# SHARECROPPING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CASE STUDY OF THE FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY – FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY JOINT COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

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I take this time to acknowledge some of the people and organizations that contributed significantly to the dissertation study. First, I claim this victory in the name of the Lord, all things are possible through Christ Jesus. The Lord gave me the sight and understanding to notice the similarities between how public Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) operate in historically oppressive states and how my mother Carlen Humphrey Darnell and grandparents Charlie and Velmer Humphrey worked and lived as sharecroppers. My parents met at an HBCU, Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University, my mother's alma mater, my father graduated from Tuskegee Institute; subsequently, I have been subconciously intrigued by Black colleges since at least my introduction to primary education. In high school, Randall Perkins, some fellow Upward Bound and Butler High friends, and I decided to aggressively apply to HBCUs for college, many earned scholarships to Tuskegee, while I was blessed with the opportunity to attend Tennessee State University (TSU) on the same street as the historic Fisk University and Meharry Medical College.

The interest in HBCU history, policy, and organizational structures developed consciously during my matriculation at Tennessee State University under the leadership of the late TSU President James A. Hefner, the nurturing of Prof. Sandra Waters Holt, Student Affairs Vice President Michael Freeman, President Melvin N. Willams, Prof. William U. Latham, and support of countless friends and faculty who encouraged my further exploration of Black colleges. From the time Gerald Onuoha joined me on my first trip to learn about an HBCU, through my time at TSU, to now, I have been on a perpetual personal journey to visit all 107 Black colleges. The HBCU trek is a voyage largely for personal interest, exploration, and the gratification of seeing Black progress and productivity around, over, and through the obstacles

presented by historically racist states. After a come-to-Jesus meeting with an admissions counselor at Lincoln University of Pennsylvania, I have been advised, informed, and "voluntold" that what I do with HBCUs is for the people—for the culture.

I recognize that my interest in HBCU history and structure deepened during my PhD journey. The research trek to HBCUs was intensified through an independent study and research assistantship with Professor Valerie Grim, courses in critical race theory with Prof. Robin Hughes, higher education history with Prof. Andrea Walton, organizational theory taught by Prof. Alex McCormick, and researching the effects of interinstitutional partnerships on college enrollment under the tutelage of Prof. Don Hossler. Beyond reading about HBCUs for presentations, publications, and class assignments, I was motivated in graduate school by the students at Indiana University and youth in Bloomington and Indianapolis who showed a hunger for information on Black colleges. Undergraduates at IU and IUPUI, high school students at Bethel AME Church in Bloomington and participants of the Upward Bound program in Indianapolis drank up every story I shared about HBCUs and always wanted to know more. Moreover, my cousins Darrieux, Ghemaiya, Abeo, Sahara, and Zykira ask me continually about Black colleges, and serve as my greatest audience.

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Carl Darnell

SHARECROPPING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CASE STUDY OF THE FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERISTY – FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY JOINT COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

Historically Black Colleges and Universities have historically been given less funding than White institutions, a known discrepancy partially rectified by the Civil Rights era desegregation lawsuits. The court-ordered funding, however, came with race-based restrictions for public HBCUs, and many lost academic programs to traditionally White institutions. In numerous situations, Black colleges were closed outright or merged with White institutions. The following study explores the unique case of an HBCU coerced into merging an academic unit with a neighboring historically White university. Using archival data and interviews from the HBCU administrators, the case study presents a narrative of how the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University – Florida State University partnership was formed, explores the partnership's development over time, and examines differences between the mission and practices of the joint venture from FAMU's perspective.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

The United States Congress outlawed segregation in higher education through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Civil Rights Act of 1964," 1964). Title VI affected college bound African American youth similarly to how the Emancipation Proclamation liberated many of the country's enslaved Africans a century earlier; tragically, the aftereffects were similar as well. Instead of African Americans being able to start completely new lives with their new federally proclaimed emancipation, cities with large African American populations introduced public policies that maintained racial hierarchy and legalized discrimination against former slaves. The policies prevented the majority of African Americans from buying land and opening businesses, restricting many African Americans' primary means of survival to sharecropping—working former slave owners' cotton and vegetable fields (Royce, 2010).

The American South, where most African Americans lived and, subsequently where virtually all Black colleges were established, had a deeply rooted, centuries old culture of "other race" exploitation. From the exploitation of Native Americans to the beginnings of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, the southern land owners developed a sophisticated system to enhance their economic positions. The landowner treated Africans as both property and free labor, exploiting African's strength and skills to turn a profit. The system included overseers and drivers who worked directly with the exploited Africans to ensure the fruits of the labor would be distributed throughout the White population.

The system effectively kept enslaved Africans in physical chains and indentured servants in metaphorical chains of debt, all the while, the White landowners, overseers, and slave drivers' families grew from the wealth of Black labor (Hurt, 2003). The racist slavery system technically ended with the Civil War; yet, still operating with a racist worldview, the South virtually continued slavery under the new name of sharecropping (Kayatekin, 2009). Though slavery was

outlawed, southern landowners still had the goal to exploit Black labor, to extrapolate, at a minimal cost, the most labor as possible for their fields and to keep control of the money firmly in White hands. The lawmakers and landowners worked together to keep control of education and sought to retard Black intellectualism as well.

In order for both the slavery and sharecropping systems to be successful, teaching Africans in America to read and write was generally outlawed. The system was designed to enslave African bodies and minds. Sharecroppers experienced physical and psysic violence at the hands of landowners and overseers. White supremacy racism led to the literal erasure of African history, landowners added to the epistemological nihilation by prohibiting Africans from speaking their native languages and practicing culturally significant traditions (King, 2017). Landowners sought to make Black people despise themselves and to keep the sharecroppers ignorant of African history except for negative terms that would make the Black people think that sharecropping in America was a special opportunity.

Even with slavery outlawed, the landowners were determined to enslave Black minds and establish the White race as superior and deserving of the privileges and benefits produced by Black labor. Consequently, this mindset resulted in the sharecropping system that resembled slavery in nearly every aspect but the name. Landowners now leased housing, equipment, and part of the land to Africans in exchange for their continued work, still under the supervision of White overseers and drivers, on the landowner's crops. The owner's fee for housing, equipment, and leasing the land came at such a high rate that Africans were perpetually indebted to the landowner (Royce, 2010).

Similarly, Black colleges were founded on land belonging to states operating under racist policies. The policies created an interest convergence dilemma for African Americans seeking

higher learning (Bell, 1980).[1] States only allowed the establishment and support of African American serving institutions if the institutions provided some form of benefit to the White population of the state (Gasman & Hilton, 2012; Harper, Patton, & Wooden, 2009). Though African Americans campaigned for schools, raised funds, donated labor for structures, and hired teachers, most of their educational facilities were significantly financed by White philanthropists, industrialists, and rarely the institutions' host municipality (E. Anderson & Moss, 1999). The funds supplied by the White-controlled foundations and cities, like landowners in the sharecropping system, relegated many Black colleges to operate as second tier institutions led by White administrators, similar to sharecropping's overseer, and taught by mostly White teachers, in the role as driver; subsequently, many public Black colleges were founded in a sharecropping system.[2]

From their founding to the end of the twentieth century, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) have endured disproportionate challenges to their academic, legal, and financial standings (Lovett, 2011).[3] States governments in Alabama and Florida established provisions to limit the development of public Black colleges ("Knight v. State of Alabama,"

[1] Using the term coined by Derrick Bell in the 1980 work on *Brown* and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, "the principle of interest convergence provides: the interest of Blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of Whites" (p. 523).

[2] Sharecropping, as defined by Eugene Canjels (1998) of the Center for Economic Policy Analysis, is a form of an agricultural land lease contract in which, instead of paying a predetermined amount of rent, the tenant agrees to give the landlord a share of the output. The sharecropping system was prevalent in the American south immediately following the end of legal slavery; it allowed White landowners to continue having Black people work their crops for little to no pay. Subsequently, race oppression was deeply interwoven into the economic context of the sharecropping system (Hurt, 2003). The White landowners overcharged for the use of their equipment, demanded a large share of the harvest proceeds, and influenced governmental policies that resulted in the sharecropper coming out even at best, ending the season in debt as the norm (Hurt, 2003). Sharecroppers were continually in a financial bind, similarly to the status of America's Black Colleges.

[3] HBCU is a distinction designated by the United States government. Initially coined in the Higher Education Act of 1965, the term HBCU refers to any accredited higher education institution established before the year 1964 with the express mission of educating African Americans. Conversely, the term TWI, traditionally White institution, is used in the study in reference to any higher education institution established exclusively for educating members of the White population.

1991; Neyland & Riley, 1987). Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University (AAMU) was designated as Alabama's 1890 Black land grant university, yet AAMU did not receive state funding for land grant functions for over 92 years. By 1991, when the *Knight v. Alabama* case was decided, the state of Alabama still denied additional land-grant associated funding to the public Black college ("Knight v. State of Alabama," 1991). The state of Florida similarly limited the development of Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU). Also given land grant status with the passing of the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1890, FAMU was denied the matching state funds required for states accepting federal land grants (Lee & Keys, 2013; Neyland & Riley, 1987).

In the majority opinion in the *Fordice* ruling, Mississippi's higher education system's institutional mission classifications were determined to be racist ("United States v. Fordice," 1992). The Mississippi system essentially classified the three traditionally White institutions as flagships with the freedom and resources to provide a wide range of academic offerings, while Mississippi's classification of public Black colleges significantly limited degree offerings and financial resources (Lee, 2010). Of the numerous inequalities impeding the growth and development of HBCUs, disproportionate challenges with institutional accreditation is one of the most pronounced and damaging disparities for America's Black colleges.

Regional accreditation agencies have placed HBCUs on warning, probation, or all out denied their accreditation at a higher rate than the national average (Donahoo & Lee, 2008). The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), the regional accreditor for 80% of all HBCUs, has long been criticized for its rate of sanctioning Black colleges as compared to its traditionally White institutional members (Fester, Gasman, & Nguyen, 2012). Though HBCUs only make up 13% of the SACS's member institutions, since 1989 nearly half of the colleges that

have had their accreditation revoked by SACS are historically Black (Bollag, 2006). Without regional accreditation, higher education institutions are ineligible for federal funding programs and lose most, if not all, of their student enrollment (Fester et al., 2012; Wershbale, 2010).

Most Black colleges began as standalone, private institutions (J. Williams & Ashley, 2004). As single institutions, a number of HBCUs have lost their autonomy succumbing to state takeovers and becoming state-run, "public" institutions ("Knight v. State of Alabama," 1991). Additional HBCUs have experienced denial of regional accreditation and endured policies meant to weaken their financial stability and academic reputations (Harman & Harman, 2008). In association, affiliation, and partnership with another college or governmental body, however, many Black institutions have garnered the support needed to withstand a barrage of external challenges to their continued existence.

The collaborations and partnerships HBCUs develop to fortify financial stability, avoid losing accreditation, and to offer new academic programs are vast and vary case by case. Moreover, the methods employed to establish and sustain partnerships with HBCUs prove to have a direct effect on the institutions' ability to fulfill the purpose of the partnership. Cooperative agreements among HBCUs in some cases may provide two or more institutions with the leverage to earn a grant that none of the individual institutions would have been able to secure individually. While partnerships in other cases are established behind closed doors and presented to HBCUs as an ultimatum, the agreements in such cases tend to end abruptly.

Cooperative agreements are initiated and operated by higher education institutions, while involuntary partnerships and mergers are often mandated by governing boards, legislation, and court decisions. Most colleges and universities voluntarily participate in inter-institutional partnerships, such as the colleges federated in the Interdenominational Theological Center, the

library cooperative agreement between Alabama A&M University and six other colleges in Alabama, and the HBCU library alliance to name a few, in order to enhance their academic prestige and financial standings (Bronson, 2010; Eastman & Lang, 2001; Hollingsworth, 2008; Payton, 2013; Roebuck & Murty, 1993).[4] Involuntary partnerships like the merger that created Harris-Stowe State University, however, have been forced upon dozens of HBCUs, specifically public Black colleges, in order to fulfill their host state's diversity goals (Patterson, 1966; Smith, 1994).[5] Drawing on this context, the following study examines the history and effects of an inter-institutional partnership between Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, a public HBCU, and Florida State University, a traditionally white institution (TWI).

The study seeks to answer three research questions revolving around college partnerships involving HBCUs: a) how and why do HBCUs partner with TWIs using a case of one specific HBCU-TWI academic partnership, b) how does one HBCU-TWI partnership persist for more than 30 years while other institutional partnerships fail within the first five years, and what effect does this lasting partnership have on the HBCU involved, and c) what may other HBCUs gain from a study on one of the longest-lasting, most tightly-coupled institutional partnerships among America's HBCU and TWI? Focusing on the case of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, the study specifically explores the establishment of the joint college drawing almost exclusively from the perspectives of the HBCU's staff, alumni, and former administrators. Beyond identifying the origin of the partnership from archival documents and the stories of FAMU-

[4] See The Alabama A&M University J.F. Drake Memorial Learning Resource Center website http://libguides.aamu.edu/accessservices for details of their Library Cooperative Agreements with HBCUs Oakwood University, J.F. Drake State Community College, Concordia College Alabama, and PWIs Athens State University, Calhoun Community College, and the University of Alabama Huntsville

[5] The Harris Teachers College – Stowe Teachers College merger in 1954, the mergers of all 12 of Florida's public historically Black community colleges in the 1960s, the merger of 4 Black community colleges in Alabama in the late 1990s and early 21st century, and the Tennessee State University – University of Tennessee-Nashville merger of 1979 were all involuntary (Guyden, 1999; Smith, 1994; Southern Education Foundation, 1995; Wetstein, 2005; Winn, 2008).

associated sources, the study examines how the joint college has endured over three decades and how that time as a shared academic entity has affected the historically Black institution and its students. Finally, the study identifies the lessons other HBCUs may learn from FAMU's experience with the partnership.

The researcher argues that the FAMU-FSU joint college case serves as an example of how public HBCUs are forced to operate in a different role than public traditionally White institutions, a role where HBCUs are stripped and robbed of resources and programs for the eventual benefit of traditionally White institutions. Following the introduction of the sharecropping system and how it mirrors HBCUs' situation in American higher education, chapter one continues with a brief overview of HBCU partnerships, a significant construct in the study that is examined in detail in the literature review of the study. The HBCU partnerships section follows a brief synopsis of the historical effects of Black college partnerships and further overview of the study of HBCU-TWI partnerships.

Black colleges partnering with TWIs have proven to have adverse effects on other nearby HBCUs similar to Fisk University's engineering partnership with The University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK). The Fisk-UTK partnership improves the TWI's diversity representation, while denying the opportunity to support the engineering program at neighboring Tennessee State University that remains under scrutiny for low numbers, and in many cases on the partnering HBCU itself (Federal Demonstration Partnership Membership Steering Committee, 2003; Lloyd, 2007). The HBCU perspective in both the partnering process and the resulting partnership is often left out of literature covering historically Black college partnerships with traditionally White institutions (Lloyd, 2007). Subsequently, the study seeks to offer a view of a HBCU-TWI partnership mainly from the HBCU's perspective.

In order to present the HBCU perspective, this study draws on interviews with former administrators, faculty members, and alumni of the Black college in the partnership. Each group of narrators operated in a different tier of the joint college and their perspectives varied, however, their collective voices represent the HBCU perspective for this study. Moreover, this study includes data from several TWI students and faculty members to provide additional context and support for the data collected from HBCU participants; however, the research does not attempt to tell the story of the FAMU-FSU partnership from FSU's perspective. The HBCU perspective, which is missing in most HBCU-TWI partnership literature, intentionally serves as the focus of the study as a counter-balance to extant studies on the topic interinstitutional partnerships involved Black colleges.

The terms college partnerships and inter-institutional cooperation will be used interchangeably in this study to cover a broad array of cooperative options in higher education. Both terms refer to inter-organizational relationships among colleges. Eddy (2010) defines college partnership as a collaborative between two or more higher education institutions with the goal of attaining a shared objective. Kezar and Lester (2009) group partnerships and collaborations together as inter-institutional arrangements involving joint goals and a reliance on each participating institution to accomplish the goal. The study uses a combination of definitions of inter-institutional cooperation and groups them all under the umbrella term of college partnerships. An examination of the various forms of cooperation will be presented in the study's literature review.

In order to succinctly provide the HBCU perspective in partnerships, the study begins with a brief overview of HBCU inter-institutional cooperation. A literature review of inter-institutional cooperation follows the introduction; the review features a taxonomy of institutional

partnerships supported by an HBCU case for each type of partnership. After partnerships are defined and explored, the following section outlines the historiographical methods used to collect the data. Next, the findings portion of the study chronicles the formation of the HBCU-TWI joint college, and presents the parity issues that emerged from the research of the partnership. A recommendation for partnering HBCUs and further research into inter-institutional partnerships concludes the study.

**HBCU Partnerships**

A number of HBCUs have participated in institutional cooperation at different stages along the continuum of inter-institutional arrangements (Lang, 2002). At the far ends of the theoretical continuum are program closures and mergers [see Figure 1], the most common forms of cooperation for HBCUs between the two extremes are consortia, federation, and affiliation.

Voluntary cooperation among Black colleges have protected the legacy, enhanced the financial resources, and maximized the academic offerings of many partnering institutions (Flemming, 1995). Partnerships between TWIs and HBCUs, however, are often involuntary and many have led to the complete dissolution of the HBCU as was the case with Sewanee River Junior College being forcibly absorbed into North Florida Community College (Edens & Gilsinan, 2005; Lovett, 2011; Smith, 1994). HBCU partnerships with TWIs span the continuum of inter-institutional cooperation; examples of each form of cooperation involving HBCUs will be surveyed in this study's review of literature.

Of the many partnership types that exist between HBCUs and TWIs, jointly operated academic programs tend to be the most tightly coupled partnerships formed. A number of HBCUs participate in academic partnerships with TWIs through consortia and affiliation; however, only two partnerships exist as a merger of entire academic schools between a public

HBCU and a public TWI. Of the two extant HBCU-TWI joint schools, one has been operating since the early 1980s and involves the largest HBCU in the nation, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University. Due to its size and the nature of its strategic alliance, examining the partnership between Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University and Florida State University as a case study may provide valuable insight into the parity of HBCU-TWI partnerships and uncover implications for the future of such inter-institutional cooperation.

**Figure 1.** Lang's (Lang) continuum of inter-institutional cooperation




**Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University – Florida State University Partnership**

Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University is one of the largest HBCUs, and as many other Black colleges, it maintains multiple partnerships with fellow higher education institutions. FAMU participates in an intercollegiate athletic conference, a very common collaboration for universities with revenue generating sports. As a member institution of the all-HBCU Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference, FAMU is able to tap into a niche market that can be profitable for it and each of the conference's member institutions. FAMU also participates in the HBCU Library Alliance, a consortium of HBCU libraries designed to promote collaboration among HBCUs and improve efficiency in each libraries' delivery of services (Hollingsworth, 2008). The collaboration that is the focus of this study, however, is the academic partnership for the college of engineering between Florida A&M University and Florida State University (FSU) – a TWI.

The Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University-Florida State University College of Engineering is the longest-running joint college between a Black university and a TWI. Established in 1982 by an act of the Florida General Assembly, the FAMU-FSU Institute of Engineering, as it was originally named (Neyland & Riley, 1987), was created during a period of rapid, court-ordered and federally sanctioned change for America's HBCUs (D. A. Harley, 2001; Lee, 2010; Palmer, Davis, & Gasman, 2011). Desegregation cases ranging from the 1971 *Adams v. Richardson* decision that broadly effected every state with a public HBCU, to decisions with a more narrow scope such as *Geier v University of Tennessee* and the first *Knight v Alabama* ruling in 1991 (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007), took place nearly every year from the passage of the Higher Education Act of 1965 to the establishment of the joint Engineering programs in Tallahassee in 1982 (Frair, 1990). Moreover, an ongoing program duplication concern in Maryland is still being litigated as recently as 2017 (Kelderman, 2012; La Noue, 2013; Palmer et al., 2011).

Of all the changes in higher education during the 1970s, Florida's legislature was possibly most concerned about the developments in Tennessee. Beginning in 1968, Rita Sanders Geier, an employee of the public Black institution Tennessee State University, was in litigation with the state of Tennessee regarding segregation and discrimination in the state's higher education policies (Lovett, 2011). The settlement resulted in a merger of the University of Tennessee-Nashville, a traditionally White institution, into Tennessee State University, an HBCU (E. B. Davis, 1993; Winn, 2008). The 1977 *Geier* decision was the first court-ordered merger in higher education in which the Black college absorbed a White institution ("Geier v. Blanton," 1977; Lovett, 2012).

Prior to the *Adams* case in 1972, several Southern states' solutions to desegregation involved closing down Black schools or merging them into PWIs under White leadership (Education, 1991; Provasnik & Shafer, 2004; Smith, 1994). After the United States government interceded to support Black colleges like Tennessee State University in the desegregation cases, states with public HBCUs, including Florida, began submitting desegregation plans that explicitly declared that they would not be merging any PWIs with neighboring HBCUs (State University System of Florida, 1978). Before being pressured by the United States Office of Civil Rights, however, Florida openly and explicitly segregated their public higher education institutions. The submission of the desegregation plan, however, set the stage for the focus of the study, a historical look at the formation of the FAMU-FSU joint college of engineering.

The literature referring to college partnerships is voluminous (Butcher, Bezzina, & Moran, 2011; Eckel & Hartley, 2008; Harman & Harman, 2008); however, there is a paucity of refereed journal articles, books, and published papers highlighting HBCU partnerships with PWIs (Ofili et al., 2013). This study seeks to fill this gap by surveying the existing literature on HBCU-PWI partnerships and investigating the operations, productivity, and effects of unique type of college partnership in one particular setting. The primary focus of this study is the formation of college partnerships, HBCU-PWI partnerships in particular. Accordingly, the study highlights and explores the partnership between America's largest HBCU and one of the country's largest PWIs to identify 1) how the partnership was established, 2) what has sustained this partnership, and 3) how the partnership has affected the institutional advancement of the participating HBCU, specifically FAMU's engineering program. The purpose of the study is to examine how the FAMU-FSU partnership has evolved over time from an equity perspective and

to ascertain what can be learned from this partnership to possibly apply to other HBCUs in similar situations to establish or enhance successful partnerships.

## Research Design

The study is based in qualitative research methodology. Qualitative research methods are best suited for understanding the meaning individuals and groups ascribe to social problems (Creswell, 2009). In order to conduct an in-depth exploration of a particular phenomenon, in this case the establishment and development of a joint college, the study espouses the case study qualitative research strategy. The case is limited by time and activity, thus the study uses both archival data and oral histories to collect data.

The paper also utilizes historical methodology to illuminate the establishment of the partnership and its associated challenges over a thirty-two year period. The study draws heavily from the special collections, institutional histories, and archives of a number of both historically Black and historically White institutions. Furthermore, as a case study of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, data are drawn from the archives of the Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University, Florida State University, FAMU-FSU College of Engineering Office of the Dean, and the State Archives of Florida. The researcher used phone calls to college historians, perused individual university's academic catalogs dating back to the 1980s, and held meetings with various college officials and faculty to collect information through personal communication.

A specific group of the faculty proved completely unwilling to participate in the study. The interviews for this study were conducted on-site and by phone coincidentally while an internal study commissioned by the State University System of Florida was also taking place. Consequently, the FAMU-associated engineering professors declined to participate in the

interviews for this study. One FAMU professor explained the sensitive nature of the study being conducted by the SUS commissioned organization, and confirmed with the researcher that the engineering professors on FAMU faculty funding lines had collectively decided to refrain from additional interviews until the final SUS report was made public. As a result, the only FAMU faculty member interviewed served the joint college within their appointment as a full-time administrator in the joint college.

Informal conversations with campus officials and archivists provided fruitful leads to primary documents and secondary materials unavailable in the archives, added support and context to the documented histories, and filled in the gaps left by the archived reports. Reference and special collections librarians provided digital copies of physically delicate artifacts, and the librarians also provided complimentary print resources to provide a context for the few, seemingly nondescript artifacts.

**Institutional Histories**. Historian Bobby Lovett's 2011 book *America's Black Colleges and Universities* provides a narrative history of HBCUs collectively and the formation of the institutions individually (Lovett, 2011). In the book, Lovett summarizes the mergers and partnerships that formed many of the country's Black colleges. Following the mergers presented in Lovett's (2011) work and Provasnik and Shafer's (2004) National Center for Education Statistics report on HBCUs, a list was developed outlining the names of the merged institutions and the dates of their mergers.[i] Further investigation revealed institutional histories, usually written by or sanctioned by the individual institution's leadership, which possessed in-depth accounts of the mergers (Corey, 1895; Edens & Gilsinan, 2005; Engineering, 2007; Flemming, 1995; Matlock & Humphries, 1979; Neyland, 2001).

**Archives**. The archives and special collections departments of Florida A&M University, Florida State University, and the State of Florida were visited to located primary documents for this study. The FAMU-FSU College of Engineering library did not possess any institutional records in its holdings; however, the college of engineering's Dean's Office held a large cache of documents spanning the tenure of the college's first dean. Assistant Dean Braketta Ritzenthaler identified the relevant documents from the stacks of binders in the former dean's vault, and provided photocopies of the original documents.

At Florida Agricultural Mechanical University, the Coleman Library staff provided caches of academic bulletins and course catalogs dating back to the year 1980. Each catalog was examined by the introductory history, list of academic colleges and divisions, course offerings, and course descriptions for evidence of engineering related courses offered. Additionally, the library provided access to the centennial history of FAMU as recorded by History Professor Leedell Neyland (1987), and the staff offered photocopied sections covering the engineering partnership from the updated version of FAMU's historiography that included the years from the university's centennial to the 21st century (Neyland, 2001).

When leads had been nearly exhausted in the university libraries, both the archivist at FSU and the FAMU special collections librarian identified complimentary partnership documents in the State Archives of Florida. The state archivists provided boxes of the Florida Board of Regents' meeting minutes from 1979 to 1987, the founding and formative years of the FAMU-FSU partnership. Each document from the universities, the College of Engineering, and State of Florida archives were copied, read, and examined for relevance. If a document mentioned the contention, negotiation, and/or formation of the FAMU-FSU partnership, it was selected to be included in the study. The researcher draws a base understanding of the FAMU-

FSU partnership from the extant literature on the relationship between the institutions leading up to the joint college.

**Oral History.** Oral history is a qualitative interview method that emphasizes the participant's point of view. Separate from oral traditions of passing down stories, oral history is the extraction and preservation of data from memories (Ritchie, 2014). It focuses on the individual, with an organic approach to finding out about a person's life or a phenomenon in their life (Conway, 2012). The oral history method allows researchers to record the remembrances of people and entire groups that may previously not have been heard or regarded as significant (Conway, 2012). As a result, oral history research methods have been used and further developed in feminist research, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, folklore, psychology, media research, and federal historiography projects (Conway, 2012; Leavy, 2011).

Though oral history interviews are used in numerous fields for commercial application, the process, also known as life history, personal narrative, memoir, and testament (Conway, 2012), has set standards and best practices for basic research. According to the Oral History Association (2009), research-based oral history is distinguished by its content and extent; therefore, oral history interviews they cannot be rushed (Conway, 2012). Ritchie (2014) provides additional support for how oral history differs from more common forms of interviews such as news journalism in his book *Doing Oral History*:

> An interview becomes an oral history only when it has been recorded, processed in some way, made available in an archive, library, or other repository, or reproduced in relatively verbatim form for publication. Availability for general research, reinterpretation, and verification defines oral history. By preserving the recordings and transcripts of their

> interviews, oral historians seek to leave a complete, candid, and reliable record as possible. (Ritchie, 2014).

Pertaining to interviews, Ritchie (2014) writes that the reason for doing oral history is to ask questions that have not been asked and to collect memories that would otherwise be lost. Oral history requires a deep, personal interaction with the interview participant/narrator and a realization of the researcher that the interview is a highly collaborative process (Conway, 2012). The length of an oral history interview can vary substantially and is determined by numerous influences, including narrator preferences, time constraints, and budget (Conway, 2012). Historian Patricia Leavy (2011) writes that oral history interviews may involve few participants in multiple sessions of 90 to 120 minutes, while other research provides examples of significantly more participants interviewed in single sessions for varied time spans: in every case the oral history interviews are described taking "sufficient time" to allow the narrators to tell stories in their entirety (Association, 2009; Conway, 2012; Ritchie, 2014). As such, oral history allows for a more in-depth interview with each participant than other qualitative study methods, and is the method commonly used to access subjugated voices (Leavy, 2011). Using the oral history strategy provides the best method for filling in the historical record with the views and perspectives of those still living who formerly represented the university and the joint college (Leavy, 2011).

Interviewing people about events that took place throughout their lifetime has its limitations. Problems may occur due to the inaccuracy of human memory, including, but not limited to problems with story recall, loss of memory, and suppressed memories (Conway, 2012; Ritchie, 2014). News coverage and current events may skew or bias the stories of narrators over time. Personal biases, a partisan point of view, and prejudice could alter narrators' stories as

well. Finding supporting information boosts the reliability of narrator's stories, thus testing stories against other evidence such as the stories of other participants and archival documents may enhance the trustworthiness of the data. Archival documents may sometimes be incomplete, inaccurate, and deceiving, and interviews conducted years after the event may draw from imprecise memories; however, trained interviewers can raise questions, triangulate data, and challenge dubious answers to get the most accurate responses possible (Ritchie, 2014).

Drawing from Armitage and Gluck's 1998 dialogue on oral history, Patricia Leavy (2011) writes "oral history can be both a scholarly and activist enterprise, contributing to people's empowerment and social change, often at a community level" (p. 6). Accordingly, oral history methodology fits the ideology of the research and the larger goal of the study: illuminating the disparity common in HBCU-PWI partnerships in an effort to promote improved approaches to inter-institutional cooperation.

The study examines the perceptions of the institution during the formation and development of the merger. In order to get the perspective of the HBCU in the partnership, former administrators, students, and faculty of FAMU and the joint college were identified and interviewed. During the interviews, 17 narrators including top administrators, alumni, and former faculty were asked to recall the changes over time that took place with the merger and how those changes affected FAMU. The following section presents findings of the partnerships orgins and then leads into chapter organization for the rest of the study.

**The Evolution of the FAMU-FSU Relationship & the College of Engineering**

Though established in direct response to the policy preventing program duplication included in the Florida Desegregation Plan, the FAMU and Florida State University joint program was promoted by the State University System of Florida as primarily academic

(Engineering, 2007). The FAMU-FSU partnership, moreover, is an academic partnership forged by merging similar academic units from both participating institutions. The complexity and level of its cooperation is unique in the field of college partnerships (Engineering, 2007); more than sharing one or two academic programs, Florida A&M University and its neighboring college Florida State University share an entire college. With little literature available concerning HBCU-PWI partnerships, there are virtually no published articles on FAMU-FSU joint college of engineering. This gap in the literature is where this research concentrates its investigation. The following description of the partnership draws from the few articles that could be found that peripherally mention the FAMU-FSU partnership and the two historical texts that were written and published at FAMU and the joint college. The College of Engineering history text is identifiably written from the PWI perspective, filling this gap of literature on HBCU partnerships written from the perspective of the HBCU is another goal of this study.

The Florida A&M University-Florida State University College of Engineering is one of the first HBCU-PWI joint colleges in the nation (Ohland & Zhang, 2002). The existence of the two public institutions in the same city of Tallahassee, Florida is a result of segregation as was the case for most HBCUs (Bell, 1979). Founded in 1887 adjacent to downtown Tallahassee, FAMU quickly established a relatively large student enrollment due the location and large number of African Americans in the state desiring a higher education (Neyland & Riley, 1987). Three years into its establishment, FAMU was designated as the state's 1890 Morrill Land-Grant institution for Black students.

