ; III 12, 1119b17, οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος; IV 5, 1125b35, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ. See Cook Wilson (1912), p. 114.

observation that Aristotle uses the terms interchangeably in several texts. Aristotle does not explicitly say that the *logos* itself has the same normative meaning as the *OL*. If they were the same, the phrase *orthos logos* would be redundant. Moreover, if they were the same, Aristotle would not have to repeat the question "What is the *OL*?" in the sixth book of the ethics, as he would have provided the answer beforehand by application of the *logos*. If the *logos* and the *OL* are not the same, then the many meanings specific to the *logos* cannot be directly ascribed to the *OL*; the *OL* would possibly have much narrower or even entirely different meaning than the *logos*.

Putting this puzzle temporarily aside, let us first look at commentators' criticism of Cook Wilson's view. It is important to note that these criticisms developed from selecting and modifying the three meanings discussed above.

2. Rule View

Just one year after Cook Wilson's paper was published many philological critiques of his interpretation were advanced by A. R. Lord (1914), J. Burnet (1914), and J. L. Stocks (1914). Among them, Stocks presented the most detailed argument against Cook Wilson's view, which he organized in two levels. First, he argues that the term "*logos*" cannot be taken to stand for reason as a part of the soul. Aristotle's expression for the human rational faculty is not *logos*, rather the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον, the part of the soul that has *logos*. Stocks insists that the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον implicitly denies the *logos* as a faculty, and further, that there is no list of "parts" or faculties of the soul in the works of Aristotle that contains the term *logos*; the word that Aristotle uses to refer to the rational faculty is *nous* rather than *logos*. (1914, p. 9)

Second, Stocks utilizes another piece of philological evidence to argue that the phrase ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ is the passive form of ὁρίζειν and that it is joined with a noun in the dative form. Stocks argues that a noun in the dative is never the defining faculty, judge, or legislator, but rather the standard, measure, or mark by which the definition

is affected.[48] Therefore, he concludes that *logos* in this context should be understood as a universal formulation, such as a defining rule, moral principle, or law.

These philological arguments create quite an attack on the faculty view. The arguments are also accepted by the proposition group, both universal and particular. Based on these arguments, scholars generally find it appropriate to refute the faculty view.[49] I agree that these are strong arguments from the philological standpoint, but I have two main points to make, here: 1) These philological arguments only attack Cook Wilson's first-level meaning, i.e., the *OL* as rational faculty, which is a principle of the soul, unrelated to the other two aspects of the meaning of the *OL* in his view. We might still successfully defend the *OL* as reasoning with some modification, (a point which will be further discussed in Section 5 of this Chapter.) 2) Though Lord and Stocks raise strong arguments against the faculty view, they do not present positive or systematic evidence to establish their position that the *OL* is a general rule.

Let us take a closer look at that second point, and explore a more systematic and coherent argument that has been established by other proponents of the rule view. Ross, the most well-known proponent of this view, states his position clearly and assertively through his translation. He translates the *OL* as the right rule or right principle, interchangeably. His translation remained influential for several decades in the 20th century, and thus merits discussion here. He emphasizes the *OL* as a universal rule "which our reasonable nature grasps for itself." (1923, p. 203) For Ross, every reasonable creature endowed with this right rule can overcome or subjugate inappropriate feelings and apply right rule to particular circumstances. A sense of duty drives the moral learner to follow and apply the rule. As Ross says that feelings should be thoroughly subjugated to the 'right rule' or to the sense of duty. It is obvious

[48] There is actually a similar philological argument raised by Lord about πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, which I discussed in Chapter 1.1.

[49] Gomez-Lobo: "I find it hard to believe that anyone would want to defend this position (Cook Wilson' position) today" p. 17; Corcilius: "This is unfortunate, since it seems to have been precisely (ignored) the insight into untenability of the faculty view that made scholars adopt the rule view in the first place." I will come back to this point later in this chapter.

that Ross' position is strongly influenced by Kantian moral theory,[50] in fact, this influence is so strong that Kantian moral theory seems to Ross to be self-evident. He does not make any effort to justify why Aristotle's *OL* has the same meaning as the Kantian sense, nor does he give us any detailed explanation as to why he translates the *OL* as the "right rule". Perhaps it is because he simply thinks that the Kantian background is clear enough for every reasonable creature to accept, or possibly, the rule view is the most consistent understanding for Ross of Aristotle's ethics; although he expresses awareness that Aristotle never explicitly defines the *OL* as a rule or principle, (rather once as the term of virtue, i.e., *phronesis*) Ross concludes as follows:

> The question propounded at the beginning of Book VI. —'what is the right rule'—has not been answered in so many words, but Aristotle's answer is now clear. The right rule is a rule reached by the deliberative analysis of the practically wise man, and telling him that the end of human life is to be best attained by certain actions which are intermediate between extremes. Obedience to such a rule is moral virtue. (1923, p. 229)

According to Ross, there are two crucial stages that the practically wise man must reach by the end of his life: The right rule through deliberative analysis, and the performance of virtuous actions through obedience to the rule. The logic would be simple here: by the end of our lives, we must perform virtuous actions, and to perform virtuous actions, we need the right rule to guide us. This right rule is reached through deliberative analysis, which indeed sounds very Aristotelian.

Deliberative analysis plays a key though somewhat vague role in the system Ross's proposes. There are two ways to approach the "rule reached by deliberation". The right rule can be reached by deliberation as a process of induction, namely, the rule is reached by amplified moral experience gained by living through concrete and

[50] There are other famous commentators who support this universal rule view and who are also highly influenced by Kantian moral theory, like the French commentators Gauthier and Jolif. They even endow this "rule" with Kantian meaning of Authority, "La regle està la fois ce quit permet de parvenir à la fin souhaitée et ce que s'impose avec autoritée." II 1, p. 149. Their argument is similar enough to Ross's that I will not discuss it separately here.

particular situations. "Rule reached by deliberation" could also mean that there are rules already in place, but that the application of rules depends on a larger goal, i.e., what kind of life one chooses to live. The right rule is reached by determining how to deftly and virtuously fulfil the larger goal, which takes place via deductive process. To which of these approaches does Ross refer, then?

We could raise another question outside of Ross's system, here. As both the acquiring and the applying of the rule require deliberative analysis, deliberative analysis itself would be sufficient for performing a virtuous action: So why do we need a rule at all? What kind of role does the rule play in Aristotle's ethics? Even if the rule view is an accurate reflection of Aristotle's mind, (or in a weaker sense, if Aristotle would reluctantly accept this role of the rule,) Ross's model should be further clarified to explain the origin of the right rule and the manner in which it cooperates with deliberation as-applied to particular situations. Basically, we need evidence that Aristotle needs such a universal rule in his ethics.

The rule view faces two sizeable challenges in this regard: 1) Aristotle seems to play down the role of the universal proposition since it cannot be precisely applied to particular situations, and 2) Aristotle does not define the *OL* in terms of "rule," rather he does so in terms of "virtue." If we take the rule view, we also risk an inconsistent interpretation of the sixth book of the *Ethics*. At the end of the first chapter of *EN* VI, Aristotle re-asks the question regarding the exact nature of the *OL* and its limit; in the other chapters, he discusses intellectual virtue and defines the *OL* as one of the intellectual virtues, i.e., *phronesis* in the last chapter. If we take the *OL* as a rule, there would be a gap between the first chapter and the other chapters of Book Six.

In response to the second challenge, certain proponents of the rule view (e.g., Gauthier and Jolif) take the first chapter of Book Six as an insertion.[51] This is quite a radical treatment, since it is difficult to find evidence from the manuscript to support it. Even if we take the first chapter as an insertion and consider the rule view to be correct, we would still ask why Aristotle does not mention the terms of the "rule"

[51] "Les sections 1138b14-34 et 1138b35-1139a3 sont juxtaposes sans qu'il y ait dans l'une un seul mot qui fasse allusion a l'autre." II 2, p. 440.

while defining *OL* as *phronesis* in Book Six. Basically, forcing the rule view to accommodate the identification between the *OL* and *phronesis* is a challenging endeavor.

Despite the challenges, there are certain eminent scholars (e.g., Dorothea Frede) who continue to defend the rule view as of today. My own interpretation does include some defense of the rule view, as discussed in the next two chapters. Before I begin defending the rule view in earnest, however, I would like to introduce other interpretations of the *OL*.

Many other scholars have either returned to revise the faculty view to take the *OL* as the exercise of the rational faculty, i.e., right reasoning or right deliberation, or have modified the rule view to assert that the *OL* is not a universal statement but a correct prescription or a particular proposition.[52] In the former group, we have Urmson, Pakaluk, Dirlmeier, Ursula Wolf, Carlo Natali, and Roger Crisp; the latter group, which represents what I call the "paticularist view", is associated with the names Broadie, Rowe, and Gómez-Lobo. This latter group actually includes two different interpretations, namely Broadie's and Gómez-Lobo's, which are highly complex and somewhat challenging to explain.

A quick note as to why I merge the latter group into one category though they actually contain very different interpretations: I do so simply on the grounds that they mutually define the *OL* as a type of proposition, and that they reject the faculty view for similar reasons. They accept the philological arguments used by the rule group to attack Cook Wilson's view, and yet are not satisfied with the positive proposals of the rule view in general. I discuss Broadie's and Gómez-Lobo's arguments separately below.

3. Particularist View

Broadie and Rowe translate the *OL* as a correct prescription; however, it is not

[52] The criticism of the rule view, especially the Kantian deontological version, was initiated by Anscombe in the late 1950s.

obvious how we should understand this "prescription." They claim that "rule is inappropriate, since the *orthos logos* operates in particular situations, and Aristotle does not think that knowing just what to do in a particular situation is given to us by rules." They also reject the translation "right reason," which they find misleading; instead, they assert that the *logos* here means "a product of reasoning such as a formula or articulate declaration."(2002, p. 297) We can thus determine that the "prescription" is a formula or articulate declaration that should be relevant to particular situations, but it remains unclear whether the universal rule has any relation to (or even makes any active contribution to) generating this prescription applied to any particular situation.

When Broadie and Rowe discuss the purpose of the first chapter of the sixth Book, they find that the *OL* is used by Aristotle as a generic term; namely, there are many *orthoi logoi* for different manner of domains, e.g., *logoi* for *techne*, *logoi* for *Sophia, logoi* for ethical matters, and so on. They argue that the task of Book Six is not to define the *OL* as something to guide us very specifically through particular situations, but rather to single out the ethical *OL* among a number of ethical and non-ethical *logoi*. According to this reading, the task of Book Six is simply to determine the difference between *phronesis* (which is always associated with ethical virtue) and other forms of intellectual virtue, e.g., *techne*, *sophia*. This reading rather elegantly solves the main problem the rule group grapples with, namely, the gap between the first chapter and the other chapters of Book Six, while avoiding the philological disadvantages of the faculty view. Despite these merits, however, there are two urgent questions raised by this interpretation. 1) What really is the essence that Aristotle intends to attribute to the *OL* in the sixth Book? And 2) how can we determine the intermediate in a particular situation with such an ethical *OL*? These questions are not totally independent of each other: the answer to the first question might imply somewhat the answer to the second, namely to know what the *OL* is might also, more or less, tell us its function, and the answer to the second might also shed light on what the ethical *OL* is. Both questions concern our understanding of the sixth Book.

In respect to the first question, it might be correct that there are many sorts of *OL*, although Aristotle does not say so explicitly. It is not fair to assume that Aristotle has

placed the ethical *OL* into other kinds of *OL* in Book Six, however. First, the first chapter of this Book leaves us with the impression that Aristotle connects the *OL* with ethical virtue and probes the definition of this particular *OL*, therefore, this *OL* must refer to the *OL* in the ethical field (or the ethical *OL*) rather than the *OL* in general. Moreover, in this central book, Aristotle seems to endow *phronesis* with overwhelming importance among other intellectual virtues. Book Six is rife with discussion of the *phronesis* and Book Six is where Aristotle naturally bounds *phronesis* only with ethical virtue. Indeed, the entirety of Book Six seems to focus on the question of what the ethical *OL* is, and then states that the answer is *phronesis* or something closely related to *phronesis*. Broadie and Rowe's reading is not fair considering the emphasis of the ethical *OL* and its relation to *phronesis* in the sixth Book.

Broadie herself might be aware of the problematic nature of her argument, as she seems to defend her interpretation by replying to the second question. In her influential book *Ethics with Aristotle*, she tells us that in order to acquire the right advice for the right action, a moral agent should appeal to the *phronimos*, a man who possesses the practical wisdom, just as an ill person should refer to his physician in order to cure his illness; that said, the type of physician a patient should appeal to depends on what type of disease he has. A medical specialist can offer the right treatment and right prescription only to treat a disease with which she is familiar. Similarly, in ethical matters, there is a specific kind of person who can give the right prescription to the moral agent according to every particular (type of) situation. This person is the *phronimos* who has the right ethical type of *orthoi logoi*, and the moral agent should consult *phronimos* for specific advice. Broadie says:

> …if anyone seeks from the ethical philosopher advice about how to make every decision, the latter is under no obligation to reply to him on this level (in this case, not because it is not his business or he is not trained, but because, as Aristotle has said, no one can give effective guidance of that sort); but he ought to be able to say something informative about the kind of person one should go to for advice—not about all decisions in the abstract, but about this or that particular problem. The kind which the philosopher should be able to

> characterize is, of course, the person of practical wisdom, who is Aristotle's subject in *NE* VI, being the embodiment of the uniquely ethical type of *orthos logos.*(1994, p. 189)

We might understand why Broadie and Rowe translate the *OL* as "right prescription" according to the argument that it is similar to a prescription handed down to an ill person by a physician: In an ethical quandary, it is a prescription that *phronimos* gives to the moral learner. When the moral learner has acquired the ethical virtue, he becomes *phronimos* according to Aristotle. *Phronimos* can then issue himself prescriptions as necessary.

Even armed with this definition of "ethical prescription", the *right* prescription still remains somewhat obscure. Is right ethical prescription relevant to a particular situation itself articulated in the form of universal or particular proposition? Or what is the form of the *OL* which is generated by *phronimos* for a particular situation?

In light of the physician-prescription analogy, the ethically right prescription that is relevant to a particular situation might likewise be particular: Like a medical prescription, it simply tells you what kind of medicine you should take for a particular sickness at a particular time. In ethical matters, the prescription might just tell you to do "this" or "that" at a particular time and place, without necessarily explaining to you "why". Instead, the why is grasped only by the *phronimos,* the one who can issue the particular ethical prescription. Accordingly, the ethical *OL* is the general name for numerous particular and concrete prescriptions.

But let us consider more details of this analogy between medical and ethical domain. Assume that the doctor himself is sick and he wants and is aslo able to cure himself. Is his medical *OL* is simply a particular prescription? Here we might agree that the reasoning or deliberative form is probalbly involved in his prescription-given process. This process would be a reasoning process combining the universal and particular knowledge. In ancient medical society, both Hippocraticus and his opponents reached the agreement that a general theory of human (body) nature is important and

necessary for adapting the therapy to peculiar cases.[53] So why could not the whole reasoning process involving both universal and particular knowledge be the real ethical *OL* for the doctor? It seems more reasonal to take the *OL* as the reasoning form than other candidates in the doctor. In the practical domain, it is, on the one hand, the same as the ancient medical domain, the *OL* of *phronimos* could also be proven as a reasoning form involving both universal and particular knowledge. And moral learners, on the other hand, in contrast with patients, might not only follow the prescription of *phronimos* to do right action, but also want to be *phronimoi*. Most patients follow the prescripiton of doctor only for the sake of being cured, but not for the sake of being doctor. In order to become *phronimoi*, moral learners would reflectively ask phronimos why they should do this or that. During the process of seeking why, moral leaners would grasp the morally universal knowledge or rules, (I will argue in next chapters that there are rules playing important role in Aristotle's ethical frame work), to help them to biuld their moral state. So even for moral learners, there is reasoning form actively engaged in and even decisive for the performance of moral action. Why could not we legitimately determine the *OL* as a right reasoning form which involves both particular and universal knowledge?

So Broadie and Rowe's reading requires some clarification despite its avoidance of the problems inherent to both the faculty view and rule view. By contrast, Gómez-Lobo does directly state that the *OL* is a particular proposition and that a universal rule plays no role in determining the right action in a particular situation. There are three main points to his argument which are worth examining separately.

1) Aristotle declares that the mean is relative to the agent and also to the time of the action, the objects involved, the people affected, the motive adopted, the mode of the action, and other factors (*EN* II 6, 1106b21-22). Aristotle seems to "have ruled out a general principle or norm as the candidate of the *OL*."[54] One may react differently to different circumstances, i.e., each individual agent handles the same circumstances in

[53] For more on the disputes in ancient medical society, see Mark J. Schiefsky (2005), pp. 11-3.

[54] From the relativity of mean to the agent, it seems to follow that Aristotle adopts some form of moral relativism since different people would have different standards to make their decisions. But Gómez-Lobo does not think that is so. Gómez-Lobo (1995), pp. 17-8.

his or her own way. If there were rules for each set of circumstances, the rules would be excessively complex as they would involve multiple quantifications over a larger set of variables; they would thus be entirely useless in terms of particular actions. Gómez-Lobo claims, "There are, at most, vague pieces of advice" which are helpful to find the intermediate.[55] He claims this practical advice, however, "can be applied only after the intermediate has been determined. Hence, it cannot be taken as an example of the *logos* used for its determination."[56] Because the intermediate as-determined by the *OL* should be precise, and only the *OL* itself is a precisely particular proposition, then the intermediate can also be precise. Therefore, the *OL*, in Gómez-Lobo's opinion, is a particular proposition. The supporting evidence for this point is taken from Aristotle's example of the intake of food:

> If ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds, for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little for Milo [the huge Sicilian wrestler], too much for the beginner in athletic exercise. (*EN* II 6, 1106a 36-b4)

It would be ineffective for a trainer to provide a range of choices to a particular person in a particular set of circumstances; rather, he must give "only one correct amount or reason for a given individual in the particular context of choice."[57] Thus, Gómez-Lobo suggests that the *OL* is a particular practical proposition that identifies the means to be chosen for given circumstances. He gives us an illustration of this: In the case of the trainer, the *OL* would say that "four pounds [for example] is the appropriate amount for you given the circumstances, your physical constitution, etc."[58]

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[55] The text that Gomez-Lobo uses is the *EN* II 9, 1109b1-7: "But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent."

[56] Ibid., p. 18.

[57] Ibid., p. 21.

[58] Ibid., p. 21.

2) His interpretation is strengthened through the discussion of the term ὅρος. In the opening passage of Book Six (which I have quoted in Chapter 1 and marked "Passage 4",) Aristotle connects this term with the question of what the *OL* is, i.e., τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος. Literally, it is simply a genitive form, namely, the ὅρος of the *OL*. Scholars have made several different interpretations of this genitive form, however. Ross takes it to be "the standard that fixes *orthos logos*"; Irwin renders it the "definition" of the *OL*. Gómez-Lobo argues that either the "standard" or "definition" is a universal formulation that is useless to the particular situation, and takes the original meaning of ὅρος ("limit" or "boundary mark"), which is particular.[59] Moreover, he understands this genitive form not as "definition" or "standard" of the *OL*, but rather that the *OL* determines the ὅρος.[60] He uses a similar argument as the one described above. Because the ὅρος is a particular mark that is determined by the *OL*, only if the *OL* is a particular proposition can the particular ὅρος be determined. Therefore, the *OL* is a particular proposition. The examples of physical training and medicine can again be applied here, where the *OL* uttered in the particular case by the trainer or the physician establishes limitations beyond which or below which exercise and food would be excessive or insufficient, respectively. The *OL*, the particular practical proposition conceived by the trainer or physician, thus determines the ὅρος or boundary mark for a proper choice. Since the limit is strictly particular, it explains why Aristotle says that 'it is true, but not clear' (1138b25-26). It is true that we should look for the ὅρος, but it would be different in every particular case, so it is not clear what it is.

3) The path of the third argument made by Gómez-Lobo is similar to the former, and focuses on the passage where Aristotle mentions that practical wisdom is not only concerned with the universal, but also with the particular (*EN* VI 7. 1141b15). Gómez-Lobo asserts that the intermediate action is particular, and the task of practical wisdom is to deal with particulars. Practical wisdom operates in ethical virtue to identify the right action, and in order to do this, the practical wisdom must issue a particular proposition: the *OL*.

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[59] A brief overview about the translation of this term: Grant renders it "law"; Gauthier and Jolif "standard"; Broadie and Rowe "mark"; Dirlmeier "*Grenzmark*"; Rowe "criterion"; and Sandra Peterson "limit".

[60] This reading is also suggested by Sandra Peterson.

Gómez-Lobo's three arguments can be combined and summarized as follows: The intermediate that is determined by the *OL* is particular, and only if the *OL* is a particular proposition can the intermediate be precisely determined; thus the *OL* is a particular proposition.

This argument is quite monotonous. Gómez-Lobo refuses the faculty view by making his philological argument and rejects the rule view by insisting that the intermediate is particular. The rule group also recognizes that the intermediate is particular, and they also realize that the rule should be applied and adjusted for particular situations. Thus, any critique of the rule view cannot simply focus on the particular intermediate, as Gómez-Lobo does, but rather should focus on the shortages of the rule view itself, namely, the two challenges I mentioned above: 1) Aristotle plays down the universal knowledge many times, and 2) that Aristotle never defines the *OL* in terms of the "rule," rather in terms of virtue, (albeit in a weak sense.)

Basing his interpretation on the studies established by above mentioned particularlists, Klaus Corcilius provides us much more insightful argument to support the particularist view of the *OL*.

In view of the moral function of the *OL*, namely finding out the intermediate of the feelings and actions in each given particular situation, Corcilius argues that if and only if the *OL* is a right, particular proposition which can describe all the relevant information in a given situation, then this particular proposition meets the conditions that Aristotle endows to the *OL*. Moreover, he argues that in respect to such a particular proposition, it is difficult accurately portray it according to any form or content under Aristotle's description of the *OL*. Therefore, the *OL* is "a placeholder for a true proposition descriptive of the morally relevant particular circumstance of a given situation."[61] Furthermore, he argues that this description of the *OL* leaves room to articulate something more interesting for Aristotle's moral philosophy in general; with such a placeholder, moral virtue can directly connect to human feeling. Moral virtue with such a placeholder brings the feelings under control as necessary, and

[61] Corcilius (unpublished), p. 19.

allows reaction through said feeling in an appropriate manner when faced with a particular situation.

This interpretation makes the clear-cut claim that "Aristotle is not interested in making general normative statements. Nor is he interested in explaining to us why we ought to do."[62] I do agree that Aristotle's main interest is not to propose general statements in his ethical works, but I would not go so far as to deny the positive role of the general statements in explaining that actions ought to fall under Aristotle's ethical teachings. If some sort of explanation is required by Aristotle, maybe the *OL* simply qua a descriptive proposition would be open to dispute. I will discuss this point in the final two chapters of this thesis, and express my own opinions (and solutions to these problems) there.

The particularists' critiques of the rule view attempt to solve problems with the rule view, but said critiques are not entirely fair to the rule view. I believe that rules do play an important role for Aristotle. In order to defend this position, I will re-examine the particularists' challenges to the value of general knowledge, namely, the lack of exactness in particular situations. This does not mean that the universal rule is useless, or less important than a particular proposition like "four pounds [for example] is the appropriate amount for you given the circumstances, your physical constitution..." If the trainer and physician do not provide any universal guidance, how can they possess the knowledge that they impart in order to teach and prescribe? Admittedly, all trainers and physicians are educated by means of general knowledge of human nature even in antiquity; they apply this general knowledge to particular cases. The general knowledge, while being adapted to particular cases, is also transferred into (a set of) particular propositions or prescriptions, and only the particular proposition is directly useful for the particular situation. If this is the case, what is the standard to determine the universal rule or the particular proposition as the *OL* at all? Which argument should be given priority? (I will come back to this point in Chapters Three and Four.)

With respect to the argument established by both the universal and particular proposition groups, there is one main proposition to consider. The philological

[62] Ibid., p. 20.

argument that is established by the rule group is also accepted by the critics of the rule view, and so it seems to the proposition group that philological arguments condemn the faculty view to obsolescence. Many scholars have returned to the faculty view, however, forming what I call the "revised faculty view".

4. Revised Faculty View

So what exactly is the revised faculty view, and how does it differ from the faculty view or Cook Wilson's view? I would first like to explain my definition of "revised faculty view". Proponents of this view maintain a very similar position to Wilson's and adopt some of his philological arguments. Unlike Cook Wilson, however, this group does not unify many different levels of meanings or functions in the *OL*; rather, they focus on the sense of the *OL* as the exercise or activity of the rational faculty. This group accordingly defends the faculty view, as they believe they have a better philosophical explanation of the *OL*. The revised faculty group does not agree with the rule view, mainly in the light of the two challenges discussed above (the down-played role of the rule and the rule never meeting the definition of the *OL*.) They share some arguments with the particularists, although they (the revised faculty view) do not address the particularist view. The arguments they share are as follows: 1) Aristotle does not even implicitly say that the intermediate is determined by rules, and 2) the intermediate action is determined with reference to a number of variables, such as time, place, persons, and goals (1106b 21), and in particular situations, there is no general rule by which the moral agent can make decisions but rather that decisions are made according to perception (1109b 23).[63] The proponents of the revised faculty position do not gravitate toward the particular proposition view; rather, they insist that the *OL* is made right by using the faculty or power of deliberation or calculation to reach a right end. This resembles Cook Wilson's argument. In fact, they also adopt his

[63] Urmson (1988, p. 85): "Aristotle is clearly saying that he is to examine how the intermediate, or mean, is to be determined, but not at all clearly that the answer is to consist in a set of rules. Moreover, he has repeatedly told us that the action which will exhibit the excellent or intermediate character has to be decided with reference to a number of variables, such as time, place, persons and goals (1106b 21), and that in particular circumstances there is no general rule by which we can decide. 'Judgment is in perception' (1109b 23) - that is, one can decide only when faced with the concrete situation. No simple rule would be adequate to deal with the complexities of real life."

precise philological arguments, e.g., 1) ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ, ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει indicates the personification of the *logos* in such a way that it would be absurd to take the *logos* as rule; and 2) the primary passages used as evidence are mainly our Passages 1 and 2, where Aristotle seems to identify the *OL* with a virtue (*phronesis*) and personifies *logos*.[64]

There is no explicit identification made in the second argument, however; neither does the linguistic implication in Passage 1 adequately identify *OL* as a virtue. Further, the identification in Passage 2 is not without qualification, leaving us in need of other evidence to identify the *OL* as a virtue. (This point is discussed at length in Chapter 1.) The first argument is vulnerable to philological attack from both the rule group and the particular proposition group, who understands the *logos* not as a faculty but rather as a formulation or articulated declaration. At this point, I have introduced this argument but not yet discussed any response to these philological attacks by anyone from the revised faculty group—this is because I have yet to encounter any such response. Perhaps the revised faculty group does not find these philological attacks sufficiently decisive.

The advantages to the revised faculty view would be very clear if it were possible to overcome the philological attack raised by the rule group. According to the revised faculty view, there would be no gap between the first chapter and the other chapters in the sixth Book; namely, where Aristotle raises the question of what the *OL* is in the first chapter and answers it in the last chapter. When read this way, the sixth Book is a coherent and consistent work.

