The Field in Psychoanalytic Research Methodology

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Abstract

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This dissertation is an exploration of the field in psychoanalytic research methodology aimed toward increasing understanding of unconscious processes that develop between researchers and their research topic. In this study, recent psychoanalytic research is discussed with an exploration of the research methods utilized. The methods used are then discussed in the context of the "circle of research methods" (Romanyshyn, 2012), a conceptualization of large groups of research traditions including natural science, human science, hermeneutic science, and science of the soul. The research approach of this study is centered in the traditions of hermeneutics and alchemical hermeneutics, which are grounded in the works of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Palmer, 1969). The researcher utilized the hermeneutic circle to explore research methods in psychoanalysis comparing the new information that arose from the process to the previous information that was already understood. Alchemical hermeneutics was also used to make a place for unconscious processes between this researcher and the research topic. The question of the place of the dynamic unconscious in research methods in psychoanalytic research opened up the larger question about the scientific status of psychoanalysis, and this topic is addressed throughout this study. For research conducted in the traditions of hermeneutic science and science of the soul in psychoanalysis, this study proposes that several theoretical concepts of analytic field theory be used and

applied to develop a new research method in psychoanalysis that would make room for

dynamic unconscious processes.

       Keywords: Research methods, Psychoanalysis, Unconscious, Analytic Field,

Uroboros

Dedication

A mes parents pour m'avoir transmis leur amour des livres et de la pensée.

To my husband and my son, for their unconditional love and support.

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The style used throughout this dissertation is in accordance with the *Publication Manual*

of the American Psychological Association (6th Edition, 2009), and *Pacifica Graduate*

Institute's Dissertation Handbook (2016-2017).

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study is to explore the field in psychoanalytic research methodology using hermeneutics (Packer & Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969) and alchemical hermeneutics (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Romanyshyn, 2007) in order to understand unconscious processes that occur between the researcher and the research topic. The study focuses specifically on the field of psychoanalysis and investigates the apparent paradox that although psychoanalysis recognizes the unconscious from a theoretical perspective, it does not explicitly incorporate unconscious dynamics in its research methodologies.

Relevance of Topic for Clinical Psychology

The field of psychology encompasses a wide variety of disciplines. The American Psychological Association (APA) is composed of 54 divisions, including areas such as cognitive, social, and clinical psychology (APA, 2013). Some introductory textbooks in psychology include areas such as biological, psychoanalytic, behavioristic, humanistic, cognitive, and evolutionary subdisciplines (Bernstein, Clarke-Stewart, Penner, & Roy, 2008; Fernald, 2008). Within such a wide sphere of study, several debates presented by those in the field of psychology derive from their ambivalence in relation to psychology's scientific status (Bernstein et al., 2008; Fernald, 2008; Gergen, 2001; Goertzen, 2008; Hunt, 2005; Yanchar, Gantt, & Clay, 2005; Yanchar & Hill, 2003).

Debates have emerged regarding psychology's clinical practice in contrast to academic research (Belar, 2000; Cautin, 2011; Hunt & Wisocki, 2008) as well as

differences between various kinds of research approaches, including quantitative and

qualitative methods (Allwood, 2012; Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Mertens, 2009; Patton,

2002). In introductory psychology textbooks, research is often presented under the

experimental and quantitative paradigms, which follow the scientific method of natural

science (Coon & Mitterer, 2011; Gilbert, Schacter, & Wegner, 2011; Heiman, 2001;

Hockenbury & Hockenbury, 2010; Pomerantz, 2008; Weiten, 2005). These textbooks

include only a few qualitative research methods, such as naturalistic observations and

case studies (Coon & Mitterer, 2011; Gilbert et al., 2011; Heiman, 2001; Hockenbury &

Hockenbury, 2010; Pomerantz, 2008; Weiten, 2005). Debates regarding research in

psychology parallel discussions that have occurred broadly in the social sciences

regarding the natural and the human sciences (Madison, 1990) and the emergence and

relevance of qualitative research methods (Crotty, 1998; Lincoln, Lynhman, & Guba,

2011; Neuman, 2000; Phillips & Burbules, 2000).

The field of clinical psychology in general has experienced a split, which is

apparent at various levels, including the scientist–practitioner or *Boulder model* (Donn,

Routh, & Lunt, 2000; Pomerantz, 2008) and the practitioner-scholar or *Vail model* (Donn

et al., 2000; Pomerantz, 2008) as well as the clinical practice versus academic and

research debate (Belar, 2000; Cautin, 2011; Hunt & Wisocki, 2008; VanderVeen, Reddy,

Veilleux, January, & DiLillo, 2012). Although the majority of introductory textbooks in

psychology and in research methods for the human and social sciences endorse the

quantitative and qualitative research split (Heiman, 2001; Pomerantz, 2008; Weiten,

2005), the dichotomy between research methods is controversial and unclear (Allwood,

2012; Kelemen & Rumens, 2012; Lund, 2005; Walsh, 2012) and perpetuates a lack of

dialog and integration between the research paradigms. Various researchers have explored the specificity and complementarity of research methods (Creswell, 2009; Heppner & Heppner, 2004; Patton, 2002; Romanyshyn, 2007). The important point is not that one method is better or worse than the other but rather that each brings in an essential aspect of psychology that can better inform the knowledge and understanding of the overall aspect of human experiences.

In the past several decades, however, a variety of research methods following the qualitative paradigm have emerged, including observational methods, interviewing, diary and narrative methods, focus groups, phenomenological methods, grounded theory, discourse analysis, and content analysis (Berg & Lune, 2011; Breakwell, Hammond, Fife-Schaw, & Smith, 2007; Breakwell, Smith, & Wright, 2012; Coolican, 2013; Creswell, 2013; Mertens, 2009; Patton, 2002; Smith, 2007; Willig, 2008). Although the designations of quantitative and qualitative paradigms are widely accepted (Breakwell et al., 2012; Creswell, 2009; Davies, 2007; Fernald, 2008; Mertens, 2009; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008; Sheperis, Young, & Daniels, 2010), their definitions and separations are arbitrary, as they encompass complex nuances (Allwood, 2012; Breakwell et al., 2007; Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Patton, 2002).

Even though mostly omitted from textbooks, research methods based on a depth psychological perspective have also appeared more recently (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Romanyshyn, 2007) and need to be included as a research process in psychology. Depth psychological research methods were highlighted by Coppin and Nelson (2005) and further developed by Romanyshyn (2007). Depth psychological research methods hold the basic assumption that the way that researchers interact with their topic impacts their

observation and understanding about that topic (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Romanyshyn, 2007). In this tradition, the research project not only acknowledges the presence of the researcher but also depends on it (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Romanyshyn, 2007). Depth psychological research methods validate the existence and presence of unconscious dynamics in research and call upon researchers to investigate the various elements that arise from their relationship with the work while keeping "soul in mind" (Romanyshyn, 2007, p. 48). This research paradigm emphasizes the place and impact of the researcher in research methodology and also makes a place for unconscious dynamics in the research process (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Elsner, 2009; Romanyshyn, 2007).

Psychoanalysis is a specific area of psychology that encompasses the complexity of the nature of research (Blatt, Corveleyn, & Luyten, 2006; Chiesa, 2005; Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, 2007; Kernberg, 2006; Wallerstein, 2006). The field of psychoanalysis reflects several debates including questions regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis (Chiesa, 2010; Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, 2007; Gerber, 2002b; Blatt et al., 2006; Wallerstein, 2006), the natural science and human science split (Brookes, 2004; Chiesa, 2010; Shapiro & Emde, 1995), and the relationship between clinical practice and research (Bucci, 2001; Blatt et al., 2006; Sandler, Sandler, & Davies, 2000). The field of psychoanalysis also encompasses debates regarding the type of methodology it should follow in its research, including empirical and phenomenological methods (Brookes, 2004; Kernberg, 2006; Shapiro & Edme, 1995; Wallerstein, 2006) and hermeneutic methods (Wallerstein, 2006), or whether or not the field should be studied in these terms at all (Chiesa, 2010; Gerber, 2002b).

Popper believed that psychoanalysis should not be considered an empirical science, because it could not be falsifiable (Grünbaum, 2008). In the past several decades, researchers argued that psychoanalysis is an empirical science, which should be advanced through qualitative and quantitative research (Wallerstein, 2006; Gerber, 2002b). Historically, psychoanalysis has relied on the single-case clinical study (Chiesa, 2010). The field has also included a hermeneutic movement whereby researchers have incorporated the work of Ricoeur and hermeneutic methodology in their research process (Wallerstein, 2006). Despite arguments from antihermeneutic psychoanalysts such as Green (2003), who claim that objective and empirical research methods do not capture the complexity of the discipline, Gerber (2002b) argued that almost nothing in science is researched directly, rendering psychoanalysis no more complicated than any other field of study. Acknowledging the differences between methodologies, Wallerstein (2009) argued that quantitative and qualitative methods, whether idiographic or nomothetic, were all necessary to advance the clinical, conceptual, and empirical aspects of the field of psychoanalysis.

Although a significant increase has occurred in quantitative and qualitative research studies in psychoanalysis (Chiesa, 2010; Gerber, 2002b; Kernberg, 2006; Wallerstein, 2009) as well as reflections in terms of the type of methodology to use, a lack of overt discussion seems to exist regarding the presence and the role of the unconscious in the methodological process of research. Psychoanalysis recognizes the unconscious from a theoretical perspective (McWilliams, 2004; Shedler, 2010; Shevrin & Dickman, 1980; Wachtel, 2010), but there seems to be no explicit recognition of unconscious processes in its research methodologies or explicit inclusion of depth

psychological research methods that have emerged recently (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Romanyshyn, 2007).

In this study, the term *depth psychology* refers to a psychology that recognizes unconscious dynamics and acknowledges conscious and unconscious processes as essential aspects of its theoretical constructs (Bleuler, 1910; Downing, 2006; Freud, 1926/1978; Hillman, 1979). The term *unconscious* refers to a broad concept including Freudian, post-Freudian, Jungian, and post-Jungian ideas. The concept of the unconscious includes Freud's (1915/2005, 1940/1949) original topographical model of conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and the idea that everything outside of consciousness is unconscious. The unconscious also includes phantasies (Isaacs, 1948), resistances, and defenses (Etchegoyen, 2005), and wishes and impulses (Sandler & Sandler, 1984) as well as the dynamic process that occurs in dreams and daydreaming (Brown, 2011). According to Jungian and post-Jungian theories, the unconscious relates to the psychic process and content pertaining to a person's individual life as well as to the collective and universal aspects of human beings, including instincts, archetypes (Hall, 1983; Jung, 1954/1972), and the psychoid, or the relationship between the psyche and the body (Addison, 2009; Jung, 1954/1972; Stein, 1998), and conceptualizations comprising animate and inanimate entities (Jung, 2002), including the *anima mundi* (Hillman, 1992), the *mundus imaginalis* (Corbin, 1984/1995), and the "world unconscious" (Aizenstat, 1995, p. 95). The concept of the unconscious also includes the vast unknown area out of which consciousness emerges (Stein, 1998), which can be viewed as a powerhouse of possibilities and potential (Sedgwick, 2001), including dreams, symptoms, and psychopathology (Coppin & Nelson, 2005).

Reflecting upon the presence and the role of the unconscious in psychoanalytic research methodologies as well as investigating the possible development of a field in the research process are together an important contribution to the field of clinical psychology because of the essential nature of these concepts in clinical psychoanalysis. Investigating these processes from a methodological perspective adds to and informs the current understanding of such processes from a clinical perspective. If the field of psychoanalysis recognizes the importance of understanding these theoretical concepts for clinical purposes, it seems important to understand them further from a research methodological perspective as well. An important aspect of understanding the field of psychoanalytic research is gaining a better understanding of the conscious and unconscious role that the researcher plays while undertaking research. This dissertation strives to keep in mind these various concepts of the unconscious, as they are relevant to the investigation of the dynamic processes that occur between the researcher and the research topic. The paradoxical absence of the recognition of unconscious dynamics in the research process and methodology in psychoanalysis reflects a gap between psychoanalytic theory and research assumptions. This study therefore explores the field and the role of the unconscious in psychoanalytic research methodologies using hermeneutics and alchemical hermeneutics.

Autobiographical Origins of Researcher's Interest in the Topic

My interest in research methodologies and the process of doing research started during my graduate studies when I explored the myth of Demeter and Persephone in relation to my investigation of the process the researcher undergoes while doing research with soul in mind (Schwarcz-Besson, 2013). In parallel, a series of events involving

singing that linked Shakespeare's Ophelia, from his play *Hamlet* (Shakespeare, 2009) to

Persephone (Rice & Stambaugh, 2009), as well as dreams and experiences with active

imagination, gave rise to my interest in using hermeneutics and alchemical hermeneutics

as a research method. In the development of my dissertation proposal, the concept of the

unconscious in psychology and depth psychology, in particular, periodically resurfaced,

compelling me to seek better understanding of these concepts. As I investigated these

theoretical and clinical constructs further, my research topic became more defined, as I

was able to integrate the process of the researcher in research methodology and the place

of the unconscious in such an undertaking. This resulted in a desire to investigate the

field and the role of the unconscious in psychoanalytic research methodology as well as

the relationship between the researcher and the research project.

My interest in this research topic is also grounded in my own life, including my

personal process of engaging with the written word while both reading and writing, the

process of hermeneutics as giving voice or embodiment, the importance of voice and

singing, the need to navigate between multiple worlds, and the relevance of integration in

general and in research methodology in particular.

Researcher's process of engaging with the written word.

My relationship with the written word has dramatically changed and evolved in

the past several years. While reading and writing, I enter a dynamic process, and a dialog

emerges between the topics presented by an author and the various voices and images

that emerge, mine and those of the author. During the course, Imaginal Psychotherapy,

we students were asked to keep a journal of our reactions to the assigned articles and

books we were reading. In this process of journaling, I started to dialog with the voices of

the text I was reading and with the voices that arose in my own internal world through

daydreaming and night dreams. While reading Corbin (1984/1995), for example, and

struggling with the aspect of Sufi mysticism in the historical background of imaginal

psychotherapy, I re-approached the world of subtle bodies experientially, as illustrated in

this passage from my journal:

> I started re-reading *mundus imaginalis*, the imaginal (Corbin, 1984/1995). This
>
> seems so "out there" in the sense of so removed from our Western world. I am
>
> trying to picture this middle world between the concrete, natural world of the
>
> senses and that of the intellect, the middle world being the imaginal. I feel like
>
> Ratatouille's brother in the Pixar movie, when Ratatouille makes him taste the
>
> food to try to make him understand the subtleties and complexities of the different
>
> tastes, which Ratatouille experiences as a colorful firework. Whereas his
>
> brother—I—can only grasp or tune into tiny little sparks that are only mere
>
> embryos of the large and beautiful firework of Ratatouille's experience. I am the
>
> brother experiencing only sparks of the imaginal. (Author's journal, 2013)

In class, we talked further about the sparks or *scintillae*, as Jung (1954/1972) called them,

and I experienced them as a metaphor throughout the course. While discussing the nature

of psyche and the multiplicity of the unconscious, Jung explained that various traditions,

including alchemists, Hindus, and Christians, used the image of the sparks of light as a

means to describe the nature of consciousness. Jung equated the appearance of luminous

flickers to the intuitive emergence of consciousness out of the depth of the unconscious.

Jung further discussed the significance of the *scintillae* or sparks in alchemy, where they

encompass the union of male and female and parallel the image of the Jewish gnostic

union of sun and moon. Jung also pointed out that the sparks are associated with the

symbol of the eye, which, combined with the image of the sun, come to represent another

metaphor for consciousness and the ego complex.

From an experiential perspective, I realized that I was actually not like

Ratatouille's brother anymore—at least not the brother who takes it for granted that he

will only be able to experience sparks or that sparks are the end point of this particular

experience; rather, I came to realize that the sparks are only the beginning, the promise of

something much larger that is ready to be discovered. The sparks, *scintillae*, flickers of

light, are the first signs of the emergence of one aspect of the imaginal: an invitation into

the psychoid experience.

My interest in the process of research is rooted in the development of my

relationship with the written word, as described above, and the process of hermeneutics

guided by Hermes. Palmer's (1969) discussion of hermeneutics as a way to give voice to

a text became an engaging platform for further investigation of this dynamic process of

dialog between the multiple levels of the texts and the various voices and images that

emerge.

Hermeneutics as giving voice or embodiment.

Further reflections regarding the process of hermeneutics inquiry as giving voice

to tradition arose while reading Bosnak's (2007) *Embodiment*. In this book, he stated,

It is as though through a medium of Paleolithic wall painters the animals have

charged into the wall, waiting in static polychrome for a next observer to embody,

who again will feel their energetic charge, and change them back from stasis to

ec-stasis (out-of-stasis). (p. 7)

While reading, I thought about what Bosnak was describing and drew a parallel with music and singing. I wondered whether the composer's feelings or the people, animals, images, archetypes, and emotions embedded in the composer's music (both melody and words, if any) were waiting in static melodic harmony for the next musician or performer to embody. Maybe the performer—as the person who plays music, in the large sense of the word—experiences the music's energetic charge and changes the notes and melody "from stasis to ec-stasis" (p. 7). I tied this idea of embodiment back to Romanyshyn's (2007) concept of alchemical hermeneutics and the process of doing research "with soul in mind" (p. 4). I wondered if some aspect of the "unfinished business of the soul" (p. 4) might mean that the content of research—possibly people, ancestors, images, themes, topics, and archetypes—is waiting for another researcher or writer to embody and advance a little further.

Relevance of voice and singing.

An important aspect of the origins of my interest in this dissertation topic related to my passion for singing. In parallel to investigating the process the researcher undergoes while doing research with soul in mind using the myth of Demeter and Persephone, I encountered a series of events that illustrate how singing and voice, occurring in parallel with the process of reading and writing, are relevant to a hermeneutics and alchemical hermeneutics process of research, in terms of giving voice to heritage and tradition while being engaged in a process of transformation.

After coming back from our class session where we discussed our research papers, a melody came back to my mind. It was from a song I had sung almost twenty years before in a choir in my home country. The song was called "La Mort d'Ophelie," or

"Ophelia's death," with music by Berlioz and lyrics by Legouvé (1863). I felt an urge to find the written score and when I arrived home, I looked in several boxes in my garage and unearthed the score. When I sat down at my piano and started singing, I immediately experienced strong emotions.

In parallel to finding and singing "La Mort d'Ophelie," I was reading a section of Hillman's (1976) *Re-Visioning Psychology* in preparation for our summer class session. In that book, I found a passage on the Greek goddesses, Persephone and Demeter, where Hillman commented,

> When we fail to recognize our human frailty, Persephone, image of soul, must carry it for us. Then it is she who is frail and insubstantial. Then soul is a phantom we can never catch, an ever-fleeting daughter desperately distracted, symptomatic, at the fringe of the field of consciousness, never able to descend to her proper enthronement within and below. Then we go into the dark afraid of the dark, without soul of bulk or substance. (p. 208)

At that moment, I realized that Ophelia, from the song I had heard in my head, was an articulation of this image of Persephone, who had not been enthroned and who had been denied her proper access to the Underworld. After doing more research, I also realized that Ophelia was part of Shakespeare's (2009) *Hamlet* and that Legouvé based the lyrics on Hamlet's mother Gertrude's speech in the play. Researching the myth and hearing the song, singing it, and reflecting about it provided me with a hands-on experiential example of the process of hermeneutics. I had entered a hermeneutic circle for my research methods paper, while allowing my body and my voice a place as significant as that of my intellect in the research process.

Over the years, I experienced periods during which I was overtly musical and others when I was musically silent. Starting graduate school at Pacifica played a significant role in my journey toward reconnecting to my soul and finding my passion. In French, the word *voix*, which means "voice," is a homonym of the word *voie*, which means "path" or "journey." It is no surprise that as I was struggling with finding my path, I lost my voice, and that when I started my new path in clinical psychology, I reconnected with my voice through singing.

Navigating multiple worlds.

My interest in psychoanalytic research methodology stemmed from hermeneutics and the guidance of the Greek god Hermes in research. Being an immigrant, I had to learn to navigate the world of my country of origin and that of my new home in the United States. Although it has been many years, I understand that a part of me identified with the traveler and the outsider. Growing up within the boundaries of an establishment for disabled children, I learned to navigate between the inside world of that establishment and the outside world of so-called *normality*. The aspects of Hermes as traveler between worlds and the god's ability to translate things back and forth between them strongly resonated with my belief in maintaining an open mind on various aspects of life, including research. In the back-and-forth process of translating and traveling between worlds, just as in the clinical field, a third is created which does not belong to one of the worlds in particular but depends on the presence of both to emerge. Hermes as traveler and translator has become an important aspect of my gaining understanding of the process of research in psychoanalysis.

Integration, circle of research, and image of the uroboros.

While reflecting on and conceptualizing my research topic, the question of the

relevance of integration in research methods arose. This question was prompted by my

reflections on Romanyshyn's (2012) concept of the "circle of research method," which he

presented during the course, Depth Psychological Research Methods. He drew a quadrant

similar to a watch and placed the tradition of research from a natural science perspective

at 12 o'clock, human science at 9 o'clock, hermeneutic science at 3 o'clock, and science

of the soul or the imaginal at 6 o'clock. Romanyshyn's conceptualization of the

relationship and possible integration of large groups of research methods can be

represented as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Circle of research methods. Adapted from an unpublished lecture presented in

the course, Depth Psychological Research Methods, by R. Romanyshyn, 2012, Pacifica

Graduate Institute, Carpinteria, CA. Used with permission.

Romanyshyn explained that the circle of research (Figure 1) depicts the idea that

each research tradition that emerged after that of the natural sciences considered an

aspect of the research process that was previously left unconscious or that was unknown. The circle represents what he called a "round dance" (personal correspondence, 2015), or the relationship between the research traditions and how they all reveal and conceal aspects of the psyche. It is not that a method is better or worse than the other but rather that each tradition contains strengths and weaknesses in its approach and perspective, and in the aspects each reveals and conceals.

In the tradition of psychology as a natural science, the researcher is removed from the research process, a role that Romanyshyn (2012) described using the phrase "the absent researcher." In research from this perspective, objectivity requires that the researcher's personal biases, attitudes, or subjective impressions do not influence the observations or conclusions of the research (Heiman, 2001). The researcher strives to obtain empirical, systematic, and precise data based on observation (Heiman, 2001). The researcher's personal interpretations are removed from the research process, as the data is intended to reflect what the participants actually do in a given situation (Heiman, 2001). Objectivity is also defined by the idea that another researcher should be able to replicate the study and make the same objective observations (Heiman, 2001).

Patton (2002) explained that, in the tradition of psychology as a human science, the researcher's presence is acknowledged, as it is understood that he or she will make conscious assumptions about the research question. In this type of research, the researcher acknowledges that a bias-free inquiry is not attainable. The researcher strives to make conscious and to set aside, or bracket, his or her personal assumptions and judgments about the data. Romanyshyn (2012) used the term "the bracketed researcher" to describe the researcher engaged in human science methodologies. Objectivity is then

defined by the idea that the researcher is dedicated to getting as close as possible to what is actually occurring in the research setting but acknowledges that absolute objectivity is impossible to attain (Patton, 2002).

In the tradition of psychology as a hermeneutic science, particularly in philosophical hermeneutics, the research project is centered on interpretation and understanding (Palmer, 1969). The researcher enters into a "hermeneutic circle" (Palmer, 1969, p. 78) and engages in a dialog between old information and new information that emerges in the process. The presence of the researcher is central and essential to this dynamic process in which the researcher becomes the "encircled researcher" (Romanyshyn, 2012).

In the tradition of psychology as a science of the soul, the research project is contingent upon the presence of the researcher. Romanyshyn (2007) explained that the relationship between the researcher and the research is unique and intricate, as "the work wants something from the research as much as the researcher wants something from the work" (p. 105). This tradition not only validates the existence and presence of the unconscious in research, both for the researcher and for the work, but it calls upon the researcher to examine the unconscious dynamics of his or her work. From this perspective, said Romanyshyn, objectivity includes the subjective aspect of these unconscious dynamics. He pointed out that the research becomes a process in which the researcher and the work influence each other, as the unconscious dynamics of the work are present regardless of whether or not they are acknowledged. The imaginal approach to research "deepens the circle of interpretation and imagines the researcher as a vulnerable or complex researcher" (Romanyshyn, personal correspondence, 2015).

Although each research category is arbitrary, Romanyshyn's (2012) model provided a visual representation of the type of research that exists in psychology today and the relationship between the groups of commonly accepted research methods became apparent. This model acknowledges that each research method brings in a different view and expands our understanding of the world and of what it means to be human. This idea resonated well with Palmer's (1969) reflection that the role of hermeneutics inquiry is to put the object of research back in its "historical moment" (p. 194) and to bring validity back to the "inner historicality of experience" (p. 194). It is not that research should move away from a natural science concept of experience oriented to "knowing as a perceptual act and knowledge as a body of conceptual data" (p. 194), said Romanyshyn (2007), but that researchers should make a sustained effort to diversify their methodologies in order to understand experiences from as varied a stance as possible.

As I further reflected upon Romanyshyn's (2012) model (adapted in Figure 1) and the place of the researcher and the unconscious in research methods, the relevance of the integration and complementarity of research methodology and the research process was reinforced. In the midst of these reflections, an image of the uroboros emerged, which I added to the original model (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Circle of research methods with uroboros. Configured by the author, from an unpublished lecture presented in the course, Depth Psychological Research Methods, by R. Romanyshyn, 2012, Pacifica Graduate Institute, Carpinteria, CA.

Although I was initially unaware of this, one difference between Figures 1 and 2 is that I moved the positions of the research methods, except for the natural science tradition. In Figure 2, the circular motion starts with the natural science at 12 o'clock, followed by the human science at 3 o'clock, hermeneutic science at 6 o'clock, and science of soul at 9 o'clock. When I conceptualized Romanyshyn's (2012) reflections about the presence of the researcher and the unconscious in the research process, this sequencing made more sense to me. With this interpretation, I could visualize the progressive emergence of the acknowledgment and presence of the researcher and of unconscious processes in research methods as the circle was formed, starting somewhere between the human science and hermeneutic science but more predominantly between hermeneutic science and the science of soul. In this progression, the researcher navigates different levels of consciousness and descends gradually into the realm of the

unconscious. In this modified model (Figure 2), a progression and sequence emerges between the research methods from natural science, to human science, to hermeneutic science, to science of soul, and back to natural science. As Romanyshyn (2012) described it, the researcher's presence evolves around the model, from absent, to bracketed, to encircled, to vulnerable, and back to absent.

The second difference between the figures is the overlay of the image of the uroboros taking the place of the circle and spiral in Figure 2. The uroboros is often represented as a mystical symbol depicted as a flying dragon or serpent that eats its tail (Archive for Research in Archetypal Symbolism [ARAS], 2010; Jung, 1948/2014; von Franz, 1980). This symbol represents the unconscious (ARAS, 2010; Prochaska, 1998), includes the connection or integration of the beginning and the end of a process (Jung, 1948/2014; von Franz, 1980), and depicts the process of regeneration (ARAS, 2010). Von Franz (1980) stated that the symbol of the uroboros represents "the moment when death and resurrection meet" (p. 70). In addition to a symbolic representation of the circle formed by its body, the uroboros also mirrors the spiral discussed above, while graphically emphasizing the dynamic aspect of the model. The uroboros connects the realm of the conscious and the unconscious in a spiral motion, exemplifying the importance for researchers to engage in integrative movements and dialogs between research methods and modalities. The junction between the science of the soul and the natural science paradigms seems a particularly important hinge where dialog and integration is needed, which the uroboros emphasizes as the area where the head eats the tail. Figure 2 thus depicts the dynamic relationship between conscious and unconscious,

subjective and objective, and acknowledges their varied presence within the different research methods.

Both Jung (1948/2014) and von Franz (1980) linked the image of the uroboros to the Greek god Mercurius or Hermes. It is as though I had already started a hermeneutic dialog or hermeneutic circle in the early conceptualization phase of my dissertation topic through the emergence of the image of the uroboros in my adaptation (Figure 2) of Romanyshyn's (2012) model.

Relevance of integration of methods in psychoanalytic research.

Several researchers in the field of psychoanalysis have also recognized the relevance of the integration and complementarity of research methods and called for an urgent need for collaboration within its field as well as with other disciplines (Blatt et al., 2006; Chiesa, 2010; Gerber, 2002b; Kernberg, 2006; Schachter & Luborsky, 1998). Some of the questions raised are related to the need for the integration of scientific research with clinical observation (Chiesa, 2010); the value of collaboration between theorist, methodologist, and experimentalist for the continued development of the field of psychoanalysis (Gerber, 2002b); and the need to advance psychoanalysis as a scientific discipline (Kernberg, 2006). An essential goal of psychoanalysis is to integrate the unintegrated areas of one's personality and life experiences (Eagle, 2013). A similar goal of integration should be more prevalent in psychoanalytic research and psychoanalytic research methodologies.