The Morrill Land-Grant program provided federal money that was to be matched by state funds for instruction in agricultural sciences, mechanical arts, and the preparation of military officers (LaMay, 2001); the state of Florida, however, did not match the land-grant funding for

engineering. Consequently, FAMU, devoid of the state matching funds for mechanical arts, went 90 years only being able to offer engineering sciences and engineering technology programs, instead of a full engineering degree like the state's 1862 Land-Grant designee, the predominantly White University of Florida. Still in its infancy, FAMU was relocated to the land immediately south of the railroad tracks from its original campus in downtown Tallahassee, and the state of Florida deeded FAMU's former campus to FSU (Neyland & Riley, 1987). The loss of their campus to FSU was only the beginning of FAMU's past with their predominantly White neighboring institution: over the course of the next seven decades, FAMU lost their medical and law programs to FSU (Engineering, 2007; Neyland & Riley, 1987).

The Florida desegregation plan accepted by the Office of Civil Rights in 1977 set policies in place that considered this state's historic unfair treatment of FAMU (Florida, 1977). Accordingly, Florida denoted in the desegregation plan that FAMU would get preferential consideration for new programs (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007; Neyland & Riley, 1987); therefore, when FSU administration requested new engineering programs to be located in Tallahassee, the request was struck down until FAMU was invited to the conversation.

*Origin of the FAMU-FSU partnership*. The Florida desegregation plan disallowed FSU from simply persuading the state government officials to authorize an engineering program to be located at the FSU campus as had been the case with the medical and law programs. FAMU was supported by the desegregation plan's preferential consideration clause and, because it had been offering engineering sciences programs since 1890, FAMU's ability to host the only engineering program in city was protected by the desegregation plan's program duplication prohibition. Florida State, convinced that hosting a college of engineering would significantly increase its

academic reputation, devised a strategy to partner with FAMU to secure an engineering program in the Tallahassee city limits (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007).

Consequently, FSU and FAMU, both anxious to expand current academic offerings and to host a comprehensive engineering school, put their contentious past behind them, wrote a collective report for the need of a college of engineering in west Florida, and presented a joint request for a college of engineering (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007). With the request submitted, the Florida Board of Regents had multiple factors to consider before making a decision. The literature suggests the Florida BOR deliberated on the location, institutional history, and financial complexities associated with a college of engineering. After facilitating internal discussions and examining external consultation reports, the state of Florida approved the new engineering institute be established in Tallahassee and operated jointly by the two universities effective for 1982-1983 academic year (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007; Neyland & Riley, 1987).

The significance of location and proximity of FAMU to FSU is more extreme than that of most HBCUs in the same service area as TWIs (Southern Regional Education Board, 1969). FAMU is located less than half of a mile south of the FSU campus. Though so close in proximity, each university, FAMU and FSU, operated separate engineering programs or departments at one point before the merger. Directly before the merger, however, FAMU had two engineering divisions, while FSU had none (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007).

The literature reveals that though there has not been much written about either desegregation or college partnerships with Florida A&M University, the few articles that do exist pertain to FAMU's consolidation of programs with the University of Florida (Southern Regional Education Board, 1973), or offer an in-depth view of the history and current operations of the

FAMU-FSU College of Engineering (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007; Ohland & Zhang, 2002). Though numerous articles have been published regarding African Americans in STEM fields, FAMU, which was once prominent in the literature for being a top producer Black physical science bachelor's degrees, has not been mentioned recently in the discourse about training Black scientist and engineers.

Stassun (2010; 2011) and the Southern Regional Education Board (1973) have called for further studies to investigate whether institutional cooperation is an efficient method of broadening participation for underrepresented minorities. The following case study examines the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering presents how the college of engineering partnership has affected the HBCU, FAMU. Investigating the partnership from the perspective of the FAMU administration, faculty, and alumni, the study highlights how the partnership has influenced FAMU students' approach to engineering education. Moreover, the study exposes how the partnership exists as a loophole to Florida's higher education desegregation plans and policies. Finally, the study reveals how far the partnership has fallen from fulfilling its goals of being the top grantor of undergraduate degrees to African Americans and major conferrer of engineering degrees to women. The partnership is found to be a unique inter-institutional partnership, yet numerous very public attempts to dismantle the partnership reveal the intentions of the state, governing board, and the institutions themselves toward the coerced merging of racially identifiable organizations. The information about the attempts to dismantle the partnership was not highlighted in the literature, and was uncovered through oral history.

## Chapter Organization

The following chapters in this study cover the literature relevant to inter-institutional cooperation, results and analysis of the study's findings, and a discussion of the study's

implications on current and future HBCU partnerships. In this chapter I explore HBCU partnerships and discuss the reason behind conducting a study on the FAMU-FSU joint college. The purpose of the study and the problem statement are presented along with the methods used to collect and analyze the data.

Chapter two presents a review of literature that provides context for the FAMU-FSU partnership. The literature review is divided into three major sections: inter-institutional partnerships, HBCU history, and FAMU-FSU partnership history. The first section introduces college partnerships, explores the various forms of higher education cooperation, and provides HBCU examples for each partnership type. Afterwards, the chapter presents the origin of historically Black colleges and examines the similarities and differences among institutional types. The chapter ends with an overview of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering partnership.

The second half of the study features three findings chapters and a conclusion. Chapter three presents the study's findings from the archives and interviews with two former FAMU presidents. Chapter four explores the partnership mainly using the perspectives of former students, how the students observed the daily operations of the partnership and how they perceived the partnership affecting them personally and their home institutions. Major issues in race relations, grading policies, and contrasting perspectives among the students and faculty highlight chapter five. Finally, chapter six concludes the study with implications of the findings and recommendations for further research.

## Chapter Endnotes

[i] Merger information drawn directly from the Provasnik and Shafer (2004) National Center for Education Statistics Report on Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and institutional histories found on specific institution's websites:

## Black College Mergers

| Merged Institution (year of merger) | State | Original Institution(s) (founding year) | Original Institution(s) (founding year) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bishop State Community College (1993) | AL | Bishop State Jr. College (1927) | Carver State Technical College (1962)<br>Southwest State Technical College (1954) |
| Gadsden State Community College, Valley Street Campus (1985) | AL | Gadsden State Technical Institute (1960) | Alabama Technical College* (1925)<br>Gadsden State Junior College* (1965) |
| Lawson State Community College (1973) | AL | Wenonah Vocational Trade School for Negroes (1949) | Theodore Alfred Lawson State Junior College (1963) |
| Shelton State Community College, C.A. Fredd Campus (1993) | AL | C.A. Fredd State Technical College (1963) | Shelton State Community College* (1952) |
| University of the District of Columbia (1976) | D.C. | D.C. Teachers College (1851) | Federal City College (1968)<br>Washington Technical Institute (1968) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bethune-Cookman University (1923) | FL | Daytona Normal and Industrial Institute for Women (1904) | Cookman Institute (1872) |
| Clark-Atlanta University (1989) | GA | Clark College (1869) | Atlanta University (1865) |
| Fort Valley State University (1939) | GA | Fort Valley Normal and Industrial School (1895) | Forsyth State Teachers and Agricultural College (1902) |
| Hinds Community College, Utica Campus (1982) | MS | Utica Junior College (1903) | Hinds Junior College* (1917) |
| Harris-Stowe State University | MO | Harris State Teachers College* (1857) | Stowe State Teachers College (1890) |
| Barber-Scotia College (1930) | NC | Barber Memorial College (1869) | Scotia Women's College (1867) |
| Knoxville College (1989) | TN | Knoxville College (1875) | Morristown College (1881) |
| LeMoyne Owen College (1968) | TN | LeMoyne College (1862) | Owen Junior College (1954) |
| Tennessee State University (1979) | TN | Tennessee State University (1912) | University of Tennessee-Nashville* (1968) |
| Huston-Tillotson College (1952) | TX | Tillotson College (1875) | Samuel Huston College (1876) |

## Black College Spinoffs and Expansions

| *Extension/Spinoff Institution* | *Original Institution* |
|---|---|
| *Bishop State Community College* | Alabama State University |
| *University of Arkansas, Pine Bluff* | University of Arkansas* |
| *Morehouse School of Medicine (1975)* | Morehouse College |
| *Central State University (1947)* | Wilberforce University |

**Bishop State CC** – Founded as the Alabama State Branch by Mrs. Fredericka Evans and Dr. H. Council Trenholm, President of Alabama State College. In 1936, the College began offering a two-year curriculum as part of the parent institution, Alabama State University. In 1965, the College became an independent junior college and the name was changed to Mobile State Junior college. In 1971, the name of the institution was changed to honor its first President, Dr. S.D. Bishop. In 1993 Carver State Technical College and Southwest State Technical College merged with Bishop State Community College.

**Lawson State CC** – In October 1973, Wenonah Vocational Trade School for Negroes (founded in 1949) and Theodore Alfred Lawson State Junior College (founded in 1963 and known as the Wenonah State Technical Junior College between 1963 and 1969) merged as a result of Alabama legislation adopted June, 1972.

**Shelton State CC, C.A. Fredd Campus** – C.A. Fredd State Technical College merged with Shelton Sate Community College on February 1993. Enrollment is for C.A. Fredd State Technical College only.

**University of the District of Columbia** – The roots of the University of the District of Columbia, the nation's only metropolitan, land-grant institution of higher education, stretch back to 1851 when Myrtilla Miner opened a school to prepare Black women to teach. In 1976, three public higher education institutions, D.C. Teachers College, Federal City College, and Washington Technical Institute, were merged into the University of the District of Columbia. This merger caused the enrollment increase between 1976 and 1980.

**Bethune-Cookman U** – Upon the merger in 1923 of Cookman Institute for Men, founded in 1872 by the Reverend D.S.B. Darnell, and Daytona Normal and Industrial Institute for Women, founded in 1904 by Dr. Mary McLeod Bethune, the institution became the Daytona Cookman Collegiate Institute and was taken over by the Board of Education of the Methodist Church. The name was later changed to Bethune-Cookman College.

**Clark-Atlanta University** – Atlanta University and Clark College merged in July, 1989, to become Clark Atlanta University.

**Fort Valley State University** – The Fort Valley Normal and Industrial School merged with the Forsyth State Teachers and Agricultural College in 1939 to become Fort Valley State College.

**Harris-Stowe State University –** Founded in 1857 as the first teacher education institution west of the Mississippi. Was formerly known as Harris Teachers College and Harris Stowe College.

**Barber-Scotia College** - Founded as Scotia Seminary, a preparatory school for young Black women. In 1916 changed its name to Scotia Women's College. Merged with Barber Memorial College in 1930. In 1932 changed name to Barber-Scotia College and then became coeducational in 1954. Historically affiliated with the Presbyterian Church (USA).

**Knoxville College** – In 1989, Morristown College merged with Knoxville College. Knoxville was founded in 1875 by the United Presbyterian Church of North America. Lost Title IV accreditation in 1996.

**LeMoyne Owen College** – In 1968 LeMoyne College and Owen College merged.

**Tennessee State University** – Founded in 1912 as the Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial Normal School for Negroes. It merged with the University of Tennessee at Nashville in 1979 and now has two campuses.

**Huston-Tillotson College** – Was formed in 1952 by the merger of Tillotson College (founded in 1875) and Samuel Huston College (founded in 1876). Is supported by the United Methodist Church and the United Church of Christ.

## Chapter 2: Review of the Literature

The following chapter presents a review of the literature that provide context and explains potential influences on the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU) – Florida State University (FSU) partnership. This study aims to consider the voice of FAMU administrators and alumni in order to present a narrative of how the partnership works from the perspective of the HBCU, its leadership, and its stakeholders. To provide a structure to this large body of work, the literature review is divided into three major sections with multiple subdivisions. Aligning the major sections with the three constructs, the chapter will open with a review of college partnerships, provide a historical overview of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) which leads into the prevalence of college partnerships among HBCUs, and ends with an overview of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering partnership.

In section one of this chapter, the literature review will present college partnerships as a particular development of desegregation cases. This literature will begin where section one concluded by describing how HBCU partnerships, in particular, were influenced by desegregation litigation and legislation. The next area on college partnerships literature opens by taking a step back and covering inter-institutional partnerships as a whole. The third area concerned with college partnerships introduces an overview of the three main varieties of the college cooperation/inter-institutional partnerships that are prevalent among HBCUs: system wide consortia, multi-institutional affiliation, and program/department level partnerships. To end the section on college partnerships, the section introduces a unique HBCU-PWI partnership, one of the only single-college partnerships between an HBCU and a PWI—the FAMU/FSU College of Engineering.

Next, the chapter takes a step back to briefly introduce the origin of HBCUs as specially designated institutions. Within this body of literature is an examination of several HBCUs to illuminate how distinctions, differences, and similarities among HBCU institutional types are presented in the literature. The HBCU history section also highlights the seminal desegregation cases that led to major changes at public HBCUs. This area ends with evidence found in the literature linking HBCU closures, mergers, and acquisitions to inter-institutional partnerships.

The final section will provide historical and current context from which to understand the partnership between Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University and Florida State University. Immediately following a brief history of FAMU and its tenuous relationship with the state of Florida, the section will end with an overview of the origin and operations of the FAMU FSU partnership, the subject of this study. Key agents in the origin of the partnership will be identified as wells as indicators of the partnerships productivity.

**College Partnerships**

Before examining the Florida A&M University partnerships specifically, it will be beneficial to identify fully what a college partnership is and how it exists beyond the FAMU example. The FAMU partnerships, along with many other public HBCU partnerships, resulted from states' compliance with either the *Adams* case or subsequent desegregation case rulings. Determining how the partnerships operate, however, requires an investigation into a different construct and exploring college partnerships themselves. The following sections will offer insight on how college partnerships appear in educational research, the different types of college partnerships that exist, and provide examples of how some HBCU-PWI college partnerships function, both their benefits and detractors.

**Inter-institutional Partnerships.** College partnerships have been examined, defined, and redefined by multiple authors and organizations. For this study, a combination of the authors' definitions will be used and new definitions will be offered to fit this particular research topic. College partnerships will refer to all matter of higher education institutions working together, regardless of the capacity, level, or scope. College partnerships will serve as an umbrella term to refer to institutional cooperation, inter-institutional cooperation/partnerships/arrangements, intercollegiate cooperation, joint programs, mergers, acquisitions, consolidations, affiliations, and consortia. The following explanations and examples of college partnership types will be discussed in order from the broadest, wide-ranging terms to the most specific, narrow-ranging definitions.

*Institutional Cooperation.* Institutional cooperation is a term with a long history in higher education literature, dating back to the early 1970s, as referenced in Martha Ellison's chapter on "The Cooperative College Library Center" (Southern Regional Education Board, 1973). Institutional cooperation involves two or more post-secondary institutions operating a joint academic program, sharing grounds or physical plant facilities, dually appointing faculty, or participating in a host of any other forms of cooperation. An example of institutional cooperation presented in Ellison's case study involves a library consortium agreement designed and implemented in 1969 by six private, liberal arts HBCUs (Miles, Oakwood, Stillman, Talladega, Tougaloo, and Tuskegee) in two adjacent states, Alabama and Mississippi. The library cooperative allows the institutions to save money by group purchasing books in bulk. As the term cooperative suggests, institutional cooperation always appears in the literature as a consensual agreement among post-secondary institutions (Jackson, 2007; Southern Regional Education Board, 1973).

*Inter-institutional Cooperation*. Inter-institutional cooperation appears in the literature as fully synonymous with institutional cooperation, yet not as widely referenced (Southern Regional Education Board, 1973). Inter-institutional cooperation as a term benefits from the use of "inter" to more clearly denote that the cooperation is between two higher education institutions and not between one post-secondary institution and an agency or organization outside the realm of higher education. The term inter-institutional cooperation has appeared in the literature both with and without the hyphen and with cooperation exchanged with the words partnerships or arrangements; moreover, similarly to institutional cooperation, the term inter-institutional cooperation appears in reference to colleges opting to work together for a shared benefit. An example of this term may be found in older works on college partnerships such as the Southern Regional Education Board's (1973) *Expanding Opportunities: Case Studies of Interinstitutional Cooperation* or Barton's (2005) work on the governance of inter-institutional cooperation in American and Canadian higher education consortia.

*Inter-collegiate Cooperation.* Intercollegiate is a term most commonly used in reference to sports. An EBSCOhost search of this term generates numerous articles and books mostly with the word sports, athletics, or the actual name of an athletic event immediately following intercollegiate. Though this term more explicitly identifies the cooperating entities as colleges and not simply an institution, which could refer to mental institutions, because of its wide use in the literature in relation to athletics, intercollegiate would not be the most appropriate term for the partnerships being investigated in this study (Forcier, 2011; Johnston & Noftsinger, 2004; Lang, 2002). Some athletic conferences, such as the Big Ten, serve as examples of inter-collegiate cooperation that also fully operate as an academic inter-institutional cooperation.

*Joint Program Partnerships.* Joint programs between colleges are common in the literature. As it concerns joint programs, also referred to as cooperative programs, the literature alludes to two or more colleges sharing the resources, personnel, and/or students of a single academic unit, department, or program (Keivan Guadalupe Stassun, Burger, & Lange, 2010; Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011; Tatro & Hodson, 2011). Joint programs between institutions often originate from academic need, financial efficiency, physical proximity, or to achieve enrollment diversity goals. An example, to be further detailed later, is a joint program in physics and astronomy designed by faculty at two separate universities, in which one program is in need of more lab space, equipment, and materials, while the other is in need of more students in to enter its graduate programs (Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011). The two colleges work together to provide the joint program that involves faculty, physical space, and classes that transfer fully at both the institutions (Tatro & Hodson, 2011). Joint programs that require additional funding, articulation agreements and considerable time commitments of the faculty exist more frequently between private institutions due to their relatively higher level of flexibility—"flatter" administration, reduced bureaucracy and politicking.

*College Mergers.* College mergers, like business mergers, exist as the complete fusion of two or more institutions. Colleges have merged for multiple reasons; many mergers involving HBCUs took place between 1955 and 1980, because of the *Brown* ruling and desegregation cases following the *Adams* case (Bell, 1979; Lovett, 2011; Morris, 1999). Other colleges have merged to relieve financial and administrative problems such as Case-Western Reserve University, Davenport University, and Virginia Union University (Brown II, Donahoo, & Bertrand, 2001; Fischer, 1978). Lang (2002) offers a full taxonomy of college mergers, their various types, and

the reasoning behind many mergers in North America; both Lang (2002) and M. C. Brown (2001) offer explanations for mergers and ample examples of existing mergers.

*Acquisitions*. Acquisitions consist of one college completely absorbing another college or school. Acquisitions have taken place in various forms including, universities that have bought other full universities such as Vanderbilt's purchase of the Peabody School of Education (Conkin, 2002), and universities acquiring one school division from a university like Alabama's Samford University's acquisition of Tennessee's Cumberland University's School of Law, bringing the entire unit across state lines to be housed on the Birmingham, Alabama campus (Vause, 1996).

*Consolidations.* College consolidations occur similarly to acquisitions and mergers. However, instead of originating from wealthy private colleges buying poorer ones like the Vanderbilt acquisition of Peabody Teachers College (Conkin, 2002), or college presidents deciding that one consolidated, comprehensive university is better than two separate colleges like in the Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis merger (Gray, 2003), and consolidations normally result from public college systems combining failing programs between colleges in an effort to save money.

*Affiliations*. Affiliations and federations are alternatives to mergers that involve combining the operations, physical plant, or auxiliary functions of multiple post-secondary institutions without any of the existing parties losing name, identity, or autonomy (L. Davis, 1998; Roebuck & Murty, 1993). One of the most referenced college affiliations is the Atlanta University Center, an affiliation of Morehouse College, Spelman College, Clark-Atlanta University, Morris-Brown College, Morehouse School of Medicine, and the Interdenominational

Theological Center, six HBCUs sharing one campus and a library while fully retaining their independence, identities, and institutional missions (L. Davis, 1998; Jackson, 2007).

*Consortia*. College consortia is one of the most prevalent types of college partnerships in US Higher Education, numerous articles and books on college partnerships reference consortia (Jackson, 2007; Lang, 2002; Southern Regional Education Board, 1973). Consortia are the relatively loose cooperation agreements between multiple universities to share a common resource, to allow for seamless transfers of students, and/or to exchange people, property, material, equipment, or programs on a regular basis. Consortia usually span larger spans of area and space than other types of college partnerships. The Virginia Tidewater Consortium sharing one specialist professor among three public colleges along the eastern shore of Virginia and the Cooperate College Library Center consortia of HBCUs in "Deep South" states sharing one library processing center and exchanging library holdings are examples of consortia (Southern Regional Education Board, 1973).

The literature referring to college partnerships are voluminous; however, the availability of refereed journal articles, books, and published papers highlighting HBCU partnerships with PWIs is limited. This study seeks to fill this gap by surveying the existing literature on HBCU-PWI partnerships and investigating the operations, productivity, and effects of unique type of college partnership in one particular setting. Though the primary focus of this study is college partnerships, HBCU-PWI partnerships, as a less researched subject area, will be highlighted and the partnership between one of the nation's largest HBCUs and one of the country's largest PWIs will be examined to identify: 1) how the partnership between the HBCU and PWI was established, 2) how the partnership endured for more than 30 years and how the 30 years of

partnership affected the HBCU, and 3) what can be learned from this partnership to possibly apply to other HBCUs in similar situations to establish or enhance successful partnerships.

**HBCU-PWI Partnerships.** The following subdivision of this literature review will identify HBCU-PWI partnerships, provide rationalities for their establishments, and offer some insight into the operations of these lightly researched college partnerships. Beginning with the main reasons HBCUs partner with PWIs, the subsection will lead into the main types of HBCU-PWI partnerships and give examples of each type. The third type of college partnership identified will lead into the third and final section of this chapter, the FAMU-FSU partnership.

Relatively small HBCUs graduate more students in the sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics than most of the largest traditionally White institutions. Vanderbilt University physics professor Keivan Stassun (2010) provides the example that Xavier University of Louisiana graduated more African American physics baccalaureates in 2005 than all of the Big Ten schools combined (Keivan Guadalupe Stassun et al., 2010). Subsequently, the argument is made that institutional partnerships with HBCUs are effective solutions for broadening participation in the STEM fields (Keivan Guadalupe Stassun, 2003).

***HBCU-PWI Full institutional merger.*** A common type of partnership in the 1960s and 1970s was the merger as a result of desegregation court case mandates and policies. Harris Teachers College, a White teachers college in St. Louis, merged with Stowe Teachers College to become Harris-Stowe State University, a Black teachers college also located in midtown St. Louis, in 1955 in response to the state of Missouri's implementation of *Brown*-influenced desegregation plan (Morris, 1999). Another commonly referenced survivor of an HBCU merger is the Tennessee State University Merger with University of Tennessee – Nashville (Bell, 1979; Lovett, 2011; Winn, 2008).

***Multi-institutional affiliation***. The Atlanta University Center is made up of a voluntary partnership between six historically Black colleges and universities in which they share one contiguous campus (L. Davis, 1998; Lovett, 2011; Roebuck & Murty, 1993; Southern Regional Education Board, 1973). The original impetus to create the Atlanta University Center stemmed from efficiently directing funds for Black education in Atlanta, the affiliation drew Morehouse College, Spelman College, and Atlanta University (currently Clark-Atlanta University, a merger itself of Clark College and Atlanta University) on one campus to share a library and grounds while retaining autonomy and operating as separate institutions (L. Davis, 1998).

*HBCU affiliation partnership with PWI consortia*. The AUC has created a partnership in the form of a dual-degree agreement with engineering schools at four PWIs, the Georgia Institute of Technology, Boston University, Auburn University, and Rochester Institute of Technology (Roebuck & Murty, 1993). The AUC is not alone, Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee partners with the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Harris-State State University established a "3+2 partnership" with Saint Louis University for engineering, and multiple other HBCUs have formed partnerships with PWIs to provide students with access to academic programs possessing more faculty and cutting edge facilities than are commonly found at HBCUs (Roebuck & Murty, 1993; Southern Regional Education Board, 1973; Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011). However, the AUC partnership is not given much attention in the literature on college partnerships, even though it is one of the only partnerships consisting of multiple levels and types of partnerships within its affiliation and consortia; the AUC is basically college partnerships epitomized, a gap in the literature that may be investigated in another study.

***Academic Program Partnership.*** *Fisk-Vanderbilt Master's to PhD Bridge Program.* The Fisk-Vanderbilt Master's-to-PhD Bridge program is an academic partnership between two

historically prestigious institutions (Fisk University is considered one of the "Black Ivy League" schools, and Vanderbilt is regarded by many Southerners as an elite university) less than a mile away from each other in Nashville; the program appears in the literature as a model for cultivating potential in underrepresented students (Roebuck & Murty, 1993; Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011). The Fisk-Vanderbilt Bridge Program focuses on finding and activating the potential in students who would normally be overlooked by other top-research science programs (Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011).

Stassun (2010; 2011), is a staunch advocate of HBCU-PWI partnerships, subsequently, he offers six keys that PWI academic programs may consider adopting in order to successfully cultivate potential in underrepresented college students: 1) developing strong relationships between faculty mentors and the students in the program; 2) peer mentoring and support are presented as the second most significant component necessary for activating the potential in students that may not possess high standardized test scores yet show promise and ability through their grade point averages; 3) research and presentation opportunities must be highlighted and offered to the underrepresented students; 4) a PWI should focus on integrating intellectual, time management, logistical, emotional, and social skills; 5) traditionally White institutions intending to cultivate potential in underrepresented students must get develop tools to share tacit knowledge; and finally, 6) special attention must be given to navigating critical junctures, the Fisk-Vanderbilt Bridge Program administrators take care to inform incoming classes of the stumbling blocks their predecessors faced in the program. For each cohort, the Fisk-Vanderbilt Bridge Program successfully tracks students and their progress through the program by looking at "inflection points" for students in the program.

The Fisk-Vanderbilt Bridge Program did not develop as a direct mandate from a desegregation case ruling. Thus without settlement money to supplement costs, the program is funded by both of private institutions themselves and supported as well any external grants such as those from the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011).

The coordinators of the Fisk-Vanderbilt Bridge write that the program is successful because it uses a variety of mechanisms to cultivate a truly mutual institutional partnership between Vanderbilt and Fisk (Keivan Guadalupe Stassun et al., 2010). It is not that one college benefits from the partnership significantly more than the other. Faculties in both physics departments take care to form research collaborations across campuses. Additionally, the faculty push for support of administrators of the program and their home institutions, while the administrators also support the faculty to continue facilitating all the activities that make the program a success—this is a situation Stassun (2010) refers to as bottom-up and top-down support.

## HBCU History and Culture

It is important to contextualize Black college partnerships within the larger scope of Historically Black College/University history and culture. The history of HBCUs begins with the history of segregation in education (Bell, 1979). Beginning with the establishment of higher education in the United States with the founding of Harvard in the year 1636, college, like freedom,[6] was reserved for descendants of Europeans (Rudolph, 1977). In the mid-1600s, both

[6] Slavery in America has roots in the early 1500s, in fact, in 1510, King Ferdinand of Spain ordered 250 enslaved Africans be sent to work the gold and silver mines in the New World [Central America] (Rawley & Behrendt, 2005). Some historians, however, distinguish the beginning of chattel slavery in the United States as a separate phenomenon kicked off by the arrival of captured Africans to Jamestown, Virginia in 1619 (History.com, 2009; Rawley & Behrendt, 2005). Dorothy and Carl J. Schneider (2007) write that Europe engaged in the slave trade in

enslaved and free Africans in America were more concerned with the accessing the basics of education in this "New World" than with German-based higher learning. After learning to speak the English language, Africans sought to master the written words of their new home and thus began the long road to Black higher education with the primary objective of obtaining literacy.

**Black education before HBCUs.** Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Puritan and Protestant missionaries in New England taught enslaved and free Africans to read, linking literacy to a deeper understanding of the Christian Bible. Many white citizens, including slaveholders, in the late 1600s and 1700s also tolerated and, in some cases, encouraged African literary and vocational instruction, linking education to the preparation of more efficient workers (Moss, 2009, p. 10). Local and state legislators, however, associated the thought of African literacy with nightmares of insurrection and loss of revenue; subsequently, laws were established throughout the English colonies to restrict the gatherings and teaching of African slaves (Williams, 2005). Enslaved Africans defied the law and learned how to read in secret, "stealing" education at the sides of their White charges, playing school with White children, and holding clandestine education meetings during Sunday gatherings (Anderson, 1988; Williams, 2005).

Frightened by the Stono Rebellion in 1739, concerned about the smaller insurrections that occurred directly before and during the American Revolution, and capped by Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831, slaveholders and lawmakers throughout the newly formed Union began modifying laws regarding the education of Africans in America (Williams, 2005). While cities like Boston, Massachusetts; Providence, Rhode Island; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Portland, Maine; New York, and Philadelphia supported "African" schools with public funds by the year 1830, most southern states further limited the education possibilities for the enslaved and free

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the mid-15th century and "beginning in 1636 Americans too sent ships to Africa, at first to transport slaves to the British colonies in North America" (p. 3).

African American population (Moss, 2009). Educators in New York, Philadelphia and Connecticut worked together in 1831 to propose the creation of what would be the nation's first "African" college in New Haven, Connecticut. New Haven had already shown support for African American literacy by serving as the host city for the African Improvement Society, multiple schools for freedmen, and numerous Black churches, so it seemed a prime location to the proposal organizers for the commencement of African American higher education. New Englanders' growing discomfort with the increased African American presence and, more poignantly, the proposal for an African American males college coming just two days after the Turner rebellion led to a swift and decisive rejection of the proposed college's charter (Moss, 2009). It would take until 1837, another six years, and a change of location before the groundwork was laid for a reading room in a library that would become America's first Black college.

The very concept of slave rebellions influenced race related uprisings throughout African American history. As the issue prompting the revolt became less violent so too did the method of rebelling. Slavery prompted the revolutionaries like Nat Turner to take up arms and take lives in 1831. Institutional racial hostilities that occurred 130 years after the end of slavery, on the other hand, prompted a group of FAMU students to rebel by taking over a joint college ceremony and the dean's office (Frair, 1990). Slavery presented a tragic, dire situation for Africans in America, and the knowledge that the system set up the condition to extend beyond one's lifetime to their descendants intensified the desire, the need to rebel.

During legalized slavery, not all states required all Africans into forced servitude indefinitely. States north of Maryland and the Canadian territories were considered free states and allowed Africans to read, receive job training, receive payment for work, and to take

advantage of basic liberty. Subsequently, some Africans in America were able to buy their freedom and few escaped southern slave states by going North. The North's charity schools for Africans provided some education; however, as of 1860, ninety-two percent of United States' Black population lived in the South where it was forbidden to teach Black people to read (Guyden, 1999).

Even after the Civil War, most African Americans did not have access to the social capital, economic resources, or mobility to access the Northern institutions that would accept them. Older African Americans taught what they knew to the youth in makeshift school houses, under trees, and in churches. Directly after the war, Black communities would put money together to send a small number of the youth away to learn to read and count at schools that accepted Black students. Federal help and northern missionaries provided a large amount of the support necessary during Reconstruction, 1865 – 1877, for African Americans to create schools and direct some public funding toward Black educational institutions. The unofficial class system of the South and the North's compromise to end Reconstruction support, however, ended Black communities' ability to establish schools on equal standing with extant white institutions.