This reading also seems to echo throughout the entirety of *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the

[64] Pakaluk (2005, pp. 214-5) says: "But it is better to take the phrase [the *OL*] to refer principally to a power or faculty (just as, aswe have seen, *logos* on its own typically indicates a power or faculty.) This is clear, first of all, from Aristotle's plain words. He says in 2.2, 'Later we will discuss sound reason—what it is, and how it is related to the other virtues' (1103b32-34), implying that *orthos logos* is one of the virtues, and he says explicitly in Book Six that *orthos logos* simply is the virtue of *phronesis* (1144b28). Moreover, he treats as equivalent the expressions 'as sound reason indicates' and 'as a person with *phronesis* indicates' (cf. 1107a1), and he regularly speaks of *orthos logos* as something that commands (1114b30) and speaks (1138b20). And it would be absurd to take a maxim or prescription to do these things, or to think that a maxim had the job of adjusting and refining other maxims to suit particular circumstances."

first book, Aristotle presents us a psychological distinction of the human soul. The rational faculty is the principle of the soul, thus, the rational part should inform the non-rational part in the way a father imparts knowledge to his son. Furthermore, human happiness is based on the activity of the rational faculty and thus the rational part plays a dominant role in the human soul. Aristotle presents two kinds of rational parts: the part having reason in itself and the part listening to the reason. We can imagine that in the rest of the books, then, all the other activities discussed relate to these two manners of rational parts. It is in fact so in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: the second through the fifth Books correspond to the part listening to reason, while Book Six corresponds to the part having reason in itself. The exercise of the rational faculty plays an important role throughout these books. If we take the *OL* as the right use of the rational faculty, it seems to cohere perfectly with the entire context of the ethics. In order to make this advantage legitimate, it is necessary to first respond to the philological attack made by the rule group.[65]

5. Author's Revision of the Philological Attack

There two main philological attacks made by the rule group which have been fully accepted by its followers as well as the particularists. The first argument is that Aristotle uses the whole phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον to refer to the rational faculty of the soul, not the *logos* alone; the second one is that the phrase ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ is the passive form of ὁρίζειν, which is joined with a noun in the dative form of *logos*. Stocks argues that a noun in the dative form plus the passive form of ὁρίζειν is never the defining faculty, judge, or legislator, but rather the standard, measure, or mark by which the definition is affected. I would like to further explain and/or expand these two arguments in order to open an alternative to the understanding of the *logos* that the rule view provides.

In respect to the first argument, the rule-group rightly observes that Aristotle uses the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον to refer to the rational faculty of the soul, but it is hasty to define the *logos* as "rule". It is possible to take the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον as "the part which

[65] To solve the philological problems is sufficient to argue for more advantages than rule view, but not sufficient for more advantages than particular view. I will establish other arguments accordingly.

has rule," as the rule group insists, but it is also possible to take this phrase as "the part which has reasoning activity." The whole phrase refers to the rational faculty that possesses the use, exercise, or activity of the faculty, such as reasoning, calculation, or deliberation.

There is another important phenomenon here that is worthy of notice, that is, it is difficult to distinguish the same word referring to the mental state and elsewhere referring to the activity or product of this faculty in Aristotle's vocabulary. For example, διάνοια refers usually to the mental state: In *Rep.* διάνοια is a middle state of *nous* and *doxa* (διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλ' οὐνοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν. 511d); and in *Pol.* 1270b40-1271a 1 the διάνοια grows old as well as the body (ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας γῆρας). But somewhere else, διάνοια refers to the thinking process: 1. διάνοιά, δόξα, and φαντασία, each of which can be true or false (διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε ψευδῆ τε καὶἀληθῆ πάνθ' ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται. *soph.* 263d). 2. In *Meta*, διάνοια is either practical, productive, or theoretical (ὥστε εἰ πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητική, *Meta*.1025b25).

Aristotle also uses the phrase διάνοιαν ἔχειν. In *DA* 410b24, he states that many animals do not possess the process of thinking (καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰ πολλὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχειν); in *EN* 1174a2, Aristotle says no one would choose to live their entire life with a child's level of intellect (οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου).[66] Aristotle uses διάνοιαν ἔχον in these passages, where διάνοια is a thinking process which refers to the rational activity of the human soul. In view of the close relation between *logos* and *dianoia*, the possibility is also left open to take the *logos* in the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον as the rational activity. We could thus infer that the *logos* is the same as, or at least partly similar to, the *dianoia*. The result of this inference is potentially legitimate or at least not contrary to Aristotle's thinking, e.g., *EN* VI 2, 1139a32, προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, which naturally causes the reader to infer that the *logos* is identified with

[66] See also *DPA* 650b19, where Aristotle discusses certain animals that do possess intellect (συμβαίνει δ' ἔνιά γε καὶ γλαφυρω τέραν ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν τοιούτων.)

nous and *dianoia*. It is thus at least *possible* to determine the *logos* as a rational activity, although it makes a relatively weak argument.

Regarding the second philological argument, (again, the proposition that ὁρίζειν with the dative use of *logos* in the definition of the ethical virtue is never the defining faculty, judge, or legislator but rather the standard, measure, or mark by which the definition is affected) I am not as convinced as Stocks. He gives us some examples of this use: ὁρίζειν with ἀφῃ (435b16), τέλει (1115b22), ἔργῳ (1253a23)[67] where he is indeed correct that the dative use of the noun is obviously a kind of standard, measure, or mark to make distinctions. For example, touch is typical for animals; the purpose of something is a mark of distinction, and *ergon* as an activity often identified with the end by Aristotle, i.e., the mark for distinguishing types of living beings from each other. He does not give us any other examples of the *logos* in dative use with the passive form ὁρίζειν, however, and if we determine the *logos* in the phrase τὸ λόγον ἔχον as rational activity, it could also be understood as a distinct mark. Rational activity is the mark to distinguish rational animals and nonrational animals, just like the *ergon* of living beings is the distinct mark to distinguish plants, animals and human beings.[68]

At this point, I have made my argument that if we take the *logos* as an activity of the rational faculty, rather than the faculty itself, the revised faculty view could be spared the philological attacks. The revised faculty view thus seems to be a very promising interpretation due to this robustness against attack, but also because it brings us to a coherent reading of Book Six (and perhaps even the whole *Ethics*.)

Despite the advantages of the revised faculty view, though, it remains inappropriate to determine the *OL* as the right use of the rational faculty. How can the moral agent

[67] The Bekker Number of this quotation is incorrect in Stocks's paper.

[68] I respond only briefly to other argumentsthat Stocks raises, as other scholars do not give them much attention either. Stocks claims that *logos* is not the faculty of soul, and its place is taken by *nous* because it is unlike Aristotle to use the actual defining formula of one of the central terms of the treatise as an ambiguous synonym for *nous*, without a word of explanation, instead of the unambiguous term *nous* itself. My response: If Stocks is right to say that the *logos* is ambiguous, is not the τὸ λόγον ἔχον also, or even more, ambiguous? Why does Aristotle use this ambiguous formula at the beginning of the work (first in *EN* I 7, again in *EN* I 13) while the unambiguous term *nous* is discussed in Book Six in detail?

have and guarantee the right use of the rational faculty, exactly? One might say the right use comes from virtue, since the rational faculty itself is probably neutral, in other words, that it can be used for good but also for bad. Virtue, according to Aristotle, is determined by the *OL*, which *prima facie* creates circular reasoning, i.e., the *OL* is guaranteed by virtue, while virtue is determined by the *OL*. We could insist that the use of the rational faculty is not neutral, rather that rightness comes from the rational faculty itself, but it does not seem obvious that this is Aristotelian thinking. This claim is also challenged by the question of the normative question of *logos,* as discussed in Chapter 1. If the revised faculty view is really the right candidate for the *OL*, we have to examine whether using the rational faculty can determine the virtue or the intermediate action. If so, how does the right use of rational faculty determine the virtue? Further, how can be the right use guaranteed?

My position is sympathetic to the view of the *OL* as the use or activity of the rational faculty, namely, that the *OL* is the right reasoning or right deliberation. But I will emphasize that this rational activity is a kind of reasoning form which involves both universal and particular knowledge. A new study on *logos* in Plato and Aristotle's ethical context from Jessica Moss is quite similar and highly supportive of my argument, in fact.[69] Moss argues that the *OL* is a practical syllogism serving as an explanatory account—an argument that served as a sound foundation upon which I established my own interpretation. I present my argument with a different strategy, but the most central and essential ground on which we rely is the same: That the *OL* is indeed loaded with explanatory function in telling the moral agent not only what should be done in each particular situation, but also *why* it is so done.

In the following chapters, I will examine whether and how the use of the rational faculty can determine the virtue and intermediate action as the *OL* does. I have organized this examination, (as I have argued in the Introduction and in Chapter 1,) into two separate chapters that correspond to two moral stages: The virtue-acquiring stage and the virtue-acquired stage. The role of the rule and particular proposition will

[69] Jessica Moss (2014). I submitted my dissertation before Moss's paper was published. I made a similar proposal to Moss's in that draft, but did so in a far less systematic or concise manner than she does. Her paper helped me a great deal to organize and clarify my argument.

also be discussed at length, as the particular proposition view does not do justice to the rule view and the revised faculty view does not mention one word of the particularist view.

6. A Brief Summary

Before we continue, let us briefly summarize the advantages and disadvantages of the different interpretations discussed in this chapter.

Cook Wilson's View

The advantage of Cook Wilson's view (the faculty view): 1) It provides a coherent and consistent reading of Book Six (and potentially of the whole *Ethics*); and 2) the meaning of the *OL* can be applied to various contexts, i.e., faculty, reasoning, or law according to necessity.

The disadvantages of Cook Wilson's view: 1) It assumes equality between *logos* and *OL,* which is never explicitly stated by Aristotle himself; (2) some meanings of the *OL*, e.g., the *OL* as rational faculty, are vulnerable to philological attack; and 3) it consists simply of a conglomeration of philological arguments while making no precise philosophical arguments that the *OL* is "reason".

Rule View

The advantages of the rule view: 1) It avoids the philological attacks faced by the faculty view; and 2) it effectively applies to moral education. (By this I mean the *OL* is teachable and universally applicable.)

The disadvantages of the rule view: 1) It causes Book Six to run the risk of inconsistency; and 2) it seems contradictory towards Aristotle's own opinion of universal knowledge, since he seems to downplay universal knowledge in many places in the *Ethics*.

Particular Proposition View

The advantages of the particular proposition view: 1) It avoids philological attack; 2)

it likewise avoids all the disadvantages of the rule-view by reflecting consistency and coherence among Book Six and the rest of the *Ethics*; and 3) it makes the *OL* highly effective, i.e., allows a particular proposition to precisely and directly prescribe what the right action is for the particular intermediate.

The disadvantages of the particular proposition view: 1) The explanation for the sake of a consistent reading of Book Six is not especially intelligible and seems to contradict the importance and emphasis of the *OL* Aristotle makes in Book Six, thus weakening the systematic function of the *OL* altogether; and 2) it makes the *OL* ineffective in the aspects of teaching and application. In other words, the particular position is useful only once and rendered inapplicable to other cases.

Revised Faculty View

The advantages of the revised faculty view: 1) It shares the first advantage of Cook Wilson's view in terms of coherence and consistency in the *Ethics*; and 2) it avoids all the disadvantages of Wilson's view in that it is not necessary to assume the identity of the *logos* and the *OL*. Accordingly, this view is free of philological attacks and provides (or at least attempts to make) a sound philosophical argument. 3) It likewise avoids all the disadvantages of the rule-view and the particular proposition view, as the universal rule is not over-emphasized as it is under the rule view. It is more intelligible than the particular proposition view, as well. Whether the revised faculty view has the advantage of being teachable is not yet clear, however, (which I will further discuss in a later chapter.)

The disadvantages of the revised faculty view: 1) The relationship between the *OL* and ethical virtue is unclear, as there seems to be a vicious circle between them; and 2) it might make the moral philosophy simpler than it should be namely, makes moral training simply the training of a psychic faculty.

The revised faculty view is more advantageous than other views, however, it is not quite appropriate to argue that the revised faculty view is the correct interpretation of Aristotle's meaning. In the following chapter, I will more closely examine the disadvantages of this view. I will also further examine the original rule view,

especially in terms of the second disadvantage listed above (and correspondingly, the second advantage of the particular proposition view.) I will attempt to prove that the rule should play a more important role than the particular proposition group or revised faculty group ascribe to it.

Scholars in both of these groups do recognize the positive role of the rule for right actions, but they do not recognize that the rule could be (a kind of) *OL* applied in particular situations. For example, Urmson says:

> There are important general principles to be discovered and applied by the practically wise man; the whole of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is devoted to determining some of the most ultimate of these principles, such as those that tell us what activities are most worth pursuing in the quest for eudaemonia. (1988, p. 86)

Urmson does not think the general principle can determine the final decision made in a particular situation; however, as he goes on to say that "these are not principles by which the mean can be determined on particular occasions."(1988, p. 86) I do fully agree with Urmson's point, but refute the particularist tendency to ignore the fact that the rule might play different roles or have different functions in the virtue-acquiring stage from that in virtue-acquired stage. This is further discussed in Chapter 3, where I primarily focus on examining whether the *OL* is the rule or moral reasoning.

Chapter 3: The *Orthos Logos* in the Virtue-Acquiring Stage

In this chapter, I will focus on the question of what the *OL* is in the virtue-acquiring stage. As I argued in the first chapter, the *orthos logos* (abbreviated as "*OL*") might be different things in the virtue-acquiring stage (sometimes called "moral learning stage" by scholars[70]) and in the virtue-acquired stage (which is also called the "moral learned stage" or "morally mature stage".) Even though the *OL* is, per se, the same thing in both stages, it will appear differently in moral learners than in fully virtuous people due to the immature moral state of moral learners in the virtue-acquiring stage. Here, I will argue for this interpretation.

In this virtue-acquiring stage, moral learners do not possess the *OL* in their own right, but rather follow the *OL* qua external guidance. However, moral learners, as I will show, will internalize the external guidance into their own *OL* qua their own reasoning process during the virtue-acquiring process. Then, in the virtue-acquired stage, when moral learners have grown into fully virtuous people, they have the *OL* in their own right. This *OL* qua a reasoning process tells the moral agent not only what should be done, but also the reason it should be done. In the virtue-acquiring process, we will see that the different phases of moral education will influence the form and content of the *OL* that the learners grasp since the different phases of moral education bring different moral psychic states, namely how the rational faculty and desiderative part of the soul relate to each other. This relationship will essentially influence the form and content of the *OL* appearing to moral learners.

However, given that we have not yet determined what the *OL* is, per se, this will cause difficulties in identifying the different ways *OL* appears for moral learners. On the one

[70] For example, see Burnyeat (1974).

hand, my research here will focus on the inner state of moral learners rather than the *OL* itself, which is still an external thing for them; on the other hand, we have some candidates for the *OL*, and these will aid my inquiry in this chapter. In the second chapter, I analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of four different interpretations of the *OL*: Cook Wilson's view (the faculty view), the rule-view, the particularist view, and the revised faculty view. According to my analysis, the revised faculty view has more advantages than the other interpretations. However, the revised faculty view itself also faces serious challenges. If the disadvantages of the revised faculty view can be surmounted, the revised faculty view would be a promising interpretation of the *OL*.

The unknown *OL,* per se*,* in spite of the difficulty it causes, will be expedient here. We do not have to be confined to investigating what the *OL* really is, but the inquiry into the moral learning process will show how fully virtuous people acquire their own *OL* from the moral learning process. This inquiry will shed light on the content of the *OL*. During this process, the practical reasoning of moral learners and the proposition view will be reconsidered with reference to the moral function of the *OL*. Namely, I ask which one would be best for moral learners to find the intermediate and appropriately regulate their feelings in a particular situation. I will begin with the difficulty of the revised faculty view since the difficulty is essentially related to the moral function of rational faculty to acquire virtue. Then I will establish that the different phases of the moral learning process will influence the form and content that the *OL* takes. Finally, what the real *OL* is will also begin to emerge in the last phase of the moral learning process. The conclusion to which my inquiry will lead here will not only avoid all the disadvantages and meet all the requirements of the *OL* put forth by Aristotle in the whole ethical context, but will also lead to defining the real *OL*.

1. The Disadvantages of the Revised Faculty View: A Review

In the second chapter, I listed the following two general disadvantages of the revised faculty view:

(1) The revised faculty view would create a dilemma for the relationship between the

OL and ethical virtue if the *OL* is the right deliberation of the rational faculty. One horn of the dilemma is that there seems to be a vicious circle between them; the other is the normative problem of the *logos*, as I call it in the first chapter. First, the vicious circle: since ethical virtue is determined by the *OL* and the *OL* is the right use of the rational faculty guaranteed by the ethical virtue, if we take the *OL* as the right use of the rational faculty, there would be a vicious circle between ethical virtue and the *OL*. Second, we must consider the normative problem of the *logos*: the only way to solve the vicious circle problem in Aristotle's ethical context is to determine that the use of rational faculty is not neutral, but normative (i.e., being right is due to the rational faculty itself, not ethical virtue.) This claim would address the question of the normative problem of *logos,* which I mentioned in the first chapter. However, this does not seem to be Aristotle's way of thinking because it would be difficult to explain how the use of rational faculty already contains the right thing to do.

(2) The revised faculty view might make Aristotelian moral philosophy simpler than it should be; namely, the moral training would be simply the training of a psychic faculty and not so much related to other elements, such as laws, concrete situations, and so on.

These disadvantages in the virtue-acquiring stage should be precisely detailed as follows:

(1') If we take the *OL* as the right use of the rational faculty, we would determine that moral learners do not possess the *OL* on their own since the reasoning of moral learners cannot always be right without possession of the virtuous state, but they simply act according to the *OL* of the practical wise man. If the *OL* of the practical wise man is the right practical reasoning, moral learners should act in accordance with this reasoning process. The reasoning process (e.g., the Aristotelian practical syllogism) arguably involves propositional reasoning. However, it is unclear whether the acting in accordance with the reasoning process for moral learners is the process of reflectively following the reasoning or just mechanically following the conclusion, like obedience following a command. If the former is true, moral learners understand the reasoning process and know why it is reasonable; if the latter is true, moral

learners, on the contrary, neither understand the reasoning process nor know why it is reasonable. In this latter situation, the *OL* for this kind of moral learner would simply reduce the reasoning process into a single proposition of the whole reasoning process, like a command or order. In other words, the whole reasoning process is meaningless for them. The latter situation seems like the right case from our daily experiences, especially moral learners in the very early phase of the virtue-acquiring stage. With respect to the former situation, assuming moral learners can understand the reasoning process, or even possess the ability of reasoning, we would ask how it is possible. Thus, what the case is for moral learners must be made clear in the virtue-acquiring stage.

(2') The training of a psychic faculty would be decisive for the whole process of the moral training. However, in this training process, would many other important elements (e.g., laws, traditional precepts, the concrete particular situation, and so on) be ignored?

In order to figure out these issues, the following discussion will center on this question: what is the most reasonable thing that plays the role of the *OL* for moral learners to determine the intermediate and regulate their feelings in a particular situation? In order to answer this, we must systematically examine the process of acquiring ethical virtue to disclose how to achieve the virtuous state through performing virtue-building action and regulating feelings. In the second and following section, I will closely examine the doctrine of ethical virtue from the habituation standpoint rather than considering human nature. Human nature contains the reasoning capacity which will grow into the intellectual virtue *phronesis* along with the virtue-acquiring process. And this growing reasoning capacity contributes to building virtuous state through trying to prescribe and explain what should be done and why it should be done.

In the third section, I will examine how the reasoning capacity can grow from a human nature that is a mixture of rational and sensitive (or desiderative) activities. My argument will be established on two premises. Namely, I will argue that imitation is the natural tendency of human beings and that imitators will always feel pleasant from

their imitating activity. Imitation with pleasure is able to stimulate the growth of reasoning capacity if the pleasure is guided by the *OL* in the right way. I will examine another special feeling, shame, to analyze the contribution of this feeling toward growing reasoning capacity in the process of acquiring ethical virtue and, in turn, how the reasoning activity trying to regulate the feelings. According to the analysis of this section, I will conclude that there are basically two phases of the moral learning process, and the *OL* will also *appear* differently for moral learners in these two phases due to the limit of reasoning capacity in the beginning and the later phase.

From the above investigation, we will see that reasoning activity engages and grows in the process of actively acquiring ethical virtue, but could this actively engaged reasoning activity be the *OL*? In the last step (i.e., section four), I closely look at whether the reasoning activity of moral learners (e.g., in the form of deliberation or syllogism) can be the *OL,* especially in the later phase of the moral learning process—that is, whether the deliberation of moral learners can be the guideline of virtue-building action and the proper degree of feelings for themselves. The answer that emerges here will not be an absolutely positive answer since the deliberation of moral learners only partially functions as the *OL*. However, the answer is not absolutely negative, either; rather, it will provide the hope to determine the practical deliberation of *phronimos* as the *OL*.

2. Nature, Habit, and Virtue

In this section, I will examine what our human nature and habit do when acquiring virtue. I will also investigate whether the nature of moral learners already contains the affinity to virtue and whether the habituation is only a mechanical process or rational reflective understanding involved in the habituation. If the latter is the case, how does the rational ability of moral learners engage in the virtue-acquiring process?

2.1. Nature and Habituation

In the second book of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle discusses how to acquire ethical virtue. He contrasts the contribution of human nature and habit to the acquisition of ethical virtue. He says that no ethical virtue arises in us by nature; rather, it is formed

from habit.[71] Meanwhile, however, Aristotle does not deny the positive role of our nature, even though it seems to have a very limited function—namely, to receive virtue. Habituation cannot change our nature but only perfect (or complete) it. He says the following:

> (Passage 10)
> ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται… οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.
>
> From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtue arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature… Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.[72] (1103a18-26)

Passage 10 clearly shows that we, by nature or naturally, have some basis upon which ethical virtues could be established, but the acquisition of virtue does not happen naturally. Rather, it is formed through habit. However, how much the nature of our basis contributes to the reception of virtue perfected by the habit is unclear. Aristotle not only says the acquisition of virtue is not by nature, but also says the acquisition is not against nature. "Not by nature" seemingly implies that the "basis" has no principle in itself to develop itself into virtue.[73] "Not against nature" seemingly implies that the "basis" contains the basic character that has affinity with or inclination toward virtue, but this affinity or inclination cannot develop on its own (that is, not by nature). Rather, its development requires the aid of habit. Thus, what our nature can do for

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[71] Such a distinction is made at *EN* VII 4, 1148 b 29-31; X 9, 1179b18-31, and *Pol*. VII 13, 1332a38-b11. Also see Plato, *Laws* 653b6-c4.

[72] Translation is from ROT. I only substitute "virtue" here for "excellence."

[73] Aristotle's general discussion of nature is in *Physics* II 1. There, Aristotle discusses the nature by distinguishing living beings from artifacts; the living beings and the parts of them that have, in themselves, a principle of motion and stationeries exist by nature. The artifacts that have no such principle in themselves exist not by nature. Thus, Aristotle defines the nature as "a principle or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidentally" (192b9-23).

virtue is not very clear here. Moreover, it is also not yet clear whether nature has anything to do with reasoning activity, which should be the central issue in this chapter. Therefore, I must first clarify the meaning of the phrases "not by nature" and "not against nature," and clarify how the discussion of nature is related to reasoning activity in this ethical writing.

2.2. By Nature, Against Nature, and According to Nature

We would infer from Passage 10, as well as other passages where Aristotle puts nature and habit in contrast, that "nature" in his ethical writing implies something inside of us that we have from birth on and endowed by something outside of us (e.g., "divine cause") that is out of our control.[74] Habit, contrasted with nature, is something formed after birth in a human community. The "basis"—which is endowed by divine cause and can be developed into ethical virtue,[75] according to Aristotle—could be two things: (1) many abilities of feelings. Aristotle says, "We have the abilities by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature."[76] Virtue would then be a state formed from the right reaction of feelings. (2) Some natural state of character. In *EN* VI 13, Aristotle distinguishes "natural" and "full" (*kuria*) virtue. The natural virtue, Aristotle thinks, is the character that everyone has (even animals) immediately after birth. Some people are, by nature, to some extent brave, some others by nature just, but we still seek the full virtue of braveness and justice. Full virtue is the full good that develops from the natural virtue (1144b3-9). Either abilities or natural states, according to Aristotle, can be made for good or bad. We need habit to cultivate the nature to form a fully virtuous state.

Thus far, at least from Aristotle's ethical work, the basis has no principle in itself to develop itself into virtue, and we have not seen the inclination to virtue. However, one passage in *Physics* might indicate the inclination to virtue that the "basis" contains.

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[74] 1179b21-23, τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει.

[75] Aristotle also calls the virtuous state the second nature of human beings. Julia Annas (1993) distinguishes two kinds of nature. The nature that I discuss here, Annas calls the "mere nature," and the second nature, or the virtuous state, simply "nature." I agree with her distinction, but only use "nature"to refer to her "mere nature" since I do not discuss the virtuous state in terms of the nature or second nature here.

[76] 1106a9, ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει. The translation is from ROT. I revise "faculty" to "ability."

In *Physics* VII 3, Aristotle, in connection with the topic of alteration and coming into being, determines that virtue is a perfection that is mostly according to nature. I quote the passage here:

(Passage 11)

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἱ ἕξεις οὔθ' αἱ τοῦ σώματος οὔθ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλοιώσεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρεταὶ αἱ δὲ κακίαι τῶν ἕξεων· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ἡ ἀρετὴ οὔτε ἡ κακία ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις (ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον—τότε γὰρ ἔστι μάλιστα [τὸ] κατὰ φύσιν—ὥσπερ κύκλος τέλειος, ὅταν μάλισταγένηται κύκλος καὶ ὅταν βέλτιστος), ἡ δὲ κακία φθορὰ τούτου καὶ ἔκστασις· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς οἰκίας τελείωμα λέγομεν ἀλλοίωσιν (ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὁ θριγκὸς καὶ ὁ κέραμος ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ εἰ θριγκουμένη καὶ κεραμουμένη ἀλλοιοῦται ἀλλὰ μὴ τελειοῦται ἡ οἰκία), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων ἢ λαμβανόντων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ τελειώσεις αἱ δὲ ἐκστάσεις εἰσίν, ὥστ' οὐκ ἀλλοιώσεις.[77](246a10-b3)

Again, states, whether of the body or of the soul, are not alterations. For some are virtues and others are vices, and neither virtue nor vice is an alteration: virtue is a perfection (for when anything acquires its proper virtue we call it perfect, since it is then really in its natural state: e.g. a circle is perfect when it becomes really a circle and when it is best), while vice is a perishing of or departure from this condition. So just as when speaking of a house we do not call its arrival at perfection an alteration (for it would be absurd to suppose that the coping or the tiling is an alteration or that in receiving its coping or its tiling a house is altered and not perfected), the same also holds good in the case of virtues and vices and of the things that possess or acquire them; for virtues are perfections and vices are departures: consequently they are not alterations.[78]

[77] The first three chapters of *Physics* VII have two versions. I quote the α version from Ross' edition.