I agree with Gerber (2002b) that it is not a sufficient argument to qualify psychoanalysis as unscientific because the scientific inquiry modifies the psychoanalytic process. This argument also seems too perfectionistic, as if each study should cover the

entirety of the discipline. An integrative, collaborative, and interdisciplinary stance,

including methodological perspectives, seems more appropriate, because with more

varied efforts, the diversity of approaches become complementary. Gerber also alluded to

the potential wealth of outcomes for both clinical practice and the scientific advancement

of psychoanalysis if researchers and theorists were to collaborate. I also agree with

Wallerstein (2009) that it is essential to conduct research in order to advance the field of

psychoanalysis; however, I believe it is as important to expand and advance an

understanding of what it means to be a psychological being from an ontological

perspective. Kernberg (2006) showed several areas where psychoanalysis and

neurobiology could build bridges, as he believed it would benefit the development of

both disciplines. In his article, he reviewed the literature in which empirical

investigations in psychoanalysis were integrated with psychoanalytic theoretical

constructs. Although Kernberg called for a broader range of research in and on

psychoanalysis, I would argue for broadening that scope even further to incorporate depth

psychological research methodologies as well.

Although this is only a speculation, I find it worth pursuing Schachter and

Luborsky's (1998) reflections about the possibility that psychoanalysts might be

defended against reading research, because they speak to the need for better

understanding of unconscious dynamics that emerge in the process of conducting

research. This dissertation is a first step in addressing the relevance of these various

questions to the process of doing research in psychoanalysis.

As a researcher in clinical psychology, I am compelled to increase my

understanding of what it means to be human. I am convinced that each research project,

small or large, contributes to this body of knowledge. In order to gain as wide a

perspective as possible, though, researchers must engage a variety of methods, as each

one sheds light on a different aspect of humanity. Within this larger context, it seems

essential to investigate the presence and place of the unconscious in this process, and this

dissertation strives to make one step in that direction.

The Researcher's Predisposition to the Topic

Given my personal background, growing up within the boundaries of an

establishment for disabled children and my experience as an immigrant, I acknowledge

that I am particularly sensitive to the importance of integration in general. My desire to

investigate integration in research methods is in part tied to my personal need for

integrating the various worlds in my own life. Additionally, it is not surprising that I have

chosen an adjunct research methodology that allows for self-reflection, given my research

topic but also given my own bias and personality, which favor introspection in terms of

communication and way of life. As I gathered the data and analyze the findings of this

research, I kept these predispositions in mind. As alchemical hermeneutics specifically

makes space for images that arise through dreams, active imagination, and reflections

(Romanyshyn, 2007), it created a systematic and structured place for exploring the

presence and the role of my own unconscious in the research process, while providing a

practice in which I can continue to pay attention to and explore my transference and

complexes related to my research topic.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

This chapter presents a review of current literature related to research methods in the field of psychoanalysis and highlights the paradox of the absence of unconscious dynamics within its research methods. In order to situate the purpose statement of this research, this section includes a review of the current literature related to depth psychology, the broad concept of the unconscious, the *field* or area co-created between patient and therapist, and research in psychoanalysis. Literature in depth psychology is reviewed to provide a frame within which psychoanalysis lies. The broad concept of the unconscious is reviewed in terms of Freudian, post-Freudian, Jungian, and post-Jungian general understandings. The idea of the field as a representation of the area co-created between patient and therapist is reviewed from both a psychoanalytic and analytic perspective.

Depth Psychology

Depth psychology is often associated with the psychology of Freud and Jung (Beebe, 2004; Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Craig, 2007; Hillman, 1976; Jacobs, 1971; Romanyshyn, 2007) and that of Adler (Beebe, 2004; Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Jacobs, 1971). Bleuler originated the term *depth psychology* (*Tiefenpsychologie*) in reference to Freud's psychoanalysis (Craig, 2007; Ellenberger, 1970; Jung, 1912/1966; Hillman, 1979). Freud (1915/2005) referred to his topographical model of the psychical apparatus—preconscious, unconscious, and conscious—to explain why psychoanalysis belongs to depth psychology. Jung (1912/1966) stated that Bleuler chose the name "depth psychology, in order to indicate that hinterland of the psyche, also called the

unconscious" (p. 247). Jung (1961/1989) conceptualized depth psychology as a human science, which aims to understand and interpret the unconscious through the rhetorical language of the psyche, such as dreams, archetypes, and myths. Others have placed at the heart of their definition of depth psychology the concept of the unconscious (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Ellenberger, 1970; Jacobs, 1971; Stein, 1998); the invisible, alien, or hidden aspect of human nature (Craig, 2007; Hillman, 1976); and the dynamic and layered nature of human beings (Jacobs, 1971). Downing (2006) and Romanyshyn (2007) set the idea of soul at the center of depth psychology, and von Franz (1975) referred to soul in the context of Jung's concept of synchronicity. Mitchell and Black (1995) explained that depth psychology became an integral part of culture and the way in which people make sense of their experiences.

In his metabletical analysis of the cultural–historical context of the emergence of the unconscious as a double ego, while acknowledging its establishment by 1899 through Freud's method of free association, van den Berg (1971) attributed the discovery of depth psychology to Breuer in 1882. Identifying the existence of an unconscious as central to depth psychology, van den Berg argued that the actual roots of depth psychology and neuroses dated back to the end of the 18th century and not the end of the 19th century (Jacobs, 1971; Mook, 2008), as various people discovered precursory notions of a double ego, alter ego, ego split, or unconscious across several disciplines. Included among those he cited were the philosopher von Shubert with his work on dreams in 1814, the poet Byron in 1816, and the author Richter with his 1796 novel *Siebenkas*. Van den Berg further observed that phenomena similar to the double ego were simultaneously discussed by independent theorists between 1884 and 1893; in 1895, "the year of Breuer and

Freud's *Studien ueber Hysterie*" (Jacobs, 1971, p. 380); by French psychologist Ribot in

his conceptualization of the unconscious in his 1879 article published in the *Revue*

Philosophique; and James, who discussed the question of the existence of unconscious

mental states in his 1891 publication, *The Principles of Psychology* (Ellenberger, 1970;

Hunt, 2005; Jacobs, 1971).

The Unconscious

        Freudian and post-Freudian views of the unconscious.

        Freud provided an operational definition for the dynamic unconscious and

investigated its hypothesis in a scientific manner (Auchincloss & Samberg, 2012;

Lothane, 2006). Although Freud's conceptualization of the unconscious evolved

throughout his writing, in general terms, he described the unconscious as a fundamental

concept in psychoanalysis and stated that "the notion of a mental thing being

unconscious" (1940/1949, p. 35) was its central hypothesis. Freud set forth the notion that

everything mental outside of consciousness is essentially unconscious. In *The*

Unconscious, Freud (1915/2005) first conceptualized the unconscious from a

topographical perspective and saw important divisions in what he called the *system*

unconscious. Although the divisions are not finite, Freud conceptualized mental

processes as conscious, preconscious, or unconscious. He described the *preconscious* as

everything able to come into consciousness and reserved the term *unconscious* for the

other mental processes that do not enter consciousness as easily. Freud further explained

that whereas preconscious activities become conscious without much effort, powerful

resistances often obstruct unconscious activities from consciousness. Although the

concept of repression was central to Freud's first topographical model, his ideas

expanded as he explained that the repressed was only one part of the unconscious. In *An Outline of Psychoanalysis,* Freud (1940/1949) exposed and discussed his new structural model and described the divisions of the mental apparatus as id, ego, and superego.

There are many accounts and discussions about Freud's conceptualizations of the unconscious (Calich & Hinz, 2007; Etchegoyen 2005; Green 2005; Sandler & Sandler, 1984; Stolorow & Atwood, 1989). Freud defined the unconscious as "the true psychic reality" (as cited in Calich & Hinz, 2007, p. 1) and emphasized its unknown nature and the incomplete manner in which it presents itself to us.

Horney (1939) discussed Freud's view of the unconscious as including the fact that mental processes can exist and be present without awareness as well as his notion of resistance imposed by part of the psyche that has a vested interest in keeping unconscious processes from reaching consciousness. Etchegoyen (2005) identified the unconscious in the context of Freud's theory of resistance as "that which is resisted" (p. 9). He described condensation and displacement as the laws of the unconscious, and reiterated Freud's theory of libido as the content of the unconscious. Etchegoyen also conceptualized the unconscious as being present in the psychoanalytic field in the form of unconscious fantasies. Isaacs (1948) also identified fantasies, in the psychoanalytic sense of the term, as the "primary content of unconscious mental processes" (p. 9).

In their discussion related to transference, Sandler and Sandler (1984) proposed another type of psychic apparatus closely related to Freud's topographical and structural models (Etchegoyen, 2005). Sandler and Sandler (1984) distinguished between the past unconscious and the present unconscious. They defined the past unconscious as including an individual's immediate "wishes, impulses, and responses" (p. 2), inclusive of, but not

limited to, instincts, all of which formed in the early part of life. Drawing on Sandler and

Sandler's interpretation of Freud's theory, Etchegoyen (2005) defined "infantile amnesia"

(p. 109) as the process whereby these experiences stay concealed and hidden behind the

"first censorship" (p. 109) and which is similar to Freud's id in the structural model.

Sandler and Sandler (1984) used the metaphor of the "child within the adult" (p. 3, and

implying the person's inner life as a representation of the "object-related child" (p. 3)

present in the past unconscious of the adult. The past unconscious is under the influence

of primitive defenses, including projection and denial (Etchegoyen, 2005; Sandler &

Sandler, 1984) and is situated behind the first censorship, out of which arises the

superego. Sandler and Sandler (1984) postulated that the past unconscious can only be

conceived retroactively through reconstruction in analytic work.

In contrast to the past unconscious, Sandler and Sandler (1984) described the

present unconscious as including unconscious byproducts of the experiences deriving

from the first unconscious experiences of the past, which arise in the present. The present

unconscious is preoccupied with keeping the present protected from the intrusions of the

past, and it is grounded in the present and is influenced by reality (Etchegoyen, 2005;

Sandler & Sandler, 1984). Sandler and Sandler (1984) situated the present unconscious

between the past unconscious and the conscious, and associated it to Freud's

topographical preconscious and structural unconscious ego and superego. They noted,

however, that the past unconscious is present in the here-and-now and activated by the

present unconscious. Following Freud's idea of a second censorship between the

preconscious and the conscious, Sandler and Sandler suggested that a second censorship

exists between the present unconscious and consciousness. They stated that because only

the present unconscious can be directly perceived, transference is restricted to the present

unconscious. Sandler and Sandler's theoretical ideas fostered a distinction between

unconscious experiences from the past and those that, although related to the past, are

grounded in the present.

Storolow and Atwood (1989) discussed the unconscious in the context of the

development of consciousness in children and distinguished three interrelated forms of

unconsciousness within the realm of experiences: the prereflective unconscious, the

dynamic unconscious, and the unvalidated unconscious. They differentiated the

prereflective unconscious and the dynamic unconscious as two forms of unconsciousness

divergent from Freud's idea of the preconscious. *Prereflective unconscious* refers to "the

shaping of experience by organizing principles that operate outside a person's conscious

awareness" (p. 2). Quoting their earlier book, Atwood and Storolow (1984) expanded this

definition:

> The organizing principles of a person's subjective world, whether operating
>
> positively (giving rise to certain configurations in awareness), or negatively
>
> (preventing certain configurations from arising), are themselves unconscious. A
>
> person's experiences are shaped by his psychological structures without this
>
> shaping becoming the focus of awareness and reflection. We have therefore
>
> characterized the structure of a subjective world as prereflectively unconscious.
>
> This form of unconsciousness is not the product of defensive activity, even
>
> though great effort is required to overcome it. In fact, the defenses themselves,
>
> when operating outside a person's awareness, can be seen as merely a special
>
> instance of structuring activity that is prereflectively unconscious. (p. 36)

Stolorow and Atwood associated the prereflective unconscious to the experiences that arise within the subjective world as part of the interactions between children and their caregivers and made a parallel with the development of Freud's superego.

Stolorow and Atwood (1989) grounded their discussion of the *dynamic unconscious* within the context of repression and saw it as comprised of the "particular configurations of self and object . . . [that are] prevented from crystallizing in awareness" (p. 2). In this context, Atwood and Stolorow (1984) described the dynamic unconscious as a "set of configurations that consciousness is not permitted to assume, because of their association with emotional conflict and subjective danger" (p. 35). These "particular memories, fantasies, feelings, and other experiential contents are repressed because they threaten to actualize these configurations" (p. 35). They traced the origin of the dynamic unconscious to the affective interactions between child and caregiver, or what Stern called "interaffectivity" or "the mutual regulation of affective experience within the developmental system" (as cited in Stolorow & Atwood, 1989, p. 2). Stolorow and Atwood (1989) explained that when central affect states of the child cannot be integrated within the caregiving system, they become walled off and repressed. Here the dynamic unconscious does not consist of repressed instinctual drives but rather of unintegrated and walled off affective states. In this context of intersubjectivity, the nature of repression shifted from drives to affectivity. When the dynamic unconscious is understood in terms of the regulation of affective experience as it emerges within the interaction between child and caregiver, the boundaries between consciousness and unconsciousness are contingent upon this intersubjectivity.

The third form of unconsciousness that Stolorow and Atwood (1989) discussed is the *unvalidated unconscious*, which they also situated in the context of the development of consciousness in the child. They explained that consciousness starts to develop within the interaction between child and caregiver through sensorimotor attunement. When some of the child's experiences stay unarticulated and unacknowledged, they remain unconscious because the child and the caregiver lack the capacity to articulate them symbolically. These unsymbolized experiences arising from the interaction between child and caregiver constitute the unvalidated unconscious.

Brown (2011) described the unconscious in Freudian terms as an instrument of analysis and communication, an organ used to receive and transmit information, and compared the analyst's unconscious to a telephone ready to receive the patient's unconscious. He further noted that these ideas were elaborated into the concept of conditioned daydreaming by Fliess; the third ear, dreamy ego state, and unconscious shared emotion by Reik; instrument of analysis by Isakower; and unconscious daydreaming by Arlow, Sandler, and Jacobs. Ellenberger (1970) described Freud's first concept of the unconscious as encompassing all repressed memories and tendencies. Green (2005) quoted Freud's qualification of the unconscious as an "other scene" (as cited in Green, 2005, p. 220), which is the unconscious as "a territory separate from consciousness, a segregated psychical nucleus obeying a causality peculiar to itself" (Green, 2005, p. 220) and described inter-subjective exchanges of the unconscious.

For Lacan, the unconscious is neither an unstructured mass of animal-like instincts (Johnston, 2014) nor a primal or archaic "set of unorganized drives and repressed contents" (Hook, 2013, p. 224). Lacan viewed the unconscious as an organizing

system structured like a language (Babich, 1996; Bornedal, 1997; de Bernardi, 2000; Green, 2005; Guido, 2013; Johnston, 2014), in the sense of the French term *le language*, referring to the structure of language, including "logics, structures of syntax and semantics" (Johnston, 2014, "2.12 The Symbolic," para. 2). Lacan (1966/2006) stated that the unconscious is "that part of concrete discourse qua transindividual which is not at the subject's disposal in reestablishing the continuity of his conscious discourse" (para. 258). Lacan spoke of the unconscious wish or the discourse of the Other (de Bernardi, 2000) and stated that "the presence of the unconscious, being situated in the locus of the Other, can be found in every discourse, in its enunciation" (Lacan, 2006/1966, para. 834).

Referring to Grotstein's (2009) development of neo-Kleinian theory, Newirth (2003) differentiated the generative unconscious from the repressed unconscious and the relational unconscious. The generative unconscious, said Newirth, holds the capacity to create meaning, which occurs as the patient develops subjectivity. Discussing Kleinian theories, Grotstein (2009) explored how Klein's theoretical understanding of the unconscious began with Freud's topographical model and the System Unconscious, which included the "repressed dynamic unconscious" as well as his significant discovery of the "unrepressed unconscious" (p. 116). Grotstein highlighted the fact that, although Freud seemed to move away from the unrepressed unconscious with the further development of his structural model of the ego, id, and superego, Klein continued to explore the former discovery, including her conceptualization of schizoid mechanisms such as "splitting, projective identification, idealization, and magic omnipotent denial" (p. 116). Grotstein further explained that Kleinian and Bionian theories consider the dynamic unconscious as well as the unrepressed unconscious in representations and

perceptions of internal and external object experiences. He indicated how Bion's notions

of the unconscious included his concept of O as well as the idea of infinity and its

relation to the self.

Bion's concept of O is relevant to this review of the idea of the unconscious

because, although the word unconscious is not used, O relates to the unknown. When

discussing Bion's concept of O, some authors (Dehing, 1994; Ogden, 2004;

O'Shaughnessy, 2005; B. S. Sullivan, 2010) have referred back to Bion's (1970)

Attention and Interpretation, wherein he wrote,

> I shall use the sign O to denote that which is the ultimate reality, absolute truth,
>
> the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself. O does not fall in the domain of
>
> knowledge or learning save incidentally; it can be 'become,' but it cannot be
>
> 'known.' It is darkness and formlessness but it enters the domain K when it has
>
> evolved to a point where it can be known, through knowledge gained by
>
> experience, and formulated in terms derived from sensuous experience; its
>
> existence is conjectured phenomenologically. (p. 26)

Ogden (2004) and O'Shaughnessy (2005) emphasized that Bion used the sign O to

designate a psychoanalytic concept. Although O is not a philosophical or mathematical

construct (Ogden, 2004), O'Shaughnessy (2005) pointed out that discussions describing

O inevitably touch upon philosophical ideas. Grotstein (2005), Ogden (2004), and B. S.

Sullivan (2010) emphasized that O is unknowable. Ogden (2004) went further to say that

given that O is unknown and unknowable, trying to define it and describe it with words

goes against the fundamental nature of O.

Grotstein (2005) discussed the dynamic process that occurs when the analyst and the analysand engage in the process of becoming the O of a session. Ogden (2004) discussed the fundamental idea that O is better described with the words *being* or *becoming*. Discussing experiences of O, Ogden drew a parallel with art and stated,

In this sense, *O* is that set of inarticulate, universal human truths that we live, but do not know; it is what we hear in music and poetry, but cannot name; it is who we are in dreaming, but cannot communicate in the telling of the dream" (p. 8).

Ogden (2003) stated that Bion's O might be compared to Kant's "thing-in itself, Plato's 'Ideal Forms' and Lacan's 'register of the Real'" (p. 14).

B. S. Sullivan (2010) explained that Bion's concept of O as "infinite nature" (p. 31) is similar to Jung's concept of the collective unconscious. In order to offer better understanding of Bion's idea of O, Sullivan compared it to other philosophical and mystical concepts that emerged over the past centuries, including "the Absolute, Ultimate Reality or Ultimate Truth, the Ground of Being, God or the godhead, . . . Plato's ideal forms, Kant's things-in-themselves, Bion's pre-conceptions, Klein's inborn phantasies and Jung's archetypes" (p. 38). For B. S. Sullivan, O relates to the vast realm of "truths excluded from our conscious view of reality" (p. 38). Quoting Milton (1968), Bion referred to O as "the void and formless infinite" (as cited in B. S. Sullivan, 2010, p. 38). Emphasizing the fluidity of O, B. S. Sullivan (2010) stated that Bion's concept of O was a symbol and that its essence was unknowable. Dehing (1994) also drew parallels between Bion's concept of O and Jung's archetypes and collective unconscious. He discussed the dynamic idea of *getting to know* and said that O cannot be known directly

and that the process of getting to know is contingent upon a capacity for tolerating doubt and a "sense of infinity" (p. 437).

Bion's (1970) ideas of O, *getting to know*, and *becoming* were used to represent what takes place in the analytic field between analyst and analysand. Drawing parallels with the possible analytical field that is created between the researcher and the research project, this discussion now moves on to explore how these three concepts are applicable to the research process.

Jungian and post-Jungian views of the unconscious.

Along with Freudian and post-Freudian views (Calich & Hinz, 2007; Etchegoyen 2005; Freud, 1915/2005; Green, 2005; Sandler & Sandler, 1984; Storolow & Atwood, 1989), the literature offers Jungian and post-Jungian conceptualizations of the unconscious (Adams, 1996; Aizenstat, 1995; Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Edinger, 1994; Fisher, 2002; Hall, 1983; Hillman, 1992; Jung, 1948/1960; Romanyshyn, 2007; Roszak, 1995; Sedgwick, 2001; Stein, 1998). Jung's (1948/1960) view of the unconscious included the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. According to Jung, the term *personal unconscious* pertains to the psychic processes and contents that relate to a person's individual life, including elements that have been forgotten, those that need clarification to become conscious, and those that are repressed. The term *collective* or *impersonal unconscious* encompasses elements that belong to individuals as a collective group, such as a culture or human beings in general, and also includes instincts and archetypes.

When discussing the nature of psyche and the multiplicity of the unconscious, Jung (1954/1972) explained that various traditions including alchemy, Hindu, and

Christian used the image of sparks of light as a means to describe the nature of consciousness. Jung equated the appearance of luminous flickers to the intuitive emergence of consciousness out of the depth of the unconscious. Jung further discussed the significance of the scintillae or sparks in alchemy, where they encompass the union of male and female, which parallels the Jewish gnostic image of the union of sun and moon. Jung also pointed out that the sparks were associated with the symbol of the eye, which, combined with the image of the sun, came to represent another metaphor for consciousness and the ego complex.

Stein (1998) referred to Jung's theory of the psyche in his discussion of a Jungian conceptualization of the unconscious. Stein emphasized the distinction that Jung made between the conscious and unconscious aspects of the psyche and between the psyche and the body. He explained that conscious and unconscious, defined in terms of what we know or do not know, represent a first threshold, and psyche and soma portray a second. Stein reported that according to Jung, the psyche includes both conscious and unconscious aspects of mental life but not all physiological dimensions of the body. Although these thresholds are present and significant, their boundaries are not fixed. Jung conceptualized the murky areas between the various aspects of the psyche with the concept of the psychoid, which represents the interrelations between the psyche, mind, soul, and body (Addison, 2009; Stein, 1998). Addison (2009) stated that Jung defined the *psychoid* as "a deeply unconscious set of processes that are neither physiological nor psychological but that somehow partake of both" (p. 123). Jung (1954/1972) also referred to the psychoid as a link between archetypes and instincts.

Stein (1998) used the image of the solar system to illustrate Jung's structure of the psyche, with earth represented by ego-consciousness, where we live in our conscious mind, and the surrounding space as the vast unconscious. The personal unconscious is the space close to the ego-earth, which is fed by the larger collective unconscious around it. The unconscious-space is filled with other objects such as satellites and meteorites, which represent the complexes. The unconscious is an undifferentiated whole, out of which the ego is formed (Edinger, 1994).

Hall (1983) described the collective unconscious as the part of the psyche that "has an apparently universal structure in mankind" (p. 9) and the personal unconscious as the part of the psyche that is "unique to an individual . . . but not conscious" (p. 9). In his discussion of archetypes and prototypes, Adams (1996) stated that humans are archetypally similar, but that there is diversity among their psyches in terms of history, culture, and ethnicity. Adams discussed the two dimensions of the collective conscious and unconscious, which include an archetypal and a stereotypical dimension. The archetypal dimension is a natural one, which goes beyond history, culture, and ethnicity, whereas the stereotypical dimension is based on an individual's history, culture, and ethnicity. Adams also identified a "cultural unconscious" (p. 40) encompassing racial factors including collective attitudes and behaviors that have prejudicial and discriminatory consequences.

Sedgwick (2001) defined the unconscious as the unknown and emphasized the unknowable quality of the unconscious given the fact that once an observer observes something, it changes what is observed. He postulated that, by definition, the unconscious is "an indirect, second-order phenomenon, and usually attributions about it are second-

hand, coming from someone else's viewpoint" (p. 26). Sedgwick contrasted Jung's view of the unconscious, particularly the collective unconscious, as a powerhouse with Freud's view of the unconscious. He said that Jung also considered the unconscious as a "storehouse" (p. 35) of possibilities and potential, which becomes a therapeutic tool because of its creative, generative, and dynamic aspects.

Coppin and Nelson (2005) defined the unconscious as an "invisible field that produces visible effects" (p. 44) and referred to Jung's (1951/1978) observation about the parallel between this view of the unconscious and Einstein's concept of gravitation as an invisible force that influences the visible world. Coppin and Nelson (2005) pointed out that the invisible force of the unconscious can be seen in dreams, symptoms, and psychopathology. They emphasized that both Jung and Freud believed that the unconscious extensively influenced people's life through their ideas, thoughts, and imagination.

In his work to conceptualize his theory, Jung (1954/1972) investigated alchemy from a psychological perspective and saw it as a metaphorical representation of the unconscious being projected onto matter (Edinger, 1994; Goodchild, 2006; Sedgwick, 2001; von Franz, 1980). Goodchild (2006) discussed Jung and von Franz's studies of alchemy and the embodiment of the psychoid through the subtle body, which they referred to as the conjunction of the psychological with the physical through the *unus mundus*. Goodchild discussed the subtle body as including embodied experiences of another world within this world, and she linked this concept back to Jung's discussion of the third *coniunctio*, the "union with the *unus mundus*" (p. 64).

Jung (2002) stated that "the collective unconscious is simply Nature—and since Nature contains everything it also contains the unknown" (p. 82). Several post-Jungian scholars adopted Jung's idea that the collective unconscious and the psychoid include the world of nature. Hillman (1992) postulated that psychology needed to include the unconsciousness of the world into its construct. Roszak (1995) suggested that an "ecological unconscious lies at the core of the psyche, there to be drawn upon as a resource for restoring us to environmental harmony" (p. 14). Aizenstat (1995) proposed a broader view of the unconscious beyond the personal or collective unconscious that would include the realm of the natural world. He called this concept the "world unconscious" (p. 95), in which "all creatures and things of the world are understood as interrelated and interconnected" (p. 96). Assuming that human nature and nature overlap, Fisher (2002) discussed Jung's idea that humans had lost their "emotional unconscious identity with natural phenomena" (as cited in Fisher, 2002, p. 4). Romanyshyn (2007) emphasized Jung's idea of the psychoid level of the unconscious as encompassing the consciousness of nature within human beings, the "level of the unconscious where psyche and matter turn around each other, where psyche matters and matter is psyche" (p. 290).

Other views of the unconscious.

Adler believed in the reality of unconscious mental processes (Adler & Furtmüller, 1964), however, he rejected Freud's "reification" (Ansbacher, 1982, p. 33) of the unconscious that included unconscious processes such as repression and censorship. Adler (Adler & Furtmüller, 1964) defined the unconscious as the area of one's life that one has not yet been able to clarify. Other theorists have provided reflections and

definitions of the concept of the unconscious (Basescu, 1981; Fromm, Suzuki, & De

Martino, 1960; Yalom, 1980; H. S. Sullivan, 1964; Van den Berg, 1972).

Existential psychology recognized unconscious processes that manifest through

motivations and fears (Basescu, 1981). Yalom (1980) placed existential psychotherapy

within dynamics therapies in which unconscious processes are recognized. He

characterized existential psychodynamics in terms of four fundamental "concerns: death,

freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness" or meaning in life (p. 8). He explained that the

structure of existential psychotherapy follows Freud's basic dynamic model but that its

contents differ from it. He stated that "the old formula of: drive → anxiety → defense

mechanism" is replaced by the existential formula of: "awareness of ultimate concern →

anxiety → defense mechanism" (pp. 9-10). In existential dynamics, anxiety is recognized

as a major force powering psychopathology. Yalom (1995) recognized the existence of

unconscious factors that "influence human behavior" (p. 188) but did not limit them to

the past. He referred to analytic theories' understanding of past unconscious and present

unconscious, including the difference between past experiences in childhood and current

dynamics (p. 188).

Fromm, Suzuki, and De Martino (1960) provided several different meanings for

the term *unconscious*. They posited that, in a functional sense, being unconscious could

refer to being unaware of some or all inner experiences, as in being literally unconscious,

or it might pertain to a lack of awareness of specific processes, experiences, and impulses

while being conscious of others. Fromm et al. also referred to the unconscious as an area

or specific content of the personality. He contrasted Freud's and Jung's perspectives

about the unconscious, defining it as the "seat of irrationality" for the former as opposed

to the "seat of the deepest sources of wisdom" (p. 95) for the latter. Fromm also stated

that the unconscious might be associated with experiences that have not been subject to

intellectual reflection. Fromm (2000) defined unconscious as "that which is not

conscious" (p. 167), which includes what has been repressed or dissociated as well as

what has not yet reached awareness. Fromm believed that the unconscious contains both

destructive and irrational as well as constructive and creative drives (Mann, 2000).

Though H. S. Sullivan (1964) acknowledged the usefulness of the discovery of

the unconscious and its hypothesis, he did not welcome the idea of the localized

unconscious (Fromm, Suzuki, & De Martino, 1960); instead, he defined the concept in

general terms as "that which cannot be experienced directly" (H. S. Sullivan, 1964,

p. 204) and favored terms such as "unaware" and "not-me" (Jacobs, 1971, p. 389). Van

den Berg (1972) criticized the psychoanalytic idea that the unconscious is something that

is present within the patient. He stated that the content of the unconscious is precisely

what the patient is lacking and is brought to consciousness through the insight of others.

Van den Berg explained that from a phenomenological perspective, there is no

unconscious deeper layer of the personality, as the content of the unconscious is to be

found in the knowledge and insights of others.