Barely removed from slavery, African Americans throughout the South in the mid-to-late 1800s had to collect enough money to lease land and donate the labor to build their own school buildings before states, forced by federal agencies, would supply the public funds to pay for a teacher (H. A. Williams, 2005; J. Williams & Ashley, 2004). Reaffirmed by court rulings like *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), state documents like the Alabama Constitution of 1901,[7] and reinforced by Jim Crow Laws, legal segregation was a reality throughout the American South

[7] Found by the Judges in the *Knight v. Alabama* (2004) and *Lynch v. Alabama* (2011) cases to be based on racism and White supremacy, the Alabama Constitution of 1901 is considered one of the most overtly racist state constitutions in the United States of America (Guyse, 2014)

from 1877 to 1964 (Guyse, 2014). Though most prevalent in the South, segregation was a reality throughout the United States.[8] That created the need for separate facilities for Black people in America (Bell, 1979). Consequently, new educational institutions had to be established and developed for the education of the freedmen (Bell, 1979).

The origins of the separate educational institutions for Black students, HBCUs, are documented in numerous literary sources (J. D. Anderson, 1988; Bell, 1979; M. C. Brown, II, 2002; M. C. Brown, II & Davis, 2001; Lovett, 2011; Stefkovich & Leas, 1994). In the period directly before the Civil War, slavery and the hatred of Black people in the nation was most overt in the South; subsequently, the first post-secondary educational institutions for Africans in America were established mainly in the Northeast and the Midwest (Betsey, 2008; Lucisano, 2010; Willie, Reddick, & Brown, 2006). Pennsylvania, specifically the Philadelphia region, was sympathetic to the education of African Americans and served as the host cite of the first two Black colleges, Cheyney University founded in 1837 and Lincoln University of Pennsylvania established in 1854. The third HBCU to be established, Wilberforce University, followed the trend of being located in a liberal location, Pennsylvania's border state of Ohio. Cheney, Lincoln, and Wilberforce are the only HBCUs to be established and fully operational before the end of the US Civil War (Lovett, 2011; Provasnik & Shafer, 2004; Roebuck & Murty, 1993).

**Private HBCUs.** Each of the original three HBCUs began under the control of churches and was funded by the donations of wealthy northern philanthropists (Lovett, 2011; Roebuck & Murty, 1993). Though each college needed charters from their host states to officially operate as educational institutions, states had little to no influence in the day to day operations, hiring and

[8] Though Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania possessed "African" schools, the states largely balked at the idea of full integration. Instead the states supported the formation of separate schools for Black youth and, in hopes of quelling the rapid increase of Black families moving into their urban centers, created ordinances to prevent out-of-state Black students attending classes (H. A. Williams, 2005).

firing, curriculum and instruction, or policy making for the three schools. Each Black college's respective church selected the presidents for the universities, and ensured the fulfillment of the colleges' original donors' wishes (Roebuck & Murty, 1993). As extensions of the Presbyterian, Quaker, and Methodist Episcopal churches, the first HBCUs all began as a private institution. After the Civil War, hundreds of private Black schools were established by Blacks, various church societies and the US Freedman's Bureau[ii] (J. D. Anderson, 1988; J. M. Richardson, 2008; Roebuck & Murty, 1993). In line with most higher education institutions in country at the time, HBCUs existed as private, religiously-affiliated institutions with strict regulations and costs that only the most financially well-off or academically promising students could hope to attend. The distinction for most public HBCUs is that they were established based on federal government seed money designated to move formal education from an elite privilege to public right for the masses of the U.S. citizenry (Rudolph, 1977; Thelin, 2004).

**Public HBCUs.** Public HBCUs largely were a result of the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1890, consistently referred to in the literature as the Second Land-Grant Act (M. C. Brown, II, 2002; M. C. Brown, II & Davis, 2001; Stefkovich & Leas, 1994). When the first Land-Grant was offered in 1862, only three states used the funds to support Black education, Virginia, Kentucky, and South Carolina (Stefkovich & Leas, 1994); in Florida, the 1862 Land-Grant went to the White flagship college, the University of Florida. The First Land Grant Act was passed when many states still forbade African descendants' literacy; after the Civil War, however, the federal government made a second attempt to promote mass education in the form of a more explicit education act. To ensure the entire population of a state could benefit from the federal government's donation of U.S.-owned land, a second, smaller less financially lucrative land grant was established by U.S. Congress in 1890. The Second Morrill Land-Grant called for

schools accepting the federal grant funding to admit Black students or to use part of the funds to create separate schools for Black students (Litolff III, 2007; Rudolph, 1977).

Rather than allowing descendants of Africans to be educated in historically White institutions, 17 Southern and border states elected to create new Black colleges with part of the funds, but used the majority of the Second Morrill Land-Grant funds to enhance and/or create new White only higher education institutions. Consequently, the majority of public HBCUs were established with less funding than their traditionally White counterparts and concentrated in the Southern states (Gasman, Lundy-Wagner, Ransom, & Bowman, 2010; Litolff III, 2007).

Besides providing for the higher education of Black youth, another requirement of the schools accepting Morrill Land Grants called for industrial, mechanical, and agricultural education (Roebuck & Murty, 1993). This introduction of funding to support agricultural sciences and the mechanical arts led to the creation of research and development initiatives in the sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) at Land Grant institutions; moreover, public HBCUs in the South became the major producers of the nation's African American baccalaureates in STEM (Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011). Accordingly, public colleges focused particularly on agricultural education and engineering, while private colleges covered liberal arts, religious, and normal (teacher preparation) education (Roebuck & Murty, 1993). Their tumultuous financial beginnings, location in the hostile South and the type of instruction offered significantly influenced the cultures and missions of the institutions.

**Culture and Mission**

The 106 accredited colleges created to educate the Black youth before the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are designated by the United States government as Historically Black Colleges and Universities (Brown II et al., 2001; Lucisano, 2010; Palmer, 2010); subsequently,

the current primary mission of any HBCU is to educate African American students (M. C. Brown, II & Davis, 2001). Other special mission institutions exist in the United States including tribal colleges for displaced Native Americans living in or near so-called Indian Reservations, work colleges, single-sex institutions, and Hispanic-Serving Institutions (Gasman, Baez, & Turner, 2008); however, no other special mission institution shares either the unique missions or the same constraints as HBCUs. As stated earlier, in order to qualify for the distinction as an HBCU, an institution must have been established before 1964 (Lee, 2010). The HBCU designation highlights both the history of such institutions and sets a cap that does not allow for any new HBCUs to be created (Gasman et al., 2008). Without the ability to reproduce, along with being located in states historically opposed to their continued existence, HBCUs have generally operated constantly resisting their discontinuation and defending their relevance/significance.

Due to their similar beginnings, nearly identical missions, and collective focus on serving the Black community, HBCUs, though by no means monolithic entities (M. C. Brown, II & Davis, 2001), share common characteristics, traits, and traditions that collectively have been referred to as the Black college experience (Willie et al., 2006). Brown and Davis (2001) provide a list of goals, originated by the work of Walter Allen (1992), that virtually all HBCUs share—these goals both contribute to and are results of the Black college experience:

> The six goals of HBCUs include (a) the maintenance of the Black historical and cultural tradition (and cultural influences emanating from the Black community); (b) the provision of key leadership for the Black community given the important social role of college administrators, scholars, and students in community affairs (i.e., the HBCU functions as a paragon of social organization); (c) the provision of an economic function

> in the Black community (e.g., HBCUs often have the largest institutional budget within the Black community); (d) the provision of Black role models to interpret the way in which social, political, and economic dynamics impact Black people; (e) the provision of college graduates with a unique competence to address the issues between the minority and majority population groups; and (f) the production of Black agents for specialized research, institutional training, and information dissemination in dealing with the life environment of Black and other minority communities (M. C. Brown, II & Davis, 2001, p. 32).

Black colleges have a significant role in the Black community by serving as repositories of much that is important and unique in Black traditions and customs (Bell, 1979; Grim, 2003). In the rural South, Black schools and churches promoted cultural literacy for children and adults, and provided space for the Black communities to engage in activities ranging from discussing politics to sharing poetry (Hurt, 2003). In addition to relating to the rare artifacts and experiences of Black traditions, art, and culture HBCUs provide, Black students also feel more connected to the professors, staff, fellow students, traditions, rituals, and celebrations at HBCUs (Fries-Britt & Turner, 2002; Gasman, Lundy Wagner, Ransom, & Bowman, 2010).

In addition to serving as a warehouse to irreplaceable facets of Black culture and improving the Black representation in STEM careers fields, HBCUs provide key leadership for the Black community via college administrators, scholars, and students in community affairs. Roebuck and Murty (1993) support the argument that "HBCUs are a vital national resource and have served as the fulcrum of African-American leadership" (p. 4). Black colleges largely supply role models and an educated service corps for the Black community (Roebuck & Murty,

1993). Finally, HBCUs educate Black graduates equipped to productively address issues of race and serve as a mediator between the races.

The way professors are able to relate and connect to the students situates Historically Black colleges in a position to encourage and support Black students to pursue degrees in STEM fields more successfully than PWIs (Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011). Moreover, the nurturing culture and mentoring traditionally found at HBCUs lends itself to make Black colleges the producers of nearly one-third of all African-American degrees in STEM fields (Keivan G. Stassun et al., 2011). Many of the public HBCUs receiving Land-Grant funding, reflect the STEM fields they teach in the very names of their schools, such as the largest HBCU Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU).

**Desegregation Litigation and Legislation.** Just as segregation laws created the need for HBCUs (Bell, 1979; Raines, 1998), desegregation policies have led to questions about Black colleges' continued existence (M. C. Brown, 2001; Palmer, Hilton, & Fountaine, 2012; Smith, 1994). Numerous studies have associated desegregation legislation and litigation with significant, often detrimental, changes at Florida A&M and other public HBCUs (Bell, 1979; Brown II et al., 2001; M. C. Brown, II, 2002; Evelyn, 1998; D. Harley, 2001; Hebel, 2004; Litolff III, 2007; Palmer et al., 2011; J. W. Richardson & Harris III, 2004), even to the point of closing the doors of numerous Black colleges. After the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954, 1955) rulings called for the integration of public primary and secondary schools, new desegregation cases and policies arose that called Southern states' public higher education systems into question. Frequently, when higher education systems make plans to desegregate, public HBCUs were closed or merged (M. C. Brown, 2001; Smith, 1994).

According to Bell (1979), American society interprets an integrated school as one that is majority White. HBCUs have not had policies that restricted enrollment based on race, a number of southern states, however, applied Jim Crow segregation laws to every public institution in the state. Black students, under the counsel of Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, began challenging segregation laws in higher education beginning with a full out assault on *Plessy v. Ferguson's* "separate, but equal" clause (Wattley, 2014). Missouri's segregation law was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1938 when they could not provide separate and equal public law school for Black applicant Lloyd Gaines ("Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada," 1938). Using the momentum from the *Missouri ex rel. Gaines* (1938) ruling, Black students successfully sued their way into the University of Oklahoma (1948), the University of Alabama (1955), and more of the South's flagship TWIs throughout the 1940s and 1950s ("Lucy v. Adams," 1955; "Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla," 1948). In some cases, states attempted to prevent higher education integration by funding new graduate programs at extant HBCUs ("State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida," 1950). In the *Sweatt v. Painter* case (1950), the state of Texas went so far as to establish a new, state-funded HBCU, Texas Southern University, just to keep a Black mailman from entering the University of Texas School of Law; the Supreme Court, however, saw through the farce and struck down the laws segregating higher education in order to protect the rights of Black citizens to be educated in their home state ("McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed," 1950).

Even once segregated schools and state segregation laws were found unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court, the traditionally White institutions remained largely White, despite the scores of Black students clamoring to access TWI's newer facilities, highly reputed instruction,

and vast resources. As predominantly Black, perennially underfunded institutions, Black colleges proved not to be very attractive to the South's White, college-bound youth. Accordingly Florida A&M University and virtually all HBCUs were accused of being segregated by their respective host states, the very states being sued for creating and perpetuating the racial divide. In an unexpected turn of events, the same legislation intended to aid African Americans attain full access to public resources, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was referenced to dismantle and disintegrate numerous HBCUs (Brown II et al., 2001).

Ten years after the *Brown I* (1954) decision, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to eliminate legal discrimination in the country (M. C. Brown, 2001; "Brown v. Board of Education," 1954; J. B. Williams, 1988). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for anyone, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin," in the country to "be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (p. 252). Higher education institutions receive a federal funds for an assortment of programs, the most prominent program being each school's federal financial aid funding. Nearly every college in the United States accepts federal financial aid as payment for students' tuition and fees; consequently, federal financial aid, federal grants money, and all federal funds will be discontinued at any institution with a written policy restricting the full participation of any person on account of race (Bell, 1979; M. C. Brown, 2001). Based on Article VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (PubL No. 88-352, Sec. 601 et seq., 78 stat. 241, 252, 1964), the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) determined that ten states with public HBCUs, including Florida, were still operating segregated systems of higher education five years after the law was passed. Subsequently, HEW called for each of the states to submit a

desegregation plan within three months of the 1970 mandate: the states largely missed the deadline and further legislation was pursued (Neyland & Riley, 1987).

***Adams v. Richardson*.** Because this study focuses on institutions in the state of Florida, much of the discussion of this legal case will concentrate on its implications in Florida. The slow response by Florida and the other nine states to meet the federal mandate for submitting desegregation plans prompted the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) to file suit (Neyland & Riley, 1987). In 1970, the NAACP LDF representing Kenneth Adams, a group of 30 other students, and two taxpayers, brought suit against HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson for not enforcing desegregation policies in states that openly operated dual systems of higher education, one for White students and separate, less funded one for Black students (Litolff III, 2007). The suit, *Adams v. Richardson*, was ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and the U.S. District Court Judge over the case ordered HEW to begin compliance proceedings against Florida, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia (Bell, 1979; Neyland & Riley, 1987). Though the case was ruled in favor of the NAACP it did not have the desired effect on desegregating systems of public higher education nationwide (M. C. Brown, 2001), the implications of the initial ruling led the way for subsequent, successful desegregation law suits and prompted the state of Florida to begin developing desegregation plans (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007; Neyland & Riley, 1987).

Leedell Neyland, FAMU historian, wrote extensively of the effect desegregation mandates had on the state of Florida and specifically how the *Adams* case and subsequent proceedings caused significant changes at FAMU (Neyland & Riley, 1987). Most notably, Neyland's (1987) treatment of the state's response to the HEW's mandates descriptively chronicles The Florida Board of Regents (BOR) decision making process and FAMU

administration's responses to every stage of Florida's desegregation plan development. As an FAMU professor, Neyland (1987) offers the perspective of public higher education desegregation policy development from the side of the HBCU; most literature on desegregation comes from a third-party's view that does not treat the entirety of the situation for those attending and leading the Black college.

Two internal publications on FAMU, several law articles, and multiple higher education literature all highlight the victimization of public HBCUs that occurred in the wake of *Adams* and its successor desegregation cases (Bell, 1979; M. C. Brown, 2001; M. C. Brown, II, 2002; Evelyn, 1998; FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007; Gasman, Lundy-Wagner, et al., 2010; D. Harley, 2001; Hebel, 2004; Litolff III, 2007; Lovett, 2011; Neyland & Riley, 1987; J. W. Richardson & Harris III, 2004; Stefkovich & Leas, 1994). In Florida, the BOR and State University System (SUS) targeted the state's lone public HBCU, Florida A&M University, as the main obstacle in desegregation efforts; as a result, the Regents discussed possible solutions to its "problem" by merging, closing, or further demoting FAMU's higher education status and prestige (Neyland & Riley, 1987). The President of FAMU responded by joining fellow public HBCU presidents in submitting a brief to the US District Court and the newly formed Office of Civil Rights (OCR) reporting on the relevance and necessity of Black colleges in each of their respective states. As a result, Florida's original 1973 desegregation plan was rejected (Neyland & Riley, 1987).

After several modified drafts and revisions, the final Florida higher education desegregation plan that was accepted by the Office of Civil Rights made no mention of merging or closing FAMU; moreover, the Florida House and Senate legislatures passed a bill prohibiting a merger of any SUS institution without full legislative approval (FAMU-FSU College of

Engineering, 2007; Neyland & Riley, 1987). Though the entire institution was protected from being consolidated with FSU, program merger remained the main desegregation strategy in Florida (Bell, 1979); consequently, FAMU lost half of its agriculture programs in a merger with the University of Florida's agricultural research and education programs (Bell, 1979; Southern Regional Education Board, 1969). FAMU as an institution was spared; however, the literature reflects an ongoing issue with program duplication in the state of Florida that the desegregation policies would decisively address (Neyland & Riley, 1987; Pluviose, 2006).

The 1974 edition of Florida's higher education desegregation plans sparked large-scale desegregation efforts in Florida, and the *Revised Plans for Equalizing Opportunity in Public Higher Education in Florida* approved by the OCR in 1977 focused those efforts. Race-based scholarships were created to attract Black students to White colleges and White students to FAMU (State University System of Florida, 1978), and bonuses were offered to SUS faculty to transfer from Florida's PWIs to FAMU, and from FAMU to the system's traditionally White colleges (Neyland & Riley, 1987). Further desegregation strategies outlined in the revised *Plans* of 1977 called for a reduction in program duplication and the preferential consideration of FAMU for newly developed academic units (Stanley & et al., 1975). Strategies to reduce program duplication and foster further integration among the public colleges in Florida led to Florida A & M University losing its "low performing programs" to FSU and the University of Florida, while being "enhanced" with new "high demand" programs assumed to attract more White students to the nearly all-Black campus (Bell, 1979; FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007; Neyland & Riley, 1987; Stanley & et al., 1975).

The preferential consideration clause of Florida's higher education desegregation plan situated FAMU to be the recipient of new academic programs, a significant development that led

to the university's ability to host engineering programs. A precursor to the engineering programs, however, was the development of the FAMU's technology programs. Most of the literature identifies this as a gain for FAMU and the Black community in Florida. Reading it from the HBCU's perspective, however, reveals the unreported cost of the desegregation plan—the targeting of FAMU for the state's desegregation efforts (Neyland & Riley, 1987).

FAMU gained the state's new School of Architecture, but the state appointed a White dean and most of the faculty hired for school were White; moreover, one critical race theorist reported that the school was funded differently than the rest of the schools at FAMU and that only 10% of the Architecture students were Black (Bell, 1979). In fact, the School of Architecture, journalism programs, and allied health sciences were all located at FAMU solely as a result of the mandated desegregation plan. Due to FAMU's close proximity to FSU and interest convergence, the identified strategy to use desegregation mandates for the benefit of White students in the state, program partnerships between FAMU and neighboring White colleges were orchestrated by the state (Neyland & Riley, 1987; Southern Regional Education Board, 1973).

The literature exposes that many of the changes at FAMU and other HBCUs resulted from desegregation rulings. A number of schools gained new programs, additional funding for capital improvements to the physical plant, and most benefits were coupled with White enrollment and employment stipulations in the form of consent decrees (Winn, 2008). When White student and staff quotas did not fulfill state "desegregation goals" in a short period of time, the states and courts took more aggressive steps to instantly "integrate" Black schools. Subsequently, many of the partnerships between Black colleges and PWIs stemmed indirectly

from litigation and more from desegregation legislative mandates and policy restrictions (Southern Regional Education Board, 1973).

College partnerships are common in North America, in fact, according to Lang (2002), well over 500 college mergers took place from 1992 to the year 2002. College partnerships between Historically Black Colleges and Universities and traditionally White post-secondary institutions have not occurred as frequently, and the number that have taken place have not been widely researched and published in large research journals. Of the research articles focusing on HBCU-TWI partnerships, few have analyzed the cooperation's effects on the HBCU itself. The study seeks to fill that gap by examining the founding and development of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering from the HBCU's perspective.

Multiple measures were taken to present valid and trustworthy results. An objective timeline of events, facts, and figures is extracted from archival documents found in the Florida State Archives and Library. Enrollment, demographic, and completion data from the National Clearinghouse for Education Statistics (NCES) and the joint engineering college reports provide data necessary to put the partnership's productivity in context and comparison with other engineering colleges. Additionally, interviews with former administrators, faculty, and students of the joint college were conducted to triangulate the information and provide the perspective of the Black college involved in the partnership.

The study presents outcome from an inter-institutional cooperation involving predominantly White and historically Black colleges. The HBCU benefit from partnering with a TWI, in the case presented in the study, is nominal and the coerced cooperation furthers the racial tension and weakens the relationship between the host state and the involved institutions. Drawing from the interviews with former administrators, faculty, and students of the joint

college, the study presents the implications of FAMU's partnership for existing and future HBCU inter-institutional cooperation. The study identifies three core revelations. First, the partnership was forced upon FAMU so that FSU could offer engineering on its campus again and promote investment in FSU's new technology park venture. Second, FAMU and FSU have not sustained the partnership over three decades, the joint college was established through an act of the general assembly to fulfill the state's commitment to FAMU's land-grant status and so that FSU could enhance its reputation and receive recognition for offering engineering; therefore, dissolving the partnership would require action from the general assembly to technically deny FSU access to the federally-recognized FAMU college of engineering. Finally, in consideration of the narrators' suggestions, HBCU are recommended to reevaluate their current partnerships with PWI, redouble efforts to clarify the need for parity with potential partners, and HBCU are recommend to seek partnerships with fellow HBCU before pursuing partnerships with PWI.

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**Chapter Endnotes**

[ii] Private Black Colleges with Religious Affiliations and Backgrounds

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| **American Missionary Association** | Fisk University* |
| | Straight University (merged into Dillard University) |
| | Talladega College |
| | Tougaloo College |
| **Freedmen's Aid Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church** | Bennett College |
| | Clark University (merged into Clark-Atlanta University) |
| | Claflin University |
| | Meharry Medical College |
| | Morgan College (Morgan State University) |
| | Philander Smith College |
| | Rust College |
| | Wiley College |

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|---|---|
| **American Home Baptist Mission Society** | Benedict College |
| | Bishop College (Closed, campus now belongs to Paul Quinn College) |
| | Morehouse College |
| | Shaw University |
| | Virginia Union University |
| **Presbyterian Board of Missions for Freedmen** | Biddle College (Johnson C. Smith University) |
| | Knoxville College |
| | Stillman College |
| **African Methodist Episcopal Church** | Allen University |
| | Morris Brown College |
| | Wilberforce University |
| | Paul Quinn College |
| | Edward Waters College |
| | Shorter College |
| **African Methodist Episcopal Zion** | Livingstone College |
| **Christian Methodist Episcopal (formerly the Colored Methodist Episcopal Church)** | Lane College |
| | Miles College |
| | Paine College |
| | Texas College |
| **Black Baptist Conventions** | Arkansas Baptist College |
| | Selma University |
| | Virginia Seminary and College |
| **Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (commonly referenced as the Freedmen's Bureau)** | Howard University |
| | Atlanta University |
| | Hampton University |
| | Fisk University* |
| | St. Augustine's College |

Private HBCU religious affiliations as found in James Anderson's (1998) *The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935* and multiple works on HBCU history (Redd, 1998; Reed, 2007)

# CHAPTER 3

## The History: A FAMU Perspective

The history and status of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering appears inspiring in the college's sanctioned literature. The college's history book, website, pamphlets, and marketing materials present the college as an exemplar of inter-institutional partnership, breaking the boundaries of race and culture, and promoting diversity. Until the joint college received national publicity for the state legislators' proposal to dissolve the partnership, the joint college supported the narrative that FSU and FAMU decided on the partnership to meet goals that neither could accomplish alone. Though the narrative was not necessarily untrue, it was misleading in some ways.

A deeper look into the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering authorized sources reveal that the joint college's web presence, promotional literature, a research article on the college's history, and the college's official history book are disproportionately, and in some cases fully orchestrated, controlled, and/or supported by Florida State University, the historically White institution of the partnership. This chapter presents a counter-narrative to the FSU-influenced view that the partnership was for mutual benefit and provides the history of the joint college from the FAMU perspective through the use of interest convergence theory. Derrick Bell (1980) defines interest convergence as "The interest of Blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of Whites" (p. 523). Considering the history of the state of Florida stripping professional programs and institutional units from FAMU to distribute them to the state's TWIs, the chapter further presents the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering instance of interest convergence as an intersection of sharecropping in higher education and higher education desegregation litigation.

The history of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering is recorded in a book sanctioned by the college titled *A History of the Florida A&M University-Florida State University College of Engineering: 1982-2007*. The book claims that it "presents profiles of some of those who were instrumental in starting the College, and their involvement in it, as well as some of the important events in its creation and development" (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007, p. ix.). Of the eighteen people profiled in the *A History of the Florida A&M University-Florida State University College of Engineering: 1982-2007* (2007), only three are Black.[9] The book has numerically more profiles and more in-depth descriptions of the people associated with Florida State University and the Florida government officials' than FAMU representatives; consequently, the history seems to be told mostly from the Florida State University and State of Florida point-of-view. Interviews with the two former presidents of FAMU profiled in the book, President Emeritus Walter Smith, Ph.D., and President Frederick Humphries, Ph.D., provided a different perspective of the joint college's establishment, complicating story.

Presidents Smith and Humphries' combined administration cover the first two decades of the joint college's existence; moreover, they led FAMU from the engineering program's proposal in 1981, to establishment of the partnership, its infancy, and its development through the year 2001. The presidents' stories present the state legislators, the public higher education governing boards, and Florida State University administrations in a different light. While some of the stories align with the accounts from the joint college's history book, other accounts from the presidents illuminate a situation that more closely mirrors the situations that many other public HBCUs were facing in the 20th century: being treated as less than, expected to defer to the

[9] The three African American's profiled in the book are Charles Kidd FAMU lead on the formation of joint Institute of Engineering, Walter Smith FAMU president when partnership was formed, and Fredrick Humphries FAMU president at the time the book was written and printed.

larger more resourced entity, and having to rely on litigation for equal treatment and fair practices.

The narratives from the presidents bolstered by newspaper articles, enrollment data reported to the U.S. Department of Education, and additional interviews with faculty and alumni, illuminate how FAMU was treated like a sharecropper. In this sharecropping system of higher education in Florida, the state of Florida itself serves as the land owner. Staying closeby and keeping watch over the regular operations, Florida State University fits directly into the role of the overseer. Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, established on the owners land, borrowing necessary supplies and resources, and charged in such a way to ensure perpetual debt, is cast in the position of sharecropper. FSU, privileged by its majority White enrollment, employment, and administration, benefited directly from FAMU being treated as sharecropper. As the traditionally White institution in Tallahassee, each FAMU loss ended up as FSU's gain. In fact, the narratives reveal cases of interest convergence in which FAMU gains were conditional on FSU getting a share of the growth. Consequently, whether FAMU had a season of lean or an abundant harvest, FSU received a share of the crop. FAMU's treatment as sharecropper did not begin, however, with the engineering program nor when the President Smith or Humphries led the institution, Black higher education in Florida has struggled since the beginning of higher education in the state.

Public higher education in Florida began in 1851 with the founding of the University of Florida (UF) and Florida State University. After the federal government reserved land for the establishment of higher education in the Florida in 1825 and 1845, the lawmakers in Florida began using the land, and the money from the sale of it, to establish public higher education in the state. The "Legislative Act of January 24, 1851 provided for the establishment of the two

institutions of learning," the seminaries were to be located on both sides of a major waterway, the Sewanee River, in Florida (FSU, 2015). The two institutions were established as East Florida Seminary which opened in 1853 in the city of Ocala, 35 miles south of Gainesville, and West Florida Seminary which began four years later in 1857 in the state's capital city, Tallahassee.

The seminaries were backed by federal land granted to Florida, the state legislation, and local municipalities honored to serve as hosts to the state's highest level of education. The federal government further supported higher education when it passed the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862. Additional federal land and resources were granted to states to either establish new colleges or enhance existing higher education institutions. Institutions chosen by their host state to receive the funds from the 1862 Morrill Land Grant Act were required to provide instruction in the agricultural sciences, mechanical arts, and military tactics. The federal resources were going toward making colleges more directly beneficial to American industries and advanced research, differing significantly from the liberal arts focus on teaching undergraduates to improve critical thinking, communications skills, and an appreciation for the arts. The state of Florida designated East Florida Seminary as the recipient of the 1862 Land Grant and the institution developed from a liberal arts seminary to a comprehensive land-grant university where males were taught in the arts as well as the basic and applied sciences.

Meanwhile in Tallahassee, West Florida Seminary developed in a different manner. Without the federal land grant, West Florida Seminary academics focused on the arts and literature. In 1905, the Florida Legislature reorganized the state higher education system making the former East Florida Seminary an all-male institution under the new name of the University of Florida. The men from Florida's seminary in the West were to transfer to the University of Florida, and the former West Florida Seminary gained the University of Florida's women and a

new name, the Florida State College for Women. While the University of Florida offered courses leading to careers more associated with men in the 19th and 20th centuries, Florida State College for Women prepared Florida's females to excel in the arts and sciences, education, home economics, and music--a mission it would develop for over four decades. President Humphries, considering Florida State's mission, describes FSU as "a liberal arts, home economics university state-supported to produce women in higher education" (personal communication, December 18, 2014). The stories of the two seminaries on each side of the Suwanee River, UF and FSU, are well-documented; however, the history often left out is the founding and development of the state's public college established to educate Florida's African Americans.

Thirty years after the establishment of Florida's two state colleges that only admitted White students, a Black, Florida legislator from Jacksonville, Representative Thomas Van Renssalaer Gibbs, successfully orchestrated the passage of a Florida House Bill for a state-supported college for African Americans (FAMU, 2015; Neyland, 1987). The bill went through several iterations in the Florida House of Representatives in 1887; knowing that the Black students would not be allowed to attend a White normal school, Gibbs influenced fellow Florida Representative C.F.A. Bielby to present a bill that would benefit both Black and White Floridians. The language of the bill made it clear that White interests would be served in establishing a Black school; specifically, the House Bill 133 approved by the Florida House of Representatives in 1887 proposed that there would be "a white normal school at Gainesville; [and] also a colored normal school at Jacksonville" (Neyland, 1987). Representative Gibbs sought to establish the school in Jacksonville, his hometown, the largest city in Florida, and the town with the largest Black population in the state; however, the majority of legislators decided

to locate the Black normal school in Tallahassee, the Florida town with the highest proportion of Black citizens at the time.

Consequently, the bill was sent to the Florida Senate and eventually passed as Senate Bill 103, an early case of interest convergence in Florida higher education. In order for the Black citizens in Florida to access in-state public higher education, they had to ride the coattails of a third public, White-only school in the state. Subsequently, the bill called for the establishment of two normal schools, institutions dedicated to training primary and secondary school teachers. The permanent site for the White-only normal school was set in west Florida near Pensacola in the city of DeFuniak Springs, and the other for African Americans was established "west of Tallahassee on a commanding hill which is now the home site of Florida State University" (Neyland, 1987, p. 11). Coming on the heels of Florida's 1887 law that called for railroads to provide separate accommodations for each race, the two normal schools were established in relative parity in 1887. The *Laws of Florida*, Chapter 3692, No. 12, Sec. 4, specifically states

> That a Normal School for colored teachers be established at Tallahassee, Leon County, similar in all respects as prescribed above for the establishment of the Normal School for white teachers, and subject to the supervision and direction of the State Board of Education, and the same amount to be appropriated to meet the current expense of the said Normal School for colored teachers (Neyland, 1987).

According to former FAMU President Dr. Frederick Humphries, the Normal School for "colored teachers", which was to become FAMU, was meant to be a "coeducational institution dedicated to the purpose of educating African Americans in all of the fields" (F. Humphries, personal communication, December 18, 2014). Dr. Humphries statement about FAMU's dedication to educating in all of the field comes from a special distinction and designation of the

college four years after its establishment. Specifically, in 1891, FAMU was chosen by the state to receive the funds from the Second Morrill Land-Grant Act. Similar to the first land grant authored by Vermont Senator Justin Morrill in 1862, the second Morrill Land-Grant Act served as Morrill's attempt to make higher education more accessible to all of the larger public, White and African Americans.