[78] In order to conform to the discussion in the ethics, I revised the translations of *arête* and *kakia* in ROT and substitute "virtue" and "vice" for "excellence" and "defect." Again, neither "virtue" nor "vice" is used here necessarily in a restricted moral sense, but used quite generally.

This passage suggests that the acquisition of virtue is not an alteration but rather perfection, and this perfection is most in accordance with nature (ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον—τότε γὰρ ἔστι μάλιστα [τὸ] κατὰ φύσιν.).[79] There are two questions about this claim: (1) What is alteration? (2) How should we understand "the perfection is most in accordance with nature"? The first question is related to my research, but not the main concern here. Thus, I will discuss the first question very briefly and pay more attention to the second.

In *Physics* V 2, Aristotle defines the alteration as change with respect to quality.[80] He says, "Motion in respect of quality let us call alteration … by quality I do not here mean a property of substance … but a passive quality in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted on or to be incapable of being acted on" (*Physics* V 2, 226a26-30). In Passage 11, Aristotle also gives two examples to explain that the acquisition of virtue is not alteration, but rather perfection—namely, the examples of the circle and the house. According to Aristotle, the virtue of the circle is to be as circular as possible, and this is perfection not alteration. This claim seems to assume that there is also a non-perfect circle, just as the house without coping stones or a tiled roof is a non-perfect house. However, the move from a non-perfect circle or house to a perfect circle or house is not an alteration since the basic quality is not changed. This is a very brief explanation of the question of alteration.[81]

The second question of how to understand that "the perfection is most in accordance with nature" is more difficult. Why is virtue most (μάλιστα) in accordance with nature (κατὰ φύσιν) or in a natural state (Ross' translation)? One possible answer is that the virtue of something is the natural state it would be inclined to acquire; the thing has the principle inside to move it to acquire virtue. If this is the case, there seems to be a kind of tension between Passage 10, which tells us that virtue is formed from habit rather than by nature, and Passage 11, which tells us that virtue is most in accordance with nature. One would say that, if the thing has the principle in itself to move it to

[79] I will focus on the acquisition of virtue. In order to avoid the distraction, I intentionally ignore the case of vice here.

[80] The other two are change with respect to quantity and change with respect to place.

[81] For a much more detailed discussion on this issue, see Morrison and Coope in Maso (2012), pp. 37-72.

acquire virtue, it could also probably acquire virtue by nature. However, I would say here that, even though we admit that the thing has a principle inside itself, it could not acquire virtue by nature. Another Aristotelian example helps illustrate this issue.

I have two reasons to replace the circle and the house examples from Passage 11 with the new examples: (1) I think Aristotle's example is not suitable because it is not obvious that a circle and a house have nature.[82] According to *Physics* II 1, where Aristotle tells us that only living beings and simple bodies (earth, fire, air, and water) have nature and that nature is "a principle or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidentally," the production of craft (e.g., a bed or coat such like these things) does not have such innate impulse to change (192b12-17). We might have many ways to defend Aristotle's use of this example in Passage 11, where he mentions nature,[83] but I will not undertake this defense here since it is not related to my concern in this work. We can just assume that a circle or a house has nature in some sense and still have a second reason to use another example here. (2) In the circle and house example, Aristotle seems to assume that there are non-perfect circles and houses. A non-perfect circle/house versus a perfect circle/house corresponds well to the case of natural virtue versus full virtue—namely, the non-perfect state to perfect state. However, this example might not correspond very well to the other case I mentioned above—namely, the case of abilities versus virtue—since it is hard to determine the ability as the non-perfect state. Thus, my example should avoid these two disadvantages—namely, (1) the thing should obviously have nature, and (2) it should also fit the ethical context.

I will take the example of a normal seed of a tree to explain why there is no tension between "not by nature" and "most in accordance with nature." By "normal" here, I mean the seed has the ability to grow; it is living, not dead. Aristotle would agree that

[82] Especially the example of the circle is not very clear about how to illuminate the process from the imperfect state to the perfect one. Cf. Wardy (1990), p. 212.

[83] One way to defend Aristotle is to say that the circle and house are simply analogies that do not need to have nature in them; the other way to defend Aristotle is to say the nature of a house is not in a house, but rather in the soul of the house-builder. However, to defend these is complicated and unnecessary here since we can find easier examples to explain the relationship between "by nature" and "according to nature."

such a seed has a nature in itself since it has the principle inside itself to grow. We can define the ability of growing as the nature of the seed, and no one would define the ability of growing as an existing state of the tree. Aristotle would also agree that the seed growing into a tree is perfection most according to nature since this perfection is potentially contained already in the nature of the seed. Thus, this example shows that the seed obviously has a nature and that it can perfectly correspond to the ability versus virtue case.

Now, let us examine whether the seed would grow into a tree by nature or naturally (Ross' translation). The answer, I think, could also be negative from the point of view of the need of external elements (e.g., nutrition, cultivation, and so on). The seed can attain its perfection in accordance with nature, but still needs the external conditions that could be favorable to this nature (e.g., soil, water, sunshine, and so on) in a suitable condition. The seed cannot grow into a tree simply by nature even though the nature of the seed is the ability to grow. This example clearly explains that there is no tension between "by nature" and "most in accordance with nature." From this example, we could also conclude that there is no tension between "most in accordance with nature" and "not by nature" in the acquisition of ethical virtue. Acquiring virtue is mostly in accordance with our nature, but the virtuous state cannot be acquired by nature or naturally; rather, it still needs suitable external conditions, such as habituation.

Thus far, the term "by nature" is clarified. Now I will establish the relationship between the nature and rational activity to show that the perfection most in accordance with nature is mainly related to or promoted by the rational activity. In the following section, I will argue for the connection between nature and reason in human beings.

2.3. Nature and Reason

In *Ethics*, Aristotle seems to be conservative about the role of nature, but emphasizes something else (i.e., habituation) when he discusses the acquisition of virtue. I would admit that habit is more important than nature in the process of acquiring virtue. However, the importance of habit should not overshadow the contribution of nature.

Passage 11, which is from *Physics* VII 3, shows that virtue is most in accordance with nature, and there is no tension or contradiction between "not by nature" and "most in accordance with nature." Thus, the claim that "virtue is most in accordance with nature" should also be true in the ethical context. It also means that our nature itself inclines to acquire virtue, just like the nature of the seed inclines to grow into a tree. Although the inclination alone is not enough, and the proper external conditions are also needed, nonetheless, the positive role of nature cannot be ignored here—but what is our nature? How it is related to reasoning activity?

Aristotle's *ergon* argument is widely deemed relevant to the question of our nature and its relationship to the rational activity of the soul. First, the *ergon* argument could be interpreted as an argument about human nature.[84] Aristotle argues that humans have a characteristic *ergon*, or function, that distinguishes them from other kinds of living beings, such as plants and animals.[85] Thus, we may say the characteristic *ergon* reflects human nature. Second, since Aristotle defines this characteristic *ergon* as the rational activity of the human soul, it implies that rational activity is contained in our nature.

Another passage, which is located before the discussion of ethical virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Aristotle, is important and helpful here:

> (Passage 12)
> φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ'ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ οῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο

[84] As Julia Annas (1993) already pointed out, Aristotle himself does not identify the *ergon* as nature, nor use the "nature" in the *ergon* argument, even though it can be considered relevant to human nature.

[85] See also *DA* II 2-3, where Aristotle inquiries into the different psychic capacities in different kinds of living beings and figures out what capacities are characteristic of plants, animals, and human beings—namely, the nutritive capacity, the sensitive capacity, and the capacity of thought, respectively. By these characteristic capacities, the different kinds of living beings can be distinguished from one another. Each lower capacity can be separated from the higher, but each higher capacity depends on the lower (413b4-8, 414b20-415a11).

> φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.
>
> Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of paying heed to one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of "the rational" in mathematics. That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have reason, that which has reason also will be two-fold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's Father. (1102b29-1103a3)

In this passage, Aristotle describes a basic division of the human soul, which includes the rational part and non-rational part. Each of these parts could divide into two additional parts—namely, the non-rational part into a vegetative part sharing no reason and the desiderative part sharing reason and, correspondingly, the rational part into the part having reason in itself, and the part itself is actually non-rational but can only obey reason. This reason-obeying part in the rational part clearly refers to the desiderative part in the non-rational part. Thus, we actually have three parts of the soul according to Aristotle: the rational part, desiderative part, and vegetative part. Human virtue, which Aristotle discusses in the whole *Ethics*, is distributed into the former two parts. Putting the topic of virtue temporarily aside, we will instead focus on the relationship of the rational part and desiderative part.

This picture is still too general and remains ambiguous, so a few points should be clarified. First, rational activity characterizes human nature, but is not the whole of human nature. Although rational activity is peculiar to human beings, it does not exclude the nutritive activity, which is the *ergon* of plants, and the sensitive activity, which is the *ergon* of animals. The high-level *ergon*, as the *ergon* of human beings, requires the lower level as the nutrition of plants and sense perception of animals, and

the lower-level *ergon* might also affect the higher level.[86] Second, rational activity in the *ergon* argument seems neutral. By "neutral," I mean it can be used for good or bad. Since Aristotle says that human good is the performance of *ergon* in accordance with virtue, it implies that, without virtue, the performance of *ergon* is not necessarily good.

Therefore, from these two points, we can see that our nature is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity, and the rational activity is neutral. However, since the rational activity stands at the top of the psychic hierarchy in Aristotle's moral psychology, it is still more important than the sensitive activity. Even though it is neutral, it is still able to persuade the desiderative part, but not in the moral sense. In *EN* I 13 (the quoted Passage 12 above), Aristotle not only emphasizes, again, that the rational part of the soul (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) is peculiar to human beings, but also divides the "rational part" into two parts (i.e., (1) the part listening to the *logos* as a son listening to his father and (2) the part having *logos* strictly in itself [διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. 1103a2-3]).[87] He immediately connects the concept of virtue to these two kinds of τὸ λόγον ἔχον. He says that virtue, correspondingly, can be divided into the intellectual virtue and ethical virtue (διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς. 1103a5). This distinction is made at the end of *EN* I and is then repeated immediately at the very beginning of *EN* II, where Aristotle

[86] The feedback function of the lower level to the higher level is pointed out by Thomas Nagel in Rorty (1980).

[87] *EN* I 13, 1102b 30-32 tells us that the part obedient to *logos* is τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν. Here, a slight transformation might be detected if we compare this passage to the similar distinction in the *ergon* argument. In the *ergon* argument, Aristotle does not mention the the term ὀρεκτικὸν explicitly. Reading the *ergon* argument, we might be led to understand sense perception as the obedient part. However, if we read the parallel distinction in *EN* I 13, where he excludes the ability shared with the plants, it is reasonable to confirm that the desiderative part is the obedient part. Aristotle seems to use the sensitive part and desiderative part interchangeably. On the relationship between sense perception and desire, see DA II 2, 413b22-24, where Aristotle gives us a very general interpretation: he says, "εἰ δ' αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία." This seems to imply that the desire always supervenes upon the sense perception. When we say "desire," sense perception is involved—but why has Aristotle done this slight transformation in the *Ethics*? One guess might be that Aristotle discusses virtue after he makes this distinction, and one kind of virtue (i.e., ethical virtue) is relevant to the desiderative part of the soul, so Aristotle announces which part of the soul is directly relevant to the virtue in order to pave the way for the following discussion.

opens the discussion of the ethical virtue.

According to the above analysis, then, the "virtue is most in accordance with nature" can be explicated as "ethical virtue is most in accordance with the mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity (or desiderative activity), but more in accordance with rational activity." Ethical virtue should already be potentially contained in this mixture, but this mixture on its own cannot develop into virtue (not by nature). In the process of acquiring ethical virtue, rational activity itself should mature after some guidance. By "mature rational activity," I mean the rational activity the *phronimos* possesses. After rational activity matures, it can guide the sensitive activity. The mature form of rational activity would ideally always pursue the right. Sensitive activity would also pursue the right after the guidance of the rational activity, for they are in a harmonious state.

This suggestion of growing rational activity from nature can be confirmed by one passage in *Politics,* where Aristotle again discusses the contribution of nature, habit, and reasoning to virtue, with reasoning peculiar to human beings and dominant among the three. He says the following:

> (Passage 13)
> ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῴων· οὕτω καὶποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνια δὲ οὐθὲν ὄφελος φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γὰρ εἶσι, διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα, διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲντῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνος γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις. πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.
>
> There are three things which make men good and excellent; these are nature, habit, reason. In the first place, everyone must be born a man and not some other animal; so, too, he must have a certain character, both of body and soul. But

> some qualities there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered by habit, and there are some gifts which by nature are made to be turned by habit to good or bad. Animals lead for the most part a life of nature, although in lesser particulars some are influenced by habit as well. Man has reason, in addition, and man only. For this reason nature, habit, reason must be in harmony with one another; for they do not always agree; men do many things against habit and nature, if reason persuades them that they ought. (*Pol.* 1332a38-b10)

This passage makes three claims: (1) human nature, which is different from the nature of non-rational animals, makes virtue possible; (2) habit establishes virtue; (3) reasoning, which is peculiar to human beings, will guide nature and habit. According to the *ergon* argument and claim (1), human nature is different from animal nature because human nature is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity, but the rational activity is neutral before being habituated. Claim (3) implies that the reasoning has matured in some sense, even if not into the form of practical wisdom since the reasoning can guide habit and nature.[88] This means that the reasoning can distinguish right from wrong. Therefore, the reasoning in claim (3) has grown from nature, which is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity, into a normative level.

According to my analysis, then, the connection between human nature and reasoning activity can be established in Aristotle's context. However, this is only a brief picture of the connection of nature and reasoning activity in the process of acquiring ethical virtue, which I sketch in section 2.2. The starting point of this process is the nature, which is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity. During this process, rational activity will grow into a dominant role to guide the sensitive activity. This

[88] A similar view is held by Vasilou (1996). In his paper "The Role of Good Upbringing in Aristotle's Ethics," which is influenced by Burnyeat and McDowell, he says, "*Logos* is what a human being possesses by virtue of his nature as a human being. This is a fact … which belongs to the area of 'physics' in Aristotle's sense-that is, the study of nature. *Phronesis,* on the other hand, is the upshot of acquiring a 'second nature' or an 'ethos' ('habit'). It is also defined as *orthos logos* ('right reason'); that is, reason after it has been habituated in the appropriate sort of way. In the Nicomachean Ethics '*phronimos*' (the adjectival form of *phronesis*) is used in the thick sense for someone who has acquired the sort of character that fits the substantive and detailed character sketches that fill the middle books of the Ethics", p. 779.

brief picture has to be proven in detail, and the first problem here is to argue how the rational activity can become dominant and normative from the mixed human nature; the second problem is to argue how the growing rational activity can influence the process of acquiring virtue. If these two problems can be proven, then we can finally decide whether the growing rational activity can be the *OL*. Thus, in the following section, I will argue how rational activity becomes dominant.

3. Reasoning and Virtue-Acquiring

In section 2, I have argued that rational activity becomes dominant in our nature, which is a mixture of rational activity and sensitive activity of soul in the process of acquiring virtue. On the one hand, Aristotle seemingly implies that acquiring virtue needs no rational reflective activity. He argues that acquiring virtue is a process of habituation, just like learning a craft; the only important thing in the process is imitation and repetition. On the other hand, Aristotle also emphasizes that the condition of virtue is to make a decision that involves rational deliberation. Therefore, these two aspects must be fairly considered.

3.1. Repeatedly Practicing and Making Decisions

Aristotle defines the process of acquiring virtue as a process of habituation. Habituation seems to be simply a process of repetition. Aristotle's analogy between acquiring virtue and craft might prove that this virtue-acquiring process is simply a process of repetition that does not need the involvement of rational reflective activity. Aristotle says the following:

> (Passage 14)
> τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.
>
> But excellences we get by first exercising them, as also happen in the case of

> the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. (1103a31-1103b2)

According to Aristotle's account, we acquire virtue just as we acquire crafts (ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν). Like learning to build a house or play the lyre, through performing those actions, namely, we become just through performing just actions, temperate through temperate actions, brave through brave actions. I call this practice of virtuous action "virtue-building action" to distinguish it from truly virtuous action—namely, action according to the virtuous state. The craft analogy tells us that the process of acquiring virtue involves a kind of imitation and practice. That is, the agent imitates and practices virtuous actions just like the apprentice imitates and practices the master's craft. By repeating the practice, we form the habit.

This general picture of acquiring ethical virtue does not clearly show whether reasoning activity is involved.[89] It would be open to two interpretations: either this

[89] Sarah Broadie (1991) raises many ambiguities of the virtue-acquiring process in other ways, and some of them are related to my concern here. I will make only a very brief introduction and response here. She says, "What he does not make clear is *how* by engaging in the behavior we come to develop the virtuous disposition expressed by that sort of behavior. This means that his conception of the virtuous disposition is open to different interpretations, depending on how we think he conceives of the process through which it arises. (1) Is it that by doing brave things we get better and better at doing them, in the same way as we acquire skills—through practicing? (2) Or is it that by doing brave things enough times, we acquire a habit of doing them automatically? (3) In other words, is the brave man an *expert,* so to speak, at performing brave actions? (4) Or is it more as if he is *addicted* to performing them?" I added the seriation within the quotation for clarity, pp. 72-3.
These questions are very difficult, and it is hard to get clear answers to them from Aristotle. Regarding question (1), in the case of virtue acquisition, we might say we get a better and better virtuous state, but only from the outward appearance, character-building actions and virtuous actions look alike; it is also hard to determine which one is better except by reference to the inner state. Question (2) is more related to my concerns; Sarah Broadie might assume that the acquisition of craft is a mode of "automatic acquisition." In this "automatic acquisition," the imitation and practice play the most important role. When we practice enough (times and ways), we succeed "automatically," while reason, our rational faculty, or any reflective thinking plays a minor role in this process. Now we can identify the "automatic acquisition" with the limited use of the rational faculty. Thus, we get another question (2) here: namely, would Aristotle agree that the acquisition of virtue by habit implies that it involves the limited use of the rational faculty? Questions (3) and (4) can be left aside here as, I

virtue-acquiring process is a mechanical process in which no reasoning activity is involved or it is a rational reflective process involving reasoning activity. By "mechanical," I mean that it is not an intentional, let alone rational, activity of a moral learner. Rather, it is a matter of simply following guidance repeatedly, and the virtuous state is automatically established. By "rational reflective," I mean that there is rational deliberation or reasoning, or even a decision to take character-building action.

My position is sympathetic with the rational reflective view, which is becoming the mainstream position on this issue today. However, it does not mean that the mechanical view holds no persuasive and reasonable argument. Aristotle himself does not give any clear-cut, comprehensive account as to which one is right, but seems to alternate in his opinion. No matter which view one would take, he will face the difficulties that many eminent scholars have faced for centuries.

The first of those I will discuss are the difficulties of the mechanical view: Aristotle also realizes the differences between craft and virtue. He determines that the virtuous actions should meet three conditions: namely, (1) performing them knowingly (εἰδώς); (2) deciding to perform these actions and deciding to perform them for themselves (προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά);[90] and (3) performing them from a firm and unchanging character (βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ).[91]

The first condition is shared by both craft and virtue, and it is a less important condition for virtuous action,[92] while the other two are more important for virtuous action and come to differentiate craft from virtue (1105b1-3). Aristotle does not use a

think, a virtuous person could be called an "*expert*" in virtue, and the phrase "is *addicted* to" itself implies improper feelings, which Aristotle would not accept.

[90] I use "decide" or "choose" to refer to προαιρέω interchangeably in my dissertation. However, "choose" or "decide" cannot cover all the meanings of this Greek word. I will come back to this concept below.

[91] 1105a26-b1, ἔτι οὐδ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· … πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ.

[92] About the reasons that Aristotle plays down the importance of this condition, Lesley Brown (2009) makes a plausible guess: "(1) to counter the well-known Socratic claim that virtue is nothing but knowledge (see VI 13, 1144b18), and (2) to stress the importance of the *other* conditions". I prefer to think that the second reason is Aristotle's development based on the Socratic claim, p. 214.

γὰρ-clause (or something similar) to explicitly explain the reason these two conditions are so important and distinct; he only says that both of them are the result of frequently performing the just and temperate actions (ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται.1105b4-5). It seems that these two peculiar conditions for virtue also result from frequent practice or from habituation. However, if the virtue-acquiring process is just a mechanical process, how can condition (2)—the decision-making (*prohairesis*), which involves rational deliberation—come into being? Plus, if Aristotle does seriously envision decision-making as one important condition for virtue, we will ask the following question: how do the rational activities penetrate the mechanical process?

Furthermore, this kind of paradox is even sharper under the account of the relationship between ethical virtue and practical wisdom (*phronesis*). Aristotle says that ethical virtue is determined by *phronimos,* who possesses practical wisdom (*EN* II 6, 1107a1-2), and it is impossible to have ethical virtue without having practical wisdom or to have practical wisdom without having ethical virtue (*EN* VI 13, 1144b30-32). Now we have the paradox: on the one hand, how can we acquire practical wisdom if we are just mechanically habituated? On the other hand, how can practical wisdom guide the mechanical process, or is practical wisdom even useful in this mechanical process?

The second difficulties I will discuss are the difficulties of the rational reflection view: Aristotle does not think people who are learning to be virtuous are capable of consistently making good decisions on their own. Good decision-making (*prohairesis*) is the distinct mark of fully virtuous people—but what could produce a transition from incapability to the capability? Put another way, how can this immature rational reflection establish the virtuous state? Moral learners must also calculate and make choices when they face morally new situations (e.g., they would consider what they ought to do, how to do it, and even why to do this way or that way). However, people who possess the rational reflective view have to prove that this kind of calculation and decision-making can help us establish the virtuous state.

Whether the mechanical or rational reflective view is right for virtue acquisitions is

one of the most debatable issues in the study of the *Ethics*. In this paper, I will argue for the rational reflective view, but my position is subtly different from the common version of rational reflective view. I will use the similar argument that the main rational reflective view has used, on the one hand; on the other, I will also make my rational reflective view, to some extent, compatible with the mechanical view. Then, so that this topic does not overwhelm, I will focus on this latter aim and briefly make the regular argument for rational reflective view.

In the following section, I will briefly review the debate and analyze the arguments the scholars have used. Then, with the help of this improved argument, I will argue that, in the virtue-acquiring process, rational activity is not only engaged but also becoming mature. In order to fulfil this aim, I will examine the imitation-practice pattern (section 3.3.). I will argue that the rational ability grows from the nature of imitation and the stimulation of accompanied pleasure. In section 3.4, I will do the same work on the concept of shame to explore the ability of rational reflection growing toward mature. Meanwhile I will argue that this growing rational activity is one important factor for moral learners to build virtuous character.

3.2. Two Basic Positions

The mechanical view is actually a very traditional reading of Aristotelian moral development. In the process of acquiring virtue, habituation is envisaged as essentially separate from or an antecedent to the development of rational reflective capacities. The well-known commentator, Grant, comments as follows:

> A mechanical theory is here given both of the intellect and the moral character, as if the one could be acquired by teaching, the other by a course of habits… We need only compare the theory of virtue in this book with the discussions in the *Meno* of Plato, to see how immensely moral philosophy has gained in definiteness in the meantime. While becoming definite and systematic, however, it had also to some extent become scholastic and mechanical. (1858, pp. 480-1)

Burnyeat (1974) has a developed, but still somewhat similar idea on this point. He argues that Aristotle emphasizes the importance of beginnings and the gradual development of good habits of feeling and that, in this earlier stage, the reasoning plays no role if one lacks the appropriate starting point—"the that" (τὸ ὅτι). "The that" is that which the moral agent knows or believes to be so. After he has firmly grasped "the that," then it is possible for him to understand the reason (τοῦ διότι) that the fact is so—Burnyeat renders it "the because." The passage on which Burnyeat relies is the following:

> (Passage 15)
> ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως.
>
> For, while we must begin with what is familiar, things are so in two ways—some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, *we* must begin with things familiar to *us*. Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the facts are the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting-points. (*EN* I 4, 1095b2-8)

This passage tells us that it is important to get the starting-point in the ethical matters that are the facts familiar to us ("the that"). However, this passage does not tell us explicitly the necessary transition from "the that" to "the because" as Burnyeat describes. Arguably, we could also understand this passage, as the ROT indicates, to be saying that "the that" would be sufficient for the ethical matters, and "the because" is not necessary in many cases.[93]

[93] The translation of τὸ ὅτι and τοῦ διότι in ROT, as "the fact" and "the reason," is more understandable than Burnyeat's. Burnyeat keeps his translation more literal, I guess, just for the sake of his interpretation. If we read

Put aside first whether Burnyeat's reading is the only correct way to interpret this passage. According to his interpretation, the moral development must be less than a fully rational process for a long time. On the other hand, Burnyeat is also aware of the importance of rational reflection at a later stage. He admits that practice involves cognitive powers. According to *EN* II 4, the ultimate goal toward which the beginner is aiming is that of becoming the sort of person who does virtuous things in full knowledge, choosing to do them for their own sake, and from a firmly established state (1105a28-33). The beginner would hardly be on the way to this desirable condition if he were not in the process of forming corresponding ideas as to the goodness or justice of his actions. Thus, Burnyeat seems to envisage the process of training as a combination of two different stages: first, the non-rational one where the moral learners need to only follow the orders, instructions, or traditional precepts and, secondly, a rational one where the learners have been equipped with the rational reflective capacity. It is in this stage that the description and explanation are needed.

Burnyeat's view is reinforced and developed with a significant step by Nancy Sherman (1989). She points out the fundamental problem of the mechanical theory of habituation and says the following:

> It [mechanical theory] ultimately makes mysterious transition between childhood and moral maturity. It leaves unexplained how the child with merely 'habituated' virtue can develop the capacities requisite for practical reason and inseparable from full virtue. (p. 158)

She also argues against the mechanical view very radically, arguing that from the very beginning of the habituation, moral learners should be exercising their judgment and reason. At the very beginning, moral learners might make only a few spontaneous choices, but through training these spontaneous choices, they grow into mature reasoning. Moral learners become virtuous through virtuous action if it is always

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the Greek or ROT translation, we might not divide the moral learning process as "the that" and "the because" of these two stages as Burnyeat (1974) does. We can also read οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι as "the fact does not need the explanation, or the reason."

accompanied by description and explanation. Sherman uses an example from our daily experiences: "Aristotle would probably object to the practice of the parent, who says, 'Do this, don't do that' without further description or explanation. The child can legitimately ask 'why,' and some description and explanation will be in order."(p. 172) She adds an example from our psychological experiences: "Emotions cannot be shaped without some simultaneous cultivation of discriminatory abilities. This is included as a part of habituation."(p. 173) "Habituation" is not meant to indicate "manipulation," but rather constitutes a gradually growing critical discrimination with the guidance of an outside instructor.

However, Curzer rejects Burnyeat's interpretation of Aristotelian habituation, which is developed by Sherman.[94] Curzer criticizes Burnyeat for having mixed the teaching (description and explanation) and the habituation since there is no textual evidence to support Burnyeat's reading. In fact, Curzer argues, there are a few passages that prove that there are no two such stages in habituation.[95] Rather, teaching or argument is a different, independent process that only works once moral learners have completed the process of habituation. If the teaching in Burnyeat's methodology is excluded from the process of habituation, then the habituation, in Curzer's view, seems to be back to the mere mindless mechanical process, although Curzer himself does not say so explicitly.