Discussing the difficulty in defining the concept of the unconscious, because it is

fundamentally the unknown, Kugler (1990) quoted Jung who used words like

"unknowing" and stated that "the unconscious is a piece of Nature our mind cannot

comprehend" (as cited in Kugler, 1990, p. 307). Further reflecting upon the definition of

the unconscious for humans as individuals, patients, or authors, Kugler (1990) laid out

the problematic of our being both originators of the unconscious content and interpreters

of that content—in his words, "both author and critic of our own text" (p. 307). In order to explore this problem in relationship to depth psychology, he looked at the development of the field of literary theory during the 20th century.

Kugler (1990) examined how modernism, the New Criticism, structuralism, and postmodernism affected literary interpretation and drew a parallel to depth psychology and clinical practice. He stated that for the modernist scholar, the true interpretation of a text consisted in unearthing the real meaning or absolute truth embedded in the text. Such a scholar considered the reader as a detached and objective observer focused on the history and the content of the text. Kugler compared this modernist approach with classical Freudian interpretation. He noted that during the New Criticism period, scholars viewed the text as a more complex entity containing multilayered meanings independent from the author's history or intent.

According to Kugler (1990), following de Saussure, structuralist scholars shifted further away from the history and content of the text and focused on language "as a collective system of signs" (p. 310). De Saussure explored the structure and form of language and the various relations between its basic units, including sound, meaning, signifier, and signified. Levi-Strauss divided the classical Freudian unconscious into subconscious and unconscious. The subconscious, as he described it, included psychic materials, such as memories and images, pertaining to the individual's personal life experience, whereas the unconscious remained the unknown. Kugler compared Levi-Strauss's subdivisions to Jung's psychology, equating the subconscious to the personal unconscious and the unconscious to the collective unconscious.

During the period of poststructuralism, said Kugler (1990), scholars deconstructed the assumption that absolutes such as "Truth, Reality, Self, Center, Unity, Origin, and even Author" (p. 313) should be placed at the center of the process of interpretation. In postmodernism, scholars viewed the text as being a complex and plural mix of literal and figurative elements. Scholars shifted from conceiving the text and the interpretation of the text as an empirical and structural process, where the reader is a detached observer, to understanding text interpretation as an intersubjective process, where the reader and the text influence each other.

With postmodernism came the realization that absolutes were not eternal but rather temporal and fictional. For Kugler (1990), although such absolutes guided the therapeutic process and formed a necessary lens used in the process of interpretation, the crucial difference rested in the knowledge that such absolutes are never literal. He concluded that although psychological ideologies are necessary, they should never be conceived as absolute truths and that depth psychology ultimately rests on the fundamental idea of the unknowable unconscious.

The Field

The psychoanalytic field.

Field theory represented a significant paradigm shift that occurred in the field of physics, which had an impact on philosophy, biology, and the social sciences (Deutsch, 1954; Tubert-Oaklander, 2007). The core idea in physics at the time was that natural phenomena could be explained by looking at the forces that one body exerted on another. With field theory, this belief moved from the concept of linear causation to that of complex interdependence (Deutsch, 1954; Mansfield & Spiegelman, 1996; Tubert-

Oklander, 2007). Although Deutsch (1954) showed the connections between physics and social sciences, he emphasized that Lewin's development of field theory in social psychology was entirely psychological.

Baranger, Baranger, Rogers, and Churcher (2008) are often referenced as the first to apply concepts of field theory to psychoanalysis (Brown, 2011; Civitarese, 2008; Etchegoyen, 2005; Ferro, 1999; Tubert-Oklander, 2007), marking an important shift in psychoanalysis (de Bernardi, 2008; Tubert-Oklander, 2007). According to Brown (2011), Baranger et al. (2008) were the first to develop the notion of a third being co-created through the dynamic intersubjective interaction of analyst and analysand. The field in psychoanalysis is referred to variously as the dynamic field (Baranger et al., 2008; Brown, 2011; de Bernardi, 2008; Etchegoyen, 2005), the psychological field (Deutsch, 1954; Ogden & Ogden, 2013; Tubert-Oklander, 2007), the analytic field (Civitarese, 2008), the analytic third (Ogden, 1994), or simply the field (Ferro, 1999; Ferro & Basile, 2008).

Drawing upon Gestalt psychology as well as the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Kurt Lewin, and Pichon-Riviere (Brown, 2011; de Bernardi, 2000; de Bernardi, 2008; Ferro, 1999; Tubert-Oklander, 2007), Baranger et al. (2008) identified the multiplicity of the analytic field, including spatial, temporal, functional, and bipersonal dimensions. These dimensions include practical parameters of the agreement between analyst and analysand, such as the configuration of the room in which the encounter is taking place, the mutually agreed-upon frequency of sessions and long-term nature of these encounters as well as the understanding that the work is centered on verbal and nonverbal communication between both parties. Baranger et al. emphasized the

ambiguous and multiple quality of the analytic field as they contrasted the concrete and

practical components of the contract between analyst and analysand to the dynamic

aspects of the bipersonal field, including the manifest content and the unconscious

phantasy that arise within the encounter.

With the application of field theory to psychoanalysis, the analyst was no longer

considered a separate observer but rather an active participant in the complex and

dynamic intersubjectivity that is co-created between the analyst and the patient (Conci,

1997; de Bernardi, 2008; Etchegoyen, 2005; Ferro, 1999; Tubert-Oklander, 2007). The

dynamic field is a representation of the analytic situation as being co-created by two

people between whom an emotional field emerges without their conscious willful

intention (Baranger et al., 2008; Brown, 2011; Ferro, 1999; Etchegoyen, 2005). For Ferro

(1999), the notion of the field went beyond that of the relationship, as it captured a

broader domain including the practical setting and rules as well as the intersubjective

dynamic of the bipersonal field. Ferro and Basile (2008) compared the dynamic aspect of

the field to breathing, which expresses the continuous transformation that happens in the

analytic encounter. Ogden (1994) used the term *analytic third* to explain the third

subjectivity that is co-created by and between the analyst and the patient. He described

the intersubjective analytic third as a representation of the multiple relationships between

analyst, patient, and the third intersubjectivity, which continuously evolve and influence

one another. Etchegoyen (2005) described the analytic situation as a dynamic field, which

includes components of both observation and interaction between analyst and analysand.

What is co-created in the field depends on both participants and becomes greater

than the sum of each of them individually (Brown, 2011; Tubert-Oklander, 2007).

According to Civitarese (2008), fiction and worlds emerge between and are co-created by the analyst and the patient in the analytic field. Ogden and Ogden (2013) brought in Bion's notion of dreaming and reverie within the psychological field. In addition to thoughts and reverie, Ogden (1994) referred to bodily sensations as nonverbal manifestations of the analytic third.

In his discussion about play, Winnicott (1971) introduced the ideas of potential space and interactive field as intermediate areas of mutual experience between the child and caregiver and posited that "inner reality and external life both contribute" (p. 3) to these areas. Winnicott applied these concepts of potential space and interactive field to therapy with children and adults and emphasized the creative nature of the therapeutic process. Clinicians and theorists such as Cwik (2011) and Ogden (1985) elaborated on these concepts in terms of the interactive field that is developed between patient and therapist.

The field in Jungian psychology.

The idea of the emergence of a third element being co-created between the analyst and the analysand is widely discussed in the analytic literature (Jung, 1963/1977; Schwartz-Salant, 1991; Sedgwick, 2001), which also includes references to Ogden's (1994) concept of the analytic third (Cambray, 2001; Cwik, 2011; Schaverien, 2007). In this section, analytic literature refers to the research literature in analytic psychology, which was developed by C. G. Jung (1912/1966; Silverstein, 2012; Stevens, 2001; von Franz, 1998) and further developed by post-Jungian theorists (Alister & Hauke, 2013; Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Samuels, 1986; Schwartz-Salant, 1991; Sedgwick, 2001; Spiegelman, 1996). In the analytic literature, the field is referred to variously as the

interactive field (Cambray, 2001; Cwik, 2011; Mansfield & Spiegelman, 1996; Schwartz-Salant, 1991; Spiegelman, 1996), the imaginal or dynamic field (Schaverien, 2007), the intersubjective analytic third (Cambray, 2001), the mutual process (Mansfield & Spiegelman, 1996; Spiegelman, 1996), and the therapeutic transferential field (Sedgwick, 2001).

Jung (1954/1972) also discussed the relationship between the field of physics, including quantum physics, and the field of psychology. Cambray (2001) stated, "In terms of psychodynamics, Jung's 'Psychology of the Transference' presents an interactive field model emerging from a background archetypal field" (p. 57). According to B. S. Sullivan (2010), Jung's concept of the *conjunctio* described the therapist-patient as a co-creating dyad "larger than the sum of the two" (p. 14). She compared Jung's *conjuntio* to the concepts of the *field* (Baranger et al., 2008) and *the analytic third* (Ogden, 1994).

Using the development of the concept of the field in physics, Mansfield and Spiegelman (1996) explored the parallel between physics and psychology to understand better the mutual process that occurs within the interactive field that emerges between analyst and analysand in the course of therapy. The authors provided a short historical evolution of the therapeutic encounter in relation to the field. In terms of psychoanalysis, they started with Freud's awareness of the potent projections of the patient and continued with Klein's concept of projective identification, which was further developed in object relations theory. They attributed to Jung the realization of the proportional impact of the analysand and the analyst on one another. They discussed Meier's concept of the mutual influence and Spiegelman's idea of mutual process, in which the dyad engages the

unconscious in their therapeutic encounter. Mansfield and Spiegelman suggested that the idea of an invisible force interaction happening between two people is derived from the concept of the classical field in physics, which subsequently expanded with the emergence of quantum mechanics. The authors pointed out the parallel of the properties of quantum fields, which are invisible, nonspatial, nontemporal probabilities for acausal manifestation, to the field created in the analytic third.

Cambray (2001) viewed the analytic third and the reverie in which the analyst engages as a gateway to social, historical, cultural, and archetypal material, which he found instrumental to the therapeutic relationship. Cwik (2011) discussed reverie and active imagination in relation to the dynamic experience arising from the interactive field. Cwik integrated Ogden's concept of the analytic third, Bion's notion of reverie, and Jung's use of active imagination. He also emphasized the mutual transformation that occurs in the therapeutic relationship when the therapeutic dyad is engaged in the dynamic field. Referring to Ogden's concept of the analytic third, Schaverien (2007) postulated that, in the third area, images emerge in the analyst as well as in the analysand. The author explained that the analyst engages in a form of active imagination in relation to the images that arise from the third.

Schwartz-Salant (1991) discussed the interactive field as an imaginal area in between two people and claimed that this area has an autonomy of its own; it does not belong to one or the other but rather emerges from that third place in between them. He described this imaginal area or field as dynamic and co-creative, as it becomes the vehicle for the emergence of a new experience for both participants. Sedgwick (2001) mirrored the idea of an interactive process when he described psychotherapy as a creative

process with a dynamic of its own. He cited Jung's description of an interactive and dynamic process between patient and analyst, highlighting the mutually transformative quality of the therapeutic encounter.

Romanyshyn (2007) applied the idea of the dynamic field to research methodology when he developed alchemical hermeneutics, an adjunct research method that recognizes a dynamic process between the researcher and the research topic. Without equating research to therapy, Romanyshyn postulated that a

transference field exists between the researcher and his or her work as much as it

exists between a therapist and a patient, a lover and a beloved, a teacher and a

student, a parent and a child, a writer and an editor, a reader and a work. (p. 136)

Based on Jung's practice of active imagination, Romanyshyn developed the use of transference dialogues as a methodological tool for the researcher to engage with his or her research topic in the interactive field. Romanyshyn brought in Winnicott's (1971) concepts of transitional phenomena and potential space and drew upon Cwik's (1991) parallel between Winnicott and Jung to illustrate the interactive nature of the relationship between the researcher and the research topic.

Discussion of conceptualizations of the field beyond the therapist-patient dyad, including those stemming from an ecopsychology perspective (Fisher, 2002; Roszak, Gomes, & Kanner, 1995), such as ideas that psyche exists as a force within Nature (Jung, 2002; Roszak et al., 1995), are beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the purpose of this dissertation, *the field* is defined as a dynamic area similar to that described by Romanyshyn (2007) as created between the researcher and the research topic.

Research in Psychoanalysis

The field of psychoanalysis is an area of psychology that reflects the complex

nature of research as evidenced in debates such as clinical practice versus research (Blatt

et al., 2006; Bucci, 2001; Sandler et al., 2000; Schachter & Luborsky, 1998). Also argued

are methodological questions regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis and

whether the discipline should be studied from an objective and empirical perspective or

from a subjective and phenomenological perspective (Blatt et al., 2006; Brookes, 2004;

Chiesa, 2010; Cohler & Galatzer-Levy, 2007; Kernberg, 2006; Shapiro & Emde, 1995;

Wallerstein, 2006), or from a hermeneutics perspective (Wallerstein, 2006), or none of

these perspectives (Chiesa, 2010; Gerber, 2002b).

Historical aspect of the scientific status of psychoanalysis.

Cohler and Galatzer-Levy (2007) reviewed the historical context of

psychoanalysis in terms of its status as a science. They explained that historically, the

advent of experimental psychology relegated the concerns of meaning and significance to

philosophy but that Freud made a significant contribution in bringing those concerns back

to the psychologist's mind. Referring to Toulmin's thought, the authors identified the

separation between rational and narrative/rhetoric explanations as a "cornerstone of

modern science" (p. 548) and claimed that psychoanalysis could not separate fact from

narration. Cohler and Galatzer-Levy identified the influence of the "rational-logical

emphasis in science that started with Descartes, Galileo, and the Enlightenment" (p. 551),

which marked the separation of fact from the "representation of facts" (p. 551). Cohler

and Galatzer-Levy explained that certain aspects of modernity generated disturbances and

anxiety, thus contributing to the development of science in terms of a rational and logical

perspective, because facts provided a sense of certainty, which helped contain the anxiety of the time. The authors showed how psychology and the study of human beings followed a similar development as those disciplines advanced within a natural science framework. They discussed the shift in medicine from natural philosophy to demonstration and laboratory study in the 19th century and the direct influence of this shift on the scientific status of psychoanalysis. They pointed to Freud's investigation in the neurobiology of wish, meaning, and intent as reflecting the presence of this shift in psychiatry and psychology.

Grünbaum (2008) provided an overview of his findings of over three decades of research pertaining to the philosophical background of psychoanalysis, particularly as it related to Popper's report that psychoanalysis could not be an empirical science because, he believed, it was not falsifiable. Grünbaum carefully studied Popper's claims and methodically refuted them with specific examples taken from his extensive knowledge of Freud's work. Grünbaum used Freud theory of paranoia, for example, to demonstrate that theoretical constructs in psychoanalysis are in fact falsifiable, contrary to Popper's denial.

Scientific status of psychoanalysis.

Many researchers have addressed the complex question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis and the polarized state of its related debates in the field. Those whose ideas are discussed below are particularly relevant to this current study.

Chiesa (2010) discussed the difficult relationship between empirical research and psychoanalysis and identified three positions in the field: the "rejectionists" (p. 104), the academic researchers, and the clinicians. According to Chiesa, rejectionists in the psychoanalytic community, such as Green, Brenman-Pick, and Hoffman, have declared

that psychoanalysis and research are utterly incompatible and that empirical scientific

inquiry is irrelevant to the field. At the other end of the spectrum, Chiesa placed

psychoanalysts who are engaged in research in academic and mental health services

settings and claimed that this group contributes to the development of scientific inquiry in

the field of psychoanalysis because its members believe in its vital necessity. Chiesa

identified a third group of clinicians who are not involved in doing research. This group

includes psychoanalysts who may or may not endorse the need for scientific research and

may or may not rely on the scientific literature in their clinical practice for various

reasons.

A long-time proponent of empirical research in psychoanalysis, Wallerstein

(2006) believed this type of research results in the systematic advancement of science. He

noted that the debate regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis has been present for

several decades, both inside and outside the field, and goes beyond its empirical scientific

status as it also relates to the metapsychology of psychoanalysis. This multifaceted debate

includes questions regarding whether psychoanalysis is an empirical and natural science

or a human science, a hermeneutic science, or a flawed science and even whether or not it

is to be considered a science at all and not a purely interpretive discipline.

A group of psychoanalysts, including Wallerstein (2006) and Stern (1985, 2000),

have strongly believed that empirical research results in the advancement of knowledge

in science and is essential for the discipline of psychoanalysis (Gerber, 2002a;

Wallerstein, 2006). This group of researchers argued that psychoanalysis is an empirical

science and should be advanced through qualitative and quantitative research

(Wallerstein, 2006). Wallerstein (2006) briefly mentioned a group of empirical

researchers who conceptualize the mind as an information processing system, indicating

the emergence of neuropsychoanalysis. He also discussed the emergence of the

hermeneutic movement, as some psychoanalysts came to integrate the work of Ricoeur,

the hermeneutic method, and the hermeneutic circle in psychoanalysis. Regarding the

hermeneutic versus antihermeneutic debate, Wallerstein pointed to individuals such as

Gill, who argued that psychoanalysis is its own hermeneutic science, which should follow

its own scientific laws, and Green, who stood against these views and argued that

psychoanalysis is not a science at all and that it should not be studied as such.

In his review of Sandler, Sandler, and Davies's (2000) book, *Clinical and*

Observational Psychoanalytic Research: Roots of a Controversy: Andre Green and

Daniel Stern, Gerber (2002a) summarized the discussion of the relevance and place of

research in psychoanalysis. Gerber presented the core of the book as the discussion

between Wallerstein and Stern, two psychoanalytic researchers, and Green, an

antiresearch psychoanalyst. He pointed out that Green challenged the value of empirical

research for psychoanalysis because he believed that the methodologies of objective

research do not capture the complexity of the discipline accurately. Gerber argued that

the psychoanalytic research conducted so far has failed to make significant a change in

"the way clinicians think" (p. 1); he pointed out the researchers' lack of proper

knowledge in psychoanalytic theoretical constructs including that of the dynamic

unconscious. Gerber argued that psychoanalysis is not more complicated a field than any

other to study through research. He claimed that almost nothing in science is researched

directly and that the study of the unconscious, in that regard, is not more complicated or

distant and "no less manipulable" than other topics in modern science, such as "subatomic particles . . . , DNA . . . , or general relativity" (p. 2).

Schachter and Luborsky (1998) investigated the attitude of psychoanalysts toward reading clinical as opposed to empirical research articles. First, they reviewed articles in the psychoanalytic literature and found that clinical research studies were more frequently referenced than empirical articles. Then they conducted surveys to provide better understanding of the analysts' disposition towards reading clinical and empirical research. They found that the majority of psychoanalysts reported a high conviction in the theoretical basis of their clinical practice. Interestingly, analysts reporting such higher conviction also reported reading fewer research papers. The authors speculated that psychoanalysts who reported a high degree of conviction in the theoretical basis of clinical practice were possibly defended against doubt and against reading empirical research. Schachter and Luborsky emphasized the division between clinical practice and research in the field of psychoanalysis and the equally important contributions of both clinical and research practices to the field of psychoanalysis.

Cohler and Galatzer-Levy (2007) discussed the split in the field regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis, which they identified as being the division between rational logic and narrative or rhetoric. They advanced the idea that psychoanalysis is to be considered a human science rather than a natural science, because it fits human science's core issues more appropriately. Their rationale was that psychoanalysis involves meaning and narratives in addition to factual information and allows researchers better understanding of the meaning of self as it changes overtime in relationships. Blatt Corveleyn, and Luyten (2006) discussed the scientific status of psychoanalysis as well as

the credibility of psychoanalytic theories. They recognized the concerns of proponents of both clinical and research orientations that the field of psychoanalysis might become either one-sided or isolated and fragmented.

Methodological questions in the study of psychoanalysis.

Chiesa (2010) argued that psychoanalytic research has historically relied on single-case clinical studies, the findings of which have been overly generalized to theoretical laws. She claimed that the reliance on this method is the root of theoretical multiplicity and lack of unity in psychoanalysis. In 2006, Blatt et al. (2006) reviewed the historical background of the clinical and the research orientations in psychoanalytic research. They found that the clinical position primarily used the case-study method to understand meaning and interpretation, whereas the research position concentrated on cause-and-effect using empirically based research methods.

Furthering his life-long exploration of the nature of psychoanalysis as a science, Wallerstein (2009) turned to the kind of research, from a methodological perspective, that best serves its scientific requirements. In his reflections, Wallerstein focused on the distinctions between quantitative and qualitative research; idiographic and nomothetic research; and clinical, conceptual, and empirical research. The author pleaded first for the acknowledgement of the differences he explored in research methodologies, while appreciating the fluidity of those distinctions. Secondly, Wallerstein called for applying qualitative and quantitative research methods, as appropriate, in order to advance the clinical, conceptual, and empirical domains of psychoanalysis.

Collaboration in psychoanalytic research.

Several researchers advocated for an urgent need of collaboration in research both within the field of psychoanalysis and with other disciplines. Chiesa (2010) called for more active integration of scientific research with clinical observation, discussed the compatibility and relevance of evidence-based practice to clinical psychoanalysis, and urged the rejectionist side of the debate to take an active stance in research inquiry and to propose alternative methodological approaches if necessary. Blatt et al. (2006) recommended that the proponents of both ends of the spectrum engage in a dialog and recognize the complementarity of the research methods they follow. Gerber (2002a) proposed a model for reconciliation of the various parties in the debates wherein the significance of the role of each party—theorist, methodologist, or experimentalist—is recognized as equally significant, thereby opening up the possibility of collaboration of different minds in the service of the further development of the field of psychoanalysis.

Given the continued crisis in the psychoanalytic field in relation to the lower numbers of candidates in its institutes worldwide, marginalization of its teaching in the mental health fields, and wider emphasis on evidence-based treatment, Chiesa (2005) called for a need to acknowledge the importance of research for the continued development of psychoanalysis. Chiesa further argued that psychoanalysis, as a field and practice, has already benefited from scientific research, including areas such as validating the effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapy and providing alternative data and methods to advance clinical practice. She proposed that the clinical and the research sides of the scientific debate within the field adopt a collaborative stance, as the integration of clinical

observations with empirical findings would improve knowledge and understanding and better contribute to the scientific advancement of psychoanalysis.

Kernberg (2006) identified an urgent need to increase the amount of empirical, naturalistic, historical, and clinical research both within the field of psychoanalysis and in collaboration with other disciplines. Kernberg believed that this critical need exists for three main reasons: first, because psychoanalysis is an empirical science that advances through the accumulation of knowledge gathered in the process of scientific research; second, because of the social and financial responsibility to maintain evidence that psychoanalysis is effective and efficacious; and third, because of a need to maintain and strengthen the position of psychoanalysis as a scientific discipline alongside other related disciplines and to reinforce the relation between clinical and academic field. Arguing for the benefits of more interdisciplinary collaboration, Kernberg identified several possible areas where psychoanalysis and neurobiology should develop bridges, such as the "hyper-reactivity of the amygdala" and the abnormality of neurotransmitters with "affects, drives, and ego functions" (p. 920); "the neurobiology of consciousness, dissociated mental states, and alterations of consciousness under acute traumatic conditions" with splitting and "dissociative functioning" (p. 920); "normal and pathological attachment" with object relations and "temperamental predisposition" (p. 920). Along with warning against the risks of oversimplification and the fact that empirical inquiry fails to represent the "wealth of unconscious processes evolving in patient and analyst" (p. 920), Kernberg reviewed relevant studies in the literature, which show empirical evidence of the effectiveness of psychoanalysis and the effects of interpretation.

As reviewed in the above section, the question regarding research and methodology in psychoanalysis is complex, as it is reflected in the various debates present within the discipline. Applying to qualitative psychoanalytic research the work of Gadamer (Moules, 2002; Palmer, 1969) and the importance of the place of the researcher in research, this study examines the field and the place of the unconscious in psychoanalytic research methodology and the apparent paradox that, although psychoanalysis recognizes the unconscious from a theoretical perspective, it does not explicitly incorporate unconscious dynamics in its research methodologies. This study's exploration of the possible development of a psychoanalytic field between the researcher and the research topic in psychoanalytic research is a contribution to the expansion of qualitative research methodology and the further integration of systematic qualitative methods in the psychoanalytic literature.

Chapter 3

Methods

This study explores the field in psychoanalytic research methodology by combining a hermeneutic approach (Packer & Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969) with alchemical hermeneutics (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Romanyshyn, 2007). In the literature, *hermeneutics* was broadly referred to as "interpretation theory" (Madison, 1990, p. 25), "reflective inquiry" (Madison, 1990, p. 45), and "interpretive inquiry" (Moules, 2002, p. 1). As a foundational definition, Palmer (1969) provided *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*'s definition of hermeneutics as "the study of the methodological principles of interpretation and explanation" and specifically "the study of the general principles of biblical interpretation" (as cited in Palmer, 1969, p. 4). Historically, hermeneutics pertained to the art of interpretation of texts and the nature of understanding (Grondin, 1997; Packer & Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969; Ricoeur, 1981) in the three main areas of "theology, philosophy, and literary interpretation" (Palmer, 1969, p. 4).

The term *hermeneutics* is derived from the Greek words *hermeneuein* and *hermeneia* (Moules, 2002; Palmer, 1969). *Hermeneuein* means "to say" (Moules, 2002, p. 2) or "to interpret" (Moules, 2002, p. 2; Palmer, 1969, p. 12) and to translate or explain (Palmer, 1977). *Hermeneia* means "utterance, . . . explication" (Moules, 2002, p. 2), or "interpretation" (Palmer, 1969, p. 13) of a thought (Moules, 2002). In terms of hermeneutics, Palmer (1969) provided three basic directions these words take in relation to language: (a) to say or speak words out loud, (b) to give an explanation of something, and (c) to translate, as when translating a foreign language. The first direction relates to sayings or reciting words; through oral recitation and by way of intonations and

inflections, the reader interprets the written poem. The second direction relates to giving

an explanation as a mean of interpretation and is connected to the philosophical concept

of *horizon*, which refers to the context in which the text was written. The third direction

relates to understanding as translation.

Hermes

The term *hermeneutics* refers to Hermes (Moules, 2002; Palmer, 1969, 1977),

"the playful, mischievous, trickster" (Moules, 2002, p. 2) and classical Greek god. Many

aspects of Hermes's personality and functions are relevant to understanding the process

of hermeneutic inquiry.

From the onset of his myth, Hermes is a fast runner, tricky, playful, prince of

thieves, and marvelously ingenious (Séchan & Lévêque, 1966, p. 269). Hermes is

associated with music and singing, as he builds a lyre with a turtle shell and a syrinx with

reeds (Graves, 1967; Séchan & Lévêque, 1966). As a musician and a singer, Hermes

gives voice to new ideas, thoughts, and feelings. Hermeneutics is thus considered the act

of giving a new voice to an old text. Interpretation includes the act of reading out loud in

order to enter the text's heritage and tradition as well as to bring in the new voice of the

reader's horizon. Hermeneutic inquiry calls for Hermes's flexibility in the process of

interpretation and understanding. The hermeneutic act requires the capacity to let go of

the concrete and objective initially, so as to access the symbolic and to create a dynamic

process between the latter and the literal. This is where Hermes's playful, inventive, and

creative representation as a child god (Jung & Kerenyi, 1951) is significant, as the

hermeneutic act entails a capacity to enter a dynamic play-like process with the text.

Understanding and meaning sprout out of a capacity to remain flexible, spontaneous, and creative, and to hold in tension the multiple worlds in question.

As an executor of Zeus's will (Séchan & Lévêque, 1966), Hermes crosses boundaries and is responsible for various types of exchanges (Graves, 1967; Palmer, 1977). Hermes guides the dead to the underworld. Similarly, hermeneutics includes a process of travelling down into the depth of the meaning of a text as well as a death of ideas as we initially know them. In this process of death and rebirth, the literal enters into a new relationship with the symbolic. Hermes is also the messenger between the worlds of the living and the dead. In the journey back to the upperworld, Hermes enables transformation. Hermeneutic inquiry is a dynamic process of death and rebirth leading to transformation, which takes place in the act of translation, understanding, and interpretation. The function of Hermes as the messenger between the text and the reader comes into play, as the reader finds a way to bridge the gap between those two worlds (Palmer, 1969). Hermeneutics acknowledges the presence of Hermes as messenger between the texts and the understanding of the texts (Packer & Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969; Romanyshyn, 2007). As a trickster and seducer, Hermes reminds the reader that the process of understanding and interpretation has a shadow side, which needs to be kept in mind. Hermeneutic inquiry is vulnerable to the never-ending process of interpretation when one forgets to keep in mind the multiple worlds and horizons at play in its process.

Hermes is the messenger between the world of gods and the world of humans, and an interpreter of divine messages into ideas that humans can understand (Palmer, 1969, 1977). Hermeneutics, as the act of translation, requires the god's capacity to interpret the text and translate its meaning for others to understand. Hermes is also associated with

writing and language (Palmer, 1969; Palmer, 1977) as well as eloquence, reason, and

persuasion (Séchan & Lévêque, 1966). Clever and crafty, he is at the threshold between

truth and lie (Graves, 1967). As the art of interpretation, hermeneutics relies on a similar

capacity to use language to bring understanding and meaning in areas where there was no

language or where language was too cryptic and not understandable from the perspective

of the horizon of the reader. In addition to being the god of shepherds, traders, and

travelers (Séchan & Lévêque, 1966), however, Hermes is also a thief. Hermeneutics

embodies the abduction of symbolic meaning from the literal text. The hermeneutic act is

often situated in the space between worlds and in the uncomfortable gray area of the

unknown. Hermes invites the hermeneut to linger in this area long enough to engage with

the paradoxical attributes of the area in between worlds, while warning against the risks

associated with never crossing the threshold.