The first Land Grant Act of 1862 was designed to greatly enhance access to public higher education for U.S. citizens of the "industrial classes." Prior to the passage of the act, the cost of attending a higher education institution priced out all but the elite, those of the highest socioeconomic backgrounds. The Morrill Land Grant Act presented a new partnership between the federal and state governments to move higher education from elite to mass education. In order to receive the land and ongoing financial support from the federal government for the college, a state would have to pledge to ensure that the college would offer comprehensive academic programs that included agriculture, mechanical arts, and military tactics; and match the level of support the college was to receive from federal funds (Lee & Keys, 2013). Each state designated one college as the land-grant institution; as a result, the Land-Grant Act virtually fostered the era of large comprehensive universities such as the University of Michigan, The Ohio State University, and the University of Florida. Due to the Land-Grant Act, families from agricultural and industrial career backgrounds were able for the first time to send their children to college in larger numbers just as Senator Morrill intended; in the southern and border states, however, laws prohibiting racial integration prevented most Black families from taking advantage of the new public colleges. Consequently, from the end of the Civil War in 1865 until 1890, most Black students in the South pursuing post-secondary education were limited to the

private Black colleges such as Howard University, Fisk University, and Atlanta University (Lee & Keys, 2013).

To include those left out of the first round of grants, Morrill helped pass a second land-grant act in 1890. The Second Morrill Act "prohibited the distribution of money to state that made distinctions of race in admissions unless at least one land-grant college for African Americans" was established in the state (Lee & Keys, 2013, p. 3). Federal funding for the land-grant colleges from the Morrill Act of 1890 proved to be considerably less than the colleges received from the 1862 Land Grant Act, and significantly fewer colleges were created by the Second Morrill Act. Subsequently, 17 southern and border states used the 1890 Land Grants to establish completely separate Black colleges, compared to the 1862 Land-Grant universities present in each of the 50 states in the US.

Each of the 17 southern and border states established at least one 1890 Land Grant institution. All land-grant colleges offer instruction in agriculture sciences and mechanical arts; there is, however, some variation among the colleges. For some Land-Grant institutions, the industrial and agricultural missions are currently reflected in the colleges' names: Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, Prairie View Agricultural and Mechanical University, Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. While other Land-Grants have changed their institutional titles to reflect a more comprehensive academic environment and more direct affiliation with their host state or city: Alcorn State University, University of Arkansas-Pine Bluff, Delaware State University, Fort Valley State University, Langston University, Lincoln University (Missouri), Tennessee State University, Tuskegee University, University of Maryland Eastern Shore, South Carolina State University, Virginia

State University, and West Virginia State University. Despite their variations, most 1890 Land-Grant institutions have shared the same fate of being underfunded compared their 1862 Land-Grant counterparts. Without the same level of state support, 1890 Land-Grants have often not been able to offer the same number or level of courses as the historically White 1862 Land-Grant institutions (Lee & Keys, 2013).

As the state's 1890 Land-Grant, FAMU began receiving federal funding to expand the outreach of its original mission of teacher preparation and include training in agricultural sciences, military tactics, and the mechanical arts. The state of Florida, however, did not match the federal government's support of FAMU; in fact, once FAMU began receiving federal funding in 1891, the state of Florida greatly reduced the amount of state money allocated to FAMU. FAMU did not receive the same proportion of funding as the state's 1862 Land-Grant, the University of Florida, and thus was not able to offer academic programs in the same quantity nor at the same quality as the state's public White institutions UF and FSU. Dr. Frederick Humphries, former president of two 1890 institutions, Tennessee State University and FAMU, explains the purpose of land-grant institutions in more depth:

> 1890 Land-grant institutions, like the 1862 land-grant institutions, had the same mission. They were to be peoples' colleges, and teach the people mechanical arts, and business and medicine and all of the academic areas that led to being able to help the involvement of the common man in the professional areas of the American social order. So if you try to determine just what the academic focus of the land-grant institutions are, all you need do is look at the University of Florida, look at North Carolina State, look at the University of Georgia, look at Clemson, look at Auburn, and there you will see that all of those schools have engineering schools, they have business schools, they have

> agricultural schools, they have strong colleges of arts and sciences, and they have an array of programs, but particularly they have engineering. (personal communication, F. Humphries, December 18, 2014)

FAMU, originally founded in parity with Florida's other normal school, was set to receive funding from both the state and federal governments. Florida seemed to be fulfilling the ideology of "separate, but equal" in higher education; however, the cost of providing equal opportunities for its Black citizens proved to be too high for Florida in the late nineteenth century. The federal land-grant afforded growth in enrollment and academic programs for FAMU; however, once FAMU's funding from the U.S. government increased, funding from the state of Florida dramatically decreased. Moreover, as a recipient of the 1890 Land-Grant, FAMU did not receive the same level of federal funding as UF, the 1862 Land-Grant designee. Consequently, FAMU was expected to teach the most disadvantaged population in the state with less state and federal funding than its peer public colleges in Florida. Segregation and discrimination, prevalent and legal practices in the South, were detrimental to FAMU and retarded its development.

Interest convergence and discrimination practices, in some cases, worked to the benefit of FAMU. Case in point, Black Floridian Virgil Hawkins sued the state of Florida in 1949 to be admitted to the UF School of Law, the state's only public law school. In order to maintain segregation in public education, the Board of Control governing public higher education of Florida, authorized and set up a law program at FAMU on December 21, 1949 (*State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida et al.,* 1950). President Humphries recalls the results of the lawsuit.

> So in 1950, they gave three programs to Florida A&M by statute. That's when they created the law school, which would help Virgil Hawkins have an option to go to law school at Florida A&M. Because there was not a college of pharmacy at FAMU they created a college of pharmacy, then that obviated Black folk from wanting to go to University of Florida and represented a potential suit because Florida A&M now had a college of pharmacy…and they authorized an engineering school. (personal communication, December 18, 2014)

Consequently, the 1951 Appropriations Act of Florida reflects funding for four new programs at FAMU: graduate agriculture, law, pharmacy, and engineering; also that year, the governing board authorized funding for a FAMU hospital (*Laws of Florida*, 1951). The interest convergence is clear, FAMU was only able to get authorization for graduate and professional programs because the state of Florida had such a deep and prevalent interest in maintaining segregation. Despite the discrimination and disparity in funding, at times because of it, Florida A&M University grew as an institution, produced accredited academic programs, and built reputable facilities. In times of harvest, however, the owner comes to claim a share of the crop.

The *Hawkins* case, the Miami wade-ins of 1945, the racial unrest of the 1950s in Florida and throughout the South, and FAMU's growth all contributed to growing tension in Tallahassee. When Florida A&M became a university the entire state only had three public universities and two of which, FSU and FAMU, were in the same city. Both FAMU and FSU had football teams, basketball teams, and Florida State University's campus was located on the site of FAMU's original campus and less than a mile north of FAMU's current campus site. Tallahassee also serves as the state capital and headquarters of the Board of Governors, the governor appointed board coordinating all public higher education in the state—essentially the

people who made the final decisions for FAMU and FSU—were within eyesight of the institutions.[10] In fact, of the 18 states with public HBCUs, 11 of the state capitals are within 20 miles of the public HBCU campus—16 state capitals are within a 50 mile radius of a Black college that it oversees. In the segregated South of the late 1940s and early 1950s, FAMU's growth could be perceived as a threat to the white power structure in Tallahassee and the tension was steadily rising.

FAMU faced considerable turmoil after being elevated to university status by the addition of the law, pharmacy, and graduate schools. Repeated calls for FAMU to be absorbed into FSU plagued FAMU stakeholders, but such calls were common in light of national desegregation cases. Moreover, Florida's decision to merge all of its public two-year Black colleges into White community colleges under White leadership contributed to FAMU's uneasiness in the late 1960s and into the 1970s (Smith, 1994). Tensions began to flare specifically in the city of Tallahassee, however, as academic programs and auxiliary units at FAMU were deemed unnecessary for the city, then wound up across the train tracks in the same city at FSU. Under the governance and mandates of the Florida Board of Control from 1905 until 1965 and the Board of Regents from 1965 until 2001, FAMU's approval for an engineering program was blocked and the FAMU hospital was discontinued. The overseeing boards' collecting of FAMU's academic crops created distrust between FAMU and the state; the governing boards' decisions to grant FSU the programs and funding taken from FAMU, however, fostered a three way tension in the city. Florida A&M University was now at odds with the governing board and Florida Legislators who

[10] The governing board of public higher education in Florida has gone through three iterations, from 1905 to 1965 the group was called the Board of Control. Florida's Board of Regents replaced the Board of Control as governing board of the State University System. In 2001, however, the Board of Regents was dissolved. The Florida Board of Governors became the board of the State University System by way of an amendment to the Florida Constitution in 2003.

mandated the removal of programs and funds from FAMU, as well as FSU itself for the role it played in obtaining the authorization and funding originally designated for FAMU's Law School, the FAMU hospital, and the School of Engineering and Mechanical Arts.

Of all of FAMU's losses, the one most often referenced is also the first academic crop to be taken as a share for the owner: the FAMU Law School. Court documents reflect that "the Board of Control had set up and established, on December 21, 1949 …a school of law at the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College for Negroes and had directed the governing head of said college to acquire the necessary personnel, facilities and equipment for such course of instruction at the school on the earliest possible date;" (*State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida et al.*, 1950). However, in 1966, seventeen years later, the FAMU Law School was ordered closed by the Board of Control. The Board of Control did not stop with disallowing FAMU's law school to accept new students; the owner had plans to give this cash crop to traditionally White Florida State University.

The appropriation for FAMU's law school was given to FSU, and FAMU was ordered to send FSU all the books from their law library (Neyland, 1987). After its last students graduated in 1968, the FAMU College of Law was discontinued. FAMU alumni and administrators lobbied for years to get the law school back; however, it took another instance of interest convergence in the year 2000 for FAMU to regain a law program. FAMU's reauthorization originated, in part, as a new request for a medical school (J. Lee, personal communication, February 26, 2015). Florida State University, also lobbying for a medical school, sought the backing of the Florida Speaker of the House, FSU alumni John Thrasher, and Florida Governor Jeb Bush to approve a medical program for the institution through state legislation. The Florida metropolis of Miami, moreover, sought a public law program for the city's Florida International

University (FIU). Refusing to authorize a medical school at FAMU, "the Legislature agreed to reopen the [FAMU] school as part of a deal that created a law school at FIU and a medical school at FSU" (Sickler & Matus, 2007; J. Lee, personal communication, February 26, 2015).

Though FAMU was authorized to reestablish its law school, it was restricted from operating the law program on its main campus or anywhere near the city of Tallahassee. The requirement of building yet another law school more than 240 miles away from its home town contributed significantly to the contentious relations between FAMU and FSU. The large distance between FAMU Law and the FAMU main campus was required in order for the law school to comply with program duplication restrictions and so that it would not compete with the FSU Law School for students (J. Lee, personal communication, February 26, 2015). FAMU's reestablished College of Law opened its doors in the year 2002 in downtown Orlando, after 36 years of deep tension in the city of Tallahassee.

The College of Law's mandated dissolution in 1968 was not FAMU's only loss at the hands of the State University System's governing board. After losing its law program to the entity overseeing its work, FAMU lost yet another product that it spent decades cultivating on the land it was given—this second share the State of Florida acquired from FAMU's harvest was the FAMU Hospital.

FAMU administration began preparing for a medical facility on the campus in the 1890s; yet the request to fund a nurse training facility was originally denied by the institutions initial governing board, the Florida Board of Education. The FAMU administration persevered and began offering workshops in health as part of a legislature-funded series of Farmers' Institutes in 1902 (Neyland, 1987). Steadily progressing despite the denial of a nursing facility, the nursing program began at FAMU in 1904 (FAMU, 2015). The persistent FAMU administrators made

requests to state legislators, the newly appointed Board of Control, and private sources until five thousand dollars in state funds were finally approved by the Board for a hospital to house the Nurse Training School in 1909. The medical facility opened in 1911 as the Florida A&M College Sanitarium (FAMU, 2015).

In 1906, FAMU administrators applied for funding from the John F. Slater Fund for the Education of the Freedmen; though the effort did not result in immediate support, the FAMU administration's pursuit of external funding paid off seven years later. James Dillard, director of the Slater Fund, sent a letter to the FAMU president dated May 14, 1913, informing him that a four hundred and fifty dollar ($450) appropriation was made out to the Florida A&M College Hospital Training School (Neyland, 1987). Over the next nine years, the Slater Fund made annual contributions to the College for Nurse Training. In 1946, the sanitarium was elevated to the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College (FAMU) Hospital. By 1950, the school secured two million dollars for the FAMU Hospital, Heath Center, and Nursing School. Finally, in 1951, one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) of state funding was set aside for the FAMU Hospital operating expenses (*Laws of Florida*, 1951).

From 1950 to 1971, the FAMU hospital served as the sole medical facility for Africans living within a one hundred and fifty (150) mile radius of Tallahassee. FAMU's hospital was the impetus for the pharmacy program and greatly enhanced the institution's nursing program as well (FAMU, 2015). The natural progression of a hospital on a college campus that already houses a nursing program and a pharmacy school is to develop a college of medicine. Similarly, UF, Florida's other land-grant institution, housed a hospital, nursing program, pharmacy school, and a college of medicine on their main campus. Before FAMU reached UF's level, however, the owner claimed the hospital as its share of FAMU's harvest. Effectively, the Board of

Regents discontinued the FAMU hospital operations on campus in 1971, and called for it to be merged with the city's public medical facility, the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. Thirty years later when FAMU requested authorization and funding to create another hospital with an adjoining medical program, the request was denied.

The timing of FAMU's request for a medical program coincided with program requests from FSU and FIU. FSU was authorized to establish a medical school on its campus and FIU was approved to create a law program on its main campus. FAMU's request for medical school and hospital, however, was denied and another, ongoing request to reauthorize its law school was fulfilled with the condition that it be relocated outside of the Tallahassee/Leon County area. In a second, clear case of interest convergence intersecting with the sharecropping model, the interest of FAMU to gain a professional program was only accommodated when it converged with the interests of the predominantly White Florida Legislators and traditionally White FSU.

As HBCUs began winning more and more discrimination lawsuits against states in the American South in the 1970s and 1980s, tactics to secure White privileges became more nuanced in some areas, while simply reverting to increased aggression in others. FSU's path to gaining a program previously promised to FAMU changed significantly from 1968 to 2000. In 1968, the governing board simply deemed law unfit for Tallahassee and denied FAMU the appropriation for its law program. The next year, the Board of Control gave the very same appropriation to FSU and authorized them to offer a law courses.

In 2000, however, the Board of Control did not play its usual role as cruel overseer to FAMU on FSU's behalf, and instead refused both FAMU and FSU's requests to establish a college of medicine. FSU circumvented the governing board and made its request directly to the Florida House of Representatives. Immediately, FSU found support in its alumni John Thrasher,

the newly appointed Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives. Though Thrasher's tenure as the Speaker of the House was brief, serving in 1999 and 2000, his timing and influence made a lasting impression on Florida higher education. While Speaker of House, Thrasher worked closely with Florida's Governor Jeb Bush to effectively pass legislation ensuring that FSU, not FAMU, was granted public funding for a medical school. Though the money was secured, FSU needed the governing board's approval to develop and offer any academic programs. Clearing the path for an FSU College of Medicine, the Speaker-Governor team passed a legislative act that dissolved the Florida Board of Control. As of 2015, medical students at FSU attend class in the John F. Thrasher College of Medicine Building.

Florida's higher education interest convergence deal in the year 2000, essentially a) allowed Florida legislators to control FAMU's growth, reminding it of its role as sharecropper; b) authorized FSU to receive the appropriation for a medical facility and health program that was originally established and developed on the FAMU campus; and c) granted FIU permission and funding to create a law school directly on its main campus. Legislator John Thrasher would author another sharecropping plan to make headlines in 2014. Fourteen years after stripping the idea of a College of Medicine from FAMU stakeholders and handing the funding to FSU, Thrasher targeted the engineering program. The engineering academic programs in Tallahassee share a similar history with its Law Schools and academic medical facilities; it was considered a prestige crop that FSU wanted for itself, however, the landowner and overseer needed a nuanced plan to get a share of engineering harvest.

FAMU was forced to transfer its law school to FSU in 1968, it was stripped of its medical facility in 1971, and the 1957 Board of Regents blocked the continuation of FAMU's School of Engineering (Neyland, 1987). Though it was meant to offer instruction in the mechanic arts, an

early and basic form of engineering, when it was designated as the Black Land-Grant institution in 1891, FAMU could not offer full engineering program until it was authorized and received appropriate funding from the state to offer a professional engineering program. FAMU, consequently, was limited to offering vocation-focused industrial and mechanic programs for fifty-nine years. FAMU received authorization to create a School of Engineering and Mechanic Arts in 1950. Moreover, the State of Florida Appropriation Act of 1951 lists FAMU's budget for "New Schools" to include funding for graduate agriculture, engineering, law, and pharmacy (Laws of Florida, 1951, Chapter 26859, pp. 721-722). The largest appropriation of FAMU's new schools, $273,000, was designated for the School of Engineering's salaries and expenses.

In preparation for an engineering school, FAMU President George W. Gore assigned faculty to start the program and rededicated the mechanical arts buildings. President Gore named the Mechanical Arts Building the Benjamin Banneker Engineering Building in 1953, to reflect its enhanced purpose to take instruction from learning to maintain machines to learning to make them. Also in 1953, Florida A&M officially became a university, with an official School of Engineering and Mechanical Arts under the leadership of Dean M. S. Thomas. Together with another faculty member, Dr. Bernard S. Proctor, Dean Thomas worked to garner the attention of potential faculty and funders for the School of Engineering. In 1955, FAMU's Dean Thomas was elected to a leadership position in the National Technical Association, and in 1956, Dr. Proctor was selected to serve on an annual program of the American Council on Industrial Arts Teacher Education (Neyland, 1987, p. 267). Dr. Proctor further served national associations in the discipline when was selected to write a chapter in the Council's 1957 *Yearbook on Planning Physical Facilities in Industrial Arts* (Neyland, 1987).

Despite the university's efforts, the engineering faculty's accolades, and the funding from the state, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) visiting committee and a separate group of the three top-ranked engineering educators evaluating FAMU, severely criticized the School of Engineering and Mechanical Arts. SACS accreditation for engineering was denied. The engineering educators and the accreditation committee informed Florida's governing board that the engineering and mechanical arts school still needed additional equipment, staff, and a more robust curriculum (Neyland, 1987).

The group of engineering consultants, the Council for the Study of Higher Education in Florida, and the SACS visiting committee studying FAMU's programs in 1956-1957 further recommended to the Florida Board of Control that FAMU not be allowed to further develop engineering and that FAMU should establish instead a vocational-technical institute, separate from FAMU (Neyland, 1987). As a result of the recommendation, yet in spite of the suggestion that technical programs not be offered under the auspices of the university, the Vocational-Technical Institute was created at FAMU in September 1957. The first director of the institute, M.S. Thomas, was quoted saying "this change", the reorganization of the work previously offered under FAMU's school of engineering and mechanic arts, "for the 1957-1958 school year is in accord with the recommendations of national leaders in the fields…" (St. Petersburg Times, 1957).

The Vocational-Technical Institute grew into a department of Engineering Technology and later became part of CESTA, FAMU's College of Engineering Sciences, Technology, and Agriculture. FAMU expanded the Engineering Technology programs in 1980 to include architectural engineering technology and construction engineering

technology. President Smith recalls making improvements to engineering technology facilities during his administration from 1977 to 1985.

> What I did was took the old laundry facility that was over on Railroad Avenue, what is now Wahnish Way, I had that renovated after I got the money to build an industrial arts laboratory over there. So you're talking about upgrading from foundational programs to graduate programs. We had some engineering programs down at Benjamin Banneker [the Benjamin Banneker Engineering Building]… Some engineering was taught in there, and then down the hill immediately beyond that where some engineering technology was taught, engineering was taught there as well as some of the technical aspects of journalism, which later moved up to the new facility which was built later (personal communication, W. Smith, March 10, 2015).

Remaining vocationally and technically based, the department of Engineering Technology was reorganized with architecture on the main FAMU campus in 2014 as part of the School of Architecture and Engineering Technology.

**Engineering in Tallahassee**

In the span of seven years FAMU had been authorized to offer engineering and had its development hampered by the Board of Control yielding to the suggestions of outside consultants. Despite the setbacks, FAMU still developed viable, accredited, and growing engineering technology and engineering sciences programs on its campus. FSU, on the other hand, operated a short-lived engineering program from 1959-1972 (CBC, 2015). Two events led to the end of FSU's School of Engineering Sciences: the death of Grover Rogers, dean of the

School of Engineering Sciences, and unfavorable reviews from studies of FSU's engineering program (FAMU-FSU, 2007; Frair, 1990; Terman & Higdon, 1971).

*The State University System Revised Plan for Equalizing Educational Opportunity in Public Higher Education in Florida* (*Revised Plan*) was submitted to the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights in October 1977. The *Revised Plan* (1977) was the Florida's response to the *Adams* (1972) ruling and subsequent 1973 court order for states identified by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to be operating a dual system of education based on race, thus violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (SUS, 1977). OCR administration did not approve Florida's previous plans from 1973, or 1974 due to lack of certain necessary assurances. Florida's *Revised Plan* of 1977 was approved, however, because it clearly stated that FAMU would not ever be merged with FSU, that there would be increased Black representation on the higher education governing board, and that preferential consideration for new academic programs would be given to FAMU for the purposes of enhancing the traditionally Black campus (SUS, 1977).

Learning from the setbacks of the previous twenty-five years, armed with a new curriculum and renovated facility to house engineering courses, and backed by the knowledge of Florida's recent agreement with the U.S. Office of Civil Rights, FAMU President Walter Smith felt the institution was prepared by 1979 to offer a fully-operational, professional engineering program.[11] President Smith approached the Board of Regents with a proposal for an engineering program at FAMU.

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[11] Office of Civil Rights enforced desegregation policy conditionally approved in 1977 and finally approved 1978, protected FAMU from merging and supposedly arranged for FAMU to get preferential consideration for new academic programs in FL (SUS of Florida, 1977)

> I had already begun to plan that with Dr. Kidd [Dean of the College of Engineering Sciences, Technology, and Agriculture] and others on campus, and it was, I think, our efforts to begin the discussion around development of engineering that brought FSU to light because they realized that we would probably get it and they then would have been choked because they could not get separate engineering programs. Of course, they knew that I knew that because I'm a former staff member of the Office of Civil Rights, and had been involved in getting Office of Civil Rights staff down when there were difficulties discussing many programs. (personal communication, W. Smith, March 10, 2015)

It was historically regular for FAMU to run into turmoil while pursuing new programs. President Smith had a particularly vivid memory of one obstacle to proposing an engineering for FAMU.

> Oh yeah, there were obstacles, Florida State wanted it. Remember they didn't have an engineering school anymore, they had lost theirs some years ago. When we started talking about engineering, they started talking about engineering too. The first thing out of the mouth of some of the members of the legislators was,…I would not be professional to call names, but there were those who wanted to the engineering program at Florida State.

Former Florida State University President Bernard Sliger, anxious to transform FSU into a major research university, also submitted a proposal to the Board of Regents requesting permission to establish an engineering program. Aware that the FSU administration just nine years earlier notified the Board it would be eliminating its engineering sciences program, FSU President Sliger worked closely with the physics department chair Joseph Lannutti and influential alumni to bolster the institution's engineering proposal. President Sliger's

connections proved helpful, resulting in the Westinghouse company financing a study of the need for engineering programs in the state and the feasibility of establishing that program at FSU (Frair, 1990). FSU President Sliger submitted the feasibility report with the proposal to the Board of Regents (Frair, 1990). The report noted that FSU's resources made it suitable to host a new engineering program (Simpson, 1981).

The Board of Regents contracted a study in 1980 to be done on the engineering education in the state and the state's need for engineering. The group conducting the study, the Task Force on Science, Engineering, and Technology Service to Industry, was asked to conduct a six-month investigation into Florida's engineering needs and how they could be addressed by the State University System (SUS). The Task Force's report indeed identified that Florida had a great need for more engineers and recommended that the engineering programs at each state university be enhanced. In response to the Task Force's recommendations, the Board set out a plan for prioritizing the funding of new projects: first, establishing a new statewide institute; second, making quality improvements in extant programs; and last, increasing the capacity of engineering programs in the state (BOR, 1980).

The Board of Regents meetings in 1981, following the plans set out in the 1980 meeting, set in motion the future of engineering education in Florida. Based on the recommendations of the 1980 Task Force, the Board of Regents created a new system-wide service unit within the SUS to "provide additional industry service" (BOR, 1981). The new unit, Florida Institute for Educational and Research Services, was responsible for a statewide program in continuing education, research, and other services in engineering that would directly address the needs of Florida industry. The Board of Regents further followed the Task Force's recommendations by setting aside 4.1 million dollars for engineering professors' salary enhancements and 5 million

dollars for the enhancement of existing engineering technology and computer science programs throughout the state, including public and private institutions. As a third and final agenda item for the Board's engineering plan based on the consultant's recommendations, the Board authorized another study be conducted to determine the feasibility of establishing engineering programs at SUS institutions that did not already offer engineering: FSU was the first college listed and FAMU was the last on the list.

The study the Board of Regents authorized to explore the need and opportunity to establish new engineering programs coincided with FSU's engineering feasibility study. Though FSU's consultant reported that FSU was well-suited to administer an engineering program, the BOR's consultant report, fully aware of the Board's desegregation agreement with the Office of Civil Rights, made a slightly different suggestion for establishing engineering in Tallahassee. The Board of Regents' consultant suggested that the Board approve a joint engineering for FAMU and FSU. The Board of Regents' decisions concerning engineering were bound to include FAMU. Confined by the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and agreements with the Office of Civil Rights in 1974 and 1977, Florida could not simply discontinue FAMU's engineering and transfer it to FSU as it had done fourteen years earlier with the law school. Consequently, a partnership presented the only remaining option for FSU to be able to offer engineering.

**Partnership Proposed**

Acknowledging the consultants' reports and recommendations, FAMU's President Walter Smith and CESTA Dean Charles Kidd met with Florida State University President Dr. Sliger, Physics Department Chair Dr. Joseph Lanutti, and Board of Regents representatives to discuss partnering to establish an engineering program in Tallahassee. FAMU conceded that it

lacked the monetary resources to establish and sustain a viable program, while FSU leadership acknowledged that it legally could not offer any academic programs similar to engineering within the vicinity of Tallahassee; subsequently, the Board of Regents and Florida State determined that the only way FSU could offer engineering would be in conjunction with FAMU. President Emeritus Smith summarizes his recollection of the partnership's founding.

> The development of a joint program began after much discussion between former president Bernie Sliger of Florida State University and I. Florida State had an engineering program earlier which failed in its efforts and closed, and they were considering developing a new program. FAMU at the same time was discussing the elevation of its engineering technology program into a full college of engineering because of the lack of minority engineering students. With both concepts emerging, the thought of a joint program evolved. The proposal was presented to the board of regents, while some board members would have preferred separate programs, they were reminded that separate programs would have violated the proved concept of unnecessary duplication which was a Board of Regents and United States Office of Civil Rights agreement.
>
> The Board of Regents and the Florida legislature approved the joint concept in 1982 with the name of FAMU-FSU Engineering Institute. Both universities appointed leadership persons to begin the planning process for the establishment of the new programs. Leadership for the new program start-up was provided by Dr. Charles Kidd, Dean of the FAMU College of Engineering Sciences, Technology, and Agriculture, and Dr. Joseph Lanutti, professor of physics at Florida State University. Throughout the spirited debate and discussions on the future of the new program, presidents Smith and Sliger along with Dr. Kidd and Dr. Lanutti would meet periodically with Representative

> Herb Morgan of the Florida legislature to continue the discussion and clarification on how the program would function. With Representative Morgan's support and agreement of several members of the Florida Senate, the Institute of Engineering was funded and began its operation on both campuses in the fall of 1982 (personal communication, W. Smith, March 10, 2015).

**Initiating the Institute**

President Smith served as president of FAMU for the first three years of the engineering partnership, playing a pivotal role in the initiation of the joint Institute of Engineering. President Smith knew that agreeing to partner was a first step to offering engineering, afterwards the two universities' presidents had to agree on course offerings, funding, and a location for the joint program before the Institute could begin operating. After years of tension between the institutions, one would imagine that it would be difficult for the respective presidents to agree on the operation of a joint academic program. President Smith, however, did not find it difficult to work in partnership with FSU's President Sliger; in fact, President Smith said it was simple.

> It was very, very simple. Bernie Sliger and I fortunately could communicate with each other, and I say fortunately because if we had not been able to communicate it would have been far more difficult and we would have been fighting each other, but we were never fighting, instead we talked about it. Now there were others out there who were at Florida State who did not want to see that kind of thing happen. They wanted Florida State to have its school of engineering. [Dr. Smith expressed that he looked more deeply into the matter and got support]. The result was, no, you can't separate this and they are part one place and part the other and it's the same thing. If you're talking about a College of Engineering it ought to be together. So, Bernie Sliger and I talked about it, and that's

> the way we worked it, and we got Dr. Kidd who was dean of the College of Engineering Sciences, Technology, and Agriculture to kind of be the lead person...and Bernie Sliger got Dr. Lanutti [who] worked with him and, of course, there was a lot of debate about it, but in spite of the debate we held it to the concept that we were not going to change from a holistic program, provided by both institutions on a common setting (personal communication, W. Smith, March 12, 2015).

The next step in preparing the joint engineering program to become operational was to agree on the curriculum. Presidents Smith and Sliger delegated this task to their resident experts leading the new institute, FAMU's Dr. Charles Kidd and FSU's Dr. Joe Lannutti. Dr. Kidd and Dr. Lannutti "agreed upon splitting the academic disciplines that made up the joint college of engineering. So FAMU was going to do civil engineering and a portion of electrical engineering… FSU was going to do chemical engineering, and they were going to do a portion of electrical engineering… [and] they had mechanical engineering" (personal communication, F. Humphries, December 18, 2014). FAMU also offered industrial engineering on the campus.

FAMU and FSU planned to offer the first course in the fall of the same year it was approved, so it did not yet have a shared facility. Consequently, in the fall of 1982, classes in the joint Institute of Engineering was offered on both campuses. Preparing to leave FAMU and the joint Institute in good shape for before his retirement, President Smith remembers that he

> got the appropriations for the building in the last legislative session before [he] left, and that was about 15 million dollars…, but meantime most of the engineering programs were taught at FAMU. [FAMU] had engineering technology going so [it] had some space that catered to engineering concepts that Florida State did not have. So a lot of the things that were necessary in professional engineering were taught at FAMU. Now on the other

> hand, FSU, which was heavy in physics and math and those areas, those things were taught there, that does not mean that nothing else was taught there… (personal communication, W. Smith, March 10, 2015)

Before retiring, President Smith proposed a site for a joint engineering building that was one mile away from each campus, President Sliger, however was committed to the idea of having the engineering facility built in the FSU's new technology park, Innovation Park. FSU had many more resources than FAMU and meetings with the legislature made it clear that FSU had the upper hand politically as well. Therefore, once President Smith left and President Humphries was appointed to lead Florida A&M University, FAMU's new leader felt pressure from the state, FSU, and FAMU stakeholders to make a lot of decisions that would have lasting effects on the joint college of engineering. President Humphries shared his experience dealing with the engineering partnership in his role as FAMU's new president in 1985.

> What always happens when a new person comes in they like to try to take advantage of their newness and their ignorance, not being of snuff. So, the chancellor had given one of his vice chancellors the task of settling where the engineering school would be located and to work with Bernie Sliger and me to do that. To get me to agree with Bernie that the joint college should be located out in the engineering school and to do it because I was new, I didn't have all the intents that maybe Walter had about it and that I wouldn't know all the intricacies of it. And spring that on me and go out there and put the college up, right? (Fredrick Humphries, personal communication, December 18, 2014).