All of them, except Sherman, are convinced that Aristotle's habituation (or, in Burnyeat's case, at least part of it) is a mechanical process, and only after this mechanical process can we have the capacity for rational thought (e.g., decision-making and practical wisdom). However, all of them (including Burnyeat) would have difficulty facing the problems that Sherman raises—namely, the mysterious transition from the mechanical habituation to the right practical reasoning, the transition from the mere "habituated" virtue to the true virtue, which can only be

[94] Curzer (2002, p. 146) mainly objects to Burnyeat's view. Curzer only mentions Nancy Sherman once in a footnote, saying briefly, "Sherman is quite right to maintain that 'descriptions and explanations' are crucial to the process of moral development. But there is no reason to think that Aristotle would include them within the notion of habituation. Description and explanation are teaching, and Aristotle insists that successful teaching presupposes successful habituation."

[95] The passages that Curzer relies on are as follows: *EN* 1095b2-7, *EN* 1179b23-31, *Pol.* 1338b4-5.

achieved through practical wisdom. This mysterious transition of mechanical view, however, is not necessarily the fatal flaw in their theory—the mechanical theory could still be correct if there is some mysterious transition in our cognitive state.[96] When considering Sherman's theory carefully, we will also find a serious obscurity.

According to Sherman, the practical wisdom seems to grow smoothly from the practice of rational capacity during the virtue-acquiring stage. However, we will ask the same question to the rational reflective view as to the mechanical view: how does the immature practical reasoning grow into mature reasoning, namely, into practical wisdom? Sherman needs another element to make this transition happen. We know in the virtue-acquiring stage, the rational activity of moral learners alone is not enough to make this transition. The external guidance is still needed. How can we surely exclude the element of mechanical repetition in this learning process?

Facing these serious questions, we should begin our inquiry with the most fundamental questions; that is, how much do the mechanic view and the rational reflective view differ from each other? Which one is right for Aristotle? Could we find a middle way with the aid of the established argument by both camps to avoid the difficulties they have?

I agree with Sherman that the rational ability is already engaged and coming into use, but because it is very weak, I determine the very beginning phase of the moral learning stage mechanical (following Burnyeat), though the rational activity somehow exists in it. Recall Sherman's interpretation; she determines the capacity of discriminating moral situations at the very beginning of moral training might be too weak to tell right from wrong. During the training of virtue, discrimination is trained and developed. Having experience in dealing with different moral situations gives us an eye to judge what is right to do. However, here are two obscure points deserving more attention: (1) how can we distinguish the weak discrimination so that it does not mechanically follow the guidance? (2) How does the weak discriminating ability

[96] It is somewhat like the epistemological process—namely, the transition from the collection of the sense-data to knowing the principle. Habituation is like collecting sense-data, and practical wisdom is like having acquired the principle.

grow into the strong, if not mechanically?

With respect to the first one, for instance, from our experiences, when a child (as a moral learner) wonders why he should do this, but not that, the reason that the instructor gives is also another "the that," or any excuse at all, and is by no means the real "the because." For example, a young girl, S, wants a toy of her elder brother's, B (also very young), but B does not it give her. As a result, S is so sad that she starts a "war." Out of the natural reaction, B would beat S. Fortunately, the parents, P (as *phronimos*), stopped them and told them that they are doing wrong. Probably both of them, or especially B, would ask why; P would answer, "Because she is your sister [another "the that"], and beating your sister is not right [seems to be a universal rule: beating is not right]." S would launch this wrong war first, and B would follow his anger rather than the rule at that moment. P could also answer with, "Beating is not allowed [an order]." B would not get the real reason that he cannot beat his sister, but neither would S get a reason that she cannot have the toy. In the absence of the real reason for action, we, with good reason, determine that he does the acts mechanically. Thus, in this early stage, moral learners might already have reasoning capacity since they are already inclined to ask why. However, since this reasoning capacity is either too weak or not in use at all, we still can call this a stage in the mechanical process. After moral learners have acquired "the that," the reasoing capacity grows and is useful for making choices—but how could this growing happen non-mechanically?

Consider another hypothetical situation involving B and S. S wants the funny toy again but cannot reach it by herself. B is the only person available to help her out. Thus, S asks B for his help. Because of an unhappy affair (S broke the toy once), B refuses to help, but S' desire for the toy is not extinguished by the refusal. In order to fulfil her goal, she figures out all the possibilities to persuade B rather than resort to a "war." Finally, she succeeds by trading, and it is a win-win ending. In this case, they have made a reasoning process exactly the same as the Aristotelian practical deliberation, even though the P is absent. The reasoning activity in this example is much more complex than the first case above, but these are just the speculative experiences we might encounter in our daily lives. Further, they might be in accordance with Aristotle's doctrine. In the following section, I will expose Aristotle's

original source to flesh out these thinking experiments.

A small conclusion for this section should be made first. My basic view follows Burnyeat's—namely, the very beginning stage of the virtue-acquiring process is a mechanical process. After acquiring "the that," moral learners can use their rational faculty actively to make moral judgments on their own, although they cannot make them always rightly. However, in order to avoid the criticism of the "mystery transition," I will argue, different from Burnyeat, that the reasoning capacity grows already in the mechanical stage, but not enough to allow independent moral judgment. In order to make my position more transparent, I will examine the growing process of reasoning capacity in detail in the perspective of Aristotle's doctrine of imitation and pleasure.

3.3. Imitation, Pleasure, and Reasoning

Since, in the learning process, moral learners have to imitate the virtuous person and keep practicing, I call this virtue-acquiring process the imitation-practice pattern. In this imitation-practice pattern, the moral learner imitates the virtuous person, and the virtuous person guides the moral learner. However, neither the cause of imitation nor the form of guidance is clearly explained by Aristotle. First, with respect to the form of the guidance by the virtuous person, the guidance could probably be the *OL*, while the moral learner by no means possesses the *OL* on its own. A few lines below Passage 7, Aristotle states that the action should be done in accordance with the *OL* (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν. 1103b32), which I have quoted and marked as Passage 1 in Chapter 1. The form of the guidance, though, which could probably be the meaning of the *OL,* is not clear. (1) The guidance could be in the form of virtuous action, which is an expression of the virtuous state, but not a systematically articulate formulation. (2) The guidance also could be some habitual or conventional principle or rule since the context of a particular society (social, political, and so on) will more or less influence the moral learner during the process of habituation. We cannot exclude the necessity and importance of the articulate formulation, which might not even be so systematic as a rule or principle (e.g., simply a command or a claim).

As previously noted, the guidance is from the virtuous person. The moral learner does

not possess any (mature) form of the guidance on his own; rather, he learns the *OL* from the virtuous person. However, this imitation-practice pattern, which seems to be a mechanical process, could entail the growing rational activity. Let us go back to the question of the cause of the moral learner's imitation. The cause of imitation might be a request or a command from the virtuous person; the moral learner simply follows the command to perform his character-building action. In this way, the learning process is simply a mechanical process and totally under the manipulation of the virtuous person. The cause of imitation, however, also could be the inner desire that the moral learner possesses from birth on. The external guidance is not necessary in the form of command or request, but rather in the form of inductive or illuminating explanation. If the latter is the case, the moral education might stimulate the growing rational activity.

The growing rational activity begins with the imitation, which Aristotle determines is a natural tendency of human beings. Imitation at the very beginning might not be an intentional activity, but rather merely a natural tendency, and it might be unconscious. However, I propose here that, during the moral learning process, the moral learner would develop the natural tendency into the intentional activity and from the intentional activity into the rational activity. Moral learners have this natural tendency to imitate from birth on, then to intentionally imitate for the sake of learning something, and finally, reasoning is developed from the intentional learning. I call this the proposal of the growing of rational activity. Now I will argue for this proposal.

The first step to argue for this imitation-reasoning proposal is to introduce Aristotle's acknowledgment that imitation is a natural tendency of human beings in the learning process. Aristotle does not discuss much about imitation in the Ethics, but in his other works, we can find the relevant passages. In *Poet*.4, Aristotle says the following:

> (Passage 16)
> τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας.

> Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation. (1448b5-9)

There are three claims noticeable in this passage: (1) imitation is natural for man from childhood; (2) imitation is the first act of learning; and (3) imitation accompanies pleasure for everyone.[97] Claim (1) proves that Aristotle admits the imitation as the natural tendency born with human beings. Thus, the first step of the argument is clearly provided by Aristotle, but the development from this natural tendency into rational activity is not explicitly reported in this passage. With aid of claims (2) and (3), however, the argument can be reasonably established.

According to claims (2) and (3), imitation is a first step in learning and accompanies pleasure. Following Burnyeat's argument, when one tastes the pleasure by learning, the delightful feeling would encourage him to continue learning. Then, in order to taste the pleasure further or fulfill his desire to know, he would intentionally keep learning, which involves using and practicing, especially in the practical domain. In other words, imitation grows from the natural tendency into rational activity because of the desire for pleasure (or for knowledge.) The rational activity becomes active during the learning process.

However, one would say that pleasure does not accompany all kinds of imitation. Especially in the ethical domain, it would be possibly unpleasant for moral learners to imitate the noble things since the imitation and practice would be tough and boring. Further, our feelings might push us to the base and easy things. Aristotle must also have realized this possibility, so he emphasizes the importance of cultivating the true pleasure and pain in moral education. By "true pleasure and pain," I mean, in

[97] Why is imitation always pleasant? Aristotle's logic maybe like this: because the learning is pleasant and imitation is a part of learning, imitation is, therefore, pleasant. It might be clearer to see this logic in *Rhet.* I 11, where Aristotle says, "Since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant—for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry—and every product of skilful imitation..." (*Rhet.* I 11, 1371b4ff). This kind of syllogism is presumably working under wider series Aristotelian premises—namely, people desire to know, leaning is able to fulfil desire, and fulfilment of desire is pleasant.

Aristotle's words, one would feel pleasure when he does right actions and feel pain when he does wrong. In EN II 3, Aristotle realizes that, in the practical life, pleasure causes us to do bad things, and pain makes us abstain from the good ones. The character-building actions are difficult to perform if our primitive feelings (mainly pleasure and pain) hinder us.

Thus, Aristotle, following Plato, insists that true pleasure and pain should be built into the moral learning process. He says, "We ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says,[98] so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought" (1104b10-13). The appropriate moral education aims first at the right feelings of pleasure and pain at the right action. That is to say, we should be educated to have appropriate pleasure and pain at the character-building actions; namely, the pleasure and pain should cooperate with action for building virtue, rather than function as the hindrance of achieving virtue. It is one of very important steps to regulate the feeling into the middle state in the moral education.To achieve the middle state of feeling is, first of all, to bring up the appropriate pleasure and pain. In other words, moral education should make the pleasure and pain not be the hindrance of virtue, but rather be the motivation for the action that helps us acquire the stable character state. The appropriate pleasure and pain are the necessary conditions for virtue. If we do the right action always accompanying the appropriate pleasure and pain, then we can confirm that we have such a state. If we do the right action with inappropriate pleasure and pain (in the long stage), then it proves that we still have not achieved the state since, in this case, pleasure and pain are still hinder the right action. In this sense, pleasure and pain are not only important for the beginning phase of moral training, but they are also the sign of having achieved the virtuous state.

However, this pleasure and pain training theory does not tell us explicitly either how we can train our natural feeling of pleasure and pain into the true pleasure and pain, or whether and how a rational activity is involved in this training process. Thus, the question seems to draw back to the place where we set out in this inquiry. However, elsewhere, Aristotle seems to provide us enough textual evidence to help us get out

[98] Plato, *Laws*, 653a ff., *Rep*. 401e-402a.

from this difficulty and convince us the reasoning can (try to) persuade the desire or appetite. In the seventh book of *Nicomachean Ethics*, we find the *logos*, sometimes with *orthos* added, which plays the role of guiding or persuading the appetite.[99] In the virtuous man, *logos* and appetite work harmoniously, while in the *enkrates* and *akrates*, they struggle back and forth. Accordingly, then, it seems that the reasoning can also persuade us to overcome the apparent pain and experience the true pleasure.

However, the case of *akrates* and *enkrates* indicates a phase that comes close to the virtuous state. *Akrates* and *Enkrates* can also, to some extent, share reason and make decisions. But moral learners at the very beginning stage cannot understand the practically wise guide. How could they turn painful feeling into pleasant feeling by rational advice? Rather, it is possible and reasonable that the appetite or feelings are also mechanically formed by certain opinions of a moral guider who instills in moral learners that such and such is pleasant and such and such is painful. Also, after moral learners having acquired "the that," their feeling or appetite can listen to and be persuaded by reasoning. From that point on, then, the contribution of reasoning becomes active and significant.

When moral learners love to taste true pleasure and use it to improve their character state, it proves that the reasoning activity has begun to play a positive role in moral education. True pleasure and pain accompanying the right action assumes that the moral learner has a basic idea of what is right and noble and that he has acquired "the that." When he feels pain at boring and tough imitation and practice, his reason would (try to) persuade him that he would acquire the true pleasure after he builds the virtuous state, and this pleasure is steadier and long lasting. The persistent learning is not only because the moral learner is afraid of the punishment of the moral guide, but also because his rational ability grows in this process and begins to work for the noble and right.[100]

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[99] *EN* VII 1, 1145b14; 3, 1147b1; 4, 1147b31; 8, 1151a12; 9, 1151b10; similar formulation in other books of *EN* I 13, 1102b16-30; III12, 1119b11.

[100] Here, it is not necessary to emphasize radically either pleasure or pain, as to which one plays a more important role in moral education, as much as some people do. Burnyeat and Sherman think pleasure provides the motivation for learning, while Curzer insists that it is pain that motivates people to learn. However, Aristotle seems to have arranged the role of pleasure and pain as equal. In *Pol.*, he says, "Learning is no amusement, but

Thus far, we have examined two basic phases of moral learning. In the very beginning phase of the virtue-acquiring stage, moral learners acquire "the that" purely mechanically through an external practical wise guide—whether in the form of the gentle promptings of parents or physical punishment, or many kinds of description and explanation. A capacity for rational reasoning may already exist, but is not yet strong enough to understand the rational form of guidance. In order to acquire "the that," moral learners practice repetitively what instructors tell or teach them. In this phase, the moral learners cannot really understand the *OL*, regardless of whether the *OL* is in the form of practical reasoning or proposition. Instead, they would take the *OL* simply as a command to obey, although they have very limited reasoning ability to pursue the why. After they have acquired a basic idea of what is just or good with the aid of experience, their rational thought becomes active and makes significant contributions to acquiring virtue.

In this later phase, we might occasionally be able to make the right decisions to take the right action according to our own reasoning. However, we might still sometimes submit to our feelings and, in the end, be swayed by our feelings into taking the wrong (or rather, intemperate) action. Therefore, we still need repetitive practice to habituate our feelings and to create a harmonious character state between reason and feelings. The point here, though, is that moral learners can and are willing to understand the *OL*. If the *OL* is a rule (or set of rules), moral learners will try to deliberatively adapt this rule (or rules) into a particular situation. If it is simply a particular proposition that concretely commands what to do, moral learners would ask why, trying to determine the reason. If the *OL* is in the form of practical syllogism, it will not only fit well with the demand of moral learners in the later phase; namely, the right practical syllogism tells the why to moral learners who, in the later phase, are urgent to ask why in the particular moral situation. This interpretation also has very good textual evidence to support it—namely, the text of *akrates* and *enkrates*, where the *OL* appears many times in contrast with desire and feelings. The position of *enkrates* and *akrates* is similar to moral learners in the later phase, just in the

is accompanied with pain." 1139a29-30. A few lines later, though, he also says, "Education is a rattle or toy for children of a larger growth." 1340b30.

perspective of the rational ability. It is highly possible, then, that the *OL* in this text, as stated before, could be used in the same meaning of deliberation.

This interpretation will be enhanced in my following inquiry.

3.4. Shame (αἰδώς) and Reasoning

In this section, I will argue that the ability of rational reflection grows to maturity through one of our feelings (i.e., shame). Shame (αἰδώς) is portrayed not as a virtue, but as a semi-virtue in Aristotle's theory. It is agreed that shame plays a special role—that is, it can help moral learners achieve virtue. It is implied that shame can push moral learners toward making the right decisions. I wonder whether moral learners in the shame-phase could understand and follow the right practical reasoning of *phronimos*, whether their rational ability is still too immature to understand it, or whether their rational ability is already mature enough to make the right decisions on their own, even if just occasionally.

What exactly can shame do for virtue? Aristotle says the following:

> (Passage 17)
> Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον… οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη.
>
> Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling than a state. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of disrepute and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger... The feeling is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we think young people should be prone to shame because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling,

> but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this sense.[101] (*EN* IV 9, 1128b10-21)

Aristotle defines shame as being more like a feeling than a virtue. Nonetheless, shame is useful for young people in acquiring virtue since shame can help them refrain from error. "Young people" refers here to moral learners, but their stage of learning is difficult to determine. As stated previously, in the very beginning of the moral learning stage, even if we have the rational capacity, it is still not useful to moral learning. In this stage, moral learners have to acquire "the that" first, and this is mainly a mechanical process. If shame works in this stage, we will not expect that the rational faculty could do much for acquiring virtue. However, if the young have already acquired "the that," the rational faculty is activated. Under the stimulation of shame, rational activity might grow mature enough to make the right decisions and be helpful in acquiring virtue. Thus, let us first determine which stage the young are in and whether their rational activity is mature enough to make moral judgments.

Another important passage on which scholars have different opinions on the conception of "the young" is in *EN* X 9. Aristotle writes the following:

> (Passage 18)
> εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἦθός τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὖται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς

[101] Aristotle uses αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη interchangeably. This is also present in Passage 10. Here, I will not discuss whether there is any difference between these two words. Here, I follow Gauthier/Jolif (1958) and consider them the same, "les deux concepts sont en effet pour lui identiques". In this section, I will focus only on the whether the rational activity can grow from the stimulation of shame.

> ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες.
>
> Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among the young, and to make a character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by excellence, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment; living by passion they pursue their own pleasures and the means to them, and avoid the opposite pains, and have not even a conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it.[102] (1179b4-17)

This passage informs us that the arguments (οἱ λόγοι) can encourage and stimulate the generous-minded of the young (τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους), who are ready to be possessed by virtue. The generous-minded have been gently born and are true lovers of what is noble. They are a subset and a minority of the young. Conversely, most of the young (τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς) have no such character, and the arguments cannot drive them toward the noble and good because they do not obey the sense of shame and have no idea of the noble and true pleasure.

Notably, in the passage, the word *logoi* means clearly explanatory accounts, persuasive speeches, or even arguments. It cannot be the rational faculty because it is in the plural and is being contrasted with nature. One may wonder whether this *logos* has the same or similar meaning of the *logos* in the *OL*. If they are same, then it tells us that the *OL* has no effect on moral learners who have no noble nature and who have not accepted virtue in the early phase of the virtue-acquiring stage. On this

[102] See *EN* X 9, 1179b4-31, where Aristotle reviews the contribution of nature, argument, and habit to the virtue. He also argues that the argument is only useful for the moral learner who has already acquired the basic idea of what is good or noble. Habit is the universal method of achieving virtue.

ground, we might be inclined to consider the two *logos* as possessing different meanings.

This contrast between the generous-minded and the many seems to imply that the generous-minded can be encouraged by arguments because they can obey the feeling of shame and understand the ideas of noble and true pleasure. Burnyeat, in light of Passage 12, argues that a young person who can obey the promptings of shame has already acquired "the that," which means that he can begin to use his rational activity to acquire virtue going forward. Burnyeat says the following:

> He has acquired a taste for, a capacity to enjoy for their own sake, things that are noble and enjoyable for their own sake. He has learned, really learned, that they are noble and enjoyable, but as yet does not understand why they are so. He does not have the good man's unqualified knowledge or practical wisdom, although he does have "the that" which is the necessary starting point for acquiring the practical wisdom and full virtue.[103]

Thus, according to Burnyeat and Passage 18, the ability to obey shame does not come at the very beginning of moral education, but rather comes after having acquired "the that" and once one already knows what is noble and good. These kinds of young people are distinguished from "the many," who have not learned what is noble and good. "The many" do not heed shame, only fear of punishment.

Following Burnyeat, Curzer divides those who can heed shame and those who cannot into two different stages of moral development. In addition, in light of Passage 18, Curzer determines more specifically that the generous-minded are the moral learners in the second stage of moral development. He claims that

> the many (*hoi polloi*) are moral beginners who have the potential for virtue, but as yet possess none of the components of virtue. The generous-minded (*eleutherios*) are the people at the second stage of moral development. They

[103] Burnyeat, in Rorty (1980), p. 78.

> have chosen to lead the virtuous life, but are confused about what virtue is.[104]

He also claims that

> the many come to choose virtuous actions for their own sake through habituation motivated by punishment and threat of punishment, and the generous-minded become able to identify virtuous acts through habituation motivated by the pain of retrospective and prospective *aidos*.[105]

Comparing the claims of Burnyeat and Curzer, we see that they both agree that shame is useful for the moral learner in a late stage, but they differ from each other in many other substantial aspects. First, Burnyeat thinks that they have acquired "the that" in this stage, but not yet "the because" since they have not acquired practical wisdom. Conversely, Curzer argues that this is their second stage of moral development, but they have not yet acquired "the that," let alone "the because," and thus, they are still far from genuine virtue. They have committed to be virtuous, but still have no ability to identify real virtue. Burnyeat does not explicitly say at which stage shame begins to work during the process of moral development, nor how far this stage is from real virtue, while Curzer argues his interpretation at length.[106] Another big difference is that Burnyeat thinks that the generous-minded are those who take pleasure in acting nobly,[107] while Curzer insists that the generous-minded are those who have experienced the pain of punishment at the beginning of moral education. I will not discuss the latter difference here, but I will pay some attention to the former to see whether Curzer's argument is reasonable.

In the *Ethics*, there is clearly a stage in which shame plays a special role. We can temporarily call it the "second stage," as Curzer does. However, arguing, as Curzer

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[104] Curzer (2002), p. 154. He emphasizes here that "the many" is not necessarily meant for children or adults, rather all people with childish character.

[105] Ibid., p. 158.

[106] Ibid., Again, Curzer reclaims here that young people refer to the young character rather than young age, p. 156.

[107] Burnyeat does not use the word "generous-minded" to refer to the people in the second stage of moral development particularly. I just borrow this term from Curzer for the easy expression. He develops this idea from the passage in *EN* X 9.

does, that the moral learner in this second stage has not acquired "the that" is problematic. Curzer argues that the character of the young is far removed from the character of virtue in light of passage *EN* I 3, 1095a2-7, where Aristotle claims that young people are not proper listeners to lectures on political science.[108] Curzer identifies improper listeners as those who have not yet acquired the starting points of lectures and discussions on political science—namely, they lack "the that." In order to make the generous-minded who are true lovers of what is noble, encouraged, and stimulated by the power of argument also be improper listeners to political lectures, Curzer makes the following suggestion to distinguish between "proper hearers" and "people encouraged and stimulated by arguments":

> Proper hearers are persuaded by the facts and logic of lectures or arguments. But people who are encouraged and stimulated, listen to an argument or a lecture about what to do, and without really understanding it, they become excited and inspired.[109]

However, Curzer's argument is not convincing, either. First, it is hard to determine whether "young people" in passage 1095a2-7 refers to moral learners at the initial stage (the many) or generally to all moral learners, including the subset—namely, those who feel shame (the generous-minded). It is absolutely possible that it might mean the youth at a very early stage, where shame has no function yet. If so, no such distinctions are needed between the "proper hearer" and "the young encouraged and stimulated by the power of arguments" since they refer to two essentially different groups of young people. Secondly, it is unreasonable to say that a "true lover" of virtue is just in love with the idea of virtue without knowing what virtue really consists of or means. If one's love stays at such a superficial level, how can Aristotle call this being a true lover of virtue (ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον)? Thirdly, the interpretation of the distinction between the "proper listener" and "those young encouraged and stimulated by the power of arguments" is far-fetched. There is no additional evidence

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[108] *EN* I 3, διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματα ίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπει δὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός.

[109] Ibid., p. 157.

to back up Curzer's claim that proper listeners are those who can be persuaded by the facts and logic of arguments, while people who are encouraged and stimulated by the power of arguments are just excited and inspired by them without really understanding the arguments themselves. The very nature of an argument is such that the only way in which it can inspire or excite the listener is if the listener can follow the argument and understand it.[110] With this theory, then, Curzer is giving false support to his argument. He might be confused between the persuasive tone of the argument, which plays on the emotions, and the argument itself, as is stated clearly in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.[111] Fourthly, in *EN* I 3, Aristotle talks about the improper hearers of political staff, while in X 9, nothing political is mentioned. We can suppose that, in Aristotle's mind, the generous-minded encouraged and stimulated by arguments are still not mature enough for political staff since political activity involves much more than true love of the noble and the understanding of arguments. In other words, having acquired "the that" is not enough for the political activity.

Thus, Curzer is right to distinguish the generous-minded from "the many", but wrong to place them too far from virtue. Curzer admits that the generous-minded are those who have been brought up well and have formed good habits, but does not allow that they have acquired "the that." He emphasizes that the standard of having acquired "the that" is having the concrete ability to identify what would be the virtuous act in particular situations. However, I would argue that this ability is only acquired after we have attained practical wisdom. Burnyeat uses a relatively loose concept—namely, "knowing or believing something so"—to refer to someone who has acquired "the that." Here, I follow Burnyeat that the generous-minded are those who have acquired

[110] Aristotle divides argument into two types—namely, deduction and induction. About deduction see *An. Post.* I 1, 24b18-20*; cf. Top.* I 1, 100a25-27*; Soph. el.* 1, 165a1*ff;* about induction, see *Top.* I 12, 105a13*ff.*

[111] *Rhet.* 1356a2-21. Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word, there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; and the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments, when we are pleased and friendly, are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is toward producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. I will address this subject in detail when I return to the discussion on emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is affected through the speech itself when we have proven a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

"the that" and the starting point of using rational activity to acquire virtue.