Hermeneutics

In the literature, the variety of definitions of hermeneutics reflects the complexity

of this tradition, which has roots in biblical text interpretation, philosophy, law, and

literary analysis. The following is a review of some of the more recent definitions of

hermeneutics, particularly in the context of depth psychological inquiry.

Moules (2002) defined hermeneutics as an interpretive inquiry or a living

"tradition, philosophy, and practice of interpretation" (p. 2). She explained that

hermeneutics as a discipline is based on a fundamental assumption that the "world is

interpretable" (p. 4). For Romanyshyn (2007), hermeneutics is the "act of understanding

and interpreting symbolic texts of whatever source or kind" (p. 219). Craig (2007)

differentiated hermeneutics in an existential or ontological sense from hermeneutic

inquiry as a scientific activity. He said that as an "ontological structure of human

existence" (p. 313), hermeneutics is concerned with the nature of human beings and

centered on understanding one's world and "one's being in the world" (p. 313), whereas

the scientific activity of hermeneutic inquiry, however, is concerned with the art and

science of interpretation and understanding.

Although the distinction between hermeneutics as ontology and hermeneutics as

scientific activity is essential, their separation is not so clear, and Craig (2007)

emphasized their interrelated qualities. He called hermeneutics a practice and said that in

the course of conducting hermeneutic inquiry, one inevitably is dealing with the

ontological aspect of hermeneutics.

Palmer (1969) started with the general definition that hermeneutics is the study of

understanding and interpretation, especially that of understanding texts. He offered six

definitions of hermeneutics, which form a concise overview of the historical development

of the field of hermeneutics:

> (1) the theory of biblical exegesis; (2) general philological methodology; (3) the
>
> science of all linguistic understanding; (4) the methodological foundation of
>
> *Geisteswissenschaften*; (5) phenomenology of existence and of existential
>
> understanding; and (6) the systems of interpretation, both recollective and
>
> iconoclastic, used by man to reach the meaning behind myths and symbols.
>
> (p. 33)

Palmer emphasized that interpretation is a "basic act of human thinking" (p. 8), which

cannot be dissociated from language.

Development of Hermeneutics as the Study of Understanding and as Field

The initial use of the term *hermeneutics* referred to the "principles of biblical interpretation" (Palmer, 1969, p. 34). Palmer (1969) explained that in this early form of theological hermeneutics, the emphasis was on the development of rules, methods, and theory of interpretation of biblical texts. This approach was later applied to the interpretation of nonbiblical texts as well and became known as the "theory of scriptural exegesis" (p. 35). Palmer pointed out that, although the term *hermeneutics* did not appear until the 17th century, the practice of "textual exegesis" (p. 35) can be traced back to antiquity.

According to Palmer (1969), with rationalism and the development of classical philology in the 18th century, biblical hermeneutics broadened and came to encompass philological exegesis. This development expanded hermeneutics to the science of linguistic understanding with the writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher, whose primary concern was formulating "a general hermeneutics as the art of understanding" (p. 84) and applying the theory of interpretation beyond biblical exegesis to a variety of texts. Palmer observed that Wilhelm Dilthey saw hermeneutics as the "methodological foundation for the *Geisteswissenschaften*" (p. 33), the human sciences and disciplines whose primary concerns are to understand human beings, and conceived of the practice of understanding as a historical discipline. With Martin Heidegger's philosophical concept of *Dasein*, hermeneutics moved away from text interpretation and methodology for the human sciences and stood for an ontological and "phenomenological explication of human existence itself" (p. 42). Palmer traced the further development of hermeneutics into an "encounter with Being through language" (p. 42), with the work of Gadamer, and noted

that Ricoeur brought textual exegesis back to the central stage of hermeneutics. Although many significant voices shaped and influenced the development of the theory and field of hermeneutics, for the purpose of this dissertation, the following brief review of the roles of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer follows Palmer's (1969) account.

Schleiermacher.

According to Palmer (1969), Schleiermacher's main goal was to conceptualize hermeneutics as a general study of the "art of understanding" (p. 84) across the specialized fields of theology, literature, and law during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. He is regarded as the "father of modern hermeneutics" (p. 97), as he broadened its horizon beyond those three disciplines. The notion of text thus extended beyond the notion of the written word to include linguistics, and hermeneutics became the art of understanding language. Schleiermacher conceptualized hermeneutics as a systematic science, which followed a set of laws. He furthered the idea of the hermeneutic circle—the circular back-and-forth process between parts and whole—previously proposed by Ast. For Schleiermacher, the hermeneutic circle included both a comparative and an intuitive component and depended on a certain level of preknowledge necessary to the process of understanding. With Schleiermacher, hermeneutics became psychological, as the aim of the hermeneut was to reconstruct and understand the mental process of the author of the text.

Dilthey.

Following Schleiermacher, in the latter half of the 19th century, Dilthey developed hermeneutics as a methodology to study the human science or *Geisteswissenschaften*. As related by Palmer (1969), although Dilthey reacted against the

tendency at the time to apply the methods of the natural sciences to the social and human sciences, he was concerned with objectivity and validity in terms of the interpretation and understanding of what it meant to be a human being. Following Kant, Dilthey differentiated two types of knowledge, that of explaining (*erklaren*) and that of understanding (*verstehen*), which lead him to distinguish between the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften)* and the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften)* (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Dilthey & Jameson, 1972; Palmer, 1969). Jameson (Dilthey & Jameson, 1972) explained Dilthey's concept of *Verstehen* as a "complex procedure of intellectual reconstruction" (p. 229) in contrast to subjectivity or intuition. Acknowledging the validity of categories for the natural sciences, Dilthey called for the development of new models of understanding the nature of the human sciences and looked for "concrete, historical, lived experience" (Palmer, 1969, p. 99) in his effort to study the inner experience of humans. Dilthey thought that the natural sciences were centered on explaining phenomena and that the human sciences should be concerned with understanding. He was concerned with the meaningful experience of humans as *Erlebnis*, a German term that specifically relates to the "immediacy of life" (p. 107) and translates well in this context into "lived experience" (p. 107).

Dilthey built upon the previously proposed concept of the hermeneutic circle, in which the interaction of the parts and the whole provide a dynamic definition and understanding of the phenomenon. With Dilthey, the hermeneutic circle became centered on units of meaning, as "meaning is what understanding grasps in the essential reciprocal interaction of the whole and the parts" (Palmer, 1969, p. 118). Meaning was always associated with the specific context—or horizon—of the interpreter, as it hinged upon not

only his or her interpretation but also that of the interpreter. Dilthey clarified that meaning is not a subjective projection of a thought or an immersion of the interpreter but rather a concrete perception (Palmer, 1969) of the phenomenon.

Heidegger.

As the understanding of hermeneutics evolved in the 20th century, although Martin Heidegger endorsed Dilthey's goal to understand "life from out of life itself" (Palmer, 1969, p. 124), he drew important concepts from the phenomenologist Husserl. According to Palmer (1969), Heidegger, like Husserl, wished to understand the process of being, but he was particularly interested in gaining an understanding that would be devoid of the influence of a person's own ideology. Unlike Husserl, who understood all phenomena in terms of human consciousness, human knowledge, and transcendental subjectivity, Heidegger emphasized the "historicality and temporality" of a human's "being-in-the-world" (p. 125). Drawing upon Husserl, Heidegger radically reformulated key concepts and developed a different phenomenological method in his book, *Being and Time*, where he discussed his "hermeneutic of *Dasein*" (Palmer, 1969, p. 126). Heidegger differed from Husserl, as he moved against empirical sciences and conceptualized hermeneutics from its traditional Greek roots. With Heidegger, said Palmer (1969), the philosophy of understanding the process of being "becomes historical, a creative recovery of the past, a form of interpretation" (p. 126).

In his hermeneutic phenomenology, Heidegger conceptualized Dilthey's concept of understanding (*Verstehen*) differently. Palmer (1969) posited that for Dilthey, understanding had a deeper "social, economic, or psychological" (p. 131) level, whereas Heidegger's understanding was grounded in life itself and represented "the power to

grasp one's own possibilities for being" (p. 131). Later, Heidegger emphasized the relationship between language and being, and language became a fundamental aspect of his hermeneutics. Heidegger revisited the concept of the hermeneutic circle as a way to explore the "ontological structure of all human existential understanding and interpretation" (p. 132). He integrated hermeneutics with existential ontology and phenomenology and pointed "to a ground for hermeneutics not in subjectivity but in the facticity of world and in the historicality of understanding" (p. 137). Further, Heidegger attached a different meaning to the term *world* , which came to take a personal significance (p. 132). In contrast to an environment that can be empirically conceived, Heidegger understood world as inseparable from self and humanity: Humans do not live in the world but rather "have world" (p. 133), and world has humans. By presupposing an entity in every act of understanding and knowing, Heidegger deconstructed the subject-object dichotomy of the natural sciences and claimed that the *Dasein* of world preceded the subject-object split.

      World, anima mundi, and mundus imaginalis.

      Heidegger's conceptualization of world as more than the environment in which humanity lives and as inseparable from humanity is related to the *anima mundi*. Sipiora (1999) traced the idea of *anima mundi* back to Plato and followed a historical line including proponents such as Plotinus, Ficino, Bruno, Vico, Paracelsus, the Romantics, Jungians, and post-Jungians. *Anima mundi* is the world soul, which embodies the idea that not only is psyche in humans but humans are also in psyche (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Sipiora, 1999). Quoting Sendivogius, Hillman (1992) stated, "The greater part of the soul is outside the body" (p. 90), suggesting that psychic reality needs to be returned

to the world. Hillman rose against the fact that the world has turned away from soul and advocated that soul needs to be restored to the world through a *re-vision* and a renaissance. For Hillman, *anima mundi* is the "world ensouled" (p. 101), and his call was for a restoration of the soul back to the world. Hillman imagined *anima mundi* as the visible and animated possibilities of things and events and recognized that the soul of the world is directly related to the images in humans' imagination.

These ideas of world and *anima mundi* are also related to Corbin's (1984/1995) term *mundus imaginalis,* which he chose to describe the "order of reality" (p. 2) pertaining to the imagination. He explained that in Sufi mysticism and Islamic culture, imagination is treated as an organ of perception. Corbin deepened the term *imaginal* and differentiated it from the *imaginary* or the *unreal*, while making room to consider images as well as the realm of the subtle-body, active parts of that living reality.

Gadamer.

With his book, *Truth and Method*, Gadamer moved hermeneutical theory into a new phase (Palmer, 1969). Following Heidegger's fundamental redefinition of understanding, Gadamer left behind Dilthey's conception of hermeneutics as a method for the human sciences, as he brought into question the status of method itself (Palmer, 1969). Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is "not defined as a general help discipline for the humanities but as a philosophical effort to account for understanding as an ontological—the ontological—process in man" (Palmer, 1969, p. 163). Gadamer's primary focus was to explore how understanding is possible in general as well as in humans' apprehension of the world as a whole.

Similarly to Heidegger, Gadamer criticized humans' subjective view of human knowledge. Palmer (1969) explained that, refuting modern "technological thinking" (p. 164), Gadamer reconnected with Socratic dialectics grounded in being and moved away from a view of method centered in a subject-object dichotomy. Contrasting with a methodology revolving around controls and manipulations, Gadamer followed a phenomenological and hermeneutical dialectics approach of questioning and responding grounded in Heidegger's concept of being. In his view, a dialectics emerged in the process between the horizon of the questioner and that of the thing in question.

According to Palmer (1969), Gadamer believed humans are "historical beings" (p. 178) and that the phenomenon of understanding the past is always contingent upon the perspective of the present. Gadamer indicated an intrinsic relationship between the past and the present, including preconceptions of the past, which can be neither dissociated from one another nor ignored. He situated hermeneutics in the dialectical space between the present and the past. He conceived of tradition as "something in which we stand and through which we exist" (p. 177) and viewed it as an invisible ally, which provided humans with a fundamental perspective for understanding. From a hermeneutical view, Gadamer believed that the interpretation of texts cannot be achieved without the preconceptions of the interpreter. Moving away from Schleiermacher, Gadamer believed that the task of hermeneutics is centered on understanding the text, not the subjectivity of the author.

As Palmer (1969) explained, Gadamer criticized the natural science approach to knowledge, where it is conceived in terms of perception and objectivity. He was interested in knowledge as a "happening, an event, an encounter" (p. 195). Drawing upon

Hegel, Gadamer explained experience as recognition of something different than what

was originally assumed; the object of knowledge becomes transformed through the

dialectic process of experience. For him, "hermeneutical experience" (p. 197) is what a

person meets as heritage and tradition, which he explained in terms of an "I-thou"

(p. 197), hermeneutical, and dialectical process. As explained by Palmer, when reading a

text, the reader and the text enter a dynamic process, where the heritage of the text and

the reader start to dialog through question and answer. Gadamer emphasized the mutual

quality of this back and forth between the text and the reader through questioning. He

defined *question* as to "place in the open" (as cited in Palmer, 1969, p. 198), which

implies that the person who questions is aware that he or she does not already know. For

Gadamer, these ideas of experience, knowledge, and questioning are all embedded in

tradition and heritage and are essential concepts for the "hermeneutical dialogue" (p. 199)

that occurs between the horizons of the text and that of the interpreter. Because of his

reconception of understanding as a "historical, dialectical, linguistic event" (p. 215),

Gadamer greatly widened the application of hermeneutical theory to areas beyond written

texts and beyond the human sciences.

Hermeneutics as Research Method

Hermeneutics as a research method is grounded in philosophical hermeneutics

and the works of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Grondin, 1997;

Heppner & Heppner, 2004; Palmer, 1969), as discussed above. A central methodological

step in hermeneutical inquiry is the hermeneutic circle (Palmer, 1969). According to

Palmer (1969), Schleiermacher and Dilthey described the hermeneutic circle as the

relationship between the parts and the whole. Discussing Schleiermacher, Palmer

explained that in order to understand new information, people compare it to old

information they have already understood. The new information enters and becomes a

part of the circle of the old information, thereby creating a new circle.

Building upon Schleiermacher, Dilthey described the hermeneutic circle as the

relationship between the parts and the whole, as their definitions and meanings are

intertwined and reciprocal (Palmer, 1969). Packer and Addison (1989) conceptualized the

hermeneutic circle in terms of a dialog between the researchers' point of view and their

evaluation of the results. The circular movement from point of view to evaluation and

back form the two parts of the hermeneutic circle (Packer & Addison, 1989). This

concept of the hermeneutic circle builds upon Heidegger's notion of the circularity of

understanding, which is the idea that one understands new knowledge based on existing

knowledge (Packer & Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969).

In this dissertation, a hermeneutic methodology is utilized in the broader Greek

sense of the term by using Palmer's (1969) three basic hermeneutic directions—saying,

explaining, and translating—in order to gain a better understanding of the contextual

horizon of the texts researched. A hermeneutic circle is created to explore research

methods in psychoanalysis, comparing the new information that arise from the process to

the old information that is already understood. In addition to philosophical hermeneutics,

alchemical hermeneutics is used to expand the horizon I am bringing into the process as a

researcher.

Alchemical Hermeneutics

Expanding upon the methodology of traditional or philosophical hermeneutics,

Romanyshyn (2007) developed alchemical hermeneutics, which takes into account

unconscious processes and keeps "soul in mind" (p. xi) as part of the process of interpretation. Alchemical hermeneutics is grounded in the tradition of psychology as a science of the soul and conceives of the research project as being contingent upon the presence of the researcher (Coppin & Nelson, 2005; Romanyshyn, 2007). Romanyshyn (2007) explained that the relationship between the researcher and the research project is unique and intricate, as "the work wants something from the researcher as much as the researcher wants something from the work" (p. 105). This tradition not only validates the existence and presence of the unconscious in research, both for the researcher and for the work, but also calls upon the researcher to examine the "unconscious dynamics" (p. 105) of his or her relation with the work. From this perspective, objectivity includes the subjective aspect of these unconscious dynamics (Coppin & Nelson, 2005). The research becomes a process in which the researcher and the work influence each other, as the unconscious dynamics of the work are present regardless of whether or not they are acknowledged (Romanyshyn, 2007).

Transference dialogue is the method used in alchemical hermeneutics to engage with the unconscious material that arises through various processes such as dreams, reverie, feelings, symptoms, and synchronicities (Romanyshyn, 2007). Romanyshyn (2007) outlined the following steps for this process of the work:

Step 1: Setting the Stage

Step 2: Invitations

Step 3: Waiting with Hospitality

Step 4: Engaging the "Others" in the Work

First Moment: Giving Form and Being a Witness

Second Moment: Critical Regard

Step 5: Scholarly Amplification (p. 141)

The following is a description of how I utilized these steps in my research.

The first step consists of creating a ritual and a space to invite reverie (Romanyshyn, 2007). I set my desk in a corner of my living room where I kept the books I was researching visible. I made a space on the shelf to display images and symbolic material that arose through the work and changed them as appropriate, depending on the chapter I was working on. I started my day with a ritual of inviting a meditative state and focusing upon an image or a quote, a story, a book, a piece of music, or any other element that arose in the process. I created a physical and symbolic ritual to invite reverie into the process of the work.

The second step involved engaging in a dialog with the multiple levels of the psyche, including personal, cultural–historical, collective–archetypal, and eco–cosmological dimensions. This step provided a recipient for the unfinished business of the work, as I opened up to a dialog with the *others* or the ancestors related to the research topic (Romanyshyn, 2007). Alongside invitation, the third step consisted of waiting in hospitality, which refers to maintaining a nonjudgmental attitude and acceptance of the material that emerges in the transference field (Romanyshyn, 2007).

The fourth step pertains to engaging the "others" in the work. This step includes two moments described by Romanyshyn (2007). With regard to the first moment, I strove to witness and give form to the imaginal figures that emerged through the transference dialog using various forms of creative expressions, which could have included drawings, sculptures, writings, singing, and movements. The second moment pertains to the

engaging with the symbolic material and imaginal figures that emerge, which I did in a reflective and critical manner in order to make meaning of the transference dialogs.

Finally, the fifth step involved the process of scholarly amplification, which consisted of researching the relevance and importance of the specific figure and symbolic material that emerged in the transference field (Romanyshyn, 2007). This final step grounded the material that emerged into the scholarly literature, bringing consciousness to unconscious subjectivity.

In order to make a place for unconscious dynamics emerging in this research process, philosophical hermeneutics (Palmer, 1969) was complemented with alchemical hermeneutics (Romanyshyn, 2007) in order to explore further the material that arose in the research project. Alchemical hermeneutics expanded the hermeneutic circle into a hermeneutic spiral, thereby providing a methodological structure that recognized the importance of subjectivity. In this research process, I attended to the dynamic relationship between subject and object.

Madison (1990) discussed Merleau-Ponty's idea of the flesh, which illustrates the subject-object relationship. Madison stated,

> The flesh is nothing other than the fact that between the psychic and the corporeal, between the subject and its body, between it and the world, between the self and the other, there exists a relation of circularity and even of reversibility. (p. 67)

The flesh—the relationship between the psychic and the body—and the circularity that exists between them exemplify the dynamic process between hard, objective facts and subjective ones that emerge in the research process. Referring to Dilthey, Hillman (1976) emphasized the "fundamental place of subjectivity in all human thought" (p. 15). Hillman

situated the subject–object split in terms of the difference between explaining (*erklaren*)

and understanding (*verstehen*) and noted that as scientific objectivity arose, subjective

thinking declined, and explaining replaced understanding. Hillman stated,

> My soul is not the result of objective facts that require explanation; rather it
>
> reflects subjective experiences that require understanding. To understand anything
>
> at all, we must envision it as having an independent subjective interior existence,
>
> capable of experience, obliged to a history, motivated by purposes and intentions.
>
> (p. 15)

Merleau-Ponty's concept of the "flesh" (Madison, 1990, p. 67) and Hillman's (1976)

discussion of subjectivity provide good examples of the relationship between object and

subject and underline the importance of allotting subjectivity its proper place in the

research process.

In this dissertation, I attended to the relationship between object and subject, and

the process at times weighed more towards the objective and at other times, more toward

the subjective. Merleau-Ponty's idea of circularity (Madison, 1990) mirrors the

hermeneutic circle and spiral, while describing the dynamic process by which I engaged

both the objective facts that I gathered from books and articles and the subjective material

including dreams, symbols, images, and thoughts that arose from this engagement.

Following the hermeneutic circle, my research process dynamically moved between an

objective or reflective approach and a subjective or experiential approach, and back again,

following the methodologies outlined in this chapter for hermeneutics and alchemical

hermeneutics.

Texts

In this dissertation, the field in psychoanalytic research methodology is explored

in reviews of contemporary articles in journals such as *International Journal of*

Psychoanalysis, Journal of Analytical Psychology, Journal of Clinical Psychology,

Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, Journal of the American

Psychoanalytic Association, Psychoanalytic Inquiry, and *Psychoanalytic Psychology*. I

also refer to Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalytic theorists who discussed research

in their writings, starting with Freud, as well as the writing of contemporary theorists and

researchers such as Green, Grünbaum, Kernberg, Sandler and Sandler, and Wallerstein.

As hermeneutics developed, the notion of text in hermeneutic inquiry widened

and went beyond the written word (Palmer, 1969). Craig (2007) extended the definition

of human *texts* to human *action*, and data broadened in scope to include any raw material

associated with human texts and human action in any discipline including "theology, law,

philology, art, music, philosophy, or psychology" (p. 312). Romanyshyn (2007)

conceived of texts or data in hermeneutics as encompassing "symbolic texts of whatever

source or kind" (p. 219). Palmer (1969) emphasized the difference between texts as

natural objects and texts as works. He commented that when texts are considered to be

historical and human, they are no longer "silent" (p. 7), and they require a different

method for interpretation. Palmer also discussed the historical origins of the interpretation

of biblical texts, which later came to include nonbiblical obscure and symbolic texts,

requiring interpretation in order to divulge their concealed meanings. The notion of text

in this dissertation also includes a broader meaning, as I engaged with the symbolic and

archetypal images that arose through the transference dialogs to explore their significance

and relation to the field created between the research process of this study and me as a

researcher.

Data Collection and Analysis

In this study, I created a hermeneutic circle as I spiraled and engaged with the

texts I reviewed and the images that arose through my reflexive process using Palmer's

(1969) three main principles of hermeneutic practice: expression, explanation, and

translation. I interacted with the various themes and images that emerged in a dynamic

way to identify the field in psychoanalytic research methodology and engage in a

reflexive manner with the material and my research process. Using Romanyshyn's (2007)

transference dialogs, through reverie, I further explored the creation of a field between

me, as the researcher, and the research process.

An essential methodological step in alchemical hermeneutics is to acknowledge

the vocational aspect of the work, which is based on the idea that the research topic

chooses the researcher as much as the researcher chooses the topic (Romanyshyn, 2007).

Throughout the research and writing process, I attended to and followed the symbolic and

archetypal images that emerged from my personal complexes in relation to my research

process, and they provided me with important pathways toward understanding the

development of a field in this research. Through these dynamic and emerging processes, I

sought to ensure that the research methods currently used in psychoanalytic research

could be understood from an integrative and complementary perspective.

Limitations of the Study

Given that this study was not conducted in the natural science tradition, it is

fundamentally limited by the nature of its methodological approach. The study did not

use or produce empirical or quantitative data and therefore did not draw quantitative

conclusions about the field in psychoanalytic research methodology. This study,

however, is grounded in the tradition of hermeneutic sciences and science of the soul and

therefore provides qualitative interpretations and perspectives about the field in

psychoanalytic research methodology and utilizes written texts as its data and primary

research material. Using a hermeneutic and alchemical hermeneutic methodology, the

data collected was analyzed through my interpretation as the researcher, which is

grounded in depth psychological perspectives including Freudian, post-Freudian,

Jungian, and post-Jungian. Although other researchers could replicate the present study

by reviewing the same sources and texts, their conclusions would be different given that

the findings would be based on their unique interpretations and reflection process and

subjective engagement with the material. As a result, this study cannot be validated from

a natural science perspective and does not offer a quantitatively based conclusion.

Organization of the Study

   This study is organized following the themes that emerged in the process of

exploring the field and the role of the unconscious in psychoanalytic research

methodologies using hermeneutics and alchemical hermeneutics. In the findings

presented in Chapter 4, Freud's view on science and research are briefly discussed,

including the idea of psychoanalysis as an instrument of research, which Freud

(1926/1978) termed *Junktim*, and considerations regarding the themes of psychoanalysis

and science and psychoanalysis and research methodology. A subsequent overview of

research conducted in the field of psychoanalysis focuses on their research

methodologies. The discussion in Chapter 5 synthesizes the research methods in

psychoanalytic research presented in the previous chapter and places them on the circle-of-research diagram (Figure 2) introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 6 revisits the question of the place of the unconscious in research methods in psychoanalysis. Chapter 7 concluded the dissertation by providing final considerations regarding this study, my writing process, and suggestions for future research.

Chapter 4

Findings

Freud on Science and Research

   Introduction.

   Before presenting and discussing the findings of this hermeneutic study

comprised of various psychoanalytic studies discussed in the foregoing chapters

regarding research methodologies in psychoanalysis, it is relevant to refer back to Freud's

reflections about research. Freud advanced several beliefs with regard to psychoanalysis

and research, including (a) psychoanalysis as an instrument of research that could not be

subjected to experimentation, (b) what he referred to as *Junktim* (the conjunction between

cure and research), (c) and psychoanalytic research as a specific process in which the

psychoanalyst engages.

   Freud and science.

   Mijolla (2003) presented Freud as an explorer and investigator fueled by vivid

passions in many areas that he investigated from an early age. Mijolla referred to a letter

between Freud and Fliess, in which Freud explained that he did not consider himself a

man of science but rather a conquistador, someone who discovered new areas. The author

arbitrarily divided Freud's life into three investigative phases: "laboratory research,

psychological clinical research and psychoanalytic research" (p. 81). These phases took

place at various points throughout Freud's life and were instrumental in the development

of his thinking and the development of psychoanalysis.

   Mijolla (2003) reported that, in his laboratory research phase, Freud conducted

research under various professors. The first area of research was zoology, which Freud

conducted in a laboratory at the beginning of his career. The second area of laboratory research was in physiology. Subsequently, Freud's career took a turn, moving from laboratory research to clinical work in a psychiatric clinic, where he specialized in neurology and infantile neurology. During this time, Freud researched the effects of cocaine and started to conduct psychological clinical research.

Freud noted that considering psychoanalysis as a science part of medicine or of psychology was an academic distinction, and he emphasized that, as a treatment method, psychoanalysis belonged to medicine (Mijolla, 2003). That being said, Freud also emphasized that unlike radiology, for example, psychoanalysis was concerned with the "mental processes of human beings" (Mijolla, 2003, p. 91) and therefore could only be studied in human beings.

Psychoanalysis as an instrument of research.

In *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, Freud (1913/1933) defined psychoanalysis as a "specialist science, a branch of psychology—a depth-psychology or psychology of the unconscious" (p. 158). In *The Question of Lay Analysis*, Freud (1926/1978) discussed psychoanalysis "as a 'depth-psychology,' a theory of the mental unconscious" (p. 83) that could be "indispensable to all the sciences which are concerned with the evolution of human civilization and its major institutions such as art, religion, and the social order" (p. 83). Freud was concerned that medicine would swallow psychoanalysis, reducing it to interventions such as "hypnotic suggestion, autosuggestion, and persuasion" (p. 83) and believed that, as a "new instrument of research" (p. 84), it could contribute to the advancement of sciences other than medicine.

For Freud (1926/1978), psychoanalysis was an "instrument of research" (p. 84).

Mijolla (2003) summarized Freud's belief that both scientific progress and

psychoanalysis were slow processes. For Freud, these processes shared similarities: Both

relied on observation in order to acquire knowledge; the construction of assumptions and

hypotheses, which were withdrawn or modified as needed; and patience in their laborious

processes. Freud believed, however, that the two processes differed in that

psychoanalysis could not rely on the methodological structure of the experiments

(Leuzinger-Bohleber & Burgin, 2003). On the contrary, Freud believed that

psychoanalysis could not be subjected to experimentation because of its nature. Mijolla

(2003) brought up the exchange that American psychologist Rosenzweig had with Freud

about experimentally testing the validity of psychoanalytic concepts. Freud responded

that because psychoanalysis depended on observation, it could not be subjected to

experimental investigation, and then added, "Still it can do no harm" (as cited in Mijolla,

2003, p. 94).

In the case of the interpretation of dreams, Freud (1913/1955) discussed the

conflict between the medical view of dreams as a purely physiological process in contrast

with the psychoanalytic view of dreams as "psychical acts possessing meaning and

purpose" (p. 169) that help explain the human mind. Mijolla (2003) also pointed out that

Freud's initial position was not to be associated to researching "occult psychic

phenomena" (p. 81), because he wanted psychoanalysis to remain clearly separate.

Several years later, Freud was less afraid and did not feel the need to keep psychoanalysis

and occult phenomena separate.

Freud's concept of *Junktim*.