President Humphries felt that the SUS Chancellor and FSU President sought to take advantage of him being a new president by pressuring him to make a quick decision on where the joint College of Engineering would be located. A similar tactic was used when Elmira

Magnum became FAMU's eleventh president in 2014. Florida Senator John Thrasher proposed that FAMU and FSU split the engineering college and orchestrated a meeting between FSU's interim president and FAMU President Magnum on her second day as president to sign a memorandum of agreement backing his proposal (Mitchell, 2014). President Humphries recognized the SUS Chancellors' strategy, yet also knew that he did not have all of the background information and context that last president, Walter Smith, possessed. Regarding the arrangement of academic programs within the joint college, President Humphries saw the pressure to make big decisions quickly as an opportunity to reconfigure the way academic courses were offered.

> Well, I was not happy that the academic disciplines had been divided, so I pushed that FAMU could offer all of the engineering degrees authorized for the joint college of engineering, and got that so that we could have faculty in the joint college associated with every one of the disciplines, so could FSU have faculty associated with every one of the [disciplines]…so, the mechanical engineering department was as much mine as it was FSU's, as was civil was as much mine as FSU had civil engineering. So, I pushed that I didn't want to just deal with industrial, civil, and part of electrical engineering, so we got agreement on that. (Fredrick Humphries, personal communication, December 18, 2014)

Initially the budget for the joint Institute of Engineering rotated control every year between the universities, this practice continued even after the institute reached college status as the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering. Consequently, joint college faculty and administrators' projects were adversely affected by all the changes that had to occur when the budget changed locations. When Dr. Humphries became president of FAMU, he and FSU President Sliger were able to address this issue. President Humphries planned to convince FAMU's vocal, skeptical

alumni that FAMU was an equal partner in the joint college of engineering by securing permanent control of the engineering budget. President Humphries shares

> So, what I did is we met, Bernie [Sliger] and I met, in the dining room of the Doubleday Hotel in Tallahassee, had drinks, and he told me his story of why he had to have the building for the joint college located in Innovation Park and that a bunch of people were putting a lot of pressure on him to have it and he was hopeful that I could agree that the joint college building go in Innovation Park. I told him OK, I needed the budget solely at FAMU… 'You give me the budget and we will build the building at Innovation Park.' So, he agreed to that, that the budget could stay at FAMU and I agreed that the building could be built. So, we met with the chancellor and with the guy that he had assigned to work with us to try to work out a solution and that was McAuthor, Vice Chancellor McAuthor. So, we went into the meeting and [Board of Regents Chancellor] Charlie said 'Well, where are we?' We said 'problem solved', and Bernie said 'we're going to build the building.' The money was already appropriated fourteen million dollars, "we're going to build the building, it's going to be in Innovation Park' and I said "and I'm [going to] get the budget, it's not going to float anymore between FSU, it's only going to be at FAMU.' So, Charlie looked at Bernie and said 'are you sure you want to do that?' Bernie said 'yeah, I'm sure I want to do that', and he said 'okay then, the budget goes to FAMU and we're going to build the building in Innovation Park'. (personal communication, December 18, 2014)

Not to be pressured into making a quick decision on the college, FAMU President Humphries met with FSU President Sliger in a public, neutral location to negotiate a deal on the governance of the joint college. President Humphries agency and ability to participate in the

decision-making process separates this instance from the fate of the Law School or the medical facility. In the cases of the Law School and the FAMU hospital, the Board of Regents and FSU had all of the power, and made decisions that affected FAMU without FAMU representatives being able to have any input. The *Adams* case, the SUS's equalizing opportunities agreement with the Office of Civil Rights, and the work of the FAMU leaders before him paved the way for President Humphries to sit at the table and make significant decisions about the future of FAMU.

The meeting in the Doubleday Hotel hinted at the possibility of FAMU being able to break free of its limited role as sharecropper. President Humphries negotiation for the budget of the joint college signaled to the FAMU alumni and stakeholders that FAMU could find relief. The idea that a FAMU president could negotiate control of the finances of a joint college with a larger, better-resourced TWI surprised the SUS Chancellor and gave hope to FAMU faculty, staff, and students that FAMU could possibly improve its situation and eventually renegotiate the oppressive sharecropping contract limiting the Black college since its establishment in 1887. President Humphries understood that if he could secure FAMU's control of the joint college's budget, that he would win the trust of those he was appointed to lead and raise the hopes of his fellow alumni. President Humphries and President Sliger rewrote the memorandum of agreement to reflect that FAMU would permanently control the budget and that the college's permanent building would be built in Innovation Park, a technology park on the FSU campus.

FAMU's college of engineering followed the same relocation trend as the law school and medical facility, it began and developed at FAMU and ended up on FSU's campus. In the college of engineering's case, however, FAMU still has full access to the academic programs and full control of the budget. Civil Rights litigation blocked the SUS and FSU from taking the

entire crop of the engineering school outright, and President Humphries' preparation allowed FAMU to make the most of its opportunity to sit at the table of interest convergence.

FAMU's growth threatened the White power structure of Florida and challenged the supremacy of its neighbor on the other side of the tracks, FSU. Blacks, in essence, were becoming too uppity and causing a stir for good people of Tallahassee. Eventually, the tension in Tallahassee reached a boiling point and the overseer took action. Rather than acknowledging and rewarding FAMU's diligence and ability to do more with less, the owners and overseers reminded FAMU that they were simply sharecropping in field of higher education. As the owner, the state of Florida, and overseer, the state higher education governing board, made decisions to redistribute FAMU's growing power, confiscate a share of the crop, to Florida State University. The data reveals a process reminiscent of an owner claiming and confiscating the best share of a sharecropper's harvest, selling the fruits of the sharecropper's labor, and distributing the profits among the ranks of fellow owners and overseers. This is the story from the laborers' point of view, the sharecropper's plight, caught in a zero-sum game in which they are constantly the loser. The case of the college of engineering, however, provides a glimmer of hope. The negotiation of controlling the budget in exchange for conceding on the location, and the opportunity to partner in a joint program rather than having an entire program simply stripped away, shows variation in the trend HBCU's being confined to a sharecropping condition with growth limited by instances of interest convergence in which the HBCU has no influence.

This chapter presented the story of three crops FAMU harvested, and the first fruits the owner took as a share, only to give it to an awaiting FSU, reaping the fruits sown by FAMU. FAMU was originally located on Copeland Street in downtown Tallahassee, next to the state capital buildings and downtown businesses. That land is now the campus of Florida State

University. FAMU had a hospital on its campus, served the poor and the Black community, and prepared students in the arts and sciences of health care. The hospital was taken away and now a medical school stands on the campus of Florida State University. Florida A&M had a law school, graduated Black lawyers, and produced attorneys who became state legislators. As with every other cash crop, the law school too was taken away from the Black college and given to traditionally White institution across the train tracks. Finally, Florida's Revised Desegregation Plan of 1977 was approved and seemed like the legislation necessary to end exploitative sharecropping contracts; however, the owner class created a loophole.

The owners practiced interest convergence where sharecropping left off and was able to take a program that was authorized for FAMU in 1950, and have it placed on FSU's west campus as the joint college of engineering. FAMU could not decry segregation because they got a professional engineering program out of the deal, yet there was no way FAMU could get it unless FSU could have engineering as well. Though the era of FAMU operating as sharecroppers in higher education was presumably over and FAMU controls the joint college's budget, the engineering crop FAMU had planted and watered since 1891, still ended up on the FSU campus.

The crop of engineering came under the oversight of a dean paid by FSU in 1982. The engineering harvest was being distributed or taught by a majority of FSU-paid faculty, to a majority FSU student body. The crop that was planted for and by FAMU was being collected by FSU and mostly benefiting FSU faculty and students. To be clear, FAMU students and faculty have access to the crop, but not the privileges inherent in being associated with owner and overseer ranks. The next chapter presents students' experiences at the joint college, how the

partnership has affected FAMU, and the factors that have sustained the partnership over a thirty-year period.

# Chapter 4
# Three Decades of Disparity: Dealing with the Devil

Understanding how the partnership was formed provides details into Florida A&M University and Florida State University's origin stories, illuminates how the joint college was established, and foreshadows how the partnership persisted for more than thirty years. Most inter-institutional partnerships fail within the first five years (Millet, 1979). The short-lived partnerships are often projects supported by a results-oriented grant, or exist as a short term goal of two or more college presidents. The FAMU-FSU College of Engineering partnership differs in that it was formed similarly to how most public higher education institutions are established, by an act of the state legislature. Under the authority of the Florida General Assembly, the legislation funding the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering proved a coercive device. The legislation circumvented the state of Florida's agreement with the Office of Civil Rights to establish new academic programs at FAMU.

The agreement to give FAMU preferential treatment for new, high demand programs was intended to both enhance FAMU as an institution and serve as a catalyst in integrating the Historically Black University. The desegregation agreement of 1977 called for the State University System of Florida to authorize new academic programs that would attract more non-Black students to the FAMU campus. The legislature's interpretation and execution of the desegregation agreement was reminiscent of a sharecropping system of operation: blatantly using legislative connections to coerce Black organizations into partnering with majority white organizations to achieve the white organization's goals. The joint college's coercive, sharecropping origins, subsequently, had lasting effects on its faculty, students, and the entire college's ongoing development.

The following chapter presents three decades of the Florida A&M and Florida State's

partnership development from the perspectives of the joint college's former students, voices largely left out of the existing published literature on the college's history. The administrators are participants of the sharecropping system in place at the joint college; moreover, adding the perspectives of the former students, the products of that system, provides a comprehensive narrative that complicates the college of engineering's extant, written history. The alumni and administrators' compiled stories, moreover, introduce a previously untapped perspective of how FAMU, as the sharecropper, endured the partnership over the course of thirty years. As narrators, the alumni present their perspectives of the partnership's effects on FAMU as an institution as well as on the joint college's students and their relationships.

**Partnership Goals**

Former FAMU President Walter Smith recounts the initial goals of the partnership being set by Florida officials. Particularly, President Smith credits Florida Representative Herbert Morgan with giving the college of engineering partnership the purpose of addressing the issues of diversity representation in the engineering education.

> He gave it purpose, which made it possible to get legislative support, because what was missing back then is still kind of what is missing today, is that the engineering community/higher education community was not producing African Americans in significant numbers in engineering, nor was it producing women in an appropriate number in engineering. In addition to authorizing the establishment of the joint college of engineering, he gave the specific role that the joint college of engineering should be devoted to producing African American engineers and women engineers. (Walter Smith, personal communication, March 10, 2015)

Representative Morgan established a purpose for the partnership that the Black

community, FAMU stakeholders, and former Florida State College for Women alumni would support—a purpose that fellow members of the Florida Congress could not openly oppose. The purpose, however, was not enforced by any goals. No measurable goals were set for the fulfilling the purpose that was given by the representative. Moreover, the way President Smith describes the planning process, FAMU did not have any input into the development of the purpose or the goal-setting. The purpose was left to be broad; as a result, the planning of the college did not include diversity goals, gender ratios, or any specific plan for how to increase the number of African Americans and women majoring in engineering. During President Humphries tenure working with the joint college of engineering, the joint committee governing the partnership did not set any specific goals regarding how many women or Black engineers the college was going to produce. According to President Humphries,

> We did not set together a goal for how many Black students we want to produce and how many women [we want to graduate]. Together we led the nation. Around 1995, we had more Black graduates with baccalaureate degrees than anyone in the country—we were always in the top five. (Fredrick Humphries, personal communication, December 17, 2014)

The FAMU leadership, accordingly, developed goals for the college that were consistent with the overall mission of the institution: to be a leader in educating and graduating Black professionals and scholars. FAMU was focused on growing the institution and enhancing the engineering program. President Humphries recalls FAMU getting two new buildings out of the engineering partnership. FAMU leaders were focused on growing, it was the number one goal, and because FAMU was growing and recognized as the nation's top producer of Black engineers, President Humphries did not have many complaints about the goals of the engineering

partnership.

Moreover, President Humphries did not have many complaints about the location of the joint college. FAMU exchanged the location of the engineering college for control of the joint college budget. Though President Humphries felt that was an acceptable exchange, the location of the engineering building concerned the students. Many of the alumni expressed an overall feeling isolation and alienation at the joint college site. FAMU engineering students, limited to taking all engineering coursework on the joint college campus, desired to revel with colleagues in the familiar and comfortable HBCU campus setting. Students attending FAMU for engineering did not expect to take classes so far from FAMU's campus yet so close to buildings adorned with FSU's logo and seal.

FSU President Sliger accomplished his goal of offering engineering courses on Florida State's campus; accordingly, FSU students felt a strong sense of ownership in the college of engineering. Florida A&M President Humphries negotiated control of the budget, thus meeting his goal to allay alumni concern that FAMU had no control in the partnership. FAMU students, however, expressed other feelings about attending classes at the joint college. The FAMU engineering students wanted the HBCU experience, and though their academic goals were being met, the students felt their social and cultural expectations were overlooked. Moreover, the FAMU students' sense of ownership and belonging in the college of engineering was measured and found wanting. FAMU students felt less like owners, and more like temporary tenants forced to deal with an arrangement they had no power to affect.

The joint College of Engineering advisory committee organized and operated the partnership based on individual institutional goals. The committee did not report any specific, measurable goals for students or faculty. In place of a list of benchmark accomplishments, both

Florida State University and Florida A&M University sought enhancements. FSU sought to enhance the university's standing and academic reputation, while FAMU's main objectives were to increase the number of African American engineers and to be the most effective school for graduating Black engineers. FAMU's leaders spoke about student enhancement, and documents from FSU leaders depict a quest mainly for institutional prominence (Fredrick Humphries, personal communication, December 18, 2014).

**Issues Under One Roof**

Without any plans for managing the proportion of FAMU and FSU engineering students or faculty, the culture and atmosphere of the joint college developed without regulation. While on separate campuses, the college of engineering grew relatively naturally as any other high demand academic program at the two institutions. Once the college moved from the institutions' main campus sites to a joint location, however, the administrators, faculty, and students encountered significant conflict on their path to coexistence.

The joint college of engineering offered courses under one roof in 1986 and by 1992 they were embroiled in controversy. Though students were not heavily involved in the original conflict over the location of the joint engineering college building, the FAMU students were well aware of their surroundings and the alumni spoke of the contention caused by the building site. FAMU-FSU College of Engineering alumni from FAMU recounted the distance they traveled by bus to get from FAMU's main campus to the joint College of Engineering building.

> It took a long time to get there [the engineering building], but you felt further away because there's nothing else near there, but Florida State was probably more comfortable because most of the people, most of the research buildings that were around there were all FSU buildings. Their golf course was right by the engineering building. (John Lee,

Jr., personal communication, 26 February 2015)

**Location. Location. Location.** Though some students found the engineering building's location controversial, other students embraced the reality that their engineering classes were taken on FSU's campus and used Florida State's nearby resources to their advantage. FAMU 2008 graduate Calicia Johnson occasionally visited FSU's Seminole Golf Course. "I remember going over there to the driving lanes just to clear [my] head. You could just walk over there, you don't have to drive anywhere. It was just something different to do (Calicia Johnson, personal communication, January 9, 2015).


*Figure 2:* FSU Southwest Campus Map, FAMU-FSU College of Engineering. This figure illuminates how the joint college facilities are bordered on every side by FSU-owned and operated property. The College of Engineering is labeled in the center, lower-half of the image. FSU's Don Veller Seminole Golf Course & Club is labeled directly below the college.




*Figure 3.* FSU Southwest Campus Map, Administrative Version. This figure was photographed in the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering Dean's Office in May 2013. The name of the map and the joint college's appearance on it exposes the fact that FSU views and categorizes the joint college as being solely on FSU's campus instead of a neutral site.

Having a golf course so close to academic buildings was indeed different for FAMU students. Though the FAMU campus has multiple basketball courts, baseball, and football fields, the only college golf course in Tallahassee belongs to FSU and it makes up the majority of the Florida State University southwest campus. Florida State University's Seminole Golf course is located directly across the street from the joint College of Engineering (see *Figure 1*); accordingly, FSU claims the joint college as part of its Southwest Campus. The claim is further substantiated by the rendering of the College of Engineering on the administrative version of the FSU Southwest Campus Map hanging in the college's Office of the Dean (see *Figure 2*).

Based on the terms agreed upon by FSU President Sliger and FAMU President

Humphries, the joint college was located in close proximity to Innovation Park, FSU's technology park. Moreover, the college is squarely situated between the FSU golf course and a set of apartments named Florida State University Alumni Village. FAMU students lost the ability to take the campus shuttle from FAMU to the College of Engineering in 2011, and began relying on the city's public bus to travel between classes on their home campus and the engineering building (Joseph, 2011).

The proximity of the engineering building to solely FSU facilities was apparent to the students. FAMU and FSU's partnership, however, was made up of a larger set of arrangements dividing the responsibilities and benefits of the joint college between both universities. Students closer to administrators, such as former FAMU student government association member John Lee, had greater access to information on the guiding procedures and compromises underlying the joint college. Some of the information, moreover, remained unknown to the students until they reached alumni status as it was for alumnus John Lee.

> Well most of us knew the arrangement that FAMU had the facility, maintenance, and that type of stuff in their budget, and part of the agreement was that FSU would pick the dean, so it wasn't a real partnership, it was more of an arrangement if you say: what made people feel good. FAMU felt good by being able to control budget. FSU felt good about being able to control the dean so that they could control direction and mission. That's how I always really felt, and all of the [technical] people at the engineering building who did all our computer labs and stuff, they were all FSU so they provided all those things. So in some instances you'd say stuff like "Do we have that at FAMU or do we have to do all of our stuff through FSU?" At the time we didn't know that was [a] formal part of the arrangement, but we did sort of see FSU heavy on some places, some pieces of it were

FAMU heavy. (John Lee, Jr., personal communication, 26 February 2015)

**Separation of Duties**

FAMU alumnus John Lee Jr., suggests that college of engineering students figured out elements of the partnership from observation and experience. The FAMU students noticed the distribution of duties and responsibilities while transitioning from one class to another and while studying in the college of engineering building. Many of the institution-specific areas of responsibility were obvious to the students, while other parts of the arrangement, as John Lee refers to it, take place more behind the scenes.

FAMU and FSU had indeed established an arrangement to share responsibilities and daily operation of the joint college. The FAMU students' perception of the distribution of responsibilities aligns directly with FAMU and FSU's 1987 *Memorandum of Agreement on Management Plan of the College of Engineering* (see appendix). As a student, John Lee and his fellow FAMU engineering classmates acutely noticed differences between the college of engineering website and the webpages of their home institution. Under the memorandum of agreement, FSU handled the "high tech" aspect of acquiring, "providing central maintenance," "planning and managing the information and computer systems" for the Engineering College (FAMU, FSU, 1987). Accordingly, the technological differences between FAMU's campus facilities and the joint college of engineering building were apparent: the college of engineering website, the computers, and all the information technology staff at the joint college were managed solely by FSU.

An in-depth look into the memorandum of understanding further calls the allocation of responsibilities into question. The assignment of responsibilities closely resembles the historical segregation and categorizing of employment positions by race and gender. FAMU was mostly

responsible for what could be considered the "Negro jobs" (Wormser, 2004).

*Table 1. Allocation of Administrative Responsibilities between FAMU and FSU for the College of Engineering*

| | FAMU | FSU | Board of Regents |
|---|---|---|---|
| Construction | -Classroom furniture<br>-Equipment<br>-Associate Director of Physical Plant | | -Supervision |
| Facility Maintenance | -Maintenance<br>-Janitorial services<br>-Landscaping / grounds keeping | | |
| Security | | -Patrol service<br>-Environmental health and safety services | |
| Controller / Business / Budget | -Permanent budget<br>-Repairs<br>-Minor renovations<br>-Purchasing*<br>-Space Inventory<br>-Property Inventory<br>-Postal Services<br>-Food services and vending<br>-Messenger services | -Telephones** | |
| Utilities | -Building manager | | |
| Transportation | | -Parking and traffic<br>-Issuing citations | FAMU-FSU Shuttle |
| Information Systems | -Purchasing**<br>-Inventory | -Technology acquisitions<br>-Maintenance<br>-Planning and managing information and computer systems | |
| Personnel | -Institution specific | -Institution specific | |

*Note*. Data drawn from FAMU-FSU's 1987 *Memorandum of Agreement on Management Plan of the College of Engineering*.

*: handled using FSU expertise and input

**: FAMU purchases while FSU operates

**Negro Jobs.** The "Negro jobs"—employment positions doing menial work historically and traditionally assigned to African Americans such as cleaning, food services, and grounds

keeping – were allocated exclusively to historically Black FAMU. The arrangement perpetuated the students' perception of racial inequalities. The distribution of responsibilities in the arrangement placed FAMU, and thus most of the African American employees, in the labor and clerical positions. FAMU is responsible for the facility management, the inventory, minor renovations, postal services, food services, and purchasing. Purchasing responsibilities are presented in the memorandum of agreement with a caveat: "as a general principle purchasing will be handled by FAMU, but the two universities shall establish a procedure by which the expertise of the FSU purchasing department in handling scientific and technical equipment purchases can be used to expedite such acquisitions" (FAMU-FSU, 1988).

The few responsibilities allocated to FAMU that are not traditional sharecropping and Jim Crow era positions have qualifiers and clauses in the memorandum. The clauses provide FSU with the means to interject in the operation and/or management of that responsibility. Purchasing is curtailed by the mandate to create a procedure for FSU input on purchases. Most separation of duties in the 1987 memorandum of agreement have remained the same throughout the joint college's history. The agreement that FSU manages the website and security remains intact as of the year 2016; the 1987 budget agreement, on the other hand, has been altogether ignored. The joint management council signed the agreement declaring that "the College of Engineering budget will be included permanently within the FAMU overall budget" (FAMU-FSU, 1987). However, in July 2015 the Florida Board of Governors successfully proposed the budget be removed from FAMU's general operating revenue and placed a separate budget line for engineering under FSU's control (Arnett, 2015).

While students identify FAMU employees handling mundane work around the joint college, Florida State University's employees seen around the college of engineering are

perceived as occupying the "good jobs." FSU is responsible for environmental health and safety matters, telecommunications oversight, information systems management, and technology acquisitions. The FSU staff also takes on the role of security and safety. Due to the engineering building's close proximity to other FSU entities—university housing, the Broadcasting Center, and the golf course—it was determined to be more cost effective for FSU police to patrol the joint college of engineering.

The reality of FSU policing the grounds and facility on FSU's property that is under FAMU's care further supports the sharecropping metaphor positing FSU as the land owner and FAMU as the field hand. In addition to being associated with the land owner, FSU staff provides the skilled services that garner higher pay from the institution and higher respect from the students. As the field laborer, on the other hand, historically Black FAMU is responsible for menial jobs demanding modest remuneration and little to no admiration, all the while being policed by traditionally white FSU. The land and buildings are managed by FAMU, while the land is owned by FSU, the area is policed by FSU, and the College of Engineering building is named after an FSU alumnus. Moreover, for the twenty-eight years, FSU was also the academic and financial home of the dean of the joint college of engineering—a fact that the students knew well.

**Joint College Dean.** John Lee mentions that FSU enjoyed choosing the dean for the college of engineering. Even as a student, the dean's stronger affiliation with FSU than with FAMU did not escape the student's notice. Alumni John Lee's reference to FSU controlling the dean position is supported by multiple works on the history of the joint college as well as joint college staff. The history of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering recorded in Karen Frair's *Now is the Time* references the arrangement between FAMU and FSU for the dean of the college

of engineering. The first dean of the joint institute of engineering, Elvin Dantin, was a colleague of FSU's President Sliger. FSU's president and the first dean of the engineering arrangement met at Louisiana State University where they both served as professors.

FAMU-FSU College of Engineering Professor and Associate Dean for Student Affairs and Curriculum Dr. Reginald J. Perry highlights connections between the dean's position and Florida State University. "According to the 1985 agreement, the Dean is paid by Florida State. The associate dean is paid by and thus affiliated with FAMU" (Perry, personal communication, 2014). Dr. Perry references an early agreement between FAMU and FSU to allocate responsibilities for the administration of the joint engineering program. After Dean Dantin, the dean position was selected by a joint college selection committee. The college's longest-serving dean, Dean Ching-Jen Chen, similar to Dean Dantin, was seen by some FAMU faculty as having ties to FSU members of the joint college advisory board and FSU affiliated faculty (Perry, personal communication, 2014). The arrangement, however, was not balanced.

The joint college arrangement allocating control of administrative budget lines provided FSU with more administrative power than FAMU. The formal agreement provides for the dean to be selected by the committee consisting of both FAMU and FSU members, "in actuality," however, "the deans have had ties to FSU administrators and faculty" (Reginald Perry, personal communication, 2014). The dean of the college of engineering is paid directly through FSU's budget, selected by the joint committee, and the engineering dean recommends the assistant deans as well as additional administrators (Reginald Perry, personal communication, 2014). The consulting firm commissioned by the Board of Governors in 2014 to conduct a study on the joint college also found that the agreement formally aligned the dean position with FSU, and one associate dean position with FAMU (Collaborative Brain Trust Consulting Firm, 2015); no limit

was placed on the number of assistant deans, faculty, or staff the dean could assign/appoint through the FSU budget. The authority afforded to FSU through control of the dean position provided FSU with the means to keep an overseer on the land. The overseer, though not the landowner or of the land owner's family, was granted more authority and power than the field hands while ensuring the owner received the greater share of the harvest.

Though the allotment of responsibilities was present in the initial agreement forming the joint college, FAMU students and staff in engineering became more aware of the peculiarities of the partnership when the engineering building opened. Students and faculty knew the disparities between the universities well, thus the differences in funding, student preparation, and resources were expected in the partnership. Experiencing classroom meetings alongside their FSU counterparts, FAMU students felt that the differences put them at a disadvantage with the faculty. FAMU students spoke out about teacher attitudes, expectations, and grading. Instead of the camaraderie students felt at their home institution, FAMU students adopted the mindset that they were sitting next to their competitors. Considering that the dean, a majority of the administrators, and disproportionate number of faculty were affiliated with FSU, FAMU students felt disadvantaged in the classroom and clamored for grades, recognition, and research opportunities.

**Seeking balance.** Hoping something could be done to balance the situation, FAMU engineering students brought their concerns to the FAMU president and vice president; however, the students communicated their issues most often among themselves. The seniors passed along stories to the underclassmen about their experiences in the college. FAMU freshmen then entered the college prepared for the worst, expecting mistreatment, and searching for opportunities. Engineering orientation, led by upperclassmen and graduate students, began

taking on a social justice tone. Freshman declaring majors in engineering were informed, both formally in orientation and informally in engineering student organizations, that engineering for FAMU students required a high capacity for mathematics, above average competency in physics, a firm foundation in logic, and a steadfast belief in themselves as young, Black, and educated. The FAMU students were taught that as students in the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, they would be dealing with the devil. The culturally conscious upperclassmen, graduate students, and faculty felt a responsibility to teach engineering concepts while raising the social consciousness and awareness of FAMU engineering students.

Florida A&M University, as the freshmen were taught, shouldered the menial duties it was allotted through the memo of agreement. Faculty affiliated with FAMU reported to an FSU affiliated dean. The students, faculty, and administrators noticed the power dynamics of partnership, and FAMU sought to balance the institution's influence in the joint college. FAMU's attempt to gain equal footing with FSU, however, followed a historical pattern: FAMU establishes a plan for parity, and the Florida higher education governing board blocks the plan. Moreover, this oral history of the joint college's one-sided development was communicated to the freshmen in orientation and private sessions. Rather than beginning with the academic proposals and appropriation bill, the students shared the history of the joint college from their experiences in periods of transition: early classes in the institute of engineering, the transition to attending courses in the engineering building, and the legislative decisions that did not prove favorable for FAMU.

**Parity Denied**

FAMU and FSU operated the institute of engineering program from their respective main campuses for six years. During which time, the institutions offered programs on the individual

campuses that aligned with each college's strengths. FSU offered mechanical, chemical, and some electrical engineering solely on their campus, while FAMU provided instruction in civil and some electrical engineering. In an effort to balance the program offerings on each campus, FAMU submitted an additional engineering program proposal to Florida's State University System in 1987. The proposal requested authorization for FAMU to establish an official industrial engineering program in the college of engineering. The original plan for academic programs drafted by FAMU's engineering lead Dr. Charles C. Kidd and FSU's engineering lead Dr. Joseph Lannutti called for this specific split of programs; subsequently, when the joint engineering proposal was accepted, both engineering leads assumed that the programs as outlined in the proposal were fully accepted and authorized as well. However, when the FAMU and FSU Vice Presidents for Academic Affairs submitted the proposal to begin developing the industrial engineering program at FAMU, the State University System (SUS) denied the request.

The denial hinged on a letter sent by then-SUS engineering consultant Dr. John Hogan after evaluating the proposal. Dr. Hogan's letter details his revelation that "the schools have violated the agreement quite seriously by informally agreeing among themselves that FAMU should have the programs in Electrical (Electronics), Civil, and Industrial Engineering and that FSU should have the programs in Electrical (Computer, Power, [etc.]), Chemical, and Mechanical Engineering" (March 24, 1987, letter from J. Hogan to SUS Vice Chancellor R. McTarnaghan). The consultant states that his concern was "not with the Industrial Engineering program, per se, but that the pressure for its initiation would be to provide parity between the two institutions" (Frair, 1989, p. 68). The pursuit of parity, according to Dr. Hogan, was not "the healthiest atmosphere [in which] to initiate a new engineering program" (Frair, 1989, p. 68).

The State University System held back FAMU from achieving parity with FSU in

academic programs offered through the joint college. Under consultation, the SUS upheld the opinion that the institutions' informal agreement to offer specific programs on the separate campuses violated the agreement for the joint college. It is important to note that the informal agreement was found to be a "serious violation" when FAMU requested another program to put them on par with FSU. The violation was not identified, however, when FSU was operating the three largest engineering programs in the joint college solely on the FSU campus under the very same informal agreement.

**Interest Convergence**

The proposal for an industrial engineering program was not approved until all of FAMU and FSU's engineering departments moved into the joint engineering building in 1988. The eventual approval of the industrial engineering program provides another example of interest convergence. Industrial engineering was approved along with a master's program in chemical engineering. Case in point, the industrial engineering program that FAMU developed was only approved once the chemical engineering department, established and originally housed on the FSU campus, was granted authority to establish a master's program. The FAMU students and faculty recognized that the HBCU in the partnership was only permitted new programs by Florida's State University System if the predominantly White FSU was also approved a new program, maintaining FSU's control of the majority of academic programs in the joint college. FAMU's interest could only be fulfilled if creation of programs also benefited the predominantly White state of Florida and majority White FSU's agendas.

FAMU's students observed the peculiar partnership and the state's role in bridling FAMU's growth. The students of the late 1980s and early 1990s well perceived the state's regulation of the status quo, maintaining the FAMU-FSU power dynamic through direct

application of the interest convergence theory. Subsequently, engineering upperclassmen and graduate students professed the history of inequality in academic offerings, location, and control between FAMU and FSU. Alumni informed the freshmen of the Institute for Engineering operating as one division on the two separate campuses, and how revealing it was to share space with the FSU engineering students and faculty during the first years as a College of Engineering in its own building.

FAMU engineering majors considered the social climate and cultural contention when the joint college began offering all courses under one roof in 1988 on Florida State University's Southwest Campus adjacent to Innovation Park. In the engineering building, FAMU students experienced a familiar diversity dynamic: though they attended an HBCU, in the joint college African American students were in the minority. Though it was the late 1980s and early 1990s, the students expressed feelings of sharecropping/Jim Crow era segregation in the College of Engineering building. The very acts FSU posited as partnership, FAMU students deduced as depredation.

**Separate, but Joint College**

Former FAMU student, I. Keino Miller, describes his experience at the joint college as anything but joint.