Moreover, if we read Curzer's brilliant analysis on shame, we would be even more surprised by his having put the generous-minded so far from the virtuous. According to Curzer, shame is formed by internalizing the punishment, and this is the way for the many to proceed to generous-mindedness. Thus, it is a way guided by pain rather than by pleasure, as Burnyeat maintains. I think that Curzer goes too far in objecting to Burnyeat, but both of them agree that feeling shame makes further moral progress possible for the generous-minded. I also agree here that the stage of the generous-minded heeding shame is a necessary stage in the process of acquiring virtue. Plus, "the many" are those even "younger" in character than the generous-minded. They (the many) would also have to step to the generous-mind stage under the guidance of both pleasure and pain, I think, not necessarily merely by pain (Curzer) or merely by pleasure (Burnyeat).[112]

Passage 18 tells us that the generous-minded heed shame, are true lovers of what is noble, and are also encouraged and stimulated by arguments (*oi logoi*). If I am right on the analysis of the conception of "true lover" and "people encouraged and stimulated by *logoi,*" this statement implies that rational faculty is activated already in this stage and is helpful to acquire virtue, "to make men good" (1179b4). Under the stimulation of shame, moral learners would practice their rational faculty frequently so that the rational faculty would be developed through this frequent practice. Curzer develops a very detailed, and reasonable, theory of the practice of rational faculty in the shame stage in his inquiry. Here is what he says about this (I added the numbers for better readability):

> (1) When a generous-minded person feels *aidos*, the act's viciousness is impressed upon her mind. The *aidos* vividly brings to the foreground the fact that the *aidos* producing act is wrong…

[112] In my opinion, both pleasure and pain play an important role in moral development, but I will not discuss this point in detail here. Briefly, Burnyeat does mention merely the function of pleasure, but he, I think, does not exclude the contribution of pain. Aristotle just says that shame works among the youth who are brought up well with good habits (good family, good surroundings), but not necessarily only with the aid of punishment; the moral learner can acquire "the that" or the feeling of shame.

(2) *Aidos* does not tell us that an act is wrong; we must already recognize that the act is wrong in order to feel *aidos*. So what information does *aidos* provide? *Aidos* emphasizes and makes us internalize the judgment that the act is wrong…

(3) *Aidos* sets us thinking what *should have been* done. It also provides context clues to the alternatives within the situation…

(4) *Aidos* develops the learner's ability to judge acts in new situations, too. First, one person can feel *aidos* for another person's act if the former identifies somehow with the latter. Fiction and friendship allow people to feel *aidos* for the acts of others. Thus, through vicarious *aidos* people come to recognize that certain acts are wrong and discover which acts are right without actually performing any of these acts. Second, *aidos* has a prospective as well as a retrospective sense. One can feel *aidos* with respect to an act that one is considering, but has not yet performed.[113]

It is very clear that the rational faculty is involved and developed in the stage of shame. Feeling shame presupposes the general knowledge of what is right or wrong. Shame enables people to identify the characteristics of wrong action and internalize the judgment of the wrong action; it stimulates moral learners to consider and find the right alternatives. Gradually, then, moral learners promote their judgments of both what is right and what is wrong with the eye of experience.[114] They will also apply the ability to judging acts in new situations. The experience of friends as "the other self in mirror" and the *phantasia* of the similar action will develop the ability to identify increasingly more new situations. At last, Curzer concludes that, "Prompted

[113] Curzer (2002), pp. 160-1.

[114] Curzer emphasizes here that, unlike Burnyeat's account of moral development, the shame-account need not fall back on "learning" and "really learning" what is noble or which is wrong. He claims that the moral learner himself or herself (rather than a teacher), pushed by shame, identifies (or intends to identify) virtuous acts. However, I think that Curzer misfires again here. Burnyeat emphasizes the very early stage in which the learner should learn what is noble, and then he can feel shame for the wrong actions. Curzer himself also admits that the shame-feeler presupposes the judgment of right or wrong, and this kind of judgment should be made upon a very early basis—namely, he should learn what is right or wrong in a minimal sense. This does not contradict Burnyeat.

by *aidos* the generous-minded gradually come to choose, not just the acts they think are virtuous, but the acts that really are virtuous. They make the right choices."[115]

According the above picture, moral learners in this stage could have integrated the *OL* into their own understanding since they can make the right choices with the aid of shame, even in a new situation. They will apply the general knowledge into a particular situation to make a moral judgment or moral decision. Although they might still feel or act wrongly, this would just be due to their passions, which lead them to act wrongly despite their making the right decisions. It is only because we lack training that we are still sometimes slaves to our passions.[116] In this picture, the generous-minded are able to make the right choices on the grounds of grasping, at least partially, "the because," which can tell moral learners which feeling or desire is right. However, due to lack of a stable state, they would still act wrongly. From this phase onward, moral learners can not only understand the *OL*, but also can generate the *OL* on their own occasionally. Here, the *OL* is determined as the right practical reasoning or the right practical calculation.

It is fairly clear that calculative activity is involved and developed in shame-producing actions—that is, rational activity is also involved in and contributes to the process of acquiring virtue. However, whether it is adequate in this stage to make the right decisions, as Curzer claims, is so far very questionable. In what sense do we understand "right decisions"? How does this process of "making right decisions" work exactly? In addition, in this process, how does general knowledge, such as rules or principles, become involved in "making the right decisions"?

Before I proceed to these questions, I will make one small conclusion to clarify my position. I accept Curzer's basic idea of his analysis of shame, but I do not accept either his view of the origin of shame or the stage of moral development where shame works. Firstly, as I have argued above, I believe that the moral learner in the stage

[115] Curzer (2002), p. 161.

[116] Curzer thinks the lack of an understanding of why virtuous actions are virtuous is also a reason that we yield to passion. However, I do not think that understanding will be helpful to persuade the passion, but it is right to say that understanding "the because" is the standard to distinguish between generous-minded and *akrasia*.

where shame comes into play has already acquired "the that." Secondly, Curzer thinks of shame as the painful internalization of punishment, while I believe this view is just one possibility among many. For those who are born into good, virtuous families and are brought up well, it is not necessary to have the process of the internalization of punishment. They would acquire "the that" in such circumstances through the gentle promptings of parents rather than through punishment.

According to my analysis, the acquisition of "the that" is still kind of mechanical. "The that" is not, however, purely mechanical like a machine receiving an order and putting out an act. The capacity for rational reasoning exists already, but is not yet developed usefully for moral learning. I call this stage "habituation 1." In order to acquire "the that," learners of morality should experience as many different situations as possible and just follow what the instructor tells them—the main task in habituation 1 is to follow the guidance to gather the basic idea of what is just or good, not to understand why.[117] In this stage, if the *OL* were one form of practical reasoning, it would be meaningless for moral learners, for they cannot understand this inference sequence. They would just follow the conclusion that the inference made or, at most, get some part of this inference (indication of trying to get "the why").

After moral learners have acquired a basic idea of what is just or good, they will automatically gain the feeling of shame. In the stage of shame, we are beginning to use our capacity for rational thought and to make choices for ourselves about acting virtuously. However, in this stage, even if we could make some right choices according to our own rational capacity, we might submit to our feelings and, in the end, be swayed by our feelings to take the wrong (or rather, intemperate) action. Therefore, we still need habituation to create harmony between reason and passion. I call this stage "habituation 2," where we need much repetition of the right action, which the practical reasoning tells us in order to form the firm and stable state. In this stage, even if our feelings make us act intemperately, the shame we experience later will remind us that we have acted wrongly and can be used to stop us from repeating our wrongdoing. Thus, shame can reinforce habituation 2. Therefore, the rational

[117] I will not exclude practice in this stage at all, rather only emphasize that to achieve the basic idea of what is noble or good is the sufficient condition to have "the that."

reasoning process that always follows shame will also reinforce habituation 2.

However, even though shame and rational thought perform perfectly in this stage, we will face many new situations where we have to figure out the right thing to do. In other words, we need to learn to make decisions by ourselves. However, in this stage in which we understand that we are making the right decisions, the criteria according to which we are making decisions is still not clear. We might gain a rough idea, though, if we consider the fact that the capacity to recognize right decisions is developed by practical reasoning from the shame stage onward, and this practical reasoning can reinforce habituation 2. Therefore, we can conclude that these two conditions, deciding to act rightly and attaining a firm state of goodness, are very closely interrelated[118]since both of them actually need the contribution of the rational calculation. If we take the right reasoning or even deliberation in Aristotle's strict meaning, as the *OL* here, it would be clear how the *OL* builds up the virtuous state through doing virtuous action, which is *prohairetic*. This interpretation will also put us one step nearer to another important Aristotelian doctrine, namely that the ethical virtue needs *phronesis*, and vice versa. I will explain this in the beginning of the next chapter.

Now, we must account for *prohairesis*, which involves deliberation, in order to explore the contribution of this deliberation-*prohairesis* process to the virtue-acquiring stage and virtue-acquired stage. I consider the deliberation as a form of the reasoning process here, since Aristotle, first of all, confines this term in the structure of means-end in *EN* III. The job of deliberation is to calculatively find the means to fulfil the end of agent. Outside this means-end structure, we may have many other forms of the reasoning process. But in the following section, I will argue that the deliberation in this structure can be a promising candidate of the *OL* for moral learners from the later stage onward. I will also hold the opinion that the deliberation in this means-end form of reasoning process is not necessary to preclude that other forms of the reasoning process will also be involved in this structure. I will argue this point in detail in the next chapter—namely, that the Aristotelian deliberation in the means-end structure can also contain the syllogistic form of the reasoning process.

[118] Cf. Sarah Broadie/Rowe (2002), pp. 300-1.

The syllogism or deductive form, which involves universal rules in its premise, actually functions behind the means-end structure, and only this whole picture can provide an explanatory account for action. Now let us first grasp the basic means-end structure of deliberation process in the following section.

4. Deliberation and *Prohairesis*

Aristotle claims that being able to make right choices or decisions (*prohairesis*) is most proper to virtue and the distinguishing mark of the virtuous man.[119] Aristotle defines moral virtue as a "*hexis prohairetike*," that is, a state that is *prohairetic*.[120] He places the discussion of *prohairesis* after his analysis of the voluntary in *EN* III 2 and tells us that *prohairesis* is different from a voluntary choice. *Prohairesis* seems to need more rational calculation than voluntary.[121] Aristotle envisages *prohairesis* as one of the conditions of virtue. In addition, he also considers it as an important factor for the best kind of friendship, *ethike philia*.[122] Aristotle also says this when he argues that we decide on good *or bad* things and that people sometimes choose what they should not choose. We can compare this conception with his discussion of *akrates* and *enkrates*; the *enkrates* act on decision, while *akrates* do not.[123] The beginning of *EN* VI seems to tell us that *prohairesis* also takes part in the intellectual virtue.[124] *Prohairesis* appears almost everywhere and definitely stays a very central part in all these important issues—but what is *prohairesis*?

Here, I will not propose any new interpretation of this concept; rather, I will provide a basic analysis in order to identify whether moral learners can contain the *OL* in themselves or, precisely, whether the *prohairesis* of moral learners can indicate the function of the *OL*. In *EN* III 3, Aristotle defines *prohairesis* as deliberative desire (βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις).[125] From this definition, we can see that two elements are

[119] *EN* II 4, 1105a31-32; II 5, 1106a2-4; III 2, 1111b5; VIII 13, 1163a22-23; *Rhet.* I 9, 1367b22-23.

[120] *EN* II 6, 1106b36-a2; *EE* II 10, 1227b5-11.

[121] *EN* III 2, 1111b6-10.

[122] *EN* VIII 5, 1157B30-31; *EE* VII 10, 1243B9-10.

[123] *EN* III 2, 1112a1-3, 7-11; 1111b14-15.

[124] *EN* VI 2, 1139a25ff.

[125] *EN* III 3, 1113a10-11; see also *EN* V I2, 1139a22-26.

required for *prohairesis*, namely, deliberation and desire. *Prohairesis* is a sort of desire—not simply irrational desire, but rather desire that is always combined with rational calculation. However, here we can have at least two different readings of *prohairesis*: the first I call "basic reading," the second one "advanced reading." The basic reading defines *orexis,* the desire in *prohairesis,* as the outcome of the deliberation, while the end is set by a wish, *boulesis*. For example, I have an end, E, which is set by my wish. In order to fulfill E, my deliberation tells me that I should do a, b, and c. Then I have a *prohairesis*—namely, the decision to do a, b, and c.

This basic reading is surely not wrong, but neither is it complete. We still need the advanced reading. The advanced reading determines the *prohairesis,* and deliberation can also affect the end, which is set by a wish. *Prohairesis* is not only deciding to do a, b, and c, but also will effectively adjust the end that the wish originally sets. The basic reading is only to characterize the motivational aspect of reasoning and deliberation, while the advanced reading also emphasizes the normative or evaluative aspect of the reasoning and deliberation. The motivational function of deliberation is generated by the first-order end, while the normative function can second-orderly regulate the first-order end. If we have only the basic reading here, it would lead us to the Humean position on this issue. However, the Humean Position is reluctant to label Aristotle. Thus, I will argue that the advanced reading has to be engaged in the deliberation-*prohairesis* process.

As briefly mentioned, there are basically two kinds of interpretations of the relationship between the end and deliberation. (1) We might take a Humean reading (i.e., that reason can only be the slave of the passions, that it serves and obeys the passions).[126] The end is set by one kind of desire (i.e., *boulesis)* according to Aristotle. Reason is merely an instrument to calculate how the end can be achieved. Such calculation is neutral, merely searching for the most effective way to fulfil the end; the effective way is the best way. Thus, under this interpretation, it seems unnecessary to determine this reading in a strict moral sense. Whether the end is good or bad depends on the character of the agent, but means are said to be effective or ineffective. (2) We can envisage the rational calculation itself as a constitutive part of the ends rather than

[126] *Treatise* II. iii. 3.

just instrumental means. Fulfilling and evaluating the end depends on fulfilling and evaluating the constitutive parts. Constituents themselves, unlike the instrumental means, should dictate the ethical value.

4.1. The Means-End or the Constituents-End

The Humean reading does not contradict the meaning of *EN* III3. In *EN* III, deliberation is just technically determined to find the means for the end. We first determine the end and then examine how and by what means to achieve it. The deliberator should find the most effective way to achieve the end (1112b12-17). However, the end is determined by our wish (*boulesis*) (1111b26-31, 1113a15). Wish, as one kind of desire (*orexis*),[127] is sometimes branded as rational by Aristotle, but sometimes as irrational.[128] In the *EN* III 3, it seems to be irrational desire since Aristotle says there that the wish itself can be for what is impossible or something unachievable (1111b22-26). The rational desire should be called *prohairesis* in his ethics since it is defined as deliberative desire (βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις). The irrational desire should be restrained by the rational deliberation. However, this restriction is only for whether there are any means to achieve the end, not whether the action will have a right or just outcome.

This Humean interpretation places desire in the most important position, and reason just provides the means to the end. It would be hard, though, to label it as Aristotelian.[129] *EN* I 13 seems to have already established the inverse of Hume's

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[127] *De. Motu.* 700b22, βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις; however, a few lines later, Aristotle seems to put *boulesis* together with *orexis* as contrasts with *epithumia* and *thumos*. τὰ μὲν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν ἢ βούλησιν (701a37-b1). Here, I take *orexis* as genus of the *epithumia*, *thumos*, and *boulesis*.

[128] *Boulesis* as irrational*: Pol.* 1334b21, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

As rational: *Top.* 126a13, πᾶσα γὰρ βούλησις ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ; *Rhet.* 1369 a1-2, τὰ μὲνδιὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλογον· ἔστιν δ' ἡ μὲνβούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ' ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἄλογοι δ' ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία.

[129] Before the first decade of the 19th century, this Humean reading was favored by some great commentators; see Walter, Zeller, and Burnet. Nowadays, however, very few people still stick to this standpoint (e.g., Fotenbaugh).

metaphor; it tells us that desire should obey reason.[130] Aristotle describes the desiderative part sharing reason as a son listening to or obeying his father or one friend listening to or obeying another friend. In order to reach the purpose of this "listening to" and "obeying," there are many ways or means introduced by Aristotle here in this passage—namely, persuading, giving advice, warning or reproofing, and exhorting. We see some of these ways—such as persuading and advice-giving—demand the ability of understanding of the persuaded. This is the analogical description of the relationship of the desiderative part to the rational part. Meanwhile, this naturally provides a clue that, in the virtue-acquiring process, moral learners probably also actively use the rational ability to understand and consider the *OL* given by the practical wise man rather than a simply mechanical obeying-process. However, this is only a clue from the analogical description of this passage. In order to prove that rational activity works in this virtue-acquiring stage, I must closely examine how moral learners make moral decisions.

Several other passages show that reason and desire should have at least the same importance in *prohairesis*.[131] The Humean understanding of *prohairesis* seems not to be the correct one, and the account of deliberation in *EN* III, which is understood as a means to an end, is not complete. As recent research indicates, "The things promoting the end (*ta pros to telos*)" could be the instrumental means leading to an end, but also could be the parts that constitute the end.[132] In the means-end mode, the emphasis is placed more on the end than on the means. On the other hand, if the realization of the end is made up of the things leading to the end, the importance moves to the constituents rather than to the end itself. In the latter case, the end could only be a rubric concept that guides the agent to deliberate about the concrete actions to fulfil it, but figuring out the concrete action is the most difficult and important part in this process. In *EN* III, Aristotle might loosely include these two readings in his usage of "the things promoting to the end," or perhaps Aristotle is attempting to use the

[130] What Aristotle says in his *Metaphysics* can also give us a general guide: "Desire is grounded by opinion, rather than opinion by desire; for thinking is the starting point." (*Meta.* 12.7, 1072a29-30)

[131] *EN* VI 2, 1139b4-5, διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. *DA* III 10, 433 a21-22, εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. *De. Motu.* 6, 700b23, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως.

[132] See Sorabji, in Rorty (1980), p. 202; Wiggins, in Rorty (1980), p. 224.

means-end mode to illuminate the obscurities of the constituents-end mode, as Wiggins argues.[133] In this case, we should focus more on deliberating what constitutes *eudaemonia* (i.e., in a given context, which of several possible courses of action would conform most closely to the ideal they hold up for themselves, or the kind of life they want to lead). The end merely functions, in this case, as a rubric or compass to guide the deliberative process.

Most contemporary scholars accept the constituents-end model. In this mode, since we deliberate about the constituents, we also, in a loose sense, deliberate about the ends themselves.[134] However, we do not deliberate about *eudaemonia* since it cannot be the constituent of any further end.[135] Anything promoting *eudaemonia* can be the object of deliberation (i.e., the means or the constituents of *eudaemonia*). The moral learners in the shame stage have decided to accept virtue; they have a basic idea of what is good, but they have not acquired "the why" and still have difficulties reading the different particular situations. Is it possible to also say that they have the idea of the right end already? On the one hand, the answer might be yes because they have decided to live a good and virtuous life, which is envisaged as the ultimate goal. A happy life (*eudaemonia*) is their right and ultimate end. On the other hand, the answer might be no because a good or virtuous life is made up of all the individual concrete situations—merely having grasped the general concept of virtue is not enough. However, it is hard for a moral learner to have already learned the virtuous choices for all subordinate situations. In *EN* VI, Aristotle tells us that the capacity to read a particular situation belongs to *phronimos*: the one who possess the practical wisdom actually possesses full virtue. Thus, for moral learners, having only general ideas of the ultimate end might not be a guarantee for knowing the concrete good end in particular situations. Even though they can deliberate in this stage, they cannot always control their desires. Thus, they would find it difficult to make the right decision on these concrete constituents. Further, even if they can make the right decision, they do not always do the right actions since they have not acquired a firm, stable state. They

[133] Wiggins in Rorty (1980), p. 224.

[134] Another sense of deliberating about ends is that what is a means to an end in this chain of deliberation can, in another chain, be an end. However, both of these cases of deliberating ends are not in the strict sense.

[135] Cf. Nussbaum (1986), she claims that Aristotle "does not hold that ultimate ends cannot be the objects of rational deliberation." This claim is not correct according the doctrine of *EN* III3, p. 162.

can make the right decisions occasionally when they meet familiar situations, and they can make right actions when they have a consistent state between reason and desires.

Does deliberation make some contribution to recognizing the new situation and to forming the firm state, though? According my analysis of shame, the deliberation or, reasoning activity in general, is developed by the stimulation of shame, and this deliberation also, in turn, helps moral learners to control feelings to an appropriate degree. In addition, according to the constituents-end reading, constituents are important and can affect the end. Further, the production of deliberation, namely *prohairesis* in the basic reading, is the starting point of the constituents for the end. In this model, deliberation has to make a very decisive contribution to the end. In other words, the end, to some extent, depends on the deliberation and the *prohairesis* in the advanced reading. Thus, the function of *prohairesis* is reasonably enlarged. Deliberation can influence the end. The end is not only set up by the irrational desire, but also from the reasoning activity. The firm state is also built through training the harmony of reason and desire. This explains the advanced reading of *prohairesis*.

4.2. Deliberation and the *Orthos Logos*

If the means-end model is right for Aristotle, it seems that the moral learners can achieve their ultimate end through deliberation. They have a correct end; the job of deliberation is only to find the means to fulfil that end. It seems very doable—Aristotle calls it the "starting point of deliberation"—to find the means, step by step, starting from the end. For instance, moral learner L, who is already in the shame stage, decides to accept virtue and pursue his *eudaemonia*. He thinks that, as a doctor, he will achieve the *eudaemonia* (having the ultimate end) since he would be able to help other people (becoming virtuous) and would, therefore, feel absolutely happy. Thus, he studies hard, applies to medical school, and so on (deliberating about the means). Finally, he graduates and receives a license to practice medicine. Thus, we could say that he has achieved his *eudaemonia*. In this model, when the ultimate end is set, every action is done well according to the right deliberation or the correct planning of a good life in order to achieve the end. The deliberation seems to play the role of the *OL* well in this model.

However, as we discussed before, the means-end model is not complete for Aristotle, for his doctrine of deliberation has another aspect: constituents-end. From this point of view, we can diagnose a few problems in the process of deliberation for moral learners. The main problem here might be that, for the moral learner, L, to achieve *eudaemonia*, he should achieve the virtuous state before or right after he becomes a doctor since virtue is one of the main constituents of the ultimate end, *eudaemonia*. He does not achieve the virtuous state during this process if he cannot resist temptation (e.g., money). For instance, if he is still continent (*enkratic,* e.g., wanting to earn more money through providing unnecessary treatments, yet not acting on his desire) or is incontinent (*akratic,* e.g., wanting to earn more money through providing unnecessary treatments and doing so). Even worse, the process becomes a vice (e.g., pursuing medicine not for health, but rather for the money). In any of these cases, Aristotle would definitely not define L as a happy person. For moral learners, and even for *enkratics* and *akratics*, their deliberation functions exactly as the *OL*, which guides them to build virtuous character, although the right deliberation and decision cannot guarantee they will perform the right action before achieving the virtuous state. However, in the case of vice, we may confirm that there is also deliberation at work there, but only for the vicious end. Thus, we will not determine the deliberation there as the *OL*. Therefore, deliberation can be determined as the *OL* only if moral learners have acquired "the that" and are ready to be possessed by virtue.

The second problem would be that L might not be able to reason out all the other necessary conditions and constituents of *eudaemonia* (e.g., wealth, health, friendship, and so on) besides virtue. L wants to be a good doctor and a virtuous person, but he does not care much about his own health and has no time to take care of family and friends. Finally, he becomes a good and virtuous doctor; however, his own health has become a very serious problem, and he is absolutely isolated from society. Could we say that he has achieved his *eudaemonia*? We could not, and Aristotle would agree since L should be responsible for his own health and social status. In this case, the *OL* qua deliberation seems to work only for part of, not the whole constituents of the ultimate end. What determines how moral learners deliberate to choose this or that among many other good things, all of which are important for their ends, after all?

Could we determine one would be happy, if he only achieved one of the most important constituent elements?

From the first problem, it is clear that moral learners cannot ensure that they will achieve the ultimate end, even though they have decided to accept virtue and to lead happy lives. They should first grow to be truly virtuous people. This case also seems to confirm that habituation is more important than rational calculation. From the earlier example, L can deliberate well, but he seems to need more habituation (especially what I call habituation 2) to build a firm state. From the second problem, it is clear that, even though deliberation can help L be virtuous, only deliberation seems to make it difficult for him achieve the full *eudaemonia*.

However, according to my analysis of *prohairesis*, the over-simplified judgment that habituation is more important than rational calculation is not fair for L. Of course, as a moral learner, L needs habituation (both habituation 1 and 2) even though he is a moral learner in the shame stage. However, in the shame stage, he has already acquired "the that." If he wants to be a doctor, he must have acquired the basic idea of what a good doctor should do (he might acquire "the that" through education, traditional precepts, or something else). Thus, when he faces, for example, temptation, he can tell right from wrong; he will deliberatively make a choice. He might struggle and think, "If I earn money in this way, it is wrong. It would not help me to be virtuous, and it would damage my happiness. However, if I do not accept money, I will be poorer than other doctors, and it might keep me from finding a wife." This struggle, though, is a kind of rational calculation, some of the pieces of which even amount to deliberation. This rational calculation helps make clear which choice is, in fact, right.

The rational calculation also helps him obtain an even clearer and sounder idea of what is right and wrong than he had before. Based on this clearer idea, he might still chose to do wrong. However, the right choice is also based on this clearer idea, and the good, firm state is based on the repetition of making the right choices (habituation 2). From this point of view, the incontinent and the continent states can be overcome using the right deliberation and repeatedly fulfilling the right *prohairesis*; then, the

continent and incontinent states can transform to the virtuous state. More importantly, rational calculation, at least from the shame stage onward, is actually more fundamental than habituation since the latter relies on the former in the later phase of the moral learning stage, especially in the face of a new moral situation.

In the second problem, we cannot deny the role of deliberation, either. We determine that L, as a moral learner, acquired "the that," so he must have realized that health is also a very important constituent he should seriously deal with—but why has L chosen to lose his health? His deliberation probably told him that a virtuous and good doctor is more important than health and his own social life. If he could get the former, the latter would not be indispensable.

It is true that L surely cannot become a virtuous person solely by aiming to achieve the ultimate end. It is also true that L surely cannot achieve the ultimate end purely through deliberation. He needs habituation to build his virtue, and he needs virtue to guarantee that his deliberation tends in the right direction toward the ultimate end. However, before he achieves virtue, rational calculation or deliberation contributes to making the right choices and is helpful in building the virtuous state through habituation. The end of habituation is to make our feelings and desires harmonize with the right reason. Thus, our feelings and desires are guided and habituated in this deliberative process. Rational calculation or deliberation is effectively directing the feelings and desires in the moral learning stage (especially from the shame stage onward).

Now we can determine whether deliberation is the *OL* or, at least, a kind of *OL*. Let us recall the basic characteristics of the *OL*: (1) the *OL* determines the intermediate for the right action in a particular situation and (2) the *OL* regulates the feeling into an appropriate degree in a given situation. According to my analysis above, the action of moral learners is virtue-building action; and deliberation seems to be very important (or even decisive) for this kind of action in the later stage of the moral learning process. Right virtue-building action aims to build the firm state, implying the agreement of feelings and reason. Deliberation is the main contributor in the later stage of the moral learning process leading to this agreement. The task of deliberation

is to identify this intermediate for action and regulate the feelings in a given moral situation for moral learners. Thus, we seem to be able to conclude here that deliberation is the *OL* in the moral learning stage (from the shame stage on). However, at the same time, we might not rightly deliberate every constituent to achieve the ultimate end. The *OL* qua deliberation seems to be valid only occasionally.

However, we should not have ignored one point I mentioned earlier in this chapter. We cannot ignore the role of proposition, both conventionally universal rules and a particular prescription, such as a concrete command from parents in shaping moral learners. As I showed above, acquiring "the that" is a very mechanical process in the first stage. Moral learners would only be able to follow the particular prescription. Even in this stage, moral learners often ask why, and empirical observation tells us that the instructor's explanations usually appeal to a moral general formulation (e.g., Question: Why shouldn't I beat him? Answer: Because beating is not right. /Question: Why shouldn't I pick fruit from my neighbor's garden? Answer: We should not take things from other people). Moreover, there are some universal rules (e.g., "do not kill," "do not steal," and so on) that are also important guides of our actions. In the shame stage, having acquired "the that," moral learners begin to use their rational faculty to calculate and deliberate. They reflect on these rules and justify, modify, or even reject these rules through calculation and deliberation.