In the field of psychoanalysis, Freud (1926/1978) believed that there was a *Junktim*, a "precious conjunction" or "inseparable bond between cure and research" (p. 94), and that the process of clinical practice and research were interconnected. To that point, Freud stated,

> Knowledge brought therapeutic success. It was impossible to treat a patient without learning something new; it was impossible to gain fresh insight without perceiving its beneficent results. Our analytic procedure is the only one in which this precious conjunction is assured. It is only by carrying on our analytic pastoral work that we can deepen our dawning comprehension of the human mind. This prospect of scientific gain has been the proudest and happiest feature of analytic work. (p. 94)

Freud believed that cure and research could not be separated and that each process informed the other.

Freud and psychoanalytic research.

Mijolla (2003) posited that the term *psychoanalytic research* should be reserved for the "permanent process of self-analysis which is characteristic of the psychical activity of any psychoanalyst" (p. 95). He continued, saying that psychoanalytic research "draws its dynamism from this process and infiltrates, from its unconscious processes, the preconscious and conscious messages which are addressed to those who are aware of them and will then, in their turn, become subject to the self-analytic impulsion" (p. 95). He explained that psychoanalytic research occurs at the junction of what psychoanalysts "find in themselves and what their patients bring them" (p. 95).

This overview of Freud's position on research and science has provided an understanding of the initial fabric that might still be at the base of research in psychoanalysis and helps inform the findings below about recent research methodologies in psychoanalysis. It seems particularly important to note that Freud's notion of *Junktim* between cure and research is still present in discussions about situating psychoanalysis in terms of its research methodologies (Denis, 2008; Dreher, 1998/2000; Leuzinger-Bohleber, Dreher, & Canestri, 2003; Mijolla, 2003).

Psychoanalysis and Research Methodology

    Introduction.

The following sections provide preliminary reflections about research methodology in psychoanalysis. In September 2002, the International Psychoanalytical Association's Conceptual Research Subcommittee held a conference titled "Pluralism of Sciences: the Psychoanalytic Method between Clinical, Conceptual and Empirical Research." The book *Pluralism and Unity? Methods of Research in Psychoanalysis*, edited by Leuzinger-Bohleber, Dreher, and Canestri (2003), provided a report of the colloquium on the subject of "articulation between the various forms of psychoanalytic research" (p. xxiv). Several discussions presented in this collection of papers provide a fitting starting place to discuss recent research efforts in psychoanalysis, particularly in terms of research methodology. The authors' reflections revolved around research *in* psychoanalysis versus research *on* psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis and science, and the relevance of Freud's concept of *Junktim* to current psychoanalytic research efforts.

Research *in* psychoanalysis versus research *on* psychoanalysis.

In his "Foreword" in *Pluralism and Unity? Methods of Research in Psychoanalysis*, Widlöcher (2003) emphasized the importance of differentiating a "process that considers psychoanalysis as a research tool with one that considers it as an object of research" (p. xx)—in other words, the difference between conducting studies on the content of psychoanalysis, such as the effect of psychoanalysis, and considering psychoanalysis itself as a method of research. Widlöcher opined that when the psychoanalytic method is studied as an object of research, psychoanalysis is no longer a "tool of discovery" (p. xx); it becomes an "object of knowledge" (p. xx). He stated his belief that when psychoanalysis is considered an object of research, one should study the origin of mental disorders as well as compare the effect of medication and the effect of psychotherapy. For Widlöcher, psychoanalysis is an evolving discipline in constant progress. He advocated for more research in the field as well as for increased interdisciplinary dialogues and open exchanges. Psychoanalysis and the cognitive sciences, for example, are complementary sciences of the mind, as each brings to the other some knowledge about aspects of their theory that they are having difficulty exploring alone. In terms of psychoanalysis and neurobiology, Widlöcher believed that efforts should be made to study the source of mental disorders and to compare the action and effect of medication with that of psychotherapy.

Following Widlöcher's (2003) distinction, Perron (2003), in his paper, "What Are We Looking for? How?" defined research *in* psychoanalysis as "any work that aims to know better what happens during the treatment" (p. 97) and the analytic process and defined research *on* psychoanalysis as "any approach towards psychoanalysis from the

outside or from its borders" (p. 97), for example, treatments, outcome, therapeutic

techniques, and functioning of institutions. Perron believed that research on the efficacy

of treatment was necessary because of the current healthcare system. He discussed the

challenge in investigating the treatment efficacy of psychoanalysis. The author discussed

various challenges in terms of three common types of research done on the treatment

efficacy of psychoanalysis: reduction of symptoms; feedback regarding treatment

outcome from patients, analysts, or others; and investigating indirect factors such as

impact on overall health expenses and work days. Perron also discussed the challenges

associated with sampling and the need to provide more information about the population

and the way in which it was sampled. He emphasized how classification worked well for

zoology but caused fundamental problems when studying human beings and their

"mental apparatus" (p. 101).

   Psychoanalysis and science.

   Widlöcher (2003) argued that the debate about the scientific status of

psychoanalysis is misdirected and that the scientific value of the field would not be

"demonstrated by any experimental confirmation, but by showing how it contributes to

the knowledge of mental activity through its own, specific approach, which should be

seen as a contribution to related branches of science of the mind" (p. xxii). He found that

the question of progress and what was new in the field of psychoanalysis were central

issues in terms of research and he advocated that, although empirical investigations are

necessary and useful to evaluate care and to study personality and treatment efficacies,

they are not enough. According to Widlöcher, it is essential and imperative for the field

to understand more fully the relationship between clinical practice and theory.

Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin (2003), in their paper, "Pluralism and Unity in Psychoanalytic Research: Some Introductory Remarks," discussed the fact that, although globalization in science allows for the development of a common language that facilitates communication and exchange, it also promotes the loss of distinct features, "cultural multiplicity" (p. 1), and diversity of traditions and that psychoanalysis also faced these risks. They considered a uniform science founded on an outdated epistemology based on a naturalistic view of validity as detrimental to psychoanalytic research, because it "destroys the richness and variety of attempts to research unconscious phantasies and conflicts" (p. 2)—complex and ambiguous phenomena not subject to direct observation. The authors believed that the international psychoanalytic community could generate innovative and creative movements to develop an intuitive resistance against scientific globalization similar to those discussed by Hardt and Negri (2000) "by remembering the specific quality of psychoanalysis as a science of the unconscious, which cannot be studied through seemingly globally" (Leuzinger-Bohleber & Burgin, 2003, p. 3) valid and objective research methods.

Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin (2003) discussed the current zeitgeist in psychoanalytic research that is based on a natural science paradigm of direct observation and measurement and the historical development of the philosophy of science. They argued that in the myth of science, there emerged an idealization of the natural science paradigm of objectivity and absolute truth and a denial of the epistemological differences of other disciplines. As a result, the "researcher's personal and social experience" (p. 10) in the research process has been removed from this empirical paradigm. The authors discussed the debate between the view that psychoanalysis should be studied only from a

natural-science perspective as opposed to the view that psychoanalysis is a field research

guided by *Junktim*—Freud's conception of research and cure as inseparable. The authors

discussed the risk of erecting a psychoanalytic ivory tower in terms of gaining more unity

but losing "our science's creative and innovative potential" (p. 7). They argued for a

dialog between psychoanalysis, other sciences, and the public.

Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin (2003) discussed the false dichotomy between

natural and human sciences from a historical perspective, as it has now been replaced by

a debate "centered around a systematic comparison of concepts of experience" (p. 12).

The authors pointed to a current trend in science that idealizes the positivist natural-

science paradigm and claimed that the split between natural and human science is a

fallacy. They argued that psychoanalysis does not have to choose between the natural

science and the arts. They proposed instead that psychoanalysis situate itself in the

current pluralism of science and follow other contemporary sciences to continue to study

its cornerstone concept of experience and engage in dialogs and interdisciplinary

exchange. The authors emphasized Hampe's (2000) conception of the current era of

pluralism: pluralism of science, of subject, of scientific forms of theories, of scientific

experience, and of research methods. Furthermore, Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin

(2003) believed that clinical practice and research cannot be separated, and they referred

back to Freud's concept of *Junktim* as an indispensable basis for psychoanalytic research.

The authors further argued that psychoanalytic research can only be conducted in the

psychoanalytic situation between the analyst and the patient because its aim is to gain

"new insights into unconscious processes that come to light in transference and

countertransference, dreams, slips of tongue, acting out, and so on" (p. 15). They

believed that the majority of the field's understanding of unconscious processes comes

from this kind of "clinical psychoanalytic research" (p. 15).

Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin (2003) differentiated between clinical,

conceptual, and empirical research. Green (2003), in his paper, "The Pluralism of

Sciences and Psychoanalytic Thinking," expressed his belief that a debate about whether

all clinical, conceptual, and empirical research in psychoanalysis should be considered

scientific is "just chat" (p. 30) and that psychoanalysis is in "great need of research on

research" (p. 31). He stated that when it comes to investigating the unconscious processes

—the core of the analytic experience—that occur in the analytic hour, quantitative

research methodologies are inadequate. Green emphasized that quantitative research

should continue to be used in psychoanalysis, but that a different methodology should be

used to study the unconscious. He asked two foundational questions: "What type of

research should we have?" and "What method should we promote in order to match

scientific and psychoanalytic research?" (p. 36). Similarly, Perron (2003) started his

paper by stating that before doing any type of research, two questions needed to be

answered: "What do we want to know?" and "How shall we do that?" (p. 97).

Because of the uniqueness of psychoanalytic treatments, Zepf (2009) argued that

qualitative research is not an appropriate methodology to determine the efficacy of

psychoanalysis. He proposed to look at the relationship between treatment and treatment

theories. Zepf argued that it is not the treatments but the treatment theories that can be

subjected to testing. He emphasized that the relationship between treatments and

treatment theories cannot be explored as long as there are no common grounds in terms

of theoretical concepts of what works in psychoanalysis and why. Zepf joined

Wallerstein (1998, 2002) and others in this belief.

The above discussion has shown that many thinkers and researchers are actively

considering questions regarding research methodology in the field of psychoanalysis

today. Their reflections include the questions that should be researched and the method(s)

that should be used to address them. Following is an overview of actual recent research

conducted in the field of psychoanalysis.

Overview of Research Conducted in the Field of Psychoanalysis

This overview of recent research conducted in the field of psychoanalysis

includes discussion of the development and evolution of a research method "to describe

and compare psychoanalytic approaches" (Tuckett et al., 2008); a presentation of

conceptual research in psychoanalysis (Dreher, 1998/2000), such as the Hampstead Index

Project and the Trauma Project; an exploration of the relation between clinical practice

and the development of theory using "a map of private implicit, preconscious theories in

clinical practice" (Canestri, Bohleber, Denis, & Fonagy, 2006, p. 29) as a research

instrument; and reflections about the place of unconscious processes in psychoanalytic

writing (Ogden, 2005).

Developing a research method in psychoanalysis.

In their book, *Psychoanalysis Comparable and Incomparable: The Evolution of a

Method to Describe and Compare Psychoanalytic Approaches*, Tuckett et al. (2008)

described the initiation and ongoing development of a research project that stemmed back

to 2000, when the European Psychoanalytic Federation voted for a new scientific policy

resulting in the formation of four working parties focusing respectively on clinical issues,

theoretical issues, interface, and education. A series of meetings followed this new

policy. The Working Party on Clinical Issues (WPCI) met in Brussels in 2001, followed

by 10 workshops in Prague in 2002. In November 2002, the WPCI divided into Track 1

and Track 2. In 2003, Track 1 met in Paris twice and developed the initial "grid"

(Tuckett, 2008a, p. 16), and 10 workshops were conducted in Sorrento. After Sorrento, a

second meeting in Paris was conducted, during which the idea of the two-step method

emerged. In 2004, during a third meeting in Paris, Track 1 became the Working Party on

Comparative Clinical Methods (WPCCM), and the two-step method was initiated. The

WPCCM was established to understand and compare the different ways in which

psychoanalysts conduct their work. Between 2004 and 2006, 10 workshops were

conducted in Helsinki, followed by two WPCCM meetings and 10 workshops in

Vilamoura, followed by two more WPCCM meetings and 10 workshops in Athens.

     The research project took place over the course of 6 years, and its aim was to

understand and compare the different ways in which psychoanalysts conduct their work.

According to Tuckett (2008a), between 2000 and 2008, 500 people took part in at least

one of the six workshop series and about 200 attended three or more; 70 of the

participants presented their work. Because none already existed, one aim of the project

was to develop an appropriate and relevant research method. Over the course of the

project as described in the book, the investigators observed that the project greatly

resembled the clinical process of psychoanalysis in its dynamic group process, in the

evolving development of the research method, and in the way the group members were

both observers and participants at the same time.

Tuckett (2008a) turned to the social sciences and used grounded theory as the

foundational basis to develop the research team's methodology, which they called the

two-step method. They used three concepts from the social sciences to initiate the

development of the research: explanatory model, ideal type, and role. The *explanatory*

model is a social anthropological concept used to "explain underlying but often

observable patterns of social interaction based on implicit beliefs" (p. 29). Explanatory

models are grounded in the idea that "most things that do not make sense from the

outside . . . do make sense if understood from the inside" (p. 29). Tuckett emphasized this

as being a shared value between psychoanalysis and explanatory models. Explanatory

models are the "complex mix of emotionally charged and interconnected implicit and

explicit beliefs that cause" (p. 30) someone to do something a certain way. For

psychoanalysts, an explanatory model is a "complex mix of implicit and explicit

underlying beliefs about what is appropriate that cause them to act as they do" (p. 248).

The investigators also applied the concept of *ideal types*, another sociological idea

used in the process of deriving "generalizable comparisons from individual observations"

(Tuckett, 2008a, p. 30), and the concept of *role*, which is "a set of connected behaviors,

rights and obligations as conceptualized by members of groups in a social situation"

(p. 30). The concept of roles was used to help identify the roles of the presenters,

discussants, and moderators. One essential initial basis for the development of the study

was to create a method of investigation that was experiential. In his chapter, "In Praise of

Empiricism," Denis (2008) discussed Freud's concept of *Junktim* (Freud, 1926/1978;

Dreher, 1998/2000), the unique connection between cure and research that lies at the

heart of psychoanalysis. For Denis (2008), psychoanalysis is a discipline whose "object

of knowledge and object of study" (p. 46) are closely interconnected; being based on experience, it can therefore not be subject to experimentation.

The aim of the WPCCM project was to compare the various ways in which psychoanalysis works from different psychoanalytic traditions and to understand more precisely what psychoanalysis is today. Some overarching research questions were the following: How do we "know when what is happening between two people should be called psychoanalysis, what is (and is not) a psychoanalytic process, and what is (and is not) a psychoanalytic interpretation?" (Tuckett, 2008b, p. 244). Hinz (2008) believed that it was inevitable that the research participants would conceptualize the analytic process in very different ways because of the existence of different psychoanalytic theories and practices that have emerged since Freud. Hinz attributed these various analytical worlds to "an expression of the liveliness and richness of the unconscious" (p. 110).

In his reflections on the development of the two-step method, Tuckett (2008c) explained that although the method reached an operational stage after the 2003 and 2004 meetings, it was intended to continue to evolve during the course of the entire project. The aim of the two-step method was to "provide a framework for a group of psychoanalysts from different traditions and language cultures to use their differences creatively to discuss and compare the way different psychoanalysts work" (p. 134). The group included a moderator, a presenter, and a group of ten to fifteen discussants. An essential basis for the group was the assumption that each presenter was a psychoanalyst.

The two-step method included five initial steps: -2 (minus 2), -1 (minus 1), 0, 1, and 2. Step -2 (minus 2) consisted of the formation of a group of ten to fifteen psychoanalysts from different countries who practice psychoanalysis from various

theoretical orientations (Birksted-Breen, Ferro, & Mariotti, 2008). The group met for

about twelve hours. The groups were initially formed via email exchanges between

Tuckett and the participants. This phase also included the start of the development of a

group identity as members introduced themselves at the beginning of the in-person

meeting.

After the introductions, Step -1 (minus 1) began, and the moderator set the frame

of the group including confidentiality and the fact that the discussions would be recorded.

After this, the presenter gave a brief presentation of the case history. Step 0 consisted of

the presenter distributing and reading the report of two or three consecutive sessions from

the chosen case. During this step, the group engaged in a free discussion of the sessions.

After the free discussion, the moderator reviewed the tasks of the group, which was to

"identify different implicit models" (Birksted-Breen et al., 2008, p. 172) of the

psychoanalyst in order to "understand what a psychoanalyst does when he or she is doing

psychoanalysis" (Birksted-Breen et al., 2008, p. 172).

After steps -2, -1, and 0, came step 1, which consisted of the group assigning each

of the analyst's interventions to one of six categories. In this process, each interpretation

was given a number from 1 to 6. The intent of this step was to bring out the "complex

implicit thought processes that lie . . . behind an interpretation" (Birksted-Breen et al.,

2008, p. 174). The classification based on the "grid" (Tuckett, 2008c, p. 140) was a tool

used to enable the group discussion to identify and unearth the implicit explanatory

models of the analyst.

Step 2 was a group discussion in which the moderator's task was to help the

group be curious about the analyst's theoretical process. Each participant was asked to

keep in mind one of the five axes of the grid. The moderator facilitated the group discussion as participants helped the "group to focus on their particular question" (Birksted-Breen et al., 2008, p. 179). During this step, the group looked more particularly at how the psychoanalyst worked, what he or she listened to, and explored the analyst's implicit and explicit explanatory models.

Although not described in Tuckett et al.'s (2008) book, Tuckett (2008b) explained that there would be a second volume presenting the findings of the research and describing the main ways in which psychoanalysts practice psychoanalysis today. The second book will describe the main working models that were identified during the workshops and show "how they related to each other and to traditional psychoanalytic preoccupations, concepts and theories" (p. 258). This second book will essentially explain step three of the research method by describing its results.

Several unintentional byproduct findings of the two-step research method were the enriching of research in psychoanalysis; the emergence of a possible new style of case discussion, which could be useful for supervision in the context of education; and the fact that presenting analysts reported that "taking part in the group . . . helped them usefully to understand and clarify what they are doing and so to refine their analytic position" (Tuckett, 2008b, p. 258).

In their chapter "Work in Progress—Using the Two-Step Method," Birksted-Breen, Ferro, and Mariotti (2008) provide an in-depth discussion of the group process while using the two-step method and particularly during the group discussions. Because the research method was experiential, evolving, and depended on the group process, the group phenomena that took place were of significant importance. In step 2, the task of the

group was to "construct a model of the analyst's approach by using the five axes" (p. 189) of the grid. During the group work, several situations arose. At times, "the group and/or the presenter" (p. 189) seemed resistant to "discover what was going on in the analyst's mind" (p. 189), as though the group felt that it knew more about the presenting analyst's process than the analyst him- or herself. At other times, strong emotions such as anger or fear arose and were enacted in the group as a result of similar emotions not being interpreted in the sessions.

Birksted-Breen et al. (2008) discussed the difficulty facing the group, whose task was to stay neutral while exploring and constructing explicitly the implicit process of the presenting psychoanalyst. They talked about the challenge in finding out more about the implicit theories of the psychoanalyst because, in some ways, these processes were unconscious, at both the preconscious and the dynamic conscious levels. The investigators noted that

> when discussing clinical material presented to a group it is very easy to find one
> has unearthed aspects of a presenter's explanatory model which rest on
> unconsciously repressed implicit theories, which may conflict with the way the
> analyst likes to think about his or her work more consciously. (p. 194)

They nevertheless emphasized that the task of the group was to construct explanatory models, not to explore unconscious determinants and dynamics of the presenting analyst.

Tuckett (2008b) discussed two main problems that arose early in the project. The first was

> overvision—the tendency when discussing someone else's clinical material to
> introduce competing ideas about what the presenting analyst should have done or

not done and largely to override or even deride what the presenter him or herself

was doing, however politely. (p. 245)

The second problem they identified was the lack of common language and meaning for

many common psychoanalytic terms and concepts. Tuckett stated, that

whether emotions are generated by complex aspects of individual group

members' responses to the patient's pathology or by the emergence (through an

experience of hitherto suppressed differences) of hitherto unconscious implicit

ideas about how analysts should treat patients, there is a tendency for the work to

be undermined by moral judgments. (p. 246)

Overvision and the lack of common language prevented the group from doing its

comparison work.

Conceptual research in psychoanalysis.

In her book, *Conceptual Research in Psychoanalysis,* Dreher (1998/2000) situated

her discussion of the relevance of conceptual research in psychoanalysis within the

context of major topics relevant to psychoanalytic research including the relationship

between science and research, the nature-versus-human-sciences debate, the scientific

status of psychoanalysis, the type of data available for collection, the initial connection

that Freud identified between cure and research, the need for research in psychoanalysis

both beyond the single case study and in interdisciplinary research exchange. According

to Dreher, conceptual research in psychoanalysis is a type of research that focuses on the

"systematic clarification" (p. 3) and differentiation of psychoanalytic concepts. This is

achieved broadly by investigating the historical origins, context, and changes of a concept

and its current clinical use and is followed by a critical formulation and discussion

regarding suggestions for any possible new use and reconceptualization. Dreher

considered conceptual research in psychoanalysis not only as valid a form of research as

empirical research but also a complementary and interdependent methodology, as it

provides a systematic process of inquiry into the concepts investigated in empirical

research. She believed that empirical psychoanalytic "practice without psychoanalytic

concepts is blind" (p. 7) and that psychoanalytic concepts without empirical

psychoanalytic "practice are empty" (p. 7). She stated that conceptual research in

psychoanalysis aims (a) "to reconstruct the modifications of psychoanalytic concepts

throughout their historical development" (p. 17) in order to help psychoanalysts learn

from old mistakes and to preserve any elements currently valid in clinical practice; (b) to

integrate systematically the experiences of practitioners into psychoanalytic knowledge,

to capture the "direction of a conceptual change at an early stage" (p. 18), and to enable

researchers to present their suggestions for conceptual change; and (c) to clarify

psychoanalytic language systematically and consistently.

Dreher (1998/2000) talked about research methodologies in psychoanalysis and

called for integration. She emphasized the parallels that have been made between the

traditional single case study and literary analysis. For Dreher, conceptual research is a

valid research methodology that satisfies scientific standards and goes beyond the

investigation of the single case. In the context of the natural-versus-human-science

debate, Dreher discussed the fact that conceptual researchers do not confine valid and

scientific research to hypothesis testing only and do not restrict their definition of science

to specific "empirical or quantifying procedures" (p. 41).

Dreher (1998/2000) emphasized the importance of defining research and its scientific status systematically, in general, and more specifically, in psychoanalytic research. She stated, "Psychoanalysts claiming that the conjunction between cure and research has validity for their work should therefore at least specify what their understanding of research is" (pp. 40-41).

In the context of the type of data available for collection in a psychoanalytic situation, Dreher (1998/2000) differentiated (a) the "primary data" (p. 44) that arise directly from the exchange between analyst and analysand in the analytic hour; (b) "derived primary data" (p. 44) that the analyst derived from the primary data or the data selected by a third party from the primary data collected with technical aids; and (c) "extra-clinical data" (p. 45) such as reflections, and day- or night-dreams that the analyst gathered by analytic or other methods in his or her mind after the analytic hour. Dreher also discussed the idea of *on-line* and *off-line data* that have been presented in the literature (Moser, 1991). On-line data arise directly from the analytic hour, and off-line data is derived from the on-line data or processed retrospectively using tools "such as transcripts, video recordings, diaries" (p. 45).

Dreher (1998/2000) expanded on the different types of data she outlined earlier: primary data, derived primary data, and extra-clinical data. The description of primary data is already broader as it goes beyond the words that were exchanged in the analytic hour but includes nonverbal material such as affect, behavior, clothing, smells, and gross motor activity for both the patient and the analyst.

Dreher (1998/2000) emphasized the fact that psychoanalysis has historically been concerned with providing access to the data of the analytic hour to third parties, for

example, during supervision, case discussion and consultation, and through research

groups. She discussed the mistrust from empirical scientists about the reporting of data

from analysts for research purposes, because of a concern that the data might be

"contaminated" (p. 48) by conscious or unconscious distortions or the fear to report

obvious mistakes. The data that are deemed subjective, "epistemologically contaminated"

(p. 48), and unreliable in terms of empirical data are precisely the type of data that could

contain traces or marks of the unconscious and that need to be investigated or recognized

from a methodological perspective in the appropriate sector of psychoanalytic research.

These types of data can be used not *instead of* empirical, conceptual, or other

psychoanalytic research but *in addition*, because they too hold important keys to our

search for a better understanding of what it means to be human or of the human mind. In

a relevant side note, Dreher emphasized that if empirical scientists are concerned with the

contamination of the data in the process of the analysts' reporting, they might just as well

be wary of the possible contamination that might occur in the data reported by patients.

Dreher (1998/2000) discussed extraclinical data gathered outside the "analytic

situation to complement and confirm psychoanalytic theory through psychoanalytically

oriented procedures" (p. 51) as well as data gathered outside psychoanalytic theory. She

gave an example of Stern's (1985) data collection in his infant research, where he used a

methodological tool to reconstruct the infant's experience from a clinical perspective by

using "memories, present reenactment in the transference, and theoretically guided

interpretations" (p. 14) based on the data collected. Using these memories, reenactments,

and interpretations, Stern inferred the subjective life of the clinical infant and

reconstructed the infant's experience.

Dreher (1998/2000) gave two examples of conceptual research in psychoanalysis: the Hampstead Index Project and the Trauma Project. These projects are briefly described below.

The Hampstead Index Project.

Although, initially, the Hampstead Index Project was an unintentional research study, Dreher (1998/2000) believed it provided a good example of conceptual research because of its process and development. She described the Hampstead Index Project as starting in London in the early 1950s in the Hampstead Child Therapy clinic of the Hampstead War Nurseries, known today as the Anna Freud Center. The research efforts began with child analysts writing case studies about their cases with the intention of establishing an index for research and training purposes. "The aim was to create a comprehensive system of classification by ordering the analytic material schematically, comparable to a detailed subject index" (p. 100). The underlying intent was to both preserve the unique and individual qualities of each case, while creating an index providing a "common theoretical framework" (Bolland & Sandler, as cited in Dreher, 1998/2000, p. 100).

Dreher (1998/2000) reported that, for the indexing process, a working group was formed to select 50 case studies of child patients seen daily for psychoanalytic therapy. The treating analysts were asked to extract "units of observation" (p. 101) from their reports in collaboration with the members of the index working group. Subsequently, the index working group classified the data into (a) general case material organized by relevant categories such as background and biographical data; and (b) psychoanalytic material organized into clinical categories such as "Ego/General, . . . Ego/Anxiety,

Ego/Defense, Instinctual, Object Relationships, Phantasies, Superego, Symptoms, Treatment Situation, and Technique" (p. 103).

Dreher (1998/2000) described the initial process as including the treating analysts and the index working group struggling to find a common agreement as to what constituted a unit of observation. This step resulted in the formation of a concept group to clarify specific psychoanalytic concepts that caused problems during the indexing phase. After the indexing phase and once concepts were clarified, the Index was formalized in manuals. In this process, the analysts involved in the project realized that as new material was indexed, concepts needed continuous modification, enlargement, alteration, and redefinition, leading to a similar modification of related concepts. Dreher stated,

It had gradually proved to be irrefutable that the construction of an index to case material must be a continuous process, "a sort of progressive spiral" (Sandler, 1987, p. 317). The more exact the observations, the more precise and accentuated the concepts became—which, in good hermeneutic tradition, refined the researchers' perceptions for the assessment of clinical material. (p. 107)

Sandler's reference to a progressive spiral is comparable to the hermeneutic circle of philosophical hermeneutics, and this was the only time that Dreher referred to hermeneutics from a methodological perspective; her other references related to hermeneutic science in relation to debates about the scientific status of psychoanalysis.

The Trauma Project.

The Trauma Project—the investigation of the concept of psychic trauma that the Frankfurt Sigmund Freud Institute undertook in the 1980s—was the second example that Dreher (1998/2000) discussed in detail to illustrate the application of conceptual research.

The task of the Trauma Project was "to clarify the 'elastic meaning-space' of the concept of 'psychic trauma' as an example, whereby the aim was to stay close to the analytic practice while also taking into account implicit conceptualization" (p. 134). Given the lack of existing research methods to draw upon, the method used consisted of a literature review and analysis of the topic of psychic trauma in psychoanalysis, interviews of 10 experienced psychoanalysts by other experienced psychoanalysts, and an evaluation of the data gathered in the interviews, followed by a discussion in a project group. The research project culminated in "the elaboration of the 'dimensions of the meaning-space' of the trauma concept as well as suggestions on how to use the concept in a differentiated way" (p. 134).

As described by Dreher (1998/2000), using semistructured interviews, the experienced psychoanalyst investigators interviewed 10 experienced practicing psychoanalysts about the concept of psychic trauma. The practicing psychoanalysts were first asked to present three terminated trauma cases from their private practice. During this phase of the interview, the investigators did not ask direct questions about the concept of psychic trauma, and they carefully guided the interview discussions to allow for the elasticity of the concept to occur. During the dialog, the investigators referenced the theoretical thoughts that emerged in the literature-analysis research phase. The interview evolved into a dialog between the two experts about the aspects of the cases presented that revolved around trauma. Then the interviewees were asked to compare their three cases, and the discussion shifted to reflections about the specific trauma and the psychodynamics at play. As such, the dialog evolved from a "case-oriented to a

concept-oriented discussion" (p. 137). Each interview was audio recorded and transcribed in a 15-to-20-page verbatim protocol.