> It was like two different worlds. It seemed like we had our floors, and they had their floors. The main floor was a FSU floor, so you walked in and it didn't look anything like FAMU. I remember vividly our orientation which took place one floor up from FSU, or maybe across the hall, but anyway the bottom line was we came out and as students we kind of congregated in the same area and I remember hearing someone say well, they gave us the breakdown, the program of studies itinerary. They had their schedule and we

> had ours, so we were kind of looking over it to see what theirs looked like and what ours looked like and we had a five-year itinerary and they had a four-year. That was one of the first experiences... (Keino Miller, personal communication, January 23, 2015)

FAMU-FSU College of Engineering students like Keino Miller found obvious differences between the students in the same program at the joint college. Keino noticed both the social interactions and overall academic structure for students from the two universities differed even within the same major. Structurally, it seemed that FAMU and FSU had separate floors in the engineering building. The college of engineering building was still in phase one of a planned three-phase building plan. Phase I, now called building A, was the only building that existed when Keino Miller attended engineering classes as a FAMU student. The phase I building consists of 110,000 square feet, has three levels, and Keino distinctly remembers the first floor being a "FSU floor." Phase II, building B, provided an additional 90,000 square feet for the college of engineering in August of 1998; the new space, moreover, allowed the college to rearrange a number of its administrative and faculty offices. As of 2016, departments that originated at FAMU were found on the first and second floors of building A.

**Race over institution.** In regards to coursework, FAMU and FSU had separate engineering introductory courses. The structural and academic separation the administration sustained in the engineering building may have influenced inter-institutional student interaction. Socially, FAMU and FSU students congregated in different areas of the building. More strikingly, as students matriculated in the college of engineering, the social groups reorganized. Instead of socializing in areas of the building according to institutional affiliations, the engineering students eventually gathered according to phenotype.

Prince Gammage, a 2005 graduate of the college of engineering, noticed the grouping of

Black students in the engineering building.

> The Black students, we would really fill the atrium, we would walk through the atrium because the NSBE office was right there so a lot of people would hang out over there, and then Black students would hang out in the computer lab upstairs. So it was divided, because it resorted back to what you know… (P. Gammage, personal communication, January 9, 2015)

Gammage's account of the separation of students by race in the joint college during his matriculation from 2000-2005 mirrors Keino's 1992-1993 experience. The separation was noticeable by floor when the college of engineering was in one building during Keino's time at the college. According to Prince Gammage, a student in the joint college nearly ten years after Keino's experience, the racial separation was identifiable by the offices groups of students frequented.

The racial self-separation was practiced by both the Black and the white students, it also superseded institutional affiliation. The Black FSU students spent more time with Black FAMU classmates, and the inverse was true for FAMU's White students.

> Chase was at FAM, White guy, he actually got a minority scholarship, that's pretty crazy. But Chase didn't hang out with us, he hung out with the White students. You know, …it didn't even matter what university you were from, the Black people were going to hang out with the Black people, the White students with the White students—unless we had a project, then we would get back together. (P. Gammage, personal communication, January 9, 2015)

Prince Gammage recalls a white classmate who attended FAMU on a minority scholarship and majored in engineering. Though his classmate attended FAMU, yet his race

identity led him to commune with the white students in the college of engineering. FAMU's white student population has modestly risen from 3 percent in 2004 to 7 percent of the total student body in 2014 (FAMU, 2016), so Prince's reference to Chase's fellowship with the White students in the College of Engineering alludes to the fact that Chase's group was virtually all FSU students. According to Prince Gammage, unless partnered in a lab or class project, Black and white students often remained disconnected in the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering. FAMU alumnus John Lee also witnessed racial separation among the students at the joint college.

> I know there were some classes where you could clearly see the divide in the classroom along racial lines, but you couldn't see that as...and you couldn't see, no matter if it was a Black person from FSU or FAMU, all the Black people were on one side and all the White people were on the other. So you did see that at some point…. most of my study partners were Black whether they were FSU or FAMU side. Most of the time I don't think I commingled a lot with the White FSU students unless we were sort of forced into doing that in a thing. It wasn't a natural cohabitation like that. (J. Lee, personal communication, February 26, 2015)

John Lee's comments parallels those of Prince Gammage. FAMU and FSU students in the joint college could identify one another's race before they could determine one's home institution. Once in the engineering building, the Black students gathered on floors, in computer labs, and even on distinct sides in a classroom. Students reported not spending much time with engineering classmates of a different race unless the grouping was necessitated by instructional purposes. No matter the amount of school pride, race trumped institutional affiliation in the social circles at the FAMU-FSU College of engineering.

**Coincidental Connection.** FAMU alumna Calicia Johnson adds to John Lee's declaration that the institutional separation, which was mostly recognizable by race, was conspicuous in the classroom.

> I felt like a lot of the FAMU students sat in the back, really talked to each [other] and didn't really engage the others, but I couldn't see very well so I had to sit in the front of the class. So I was forced to talk to the guys from Florida State. (C. Johnson, personal communication, January 9, 2015)

Initially, the students at the institutions clung to commonalities and formed comfortable relationships in a disconcerting environment. Some students, however, had the fortune of connecting with classmates outside of their home institution and outside of their race. Calicia did not make the decision to engender an amalgamation of the races in her class; her anomalous choice to breach the front row of seats in the classroom was due to her visual impairment. Speaking with the "guys from Florida State," which can be interpreted as the White male students, was not common. In Calicia's particular situation, it was happenstance to sit with the Florida State guys. Calicia's need to sit with Florida State students in order to fully experience the course follows the same route as her home institution. FAMU's impairment was that the state would not allow it to offer a full engineering program, the HBCU effectively had to sit in the room with FSU in order to provide engineering education for its students. Calicia, similar to FAMU as an institution in 1982, had to sit with people from Florida State University to fully see engineering instruction, as opposed to sitting in the back and only obtaining bits and pieces of an engineering education.

Florida A&M University had a semblance of engineering education prior to the formation of the college of engineering, it is called engineering technology. FAMU's department of

engineering technology originated in 1890 and was absorbed by the FAMU School of Architecture in 2011, becoming part of the new School of Architecture and Engineering Technology (FAMU, 2016). The department of engineering technology serves as an on-campus alternative to the college of engineering, and thus a means of absolute self-segregation among students in Tallahassee interested in the field of engineering. Engineering technology students visited the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering for career fairs; otherwise, however, engineering tech students remained on the FAMU campus for the entirety of their matriculation.

Considering engineering technology, FAMU engineering students were separate from their FSU counterparts for over ninety years. FAMU and FSU College of Engineering students under one roof in the engineering building throughout the decades have noticed self-segregation along racial lines as opposed to institutional affiliation. One journalist visiting the college of engineering in 1998 wrote of the noticeable separation of students by race. "Peering over the balcony of the college's enclosed courtyard, it is hard not to notice that clusters of students often appear segregated" (Fields, 1998, p. 8). The article on the college of engineering articulated students' sentiments precisely.

In concert with the floors and seating in the classroom, the students noticed segregation between the departments. Students felt that Black students had more of a presence in industrial engineering than any other department. White students, meanwhile, seemed overwhelmingly in the majority for students majoring in mechanical engineering and electrical engineering. Women, noticeably in the minority in the college of engineering, were perceived as being drawn to the chemical, industrial, and biomedical engineering fields more than any other academic major (Calicia Johnson, personal communication, January 9, 2015).

**Intentionally Crossing Institutional Lines.** Giselle Rojas, an FSU alumna of the college of engineering, also saw the separation in race and gender in the engineering building. Giselle noticed that the joint college had a lot of women chemical engineering majors while not many women were identified in mechanical engineering courses. Additionally, Giselle shared her perceptions of the college's racial makeup by academic department.

> Actually I feel like mechanical was majority White, and I want to say there were more Black students in electrical… I did see a lot of that as far as demographics in the organizations, but majors, like I said mechanical and chemical I think were more White and then electrical and civil and maybe industrial, it may have been split I'm not sure, was more Black. (Giselle Rojas, personal communication, January 14, 2015)

Giselle self-identifies as a Hispanic/Latina and graduated from FSU with a mechanical engineering degree in 2006. While attending the joint college, Giselle found herself in the gender and ethnic minority in her classes; subsequently, Giselle was sensitive to the grouping and separation that proved to be all too normal in the engineering building. The majority of Latino students came to the engineering college from FSU (Giselle Rojas, personal communication, January 14, 2015). Latino students found support in the Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers (SHPE), and additional support from another cultural support organization for engineers, the National Society of Black Engineers (NSBE). Though organizations like SHPE existed, the Hispanic organizations and Giselle herself tended to partner and bond seamlessly and often with the African American organizations and FAMU engineering students. (Giselle Rojas, personal communication, January 14, 2015)

Cedric White, an African American FSU alumnus class of 2000, fully intended to connect with fellow African American students in the joint college. Rather than restricting

himself to only communicating with students from his home institution, Cedric, referring to his entry to the college of engineering, remarks "I'm going to bond with an African American student no matter what their school is…I think there was definitely an ethnicity factor probably stronger than the university affiliation once I [enrolled] in my major classes" (Cedric White, personal communication, January 10, 2015).

Cedric and Giselle were FSU students who spent time in and out of engineering classes with FAMU students. Despite spending the first two years of college exclusively at Florida State, African American and Latina FSU engineering majors found comfort, camaraderie, and commonalities with FAMU's engineering students. FAMU engineering students were becoming reacquainted with Cedric and Giselle's `condition—feeling isolated and alienated. Students attending HBCUs do not often attend classes as the minority, the HBCU experience regularly consists of having classmates, professors, staff, and administrators who are conscious and aware of Black honor, history, and heritage. Despite the safety and support of the HBCU campus, FAMU students were still very familiar with the common struggle.

**Race Relations at the Joint College.** Early in the existence of the college of engineering, students perceived racial tension at the joint college. FAMU students formed a group called the Black College Defense Force, protested underrepresentation of Black students and faculty during the tenth anniversary of the college of engineering, and met with administrators frequently about race relations. The Black students in the joint college banded on multiple occasions to repel what they perceived as racial discrimination and hatred. One such incident involved students from FSU offending the FAMU engineering students in the early 1990s. The offense centered around students in an engineering organization refusing to include

FAMU's name on a machine built in the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering (Demarco Jenkins, personal communication, January 3, 2015).

A number of FAMU alumni recall either seeing or hearing about FSU engineering students removing FAMU's name from a particular car built in the joint college. When questioned about race relations at the joint college, alumni mention the story of FSU removing the FAMU name from the car as one of the first accounts of outright racial hostility. The Black students in the joint college demanded that the White students from FSU respect FAMU's name.

Alumni and faculty accounts of the incident draw to the same conclusion, a student organization composed solely of white students from Florida State University omitted Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University's name from a machine assembled in the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering. The students' exclusion of the FAMU name from the vehicle proved to be unacceptable for the Black students in the college of engineering. FAMU students expressed constantly hearing their school lambasted in local media and from faculty and administration; however, as students they may have felt that their impact on affecting the larger narrative was limited. Considering the blatant disrespect from their peers, the FAMU students felt attacked on every side and pushed into a corner.

Florida A&M University alumna Jacqueline Swift, class of 1996, shares insight into the racial issues among the students in the college of engineering. FAMU students did not run in to major racial issues every day, however, memorable incidents and stories did leave a stain on the student experience at the joint college. Jacqueline witnessed and heard of several student demonstrations and sit-ins during her undergraduate matriculation at the college of engineering. Jacqui shares her recollection of the frequency of race-related demonstrations and their causes at the joint college.

> I think there might have been two or three. I don't know that they happened every month, but then I feel like there were a couple. There were some issues that happened with the mechanical engineering department, is what I recollect. There was some competition, there was a car or something that had to be built with the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering name painted on it and somehow the students that represented were from FSU and not FAMU, but this was like a club that was outside of classes, I don't remember the name of the mechanical engineering clubs, and the FSU students spray-painted out the FAMU name so that it looked like the FSU College of Engineering. (Jacqueline Swift, personal communication, January 12, 2015)

Fellow FAMU graduate, Demarco Jenkins who entered the engineering program in 1992, expressed that he was so used to racism that he expected to see and experience racism at the joint college. Demarco's sentiment is exemplified in his response to a question about the car race snub, neither Demarco nor any other alumni provided a definite year when the car race incident took place, yet the alumni remarks imply that the issue it took place in 1991 or 1992.

> Yeah, it was a solar car race that we were involved in and when they went to compete, it was all Florida State students there, and they ended up taking the FAMU-FSU shield off of it and just using it as an FSU shield. But, overall the school was fine. Stuff like that didn't surprise me just because, you know I'm from Chicago, I went to an all-male high school, it was predominantly White, so I've seen all kinds of racism I guess. So that stuff just doesn't surprise me. I think it's bad, but it's just things that people do. I don't think that we live in this perfect world where you're not going to see stuff like that. (Demarco, personal communication, January 17, 2015)

The racial turmoil at the college of engineering affected the students in different ways,

whether directly or indirectly, each student remembers the conflicts, the tense atmosphere in the college, and the college's response to the situation. While some students expected turmoil at the joint college, others approached the engineering courses unaware of the preexisting tension. The interinstitutional student interactions resulted in mixed feelings ranging from distrust to scholarly collaborations. Students often found common ground between institutions along racial and ethnic lines; however, interracial tensions were presented as more intense within the joint college than at the individual institutions. One alumna recounted positive interracial, interinstutional interactions, many of the other former students in the joint college identified race-related conflict, whether perceived or realized, as a core element of their time at the engineering building.

Concerns of race, a condescending attitude directed at FAMU, representation of women, and the distribution of institution's students in each engineering department affected the students' each time they stepped into the Herbert Morgan building. As students, the alumni of FAMU heard stories of how nothing was given to FAMU yet things were constantly being taken, and FSU students heard accounts of how FAMU was holding FSU back in the rankings, funding options, and overall progress. The stories the students heard going into the joint college affected their attitudes and reactions to class meetings and social interactions outside of class. Overall, the former students' understanding of how the joint college operated differed greatly from the history presented in publications about the partnership; the alumni's accounts of partnership aligned more with the oral history presented by the former FAMU administrators, yet with much less detail on the establishment and more rich accounts of the culture and dynamics of the college.

The partnership within the sharecropping mode of operation affected the students' and

shaped many of their relationships well after leaving higher education. As transient participants, the students' perspectives within the college of engineering have a shortened scope. Engineering students spend three to four years in the joint college, and then normally move on to jobs and graduate programs outside of Tallahassee, Florida. Pieced together, however, the students snapshot stories provide a fundamental gallery of the partnership from the early 1990s to the year 2008. The historical texts provided a timeline and base idea of the partnership. The FAMU presidents introduced an alternate view of the formation of the college and provided an in-depth account how the sharecropping system influenced the operation of the partnership. Former students bolstered the published data and presidents' goals for the college with narratives of how they experienced the joint college of engineering.

The students' and the institutions' goals were met in the most basic sense that they were able to respectively earn and produce engineering degrees. Former students and administrators present how the partnership affected FAMU as an institution. Moreover, the published material on the joint college documents the establishment of the partnership and the numerical performance of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering. The administrators interviewed provided historical information on the early years of the partnership, and the former students' brief time at the joint college presented how the sharecropping system affected their experiences at the college. Next, the study explores the voices of those who served dually as participants and executors, the beneficiaries and the benefactors of the joint college, the engineering professors. The next chapter also highlights changes in the partnerships and more recent examples of the sharecropping system effects on FAMU leading up to and going sometime beyond the partnerships 30 year mark.

# CHAPTER 5

## Professors and Pupils

> Well, I was not happy that the academic disciplines had been divided, so I pushed that FAMU could offer all of the engineering degrees authorized for the joint college of engineering, and got [it] that so that we could have faculty in the joint college associated with every one of the disciplines, so could FSU have faculty associated with every one of the [disciplines]…so, the mechanical engineering department was as much mine as it was FSU's
>
> You give me the budget and we will build the building at Innovation Park. (Fredrick Humphries, personal communication, December 17, 2014)

FAMU President Fredrick Humphries made several major decisions during the first year of his leadership at Florida A&M University. Seeking equality for FAMU, President Humphries negotiated two deals to retain some form of power and control within the partnership. First, on behalf of the professors, President Humphries ensured FAMU could hire faculty members to teach in any academic department of the joint engineering college. President Humphries felt that FAMU was originally relegated to offering courses in the less well-known and poorer funded engineering disciplines, while FSU faculty were exclusively appointed to teach in the popular disciplines such as mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineering—the programs that historically have the classes with the largest enrollments among the engineering academic programs of study. Secondly, President Humphries negotiated that FAMU permanently control the budget for the joint college in exchange for FSU choosing the location where the engineering building would be built. President Humphries expressed his intention to provide FAMU significant power and control in the partnership, the type of power that would position both the

professors and the pupils to have the freedom to teach and the freedom to learn in a supportive, collaborative, and collegial environment.

The faculty is widely considered the lifeblood of an educational institution. Instructors' frequent direct contact with students, control over grades, and management of the classroom contributes to the culture and climate of educational space. Professors influence the publicity of a university through discoveries, change the direction of schools via sponsored research, and mentor the next generation of researchers, practitioners, and government officials. Though the faculty has authority to assess learning and assign grades, the educators' productivity, both in the classroom and in their respective academic disciplines, affect their influence and subsequently their leadership ability.

Subsequently, the following chapter supports the previous chapters' examination of the joint college by inserting the perspectives of the faculty. More precisely, the chapter continues former students' reflections on the partnership, while highlighting some of the faculty's effect on the students and joint college as a whole. The chapter explores students' and faculty's roles in the development and continuation of the college of engineering partnership and uncovers the faculty's role in the overarching sharecropping system. Quotes are drawn both directly from faculty and from alumni and administrators about the faculty's influence on the interinstitutional partnership. Considering that previous chapters covered the establishment and development of the partnership, the following chapter ends with an overview of the pivotal events that have altered the terms of the partnership that were in place for over 25 years.

The interviews with faculty were distinct from the interviews with the FAMU administrators and college of engineering alumni. While the administrators from FAMU and former students from both institutions spoke openly and frequently about conflicts and areas of

concern for the joint college, the professors, on the other hand, were more guarded with their information. It is important to note that the faculty were actively a part of the college of engineering, whereas the former presidents and alumni interviewed are no longer formally tied to either institution or the joint college. Of particular note, during the time of data collection, no faculty associated with FAMU agreed to participate in the study. The interviews, subsequently, were conducted with FSU-associated, non-Black faculty members.

**Varied Perceptions of Race Relations**

The FSU and FAMU alumni shared numerous experiences that centered on race at the joint college. The only reason two public universities exist in city the size of Tallahassee is due to race, a lawsuit based on racial discrimination predicated the formation of the FAMU FSU partnership, and race affected the daily lives of the students. Race is a key element of the joint college of engineering, the alumni participating in the study acknowledged ethnicity's effect on their experience and the development of the partnership as a whole. Most of the information provided by the alumni involved race issues at the college of engineering. Interviews with professors, however, revealed a more distant, impersonal take on the racial situation at the joint college.

The following section revisits the solar car incident that multiple alumni mentioned as a pivotal point for race relations at the joint college. The former chair of the mechanical engineering department of the joint college, Professor Chiang Shih provides some details on the solar car incident brought to light by FAMU alum from the college of engineering. Professor Shih supports the story when he mentions that FSU as an institution was not behind the disrespect to FAMU's name. Professor Shih, instead, mentions that the FSU students in the Society of Automotive Engineers may have been behind the solar car incident.

> So, maybe that's SAE, Society of Automotive Engineers. It is possible. I think maybe, I'm not sure if that's what you heard from our alumni, maybe because people using the shop...but again, they have maybe, I would guess where they came from, maybe when they go out to solicit funding and then...they didn't put the name of FAMU in there, is that the issue?" (Chiang Shih, personal communication, February 4, 2015)

It took a few moments for Professor Shih to fully remember the incident. Once the incident completely returned to the forefront of his memory, Dr. Shih remarks "Students being students, so I'm not surprised." The Black students from FAMU took the solar car incident as a clear and poignant example of the micro-aggressions and hostilities they faced regularly in the joint college of engineering. Professor Shih, on the other hand, did not comprehend how sensitive the FAMU students were to the issue. Accordingly, Professor Shih referenced the hostility as "students being students," insinuating that disrespecting FAMU as an institution and things that matter to Black students was a normal thing to be expected of non-HBCU, non-Black students.

Shih felt it may have just been an isolated incident. When asked about the race related issues at the college and about the solar car story specifically, Professor Shih acknowledged that the incident occurred and that he would not consider it a major race issue at the college. Moreover, Professor Shih explained that the occurrence may have been a reaction to a protest led by FAMU students. Professor Shih states,

> …maybe they're overreacting to some protest from the FAMU, they'd do something like that. I don't consider that very serious, because sometime I was for myself...when, in some instances I am going to talk to you, I told you that I'm an FSU faculty, because I am sitting in this center that's totally sponsored by FSU, but when I go as a professor, as

> educational...I tell them I am from FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, but when I'm doing research I may focus on something a different. When I'm presenting on behalf of my center, so then I would say this is for Florida State University, because my center is totally funded by FSU. So I don't think that would be, personally I don't think that's very, very critical, at least at this time. (Chiang Shih, personal communication, February 4, 2015)

Professor Shih presents a perspective that aligns with sharecropping era beliefs. FAMU students, read Black youth, are seen as being overly sensitive when they voice resentment for being offended, while FSU students', mostly White males, hostility towards the Black university is excused. As the children of the landowner, FSU students are treated differently by those overseeing the daily operations of the plantation as well as by the educators who know their salary comes from the landowner's taxes. In the incident of the solar car, in which a faculty member serves as an advisor to the team building a car, faculty could have intervened and publicly acknowledged that the joint college does not condone that type of behavior. The faculty failed to reassure the FAMU students that there concerns would be addressed and that measures would be taken to prevent similar incidents from occurring. Without addressing the micro-aggressions FAMU students felt exposed to while at the engineering building, faculty perpetuated Black students' feelings of being neglected and ignored.

Cognizant of the hostilities the FAMU students felt at the joint college, FAMU administrators from the assistant dean of the college of engineering to the president of the institution took time to address the race issues at the joint college. Concerned with the mistreatment of students, FAMU President Humphries made multiple trips to joint college. President Humphries spoke with both the students and the joint college deans regarding FAMU

students' experiences in the engineering building. The FAMU engineering alumni remember President Humphries' trips to the joint college and the fact that he took time out of his schedule to listen to their concerns. President Humphries spoke on making up for the faculty's neglect of race-relations and what additional steps he and his administration took to support FAMU students in the college of engineering.

> We had to spend more time than you did with other colleges and schools at the university (to make sure one) that the students were not mistreated, to follow up on their complaints, to talk with the dean, I had a regularly scheduled time to meet with him, to make sure that FAMU's students were not denied/that they were being even-handed about the distribution of goodies, in other words goodies means jobs that they had for students at the joint college, to make sure that FAMU students were getting jobs just like…that FAMU students were afforded study areas out at the joint college like the FSU students were, which was important that they had the right attitude about being even-handed no matter where the student came from…and opportunities were being evenhanded about it. You had to just watch out for that, because the students were sensitive to it. They gave to white kids at FSU a key to a computer room that the Blacks didn't have a key to, and I went out and they had to give them a key. So were things that you had to pay attention to do to make sure that you help eradicate differentiation that people were making. (personal communication, December 18, 2014)

**Same Performance, Different Grade**

The FAMU engineering students felt an uneasiness with the racial tension among students, and were equally as concerned with what they saw as unequal grading practices. FAMU and FSU students entered the joint college with dissimilar grade scales. Florida A&M

students felt racially slighted by the FSU students' behavior, and academically slighted by the faculty and policies of the joint college. FSU students' shunning and slight remarks made FAMU students uncomfortable; however, the separate grading practices in a competitive setting affected students' futures. Undergraduate grade point averages affect student's career trajectory, job prospects, graduate education opportunities, grants, and fellowships. The FAMU students felt that the College of Engineering separate grading policies for students based on institutional affiliation provided FSU with an unearned, unjustified privilege: granted, neither institution changed their university-wide grading system to appease the students at the joint college. FAMU class of 2008 graduate Jerald Porter shares his concerns with the faculty's differing grading practices between schools.

> Well, yeah, wasn't fair or able to be justified. Let me explain that just for a second, at FAMU, FAMU had a system of grading whereas an A was a certain range, a B was a certain range, ...at FSU they had the plus and minus system in place, so you could have an A plus, an A, or A minus, a B plus, a B, a B minus, so where there were quotas in regards to certain grades or certain curves to scales, a student from FSU could have gotten a C in regards to FAMU standards, but ended up with a B minus, which would've essentially helped out their GPA a little bit more than the others. Mind you, I'm not trying to say this as a knock on the university, that's their policy, that's their standards, that's great for them. My only concern as a FAMU student was how come that's not applicable for me and my colleagues as well. We should have had the same type of grading standards to be able to apply to everything, so anytime I got a C or a B I should have also had been able to get a 'B' minus or an 'A' minus. (Jerald Porter, personal communication, January 14, 2015)

Table 2) FSU Grading System

| **Definition** | **Grade** | **Quality Points Per Credit Hour** |
|---|---|---|
| **Excellent** | A | 4.00 |
| | A– | 3.75 |
| **Good** | B+ | 3.25 |
| | B | 3.00 |
| | B– | 2.75 |
| **Average** | C+ | 2.25 |
| | C | 2.00 |
| | C– | 1.75 |
| **Poor** | D+ | 1.25 |
| | D | 1.00 |
| | D– | 0.75 |
| **Failure** | F | 0.00 |

Retrieved from http://registrar.fsu.edu/bulletin/undergrad/info/acad_regs.htm

Jerald feels that some of the college of engineering policies were inexplicable. The grading policy particularly caught his attention while he attended the joint college. In academic partnerships, aligning course numbers and coordinating curriculum among universities presents a challenge. The challenge of assigning grades is intensified in the case of the joint college due to the competitive nature of engineering programs and the inherent competition between peers at rival institutions. Jerald implied that some of the classes in the joint college graded based on a curves and quotas. Curves base students grades on how one student performed in comparison to every other student in the class. Quotas, moreover, limit the number or percentage of students awarded the top grade: only a certain percentage of students in a class are awarded A-range for coursework.

Curves and quotas on number grades did not seem to be a problem. The conflict arose due to the letter grades and the associated grade point averages. A special commission exploring the issues at the joint school reported the concern of "different grading systems that resulted in

different GPAs for students with the same performance" (FAMU-FSU COE, 2007). For example, if two students from different institutions in the same course may both receive a final score of 89 for the course, the FAMU student earns a B letter grade and 3.00 grade points per credit hour for the class, while the FSU student may receive a B+ for the score earning 3.25 grade points per credit. In a four-credit hour course, the FAMU student adds 12 points into their average while the FSU student adds 13 points to their average. As a result, the FSU student would earn a larger boost to their GPA than the FAMU classmate with the exact same score. The higher GPA causes the FSU student to be ranked higher in the college, and a higher GPA affords the student with the exact same score the upper hand when applying for internships, employment, and graduate/professional school admission.

Florida State University students, however, saw the grading system controversy differently than the FAMU students. Both FSU and FAMU students acknowledged the issue as an item of high concern that caused contention within the joint college. Each student felt slighted by the grading system. FAMU students took offense to being awarded different letter grades than their FSU counterparts despite earning the same score in the course. FSU's plus and minus letter grades made the FAMU GPA scale seem limited. Conversely, the FAMU graduation honors requirements made FSU students feel that their degrees of distinction were much too limiting. FSU alumna Giselle Rojas shares her concerns with the FAMU-FSU grading practices.

> So, when you come to grades, they had different scales, right. I think FAMU had...I think Florida State's A scale was different from FAMU's. I think one was on a ten-point systems and FAMU's was probably less. I know for sure the cum laude, suma cum laude situation was way different for the two universities. I think FAMU's was more lenient I

> think than Florida State's. I can't remember, it was one or the other, but one of them accepted a lower GPA to be cum laude and the other didn't, and that caused some tension/frustration because it's like "we're all taking the same courses, the same classes, the same teachers, why is it that my friend can graduate with the same GPA as me and be cum laude and me not?" So that was...I remember that being a specific issue with the grade scale. I mean, they're two separate universities in that sense. You get your transcript from Florida State and you get your transcript from FAMU, and that's where you'd start seeing distinguishing rules being applied at that point, [but] it wasn't about the joint college. (Giselle Rojas, personal communication, January 14, 2015)

Former Florida State student Giselle Rojas perceived the grading system conflict as an institutional issue as opposed to an issue of the joint college. FSU students may have viewed the FAMU graduation honors as too lenient, or their home institution's eligibility requirements as too stringent. As Giselle pointed out, the different requirements to graduate with honors at the two universities was significant. The minimum graduation honors between FAMU and FSU in 2015 varied by one-half grade point; it is significant to note, however, that the variation in graduation honors may take into account that FAMU does not have the +/- grading scale.

The students were not the only College of Engineering group affected by the differing grading scales. Professors in the joint college also commented on the frustrations caused by the FAMU and FSU grade scales controversy. Stories of the grading issues proved significant enough to attract journalists and the controversy was covered in national education news outlet the Chronicle of Higher Education. Chiang-Jen Chen, former dean of the College of Engineering, was quoted in a 2001 interview remarking that "grading is a nightmare: Florida State students receive grades with pluses and minuses; Florida A&M students only receive a

letter grade" (Curry, 2001).

Professor Shih, former department chair for the mechanical engineering at the joint college, spoke of how the different grading systems were a hassle and yet another hoop to jump through for faculty at the joint college of engineering. "I have to have two sets of grades" says Shih. "I have to pull out the grades for one university and then the other, I had to learn both systems, and then they have their different ways of inputting grades, and then filling it through there, the drop and add" (Chiang Shih, personal communication, February 4, 2015). Professor Shih supports the analysis that the different grading system was an issue for both the faculty and the students at the joint college. The grading discrepancies strained the faculty, stressed the administrators, and aggravated the students of the joint college. According to FAMU engineering alumnus John Lee,

> I do remember that there were disparities around grading because of the different grading scales of the two universities where FAMU didn't have the plus or minus system that FSU did. So that was one thing that...in some ways was an advantage for Florida State students, but eventually engineering faculty decided not to give plus-minus grades, so that sort of evened things out there.

The grading policy at the joint college was revamped, however, seeds of discord had already taken root. Even after the policy changed, the students still felt contention about the very idea of separate grading scales. Reginald Perry, professor and associate dean for student affairs and curriculum at the joint college states that "students at FAMU thought that FSU students were getting plus or minus grades when that wasn't the case." The grading policy ended before the joint college began teaching classes under one roof. Professor Perry adds,

> At the college of engineering they stopped using plus and minuses for the undergraduate courses since 1986, when faculty members submit a grade, they only show up as letter grades without plus or minuses, they do not use them for undergraduate courses.

According to the 2015 joint college student guide regarding the "Use of plus or minus (+/-) grades: It is the policy of the College not to assign "plus and minus (+/-)" grades for undergraduate engineering courses" (FAMU-FSU CoEngr, 2015). Alumni completing courses at the joint college as recently as 2006 referenced the concerns with the grading policies. Even if the college of engineering stopped awarding plus and minus grades in 1986, as Dr. Perry mentioned, the students felt the contention from the practice a full twenty years later.

**Racial Representation in the Joint College**

In addition to unbalanced grading policies, the skewed representation within the student body proved another major source of contention for the college of engineering students. The number of students attending FAMU has only a fraction of the enrollment FSU boasts annually. Similarly, FSU employs more faculty and staff than its historically Black counterpart. Subsequently, FSU enrolling more engineering students than FAMU could be expected as well. FAMU, however, sent roughly as many students to the engineering college as FSU in the early years of the partnership. FAMU and FSU also began with nearly the same number of engineering faculty at the joint college. FAMU's representation at the joint college quickly fell once all programs moved to the Herbert Morgan engineering building. The students recognized the poor representation of FAMU students, faculty, and staff in terms of raw numbers, and sought to address the situation through inquiry and illuminating the situation.