However, moral learners in this earlier stage cannot issue a complete reasoning process or syllogism by themselves or cannot understand the reasoning process of the practical wise man to explain why this or that action should be done. Meanwhile for them, though, taking action does not simply mean to follow the particular proposition, such as a command or order, since the rational reflective ability would naturally have more or less reaction to the command and ask why. Therefore, we cannot determine the deliberation as the *OL* in this earlier stage without any qualification since moral learners can only follow the particular proposition with limited ability of rational reflection. We cannot resist the guidance of the function of universal rules and particular prescription. Thus, even though the *OL* is, per se, the deliberation or syllogism, in the moral leaning stage, especially in the earlier phase, the complete syllogism would degenerate into part of the syllogism, such as a piece of proposition

for moral learners.

However, a universal rule can neither be used directly in every particular situation, nor can the particular prescription explain why that should be done. The application of the rules in an unfamiliar situation and the explanation of why have to appeal to the reasoning activity. The mature reasoning activity is more fundamental than the universal rule or the particular prescription. From the shame stage on, moral learners can use their deliberation to adjust (or even abandon) the rule or plan according to the desired end and a given concrete situation. This capacity is also developed from the shame stage on and gradually becomes a viable judging capacity. It is only in the sense of practical reasoning of *phronimos* that we can call it *OL* in a strict sense. However, we have seen that our reasoning capacity is growing toward this direction.

5. Conclusive Suggestion

The definition of the *OL* in the virtue-acquiring stage seems changeable. According to my analysis, at the very beginning of the moral learning stage, the *OL* for moral learners might preferably be (1) a type of formulation or articulated declaration (e.g., the guidance as a request or command of the moral guider), and this guidance could be (1a) a proposition either about a universal rule or (1b) about a particular situation. Since in this very beginning stage of moral learning, moral learners have not acquired "the that," they cannot actively use their reasoning to make any moral judgment. What they can do, though, is simply imitate and follow the guidance of the moral guider—or as Aristotle defines it, the one who possesses the practical wisdom, or *phronimos*. This process is more mechanical than rationally reflective, although the rational activity is already somewhat involved.

In the later stage of moral leaning (e.g., from the shame stage onward), the *OL* could also possibly be (1) a proposition about universal rules or laws, or a particular situation that the moral learners would simply follow in some situations. It also could occasionally be (2) the good deliberation or reasoning, or well-defined life planning that allows moral learners to rightly make moral judgments in familiar situations. They use rational activity to help them make the right choices in the later stage, but

they cannot make the right choices all the time since they might not have learned all the features of the particular situations or cannot have a right end (or right desire) in every particular situation. They have decided to lead a virtuous life and have accepted *eudaemonia* as the ultimate end.

However, the capacity to make the right choice in every situation is still in training, and the rational faculty also has the task of making a decision that accords with the emotions. We also, though, have to recognize the contribution of calculation and deliberation in this moral learning stage. We can determine it as a kind of *OL* in a loose sense, but it is growing in the right direction. When it can deal well with every particular situation, we can call it *OL* in the strict sense. Since the application of the plan and rule in particular situations depends on our deliberation, and the firm state also depends somewhat on deliberation and decision-making in the later stage, I determine deliberation to be more fundamental than proposition in the later stage of moral learning.

We can see that rational activity of moral learners is maturing during the learning process; already in the very beginning stage, through imitation, the rational activity is growing. In addition, the growing rational activity and ever-increasing reliance on the reasoning activity to acquire virtue is already contained in human nature. Although we cannot acquire virtue by nature, possession of virtue is the state most in accordance with human nature. Thus far, I have addressed the *OL* in the moral learning stage. Following the discussion established in this chapter, I will continue to argue in the next chapter that the practical reasoning of *phronimos* is the *OL,* per se, in the virtue-acquired stage.

Chapter 4: The *Orthos Logos* in the Virtue-Acquired Stage

In the previous chapter, I discussed the definition and function of the *orthos logos (OL)* in the virtue-acquiring stage. In the virtue-acquiring stage, the *OL* appears different things for moral learners: at the very beginning of the learning process it may be propositional in the form of rules or laws, particular prescriptions, or an incomplete piece of the reasoning sequence for a given particular situation; at the later stage of the moral learning process, the *OL* can *occasionally* be a reasoning process. Rational activity is enhanced in the virtue-acquiring stage during which moral learners better understand the genuine *OL*, namely, the *OL* of the practically wise man. They can also issue the reasoning sequence (occasionally) to identify the "right action" and its justification for the given particular situation.

In this chapter, I will argue that the right reasoning process of fully virtuous men is the real *OL* in the virtue-acquired stage. In Aristotle's ethical context, this reasoning process is motived by a desired end. The end wished by virtuous people is noble and worthy of chasing. Further, the reasoning process itself functions in the form of the deliberation (cf. Ch. 3) and is deployed in order to identify the means to fulfilling the noble end. The right deliberation of virtuous people, I will argue, can also be identified with a kind of deductive or syllogistic reasoning process to establish an explanation for the action required. This syllogistic reasoning concerned with action is usually called practical syllogism.[136]

[136] As Kenny already pointed out, Aristotle himself does not use the term "practical syllogism"; Kenny (1979), Most scholars agree that the relationship between deliberation and practical syllogism can be identified in some way, but D. J. Allan (1955), J. Cooper (1975), and Corcilius (2008a, b) deny the identification, pp. 111-2.

Practical syllogism is comprised of the knowledge of universal rules and of particular situations. Practical syllogism altogether tells us not only what action should be done, but also explains to us why it should be done according to the concrete situation at hand. This prescriptive and explanatory account conforms to the moral function of the *OL*. I will argue accordingly that the right practical syllogism or deliberation of the fully virtuous man, or the activity of *phronesis*, is the best candidate for the real definition of the *OL*.

Let us first address the point I raised at the end of Chapter 2: because the ethical virtue is determined by the *OL* and the *OL* is the right practical reasoning, and the right end of the reasoning is guaranteed by the ethical virtue (otherwise reasoning could be used for good or bad), then there is an"explanatory circle" between ethical virtue and the *OL*. Which of the two is dependent upon the other is, to this effect, entirely unclear.[137]

Aristotle seems to endorse yet another circular argument related to my research. The right practical deliberation *(euboulia)* which is the activity of the intellectual virtue, *phronesis*, is also circularly connected with ethical virtue. Aristotle says that without the *phronesis* there is no ethical good, and without ethical virtue there is no *phronesis*. This claim itself appears to be circular, though Aristotle does not seem to consider it to be vicious. In the discussion below, by disclosing the relationship between the *OL* and *phronesis*, I will show that circle between the *OL* and ethical virtue functions exactly like the circle between *phronesis* and ethical virtue.

If we consider the *OL* to be the right practical deliberation qua the activity of *phronesis*, we can effectively avoid creating a circle between the ethical virtue and the

[137] The normative problem of the *logos* was addressed in Chapter 3. The normative depends on ethical virtue rather than the fact that the *logos*, by nature, could be normative. This point was addressed with respect to the second disadvantage, since in the virtue-acquired stage, we do not examine whether the moral learning process is simply a psychic training or something else (e.g., the *OL* in the virtue-acquiring stage.) I argued that moral training is part of the training of the psychic faculty, but other factors (such as various forms of moral guidance) also play an important role in the moral learning process. Having established this argument allows me in this chapter to focus on the result of this moral training, namely, the mature form of the rational activity: the exercise of *phronesis*.

OL: ethical virtue makes the goal of deliberation right, and deliberation finds the right action in given particular situation (i.e., the intermediate) serves ethical virtue. Moreover, my interpretation will shed more light on the circle between *phronesis* and ethical virtue; namely, I insist that virtue first provides the right goal for *phronesis* while the virtuous action appropriate for the situation is identified via the activity of *phronesis*, i.e., through right deliberation. This right action generated by *phronesis* then also reinforces and consolidates the virtuous state. This might not be the only positive function of *phronesis* in regards to ethical virtue, but it is an important one (and one compatible with any other positive contribution of *phronesis* to ethical virtue.) Let us put aside the issue of virtue making goals "right", for now, and rather focus on the contribution of *phronesis* to ethical virtue to determine how the activity of *phronesis* can function qua the *OL*.

In order to achieve my goal, I first must carefully examine the meaning of the activity of *phronesis*, which necessitates a closer look at what Aristotle says about the *phronesis* and its features, especially in terms of its relation to ethical virtue. I will also attempt to determine based on these features whether the activity of *phronesis* itself can lead to a morally right decision and right action in a particular situation. Finally, I will establish my argument that the identification between *phronesis* and the *OL* is actually dependent on the identification between the activity of *phronesis* and the *OL* in the virtue-acquired stage. I will also respond to the most notable hypothetical challenges to my interpretation.

1. *Phronesis*: An Outline

Phronesis is a popular word in antiquity. It is quite often used in the sense of wisdom, reasoning, or thinking behind the search for truth. In this sense, it is often used interchangeably with the word *sophia*.[138] Aristotle uses this word also in this sense in

[138] In Plato's *Rep*., for example, the verb form *phronein* and *Sophia* are utilized interchangeably, but sometimes *sophia* is also used in the practical domain where *phronesis* is expected, e.g., *prot.* 321d, 329e, *Rep.* 365d, 427e, 429a, 443e.

several places throughout his work,[139] but in the *EN*, especially in the common books of the *EN* and *EE*, it is defined as an intellectual virtue. This intellectual virtue, something special, is connected with ethical virtue (in the second book of *EE*, for example, it is identified with one of ethical virtues.) Ethical virtue makes ends right, and *phronesis* provides the means to fulfill the ends. In this context, *phronesis* is usually called "practical wisdom".

1.1 *Phronesis* and Ethical Virtue

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *phronesis* is first known as one of the intellectual virtues.[140] At the end of *EN* I 13 Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue, namely, ethical virtue and intellectual virtue; and *phronesis* is listed together with wisdom (σοφία) and cleverness (σύνεσιν) as an example of the intellectual virtues (1103a5-6). *Phronesis* does not appear before Book VI, where Aristotle discusses the intellectual virtues in detail. In this central Book, nonetheless, Aristotle endows *phronesis* with a very important and special function. *Phronesis* as an intellectual virtue should be separate from other ethical virtues, since intellectual virtue and ethical virtue are established on different parts of the soul: one strictly rational, and the other desiderative which is open to reason. Throughout this discussion, though, *phronesis* is essentially bound to the ethical virtues. This seems to correspond to a doctrine under which the desiderative part of the soul should listen to the rational part as a son listen to his father. *Phronesis* as an intellectual virtue can guide ethical virtue (like a father guides his son). If we take a close look at Aristotle's articulation on the relation between *phronesis* and the ethical virtue, however, the relation is much more complex than the relation between two parts of the soul.

In *EN* VI 13, Aristotle says:

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[139] E.g., *Meta.* 982b24; 1009b13, 32; 1078b15; *Cael.* 298b23. The word *Sophia* in *Corpus Aristotelium* appears fairly infrequently, almost only in *Meta., EN* VI, X and *MM* I 34, *Hist. An*. 558a29, *Meteor.* 353a35, b6.

[140] In *EN phronesis* seems to be a very important intellectual virtue. Aristotle does not give us a particularly consistent account of *phronesis* in his works. 1) In his metaphysical and biological works he ascribes *phronesis* even to non-rational animals (*Meta*. I 1, 980a27-b25; *HA* IX, 611a16, 612a3, b1; *PA* II, 648a6ff; *GA* III, 753a11-12); this view is repeated in *EN* VI 7, 1141a26-26. 2) In *EE* II 3, 1221a10, *phronesis* appears in a list of ethical virtues. 3) Even in the *EN* itself, Aristotle contrasts *phronesis* and virtue in general, seeming to imply that *phronesis* is not a virtue at all (*EN* I 8, 1098b24). Special thanks to Sarah Broadie for pointing out this somewhat inconsistent definition of the *phronesis* to me.

(Passage 19)
δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral excellence. (1144b30-32)

This passage summarizes the interrelation between *phronesis* and ethical virtue. The acquisition of this intellectual virtue, i.e., *phronesis*, can be fulfilled only with the aid of the ethical virtue; at the same time, the ethical virtue is impossible without practical wisdom. It is not possible to possess one without the other.

This argument is supported by several of Aristotle's descriptions of each side of the relationship. Concerning the statement that ethical virtue is the result of *prohairesis* or that ethical virtue follows reason, which the practical wise man tells us, the most important passage is Passage 3 (which I quoted in Chapter 1) where Aristotle defines ethical virtue as a state concerned with decision residing in a mean which is determined by *logos* by the man of practical wisdom.[141] From these passages, the rational activity or (properly) practical reasoning is the principle of ethical virtue. However, Aristotle also says several times that practical wisdom is acquired with the aid of ethical virtue or that without ethical virtue there is no practical wisdom, e.g., in 1144a28-31, "Practical wisdom is not the faculty, but it does not exist without this faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of excellence as has been said and is plain."[142] These passages imply that the ethical virtue or "good character" is the foundation for practical wisdom. In Passage 19, Aristotle concludes that "it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral excellence." We could ask here

[141] Other passages on this point: *EN* 1102b25ff, 1138b5ff.

[142] Other passages on this point: *EN* 1144a7-9, 20; 1151a17-19; *EE* 1227b35-36.

how it is possible to acquire both at the same time; a mysterious circle has formed. How do the two entities operate in tandem?[143]

The way to solve this circular reasoning is to establish one of the two components as the true foundation of the other. As discussed in earlier chapters (Ch. 3 in particular,) most scholars nowadays consider the practical reasoning as the leading (foundational) part; I call this camp the "intellectualists".[144] By contrast, in the early 19th century, several important scholars envisioned the ethical virtue as the leading part. Fortenbaugh and Moss are the most notable representative of this position. Because this reading highlights the role of the desiderative part of the soul, it is somehow similar to the Humean doctrine under which slavery serves passion. I call proponents of this view "Humeans".[145] In my earlier discussion, I made clear that my position is, in principle, in accordance with that of the intellectualists. The specific reading endorsed by Aristotle himself is not my main concern here, however, so I will not go into the debate in detail.[146] Rather, I will simply accept this interrelation between

[143] Some people would not take this problem seriously at all, or create solely extrinsic distinction between them. Kenny for example, tries to eliminate the problem by creating an analogy of husband and wife; only after marrying do they acquire the names "husband" and "wife" (1978), p. 188.

[144] See Wiggins and Sorabji in Rorty (1980), etc..

[145] Burnet (1900), Zeller (1960), Walter (1874), Fortenbaugh (1969), and Moss (2011).

[146] According to my analysis in Chapter 3, I resolve the circular argument by insisting that ethical virtue and practical wisdom grow together from immaturity into maturity simultaneously. Neither can exist separately from the acquisition process through the mature stage. Aristotle defines practical wisdom as good deliberation and ethical virtue as a firm state achieved from habituation. In my model, I define two kinds of habituation. Habituation (1), in the earlier stage of moral learning, exists to inform the learner of what is just or good but not why it is good; moral learners must gain experience while following good instructions. In the later stage, the learner begins to use his or her capacity for rational thought and make independent choices to act virtuously. In this stage, deliberation can make significant contribution to habituation; deliberation now can provide the right judgment or decision in familiar or even unfamiliar situations. A good and firm state is built through the repetition of right actions. Thus, deliberation is the foundation of the good state. In this sense, ethical virtue necessitates good deliberation. However, in this stage, the learner may succumb to raw emotions driving him to do wrong (or intemperate) actions despite his capacity to make right choices according to his rational capacity. To this effect, habituation is still necessary to create harmony between reason and passion. This is the task of Habituation (2), through which right actions must be performed repetitively for the learner to gain a firm state upon which she acts rightly and consistently (firmly). In this way, deliberation necessitates ethical virtue (or a right, firm state.) Deliberation on rightness in action and attaining a firm state of goodness are very closely interrelated. The formation of a firm state involves deliberation, and deliberation is developed during the habituation process.

phronesis and ethical virtue as a fact—a fact upon which my inquiry into the definition of the *OL* in the virtue-acquired stage is based.

So according to this interrelation between *phronesis* and ethical virtue, we should keep in mind the fact that in the virtue-acquired stage, the virtuous person is also the practically wise man. When determining what the *OL* is in this stage, it is as if we are asking what the *OL* is to the practically wise man. Passage 2 (quoted in Chapter 1) seems to explicitly state that the virtuous state is not only in accordance with the *OL*, but also implies the presence of the *OL* and that in this ethical matter the *OL* is *phronesis*. I argued in Chapter 1 that this identification is not without qualification in general; here in Chapter 4, I will assert that in the virtue-acquired stage, this identification becomes critically important: the activity of *phronesis*, namely the right practical reasoning or good deliberation about particular situations, is the *OL*. Ethical virtue is not only in accordance with this right reasoning, but also always present with this right reasoning. This also echoes what 1106b36 (Passage 3, Ch. 1) indicates, namely, that virtue is a prohairetic state.

After we have accepted this circular reasoning between ethical virtue and *phronesis* and the *OL* qua the right practical reasoning or deliberation (which is the activity of *phronesis*,) one is led naturally toward two main questions. First, how could this practical deliberation be useful to ethical virtue? Second, what is the use of ethical virtue for practical deliberation? The answer, briefly, is that the established virtuous state can maintain reasoning or deliberation consistently and in the consistently right direction by making the end right. Deliberation elucidates the means to achieve the end, i.e., the virtuous action in a given situation. In the virtue-acquired stage, rational activity occurs always under the influence of ethical virtue. That is to say, ethical virtue keeps the ends of reasoning and deliberation right while necessitating deliberation to read particular situations correctly and to fulfill the ends with right actions.[147]

In view of how the *OL* qua the activity of *phronesis* contributes to ethical virtue, I will examine in detail what exactly *phronesis* can do to establish ethical virtue. Because

[147] See *EN* VI 12, 1144a8-9; 20-26; 13, 1145a5-6.

Aristotle defines *phronesis* as the capacity for good deliberation, this is mainly about what good deliberation can actually do for ethical virtue and how this good deliberation is conducted per each given situation, as ethical virtue cannot immediately inform the learner of the correct action. (The other aspect, namely, how ethical virtue provides practical wisdom with the right end, is not discussed at length in this thesis.)

We should keep two commitments in mind here: in the virtue-acquired stage, the end that the moral agent desires to achieve is already guaranteed to be right and the feelings of the moral agent to be appropriate regardless of the situation being encountered. Under these commitments, the *phronesis* functions to identify the best means to achieve the right end, i.e., the morally correct action for the particular situation. I will argue that these best means are also by definition the right action for the given situationand the "intermediate" in Aristotle's terminology (which was discussed at length in Chapter 3.) I will go on to argue that right or good deliberation can play well and exactly the role of the *OL*, and that the rightness to which the *OL* refers can be fully explained similarly.

1.2 Phronesis and True *Logos*

Phronesis is also connected with "truth" or that which is "true" in *EN* VI. First, in *EN* VI 3, Aristotle describes five intellectual virtues as the states in which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial; *phronesis* is one of them.[148] Then, in *EN* VI 5, after having introduced deliberation as a function of *phronesis*, he defines *phronesis* as a true state which accompanies *logos* (or as state which accompanies true *logos*) that is concerned with actions which are good or bad for human beings.[149] *Logos* here can be reasonably considered identical to the *logos* in the *OL* qua deliberation. In this sense, *phronesis* is the true deliberative state through which humans identify the right action. This right action is necessary to meet the ends which ethical virtue requires.

[148] ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντετὸναριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· 1139b15-17.

[149] λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. 1140b4-6. In Susemihl's version, the ἀληθῆ modifies the *logos*.

This identification between the *OL* and deliberationcan also be confirmed by another passage in *EN* VI 2, though *phronesis* has not yet appeared.

> (Passage 20)
> ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον)· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.
>
> What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral excellence is a state concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity (for this is the function of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire. (1139a21-31)

In this thesis, I do not probe the exact meaning of practical truth.[150] For the purposes of my argument, I focus only on the necessary condition for this practical truth.[151]

Practical truth involves the combination of the true *logos* and the right desire. The function of true *logos* is to find truth through affirmation and negation. The right desire makes the truth practical through pursuing or avoiding what the *logos*

[150] There is no article in the phrase ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική, therefore, as the ROT translation rightly renders, πρακτική is predicative not attributive. The formulation of "practical truth" is not in conflict with the meaning in the original text, however.

[151] There are many scholars who have made very insightful but also subtly different interpretations of the definition of "practical truth". See Broadie (1991), Lear (2004); Pakaluk (2010).

indicates,[152] so the practical truth entails the agreement of the true *logos* and right desire. This agreement is defined by Aristotle as the good decision or choice (ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία), i.e., the most important characteristic of ethical virtue. A good decision involves both reasoning (*logos*) and desire (*orexis*); the reasoning must be true and the desire be right. They must be in a harmonious agreement, namely, the desire must pursue just what the reasoning asserts. To this effect, the "practical" truth is actually demanded by ethical virtue, which is a state concerned with morally good decisions, while decisions are characterized by deliberative desire. What *phronesis* can and should do is to grasp the *truth* in a particular action via deliberation. So in this sense, *phronesis* is defined as a state of grasping practical truth.

We should bear in mind that this practical truth is achieved through a right decision about the right action in a particular situation. This right decision involves true reasoning (τόν λόγον ἀληθῆ) and right desire (τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν).[153] Within this framework of ethical virtue, this right action which is prescribed by good deliberation is not only the means towards the end, but also actually is the intermediate between deficiency and excess.

We have now moved one important step forward in our inquiry of the definition of the *OL*. The true *logos* in the right decision and the *logos* accompanying the *phronesis* seem very close to the role of the *OL*. Further, the true *logos* motivated by the desired end fits very well the role of the deliberative thinking process in the means-to-end structure. In the passage quoted above, the true *logos* as a condition of good decisions is used with deliberation, also the conditions of decision-making, interchangeably. In the following section, I will further reinforce my argument of the identification between the *OL* and the right deliberation suggested here. The *OL* cannot be a universal rule or particular prescription in the virtue-acquired stage, but only can be

[152] Here, Aristotle implies that there are many different kinds of truth. What only intellect (*dianoia*) affirms or denies is also truth, but it is not practical truth, rather it might be called theoretical truth. Practical truth involves not only the intellect's ability to affirm or deny it, but also the desire (*orexis*) to pursue or avoid it. Practical truth is not merely the combination of theoretical truth with right desire, however, as theoretical truth concerns the eternal and necessary while practical truth can be otherwise. This passage also implies that there should be truth in regards to *techne*, but the nature of this truth is not very clear.

[153] This conforms to Anscombe's (1965) thinking that the action is the carrier of practical truth, p. 157ff.

the right or good deliberation. In this stage, the *OL* 1) is internalized and always present with the moral agent, and 2) tells the moral agent what should be done, and even how and why it should be done under the given circumstances. Only good deliberation, in Aristotle's ethical context, can complete this task.

Next, let us focus on this deliberation-decision process to examine how it can play the role of the *OL* under the doctrine of *phronesis*.

2. *Phronesis*, Good Deliberation, and Practical Syllogism

In this section, I will examine the objective and composition of the deliberation process of *phronimos*, the one possessing *phronesis*. Aristotle calls this deliberation "good deliberation" (*eubolia*). I will show that the characteristics of good deliberation are well-suited to the standard of the moral function of the *OL*.

2.1 *Phronesis* and Good Deliberation

At the very beginning of *EN* VI 5, Aristotle tells us that from the *phronimos* we can see that one of the functions of *phronesis* is to be able to deliberate about things conduce to happiness.

> (Passage 21)
> Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως.
>
> Regarding *practical wisdom* we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general. (1140a24-28)

From this passage, we know that to deliberate well is the characteristic mark of *phronimos*, the man who possesses practical wisdom. *Phronimos* must be able to deliberate about what manner of things is conducive to the "good life" in general (τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως), i.e., what sorts of things are conducive to *eudaemonia*. To Aristotle, virtue of the soul, health, wealth, friendship, and so on are the constituents or necessary conditions of *eudaemonia*.[154] According to Aristotle's words in this passage, *phronimos* should have a comprehensive knowledge of the things conducive to happiness.

This passage emphasizes that a happy life, in general, is the ultimate end which is only achieved by the good deliberation of *phronimos*. The description of the deliberation of *phronimos* seems to be an extension of the account provided in *EN* III 3. First, the task of the good deliberation is indeed to identify the means for the end, but this end is the ultimate one, standing atop the teleological chain. The means for this ultimate end could also be particular ends, e.g. virtue, health, and friendship, which require other deliberative processes to find their appropriate means. These particular ends are the constituents or conditions of the ultimate end. Second, the good deliberation is always undertaken according to a morally good end: good deliberation is not only instrumentally or effectively used to find any means to fulfill the end, but also to (morally) find the right means.

As I mentioned previously, these two accounts of deliberation do not conflict, rather they express different aspects of deliberation; moreover, only under both of these aspects can we have a complete understanding of "deliberation". In Book III, Aristotle focuses more on the motivational aspect in which deliberation provides the means to the end in a general, practical domain. Book VI emphasizes more the ethically evaluative aspect; agents create a valuable life plan for themselves via deliberation.[155] To fully understand deliberation requires that both aspects be taken into account. The former aspect tells us that to deliberate about the means allows us to effectively fulfill

[154] It is very controversial whether external goods (e.g. health, wealth,) are constituents or only necessary conditions of Aristotle's *eudaimonia*. This controversy does not affect my argument, as I believe both constituents and conditions can be allowed to be the object of deliberation.

[155] Cf. Charles (1984), p. 262.

any particular end; the latter tells us that the deliberation of *phronimos* must also be ethically good. Any particular end of a virtuous person could be the means or constituents of his or her happy life, the supreme good, or *eudaemonia*.

I do have a point I would like to emphasize here. According to my interpretation in Chapter 3, the right end is ensured by ethical virtue. In the virtue-acquiring stage, only after the moral agent has acquired basic knowledge of right and wrong can deliberation be used to enhance said knowledge; in other words, deliberation significantly contributes to the acquisition of virtue. In the virtue-acquired stage, a stable and virtuous state has been firmly set; this means that the end determined by virtuous person is always right, so the function of deliberation is to find the means to achieve the end. In the second stage, virtuous actions reinforce and consolidate the virtuous state. The ultimate end is also set gradually by the virtuous person once he or she comes into a full understanding of what the "good life" is.

My interpretation of deliberation is not as strong as some intellectualists.[156] They assert that practical reason is the most important element in end-making, while desire plays a relatively negligible role. Practical reason can command desire, and desire (if it obeys reason) converts the judgment of a good action into a wish (*boulesis*) through which a concrete action is performed. Deliberation is not merely a process to confirm the end which is issued by desire, but rather operates independently of desire to make the "real" end.