During the third phase, said Dreher (1998/2000) the project group evaluated each verbatim protocol in group discussions. The investigators drew upon the data gathered, the theoretical understanding derived from the literature analysis, and the psychoanalyst researchers' clinical experience and implicit knowledge. During this phase, the researchers paid close attention to the implicit conceptualizations that arose from the discussions between the investigators in the group.

Methodological steps to take implicit conceptualization into account in the research process.

One of the aim of the Trauma Project's research was to take into account implicit conceptualization, as far as possible, and according to Dreher (1998/2000), the Trauma research project group took into account the possible emergence of such implicit conceptualization both during the interview phase between the two experts and during the evaluation and discussion phase in the research group. Given that both the investigators and the interviewees were seasoned psychoanalysts, the investigators were aware of the likely emergence of implicit assumptions between them and the possibility that they might "fall back on a smoothed-over version of trauma" (p. 141). During the interview phase, the investigators therefore paid close attention to the development of the discussion and strived to probe the interviewees to discuss possible implicit assumptions explicitly. During the evaluation and discussion phase, implicit assumptions emerged between the investigators in the research group. Dreher compared the dynamic discussions that occurred in the group and the investigators' efforts to make the implicit

assumptions that emerged in the group more explicit to the "uncovering of unconscious material" (p. 145) during the psychoanalytic process. The researchers used the discussions in the group to bring to the surface and to clarify further their own implicit assumptions about the concept of trauma. Dreher emphasized the importance of having experienced psychoanalysts act as the investigators and researchers in the project, as their professional expertise was an integral tool in the research process.

Dreher (1998/2000) acknowledged the presence of implicit material and the rising of such implicit and possibly even unconscious material in the research process and discussed how the group worked through this material. She compared it with the process that takes place in psychoanalytic work when unconscious material is being uncovered, making the researchers' dialogue the first methodological discussion of nonconscious material and an example of the psychoanalytic field being acknowledged from a methodological perspective. Within the safety of the research group, a psychoanalytic field was created between each researcher and the topic as well as between the researchers or the group and the topic.

Dreher (1998/2000) reported that within the containment of the process of the research group, the group of investigators found it increasingly easier to converse back and forth on a specific item or a topic. As the group worked through reducing censorship and fostering an environment for discussions free of taboo and sanctions, the exchanges between the investigators became more fluid and spontaneous, and more implicit thoughts began to emerge. This process allowed for new ideas to arise, contributing to the clarification of the concepts. Dreher emphasized that this type of teamwork enabled a

creative process to develop similarly to the one psychoanalysts experience when they

work on the integration of clinical material with concepts.

Dreher (1998/2000) discussed the challenging conditions required to create a

research environment conducive to this type of creative research process:

> If they succeed in showing to advantage their respective characteristics and
>
> experiences and in allowing their creative abilities to unfold; if they succeed in
>
> not bringing into play their position of power in situations of conflict but are able
>
> to provoke, to bear, and possibly to resolve contradiction and confrontation in
>
> discourse, then the boundary between what is conscious and what is preconscious,
>
> what is explicit and what is implicit may become more permeable, and aspects
>
> that were initially hidden may be conceptualized and, lastly, be put into words.
>
> (p. 147)

In Dreher's discussion of the concept "implicit" (p. 168) that emerged in the Trauma

Project, she emphasized that, although implicit and unconscious are not mutually

exclusive, they are not the same. She clarified that the concept *implicit* in the conceptual

research methodology she discussed, particularly in terms of the Trauma Project, did not

include the dynamic unconscious. Dreher also emphasized that if a research project's

intent was to investigate the dynamic unconscious processes at play, then the researcher

would need to expand the methodological steps taken from the social sciences "by

including data collection and evaluation procedures suited to understanding unconscious

processes" (p. 169). She suggested integrating into the methodology elements from

psychoanalytic methods such as supervision and personal analysis. She advised that the

type of methodological step and tool added to such an investigation process would

greatly depend upon the investigators' conceptions of the dynamic unconscious and should equally be made explicit in the methodology.

Exploring the relation between clinical practice and the development of theory.

According to Canestri et al. (2006), a popular trend in psychoanalytic research in the 1980s was to explore ways to integrate psychoanalysis with alternative theories in an effort to evaluate the unification of psychoanalytic theories and compatibility of various theoretical points of view. The author identified Wallerstein as a major contributor of research in this domain. Canestri observed that theoretical concepts were not placed in the context of clinical practice, which compelled Canestri (2006) to reflect on the following questions: "Does their [psychoanalyst's] work faithfully reflect an official theory to which they claim adherence? Or do they integrate concepts deriving from different theories, or create new ones, usually preconsciously?" (p. 1). Canestri et al. (2006) began to look at the process by which a clinical practice gained theoretical status and became integrated into a theory. Canestri et al. posited that psychoanalytic research needed to expand its methodologies and create new ones because it was missing a systematic way to investigate and analyze the relation between theory and clinical practice. He believed that psychoanalysis lacked formal research instruments to investigate the impact of clinical practice on the development of theories, particularly the way in which analysts use "implicit, private, or preconscious theories" (p. 2) often without awareness.

Canestri (2006) discussed his team's development of an appropriate research instrument, "*a map of private implicit, preconscious theories in clinical practice*" (p. 2),

which was created by the European Psychoanalytic Federation's Working Party on

Theoretical Issues, a working group focused on conceptual analysis. The intent of this

instrument was to analyze thoroughly what happened in clinical practice in order to link

that information to the development of theories. An essential tenet that guided the

development of this instrument was the belief in the validity of Sandler's (1983) idea that

the analysts' "implicit, private, preconscious theories guide their real clinical practice"

(p. 4). One concern that motivated the research related to the problem between clinical

practice and theory and the need to establish a scientific instrument to formulate how

implicit theories affected clinical experience and how clinical practice directly

contributed to the further development of theories.

Canestri (2006) reported that the instrument was called the *Map* and was

developed out of the work of a group whose task was to analyze real clinical material.

The Map could be summarized by this formula: theory = "public-based thinking + private

theoretical thinking + the interaction of private- and public-based thinking (the implicit

use of explicit theory)" (p. 4). The Map was organized around six dimensions—

"topographical, conceptual, action, objection relations of knowledge, coherence versus

contradictions, and developmental" (p. 4)—each of which contained different

subsections.

Canestri (2006) emphasized the relevance of the "analyst's unconscious

phantasies" (p. 6) and the role they play in the development of theories. The research

team's members, Canestri, Bohleber, Denis, and Fonagy (2006), discussed several

aspects of the "complex subjective" (p. 30) activities at play in the preconscious theories

of the analyst, which he or she might rely on and refer to implicitly: the "common way of

thinking about human subjectivity" (p. 31) shared by both analyst and patient, the setting

or frame, the influence of the theoretical concepts the analyst chooses to use or not to use,

the analyst's loyalty to particular theories and their manifestations, and the use of

metaphors in the way the analyst listens to the patient and makes interpretations.

Canestri et al. (2006) addressed the unconscious processes that influence the way

analysts use theories and provided the following examples: repressed ideation, splitting of

theory, and theory as resistance. *Repressed ideation* might occur when an analyst uses

theory as a projection or shield against emotions that emerge in the analytic field and as a

way to reduce their impact and the discomfort the analyst experiences. *Splitting of theory*

might occur if an analyst uses a theoretical concept but does not believe in it, and a

splitting between theoretical knowledge (p. 35) and action emerges. *Theory as resistance*

occurs when the analyst uses theory to reduce his or her own anxiety instead of

"producing something new in the patient's mind" (p. 35). The unconscious processes of

the analyst can also influence his or her analytic writing, as described by Ogden (2005).

Psychoanalytic writing.

Ogden's (2005) article, "On Psychoanalytic Writing," provided important

reflections about the place of dynamic unconscious processes in analytic writing. Ogden

described analytic writing as a literary genre that consists of relating an analytic

experience in scholarly writing, while combining and weaving in psychoanalytic

theoretical ideas. For Ogden, this type of writing is a process involving both

interpretation and art and the linking of an "analytic idea (developed in a scholarly

manner) with an analytic experience" (p. 15). Paying particular attention to language, he

discussed conscious and unconscious processes that occur in the course of writing. Ogden

described this process as entering into a "psychological state of writing" (p. 15), which is both a "meditation and a wrestling match with language" (p. 15). In this space, a dynamic conversation could occur between the writer's *thoughts* about the experience of a clinical encounter he is trying to relate and the *words* and *style* he or she is choosing to describe and recreate that experience in a written form. Ogden compared this process to the art of literary writing and the writing of fiction and its use of imagination.

Referring to his own writing process, Ogden (2005) said he resorts to the use of metaphors, reverie, and meditation. He said that although he cannot specifically "say an experience" (p. 20), he is able to "say what an experience was like" (p. 20) using metaphors, which allow him to maintain a dialog between the lived experience and the written description of that experience. Ogden stated that the state he enters while working and reworking his writing is comparable to the experience of reverie that he enters when he works with patients in the analytic hour. He said,

> When in a "state of writing," I am in a heightened state of receptivity to unconscious experience while, at the same time, bringing to bear on the experience an ear for how I may be able to make literary use of what I am thinking and feeling. (p. 22)

He warned, however, that this state should not be romanticized, and he emphasized that this process is demanding and arduous.

The various conscious and unconscious processes that Ogden described in his analytic writing, particularly the paradox caused by the challenge of using words to express a nonverbal experience, are also related to hermeneutics whereby an experience is to be translated into words. When something nonverbal is to be described, the process

of translating the experience into words should not lose the core substance of the initial

experience.

Chapter 5

Discussion

This chapter presents a synthesis of the findings presented in the previous chapter

and integrates them using the diagram in Figure 3, "circle of research methods with

uroboros" (circle of research), introduced in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. The research

in psychoanalysis reviewed in the previous chapter is placed on the circle of research, and

the complementary relationships of the natural science, human science, hermeneutic

science, and science of the soul traditions are discussed.

Circle of Research Methods

Figure 3. Circle of research methods with uroboros (Figure 2, repeated).

Configured by the author, from an unpublished lecture presented in the

course, Depth Psychological Research Methods, by R. Romanyshyn,

2012, Pacifica Graduate Institute, Carpinteria, CA.

In reference to the circle of research methods discussed in the literature review

chapter of this dissertation, when psychoanalysis is studied in the tradition of natural

science, the researcher is removed from the research process, and there is no place for

dynamic unconscious processes in the methodologies. Although reviewing the existing

literature of psychoanalytic research conducted in the natural science tradition is beyond

the scope of this dissertation, the work of researchers such as Wallerstein (2006, 2009),

Stern (2000), and Eagle (2013) referenced in previous chapters can be placed in the

natural science quadrant of the circle of research, The methodologies used for this type of

research rely on quantitative research methods and the scientific method of natural

science.

When psychoanalysis is approached from the human science perspective, the

researcher's presence is acknowledged, and its resulting influence is bracketed out of the

research process. Subjective processes encountered by the researcher are acknowledged

in these methodologies, but they are bracketed out of the research process. When

psychoanalysis is researched from a hermeneutics perspective, the research is centered on

interpretation and understanding. The presence of the researcher, who has become

encircled (Romanyshyn, 2012) is fundamental and intrinsically a part of the research

process. When psychoanalysis is researched in the tradition of the science of the soul, the

researcher not only becomes an integral and active participant in the research process, but

his or her presence is also vital to the work. This tradition validates the presence and

subjective aspects of the dynamic unconscious in research and calls for the researcher to

examine such dynamics in his or her work.

Discussion of Dreher's idea of conceptual research.

Several methodological steps used in conceptual research (Dreher, 1998/2000),

including indexing and semi-structured interviews, can be placed in the human science

tradition. Conceptual research in psychoanalysis can also be placed in the hermeneutic science tradition because of the recognition that this type of research involves a continuous process analogous to a progressive spiral (Sandler, 1987), a methodological step reminiscent of the hermeneutic circle taken from philosophical hermeneutics. The group process described by Dreher (1998/2000), which took implicit conceptualizations into account and in which the researchers acknowledged the presence of implicit material at a preconscious level, belongs in the tradition of the science of the soul. Although not used in the research that she described, Dreher proposed the possibility of integrating elements of the psychoanalytic method, including supervision and personal analysis, as additional methodological steps to acknowledge dynamic unconscious processes in future research.

In her discussion of different types of data available for collection in psychoanalytic research, Dreher (1998/2000) listed primary data, which includes words and nonverbal material such as affect, behavior, smells, and gross motor activity gathered during the analytic hour. This type of primary data belongs to the natural, human, and hermeneutic research paradigm. When thinking about data from the perspective of a science of the soul, keeping unconscious processes in mind, other types of primary data emerge within the psychoanalytic field, including images that arise for the patient and those that arise for the analyst, synchronicities, the analyst's day-dreaming and reverie, and dreams reported by the patient and those of the analyst whether disclosed or undisclosed. Countertransference becomes a research tool for the online researcher during the analytic hour. Similarly, the "extra-clinical data" (p. 45) also includes data that the analyst has gathered in his or her mind after the analytic hour, such as reflections,

day-dreams, and night-dreams. This is the kind of data that arise during the work that takes place for the off-line researcher, outside of the analytic hour. This type of data would also include reflections, thoughts, and images arising as a result of supervision and case consultations. As Dreher reported, the extraclinical data gathered in Stern's infant research, which included memories, reenactments, and interpretations inferring the subjective life of infants, validated the importance of subjective data in gaining more understanding in this area.

Discussion of Tuckett et al.'s research.

Throughout my reading of *Psychoanalysis Comparable and Incomparable: The Evolution of a Method to Describe and Compare Psychoanalytic Approaches* (Tuckett et al., 2008), it became clear that I have been trained to look at research through the lens of the scientific method, which is a linear and methodical process. I usually look for the aim and type of the research, the person or group who has conducted the research, whether there are participants, the method used, the findings or results, a discussion about the findings, and the conclusion. From the above-mentioned perspective, the researcher defines the frame and parameters of the research in advance, and the method chosen does not change during the course of the research. In the case of Tuckett et al's (2008) research project, the process was different. This might be due in part to the fact that the research project had two main aims: (a) to compare the different ways in which psychoanalysts do psychoanalysis (and all the sub-aims related to this) and (b) to create a research method for comparing such differences. It is as though there were two research projects conducted at the same time.

In my reading process, I felt confused at times because I could not clearly identify if the group of psychoanalysts who participated in the workshops were the participants in the study or if they were the investigators. My comprehension in this regard depended on whether I considered the aim of the study to be the development of a research method or the understanding and comparison of the explanatory models of psychoanalysts who are doing psychoanalysis today. This observation paralleled the clinical process of psychoanalysis, as the investigators were both participants and observers in the process, given the dual aim of the research project to develop a research method and to further an understanding of how psychoanalysts do psychoanalysis.

Additionally, when I reached the last two chapters of Tuckett et al.'s (2008) book, I realized that this first volume only included a small sample of the findings of their project, as the final results and conclusions will be published separately. The first volume therefore did not describe the process by which the investigators will analyze the data collected in the group process. As the reader, I was therefore missing information about a significant step in the methodology used for data analysis, and I did not know if the moderator, the group, or the members of the working party would perform this step.

Tuckett (2008c) emphasized that the two-step method "looked at the preconscious model rather than the dynamically unconscious one" (p. 248). He continued:

> The question of what analysts might be considered really to know, understood from the framework of their implicit dynamically unconscious theories, is an interesting one. But in this project we want to distinguish and compare various modes of trying to work psychoanalytically and later to debate them; we are not trying to explain why an analyst chooses to use the approach he does. (p. 248)

From this statement, the intent is clear that the dynamic unconscious was not to be addressed in the research project. Given the many discussions regarding the group dynamics, including the process of overvision and the emergence of emotions, it seems that unconscious processes that arose were bracketed out of the research project.

The research project conducted by Tuckett et al. (2008) contained methodological steps that belong to the human science, the hermeneutic science, and the science of the soul traditions. The use and modification of grounded theory as the basis for the development of their unique research method was borrowed from the human science paradigm. The aim of the project to maintain a dynamic process allowing for a flexible and fluid development of a research method, which was never to be rigid but to be allowed to continue to evolve in an experiential manner mirroring the psychoanalytic process, places it in the hermeneutics science paradigm. The acknowledgment and recognition of preconscious processes as valid data in the group work can be placed in the tradition of the science of the soul. Tuckett et al.'s project is a valid example of how research methods from the human sciences, in this case grounded theory, can be adapted to the specific research needs of psychoanalysis.

Discussion of Canestri et al.'s research.

In line with Freud's notion of *Junktim* and the conjunction of cure and research, the development of the Map (Canestri et al., 2006) as a research instrument to explore the relation between clinical practice and theory was an example of research in psychoanalysis where implicit, private, and preconscious processes are taken seriously in terms of their presence and role in the psychoanalytic process in the consulting room. When psychoanalysis is considered a research method, however, the researcher is both

observer and observed. Subsequently, there is an additional methodological step that

needs to happen in order to make public the process that the researcher undergoes in the

research process. Canestri et al. stopped at the preconscious level and did not include

methodological steps to acknowledge the dynamic unconscious.

   Canestri et al. (2006) used the word *implicit* to describe the private and

preconscious theories and their development out of clinical practice. They said that the

word *implicit* can include conscious and preconscious assumptions, which could also be

influenced by the unconscious, and that the preconscious has roots in the dynamic

unconscious. Similarly to Dreher (1998/2000) and Tuckett et al. (2008), Canestri et al.

(2006) focused on preconscious processes and removed the dynamic unconscious from

the research paradigm. If it is understood, however, that preconscious processes have

roots in the dynamic unconscious, how can the former be removed or bracketed from the

research process? In Canestri et al.'s examples, dynamic unconscious influences were

defined as negative and included processes such as repression, splitting, and resistance—

defense mechanisms—that were to be bracketed out. They made no mention of dynamic

unconscious processes such as reverie and day-dreaming as recognized by Bion,

"instruments for dreaming, feeling, and thinking" (Ferro, 2009, p. 209), or the use of any

images or thoughts arising unconsciously that are seen as being in the service of the work

in the analytic hour.

   Canestri et al. (2006) were proponents of the need to develop new research

methods in psychoanalysis. Their Map of private implicit and preconscious theories in

clinical practice was based on the belief in the validity of these theories as proposed by

Sandler (1987) and is another example of research conducted in psychoanalysis that can

be placed in the human science, the hermeneutic science, and the science of the soul

quadrants of the circle of research.

Discussion of Ogden's process of psychoanalytic writing.

Ogden's (2005) process of psychoanalytic writing can be placed in the

hermeneutics science and in the science of the soul quadrants of the circle of research.

Several aspects of Ogden's discussion of psychoanalytic writing support the idea that a

field is created between a researcher and his or her research topic. Ogden's descriptions

of the use of metaphors, reverie, and the dream world outline the steps he took to enter

the analytic field that is created between him and the topic of his writing. He called his

immersion in this field a "state of writing" (p. 23). He acknowledged the presence of

dynamic unconscious processes and a meditation that occurs with the "wrestling" (p. 15)

with language in trying to translate an analytic experience into words while linking it to

psychoanalytic concepts.

Ogden (2005) defined analytic writing as a literary genre specific to the process

such writers undergo when they work with words to convey as closely as possible their

experience in the consulting room with the analysand. Although Ogden argued that

analytic writing is a literary genre, this type of writing corresponds well to Romanyshyn's

(2007) alchemical hermeneutics in terms of a methodology that takes into account

dynamic unconscious processes and can be further integrated into psychoanalytic

research methodologies. The paradox that the analytic experience does not come to one in

words and that it must be transformed through the act of imagination into words that can

approximate the analytic experience to the reader is a cornerstone of the development of a

field in research. Words become a medium to recreate the experience. Imagination

combined with conscious and unconscious thinking and processes are the catalysts for that transformation to take place. Corbin's (1984/1995) idea of *mundus imaginalis* comes to mind, including the "order of reality" (p. 2) pertaining to imagination which is considered an organ of perception in Sufi mysticism and Islamic culture.

Ogden's (2005) article about psychoanalytic writing resonates with Green's (2005) belief that psychoanalysts who were also writers developed their personal style of thinking in their writing process, which Green called a "theoretical psychoanalytic process" (p. 16). Green described the psychoanalyst's writing process as a place of "inter-subjective exchange of the unconscious" (p. 16). He described the writer attempting to put activities and situations into words as being challenged due to the "linearity of written language" (p. 320). He believed that the unconscious plays a role in the psychoanalyst's writing process and that he or she is engaged in a process of containment.

I believe that this process is present in any type of research writing, as the process of research is a conversation, at one level, between a writer and his or her text and, at another level, between the reader and the text. I would call the space in which the conversation occurs the *field of writing*, for any type of writing process, or the *field of research writing*, for the writing that occurs in the process of research. In this dynamic and spiral-like process, conversations take place between the writer, the reader, and the text.

Discussion of Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin's psychoanalytic research model.

Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin (2003) presented a model of psychoanalytic research (modified from an original diagram by Moser, 1992) as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Psychoanalytic research. Adapted from "Pluralism and unity in psychoanalytic research: Some introductory remarks" (p. 16) by M. Leuzinger-Bohleber, and D. Burgin, in M. Leuzinger-Bohleber, A. U. Dreher, & J. Canestri (eds.), *Pluralism and unity? Methods of research in psychoanalysis,* 2003, London, England: Karnac Books & International Psychoanalytical Association. Reprinted with permission.

In this model, the authors made an essential differentiation between clinical psychoanalytic research based on Freud's notion of *Junktim*, which happens in the clinical hour, and extraclinical research conducted outside of the clinical hour using empirical research designs. The left side of the model depicts clinical psychoanalytic research by showing the relationship between theoretical models, concepts, the use of metaphors, and individual theories. The model indicates different dialogs at play: (a) between the analyst's private and official use of theoretical models and concepts, which

happen at the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious levels; and (b) the analyst's use of metaphors and individual theories to work with the patient's unconscious processes.

The right side of the figure shows extraclinical research or empirical research conducted outside the psychoanalytic situation. Arrows indicate the dialectic relationship between extraclinical research and clinical research, as empirical research is based on the processes and findings of clinical research. This figure demonstrates the authors' idea that theory and empirical observation cannot be separated. After prolonged debates, the IPA concluded that empirical psychoanalytic research should be built on clinical psychoanalytic research under the following four conditions:

> (1) any effort at validation must be rooted in the history of psychoanalytic clinical thought, (2) the evaluation of process should originate in the subjective and intuitive judgment of engaged and experienced analyst, (3) evaluation should be corroborated by consultants using the time honoured methods of peer review and supervision, and (4) only then would these essentially clinical procedure receive external validity through the study of recorded texts. (Freedman, Lasky, & Hurvich, as cited in Leuzinger-Bohleber & Burgin, 2003, p. 19)

Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin discussed the importance of grounding empirical research in psychoanalysis out of clinical research and emphasized the equally important feedback loop in which the insights gained from such empirical research "find their way back to clinical psychoanalytic research and clinical practice and have a stimulating effect there" (p. 20). The authors referred to Beenen's emphasis on the challenge of integrating such new knowledge back into the clinical situation because of theoretical tenets such as Bion's (1963, 1965) idea that analysts should enter the psychoanalytic

situation without memory and desire and the difficult tension that analysts continuously confront between knowing and not-knowing.

Notably, Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin (2003) used the term *circle of research* in the discussion of their psychoanalytic research figure (p. 17), based on the circular dialog between clinical research and extraclinical research. When applied to research methods in psychoanalysis, the circle of research (Romanyshyn, 2012) complements the model depicted in Figure 4 by adding a broader view of research in psychoanalysis because it includes methodologies beyond those conceptualized in Figure 4. The circle and dialogs depicted in Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin's (2003) model are linked to the relevance of dialog in the circle of research discussed in this dissertation; the image of the uroboros, which symbolizes the connection between the science of the soul and the natural science perspective; and the need for a dialog between the various research methodologies in general and, more importantly, between the natural sciences and the other perspectives.

Integration of the Circle of Research for Psychoanalytic Research

When conducting research *on* psychoanalysis (Perron, 2003; Widlöcher, 2003), researchers study the content of psychoanalysis, such as the efficacy of treatment, outcome, therapeutic techniques, and the functioning of institutions. The natural and human science traditions provide methodologies well geared toward providing explanations and furthering our understanding of these issues. When the focus of research shifts to research *in* psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis becomes a research tool, and the hermeneutic science and science of the soul traditions provide methodologies that allow for the exploration of the analytic process.

In moving around the circle of research, from the natural and human traditions to the hermeneutic and science of the soul traditions, implicit, preconscious, and finally dynamic unconscious processes progressively regain validity in the research process. When considering research methods in psychoanalysis through the lens of the modified circle of research, the various debates in psychoanalysis—including the relationship between science and research, the nature versus human sciences debate, and the scientific status of psychoanalysis—reviewed in earlier chapters appear in a new light and gain new meaning because they become integral parts of the same whole. These dichotomies disappear as it becomes clear that research needs to be conducted from the perspectives of all four main paradigms: natural science, human science, hermeneutic science, and science of the soul. Research *on* psychoanalysis needs to be conducted using quantitative and qualitative research methods just as much as research *in* psychoanalysis using research methods adapted from hermeneutic science and the science of the soul.

Instead of being in opposition, the apparent methodological differences of these approaches become complementary. The argument that common ground is necessary in terms of theoretical concepts (Zepf, 2009; Wallerstein, 1998, 2002) ceases to be an issue when conceptual research (Dreher, 1998/2000), for example, is recognized as a valid research method to gain more understanding in that area. Conceptual research (Dreher, 1998/2000) is an essential example of the validity of research outside of the natural science paradigm that demonstrates the relevance and need for a dialog and integration between natural science and human science perspectives, because each tradition brings in a different perspective on the study of psychoanalysis, each as relevant and valid as the other. These considerations apply equally to the hermeneutic and science of the soul

traditions, as they provide ground for new understanding and valid research. It is striking, for example, how the conjunction of cure and research and the belief in psychoanalysis as an instrument of research relate to the coexistence of the researcher as part of the research project, as proposed by Romanyshyn's (2007) alchemical hermeneutics and his reflections about the place of the researcher in the research process.

The circle of research enables looking at research in general and psychoanalytic research, in particular, from a broader perspective that transcends and goes beyond the scientific method model. This perspective also enables thinking about psychoanalysis as a science in broader terms, beyond the natural science paradigm, and reinforces the idea that science does not have to be confined to the natural or even the human science models but can be expanded upon to include the hermeneutic science and the science of the soul.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Chapter 4 of this dissertation presented a discussion of recent research conducted in the field of psychoanalysis that took into consideration preconscious and implicit processes in their research methodologies, including Tuckett et al.'s (2008) development and evolution of a research method to describe and compare psychoanalytic approaches, conceptual research such as the Hampstead Index Project and the Trauma Project (Dreher, 1998/2000), and Canestri et al.'s (2006) map of private, implicit, preconscious theories. Faced with the lack of existing research methods in psychoanalysis to address their specific questions, these researchers developed new research methods, some of which were based on methods taken from the social sciences (i.e., grounded theory).

Each study explicitly excluded dynamic unconscious processes from their methodology. Although he did not present a research methodology per se, Ogden's (2005) discussion of psychoanalytic writing explicitly acknowledged, recognized, and included dynamic unconscious processes. In the case of Dreher's (1998/2000) conceptual research, the presence of dynamic unconscious processes was recognized and acknowledged but was set aside for future investigation. In their psychoanalytic research model, Leuzingber-Bohleber and Burgin (2003) acknowledged the presence of preconscious and unconscious processes in the clinical research, which is the research that happens in the clinical hour, based on Freud's concept of *Junktim*, but they restricted extraclinical research that occurs outside the consulting room to the natural science paradigm and therefore did not make room for unconscious processes from a methodological perspective.

Because the idea of the unconscious as dynamic process and experience is so central to psychoanalysis, the field needs to continue considering, discussing, and integrating such processes into its research methodologies. The natural science paradigm that currently dominates research and clinical treatments in psychology and in psychoanalysis is centered on the fundamental assumption that science is only valid from the scientific method perspective (Kuhn, 1962; Madison, 1990; Romanyshyn, 2007). This view of science and research, however, needs to be challenged (Kuhn, 1962; Madison, 1990). As discussed in earlier chapters, although the natural science tradition has its essential place, it is also limited and incomplete, and therefore, new methodologies need to be developed.

This chapter circles back to the question of the place of the unconscious in research in psychoanalysis by first discussing science beyond the natural science paradigm, science as a way to interpret the world, the pre-Cartesian worldview, and the paradigm shift that has occurred in research in psychology. Further discussion focuses on the need to expand the science paradigm and to continue to develop new research methodologies suited to the specific research demands of psychoanalysis. Theoretical elements that could be used and incorporated in research in psychoanalysis are discussed from a hermeneutics and science of the soul paradigm, including negative capability, field and *third areas*, analytic field theory, and Bion's model of the mind. The chapter concludes with the proposition that several theoretical concepts of analytic field theory be used and applied to develop a new research method in psychoanalysis, grounded in hermeneutics science and science of the soul, that would make room for dynamic unconscious processes.