President Humphries mentioned the FAMU representation at the joint college was askew early in the partnerships development.

> …because FSU was supposed to be a bigger institution with more resources, people always felt that they could get their way, but when we, and you can check these numbers because they are down somewhere, when I got there in the joint college of engineering I guess there was somewhere around a thousand students at FSU and about [one hundred] sixty-seven or seventy at FAMU, engineering students, and you know there were a lot of things that people didn't think about, I mean for instance, the people at FSU I mean who had allegiance at FSU who were hired via FSU always held that the ratio should be, FSU was about 3 ½ times the size or 4 times the size of FAMU, so they had thought [their presence in] the joint college should be four times the size of FAMU. (Frederick Humphries, personal communication, December 18, 2014)

President Humphries echoes the students' sentiments. FSU students and employees behaved like owners entitled to the vast majority of the joint college's resources, services, and opportunities. The FSU administrators supposed that the partnership should reflect the current standings of the affiliated institutions, essentially institutionalizing the status quo. FAMU administration, on the other hand, saw the partnership as an opportunity for students from both institutions to enter an academic program on equal footing. Engineering students taking courses on their home campuses before the Herbert Morgan building was constructed may not have known much about their relative proportion in the larger partnership. As an administrator however, President Humphries was well aware of the college's statistics.

Figure 4: FAMU Student Enrollment by School/College Comparison Fall Semesters 1986-1995

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**STUDENT ENROLLMENT BY SCHOOL/COLLEGE COMPARISON**
**FALL SEMESTERS 1986 - 1995**

| SCHOOL/COLLEGE | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PHARMACY | 378 | 421 | 433 | 454 | 450 | 551 | 605 | 670 | 693 | 707 |
| ALLIED HEALTH | 138 | 167 | 189 | 231 | 296 | 375 | 456 | 588 | 654 | 667 |
| NURSING | 118 | 125 | 124 | 143 | 165 | 208 | 282 | 381 | 419 | 420 |
| EDUCATION | 406 | 440 | 471 | 591 | 656 | 766 | 815 | 853 | 857 | 1065 |
| ARTS & SCIENCES | 934 | 1426 | 1630 | 1867 | 2250 | 2535 | 2709 | 2844 | 2811 | 2856 |
| ENG. SCIENCES, TECH | 587 | 252 | 259 | 284 | 353 | 360 | 356 | 339 | 326 | 359 |
| ENGINEERING | 167 | 247 | 326 | 428 | 535 | 695 | 753 | 798 | 844 | 834 |
| BUSINESS & INDUSTRY | 760 | 732 | 922 | 1086 | 1134 | 1142 | 1135 | 998 | 998 | 1003 |
| JOURNALISM, MEDIA & GRAPHIC ARTS | 185 | 203 | 230 | 268 | 330 | 377 | 390 | 357 | 330 | 332 |
| ARCHITECTURE | 247 | 288 | 278 | 285 | 312 | 307 | 283 | 294 | 301 | 286 |
| GENERAL STUDIES | 970 | 1102 | 1141 | 1307 | 1383 | 1329 | 1174 | 1271 | 1466 | 1330 |
| GRADUATE STUDIES | 532 | 522 | 430 | 533 | 547 | 577 | 535 | 484 | 434 | 475 |
| **TOTAL** | **5422** | **5925** | **6433** | **7477** | **8411** | **9222** | **9493** | **9877** | **10133** | **10334** |

*The Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Fact Book 1995-96*

(FAMU, 1996, p. 64)

One hundred and sixty-seven FAMU students and 697 FSU students enrolled in engineering in 1986 when President Humphries arrived (FAMU, 1996; FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007). The FAMU engineering majors could not perceive how absolutely they were outnumbered until the classes were held in the engineering building. Though the number of engineering majors grew during President Humphries tenure as the head of FAMU, FAMU students found it mentally jarring to go from a campus that was over 80% Black to their college of engineering courses where 80% of the students were from Florida State University (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007).

Figure 5: Fall semester undergraduate enrollment at the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering




(FAMU-FSU College of engineering, 2007)

FAMU's representation at the college of engineering wavered. In the first five years of the partnership, FSU heavily outnumbered the FAMU students. FAMU engineering majors in 1986, for example, only made up twenty percent of the joint college's student body. During President Humphries time at FAMU, the number of Black engineers spiked; after Dr. Humphries' retired, however, the FAMU engineer representation and graduation fell. FSU

alumna Giselle Rojas remembered an even larger disparity in her mechanical engineering courses and in the joint college's student organizations five years after President Humphries retirement. According to Rojas,

> Respectively to each group, mechanical engineering had a lot bigger Florida State population. Probably I would say 5 to 1 or so ratio, it was...you could tell that it was...and it probably has to do with the student population, the amount of interest in engineering from FAMU students versus Florida State... You could see the distribution of universities among the different organizations.

The students from Florida State were conscious of their majority in the joint college. Some FSU students hypothesized the representation imbalance was indicative of the relative sizes of the partnering institutions. Giselle guessed that the disproportionate representation may have been attributed to a possible lack of interest in engineering education among FAMU students. Regardless of the cause, the separation and representation of the engineering students by their respective university was noticeable.

FAMU alumnus Tio Fallen began his engineering matriculation in 2001 after President Humphries' departure. According to Fallen, FAMU was underrepresented in the engineering partnership.

> If you look at it as a partnership, it almost kind of felt like the majority partner or majority stakeholder would be Florida State. The minority stakeholder, minority partner is FAMU. That's kind of across the board with the ratio of students/representation of students from FAMU to FSU. Like I said the kind of perspective I had on the representation of staff was kind of more FSU. Even our email accounts were "eng.fsu" if

> I remember correctly. I don't think there was that sense that it was a 50-50 between FAMU and FSU. (Tio Fallen, personal communication, January 22, 2016)

Understanding the poor representation of FAMU students at the joint college, President Humphries began recruiting for the engineering program early in his tenure as president. College of engineering students and faculty noticed the impact of the FAMU administration on the student enrollment. FAMU 1999 alumnus Alfred Green remembers the distinct changes in the student population from the mid-1990s.

> Well there was, I would say that there was a change in the population and I would say for the most part it was a large increase of students of color and also the change of the hiring of the professors. There was a marked increase of persons of color at the college of engineering due to the recruiting efforts that were taking place at FAM[U]. As a mentioned through the actions of Dr. Frederick Humphries, the president of the university… (Alfred Green, personal communication, January 13, 2015).

Green noticed the change in the demographics in the student and faculty ranks. During the time of Green's arrival at the college of engineering he heard of the past students' problems with FAMU's poor representation in the college, and saw the administration's response to the representation concerns. Alfred directly credits former FAMU President Humphries with the improved representation of the Black students and professors at the joint college. Alfred, was not alone in accrediting Dr. Humphries with enhancing FAMU's representation at the joint college.

Professor Chiang Shih, former department chair for mechanical engineering, credits Dr. Humphries as the major key to FAMU's representation at the college of engineering.

Professor Shih recalls the issues the joint college has faced since he arrived as an instructor in 1988,

> It's always had issues…with the two universities trying to work it out so that they can have one college of engineering. It has never been very smooth, but it was better at [one] time. One of the reasons is Dr. Humphries. So, he kind of took the ownership and they wanted to really establish a strong college of engineering. So he was willing to put in more resources and his personal time and energy to help the College of Engineering, but after he left it was very difficult for FAMU to keep up with FSU because they have a different size, they have different resources, and they had different mission statements. So, I believe you probably know a little bit that HBCUs are really under distress now, not only FAMU, all over the country because the enrollment issue and then because many of the traditional, first-generation students that go to an HBCU they can find many other ...at a traditional university. They don't have to go to an HBCU, so then there'll be enrollment issues. So, I think FAMU faces the same thing, and because of other concerns like frequent change of leadership. So FAMU has not been able to put attention to its College of Engineering, and this for the FAMU side.
>
> For FSU side, because they really wanted to make sure that they have a strong college of engineering they started putting resources including faculty lines and some of the research center support, and also maybe encourage more students to come in through FSU so then we have a really unbalanced situation right now. We have more FSU students than FAMU student percentage-wise as compared to when I first came. When I first came I think the ratio was probably in the order of...maybe close to 60-40. Sixty percent for FSU and the forty percent. Now it's really close to 85 and 15 percent,

and then for mechanical engineering it really comes down close to like 95 and 5 percent, especially in terms of graduation. Enrollment may be still in the order of 85 and 15 percent, but the graduation rate really declined for FAMU.

Professor Shih acknowledges the concerns those within and close to the college have voiced for years. One particular issue Professor Shih highlights as a focus is the concern with student representation. Professor Shih broadly addresses what he perceives as an overall issue at historically Black colleges, low enrollment. Professor Shih acknowledges the unbalanced representation of students by institutional affiliation. Moreover, he alludes to the fact that the college of engineering is disproportionally representative of the partnering institutions. The Florida State University enrolled 36,683 students in 2002. During the same year, Florida A&M University registered 12,468 students in college courses. Accordingly, FSU's student body was roughly three times the size of FAMU's total enrollment. Professor Shih remembers a more balanced and representative make up of students when he arrived in the mid-1980s. Sixteen years later, after President Humphries retired, the FAMU representation at the college sharply diminished while FSU grew to be vastly overrepresented.

In addition to the low level of representation in enrollment, Professor Shih indicates that FAMU was poorly represented in the mechanical engineering department and in the graduation statistics as well. Dr. Shih, as department chair, likely encountered most of the mechanical engineering majors in courses and at graduation ceremonies, in addition to being privy to the graduation and enrollment information. Alfred Green, a FAMU graduate from the class of 1999 in mechanical engineering, remembers the graduating class photographs from each year telling the story of the unbalanced graduation rates. The photos fully support

Dr. Shih's mention of FAMU being greatly outnumbered in terms of graduation from mechanical engineering department.

**Class photos.** The most noticeable story FAMU students like Alfred Green draw from the mechanical engineering graduating class photographs is the lack of African Americans pictured. The images support Giselle Rojas' assertion about the low representation of women in specific engineering departments. The FAMU-FSU College of Engineering features photographs from mechanical engineering classes from 1989 to 2014 on the website. The images of the mechanical engineering graduating classes of 1989 and 1990 feature professors and students posing on a staircase in the joint college building. Only one of the twenty-one people in 1989 and one in the twenty-nine people in 1990 the pictures appear to be of African descent.

*Image 1*. FAMU-FSU Mechanical Engineering graduating class of 1989

*Image 2*. FAMU-FSU Mechanical Engineering graduating class of 1990

The mechanical engineering department and the joint college of engineering as a whole host disproportionally low percentages of FAMU students and faculty. The photographs of the graduating classes, enrollment graphs, and stories from alumni triangulate the data: FAMU is underrepresented in the engineering partnership. Several factors affected the ratio of FSU affiliates to FAMU affiliates in the joint college. The sizes of the partnering institutions are not comparable, yet it could be expected that their representation in the joint college would at least be proportional. FSU has approximately three times more faculty members and enrolled students than FAMU. Florida State enrolled 30,268 students and employed 4,366 people in full-time positions in 1995. The same year FAMU enrolled 10,334 students and filled 1,451 full-time assignments.

The joint college enrolled 1,997 students in 1995. Florida A&M University reported 834 students majoring in engineering and FSU's institutional research department recorded enrolling 1,259 engineering majors (FAMU, 2016; FSU, 2016). The improvement in FAMU's student representation, from 167 in 1986 to 834 in less than a decade, was highly attributed to FAMU President Humphries' high level of involvement with the college of the engineering President Humphries campaign to graduate more Black engineering majors than any other institution was successful. FAMU was recognized in the national media, academia, and engineering industry for the institution's resourcefulness in attracting companies and alumni to support student scholarships, internships, and post-baccalaureate opportunities.

**Maintaining overrepresentation of FSU faculty.** During and directly after FAMU's rapid increase in engineering student representation, Florida State University maneuvered to maintain an overrepresentation in the faculty ranks. President Humphries explains the manipulation FSU used to increase the number of FSU associated faculty in the joint college,

> So, FSU charges their students 15% more than what we can charge our student for tuition and fees… So, what they did with that money is they, we couldn't match that because we weren't getting it, so they'd take that money and get extra additional faculty members to the joint college which they kept growing to unbalance how many faculty members FSU had compared to the number that we had. Now that should have been a no-no, or the legislature would have to give us the money to match what they were getting and what they were putting into the joint college. If you want to be successful that's absolutely important that they cannot take their overwhelming advantage in resources and gradually overpower us in terms of their holdings in the joint college. That's one route. Then they gave them some money for excellence, just

> University of Florida and FSU. Well they took that money and put it in the engineering school, at least a portion of it, which was unmatched. Fredrick Humphries, personal communication, December 18, 2014

Florida legislators historically provide more monetary and legislative support for Florida State than it does for Florida A&M. Former FAMU President Humphries recognized that FSU was able to recruit and retain more faculty in the college of engineering than FAMU because of their ability to charge their students more than FAMU at the time. Charging additional fees or higher costs for engineering courses is not uncommon. Texas A&M University charges $540 per credit hour for engineering courses and only $137 per credit hour for teaching courses in its education department (Texas A&M University, 2016); similarly, the University of Michigan collects $1,822 more per semester for college of engineering students than it does for education, literature, and science majors (University of Michigan, 2016).

According to President Humphries, Florida State charged their students fifteen percent more than FAMU could and used that money to hire additional faculty. The situation has persisted since President Humphries' retirement. FAMU students paid $151.78 per credit hour, while Florida State University received $215.55 per credit hour for tuition. Assistant Dean Perry made it clear that the joint college of engineering did not directly control the additional amount paid by FSU students. The additional faculty FSU hired were funded by Florida State and therefore further tipped the imbalance at the joint college. FSU already garnered the larger population in the joint college: FSU provided over eighty percent of the students for the engineering partnership in 1986, and entered the partnership with three of the five original departments consisting of mainly FSU-paid faculty. FAMU perceived the

amassing of FSU faculty in the joint college as the execution of White privilege. The state of Florida historically provided more funding to FSU and the FSU took advantage of its larger endowment and virtually bought a larger share of the partnership.

Unlike enrolling students, consistently adding faculty gave FSU advantages FAMU could not access. Faculty serve on committees, conduct research, and take on leadership positions that affect the operation of academic departments and the college as a whole. As instructors, faculty make decisions that affect students' grades; as researchers, faculty apply for funding that can provide additional opportunities for the students they select; and as professors, faculty's actions, comments, and decisions are generally highly regarded. By stacking the FSU-funded faculty, FSU accrued more influence in tenure and promotion decisions, hiring search committees, and virtually every operation of the college. FAMU leadership wanted the Board of Regents to maintain the balance of power in the joint college; however, the Board neither managed FSU's unnatural growth in the college, nor provided FAMU additional resources to reestablish balance in the partnership.

The Board of Regents did not directly act to correct the increasingly skewed representation taking place at the college of engineering. In fact, one move of the Board proved to further skew the basis of power in the joint college. President Humphries noted that Florida State received additional monetary support from the Board in the form of an excellence award (Fredrick Humphries, personal communication, December 18, 2014). The June 10, 2013 issue of a Gainesville newspaper reports "The University of Florida and Florida State University have been named as the state's pre-eminent public research universities. Each school will receive $15 million for the pre-eminence designation" (Schweers, 2013). Moreover, the Florida Board of Governors allocated $24.9 million to FSU in

performance funding in 2015, while FAMU did not receive any performance funding allocation of state investment during the same funding cycle (FLBoG, 2016). The sharecropping system is often identifiable through funding disparities, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund found 10 states were underfunding Black colleges in 1970, and well over half of land-grant HBCUs still did not receive all the matching funds due to them by law between 2010 and 2012 (Lee, 2013; Arnett, 2015; Sav, 1997).

Florida State's monetary advantage over FAMU has continued growing and so too has the faculty imbalance. In Fields (1998) article "Leading from behind" in Black Issues in Higher Education, Dr. Chiang-Jen Chen, dean of the college of engineering comments that Black faculty made up 8% of the faculty in 1992, and made up 23% of the faculty in 1998 (p. 9). The underrepresentation of FAMU faculty translated into an underrepresentation of Black faculty. Dean Chen explained that the representation of Black faculty had improved in late 1990s; however, the students did not perceive the increase as enough. Students from FAMU, like Prince Gammage, still felt slighted in the partnership as it pertained to faculty representation.

> How can you really feel like a partnership when you go to an HBCU and all your professors don't look like you… no, it didn't feel like it was FAM's school. It felt more like more it was Florida State's school… if you look there and you sat in some of the classes: it's thick with Caucasian students. I showed my wife a picture a couple of months ago, our graduating class only had like four or five Black students in the whole class. We have a picture and that's it from my class in 2005… So, you don't feel like it's fifty-fifty, it just feels like it's Florida State's school that they invited us to come take part in [it]. (personal communication, January 9, 2015)

**Racial Tension Rouses Rebellion**

Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University students were keenly aware of issues at the joint college and felt that those issues disproportionately affected Black students. FAMU's underrepresentation at the college and the grading discrepancies greatly increased the racial tension the students experienced. Overall, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University students felt disrespected, neglected, and abused on multiple fronts. Though the Black students from both institutions hated the racial hostility, culturally conscious Black and White engineering students college-wide reached an emotional boiling point with the treatment of FAMU. Amidst the ongoing calls to disband FAMU and combine it with Florida State over the decades, students banded together to refute the idea of Florida A&M as being disposable. Undergraduate and graduate students essentially demanded that FAMU no longer be treated as a sharecropper and be acknowledged for its university status. The students saw themselves as defending the perception and overall existence of the Black College.

The Black College Defense Force was uncovered as a pivotal point in the history of student awareness, frustration, and action within the engineering partnership. Multiple alumni mentioned the organization as the movement of their time at the college. Much as the Florida Board of Governors practices resembled those of sharecroppers of years past, the actions of the Black College Defense Force were reminiscent of the Civil Rights Movement that preceded it by 20 years and similar of the Black Lives Matter Movement that followed 20 years after the precipice of the Force. The Black College Defense Force's movement climaxed at the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering's 10th Anniversary Ceremony.

**The protest that shook the partnership.** The college of engineering was not hailed as a great partnership by many FAMU students. Though some students viewed the joint college as a

new academic opportunity, a portion of the FAMU student body saw the engineering partnership as an objective in a larger scheme to take over the state's only public Black university. The college of engineering students heard rumors of the state legislators planning to dissolve FAMU and allow FSU to absorb it. The college of engineering merger thus enhanced the students' fear that the rumor contained some truth: students questioned the motives behind the merger at the legislative meeting that established the partnership. Subsequently, when the administration sought to celebrate the first decade of the engineering partnership, the FAMU students took the opportunity to voice their concerns, contempt, and critiques of the joint college. President Walter Smith explains why the students disrupted the celebration:

> The students were protesting the way they were organizing things and how they felt that some of the students who were in the FAMU locale were not treated the same as some of the students who were in the FSU locale, but let me say this: when I spoke I was very adamant about the purpose of the engineering school and the fact that it was designed for all students to have equal access to anything that was in that school on that campus or in that environment. (Walter Smith, personal communication, March 10, 2015)

Former FAMU President Walter Smith served as the keynote speaker at the 10th Anniversary Ceremony for the College of Engineering. Sitting atop the stage at the ceremony, President Smith had a vantage view of the protest that unfolded. President Smith recalls the students protesting the organization of the partnership and the treatment of FAMU students at the joint college. In light of the situation, President Smith focused his speech on the equality the partnership was purposed to provide. The students protesting the ceremony received President Smith's speech, and declared that the promise of equality, however, was yet unfulfilled. FAMU alumna Wendy Douglas shares the sentiment of the protestors,

…every so often something will come up when we would learn that FSU was making some move to basically take more than fifty percent of shared ownership of the school for whatever reason. That caused a lot of friction as well, in terms of who owned the resources and controlled the resources for the school, where the dean came from, where the leadership came from...and I still have the article…when we were on the front page of the Tallahassee Democrat because of the sit-in. ...something must have happened that was pretty drastic where we felt like we had to do something drastic as well in protest. ...we had t-shirts and I remember being very scared. Of course, when I was there...I was on the whole NASA scholarship, and really if I didn't have that NASA scholarship I didn't have any other resources to be at that school, so that was a pretty...I'm not a risky person, and that was a pretty risky endeavor, because we didn't know what would happen to us.

A group of us, I don't know how we took over the dean's office, sat in there, and then locked the school and we refused to leave. We didn't know the ramifications. We could've been kicked out of school, but at that time we felt it was important to send that message that this school is ours and we don't want you to take it, and I think that is generally how we felt. That general feeling, even though outside of that school we didn't hear anything was Florida State, but in Tallahassee in general...in general FAMU students felt like Florida State just got more from the city in terms of access and benefits. So we felt like a step-child all the time. That too just carried over to whatever was going on in that college of engineering. I do know a few other people who were part of that sit-in got kicked out…(Wendy Douglas, personal communication, January 21, 2015)

The Black College Defense Force (BCDF) rallied to defend the existence of FAMU through a two-part protest: disrupting the College of Engineering's 10th Anniversary Ceremony and conducting a sit-in to lock-down the college of engineering dean's office. Students supporting the purpose of the Black College Defense Force questioned the balance of power in the engineering partnership. The BCDF felt that FSU held too large of a role in selecting administrators and managing resources. Subsequently, during the ceremony, the FAMU students voiced their concerns on stage and searched for evidence of planned discrimination.

**Planned distraction to search for answers.** According to the FAMU-FSU history book, three FAMU students took the microphone from the dean of the college and spoke truth to power. The students listed the ongoing injustices at the joint college, demanded that fifty percent of the faculty be composed of Black professors, and called for the current Asian American dean of the college be replaced with an African American dean. Based on the book, moreover, only four of the fifty-one faculty members at the joint college were Black in 1994. Additionally, the "Leading from behind" article revealed that 30 percent of the engineering faculty in 1998 were born outside of the United States. In order to provide evidence that the discrimination was planned, another set of FAMU students went three floors above the ceremony to enter the office of the dean. The students locked themselves inside the dean's office and searched for documentation to support their claims of planned, institutionalized discrimination (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007, p. 56).

Considering the magnitude of the students' actions, a number of administrators and authorities responded to the protests. While the presidents of FAMU and FSU both attempted negotiating with the students, the FSU police arrived demanding the students evacuate the office. FAMU's president Frederick Humphries intervened, convincing the mostly White FSU campus

police that he and the FAMU authorities could better deescalate, contain, and control the situation. President Humphries successfully got the protesting students to leave the dean's office, he listened to the students' grievances and demands, and President Humphries protected the students from retaliation from the College of Engineering professors and administrators.

Whether the protest was a reaction to one issue or a response to rumors of FAMU being absorbed by FSU and a decade of mounting concerns with the partnership, the Black College Defense Force was organized. The BCDF held planning meetings leading up to the demonstration and successfully orchestrated a disruption of the college's largest event, while some of their members used the commotion to gain access to files in the dean's office. Despite the meetings prior to the demonstrations, the students participating in the protests still feared the possible repercussions of disrupting official college of engineering events. Student protesters braved the prospect of losing scholarships, making enemies of the very professors assigning their grades, being expelled from the school, and incurring legal ramifications.

The Black College Defense Force's sit-in at the college of engineering dean's office was presented as one of the most memorable and consequential protests in the partnership's history. The students protesting the college of engineering's injustices were careful not to block any classes, focusing only the administrative offices in the engineering building (Jacqueline Swift, personal communication, January 12, 2015). Wendy and the Black College Defense Force wanted to send the message that FAMU had supporters, the students did not want to disturb any of their classmate's education. Moreover, the BCDF identified the ceremony as an event promoting the partnership and used the opportunity to express how FAMU students experienced the joint college. FAMU students felt that FSU was disproportionately benefiting from the city of Tallahassee and the state of Florida while FAMU struggled for support and even recognition

from its home city and state. Both FAMU and FSU are public universities, however, the FAMU students saw the public support going disproportionately to FSU and felt that FAMU was being shunned, neglected, and set up to be dismantled.

Overall, a number of the students expressed feeling like FAMU was a "step-child" of Florida (Wendy Douglas, personal communication, January 15, 2016). Before the Black College Defense Force formed and after the group's major protests, students from FAMU felt neglected in college of engineering partnership. The students' discontent was noted; moreover, the Black College Defense Force's well-timed protest secured a front-page feature in the local newspaper. If the protest itself did not get the governing board's attention, the partnership's poor publicity may have influenced the Board of Regents to take action.

**Products of the Protest.** "In light of student protests on March 11, 1994, [Board of Regents] Chancellor Charles Reed appointed a Special Commission led by Dr. Simon Ostrach to review the current state of the FAMU-FSU College of engineering" (FAMU-FSU, 2007, p. 60). Florida's state university system board established a commission led by the same consultant the board contracted to conduct a study on establishing the college of engineering initially. The commission reported that the different grading system, different set of rules, infrequent and unresponsive bus service for students on both campuses, and difficulty accessing libraries on both campuses were areas of concern for the partnership (FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, 2007, p. 62). Had the Board listened to the FAMU students, they would have had the same information for free.

"The Commission concluded that, taking these issues as a whole, resulted in a decline in morale, inefficiency, inter-university rivalries, feelings of discrimination, and a lack of identity for students as members of the College of Engineering" (FAMU-FSU, 2007, p. 63). It is

important to note that the history of the joint college mentions that the Commission reported the racial tension as an issue of perception and not fact; consequently, the commission did not provide any recommendations for addressing the poor race relations at the college. Although the commission was created due to the student protests along racial lines, it was led by a White male with a history of connections with FSU. The Commission dismissed the entire racial aspect of the findings as mere perceptions without any actual base.

The Commission's dismissal of FAMU's perspective and failure to present any recommendations to address racial tensions in the joint college has direct implications for HBCUs considering HBCU-TWI partnerships. The students' accounts of the hostility they experienced through the partnership reflects the hostile conditions and coercive nature in which the joint college was forged. Moreover, the instances of professors and students' narrations intersecting verifies that specific events occurred, and also underlines the significant variance in their perceptions of the cause, meaning, and ramification of the events for the partnership. The students spoke out about their discomfort at the college, their discontent with the partnership as it existed, and the disrespect that drove them to disrupt the college's ten-year anniversary ceremony, and the result was to be placated by external commissions' study; this study, however, recognizes and presents the students' claims. This study presents the perspectives of those affected by the partnership and the institutions left vulnerable by coerced interinstitutional agreements between HBCU and PWI; the literature review in chapter two reveals that it is no coincidence that both the most affected students and vulnerable institutions left unsupported by the Special Commission's report are traditionally, historically, and undeniably Black.

**Conclusion**

Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University – Florida State University College of Engineering students have felt uncomfortable for over three decades. FAMU students have spoken against the idea of the partnership since talks of a joint college began in the year 1981. In the early 1990s, students formed an organization specifically to defend what they perceived as an attack on their institution, the states' only public Black college. Students who graduated in 2008 like Jerald Porter and Calicia Johnson felt the same racial tension as Keino Miller and Wendy Douglas who attended the joint college fifteen years earlier in 1993. FAMU students have felt slighted by the joint college's grading policies, while FSU students expressed feeling disquieted by the differences in the institutions' admission and graduation criteria. Students on both sides of the railroad tracks connect along the lines of race, bonding over student organizations and supporting one another in the collective struggle.

However, FAMU students shouldered the brunt of the burden. FAMU's name was omitted from a joint college solar car in 1992. Many of the state legislators who called for FAMU to be merged into FSU remained members of the general assembly for years after the engineering partnership was formed. Rumors of FAMU losing accreditation were printed in newspapers, exchanged by FSU engineering students and faculty, and presented to FAMU students continually. FAMU students felt as if they were constantly defending their institution and having to defend their very presence in the joint college of engineering.

The FAMU students felt like the step-children of the college of engineering, perceived FAMU as being treated like the unwanted son of Florida, and sensed that many at the joint college and throughout the state did not believe that Black colleges matter. From the underrepresentation of FAMU students, FAMU faculty, and overrepresentation of FAMU in the menial positions at the joint college of engineering, Florida A&M alumni expressed dealing with

three decades of disparity. FAMU administrators approached the situation with support. FSU administrators dismissed the conditions as unfounded perception. College of Engineering faculty since the 30-year mark of the joint college's establishment, peculiarly, addressed the students' concerns, administrations' responses, and continuation of the partnership altogether in distinguishably different ways.

During the data collection process of the study, joint college of engineering faculty presented different levels of willingness to participate that aligned directly with institutional affiliation. Of the professors asked to be interviewed, each of the FAMU-funded staff on purely faculty lines refused to participate. The FSU professors willingly and openly provided information. The level of willingness to participate seems to have been directly tied to a political conflict between FAMU and FSU with direct ties to the college of engineering.

**Proposed Separation.** A state senator, FSU alumnus, and prospective front-runner for the FSU presidency, John Thrasher, proposed separating the joint college in 2014, rehashing partnership split conversations that had not received much publicity since former FSU president T.K. Wetherall's statements in 2008 (Hatter, 2014). The senator's proposal spurred the Florida legislature to fund a further investigation of the idea. Moreover, the Florida Board of Governors followed the legislature's lead and funded a comprehensive study of the joint college of engineering. The board hired the Collaborative Brain Trust (CBT) consulting firm to study the plausibility of splitting the joint college so that FSU could operate a separate engineering program in the area.

The status of the joint college seemed nearly finalized when FAMU's President Magnum publicly began making preparations for a separate college of engineering. Without an explicit mandate from the BOG overseeing the college and legislature that created the partnership,

however, the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering spent the end of year 2014 and the beginning of 2015 in limbo. As in the past, FSU boasted more alumni in the BOG and the state legislature than FAMU, and a legislative committee had already sent a proposal to the senate floor promoting an independent FSU College of Engineering and public funding to get the new college started. Considering the turmoil at the time of the study and the FAMU president's actions, it is logical that the FAMU-affiliated faculty at the joint college would not participate in the interviews.

Sharecroppers rarely spoke publicly or on record about the sharecropping system in fear of retaliation. The landowners, on the other hand, would feel no concern for consequence speaking on the topic of ownership versus tenant farming. Case in point, while the FAMU professors refrained from speaking about the joint college until the separation talks ended, the largely FSU faculty from the mechanical engineering department penned an open letter to the consulting firm listing what they reported as FAMU's shortcomings. Additionally, each FSU-affiliated faculty member asked for an interview agreed to participate without hesitation.

**Separation averted.** The CBT study revealed that the cost of operating separate colleges was more than the state was willing to pay. Two colleges of engineering would have to be established within the parameters set by discrimination litigation and agreements with the Office of Civil Rights; consequently, a separate FSU college of engineering would not be able to operate within the same county as Tallahassee and the FAMU college would have to be funded at the same level and facilities be brought up to par with any new facilities constructed by FSU. The BOG and the state of Florida immediately backed away from the prospect of splitting the colleges.

The final FAMU-FSU College of Engineering split feasibility study from the CBT was posted on the college of engineering's website and thus publicly viewable. The consultant firm's $1 billion proposed price tag for establishing separate colleges of engineering was enough to thwart the public's call for the split. The BOG, however, did use the information from the feasibility study to identify key improvement areas for the partnership. The main element of the partnership identified for change was an area managed by Florida A&M, specifically the budget (Board of Governors, 2015).