This very strongly worded version of the intellectualist interpretation endows practical reason with a remarkable attribute: that it can formulate the end for the moral agent. Surely, this marks a reversal of the traditional interpretation of this issue.[157] In the traditional perspective, the end is determined by virtue, while practical reason exists for the means. Modern scholars typically take a relatively weak position on this. They

[156] The most famous one to emphasize the practical reason being able to formulate an end might be D. J. Allan (1953). As opposed to most scholars, however, he does not think deliberation is the same as practical reason, though he does not explicitly express this distinction until 1955. For Allan, practical reason is expressed in action, while deliberation is made before the action. I will come back to the relationship between deliberation and practical reason in Section 2.2.

[157] As mentioned before, the interpretation established by Walter, Zeller, and Burnet.

admit that practical reason plays a role in determining ends,[158] but they do not place desire under the control of practical reason as it makes said ends; rather, desire and practical reason are given the same importance in determining action.

So how is the content of the ultimate end to a happy life formed, and what kind of contribution can deliberation have toward this end? According to Irwin, *eudaimonia* as the ultimate end is reached via consideration of one's entire life and its various stages, as the endpoint must be something whole and complete. Life as a whole, Irwin claims, "extends both over different times and over different desires and capacities" (1980, pp. 65-6). All stages of life, and the particular interests and desires experienced in those stages, together comprise a "whole" life. In order to realize the ultimate end, each stage must be carefully considered. We must deliberate well on the manner in which we can (or have) fulfill(ed) particular moments to build apotentially happy life; otherwise, life can become dominated by instant gratification, e.g. bodily and sensual pleasures, and the ultimate end is difficult to realize. The ultimate end of *eudaimonia* is actually, then, made up of many subordinate goals such as courage, generosity, and justice. The fulfillment of all of these subordinate goals constitutes the fulfillment of the ultimate end. The ultimate end simultaneously guides what constitutes a virtuous action in any particular situation. As Irwin says, "to claim that H (judgment about happiness) should determine R (judgment of reason) is to claim that the end I rationally aim at on a particular occasion should be, or should be ultimately derived from, the end I recognize as my ultimate good" (1980, p. 65).

The life trajectory (or "plan") towards *eudaimonia* is one in which every deliberative step, and also every subordinate end, serves to fulfill the ultimate end, *eudaimonia*. We also seem to have good reason to trust moral people to deliberate simply for the sake of *eudaimonia.* A virtuous person should be able to deliberate on the means and constituents best-suited to the ultimate end and make decisions to meet said end by turning decisions into actions. If this is true, this deliberative process plays exactly the role of the *OL*. Deliberation shows not only what the action should be done, but why it should be done.

[158] See Sorabji and Wiggins in Rorty (1980).

Unfortunately, there are some issues with this definition. The plan to achieve *eudaimonia*, even a well-defined plan, would be too general to prescribe a particular action in certain concrete situations. Even virtuous people cannot ensure that their life plan can supply the correct deliberation to prescribe the right and moral action in every particular situation throughout life. I call this the "indeterminate problem", and would suggest that there are three ways in which it is expressed.

First, identifying the particular subordinate ends or constituents and how they must be achieved relies on *phronimos*'s deliberation, but should virtuous people collect all the constituents of *eudaemonia* or only achieve those that they regard as the most important/necessary? This also echoes the problem of the moral learner (L) described in Chapter 3: he ranks things by importance while potentially ignoring their "goodness".

Second, the means or constituents found via deliberation on various *phronimoi* might also be (more or less) different. One might choose "A" as means to the end after deliberation, but other virtuous people in the same situation might choose "B" after an equal amount of deliberation.

Third, *phronimos*'s deliberation might return many good options for means in difficult situations, among which none is more morally preferable than the others.

Under the guidance of the ultimate end, good deliberation will still sometimes fail to make good means clear, thus also failing to prescribe the right action. Aristotle does not admit, however, that good deliberation can fail even occasionally. He emphasizes many times that deliberation or *logos* determines the right actions, period,[159] creating a means-end picture that is overly simplistic. There are other factors supplying good deliberation that help the moral agent solve the indeterminate problem. In *EN* VI 7-9 and VII 3, for example, Aristotle discusses deliberation in a kind of deductive or syllogistic form as involving universal knowledge and sharp moral perception used to read situations. I will argue that these factors can help us solve the indeterminate problem.

[159] See also 1136b36-1137a2, 1138b18-20.

2.2 Good Deliberation and Practical Syllogism

Phronesis involves deliberation. To deliberate well is, above all, the *ergon* of the *phronimos* (τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι. *EN* VI 7, 1141b9-10).[160] Aristotle often states that good deliberation should be done in order to identify the means for the noble end. At the end of *EN* VI 7, he seems to associate deliberation with calculation (λογισμός).[161] He says that the unconditionally good deliberator (ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος) achieves the utmost goodness of a human being according to calculation. More importantly, this calculation manifests itself in a basic deductive or syllogistic form. The information acquired through calculation enriches the concept of deliberation toward identifying the means to an end. Deliberation also must appeal to the syllogistic reasoning. Please refer to the following passage:

(Passage 22)

ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐντοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον.

The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only—it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have experience, are more practical than others who know. For if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know

[160] Segvic points out that Irwin's translation of this sentence is incorrect. Here, I adopt Segvic's argument: the μάλιστα modifies the *ergon*, rather than the *phronimos*. Segvic in Pakaluk and Pearson (2011), pp. 159-61.

[161] In 1139a12-3, Aristotle states explicitly this identification too: "τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν," where to deliberate and to calculate is the same.

> which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health. (1141b12-20)

This calculation requires not only universal knowledge, but also the sensibility of the particular in order to function properly. The "light meat" example tells us this calculation is a type of syllogistic reasoning: the universal (light meat is digestible) is the major premise and the particular (chicken is light meat) is the minor premise, where the conclusion is the decision to eat chicken.[162] This syllogistic reasoning is usually called "Aristotelian practical syllogism", although Aristotle himself does not use this term. If both the universal and particular premises are rightly and properly fixed in a given moral situation, the corresponding action may not necessarily be done, but a right decision can certainly be made after this syllogistic reasoning process; this syllogistic reasoning is deliberation.

In *EN* VI 9, Aristotle identifies "good deliberation" with a certain sort of correct deliberation. This correct deliberation also manifests itself in syllogistic form.

> (Passage 23)
> δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὗ ἔδει.
>
> Now to have deliberated well is thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind of correctness of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which tends to attain what is good. But it is possible to attain even good by a false *deduction* and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means, the

[162] Aristotle says at least three times that the conclusion of practical syllogism is action. Whether we should take his saying literally is still open for debate. For example, Allan (1955) and Anscombe (1963) support the literal reading, while Kenny (1979) thinks that it should be understood as a decision to act. For the sake of space I will not enter this discussion, but I do follow Kenny's standpoint.

> middle term being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in deliberation—this state in virtue of which one attains what one ought but not by the right means. (1042b20-26)

Vocabulary such as "syllogistic" and "middle term" naturally lead the reader to understand this sort of correctness of deliberation as a correct syllogism.[163] As Aristotle emphasizes, this syllogism must meet two conditions: first, there is a right end at which the deliberation should aim and this end can be formed as a universal premise; and second, deliberation is a type of deduction inferred from the end toward which the steps of the inference must be true. If the end is rightly achieved, but through false deductive inference, there is no correctness of deliberation in the process. If the inference is true, but from the wrong premises (the universal, particular, or both being wrong,) the deliberation likewise is not good.

This seemingly also is an apt fit for Aristotle's general doctrine of good deliberation. The good deliberator is a fully virtuous person who consistently reaches the right end through making correct inferences. Moreover, the identification between practical deliberation and syllogism makes the deliberation more specifically defined as a process of finding the means for the end.

It is important to note that this definition still leaves unanswered questions. Generally speaking, it may not be appropriate to make the identification between deliberation and syllogism without qualification, as it is still necessary to explain: 1) is the desired end motivated by universal knowledge, or is universal knowledge simply generated by justifying the end? 2) How does one explain the particular as the object of perception as also the object of deliberation? Further, 3) is the conclusion a decision to take an action or an action itself?

I do not consider the identification between deliberation and syllogism without any qualification, but considering Passages 22 and 23, I would assert that we can at least determine that good deliberation and practical syllogism both exist in the fully

[163] Cooper (1975) argues that Aristotle does not use this logical term technically; it isused here only to illustrate the decision made by the false inference, pp. 45-6.

virtuous man. For virtuous people, it is possible to determine the end based on universal knowledge, and also possible to find the universal knowledge to justify the desired end, as they possess the virtuous state and can grasp the value of universal knowledge.

The conclusion of deliberation is a decision to act. For virtuous people, this decision necessarily leads to corresponding action; for moral learners or incontinent people, it does not. In *EN* VI 2, Aristotle defines the decision of a virtuous man (which is made through deliberation) as a good or serious decision (*prohairesis spoudaia*) which is the efficient cause of action (1139a25-32). In this case, we can also say that the decision is almost identical to action (in the sense of necessarily leading to action.) This understanding is compatible with Aristotle's statement that the conclusion of practical syllogism is action. The problematic nature of the particular as the object of deliberation is discussed further in Section 3.3.

For virtuous (as well as continent and incontinent) people, the practical syllogism or good deliberation is the *OL* per se. This practical syllogism of virtuous people not only exhibits the structure of an end set by desire and means found by deliberation, but also brings us to a stronger explanation for why a certain action should be done.

3. Good Deliberation qua the *Orthos Logos*

In this section, I will argue that the good deliberation or the right practical reasoning process, including both the universal and particular proposition, is the *OL* per se. Neither universal rules nor particular propositions alone can be the *OL*. I will first analyze the precise role of the universal and the particular in terms of practical syllogism, and then I will discuss inadequacies inherent to both the rule view and the particularists' view of the *OL*. In order to accurately establish the relationship between the *OL* and good deliberation/practical syllogism, I will tackle the afore-mentioned difficulties arising from the identification between good deliberation and practical syllogism. To conclude, I will make a positive argument for good deliberation qua the *OL*.

3.1 The Universal and the Particular

To answer the questions raised above, we first need to take a closer look at the elements and the compositions involved in good deliberation. Passage 22 merits re-analysis for this purpose.

> (Passage 24)
> ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐντοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον.
>
> The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only—it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have experience, are more practical than others who know. For if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health. (1141b12-20)

This passage implicitly tells us that the good deliberator formulates the good end as a universal proposition. In the example of light meat, we know that "health" is the good end being sought. We can accordingly form a series of syllogisms which together comprise a universal proposition referring to the end: everyone (normal people) should seek health; I am a normal person, so I should seek health; I must do what is necessary for the sake of my health; eating light meat is a means to health, so I should eat light meat; chicken is light meat, so I will eat chicken. Assuming health is a constituent of *eudaimonia*, seeking health is for the sake of *eudaimonia*, because

virtuous people should seek *eudaimonia.* The series of elements which make up the syllogistic chain can be formulated differently person to person, but the fundamental idea that "every virtuous person should seek the *eudainonia*" is final. It is the most universal proposition which explains why every virtuous action should be done.

The universal proposition alone as the final cause is not sufficient to justify the concrete, right action, however. The universal is even not the most important proposition leading to the action. In Passage 22, Aristotle emphasizes that knowing the particular is more important than knowing the universal when it comes to making the right decision.[164] Those who insist that the *OL* as a (set of) particular prescription(s) build their criticism of the rule view also based on this passage. Aristotle plays down universal knowledge here. Further, knowledge is even less useful than experience in practical domain; thus, the *OL* cannot be the universal rule rather than a particular proposition which is directly related to the particular action. The particular proposition describes the morally salient feature of the given situation and this proposition is the last order of action, namely, the decision to act propelled by deliberation; the conclusion of the practical syllogism is the *OL*.[165]

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[164] See also *EN* VI 8, 1141b21-22; *EN* VI 9, 1142a14-15, 1142a20-22, 24-27; *EN* VI 12, 1143a28-29, 1143a35-b5, 1143b13-14.

[165] This reading of "the particular" is a very traditional and standard reading. The earliest such interpretation may be that of Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae*, I/II, qu. 7.1: "Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid circumestare quod est quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropinquat ei secundum locum. Et ideo quaecumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquot modo actum humanum, circumstantiae dicuntur." *Summa theologiae*, Latin Text and English translation, ed. Thomas Gilby, vol. 17, London 1970, p. 36. This standard reading was recently challenged by John Cooper, who asserts that deliberation terminates in a decision to act in a particular situation, rather in action-type choices. How to perform the action in a particular situation is the task of perception, rather than of deliberation. "Universal" and "particular" is a false contrast in *EN* VI 9, where Aristotle discusses practical perception. Cooper argues that *to kath' hekaston* is used by Aristotle occasionally as a reference to particulars, but sometimes as a reference to particular kinds, e.g., horse or man as opposed to animal. In *EN* VI 9, Aristotle indicates that deliberation involves the consideration of action-type rather than the particular. See Cooper (1975), pp. 23-9. Space limitations prevent me from discussing Cooper's argument in detail. Very briefly, I think he oversimplifies the condition under which an action is involved in a particular situation—If the decision of the action is merely reduced to the work of perception, some cases would certainly necessitate more than perception.

The particularists criticize the generalist standpoint similarly. They reject the idea of deliberation as a theory-building or deductive reasoning exercise (which is a fundamental component of the generalist viewpoint.) According to the particularist's interpretation of deliberation, the ultimate end of human life, *eudaemonia*, is a conception of the good which lacks content and instead simply amounts to the propensity to read or perceive particular situations in the light of the rubric conception—*to kalon.*[166] Due to the variability among particular situations, it is effectually impossible to establish a set of fixed rules which correspond neatly. As Aristotle often claims, judgment of a particular situation depends on individual perception.[167] The appreciation of moral situations is the most important capacity of *phronesis*. The particularists assert that building theories or setting rules is not as important as weighing various alternatives and identifying the morally salient features of the situation at hand; they believe that the role of perception is inappropriately minimized by the generalists, for whom the function of perception in *phronesis* is to acquaint the agent with her surroundings and then to use perceptual judgment to determine which rule to invoke.[168] The particularists instead endow Aristotle's moral perception with a more robust role: that of reading situations, or (they might prefer) situational appreciation according to which the right decision is made.[169] The emphasis on the perception of particular situations suggests that practical knowledge is expressed through perception of the morally salient feature of a given situation rather than through any well-defined plan.

Another facet of the generalist view with which the particularists disagree is the fact that Aristotle often claims that the subject-matter of politics is variable (ἔχει διαφορὰν), to the effect that there is no exactness (ἀκριβὲς) in politics as in other demonstrative sciences: it is enough to outline the truth roughly (παχυλῶς καὶ

[166] E.g. McDowell (1998), pp. 27-8.

[167] See *EN* II 9, 1109b12-23.

[168] C.f. McDowell (1998): "In the 'rule'-'case' picture, the most obvious role for perception is to contribute awareness that certain conditions, which are in fact the conditions specified in a rule, are satisfied." p. 28.

[169] This term was coined by Wiggins. Although he emphasizes that moral perception provides us the features of particular situation, he does not claim that he is a particularist explicitly, pp. 232-3.

τύπῳ).[170] The particularists think that the subject matter of ethics is, in Aristotle's mind, too fluid and variable to be codified.[171]

If the particularist view is correct, it supports the *OL* as a proposition which applies to a particular situation, because moral perception encountering the situation seems to be the most important step in the reasoning process. They would also not address the problems which my deliberation view grapples with. I agree that the particular is more important than the universal in the practical domain, but I do not agree that the particular alone can be the *OL*. The particular needs, but also entails, the universal. This passage also tells us that the calculation can lead to the right or best action—and the calculation includes both the universal and particular. In effect, the right calculation or deliberation is the *OL* which is a reasoning process including both the universal and particular. I will continue to argue this claim below by my specific objection to the particularist view.

3.2 Objection to the Particularist View

Both generalists and particularists recognize the importance both of the particular and the general proposition in Aristotle's ethics; the difficulty with these interpretations lies in assigning normative priority to either one. Irwin (2000) argues that the particular proposition has no priority over the general one, but rather the opposite. The priority of the general proposition, Irwin argues, is that principles or rules guide the particular judgment and the latter simply conforms to the former. In the following, I borrow from his argument not in order to endorse Irwin's view without qualification, but to demonstrate the contribution of universal rules and deliberation necessary for the particularist view.

First, though Aristotle states several times that ethical generalizations are usual and inexact, these statements are not necessarily characterized by uselessness or unimportance. Irwin argues that the "usual" implies not only a sense of frequency, but also a sense of normalcy. For example: horses usually have four legs, as the nature of the horse dictates, but some horses may have three legs; this exception does not deny

[170] See *EN* 1094b11-27; 1104a1-9; 1141a16-19.

[171] E.g. McDowell (1979); Nussbaum (1990).

the validity of the generalization that horses usually have four legs, however. The nature of the horse is the "norm" described by Irwin. He goes on to argue that the field of ethics is similar to the science of biology or physics which also entails a norm. In ethics as well as physical sciences, we must appeal to principles both unqualified and usual.[172] Irwin asserts that in ethical theory, it is "unwise, for practical purposes, to try to build all the qualifications into our principles, even if it is possible to build them in." (2000, p. 113) In other words, different disciplines have different demands for exactness and ethics should stop at principles that are stated only roughly,[173] lest the practice be misguided by exact principles that apply only to other sciences.[174]

We do have such rules: wealth is good without qualification (but not good for everyone,) for example. Virtue results in happiness in appropriate conditions (though not in all conditions without exception.) Aristotle does not list all the exceptions and qualifications with exact formulations to replace the usual rules, however. To account for this, Irwin suggests that we should not "take the usual rules any less seriously simply because they are usual…. Our recognition of the usual character of some rules helps us to take them seriously; for we will not be disconcerted to find that they have exceptions."(2000, p. 114)

Second, the "inexactness" is not due to our propensity for creating generalizations simply as summaries, but because we recognize them as providing normative guidance. For example, virtue is defined as a mean state (which is a generalization) and individual virtues, e.g., bravery and temperance (which are particular) are defined by specifying that generalization: "…bravery is this kind of mean, temperance is that

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[172] Irwin relies mainly on the beginning passage of *EN*, in which Aristotle implies that we are on the road towards principles. "Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, 'are we on the way from or to the first principles?' There is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is familiar, things are so in two ways—some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, *we* must begin with things familiar to *us*" (1095a30-b4).

[173] Plato expressed a similar idea: different crafts have different exactness. See *Philebus* 55eff.

[174] This passage is cited by Irwin to support this argument: "For a carpenter and a geometer look for right angles in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth" (1098a29-31).

kind, and so on. When Aristotle tells us to attend to particulars, he does not abandon generalizations; he describes the generalizations we should look for."(2000, p. 116) Basically, the definition is not based on a summary of the individual virtues, rather the individual virtues through the universal definition of virtue.

Why does Aristotle not replace the inexact, usual generalization with an exact generalization equipped with all the possible exceptions? Well, according to Irwin, deliberation can contribute in the domain in which we have fewer rules to use. Let's look again at the passage on deliberation in *EN* to help us understand Irwin's argument.

(Passage 25)

καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' ἀεί, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικήν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικήν, ὅσῳ ἧττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐνοῖς ἀδιόριστον.

And in the case of exact and self-contained sciences there is no deliberation, e.g. about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be written); but the things that are brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same way, are the things about which we deliberate, e.g. questions of medical treatment or of money-making. And we do so more in the case of the art of navigation than in that of gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less exactly worked out, and again about other things in the same ratio, and more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences; for we have more doubt about the former. Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. (1112a34-b9)

Deliberation is merely involved in the domain where we have only inexact rules. When these inexact rules cannot directly tell us what we ought to do, deliberation works. Because ethics is a science which has a vast array of inexact rules, deliberation is necessary for the agent who acts in moral situations. Inexact rules are qualified in particular situations by deliberation, but this merely means that inexact general rules are limited in use rather than that they have no function as guidance in particular situations.If we make inexact, usual rules into exact rules with the addition of numerous qualifications or specifications, we would make rules too complicated to learn or apply. Irwin emphasizes the contribution of deliberation accordingly. "Instead of trying to learn fully qualified generalizations," he says, "it is better to try to learn to recognize and to compare the considerations that ought to guide us in assessing the different claims of different usual generalizations." (2000, p. 120)

The final difficulty faced by Irwin which merits discussion here is that Aristotle connects practical wisdom with perception in *EN* VI. Aristotle claims that practical wisdom is about the particular, which is the object of perception.[175] He also claims that universals are derived from particulars, which are the object of a special kind of perception, i.e., *nous*.[176] Irwin does not believe that such claims support particularism, but insists that the good deliberation of *phronimos* includes applying generalization with normative force. Perception is not used to summarize the material for moral rules, but rather to form the skill of applying general rules to particular situations.[177] The perception of a particular situation depends on the acceptance of these generalizations, and "such dependence does not conflict with Aristotle's claim that universals are derived from particulars. Aristotle might simply mean that prudent people revise their general principles in the light of their situational appreciation." (2000, p. 125)[178] Irwin argues against McDowell's argument that perception recognizes the salient

[175] 1142a26-30, "…while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of knowledge but of perception—not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction too there will be a limit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception."

[176] 1143b2-b5, "…while in practical reasoning it grasps the last and contingent fact, i.e. the second proposition. For these are the starting-points of that for the sake of which, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this is comprehension."

[177] Cf. *EN* 1126a31-b4.

[178] Cf. Wiggins in Rorty (1980), p. 233.

features in particular situations; he also draws a relationship among salience with relevance and decisiveness. Perception has no such special role in identifying either the relevant or the decisive features, however, but rather deliberation provides the awareness of decisiveness towards relevant elements.

Irwin may be correct in his assertion that the universal rule has normative priority over the particular. I will not evaluate this claim here. He may also be right that the general rule is necessary and important for a particular action, and the particularist may likewise agree with this role of the general rule but disagree that the function of perception that he or she typically advocates must also be trained by universal rules and deliberation. I accept Irwin's argument that universal rules are necessary for particular right actions, as they provide the general guidance to the moral agent. Said guidance must be adapted into particular situations by deliberation, however. Only the full deliberative process can inform the moral agent of how and why he must complete the particular right action; and this whole process is the *OL*. The particularist can draw a picture of what to do, but not why. The particular proposition alone is not adequate to comprehensively define the role of the *OL*. So the particular proposition is not the *OL*, but the right deliberation is, since the latter can provide the explanatory account.

Another argument of Irwin's that I accept is that the function of the moral perception is trained by universal rules and deliberation. I admit that a particular situationis not reached by deliberation, but rather by perception. This observation does not support the particularist view, as it is moral perception, not deliberation itself that relates directly to the effect of deliberation.[179]

3.3 Moral Perception, Experience, and Deliberation

If the particularists are correct that perception rather than deliberation plays the dominant role in reading any particular situation and providing the basis for moral

[179] McDowell insists that the particular premise is reached by perception rather than deliberation or *phronesis*, while Moss argues that some are by deliberation and some by perception, i.e., perception assists deliberation when necessary. My argument marks a departure from both of these views, I agree the particular is reached by perception (like McDowell) but argue that this perception can read particular features due to the training of deliberation, not just instances of supply from deliberation as Moss argues.

judgement, then the *OL* could not be deliberation, since the perception would seemingly comprise the entire *OL*. Deliberation can be the *OL* only if perception is also (indirectly) under the control or influence of deliberation, in which case perception is a token of deliberation.

Irwin only partially supports this point. The example of perceiving a baked loaf, which Irwin takes from *EN* III 3, seems to fall under an assumption that this perception is the same as in *EN* VI, where it is usually called "moral perception". Irwin does not give us any further detailed explanation, however. The only support for his argument is that moral perception is trained, as opposed to sense-perception. What is the relationship between deliberation and these two kinds of perception, though? And how do they apply to universals and particulars?

Aristotle discusses this perception in the following difficult passages in *EN* VI 8:

> (Passage 26)
> ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.
>
> That practical wisdom is not knowledge is evident; for it is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to comprehension; for comprehension is of the definitions, for which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of knowledge but of perception—not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction too there will be a limit. But this is rather

> perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception.[180] (1142a23-30)

In this passage, Aristotle connects practical wisdom with perception, which is concerned with the particular, but he does not describe the character of this perception very clearly. What he does do is remind us that this perception is similar to the perceptual recognition of shapes, which I call "mathematical perception"; conversely, we may call the practical wisdom connected perception "practical perception" or "moral perception". In the light of the analogy to mathematical perception, we can readily distinguish moral perception from the basic sense-perception: I see a white thing or I hear a sound.[181] Any reasonable scholar would agree that moral perception is trained, but how exactly is the moral perception trained? What can the trained moral perception do?

Let us first think about the character of mathematical perception which is used by Aristotle in Passage 24, where there is at least one aspect of this type of perception made quite clear—namely, that it is easy for a person without mathematical training to know that a particular figure is, say, triangular, but hard for him to know it as a mathematical triangle. To be able to do this would involve basic training in geometry. The universal generalization is involved both during and after this training. The medical domain yields another example: a doctor can handle various and complex illnesses after perceiving them by managing a larger quantity of universal medical knowledge about the structure of a healthy human body.

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[180] Here, I espouse Bywater's translation ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις rather than μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἡ φρόνησις, which exists in some manuscripts. According to the latter, perception is identified with *phronesis*. This reading is also favored by Reeve (2012, p. 68), but I don't think it is a correct reading. There are three reasons. (i) φρόνησις is διανοητικοί άρεταί, and as such έξεις (1106a11). αΐσθησις, however, is a δύναμις (*An.Post.* 99b33). (ii) According to Aristotle, one cannot have knowledge by perception alone (*DA* 417b23), because knowledge proper is concerned with universals. φρόνησις and νους are also concerned with universals, and so count as knowledge, in the 'for the most part' sense in which those terms may be properly applied to practical inquiries. (iii) φρόνησις is closely associated with βούλευσις, deliberation. It is ό βουλευτικός who has practical wisdom (1140a31). However, among the things about which one cannot deliberate are particular facts; of those, one has αΐσθησις (1113a2).

[181] This type of perception is discussed by Aristotle in *DA*. See 418a7-25, 425a14-24.

If mathematical perception is trained by universal knowledge, then it is reasonable to believe that the universal rule or generalization is inextricably involved in training moral perception. We have to admit that the moral situation might not be explained with a similar analogy as the triangle. The universal which serves the particular in the practical domain applies differently to the theoretical domain. In Aristotle's example of the general, practical domain, he tells us that we need trained perception to tell if a loaf is baked and that this trained perception also involves universal generalization.[182] I believe there is further evidence to reveal similar characteristics of moral perception.