Beyond the Natural Science Paradigm

In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn (1962) challenged the modern view of science and the notion that it developed through the linear accumulation of individual discoveries and inventions. He argued that science textbooks at that time were misleading because of their portrayal of science as a set of observations, laws, and theories, and demonstrated that the scientific community of mature sciences had historically leaned on these fundamental assumptions. Kuhn showed a relationship between these assumptions and the way students were being taught and prepared for professional practice in a given field, thereby perpetuating these assumptions about science.

Kuhn (1962) defined a scientific revolution as the process by which a given science shifted its fundamental assumptions. He explained that these revolutions were characterized by the scientific community's rejection of a previously established theory "in favor of another incompatible with it" (p. 6). On the one hand, Kuhn stated that each scientific revolution "transformed the scientific imagination" (p. 6) and the scientific world of that field. On the other, he also found that in the process of scientific development, some novelties were discarded because they disputed fundamental assumptions previously established. Kuhn believed that outdated theories should not necessarily be considered unscientific just because they have been rejected. Furthermore, he stated that research methods grounded in natural science were insufficient to address the various types of scientific questions that arise in the process of research.

Kuhn's (1962) reference to a scientific imagination showed how science and research include a subjective, fluid, and dynamic process that is often omitted, denied,

and forgotten in favor of an all encompassing view of objectivity. Kuhn showed the

dynamic process at work by which a new theory is assimilated into science, resulting in

the restructuring of the fabric of the fundamental assumptions and theories of that field.

Madison (1990) described science as a creative process because "human understanding is

creative" (p. 21). This idea is reminiscent of the hermeneutic circle and the impact of the

assimilation of scientific facts to particular fields but also to the larger scientific

community. Kuhn's (1962) argument relates well to the circle of research presented

earlier and the notion that science goes beyond the natural science paradigm. His ideas

also relate to the importance of explicitly defining the various assumptions that are

followed in research methods in general and in those that are used or created in

psychoanalytic research.

Madison (1990) called Kuhn's (1962) work a "historical-hermeneutical" (p. 17)

analysis, prompting a challenge to the traditional view of science and an expansion of the

natural science paradigm. Madison agreed that the natural science paradigm does not

provide access to "absolute reality and truth" (p. 17) and emphasized the need to shift and

rethink "the traditional paradigm of scientific objectivity and the traditional notions of

truth and reality" (p. 18). Madison's proposition of a reconsideration of the Cartesian

division of objectivity and subjectivity in light of scientific paradigms leads this

discussion back to the circle of research and the relevance of adding and integrating

existing research paradigms while staying open to the possibility and the process of

integrating yet unknown paradigms in the future.

Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin (2003) argued that the idealization of the natural

science paradigm included the idea of absolute truth and a denial of the epistemological

differences of other disciplines. I would add that this idealization also indicates a denial of other research methodologies practiced in the scientific disciplines outside of the natural science paradigm. Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin discussed the "myth of science" and the fact that some researchers are examining the "unconscious roots of idealized terms of science like 'objectivity' and 'efficiency'" (p. 4). These research areas are in line with the topic of this dissertation in terms of the importance of continuing to understand humanity's fascination with absolute truth and objective knowledge and to make room for more subjective, albeit not less valid, phenomena.

Science as a Way to Interpret the World

In his critique of Hirsch's notion of validity, Madison (1990) stated that Kuhn showed science to be understood as a "way in which human beings interpret the world" (p. 16). Madison stated,

> As David Carr remarks: "The scientific conception must be regarded as a view of the world, a certain way of looking at it and dealing with it which serves certain purposes." The "objective" world of science is but an interpretation of the world of our immediate experience, the life-world, which transcends, or precedes, all objectivistic as well as all subjectivistic categories. (p. 44)

As one interprets the world, the world becomes more meaningful, revealing new aspects to interpret in a dynamic process.

Madison (1990) discussed the idea that the lens through which scientists view the world determines our perception of the world and determines what that world, our world, is. As the development of research methods to interpret the world continues, new aspects of the world are revealed, prompting the development of other research methodologies.

Madison emphasized Kuhn's idea that, as scientific paradigms shift, not only human

beings' understanding of the world changes but also the "world itself changes with them"

(p. 111). For Madison (1990), the way a scientist chooses to view science is intricately

linked to what the scientist sees, which circles back to the notion that the observer

impacts what is observed, and the way in which scientists view the world determines

others' perception of the world. Interpretation cannot be ignored, because it is embedded

in human nature to look at phenomena and the world, and it has its proper place in

scientific inquiry from a hermeneutic science and science of the soul perspective.

The Pre-Cartesian Worldview

Schwartz-Salant (1998) provided a historical overview of the world before

Cartesian thinking and modern science that is relevant to this discussion of the need to

expand science beyond the natural science paradigm. He pointed out that the emergence

of modern science and the "Reformation's attacks on the role of imagination" (p. 9)

precipitated the suppression of alchemy. With the emergence of the natural science

paradigm, in which nature is to be understood in causal terms, the world was to be

viewed more rationally and less imaginatively, and the natural science paradigm became

predominant.

Schwartz-Salant (1998) stated that since the 17th century, the tradition of alchemy

has been replaced by modern science, which turned to objectivity and causality, and a rift

occurred in the relationship between matter and the "psychology of the experimenter"

(p. 10). In modern science, the transformation of the subject was understood from an

external perspective, whereas in alchemy, this transformation was understood as taking

place in the *imagination*, "an area of imaginal discourse" (p. 10), the third area between

"the inner reality of the alchemist and the outer reality of the matter to be transformed"

(p. 10). The alchemists called this area where the inner and outer reality join the "subtle

body," a space that is "neither material nor spiritual" (p. 10) but depends on both. Since

the Cartesian split between mind and body, in particular, this intermediary domain of the

imagination or subtle body has been no longer acknowledged in human consciousness.

Schwartz-Salant (1998) believed that alchemy was a "system of transformation"

based on the assumption that "change was part of an interaction between subject and

object in which both were transformed" (p. 10). The modern scientist, armed with

objective principles and causal equations, understood the world through the lens of order,

and the scientific method of inquiry replaced the alchemist and the metaphor of

transformation. Schwartz-Salant emphasized that scientific logic and that of alchemy are

not better or worse than the other but rather represent fundamentally different systems of

thinking and of understanding the world. He believed that the alchemical metaphor of

transformation could be a gift to present-day science particularly in understanding the

"mystery of the psyche and its transformation" (p. 14) or what it means to be human.

The integration or coexistence of a scientific approach grounded in Cartesian

thought with science rooted in the alchemical metaphor of transformation is particularly

useful to this discussion of methods used in clinical psychology research and

psychoanalytic research in particular. This brings me back to the circle of research and

the place where the science of the soul connects back to the natural science, the area

where alchemical thought and processes in the science of the soul, and the natural science

paradigm integrate.

Scientists and researchers carry an ethical responsibility as to the way they perceive the nature of their research, the way in which they conduct research, and what research method they choose for their study. Looking at research from the perspective of methodology, I am proposing to challenge the established research methods and continue to develop new methodologies in order to expand the paradigms through which to view the world and psychological phenomena in particular. Following Kuhn (1962), Madison (1990), and Schwartz-Salant (1998), I am proposing that there are other ways to look at or investigate phenomena, and the fact that many of these other ways fall outside of the natural science paradigm does not render them unscientific.

A Paradigm Shift in Research in Psychology

In his book, *Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development,* Schore (1994) proposed to integrate psychoanalytic views of the unconscious mind into developmental science. Later, he wrote that "emotion is central to a deeper understanding of the human condition, and . . . unconscious processes lie at the core of the self, throughout the life span" (2012, p. 2). From his 2009 APA presentation, Schore reiterated the paradigm shift in which theory and research in psychology changed from "left brain conscious cognition to right brain unconscious affect" (p. 3). He observed that this paradigm shift occurred in psychology as well as across other disciplines. Schore emphasized the importance of psychology's consistent engagement in dialog with other disciplines, particularly biological sciences, and reiterated the importance of researchers and clinicians working cohesively together.

Schore (2012) observed an important paradigm shift in psychology in the past 4 decades, from behavior, to cognition, to bodily-based emotions. He pointed out that in the

1960s and '70s, psychology was focused on behavior, and treatments were centered on behavior modification, segregating the brain, the body, emotions, drives, and the unconscious from scientific investigation. He then noted that in the 1970s and '80s, scientific inquiry in psychology shifted to not only behavior but also "internal cognitive processes (e.g., memory, attention, perception, representational schemas, consciousness, and language)" (p. 4).

Schore (2012) explained that research and clinical investigations are currently shifting to incorporate emotions and psychobiological states. He stated, "Because the brain's emotional processing is extremely rapid and occurs beneath levels of conscious awareness, the focus of both clinical and research observations has shifted from explicit to implicit phenomena" (p. 4). Schore's research and clinical model integrated all psychological aspects—behavior, cognition, and emotions—as well as conscious and unconscious affective states of brain, mind, and body. He observed that this paradigm shift provided a way to bridge the Cartesian gap that has historically divided psychiatry and psychology.

Schore (2012) suggested that research in psychology has been dominated by the functions of the left hemisphere, which include "verbal, conscious, rational, and social information processing" (p. 7) functions. He emphasized that development and psychotherapy are dominated by "implicit, non-conscious survival functions" (p. 7) of the right hemisphere. He suggested that the majority of the therapist's knowledge "that accumulates with clinical experience is implicit, [and] operates at rapid, unconscious levels" (p. 7). In their work, therapists rely on right-hemisphere processes such as intersubjectivity, empathy, compassion, humor, and creativity. Schore further stated,

With respect to the paradigm shift toward relationally oriented psychotherapy,

clinical interpersonal neurobiological models of therapeutic change are now

moving from left brain to right brain, from the mind to the body, and from the

central to the autonomic nervous system. (p. 8)

Given the current availability and abundance of data in psychology, it is necessary to

evaluate the clinical meaning and relevance of the information gathered in research and

its conceptualization across disciplines.

Schore (2012) suggested the need to develop an "overarching theoretical

perspective that can integrate, synthesize, and make meaning out of the psychological-

functional and biological-structural patterns embedded in the massive amount of data the

mental health and life sciences are now generating" (p. 10). He also explained that

clinicians are recognizing the limits of interventions and models that favor left-brain,

conscious, cognitive processes, particularly in dealing with the "involuntary

nonconscious affective and interpersonal deficits of the major psychiatric disorders"

(p. 11).

Schore (2012) indicated that the human unconscious has its biological foundations

in the right hemisphere. He pointed out that research in neuroscience has also published

findings (Tucker & Moller, 2007) suggesting that the right brain's specialization includes

processes similar to the psychoanalytic unconscious. Schore (2012) demonstrated the

current "resurgence of interest in subjective implicit, unconscious functions, and thereby

in psychoanalysis, the science of the unconscious processes" (p. 13).

Schore (2012) believed that a left-hemisphere worldview continues to dominate

Western culture as well as psychiatry and psychology, where psychopharmacology

overrides psychotherapy and insurance companies favor evidence-based and manualized therapies. Research methods are equally dominated by the left-brain paradigms of empirical science. There is an urgent need to continue to develop additional research methodologies in psychoanalysis and in psychology in general based on right-brain paradigms, such as the hermeneutic science and the science of the soul traditions.

Schore's (2012) observation of a shift from left-brain to right-brain approaches in research in psychology is important to this discussion of the place of dynamic unconscious processes in research methods in psychoanalysis. When restricting research to the natural and human science traditions, it is as though only the left-brain functions might be engaged. Expanding the notion of science to hermeneutics and science of the soul traditions and explicitly incorporating dynamic unconscious processes adds the function of the right brain. Again, it is not that research and science should be shifting from natural and human science to hermeneutics and science of the soul, but that there should be, first, a recognition that the latter not only should be but *are* part of science and that there should be an integration and dialog between these various and essential approaches to science and research.

Expanding the Science Paradigm and Research Methods in Psychoanalysis

The need to challenge the dominance of the natural-science paradigm also pertains to psychoanalysis and its research methods. Continued discussion about the scientific status of psychoanalysis and the further development of research methods in psychoanalysis is necessary, beyond the natural science and human science paradigms.

Echoing Leuzinger-Bohleber and Burgin's (2003) discussion of the globalization of science, a globalization of research methods has been experienced, particularly in light

of the current tendency to idealize the natural science paradigm. Such globalization of methodologies generates risks when limiting the methods used, endorsed, or recognized. A change is needed in the vocabulary used in research methodology to shift this tradition and change the zeitgeist of research to include all forms of inquiry including those pertaining to hermeneutic science and the science of the soul in the research process. Researchers in general and researchers in psychoanalysis in particular need to present their work as scientific and valid by describing their assumptions and the methods of inquiry used both in the room—if psychoanalysis is considered a method of research— and outside the room, in the thinking process, reporting process, and process of writing of the findings.

The need for psychoanalyst–researchers to specify their understanding of the validity of the conjunction between cure and research (Dreher, 1998/2000) is linked to the question of defining which research method is appropriate in each specific research project in psychoanalysis, while making explicit the research method used and the rationale for its use. Attention may need to be directed toward psychoanalysis's tendency toward perfection in its research and its need to know the nature of psychoanalytic phenomena in exactly the right way, precisely following psychoanalytic theory. Research, however, is a process that is ever evolving. Heraclitus's image of the river and its continuous flow (Plato, trans. 1961) comes to mind: As researchers, we take a sample of what is flowing by, which informs us of the current situation, but we know that the flow goes by, ever changing. The next time we dip in for a new sample, it will include a different data set. Research inherently has limitations, but this does not mean that we refuse to conduct any research because it presents challenges and imperfections.

Dreher (1998/2000) discussed the need for exchange between psychoanalysis and other disciplines and emphasized that this need is not only to be considered in terms of the content of research but also in terms of research methodologies. In her closing remarks, Dreher cited Toulmin on researchers tolerating differences with the views of other disciplines and allowing each other to pursue their different goals. This advice is relevant for psychoanalysis, because so much of its clinical practice revolves around a capacity to tolerate differences, ambiguities, and not knowing.

In the context of research in psychoanalysis as a way to further knowledge and understanding of what occurs during treatment, Perron (2003) emphasized the importance of furthering research on the efficacy of treatment, including symptom reduction, feedback regarding treatment outcome, and impact on health and other indirect factors. Perron's view that psychoanalysis needs to develop its own research methods is essential; this argument, however, goes beyond research pertaining to the efficacy of treatment, as there is a need for the integration of existing methodologies from natural science, human science, hermeneutic science, and the science of the soul into psychoanalytic research. Research using qualitative, micro, meta-analysis or conceptual (Dreher, 1998/2000) or hermeneutics methods using the many case studies published can generate informative data on several psychoanalytic theoretical constructs.

When taking seriously Freud's concept of *Junktim*—the inseparable bond between cure and research, where the analyst is a participant-observer—and considering psychoanalysis an instrument of research, the idea postulated by Tuckett et al. (2008), Dreher (1998/2000), and Leuzinger-Bohleber et al. (2003) can be followed: In order to conduct research in psychoanalysis, research tools and methods that are in line with

psychoanalytic theory must be developed. Some emphasized the necessity to engage

psychoanalysts as research investigators (Dreher, 1998/2000; Tuckett et al., 2008),

whereas others integrated the psychoanalytic process in their research model (Leuzinger-

Bohleber et al., 2003). Psychoanalysis is only recently expanding its research methods

and looking for methodologies in other fields such as the natural sciences, of course, but

also the social sciences and hermeneutic science and is faced with the need to adapt these

methodologies to fit better with the types of research that it needs to conduct.

Furthermore, there is a necessity for an expansion of research that goes beyond

preconscious processes and includes dynamic unconscious processes as well in its

methodologies. Dynamic unconscious processes should be taken into consideration in a

sector of psychoanalytic research, and the specific methodological steps taken should be

detailed in the study's methodology section. Research methodologies using construct

from the science of the soul would provide a container to explore dynamic unconscious

processes. Following Green's (2005) position, contemporary psychoanalysis needs to

continue to "find its own tongue" (p. 14), and this is also true for its research

methodologies.

Theoretical Elements to Incorporate in Research from Hermeneutics and Science of

the Soul Paradigms

Regarding the continued development of research from the hermeneutic and

science of the soul paradigms, several theoretical constructs can be incorporated in

methodologies, including negative capability, creativity, and third area and the analytic

third. In *The Art of Inquiry*, Coppin and Nelson (2005) discussed research from a depth

psychological perspective, and Romanyshyn's (2007) alchemical hermeneutics was

developed as an add-on methodology to include a science of the soul perspective in

methods based in hermeneutic science. This section presents possible theoretical

elements that could be used in the development of psychoanalytic research

methodologies from a hermeneutic and science of the soul paradigm. The theoretical

construct of the analytic field is also discussed, and although the actual development of a

research method goes far beyond this dissertation, its application to psychoanalytic

research is proposed.

Negative capability.

In his book, *The Wounded Researcher: Research With Soul in Mind*, Romanyshyn

(2007) incorporated Keats's notion of *negative capability*, which Keats described as the

ability "of being in un-certainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after

fact & reason" (as cited in Romanyshyn, 2007, p. 148), into his alchemical hermeneutics

research method. For Romanyshyn (2007), negative capability is the researcher's ability

to stay open to the unfolding of the experience or process without being compelled to

find facts or provide explanations and without judging what is found in terms of

Cartesian truth or validity. While fostering and practicing being in negative capability,

meaning starts to emerge and to arise organically. This capacity to tolerate not knowing is

an essential component of the creative work. Romanyshyn believed that, through reverie

and negative capability, the researcher engages in a creative and playful—and sometimes

confusing and painful—ritual through which he or she starts to dialog with the work.

Hopkins (1984) integrated Keats's (2002) notion of negative capability with

Winnicott's (1971) theory of creative play. Hopkins reflected upon the phrase itself and

emphasized the paradox that the word *negative* presents. Rather than a sense of judgment,

harm, or detriment, he characterized *negative* as carrying a notion of absence. *Negative capability* thus becomes a state of being, which Hopkins postulated as the state of being that the child enters in creativity and play. He went further and stated that the type of play that "negative capability makes possible can only take place" (p. 7) when logical thinking and self-consciousness are absent from the process. He called negative capability an "unintegrated condition of being" (p. 7) in which identity is lost, enabling creativity to take place.

In his reflections about the conditions necessary to bring about negative capability, Hopkins (1984) followed Keats again and the analogy of the beehive. Hopkins thought that, although humans' inclination is to imitate the bee's buzzing or doing, the state of negative capability is similar to imitating the flower and being receptive, not only to the bee but to all other insects and experiences that might arise. Going back to Winnicott, Hopkins emphasized that, although this state includes the ability to embody both the more masculine doing and the feminine being, negative capability starts with the state of being: "After being—doing and being done to. But first, being" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 114).

Green (1973) believed that, in his concept of reverie, Bion borrowed Keats's idea of negative capability and associated it with the process of psychoanalytic research that happens in the room. The creative space that Dreher (1998/2000) discussed—where the implicit can be made explicit, the preconscious can become conscious, and new conceptualizations can become formulated into words—belongs to the psychoanalytic field of research. As Romanyshyn (2007) indicated, the concept of negative capability is an essential state that needs to be included in research methods that make a place for unconscious processes.

Field and third areas.

Schwartz-Salant (1991) referred to *third areas*, the interactive fields that develop between analysands and analysts in the consulting room, and brought in Bion's O and K as metaphors to understand and illustrate the transformation that occurs in that space. For Bion (1970), O denotes "the ultimate reality, absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself" (p. 27), and K denotes the "domain of knowledge" (p. 27) or facts. Schwartz-Salant (1991) emphasized the essential aspect of the experience that is co-created in the analytic process.

Schwartz-Salant (1991) compared Bion's idea of the transformation that occurs in the movements between O and K in the analytic process with Jung's interpretation of the alchemical imagery of the *coniunctio*. Schwartz-Salant explained that the "coniunctio is a symbol of Bion's container-contained, and the death of the coniunctio . . . is the same phenomenon as an oscillation between a contained experience of the depressive and paranoid-schizoid levels" (pp. 349-350). He went further and drew parallels between Bion's "conjunction of O and K," and Jung's alchemical "union of spirit and matter" (p. 350). Schwartz-Salant also used Winnicott's idea of *unknowing*, the state in which analyst and analysand are in the oscillations between K and O. The dynamic movement between knowing and unknowing in O allows for a new experience to emerge, leading back to K. Notably, Schwartz-Salant explained that this process happens in science, which is "the process of going beyond existing data to a new event" (p. 352). He emphasized the expansion of science from rational or empirical to an imaginal consciousness.

Schwartz-Salant (1998) situated Jung's model of analysis with psychoanalytic notions of the *third area*, such as Ogden's (1994) concept of the analytic third. Schwartz-Salant explained that Jung recognized that the analyst and analysand co-create an unconscious relationship generated from personal and impersonal experiences. In this space between them, "psychic contents" (p. 4)—which Jung called *archetypes*, derived from the collective unconscious—emerged. Schwartz-Salant emphasized that the third space created has its own subject–object quality and that, in his research, Jung found that not only personal but also collective projections could occur. Schwartz-Salant explained that in this autonomous third space, the notion of inside and outside, or subject–object, becomes dynamic, and the analyst becomes a participant in the co-created experience with the analysand. Through this dynamic process, transformation arises.

Schwartz-Salant (1991) discussed three types of eyes from Wilber's (1990) book *Eye to Eye*: the eye of flesh, the eye of reason, and the eye of contemplation. Wilber stressed that, while maintaining the individual quality of each, the necessity to integrate them is prevalent. According to Wilber, the *eye of flesh* pertains to the world of shared sensory experience; this is the empirical eye of the natural sciences. The *eye of reason* pertains to imagination, or the world of ideas, images, logic, and concepts, and is the eye of mind. The *eye of contemplation* transcends the eye of reason and is related to the "contemplation of immutable, of the self which is reality" (p. 6). The eyes of flesh, reason, and contemplation could be overlaid upon the circle of research to show the importance of integrating these approaches in order to gain a more complete understanding of the various aspects of human experiences, which could be achieved

through the development of more diverse research methodologies. The natural science

paradigm favors Wilber's idea of the eye of flesh.

Implicitly, Schwartz-Salant (1991) advocated for research that includes the eye of

reason and the eye of contemplation, transcending the natural science paradigm's

research methods founded on empiricism. The eye of flesh, from Wilber's (1990)

perspective, is important but incomplete and limited. In fact, taken individually, the eyes

of flesh, reason, and contemplation are incomplete and limited, as the power lies in their

integration. Schwartz-Salant (1991) reiterated the importance and necessity of fostering a

well-rounded view of the world and phenomena through the eyes of flesh, reason, and

contemplation.

With his idea of the flesh, Merleau-Ponty went further by adding a dynamic

circular relationship between subject and object (Madison, 1973, 1990). Here the flesh

represented the relationship between the psychic and the body, or the self and the other.

Citing Merleau-Ponty, Madison (1973) explained his reasoning:

> If this is the way things are with the sensing and the sensible, the body and the
>
> world, if they are the front side and the back side, the inside and the outside of
>
> each other, it is because they call for one another, because each "is an archetype
>
> for the other" (*VI*, 127; *VI*, 181). (p. 175)

Merleau-Ponty conceptualized the subject and object–or body and world–as "two

dialectical entities" (as cited in Madison, 1973, p. 175) belonging to the same fabric. The

image of fabric provides a powerful representation of the relationship between subject

and object: when one pulls on an objective piece of this fabric, the subjective piece

naturally comes with it. When this is applied to research methodologies, the need to

recognize, consider, and integrate the subjective part of this fabric in psychoanalytic

research is clear.

The analytic field.

Analytic field theory stemmed from field theory in physics (Deutsch, 1954;

Tubert-Oaklander, 2007), which shifted the core assumptions of linear causation to

interdependence, and from the work of Bion (Ferro & Civitarese, 2015). Baranger and

Baranger applied field theory to psychoanalysis and developed the idea that a third

element is co-created in the intersubjective interaction between analyst and analysand

(Baranger, Baranger, Rogers, & Churcher, 2008; Ferro & Civitarese, 2015). Other

nonpsychoanalytic sources influenced Baranger and Baranger's work, including the

ontology of Merleau-Ponty (Ferro & Civitarese, 2015), who provided a philosophical

foundation for the concept of *field*. Ferro and Civitarese (2015) emphasized Merleau-

Ponty's idea of the dialectic correlation between subject and object and the regulating

function of the flesh. Subject and object are integral places in the system of the flesh,

both touching and being touched by one another. This construct is reminiscent of the idea

that the observer influences the observed, and therefore, the observed also influences the

observer.

Ferro and Civitarese (2015) discussed the influence of Bion's work on

psychoanalytic scholars in Europe, Australia, South America, and North America and its

connection to the increasing recognition of analytic field theory in psychoanalysis,

particularly "post-Bionian theory of the analytic field" (p. xiii). For Ferro and Civitarese,

analytic field theory pertains to the work of Bion. The intention of the post-Bionian

theory of the analytic field is

to bring out the historicity of the present, the way in which the relationship is

formed instant by instant from a subtle interplay of identity and differentiation,

proximity and distance. This principle resonates with the need (which Bion at

some point felt) not to speak of unconscious but of "unconscioused," replacing

the noun with the verb to better reflect processuality and becoming. (p. xv)

In this present discussion, the term *analytic field* refers to the post-Bionian theory of the

analytic field.

Bion's model of the mind.

Bion proposed that the human mind continuously produces images or beta

elements through the alpha function, an agent of transformation (Ferro & Civitarese,

2015). The successful transformation of images results in a sequence called "dream

thought of the waking state" (p. 14) that "somehow soothes and pacifies the mind"

(p. 14). Bion called the apparatus that supports this transformation process the "dreaming

function" and "reverie" (p. 14), by which analysts come into contact with these sequences

of images in the analytic session.

Ferro and Civitarese (2015) referred to a "mental device" (p. 15) and an

"apparatus for thinking thoughts" (p. 15) that performs the dreaming function. They

provided an explanation by Ogden:

A psychoanalyst's work consists of dreaming—that is, of undertaking the

transformations of sensory storms into images that the patient cannot perform by

himself. It follows, too, that the aim of analysis is to develop in the patient the

capacity to generate images, to create dreams out of the forms of concrete thought

represented by symptoms. (as cited in Ferro & Civitarese, 2015, p. 15)

For Ferro and Civitarese, the fabric of the analytic field is multidimension or "pluriverse" (p. 8) (as opposed to universe), as it consists of a space "dedicated to the transformation of sensory and emotional experiences into thoughts and meanings (Neri & Selvaggi, 2006, p. 182, translated)" (p. 8).

With Ferro and Civitarese's (2015) statement that "depending on the vertex taken, multiple possible worlds open up" (p. 73), there is a sense that the field is a space of creative possibilities that fosters transformation. Furthermore, the types of elements that emerge in the field are varied and might include images, feelings and emotions, experiences, and "characters" (p. 73); each might refer to the "past, present or future, material or mental reality, conscious or unconscious experience" (p. 73). These phenomena are nonverbal; however, in the service of meaning making, the alpha function—through the dreaming-thinking-feeling function—performs two main tasks: (a) sequencing the elements that emerge and (b) creating a narrative that can be formulated in words. One's capacity to think and give "personal meaning to reality" (p. 70) is a "measure of how much one can bear (a function of duration) the absence (empty spatiality) of the object (no-thing)" (p. 70). Meaning making through thinking involves a struggle, because one needs to be able to tolerate the presence of ghosts or characters—"images, ideas, and concepts" (p. 73)—that emerge in the analytic field. The work of analysis is to help patients develop their alpha function—their thinking-as-dreaming function and apparatus—and to help them learn how to use it.

Ferro and Civitarese (2015) used the following metaphor to illustrate the process that takes place in the analyst's consulting room:

The patient arrives with a variously sized bottle of ink (his anxieties and proto-

emotions—in the jargon, his *beta elements*), which he keeps pouring on to the

special kind of blotting paper represented by the field. The field absorbs the ink

and becomes thoroughly soaked in it. Analyst and patient dip their pens into this

ink to write down the text of the session. (p. 15)

The process of co-writing the session allows for the transformation of the ink (i.e.,

anxieties and proto-emotions), or the nonverbal, into "stories, narrations, and

constructions" (p. 16), in other words, into meaning.

Analytic field and research.

Although a detailed discussion of the analytic field, Bion's work, and the work of

post-Bion scholars goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, several aspects of analytic

field theory can be applied to this discussion of the place of the unconscious in research

methodology in psychoanalytic research. I am proposing the explicit application of the

analytic field theory to research methodology in psychoanalytic research, in a similar

manner as Romanyshyn (2007) applied Jung's concept of active imagination to his

psychological research method.

Following the work of Coppin and Nelson (2005), Romanyshyn (2007) provided

a depth psychological and imaginal approach to psychological research. His conception

of alchemical hermeneutics provides a methodology that acknowledges the dynamic field

that emerges between researchers and their topic and methodological steps grounded in

hermeneutic science and the science of the soul to support the process. Romanyshyn

emphasized the importance of engaging in dialogues and conversations with what

emerges between the researcher and the research project; he called the place where these

conversations arise the "transference field" (p. 135) and emphasized its play-like quality:

> The transference dialogues, which are modeled on Jung's notion of active
>
> imagination, are an invitation to play in this imaginal landscape. It is a landscape
>
> of Winnicottian transitional phenomena, in which the differentiation between the
>
> researcher and the work, his or her separation from it, is mediated by the fantasies
>
> and reveries and images of the work that emerge within this landscape. (p. 137)

Although Romanyshyn used the clinical concept of active imagination in the service of

research, he stressed that research conducted in this way is not therapy. Such research

that makes room for the unconscious is challenging and difficult.