As the study presented in chapter three, President Humphries negotiated the control of the joint college's budget in exchange for FSU choosing the site for the joint college building. Therefore, it would follow logic that FAMU's control of the budget would be as permanent as the building site. The Board of Governors, however, proposed transferring control of the budget from FAMU to FSU. FAMU's President at the time the transfer was proposed agreed to the exchange of the budget for the opportunity for the institution to select the joint college dean. FAMU alumni and former president Frederick Humphries have expressed disappointment with the concessions FAMU leadership has made concerning the college of engineering.

# CHAPTER 6

## REFLECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study examines questions germane to college partnerships with HBCU by exploring the case of the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University – Florida State University College of Engineering. Adding to previously studied the examples of HBCU-TWI partnerships introduced in the literature review, this study uncovers the method and reasoning behind FAMU's partnership with FSU in offering joint engineering academic courses. The data reveals a merger coerced through Florida legislation to withhold funding for a FAMU engineering program unless the school partnered with FSU. FSU forced the merger in hopes that offering engineering would significantly improve the institution's academic reputation and rank among research universities.

Next, this study explored the mystery of the partnership's longevity and the impact the joint college had on FAMU over a 30-year timespan. The researched asked former FAMU administrators and alumni a series of questions about how the partnership affected them as individuals and how the merger affected FAMU as a whole from their individual perspectives. The administrators shared that they had to provide considerably more support for the joint college than with other academic units on FAMUs campus, and the leaders did not signify that the partnership had a large impact on the university initially. During President Humphries tenure, however, the college of engineering grew significantly and garnered national recognition for FAMU. The alumni stated that the joint college courses and career fairs prepared them for positions in the engineering industry, while the issues with grading policies and othering by White classmates and non-Black faculty made some uncomfortable and drove other students away completely. As a by-product of the contention in the joint college, rumors of FAMU fully

merging with FSU increased and so too did number of students taking engineering sciences and engineering technology courses on FAMU's campus.

The final question explored and answered by the study involves the lessons HBCU may learn from the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering partnership. Several of the narrators provided suggestions they wish to convey to HBCUs considering partnerships with TWIs. The narrators advise HBCU leaders to assure their missions align with the prospective partner TWI and consider what the partnership will mean for the HBCU's students. The narrators also recommend that the HBCU layout some non-negotiable expectations upfront in the partnership talks and that HBCU enter partnerships with schools that are on a more equal level as the HBCU especially in terms of financial standing and academic reputation. This study concludes that the types of institutions that more commonly have a similar mission, endowment size, and academic reputation as an HBCU is another HBCU. The literature review presents examples of progressive and mutually beneficial HBCU partnerships, those cases may serve as models for HBCU interinstitutional partnerships.

**Reflecting on the Study**

The study presents the FAMU FSU relationship as more of a one-sided grasp for power than an equal partnership. FAMU was subjected to the regulations of a governing board, state legislature, and government administration that had a history of making decisions that aided FSU's growth while hindering FAMU's development. While the book commissioned by the FAMU-Florida State College of Engineering presents a smooth collaborative venture to provide engineering education for two of the state's oldest universities, the study presents the oral history of an embattled, coerced relationship that epitomizes the sharecropping-like system of higher education exercised in the American south.

The sharecropping metaphore provides a direct and realistic view of public HBCUs position in higher education. Considering the conditions and treatment of sharecroppers provokes images and thoughts of outdated, dehumanizing servitude, second-class citizenry, disparity and poverty, ramshackle, destitute accomodations, downtrodden and derelict living quarters, and over-the-top expectations for productivity. HBCU facilities and physical plants have often been reported as outdated, and multiple court cases have identified the dispartities in funding, faculty and staff expectations, and degree program offerings between HBCU and TWI that highlight the poor conditions and treatment of HBCU—conditions that mirror those of 20th century sharecroppers. Sharecroppers were expected to work hard to produce respectable crops for the harvest. Planters used the seeds of the best crops for the next planting season to ensure that the next harvest could have a better chance of producing all great crops. However, the land owners, ironically, would take the best crops as their "share", essentially preventing the sharecroppers from being able to accomplish the goal the owners set themselves. Likewise, the state of Florida designated FAMU as a land-grant institution, tasked FAMU with providing quality agricultural and mechanical (read engineering) degree programs, and then takes from FAMUs engineering program to give it to the FSU under the auspice of a partnership: ironic, irrational, hateful.

Since the mid-19th century, historically Black colleges and universities have struggled to find a way to survive or make one for themselves, while traditionally White post-secondary institutions have enjoyed the privilege of state, federal, and corporate support. Desegregation court cases and Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU) reports have well-documented the disparities in funding between public 1890 land grant institutions, and their predominantly White Morrill Act of 1862 counterparts. As recently as 2016, the privately-

operated PWI University of Delaware received more state funding than the state's lone public university, Delaware State University, an HBCU. HBCUs strapped for resources, yet interested in providing more opportunities for their students have tried a variety of ways to offer more educational programming without depleting their modest budgets. Interinstitutional partnerships present a cost-effective opportunity for two or more higher learning institutions to fulfill their aligned mission.

Relationships between HBCUs and predominantly White institutions, however, have few instances of mutual benefit. The second chapter of the study presents cases of PWIs absorbing HBCUs in mergers and PWI systems reducing Black colleges to satellite and branch campuses of a neighboring PWI. The most notable exception to this tragic trend being Tennessee State University. Tennessee State University was the first, and virtually the only major public HBCU to absorb a public PWI member of the state's flagship higher education system. The merger of Tennessee State University and the University of Tennessee's Nashville campus was not negotiated, that extreme case of an interinstitutional partnership was court-mandated. Moreover, the HBCU takeover of a major White university has not taken place again since the TSU-UT Nashville merger of 1979. To be sure, HBCUs are rarely treated as equal partners in relationships with PWI as presented in the case of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering.

Extant publications covering HBCU-PWI partnerships largely present a positive narrative of togetherness, equality, and integration. The study reveals that the authors of most works presenting HBCU-PWI partnerships are often written and/or commissioned by the PWI in the partnership. This study relies heavily on the historiography method of oral history to uncover the first-person perspective of those involved in the establishment, development, and daily operations of a HBCU-PWI partnership. Oral history presents a method for accessing

information not available in the published texts. The interviews with former administrators, alumni, and faculty involved with HBCU-PWI partnerships filled in gaps left by published books and articles while adding texture to archival information.

**Chapter Summaries**

The introduction began with a warrant for the study and explanation of the title. Research into educational partnerships have largely left out HBCU-PWI strategic relationships. The relationships between HBCU and PWI provide insight into the disparities between the types of institutions and the inequity in HBCU-PWI partnerships. As opposed to two similar organizations working to achieve something together neither may accomplish alone, a number HBCU-PWI partnerships have been revealed as the PWI using a relationship with an HBCU to create a loophole to a regulation or restriction preventing the PWI from offering the element alone. Moreover, in the partnerships, PWI take the more respectable positions, leaving the undesirable, menial work as the HBCU's responsibility. Moreover, the first chapter presents how the relationships between HBCU and PWI highlight the similarities between America's higher education system and the country's former sharecropping system.

Chapter two draws from the concepts present in the title and frequently referenced in the introduction, to acclimate the reader to the extant published material germane to interinstitutional partnerships. College relationships, the idea of partnerships, and the reality of post-secondary institutional arrangements are presented alongside their underlying theories and examples of their practical applications. The literature review in the second chapter identifies the establishment of historically Black colleges and universities and traces the development of HBCUs from their origins in discrimination to their rebirth, of sorts, via discrimination litigation.

The chapter goes on to present HBCU protections via discrimination litigation and legislation as a major impetus behind HBCU-PWI partnerships.

The findings chapters, three, four, and five, center on the establishment and continuation of the partnership from the perspectives of those involved in the joint college. Chapter three introduces two former Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University presidents and juxtaposes their story of the partnerships formation against the history of the partnership presented in two written works on the joint college. To triangulate the information that answers the research question regarding how the partnership was formed, the study uses the joint college's commissioned history book, documents from both institutions' archives as well as the State Library and Archives of Florida, and oral history interviews with former administrators pivotal to the joint college's founding and formative years. President's Smith and Humphries provided stories of establishing the partnership from an inside, first-person point-of-view that aligned directly with the archival documents. The former presidents' explanation of the events that led to the formation of the partnership connected the archival documents and filled in gaps regarding FAMU's role in the joint college that was largely absent from the two extant historical texts on the college's history.

Three decades of disparity, the title of the second findings chapter, directs readers to the fact that the study's scope covers thirty years of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering partnership and the finding that the people interviewed identified the relationship as unequal, skewed, and unbalanced to the detriment of historically Black Florida A&M University. The chapter draws on alumni oral history interviews to explore the research question concerning how the partnership was able to persist for 30 years while most partnerships between organizations fail within the first five years of existence. FAMU and FSU alumni share experiences of racial

tension in the joint college, uncommon camaraderie, and the relationships they formed indiscriminate of institutional affiliation. Students shared their views of how FAMU was perceived in the partnership and what they believed FAMU benefited from the joint operation of the college.

Students from both FAMU and FSU presented the finding that race and gender connections proved stronger than institutional affiliation, leading Latino and Black FSU students to spend more time studying and socializing with FAMU's Black students. The students admitted that racial and institutional tensions were consistently recognizable in the joint college, while acknowledging that no single protest or demonstration seemed significant enough to dissolve the partnership. The students did note that they heard rumors and whispers of separation, however, hearsay that eventually proved to be legislators' attempts to end the partnership and allow FSU to provide a stand-alone college of engineering.

Chapter five inserts the perspective of the faculty. The study uses the voice of the faculty to continue the telling of a tumultuous student incident at the joint college. In the transition of the storytelling from the student point-of-view to the faculty perspective, the study reveals the significant difference in feeling behind the story. The former students present the story passionately as a significant and singularly pivotal episode in the history of joint college, the faculty member asked about the issue explained the same event as miniscule and something to be expected. As the chapter continues, students' recollections of professors are presented to uncover a deeper understanding of the joint college faculty's role in influencing the larger sharecropping system evident at the college and how the students functioned in that system. Chapter five ends with a brief synopsis on the major developments with the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering partnership immediately after the first thirty years of the partnership.

**Answering the Final Research Question**

The current conclusion offers a summary of previous chapters, examines implications of the findings and areas for future study, as well as providing a response to the final research question: what can other HBCUs learn from the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering partnership. Several narrators provided responses to the question and readily provided their views as insight for HBCU that have considered partnership when private and public funding is not enough.

Wendy Douglass suggests that HBCU have effective legal representation present during partnership talks and that those lawyers speak directly with engineering faculty from FAMU or anyone from an interinstitutional school to compile a list of lessons learned from the partnership. The HBCU lawyers will need to be able to negotiate the terms of the relationship to the HBCU's satisfaction.

Prince Gammage puts more onus on the HBCU in the partnership. Considering the history of strained relationships with predominantly White entities, Prince Gammage advises HBCUs to be vigilant through the partnership talks, take initiative in the designation of roles/responsibilities/duties, and communicate a high level of expectation for the HBCU's performance in the execution of the partnership.

President Smith's sentiments align with Prince Gammage's assertion regarding initiative. The former president suggests that each institution in the partnership establish a permanent advisory board. The institutions could task the board to create plans with the leader in the joint venture and involved faculty and staff. President Humphries' reply differed from his fellow narrators. Basing on his remarks on his past experiences leading several HBCU, President Humphries offers his thoughts on HBCU-PWI partnerships in general.

President Humphries declares that in most situations when HBCU and PWI partner, the arrangement persists as long as the predominantly White institution maintains the advantage. President Humphries likens the situation to the interest convergence theory and sharecropping system noticeable in everyday society, in order to have progress, development, peace, and harmony, "whites have to win." The concept of American higher education, of America itself as President Humphries puts it, is corrupted by the condition that things are fine as long as White people are winning. Conversely, if whites are not winning, then the partnership has problems, the relationship brews contention, the arrangement withers, organizations divide and collaborations rend.

John Lee displayed optimism toward college partnerships, though with necessary caveats. Lee believes that a partnership needs separate participants to be aligned by mission and goal. Specifically, Lee suggests that those leading interinstitutional partnerships keep the needs and potential impact on their students in mind. Lee and a number of the other participants shared the idea that the ability to direct the path of the partnership is the most important aspect of a true partnership. Voluntarily partnering allows for the parties align shared goals, sign agreements, and have a mutual understanding of the path and purpose of the partnership.

**Discussion of the Results**

The goal of the paper was to examine how an HBCU-PWI partnership works. To determine how the partnership works, the study pursued answers to the questions a) how was the partnership established, b) how has the partnership lasted for over thirty years and what was its affect on FAMU, and c) what can other HBCUs learn from the partnership. Though initiated with optimism and supported by secondary works on the book, the study reveals that the FAMU

partnership with FSU resembles more of sharecropper working for a landowner than a strategic partnership.

The partnership was forced by legislation penned by an FSU alumnus. The joint college of engineering was established by an act of government as a condition for providing funds for the engineering program the state of Florida had withheld from FAMU for decades. Subsequently, the sharecropping arrangement lasts because FAMU does not want to lose the funding to offer engineering and FSU does not want to lose the authorization to award engineering degrees that it is leaching out of FAMU. FAMU's fellow HBCU may learn from the partnership that a forced partnership with a predominantly White institution is no partnership at all: partnering should occur voluntarily in spirit and in practice.

The literature and the narrators in the study suggest that agreements on the purpose, path, and goals lead to a more evenly beneficial and equitable partnership. Narrators largely perceive FAMU as getting less from the partnership than FSU in terms of faculty positions, staff roles, and student representation. Staff roles affected the students beyond the execution of the position, seeing Black FAMU employees in menial roles while White FSU employees held most of the office and desk jobs took a toll on the students' psyche. Black students want to see their possible selves in Black professors, Black engineers from the industry visiting the college, and Black administrators; however, the memorandum of agreement left FAMU largely with the responsibility over maintenance, janitorial, and dining services—the "Negro jobs."

**Implications**

The results of the partnership behind the FAMU FSU College of Engineering present a larger issue. Public HBCUs in the South operate at the will of former Confederate States known for legalizing racial discrimination well into the 1960s and requiring federal intervention to

racially integrate public schools. Many states hosting public HBCUs remain under federal supervision due to litigation proving the states have discriminated against Black colleges and withheld appropriate funding for decades, in some cases the states have redirected the HBCU's funding to create and strengthen PWI.

Subsequently, HBCUs may find more success in partnerships by pursuing agreements with fellow Black colleges. A review of the literature on HBCU partnerships and informal visits to over 74 HBCU campuses revealed an extant HBCU-PWI partnership in North Carolina that seemed voluntary, well-planned, and mutually beneficial. That partnership, the North Carolina Agricultural and Technological University – University of North Carolina-Greensboro Joint School of Nanoscience and Nanoengineering, warrants further study. The results of the study, however, imply that establishing inter-HBCU partnerships may avoid the common problems identified when HBCU partner with PWI.

A criterion for HBCU designation is that the institutions' purpose was, and remains, the education of Black people. Accordingly, the missions of HBCU, at the foundation, are already aligned. The vast majority of HBCU have a majority Black student body, faculty, and staff; therefore, concerns with racial discrimination will be at a minimum if not altogether nonexistent. HBCUs have clear models for partnerships in the Atlanta University Center and the MEAC, SEAC, SWAC, and CIAA athletic conferences. While the AUC consists of six colleges sharing a library and location on the campus originally owned by Atlanta University, the HBCU athletic conferences provide an opportunity for colleges to conduct joint recruitment, fundraising, and build collaborative relationships with cities and large organizations that host special games and multi-day events for HBCUs.

America's Historically Black Colleges and Universities and other HBCU-centered sources presented in the literature review identify multiple cases of beneficial inter-HBCU partnerships. The researcher finds that many sources covering the HBCU-TWI partnerships, including both histories of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering, largely omit student, staff, and faculty voices. The researcher identifies that the works on HBCU-TWI partnerships place significant emphasis on the benefits of collaboration; however, the researcher's examination of the so-called benefits are one-sided and skewed toward the TWI rather than producing mutual benefits as most inter-HBCU partnerships have been found to produce (Davis, 1998; Lovett, 2011). Considering the positive results of extant inter-HBCU partnerships presented in the literature review compared with the sharecropper position FAMU holds in the arrangement with FSU for engineering as revealed in the study, the research finds that inter-HBCU partnerships garner more study and application.

**Limitations**

The study has a number of limitations. The study was limited by the time spent on-site in the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering and complications with gaining access to public information. At the College of Engineering, the contact in the office of the dean requested a special form and payment be presented in order to get primary records such as reports, memos, and letters of a former dean. Consequently, the information from the joint college's former deans available inside the dean's office is not present in this study. Moreover, at the time of the interviews, the State University System of Florida was still in the process of conducing a feasibility study for splitting the college. The FAMU affiliated engineering faculty, as a result, declined requests to interview until the final results of the study were published. The study was also limited in the range of narrators who participated. FAMU administrators provided a great

deal of assistance with identifying the target population of FAMU engineering alumni for the sake of the study; FSU's assistance, on the other hand, required a price the researcher declined to pay.

Regarding generalizability, the study examines a single case of a HBCU-PWI academic partnership, thus the results cannot be interpreted as the exact case for all HBCU-PWI partnerships. The study presents the history of FAMU-FSU College of Engineering and posits it appropriately as a partnership involving the largest HBCU in terms of enrollment at the time the study began in the year 2013.

**Future Research**

Additional research in the area of HBCU-TWI partnerships would allow for the further investigation of the findings of this study. Further funding and additional time allowed, the researcher would return to the case site and interview FAMU engineering faculty as well as more administrators. Moreover, researching similar HBCU partnerships throughout the South and southeast region would be interesting. Specifically, an in-depth examination of the history of the North Carolina Agricultural and Technological State University – University of North Carolina Greensboro School of Nanoscience and Nanoengineering could build on the findings of this study. The NCAT-UNCG partnership was established decades after the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering; therefore, studying how the racial climate in the time period and physical location affect the partnership could highlight opportunities for HBCUs seeking potential partners.

Moreover, delving into the NCAT-UNCG partnership would allow for the study of a case to compare with the one presented in this study. North Carolina A&T is large for an HBCU and consistently enrolls over 10,000 students. Additionally, NCAT is an 1890 land-grant institution and partners in engineering education with a public TWI in NCAT's host city, the similarities

with the FAMU-FSU partnership make it a prime subject for a similar case study into HBCU-TWI partnerships. A NCAT-UNCG partnership study could uncover beneficial practices and processes for HBCUs currently involved in partnerships and other HBCUs considering partnering with a PWI.

Moving towards the direction of HBCU opportunities for growth, an overarching exploration of current and potential inter-HBCU partnerships would add a great deal to the body of knowledge germane to HBCU and Black College's challenges to survive and thrive in America. While studying institutionalized partnerships, it became clear that an undetermined number of collaborations frequently take place among HBCU researchers, administrators, and staff. Research shows that strong, strategic, interinstitutional partnerships often develop from smaller collaborations between faculty members (Harman & Harman, 2008). Researchers interested in opportunities for HBCU growth may consider identifying voluntary partnerships and the products of those partnerships. Examining how beneficial the partnerships have proven for each involved institution and for the institutions stakeholders could highlight HBCU partnerships that may serve as model cases for college cooperative agreements.

Beyond adding to the findings and creating a comparison case study for this study, more research may be conducted to explore the elements uncovered by this study. One element is the students' organic establishment of a support group to protect an institution from a perceived threat of complete merger. Students may not understand the different types of college partnerships and contemplate any partnership as the early stages of a forceful takeover. The idea presents an opportunity to research the messages about university partnerships communicated to campus stakeholders, alumni, students, parents, community members, and city leaders. Students who feel ownership and strong sense of connectivity with their home institution may react

drastically to perceived affronts to their campus. Future research may go so far as to assess the affect different types of college partnerships have on the psyche of students who are heavily engaged in campus life at their college.

A complimentary finding that may show promise through future study is the role of professors in partnerships decided by the college's administration. The FAMU professors collectively chose to decline from interviews when the governance board commissioned a third-party agency to conduct a feasibility study for the separation of the joint college. A researcher could investigate the FAMU faculty's reasoning for their silence and determine the limitations of the silence. The professors did not specify whether their silence extended their engineering students, engineering alumni, and colleagues outside the engineering faculty ranks, or if the silence was mainly reserved for outsiders seeking an interview while the separation study was still in progress. It would be interesting to identify what influenced FAMU faculty to be silent while the FSU faculty in mechanical engineering chose to write an open letter to the consulting agency conducting the feasibility study for Florida's higher education governance board.

Finally, research in this area may explore the potential for interinstitutional partnerships of HBCUs in the engineering field. A preliminary investigation of Black college course offerings produced a list of approximately 14 HBCUs that provide accredited engineering degree programs. A study should examine why so few Black colleges offer engineering education and if the HBCUs with engineering programs are partnering with any other post-secondary education institutions. The study could expand to investigate potential of coupling the 89 HBCU without engineering offerings with colleges that offer accredited engineering programs.

Published literature on Black college partnerships is limited. Researchers who study HBCU partnerships will be in a small group responsible for covering a lot of ground to collect

data that is not necessarily centralized in an administration office. This study, as a result, provides a valuable addition to the body of knowledge on the topic. Researchers may draw from the information in this study to reference for future inquiries in the subject of interinstitutional partnership involving HBCUs. By deconstructing and reconstructing the case of one of the largest and longest-lasting HBCU-TWI partnerships from the perspective of the Black college, this study uncovered information on the creation, maintenance, and consequences of these types of agreements. College partnerships must be voluntary agreements with clearly defined expectations and aligned goals to progressively be mutually beneficial for each institution involved.

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Stassun, K. G., Sturm, S., Holley-Bockelmann, K., Burger, A., Ernst, D. J., & Webb, D. (2011). The Fisk-Vanderbilt Master's-to-Ph. D. Bridge Program: Recognizing, enlisting, and cultivating unrealized or unrecognized potential in underrepresented minority students. *American Journal of Physics, 79*, 374.

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Williams, J., & Ashley, D. (2004). *I'll find a way or make one: a tribute to historically Black colleges and universities* (1st ed.): New York: Amistad/HarperCollins.

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Wormser, R. (2004). *The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

# CARL DARNELL

Curriculum Vita

## EDUCATIONAL HISTORY

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Ph.D. | Indiana University, Bloomington, IN<br>Major Field: Higher Education<br>Minor Field: African American and African Diaspora Studies | 2017 |
| M.Ed. | Tennessee State University, Nashville, TN<br>Major Field: Education Administration and Supervision | 2007 |
| B.S. | Tennessee State University, Nashville, TN<br>Major Field: Computer Science | 2006 |

## WORK EXPERIENCE

### Research

| | |
|---|---|
| 2017 – present | *Visiting Academic Specialist*, Director, Balfour Scholars Program, Center for P-16 Research and Collaboration, Indiana University, Bloomington |
| 2014 – 2015 | *Research Assistant*, African American & African Diaspora Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington |
| 2013 – 2014 | *Research Assistant*, Leading to Completion Lumina Project, Center for Post-Secondary Research, Indiana University, Bloomington |

### College Teaching

| | |
|---|---|
| 2013 – 2014 | *Associate Instructor*, African American & African Diaspora Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington |
| 2010 – 2013 | *Associate Instructor*, School of Education/Hudson & Holland Scholars Program, Indiana University, Bloomington |
| 2009 – 2010 | *Instructor*, University Honors Program<br>Tennessee State University, Nashville |

### Student Affairs

| | |
|---|---|
| 2008-10, 2015-17 | *Residence Hall Director*, Residence Life and Housing,<br>Tennessee State University, Nashville |
| 2010 – 2013 | *Program Mentor*, Hudson & Holland Scholars Program,<br>Indiana University, Bloomington |
| 2007 – 2008 | *CTE Recruitment Coordinator*, Recruitment and New Student Programs,<br>Collin College, Plano, TX |
| 2006 – 2007 | *Outreach Coordinator*, Center for Service Learning & Civic Engagement,<br>Tennessee State University, Nashville |

2006 – 2007 *Resident Assistant Supervisor*, Residence Life and Housing, Tennessee State University, Nashville

## CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Darnell, C. (2015, October). *Decades of Disparity: Student Experiences in an HBCU-PWI Partnership.* Single paper presentation: 2015 HBCUstory Symposium: Third Annual Meeting. Nashville, TN.

Darnell, C. (2015, February). "Graduating Adult Learners: An Examination of Adult Completion Programs." Presented at the National Association of Student Affairs Professionals Annual Conference 2015: Transforming Student Success: Recruitment, Retention, and Graduation. Huntsville, AL.

Darnell, C. (2014, March). "Dollars for Diversity: The Cost of HBCU-TWI Partnerships." Presented at the Diversity and Inclusion Summit on Historically Black Colleges and Universities (DISH) Conference 2014. Nashville, TN.

Darnell, C. (2014, February). *Sharecropping in Higher Education: The History of the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical-Florida State University College of Engineering.* A poster presented at the Black Graduate Student Association Research Symposium. Bloomington, IN.

Darnell, C. (2013, October). *Black Political Power and Historically Black Colleges.* Paper presentation at the Organization of Educational Historians Annual Conference 2013. Chicago, IL.

Darnell, C. (2013, April). *The Potential of Black College Partnerships: Enhancing Competitiveness through Inter-Institutional Cooperation.* Paper presented at the Diversity and Inclusion Summit on HBCUs Conference 2013. Lorman, MS.

Darnell, C. (2013, April). *HBCU Renaissance: The Potential of Black College Partnerships.* A paper presented at the 2013 HBCUstory Symposium: Inspiring Stories of the Past & Present for Our Future. Nashville, TN.

Darnell, C. (2012, March). *Let There Be White: The Growing White Enrollments at HBCUs*. A paper presented at the Ninth Annual Herman C. Hudson Symposium Black Diasporas: Reimagining Race, Space & Community. Bloomington, IN.

Darnell, C. (2011, December). *Social Justice: Rosa Parks and Resistance*. Presented at the Rosa Parks Day Commemoration: Remembering the Legacy of Resistance and Social Justice. Bloomington, IN.

Darnell, C. (2011, October). *Ebony and Ivory Towers: HBCU-PWI Partnerships to Improve Minority Student Success*. Presented at the Indiana Student Affairs Association Conference: Crossing Bridges for Student Success. Fort Wayne, IN.

## INVITED WORKSHOPS & PRESENTATIONS

Darnell, C. (2017, November). "Communicating Effectively with and about Ethnically and Racially Diverse Populations." Workshop presented at the Center for P-16 Research and Collaboration Retreat, Bloomington, IN.

Darnell, C. (2014, December). "HBCUs and the African American Athlete." Lecture at Instructor Caralee Jones' *History of Sports and the African American Experience*, College of Arts and Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Darnell, C. (2013, April). "The Black Panther Party and Historically Black Colleges and Universities." Lecture at Instructor Caralee Jones' *Survey of the Culture of Black Americans*, College of Arts and Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Darnell, C. (2012, November). "Social Activism: Civil Rights Movement." Lecture at Instructor Caralee Jones' *Survey of the Culture of Black Americans*, College of Arts and Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Darnell, C. (2012, April). "The Role of Historically Black Colleges and Universities' Students in the Civil Rights Movement." Lecture at Instructor Caralee Jones' *Survey of the Culture of Black Americans*, College of Arts and Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Darnell, C. (2011, November). "The Role of Historically Black Colleges and Universities' Students in the Civil Rights Movement." Lecture at Instructor Caralee Jones' *Survey of the Culture of Black Americans*, College of Arts and Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Darnell, C. (2007). "Empowering and Engaging Students in Service." Presentation at Tennessee State University Division of Student Affairs Summer Retreat: Purpose: Learn to Serve Others. Nashville, TN.

Darnell, C. and Johnson, M. (2006). "Town and Gown Partnerships: Tennessee State University's Community Development Projects" Presented at Plenary Session of the Conference of Southern Graduate Schools joint session with Conference of Historically Black Graduate Schools. Chattanooga, TN.

## PUBLICATIONS

Snipes, J.T. and Darnell, C. (in press). Non-Black student recruitment at Historically Black Colleges and Universities. In M.C. Brown II and T.E. Dancy II (Eds.) *Black Colleges across the Diaspora: Global Perspectives on Race and Strification in Postsecondary Education*. Bingley, United Kingdom.

Darnell, C. (2016). "HBCU Renaissance: The Potential of Black College Partnerships." In Crystal deGregory (Ed.) *The Journal of HBCU Research and Culture*.

Darnell, C. (2015). Sharecropping in Higher Education: A Case Study of the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University-Florida State University Joint College of Engineering. T. Ingram, A. Hilton, D. Greenfield, J. Carter (Eds.). *Exploring Issues of Diversity Within HBCUs*, pp. 241-263. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

Darnell, C. (2012). Review of Sounds of Blackness', *The Sounds of Blackness* (CD, Malaco Music Group, 2011). *Black Grooves*, April 2012.

Maddox, H.C., Bradley, R., Fuller, D.S., Darnell, C., and Wright, B. (2007). Active Learning, Action Research: A Case Study in Service Learning, Technology Integration, and Community Engagement. *Journal of Higher Education Outreach and Engagement.* Contributing author.

**SERVICE**

- Math and African American History Instructor Upward Bound Summer Academy – Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis 2011-2015
- Head Counselor, Jim Holland Summer Enrichment Program – Indiana University 2012-2017
- Graduate Advisor, Black Student Union – Indiana University 2011-2014
- AGEP Emissary, School of Graduate Studies and Research – Indiana University 2012-2013
- Vice President, Black Graduate Student Association – Indiana University 2011-2012
- Creator, Coordinator, Speaker, Social Justice Series 2011-2014
  - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Day Movie Screenings and Discussions 2012
  - Black/Diversity Toy Drive 2011-2014
  - Rosa Parks Day Commemoration 2011-2014, 2017
- Bloomington Black History Month Planning Committee 2012
- Indiana University Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Day Planning Committee 2012
- Indiana University Men & Women of Color Leadership Conference Planning Committee 2011
- Indiana University Men of Color Leadership Institute Advisor 2010
- Preston Taylor Ministries (Non-profit Agency for underserved Nashville youth) – Board Member 2010-2012
- Co-Chair, Tennessee State University Community Service Day 2009
- NASAP Annual Conference Planning Committee 2009

**PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND AWARDS**

- Association for the Study of Higher Education (ASHE) Annual Conference – Power to the People. Houston, TX. 2017
- American Educational Research Association (AERA) Annual Conference – Toward Justice: Culture, Language, and Heritage in Education Research and Praxis. Chicago, IL. 2015
- Critical Race Theory in Education Conference – Race, Education, and Public Policy for Social Justice: Transdisciplinary Activism in Critical Race Studies. Nashville, TN. 2014
- AERA Annual Conference – The Power of Education Research for Innovation in Practice and Policy. Philadelphia, PA. 2014
- Be More Engaged Award – Community Foundation of Bloomington and Monroe County Be More Awards. Bloomington, IN. 2014.
- 38th Association for the Study of Higher Education (ASHE) Annual Conference. St. Louis, MO. 2013
- Tennessee State University Center for Service Learning and Civic Engagement Staff/Administrator Award. Nashville, TN. 2010
- Collin College Essential Interviewing Skills: Professional Development Training. Plano, TX. 2008
- Tennessee Digital Sandbox Consortium: Sandbox Executive Board Member. Nashville, TN. 2007
- America's Promise Alliance Regional Forum. Nashville, TN. 2007
- Vanderbilt Child and Family Policy Conference: Family Re-Union 12 – Families and Education. Nashville, TN. 2006

- Tennessee State University Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Training Certificate of Completion. Nashville, TN. 2006
- HBCU HUD Technical Assistance Regional Workshop: Community Development and Grant Applications. Nashville, TN. 2006

## PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

- Association for the Study of Higher Education (ASHE)
- National Association for Student Affairs Professionals (NASAP)
- American Educational Researchers Association (AERA)