In *EN* VI 11, Aristotle says:

> (Passage 27)
> καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐνταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκτῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτηδ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.
>
> And comprehension is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the primary definitions and the ultimates are objects of comprehension and not of argument, and in demonstrations comprehension grasps the unchangeable and primary definitions, while in practical reasoning it grasps the last and contingent fact, i.e. the second proposition. For these are the starting-points of that for the sake of which, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this is comprehension. (1143a35-b5)

In Passage 27, Aristotle introduces *nous* into the practical domain. Like the theoretical *nous*, the practical *nous* is also concerned with ultimates (τῶν ἐσχάτων), but the

[182] Irwin gives us a similar example: "We might, for instance, learn how to cook an omelette. We notice that it is better not to allow it to cook completely in the pan. We form the generalization 'Take it out when it's still a little runny.' This generalization, however, still cannot be applied by means of ordinary perception alone; we need experience and trained perception to estimate how runny is a little runny" (2000), pp. 127-8.

meaning of the ultimate under the theoretical *nous* must differ from that under the practical *nous*. The theoretical *nous* is concerned with the highest axioms of science,[183] while the practical *nous* is concerned with precise facts. The minor premise of a practical syllogism states that a particular fact is the ultimate (e.g., chicken is light meat,) while the major premise relates to the universal (e.g., eating light meat is healthy.) Aristotle identifies this practical *nous* with perception here. Aristotle does not simply identify *nous* de facto with sense-perception. This perception must have been trained. One can immediately perceive chicken as a light meat only if they have learned the basic characteristics of the light meat; this perception of a particular meat confirms the original knowledge of light meat, i.e., perception is formed under the guidance of the corresponding knowledge.

How exactly are "universals… (reached) from [the] particular" in the practical domain? It is widely accepted that universal rules are established by induction in the theoretical domain;[184] we also must admit then that the universals in the practical domain come from induction, sense perception, or habituation which must be gained through experience.[185] The universals reached from the particular in this context refer not to generalization via induction, because perception in question is not sense perception but rather is in the sense of *nous*.

In the practical domain the universal is, as opposed to its role in the theoretical domain, the formulation of the end which the moral agent is tasked with fulfilling. For

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[183] Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων αἷς ἀληθεύομεν αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ' ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. καὶ ἡμὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα ὁμοί ως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα. *An. Post*. 100b 5-16.

[184] *An. Post.* 90a 28-30, ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐγένετο ἂν ἡμῖν εἰδέναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ὅτι νῦν ἀντιφράττει (καὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι νῦν ἐκλείπει)· ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸ καθόλου ἂν ἐγένετο. See also; 81b 3-9; 87b 39-88a 6; 88a 12-16; 90b 26-30; 99b 22-35; 100b 3-4.

[185] *EN* I 7, 1098b3-8, τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἳ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἳ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἳ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

example, "eating light meat is healthy" presupposes the desire of the moral agent to be healthy. In order to fulfill this end, he must find the means by deliberation; the particular (type) of possible means is the last step of deliberation. The performance of a concrete action, however, requires the facility of perception to provide the available means at that exact moment. This type of perception can cooperate with deliberation to make action happen, because this perception has acquired moral sensibility by moral training (which involves also deliberation or rational reflection) over the long term.[186] This is the essence of "the universals reached from the particulars" in the practical domain.[187]

Aristotle does emphasize the importance of experience in the ethical domain, however. The trained moral perception cannot be deprived of experience. The following passage in *EN* VI 11 confirms that Aristotle credits experience in ethical matters.

> (Passage 28)
> ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς.
>
> Therefore, we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright. (1143b11-14)

This passage tells us that experience is important for ethical matters, as experience allows the moral agent an eye to see what is right. The emphasis on experience seems to create another distinction between theoretical and practical matters. In the theoretical domain, knowledge is a system of demonstration searching for "the because" (*aitia*). Experience sits on a lower level than knowledge because it cannot provide the moral agent an account of "the because". In the practical domain, as the

[186] Although I have a different understanding of this passage compared to Reeve, I draw, occasionally, the same conclusion on this point.

[187] This interpretation is similar to Broadie's (2002), pp. 378-9.

above passage tells us, experience seems sufficient to dictate particular actions. It is not necessary to have or resort to either rule or principle or demonstration to identify the cause of said actions.

As I have already argued, Aristotle's ethics do not target moral theory but rather right actions in for all situations. To this effect, rules and principles are not the ends which Aristotle wants to establish. There is also no doubt that any particular action is taken with the aid of experience, but that does not mean that there is no need to find "the because" to form certain types of practical knowledge (like knowledge in the theoretical domain.) As discussed in Section 2, achieving *eudaimonia* is the final end for which virtuous people perform virtuous actions. In addition, Aristotle does not claim that the moral agent should rely solely upon experience to identify virtuous actions; experience alone cannot supply a sufficient explanatory account of why a given action is correct. Based on experience, *phronimos* should go one step further to integrate the practical universal knowledge into a final explanation for the action.

Deliberation or practical syllogism differs substantially in meaning from the theoretical syllogism. The universal proposition does not play the same role in practical and theoretical syllogism, either. The similarity between them can, however, adequately illuminate the explanatory function of the good deliberation or correct practical syllogism.

3.4 Deliberation as Prescription and Explanation

An argument for the requirement of "the because" in the practical domain as in the theoretical domain has been systematically and persuasively made by Jessica Moss (2014). To flesh out my own argument, I think it behoves me to further discuss the basics of her argument here.

In the theoretical domain, Aristotle states several times that universal knowledge is attained based on experience. Experience is only a collection of phenomena, while craft and knowledge grasp "the because". The most famous evidence of this is as follows:

> We think that *knowledge* and *understanding* belong to art rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which implies that wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge); and this because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the 'why' and the cause. (981a24-30)[188]

Moreover, knowing the why or "the because" is (or is similar to) possessing *logos*: "…we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes (κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν)" (981b6).[189] Moss understands this *logos* as "an entire explanatory argument: a syllogism that includes the statement of the cause account as a first premise, and goes on to show what it explains" (Moss, p. 207).

To identify the *logos* with (a wider genus of) syllogism is a reasonable move, since both of them are loaded the explanatory function, though we do not have many direct textual evidences to support this claim. We do know that syllogism etymologically means a combination of different *logoi*, thus, syllogism is also a kind of *logos*. Theoretical science demands a demonstrative syllogism, i.e., an explanatory account: "…a demonstration is a syllogism that reveals the cause and the why" (*An. Post*. 85b23-4).[190]The relevant *logos* at work here is a demonstrative syllogism consisting of "the that" (*explanandum*) and "the why" (*explanans*).

In the ethical context, the right *logos* is also an explanatory syllogism of relevant phenomena. Its basic structure is identical to that of the demonstrative syllogism. As discussed above, Aristotle identifies deliberation with the practical syllogism, [191] for example, by saying "there is no deliberation of ends" (*EN* 1112b11-12), or that"there is no syllogism or *logos* of the end" (*EE* 1227b23). Without an end there is also no

[188] See also *An. Post*. 71b9-12; 90a5-7.

[189] See also *An. Post*. 74b27-8; cf. *Gorgias* 465a; *Laws* 720a-d.

[190] See also *An. Post.* 78b3-4.

[191] Again 1139a11-13; 1141b11-4; 1142b1-2; *De Memoria* 453a13.

deliberation or *logos*; deliberation or *logos* begins to work only after the end has been set (*EE* 1226b25-30).

The end is considered as the fundamental assumption or the "starting-point" (*archē*) of the reasoning process. "For inferences (syllogisms) which deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting-point, viz. 'since the end, i.e. what is best, is of such and such a nature', whatever it may be"(*EN* VI.12, 1144a31-3). The starting-point of a deliberation process, just like a demonstration process, is the explanations or causes (*aitiai*) of the conclusions.[192] The conclusion is the action which deliberation tells us ought to be done, and the "why" is traced back to the stating-point of deliberation, which is the final cause.

Moss continues to enhance her argument by saying this: the final cause possessing the fully explanatory account presupposes that deliberators have been individually equipped with universal knowledge and an appreciation of various details in each particular situation. The fully trained doctor (grasped the *logos*) and the doctor honing his skills only according to his experience have the same final cause—recovering their patients' health—and also may take the same action to do so, but the former possesses a fully explanatory account of the action due to his systematic medical knowledge, while the latter does not.

In the ethical domain, fully virtuous people have fully explanatory accounts for each virtuous action. Deliberation or practical syllogism expressly provides this explanatory account. The *logos* is identified with (a wider genus of) deliberation and practical syllogism,[193] thus, the *OL* qua good deliberation is the right prescriptive

[192] There are also a few differences between theoretical demonstration and practical deliberation listed by Moss (2014) "In demonstration one begins with a grasp of the explanandum and searches for the explanans; in deliberation one instead begins with a grasp of the explanans—one lays down a goal—and searches for the explanandum (preccription)." 2) "In deliberative syllogisms, unlike theoretical ones, the explanandum is a prescription: what gets explained is why something should be done." 3) "In deliberative syllogisms the explanans is always a final cause… in demonstrative syllogisms…the explanans can be any of the four causes but is always 'logically' a formal cause", pp. 215-6.

[193] Another important and explicitly supportive passage is from *EN* VII 3, 1147a31-b3, where, as I discussed in Chapter 1, Aristotle describes the *akratic* deliberation well but in opposition to the right deliberation, as the

(telling what to do) cum explanatory (explaining why) account (Moss (2014), p. 219).

This interpretation fits very well within the ethical context. As discussed above, the moral function of the *OL* is to prescribe the right action and to regulate feelings to an appropriate degree. How the *OL* qua deliberation or reasoning regulate feelings and virtue-building action is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. My position at this stage differs from Moss's, though she does not open any analysis of the virtue-acquiring stage in her work.[194] My argument for the function of reason in moral development, I think, is fairly persuasive. In the virtue-acquired stage, the moral agent is equipped with both full ethical virtue and *phronesis*. The *OL* qua right deliberation to identify the means to the end also suits my argument related to the definitions of ethical virtue and *phronesis*. Aristotle also emphasizes that in the virtuous stage, the learner has not only *kata OL*, but also *meta OL*. The *OL* qua deliberation functions better than any other candidates, e.g., rules or particular propositions. In the context of *enkrates* and *akrates*, the *OL* is identified implicitly with deliberation by Aristotle. Further, deliberation or practical syllogism is defined as a reasoning process which not only prescribes what to do but also tells us why to do it in given situation.

Regarding the relationship Aristotle identifies between *phronesis* and the *OL* in 1144b27-8, according to mine and Moss's present interpretation, the identification is most likely a loose expression or overstatement deployed in order to emphasize the connection between them. But Moss is also happy to leave open the possibility that Aristotle may de facto introduce a new meaning: the meaning of the "virtuous state". It is hard to judge whether or not Aristotle really has changed his mind from defining the *OL* as the rational activity of *phronesis* to defining it as *phronesis* itself somewhere in the middle of the text. The passage from *MM* II 10 which I discussed in Chapter 1 shows that the *logos* prima facie possesses different meanings in different places in *MM*, but even if the 1144b27 passage really delivers a new definition of virtue, it is one that is derived from the definition of the explanatory account; namely,

appetite is opposed to the *OL*. (There is a printing mistake in Moss's quotation: it should be *EN* VII 3 rather than VI 3, see p. 212.)

[194] In another article, "Virtue makes the Goal Right", Moss argues very firmly that the rational activity cannot effect the goal which is set separately by desire; this effectively renders the intellectual view void. See Moss (2011).

the *OL* as a virtue also has to be built upon the ability to seek means and to determine why certain means fit certain situations. Accordingly, the prescriptive and explanatory account is the fundamental meaning of the *logos*.

Moss establishes her argument based on the identification between *logos*, practical syllogism, and deliberation. As I mentioned above, this identification is not without any qualification. Further, Moss does not respond to potential challenges to her position very extensively. In my argument, I have not only made the necessary modifications, but also provide a detailed explanation as to why the universal or particular proposition alone cannot be the *OL*. To this effect, though our standpoints are similar, my argument is more detailed than Moss's.

4. Advantages of Deliberation qua the *Orthos Logos*

Generally speaking, the advantages of my interpretation of the *OL* lie in two features: it fits well the context of the *Ethics*, and it more comprehensive explanatory power than the proposition view (both universal and particular.) From the point of view of the context of the *Ethics*, this interpretation first of all brings us a most coherent reading of the sixth Book with the entirety of the *EN*, and then makes the whole of Aristotle's ethics as a more compact and systematic work of literature. (I will make this advantage clearer in my final chapter which serves as a summary of my entire argument.) Here, I would like to attempt to elucidate the challenging textual understanding of the sixth Book in terms of the relationship between the *OL* and *phronesis*, universal knowledge, and experience via my interpretation of deliberation qua the *OL*.

According to my interpretation, the *OL* is the right deliberation generated by *phronesis*. I make this point in effort to explain why Aristotle identifies the *OL* with *phronesis*. The ethical virtue is not only κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, but also μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. I'll quote this passage again for the sake of convenience:

(Passage 29)

> σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν.
>
> This is confirmed by the fact that even now all men, when they define excellence, after naming the state and its objects add 'that (state) which is in accordance with the right reason'; now the right reason is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind of state is excellence, viz. that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state in accordance with right reason, but the state that implies the *presence* of right reason, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is right reason about such matters. (1144b26-28).

Ethical virtue is acquired from the process of following the right deliberation of *phronimos*. After virtue is acquired, ethical virtue is always present with right deliberation owing to the fact that virtue is a prohairetic state and virtue is always connected to *phronesis,* which generates the right deliberation to find the right action in a particular situation. The identification between *phronesis* and the *OL* is thus loosely overstated to emphasize the causality between the *phronesis* and the *OL*.

A right or virtuous action is not only "the that" which should be done, but also entails "the why" grasped by virtuous people during right deliberation. This is an explanatory structure beginning with reading or perceiving the given situation, then seeking the right action, which needs first of all experience—a fully virtuous person extracts the universal rule from his or her experience to fully establish the reason that the action to be done is correct. Acting by experience and saving experience is the prime characteristic of the moral learner. Fully virtuous people act not only according to experience, but rather by reasoning. The right reasoning or deliberation is characteristic of *phronesis*. Aristotle emphasizes experience simply to make the

reader keenly aware of its function in terms of the particular action, not to exclude the necessity of searching "the why".

The advantages of this textual understanding also introduce a stronger explanatory power than the proposition view. Clearly, based on the above discussion, rules or principles are involved in the right deliberation for particular situations although they are usual and inexact. These usual rules or principles cannot be the *OL*, however, as a rule is too general as-is to apply to all possible particular actions. In order to apply to a particular situation, the rule must be adjusted per the situation via the right deliberation generated by *phronesis* (ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν). The *OL* must function according to a particular situation to which the rule is appropriately adapted. The *OL* cannot be a particular proposition either, as a particular proposition alone cannot include "the why", i.e., a full explanation of the particular action.

Right, particular propositions that are morally useful for an action can only be made by deliberation and universal rules together. First, if we take the *OL* as only a proposition (whether universal or particular,) it would obscure the importance of *phronesis*, which is inextricably connected to virtue, generates good deliberation, and trains moral perception. Aristotle emphasizes this throughout the entire sixth Book of *EN*. This obscuration brings us face-to-face again with the problem that Book Six or even the entire *Ethics* is inconsistent, as Aristotle does not define the *OL* in regards to any form of proposition.

Even if we admit that the proposition view does account for the importance of deliberation, a particular proposition is not suitable for the condition of μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. According to Aristotle, the ethical virtue is not only in accordance with the *OL* but also is present with the *OL*. As I argued above, any particular proposition seems to be made right at the moment at which a particular situation is faced, and different situations have different propositions. Some particular propositions might be used once and then never again. Therefore, it is impossible for the always-changing proposition to be present with the ethical virtue.

In fact, in some situations, it is not reasonable or economical at all to make particular propositions. By "economical", I mean that deliberation or a virtuous state can render the proposition-making process unnecessary. In some cases, the right action results directly and immediately from the virtuous state rather than first requiring a proposition for the particular situation, followed by an action. The example of the brave person in *EN* III 8, 1117a 17-22, for instance, tells us that the man standing firm and fearless in the face of sudden danger is braver than those who are only fearless in meeting danger already foreseen—in short, braveness in the given situation results directly from a brave state of character. In this kind of particular situation, e.g., sudden danger, Aristotle tells us explicitly that there would be little time and space for deliberation to identify the right action let alone to form a proposition through deliberation. It is simpler (and safer) to perceive the sudden danger and instantly react. The reaction to danger is, in this case, formed completely the immediate state of the person in the situation and by that state along. The *OL* cannot be a particular proposition, but rather the right deliberation to find the intermediate of the particular situation, i.e., a right action for a given situation. If it can always do rightly, that is to say, it becomes a state which grasps the practical truth; and Aristotle calls it *phronesis*. This *phronesis* can thus be deemed as state of grasping the *OL*.

One may still ask whether the *OL* could be a particular proposition which does not result from general rules and deliberation, but rather is directly issued by something else. In this case, without any aid of universal rules or deliberation process, how could *phronimos* grasp a particular proposition suddenly in the face of a particular situation? The particularist would say from perception. And yes, sense perception can give us a particular proposition without the aid of universal rules (e.g., this is red, or this is sweet,) but such propositions separate from universal rules are useless for producing moral actions. Without the knowledge that eating too many sweets is unhealthy, one may eat too many because they bring him pleasure. He must know first the universal rule that eating too many sweets is unhealthy, and then he can find the intermediate to eating sweets.

As argued above, only after the moral agent has been trained, collected experience, and obtained basic practical knowledge can he use his trained perception to adapt

universal rules to particular situations, then to find intermediates for his actions. Before the training is complete, a particular proposition formed only by sense perception is still useless for moral action because the moral agent has no knowledge of the intermediate of his situation. Only after he is trained can he form a proposition to describe or summarize the basic features of what has been perceived with the senses; then this description can be used again later in a similar, but particular situation. This is exactly the process from perception to experience, then to a kind of knowledge, and finally back to a particular situation. The *OL* is not, then, a particular proposition formed by sense perception. The particular proposition that is useful for making a moral decision is built via moral perception, which is formed under training (deliberation) and guidance (universal rules).

If we are to understand that the *OL*, for a fully virtuous person, is the right deliberation generated by *phronesis* in ethical matters, our understanding conforms to all the passages in which Aristotle discusses the *OL*. First of all, we need universal rules or principles although they may be inexact and usual. We then need good deliberation and moral perception to apply the corresponding rules to a particular situation and to find the intermediate deemed as a moral action. Because the situation is always particular, *phronesis* as an intellectual virtuous state is always present with virtuous people as they deliberate upon what is best to be done then and there; otherwise, we have no proposition to guide actions into particular situations, nor can the intermediate be identified appropriately. In this process, the reasoning activity of *phronesis* plays exactly the role of the *OL* and they can be identified as equal terms.

Conclusion

After a comprehensive and careful examination of topics related to and interpretations of the definition of the *OL*, I have shown that the decisive function of the *OL* is to build a virtuous state and generate virtuous action. In view of this moral function of the *OL*, I have also explored the advantages and disadvantages of all major existing interpretations as well as my own. My interpretation, which I developed based on preceding interpretations is based on the existence of two different moral stages: the virtue-acquiring stage and the virtue-acquired stage. My inquiry has not only exposed the moral function of the *OL* in significant detail and across different stages of the moral learner's life, but also has allowed me to pinpoint the value and advantages of my definition of the *OL* compared to other interpretations.

According to my interpretation, the *OL* is ultimately the right practical reasoning or right deliberation which is generated by intellectual virtue, i.e., *phronesis*. In the virtue-acquiring stage, the *OL* is something different for moral learners: an incomplete piece of the deliberative form or a proposition separate from the reasoning sequence. Especially at the very beginning of the moral learning process, the *OL* for moral learners arguably is 1) a type of formulation or articulated declaration, e.g., the guidance as a request or command of the moral guider; this guidance could be (1a) a proposition either regarding a universal rule (the major premise of the practical reasoning of *phronimos*) or (1b) regarding a particular situation (the conclusion of the practical reasoning of *phronimos*.) Because moral learners have not acquired the "that" in this very initial stage of moral learning, they cannot use their reason actively to make any moral judgment. What they can do is simply imitate and follow the guidance of the moral guider, namely the formulation of *phronimos*. This process is more mechanical than rationally reflective, although the rational activity is already somewhat involved.

In the later stages of the moral leaning process, moral learners actively utilize their deliberative capacity to identify the right action to be done per situation and regulate their feelings appropriately. They will also attempt to develop proper explanations for particular actions. They use rational deliberation to help them make the right choices in these later stages, but they cannot make right choices all the time as they are still learning the features of particular situations through experience or cannot ensure the right end (or right desire) in all particular situations. They have decided to lead a virtuous life, and have accepted *eudaemonia* as the ultimate end; but the capacity to make the right choice in every situation is still being built and the rational faculty is yet tasked with making decisions in accordance with emotions. It is crucial to recognize the contribution of calculation and deliberation in this virtue-acquiring stage. This is a function of the *OL* in a loose sense, but once it applies to all particular situations, it is the *OL* in a strict sense. The application of plans and rules in particular situations depends on deliberation, and the firm state also depends somewhat on deliberation and decision-making in the virtue-acquired stage, so I believe deliberation to be more fundamental than proposition in the later stages of moral learning.

Once the capacity for deliberation has matured (i.e. the ability of good deliberation generated by *phronesis* has reached its peak,) the moral agent (i.e., fully virtuous person) can consistently identify the right action for any given situation; further, he or she can also provide a full explanation for why this or that action should be done then and there. This process of searching for the right reason is indeed the deliberation process, which involves knowing the universal and the particular of the given situation; deliberation can rightly determine the right action for the situation at hand. This interpretation is advantageous in that it makes the ethical text more coherent, comprehensive, and inclusive than the proposition view. Further, the rule view cannot cover all the particular factors that are actually under consideration, and the particularist view does not fully explain why a particular action is called for in a particular situation.

I'll gladly admit that there may be questions or concerns remaining in regards to my interpretation both from the textual and interpretive aspects. Why, for example, would

Aristotle place the *OL* concept in such an important position but fail to define it explicitly? How am I to prove that my interpretation accurately reflects Aristotle's interpretation of the *OL*?

First, in this thesis I do not aim to prove that my interpretation aligns precisely with Aristotle's personal interpretation but rather to introduce a coherent, architecturally merit-worthy reading of his entire work on ethics. The main topic of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the question of how humans are to achieve supreme goodness, i.e., *eudaemonia* and its constituents such as virtue (both ethical and intellectual.) Under my interpretation, Aristotle does not give us an answer to what the *OL* is directly, not because there is no such an answer but because the answer cannot be expressed straightforwardly.

The *OL* appears differently from what the *OL* is per se in the virtue-acquiring stage. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several kinds of moral guidance in this stage: universal rule, a proposition about a particular situation, or, occasionally, the rational activity of the moral learners which can contingently play the role of the *OL*, and which of these different kinds of moral guidance is used is dependent on the moral situation. One rule is the best kind of moral guidance in this situation, but in another situation the best may be a particular proposition being an order issued by the moral guider. It is, accordingly, very challenging to give one clear-cut description of the *OL* in the virtue-acquiring stage. I argue that among these types of moral guidance, Aristotle treasures the growing rational activity most of all despite the fact that in the virtue-acquiring stage, the rational activity of the moral learner does not always lead her to the right decision.

Again, in his discussion on the virtue-acquiring stage, Aristotle emphasizes the process of building a virtuous state. This process is defined by Aristotle as habituation, but under the umbrella of the "habituation" concept is actually a complex process including mechanical training and rational reflection; their contribution to achieving virtue differ and change among different phases of the virtue-acquiring stage. Rational reflection then goes on to play a more and more important role as virtue is continually developed and cemented in the moral learner. Once the moral learner matures, i.e.,

reaches the virtue-acquired stage, rational reflection in the form of practical deliberation plays the decisive role for virtuous action. This deliberation is discussed repeatedly and at length by Aristotle in his ethical work, especially in Book Six, where it is defined as the activity generated by *phronesis* inextricably linked to ethical virtue (and finally is identified with the *OL* in some sense.) We can, accordingly, consider right deliberation to be the *OL*, but neither we nor Aristotle himself can maintain this definition through such a dynamic process.

My inquiry not only proves that Aristotle actually does provide us his best answer to the question of what the *OL* is, but also leads us toward a reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a consistent and coherent work. Its structure and argument are well designed by Aristotle at the onset, (though neither are accomplished perfectly in the end of the work.)

With respect to the interpretive concern, there are several weak points in my interpretation which I have addressed above and will summarize below.

First, from my interpretation, the achievement of ethical virtue is nearly entirely dependent on rational reflection. This seems to imply that there are a set of basic rules or principles that the learner seeks to gain an explanation for virtue; if these particulars can be connected to a given situation, the right action should become clear. Seemingly, then, ethical virtue is taught deductively; but Aristotle places ethical virtue achieved from habituation in contrast against intellectual virtue that is taught/learned.

Second, the example of the brave person in *EN* III 8, 1117a 17-22 tells us that the man standing firm and fearless in the face of sudden danger is braver than those who are only fearless when facing dangers already foreseen. This argument seems to suggest that a brave action done after deliberation is not as brave as the action done immediately without any deliberation involved.

Third, under the grand conception of *eudaemonia* and complicated situations inherent to human life, though deliberators can appreciate all the particular elements, different

deliberators might select different means to fulfill the same end. By the same token, one deliberator may find it difficult to make right decisions among several doable or even good options.

I will comfortably admit that in my model, the ethical virtue is somewhat teachable. In the earlier phases of the virtue-acquiring stage, mechanical habituation mainly leads the way to acquiring virtue while in the later phases, the rational reflection of the moral learner slowly takes over that task (though habituation continues to play an auxiliary role.) Certain basic rules and principles are well-understood by the learner and he can adapt them to particular situations, though these rules and principles are not without exception. "Taught" and "habituated" can be compatible and even co-involved. Ethical virtue is generally acquired through habituation, but teaching rules remains helpful. The acquisition of intellectual virtue also necessitates habituation to make the intellectual state firm and stable. Aristotle makes the distinction between habituation and teaching not to exclude one or the other, but to emphasize that they characterize different types of virtue differently.

The example of braveness really seems a contradiction to Aristotle's own definition of virtue as a prohairetic state. To emphasize the role of deliberation so highly is to reflect the complexity of any particular situation with which the moral agent is faced. It is deliberation that helps moral agents make right decisions in particular situations, and deliberation generally needs time—excellent deliberation is completed very quickly, however (1142b26-27), assuming that the moral agent has faced similar situations many times during training and that said deliberation is supported by habituation. In highly familiar situations, the moral agent may act even without deliberation. There are other possible interpretations of this point,[195] which I will leave up to another scholar to discuss.

The last one is quite tricky. According to my interpretation, good deliberation is generated by *phronesis*, which is always connected ethical virtue. This ensures that

[195] One important modern theory interprets this virtuous action without deliberation as "apparently" non-deliberative, automatic behavior. There is actually a reasoning process hidden beneath normal consciousness, however. See J. Fodor (1968).

actions are always right and pointing the moral agent toward the ultimate end, i.e., a happy life. Good deliberation also involves both knowledge of a series of relevant universal rules and particular situations that guarantees the deliberation is soundly and reasonably conducted. We cannot absolutely eliminate the risk of "impossible" decisions, however, i.e., those in which ultimate right and ultimate wrong are patently unclear or very obscure. Virtuous people can easily tell right from wrong, but may find it difficult to choose between two good options. In this situation, the moral agent may be more or less reliant on ethical "luck": another interesting topic that Aristotle has left us to discuss.

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Erklärung über die selbstständige Abfassung meiner Dissertation

Hiermit erkläre ich, Jie Tian, Matrikel-Nr: 535770, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbstständig und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe.

Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sind als solche kenntlich gemacht.

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