With alchemical hermeneutics, Romanyshyn (2007) made room for honoring

ancestors in the research process because this "attends to the unfinished business of the

soul of the work" (p. 135). In this process, there is an emphasis on death and the return to

the beginning, as Romanyshyn discussed in explaining "elegiac writing" (p. 313) as

writing from a place of mourning, where what is lost, unsaid, and left behind is

acknowledged. He noted a tension between "what is said and what is always left unsaid"

(p. 133) and emphasized that, when writing in this way, there is an understanding that the

work is and will always remain both dynamic and incomplete.

Alchemical hermeneutics provided the following methodological steps and

concepts that are reminiscent of theoretic concepts of analytic field theory: transference

field and transference dialogs through dreaming and reverie, reverie as a way of thinking

and agent of transformation, function of play and creativity in the research process, and

making room for the ancestors of the unfinished business of the soul that arise in the

transference field (Romanyshyn, 2007). Romanyshyn advocated for a necessary

"plurality of methods" (p. 215) for research in psychology and cited Coppin and Nelson:

"Methods . . . must simply learn to move, even dance, if they are to follow the psyche"

(as cited in Romanyshyn, 2007, p. 239). This quality is equally needed and applicable to

research in psychoanalysis. The following section briefly highlights important concepts

of analytic field theory that can be used to develop a research methodology grounded in

hermeneutic science and science of the soul for psychoanalytic research.

   Applying analytic field theory to research methodology.

   According to Ferro and Civitarese (2015), psychoanalysis conducted from the

perspective of the post-Bionian theory of the analytic field "is forced to engage in

continual self-reflection" (p. xv), and the activity of the analyst is characterized by a

"special kind of circularity" (p. xv); in this sense, "analysis is more like a research

activity than striving to achieve a goal" (p. xv). When psychoanalysis is viewed as an

instrument of research (Freud, 1913/1955), parallels can be drawn to the hermeneutic

circle of philosophical hermeneutics (Palmer, 1969) and alchemical hermeneutics.

Analytic field theory provides an essential procedural frame for research that would

support researchers in their effort to acknowledge unconscious processes and to include

them in psychoanalytic research methods.

   Bion used the capital letter O to designate the unknown (Bion, 1970; Dehing,

1994; Grotstein, 2007), the unknowable (B. S. Sullivan, 2010), and the dynamic process

of being and becoming that occurs between the analyst and the analysand in the analytic

field (Ferro & Civitarese, 2015; Grotstein, 2005; Ogden, 2004). In his discussion of Bion,

Grotstein (2007) understood O as "the Ultimate Reality always in flux, that is free of

representations, images, or symbols, . . . [and] as the Absolute Truth (about) Ultimate

Reality, . . . infinity, beta-elements, the Ideal Forms, noumena or the things-in-

themselves, and godhead (godhood)" (p. 106). Grotstein postulated that maybe "the beta-

element is the emotional sense impression of O: the ghost of O" (p. 59) or, "O's

ambassadors" (Ferro, 2015, p. 137). Following Bion, Grotstein understood the

relationship between beta and alpha elements as one of unlinear, unpredictable, and open-

ended oscillation similar to the relationship between the paranoid-schizoid position and

the depressive position (Ferro, 2015). The concepts of O and beta-elements are equally

present in the field of research, and researchers who make a place for unconscious

processes should recognize and make the presence of these concepts explicit.

Ferro and Civitarese (2015) acknowledged the presence of "characters" (p. 8) in

the field, which include the analyst and the analysand along with their internal worlds.

They also added the following as places in the field:

> its scenic component (the ongoing formation and transformation of the
>
> characters); the analyst's mind; the countertransference; the place of formation of
>
> images (waking dream thought) and its derivatives; the analyst's actual
>
> countertransference dreams; his reveries; the internal worlds of the analyst and the
>
> patient; their histories; their relationship; enactments; projective identifications
>
> and all their vicissitudes; and the transgenerational elements of both protagonists
>
> (Bezoari & Ferro, 1991; Ferro, 2006). (p. 8)

Not unlike Romanyshyn's (2007) idea of the unfinished business of the soul, Grotstein

(2007) went further when discussing his idea of "thoughts without a thinker—those

thoughts which are waiting for a mind that could think them" (Ferro, 2015, p. 124). Ferro

(2015) called these thoughts "balpha elements" (p. 134), which are thoughts that need a

mind equipped with appropriate functions to dream and think them. He wrote,

> Grotstein's position, clearly similar to Bion's, is that there exists something above
>
> us and which comes before us, a sort of Platonic world of Ideas: "I believe
>
> godhood (aka 'godhead') to be the 'ghost writer' of the 'thoughts without a
>
> thinker'" (ibid, p. 78). (p. 135)

The places, characters, and thoughts that emerge in the field are not exclusive to clinical

psychoanalysis but are also present in the field of research.

Ferro and Civitarese's (2015) ink metaphor for how analyst and patient are places

in the analytic field who co-write the fabric of the session can be applied to the research

process as well. The ink poured in the field of research consists of the data with which the

researcher is interacting as well as other elements related to the provenance of the data

and the presence of the researcher. The data, the researcher, and the other elements

related to both are all places in the research and coexist in the research field. If the data is

clinical information taken from the clinical encounter, then the field will contain the

places and characters listed above. If the data include text written by other clinicians and

scholars, then those texts of these other writers will become places in the field too.

Additional elements emerge in the field as a result of the interaction and process between

the researcher and the various parts of the research project. When conducting research,

the researcher reenters that field, taking a new place in it, and interacts with it and with

the data.

In Ferro and Civitarese's (2015) ink metaphor, the assumption is that the ink

comes only from the patient but that analyst and patient both have a pen. I doubt that the

analyst's ink can actually be removed from the field, otherwise, the idea of the blank slate of the analyst applies, which moves away from the concept of the analytic field. I do not think, however, that a blank slate is assumed here, as Ferro and Civitarese emphasized that this process cannot be located in the analyst or the patient but rather "takes place in a dimension that transcends both, which is that of the field" (p. 24).

Unconscious processes are places in the analytic field of the clinical encounter and cannot be ignored in the research process. Ferro (2015) stated,

> For Bion the dream is an ongoing mental activity at the basis of our unconscious thinking. Grotstein calls "mentalisation" the first part of the move from sensoriality to image, and calls "thinking" the next stage during which the alpha elements are placed in a sequence and give shape to narratives. (p. 131)

Ferro described Bion's concept of the dreaming function as the process by which one remains continuously open to new thoughts that enable one to develop a capacity to think.

In the same way as clinicians do, researchers have their dreaming, thinking, and alpha functions at their disposal in the research process, and I am proposing that researchers acknowledge their presence as research tools in psychoanalytic research methodologies. Researchers can make use of their dreaming and thinking functions in the research process by developing and using their alpha function as an agent of transformation of the variety of data collected for their study, as described above. As the "analyst dreams the session" (Ferro, 2015, p. 136), so does the researcher need to dream the research.

As Romanyshyn (2007) emphasized, making room for unconscious processes in research methodologies is by no means therapy, but the complexes, anxieties, and dynamics of the researcher are inevitable places in the field as well. There is therefore an ethical responsibility on the part of researchers to have enough capacity for awareness of these elements when they arise or manifest and to have a place to process them outside of the research process. One can get lost in conversations and dialogues that emerge from the field when conducting research with soul in mind and based on the hermeneutics circle, and it is essential to be able to reevaluate how far the researcher needs or is willing to take the conversations. The metaphor of the analytic field, however, provides a theoretical container for the undigested beta elements that emerge in the research process through the transformative function of the alpha function and the dreaming-thinking function, because these functions are meaning-making functions.

Reverie is the dynamic state in which the analyst engages in the process of becoming (Cambray, 2001) within the interactive field (Cwik, 2011). In analytic field theory, reverie is an essential process for the analyst to engage dynamic unconscious processes, which could also be utilized in the service of research in a similar manner as described in Ogden's (2005) explication of psychoanalytic writing. Analytic field theory accounts for the nonverbal aspect of what is constellated in the clinical encounter, and the difficult work of describing experiences into words (Ferro & Civitarese, 2015; Ogden 2005), all of which pertain to research that makes place for the dynamic unconscious as well. In his review of Grotstein's (2007) book, *A Beam of Intense Darkness*, Ferro (2015) described negative capability as the capacity "to wait for shreds of meaning to emerge"

(p. 125) and "to remain in the paranoid-schizoid position without feeling persecuted"

(p. 125).

Ferro and Civitarese (2015) talked about the dialectic between subject and object

through the experience of reading by which the reader rewrites the experience generated

by the text by engaging in a "special kind of circularity" (p. xv) with the written word.

Such dialog with the text relates to Bion's idea that the text of his books could "be

recreated afresh by each new and different reader" (Ferro, 2015, p. 128). This can also be

applied to the relationship between the writer and the written word and to the process that

occurs between the researcher and the research project. The writer and the text are

coinfluenced in the process of reading and writing. In that regard, Coppin and Nelson

(2005) stated,

> For people deeply engaged in the art of inquiry, Jung's more inclusive definition
>
> of the psyche is fruitful. Among other things, it suggests that any work a person
>
> undertakes has as much psychic reality as the worker. It is an active, autonomous
>
> participant in its own development, with legitimate demands and desires, on the
>
> path of its own individuation. Though one may wish to control the creative
>
> process, it is only possible to guide its course. A more psychological approach is
>
> to treat the work as an autonomous partner by entering into a lively, dialectical
>
> relationship with it, fully prepared for the unexpected and the synchronistic. In the
>
> realm of the psyche, all authors are co-authors. (p. 55)

Winnicott (1971) introduced the ideas of potential space, interactive field, and

transitional phenomena, emphasizing the creative nature of the therapeutic encounter. He

highlighted the process that occurs in the interactive field and the importance of play both

for the analyst and the analysand. "Psychoanalysis has been developed as a highly

specialized form of playing in the service of communication with oneself and others"

(p. 55). Winnicott explained that playing is essential both for children and adults because

it is in the act of play that creativity resides and develops. Furthermore, in the creative

play that happens in the potential space arises a capacity to symbolize, which is essential

to the development of the thinking and dreaming function (Ferro & Civitarese, 2015).

These concepts have been further elaborated in relation to the analytic field between

analyst and analysand (Cwik, 2011; Ogden, 1985) and applied to research methods

(Cwik, 1991; Romanyshyn, 2007). Coppin and Nelson (2005) discussed the importance

of creativity and play in the art of inquiry and research.

Winnicott's (1971) ideas and reflections about potential space, transitional

phenomena, interactive field, play, and creativity are also present in analytic field theory

(Ferro & Civitarese, 2015) and are relevant to this discussion of the application of the

analytic field theory to research methods in psychoanalysis. A creative process arises in

the interactive field of research between the researcher and the research topic. Like

clinicians, researchers need to be able to play with the various elements and characters

that arise in the field in order for symbols and meaning making to develop.

Chapter 7

Final Considerations

Two significant images emerged in the process of writing this dissertation. The first was the uroboros, which was discussed briefly in Chapter 1, and the two-headed eagle. Additionally, Hermes, or Mercurius, was always present in the hermeneutic circle of my research method (hermeneutics and alchemical hermeneutics). This chapter presents a discussion pertaining to the additional research I conducted to learn more about these images and their relevance to this dissertation and to my research process.

Uroboros

In her article, "Unitary Reality and the Creative," Jaffé (1984) discussed humans' modern way of perceiving the world through a process of differentiation in a movement between subject and object. Jaffé investigated what preceded this type of perception and referred to Jung's and Neumann's work. Neumann (1956) called the state of preconsciousness "unitary reality" (p. 12), which "stands in direct contrast to the polarized reality of the ego-consciousness that we know, moving constantly within the tension between subject and object, man and nature, or man and his world" (p. 12). Jung (1948/2014) considered the uroboros one of the representations of Mercurius or Hermes, particularly in the god's capacity to unite opposites, and a symbol for the collective unconscious (Jaffé, 1984; Jung, 1948/2014). For Neumann, the uroboros or "Great Circle" served as a "symbol for the soul with its oppositions of spiritual and physical, conscious and unconscious" (Jaffé, 1984, p. 9) and encapsulated the "self-contained opposition" (Neumann, as cited in Jaffé, 1984, p. 9).

Fritz (1977) associated the uroboros, or the circular snake, to the symbol of "early matriarchate consciousness" (p. 348) and to death and rebirth. Fritz believed that this image stood "for total non-differentiation" (p. 348) and quoted Neumann: "It slays, weds, and impregnates itself. It is man and woman, begetting and conceiving, devouring and giving birth, active and passive, above and below, at once" (as cited in Fritz, 1977, p. 348).

As I read these references to the symbolic representation of the uroboros, I reflected about its appearance so early in my research process. This image emerged in a sort of predissertation or undifferentiated phase, as at that time, my dissertation had not yet taken the shape of what came to be in my proposal. Although ideas pertaining to research methods began to form, my topic at that time was quite different from what it became, yet it seems that I had already entered a hermeneutic circle and dialogs were starting to take place. I was also struck by my overlaying the uroboros upon the circle of research, with its mouth located at the junction where the science of the soul and natural science connect. In terms of research methods, this is the place where the opposites join and pertains to Jung's idea of union of opposites. This is where subject and object as well as conscious and unconscious join, and there emerges the recognition of a need to rely on a preconscious matriarchal energy to explore this area further for research in psychology, in general, and in psychoanalysis, in particular.

The Two-headed Eagle

In his chapter titled "Pluralism of Science and Psychoanalytic Thinking," Green (2003) compared psychoanalysis to a two-headed eagle, with "one head from medicine, psychiatry and science, and the other head rooted in culture, literature, arts, history of

civilization" (Leuzinger-Bohleber & Burgin, 2003, p. 31). This powerful image caught my attention, and I decided to research it further from an archetypal perspective. Strikingly, I found out that the two-headed eagle, the uroboros, and Hermes (Mercurius) are all connected.

Jung (1948/2014) stated that the eagle is a "variant of the uroboros" (p. 144). In *Psychology and Alchemy*, he showed a figure captioned, "The six planets united in the seventh, Mercury, depicted as the Uroboros, and the red-and-white (hermaphroditic) double eagle" (p. 64, Figure 20). In this figure, the two-headed eagle stands at the center of a circle created by the Uroboros biting its tail. Discussing alchemy and alchemical treatises, Jung stated,

> The dragon in itself is a *monstrum*—a symbol combining the chthonic principle of the serpent and the aerial principle of the bird. It is, as Ruland says, a variant of Mercurius. But Mercurius is the divine winged Hermes (fig. 146) manifest in matter, the god of revelation, lord of thought and sovereign psychopomp. (p. 292)

Jung further explained,

> The dragon is probably the oldest pictorial symbol of alchemy of which we have documentary evidence. It appears as the *ouroboros*, the tail-eater, in the Codex Marcianus . . . , which dates from the tenth or eleventh century. . . . Mercurius stands at the beginning and end of the work: he is the *prima material*, the *caput corvi*, the *nigredo*: as dragon he devours himself and as dragon he dies, to rise again as the *lapis*. (p. 293)

In the same volume, Jung discussed the symbolism of the eagle in reference to Figure 98, captioned "The philosophical egg, whence the double eagle is hatched, wearing the spiritual and temporal crowns" (p. 201). He stated,

> The eagle signifies height. . . . Birds are thoughts and the flight of thoughts.
> Generally it is fantasies and intuitive ideas that are represented thus (the winged
> Mercurius, Morpheus, genii, angels). The ship is the vehicle that bears the
> dreamer over the sea and the depths of the unconscious. As a man-made thing it
> has the significance of a system or method . . . . The flight of thought goes ahead
> and methodical elaboration follows after. (p. 202)

The two-headed eagle, in the context of the uroboros and Mercurius (Hermes), added more relevance and significance to the junction between the science of the soul and the natural science paradigms: the relationship and interdependence of the intuitive flight of thoughts of the eagle (similar to the thinking-dreaming function) and the methodical elaboration of the ship (a more Cartesian logic).

Writing Process

Early in my dissertation writing process, my acupuncturist reminded me that practice is the act of coming back to an activity; no matter how much one has accomplished or mastered, what is essential is the return to the practice. This conversation had an impact on the way I viewed my dissertation process and my relationship to writing. As a result, I gradually stopped identifying with the subjective quality and quantity of what I wrote and focused instead on the idea of returning to my writing as a practice, in a manner similar to how one returns to the breath in meditation or yoga.

In the course of conceptualizing the topic of this research and writing this dissertation, I engaged in various rituals, some of which pertained directly to my writing practice, such as setting my writing space or visiting the library, while others fell under the category of extracurricular activities such as collage making, puzzles, and walking. The latter gave me an opportunity to switch from a cognitive process to a more intuitive one as well as a physical process, that of weaving things together and integrating.

Collage.

I have made several large collages over the years, one of which was done in graduate school as part of a cognitive–behavioral class. I came to realize that, when I make a collage, I enter into the following creative process. First, I pick images to which I have an intellectual or emotional response in relation to the theme or idea I have for the overall collage. I flip through magazines or printed material I have gathered. My selection process is rather intuitive, and I have learned to let myself experience the image and allow my mind to wander freely. Later, I spread the collection of images on the floor so as to see each image in its entirety. I let my imagination make associations and move the images in various clusters. Some pictures form clusters easily, while others remain isolated. Sometimes, I find myself stalling or feeling overwhelmed by the amount of images I have chosen. In such situations, I use mind-maps as a way to step back from the images and explore my ideas using words and drawings.

After creating a mind-map, I am often able to go back to the images and start cutting them intuitively. As the collage takes form on the floor, each cluster finds its place in a rather organic manner, and I am able to complete the collage without further major interruption. Often, in the process of gluing the images to the background, images

shift and start to fit differently with their neighbors in a dynamic process, and something new starts to emerge that I did not consciously imagine or visualize until after it was completed. Collage making in this manner includes a nonlinear and almost dreamlike process, as if the images start to follow a story of their own.

As I was finishing my proposal, I realized that aspects of my writing so far had followed a process similar to that of making a collage. When researching a concept such as the concept of the unconscious, for example, I started gathering references from various authors who discussed and defined the term. I gathered quotes, at times retyping them verbatim in my word document, in a manner similar to my working with images for a collage. Then I reread all the quotes and wrote down my reactions to them. I annotated my comments and grouped them by theme. Then I started to weave the themes together to create my *story*, or my overall thinking process. Finally, I was able to synthesize and integrate what others have said about the idea of the unconscious with my understanding of the concept.

Regarding the process of collage making or writing, a parallel can be made with the development of the thinking–dreaming function. The beta elements, like the energy engine behind the emotional pull that propels the action of choosing one image, are transformed into alpha elements. The transformative process of the alpha function can be compared to the meaning-making process that occurred when letting images play with one another and be placed in relationship to one another through my playfulness. In this playful process in the realm of the dream, the images or thoughts begin to form a whole, and a narrative starts to emerge.

Puzzle.

Other aspects of my writing process could be compared to the experience of

making a puzzle. When I had most of the pieces of the data collected and the pieces of

reflections written, I engaged in a process of laying them out in a manner similar to when

I start a puzzle, separating the border pieces from the rest and grouping pieces of the

same color and texture together. When I was at the beginning of my dissertation writing

process, my son wanted to work on a 1000-piece puzzle of an ocean coral scene. Given

the amount of pieces, this puzzle required patience and took several days to complete.

Tedious sorting was required before we could start laying the pieces down and

connecting them. This phase in puzzle making was similar to the gathering of images in a

collage or quotes in a literature review.

In puzzle making, many of the pieces taken separately have no context and look

rather abstract, but once they are assembled with other seemingly abstract pieces of the

same color or texture, an image appears—in this case, that of a clown fish, a coral, a crab,

or a jelly fish, and so forth. Here, too, my dissertation writing process comes to mind, as

this puzzle-making process greatly resembles that of the collage. Sometimes, I was

gathering information in my research that seemed disjointed and unrelated or abstract in

the sense of not relating to the concrete dissertation questions. In terms of conceptual

research, Dreher (1998/2000) talked about a "progressive spiral" (p. 107) and used the

term "creative puzzle-solving strategy" (p. 107), which is relevant here. I came to

embrace these processes and reminded myself to trust the unknown parts of the process,

because I knew from previous experience that as I continued to research, reflect, and

write, the themes and ideas would develop and start to fit together to reveal a more

defined whole.

Walking.

Walking became an invaluable activity in my dissertation process, as it provided a

balance between intellectual work and physical activity. At times, I was frustrated, as if

taking care of my body was an added item on my to-do list. Over time, however, I came

to embrace and welcome these breaks, because I also realized the integrative function that

the walks provided. The type of thinking I engaged while walking often allowed me to

integrate ideas in a new way. During one of these walks, I came to realize the parallel

between the collage making and my writing process, discussed earlier.

Struggle.

Writing this dissertation, including finding my topic, defining my purpose

statement, and writing my dissertation, has been a struggle. Using hermeneutics and

alchemical hermeneutics while researching and writing is hard work that includes a

regular confrontation with the unknown. I believe that through the process of writing this

dissertation, I have further developed my thinking–dreaming function through thinking,

dreaming, and engaging in dialogs with the texts that I was reading. I entered into dialogs

with the texts I was reading and with the authors of those texts in my own reflections, in

my dissertation journal, and in my writing process.

The relevance of reading in my writing process.

My reading process evolved significantly in the course of my studies and in the

process of writing this dissertation. I noticed that conversations started to emerge often as

I was reading books and articles. I became aware of my own internal voice engaging with

the text and my thoughts emerging like the sparks or scintillae (Jung, 1948/2014)

discussed in Chapter 1. At first, I experienced my thoughts as unintelligible chatter, but

over time, I learned to jot them down and consider them as the beginning of relevant

conversations.

Reading nonclinical books also allowed me to make sense of the new clinical

concepts presented in the literature, and I started to make some parallels. For example,

Jung's (1954/1972) paradoxical concept of the psychoid, or the space that is neither

matter nor spirit but also pertains to both, took on a new meaning for me when I read the

following exchange in *The Amber Spyglass* in Pullman's (2005, audio file) *His Dark*

Materials series. Below is a conversation between the Angel Xaphania, Will, and Lyra

regarding the possibility of travel between worlds and the Angel's way of traveling

between them:

"Will you be confined to one world as we are?"

"No, we have other ways of traveling."

"The way you have," Lyra said, "is it possible for us to learn?"

"Yes, you could learn to do it, as Will''s father did. It uses the faculty of what

you call imagination. But that does not mean *making things up*. It is a form of

seeing."

"Not *real* traveling then," said Lyra. "Just pretend . . . ."

"No," said Xaphania, "nothing like pretend. Pretending is easy. This way is

hard, but much truer."

"And is it like the alethiometer?" said Will. "Does it take a whole lifetime to

learn?"

"It takes long practice, yes. You have to work . . . . What is worth having is

worth working for." (14:06:20)

This exchange beautifully illustrates aspects of the psychoid and the dynamic area where

reverie takes place and also pertains to the idea of the emergence of multiple possible

worlds (vertices) coexisting at the same time across time and space, with the elements in

the field being portals of access. *His Dark Materials* beautifully portrayed representations

of the embodiment of the psychoid with the idea of the parallel worlds that exist next to

each other that can be entered when one knows how to look.

Developing thinking–dreaming and alpha function in writing.

Reading particularly about writers' reading and writing experience played an

important role in my own process as well. Below are two examples of writing pertaining

to the development of the thinking–dreaming function outside of clinical psychology and

psychoanalysis.

In her book, *The Situation and the Story: The Art of Personal Narrative*, Gornick

(2002) made several observations that characterized the impact of nonfiction writing and

pertained to the relationship between the writer and the writing process. Several of these

processes can be compared to analytic field theory (Ferro & Civitarese, 2015), discussed

earlier, as they can shed light on the relationship between the researcher and the research

process.

Gornick (2002) believed that an essential component that makes nonfiction

writing powerful is the writers' capacity to put themselves in their writing in an

emotional manner. According to Gornick, a nonfiction essay or memoir becomes

dynamic, captivating, and powerful when writers used their emotions to move the writing

forward. She emphasized the creative process writers undergo to imagine and reimage themselves in relation to their subject. She believed that writers develop a persona shaped by a particular quality of voice, vision, rhythm of sentences, observations, and what the narrator chooses to ignore, with all of this being in the service of the narrator's subject.

Gornick (2002) believed that writers have to become aware of and engage with their defenses and embarrassments publicly, in a manner that resembles lying on a psychoanalytic couch in the open. The raw material with which writers engage also includes experiences of the past, which are infused with the writers' mixed feelings and emotions. Writers engage in a process of making meaning of their mixed feelings in relation to the subject at hand. The defenses, embarrassments, and mixed feelings with which writers are struggling remind me of the beta-elements of analytic field theory. It is as though writers need to undergo a transformation process in which their beta-elements become alpha-elements through the use of their alpha-function. A dialog between the beta-elements and the alpha-elements takes place in the process of writing the narration.

The elements that writers choose to use from their personal experience to develop the persona of a particular piece are similar to places in the field of their writing. Other elements arise in the field when writers engage with other characters in their experience. Gornick (2002) spoke not only about the writer and the characters as elements in the story but also about their relationship and influence on one another.

Gornick (2002) discussed the relationship between world and self, which is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's idea of the flesh and relationship between object and subject (Madison, 1973; 1990). Gornick (2002) also stressed the importance of what is not being said, the absence in the writing process. What is absent could relate to Ferro

and Civitarese's (2015) idea of *spacings*, or the space between the words, Bion's concept

of not-knowing, and Keats's notion of negative capability. Gornick (2002) emphasized

how challenging it is for writers to engage in such a writing process. It is hard work to

tolerate the process that takes place in the transformation of the acknowledgment of the

mixed feelings that arise in the meaning making process of the experience.

Desarthe's (2013) book, *Comment J'ai Appris à Lire* (How I Learned to Read), is

another example of writing that pertains to the development of the thinking–dreaming

function outside of clinical psychology and psychoanalysis. Desarthe's process and

reflections also made me think of the hermeneutic circle and negative capability.

Desarthe (2013) documented her work as a translator and recalled a particularly

life-altering experience as she was translating Ozick's (2007) *Les Papiers de*

Puttermesser (The Papers of Puttermesser). Desarthe (2013) reflected on the Hebrew

word *pardes*, which means *grove* or *garden* and Ozick's discussion of the remaining

acrostic *PRDS* when the vowels are omitted. *PRDS*, in Hebrew, means "paradise," and

each letter taken individually stands for a word: P for *p'shat*, R for *remez*, D for *drosh*,

and S for *sod* (Ozick, 2007, as cited in Desarthe, 2013, p. 130). Ozick (2007) explained

that *p'shat* relates to the immediate meaning or the literal, *remez* is about the implied

meaning, *drosh* means interpretation, and *sod* is the secret meaning.

A sort of circularity and field seems to develop in Desarthe's (2013) process as

she navigates from one meaning to the next in her process of translating literary texts that

are infused with the author's poetic writing. It is an arduous process, as she described

being stuck at various levels in order to capture the meaning of the words she translates.

As a translator, she believed that she needed to welcome and make space for the soul of the author.

Notably, having arrived at a translating impasse, Desarthe (2013) developed a new method or technique whereby she started to translate without understanding, the idea being that she should continue to make progress even if the words seemed not to make sense at the time she wrote them. She equated this process to other situations in life, when one moves along without knowing, such as in raising children or driving for the first time—experiences one encounters for the very first time and into which one has to throw oneself without knowing the outcome. In this manner, she was able to develop her own capacity to cultivate negative capability, leading to the gradual emergence of meaning.

Future Research

The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the field in psychoanalytic research methodology using hermeneutics and alchemical hermeneutics in order to increase understanding of the place of dynamic unconscious processes between the researcher and the research topic. I set out to understand more fully the apparent paradox that, despite a clinical and theoretical recognition of the unconscious, its inclusion in psychoanalytic research methodologies seemed to be lacking. Given the vital interconnection between clinical practice, theory, and research, researching the place of the unconscious in psychoanalytic research methodologies contributes to the field of psychoanalysis, in particular, and the field of clinical psychology, in general. That being said, the use of a method based in the traditions of hermeneutic science and science of the soul fundamentally narrows the findings of this study to a limited selection of studies and to my interpretation of the texts used. Reviewing and discussing the full extent of the

research literature and research methods recently used in psychoanalysis goes well

beyond the scope of this dissertation and therefore leaves abundant room for further

research in this area.

One important conclusion that I drew from this research project pertained to

continuing to develop more research methods for psychoanalytic research, particularly

methods from hermeneutic science and science of the soul traditions. One specific

recommendation for future research is the further development and use of a research

method in psychoanalysis using analytic field theory. Another area of future research

could be to develop a new research method workbook focused on psychoanalytic and

depth-oriented research methods that would include all four quadrants of the circle of

research proposed in this dissertation, thus providing a proper place for the hermeneutic

science and science of the soul traditions in psychoanalytic research.

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