Socialization: Parent–Child Interaction in Everyday Life

Sara Keel

SOCIALIZATION:
PARENT–CHILD INTERACTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Adopting a conversation analytic approach informed by ethnomethodology, this book examines the process of socialization as it takes place within everyday parent–child interactions. Based on a large audio-visual corpus featuring footage of families filmed extensively in their homes, the author focuses on the initiation of interactive assessment sequences on the part of young children with their parents and the manner in which, by means of embodied resources, such as talk, gaze, and gesture, they acquire communicative skills and a sense of themselves as effective social actors.

With attention to the responses of parents and their understanding of their children's participation in exchanges, and the implications of these for children's communication this book sheds new light on the ways in which parents and children achieve shared understanding, how they deal with matters of 'alignment' or 'disalignment' and issues related to their respective membership categories.

As a rigorous and detailed study of children's early socialization as well as the structural and embodied organization of communicative sequences, *Socialization: Parent–Child Interaction in Everyday Life* will appeal to scholars of sociology and child development with interests in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, early years' socialization and the sociology of family life.

Sara Keel is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Basel, Switzerland.

Directions in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

Series Editors:
Dave Francis, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
Andrew Carlin, St Columb's College, Northern Ireland

Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis are cognate approaches to the study of social action that together comprise a major perspective within the contemporary human sciences. Ethnomethodology focuses upon the production of situated and ordered social action of all kinds, whilst Conversation Analysis has a more specific focus on the production and organisation of talk-in-interaction. Of course, given that so much social action is conducted in and through talk, there are substantive as well theoretical continuities between the two approaches. Focusing on social activities as situated human productions, these approaches seek to analyse the intelligibility and accountability of social activities 'from within' those activities themselves, using methods that can be analysed and described. Such methods amount to aptitudes, skills, knowledge and competencies that members of society use, rely upon and take for granted in conducting their affairs across the whole range of social life.

As a result of the methodological rewards consequent upon their unique analytic approach and attention to the detailed orderliness of social life, Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis have ramified across a wide range of human science disciplines throughout the world, including anthropology, social psychology, linguistics, communication studies and social studies of science and technology.

This series is dedicated to publishing the latest work in these two fields, including research monographs, edited collections and theoretical treatises. As such, its volumes are essential reading for those concerned with the study of human conduct and aptitudes, the (re)production of social orderliness and the methods and aspirations of the social sciences.

Other titles in this series

Respecifying Lab Ethnography
An Ethnomethodological Study of Experimental Physics
Philippe Sormani
ISBN 978-1-4094-6586-7

Ethnomethodology at Play
Edited by Peter Tolmie and Mark Rouncefield
ISBN 978-1-4094-3755-0

Socialization: Parent–Child Interaction in Everyday Life

SARA KEEL

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

To Cristobal, Elia, Simon and Yael

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

This page intentionally left blank

List of Figures

This page intentionally left blank

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1
Introduction

Socialization: A Longstanding Object of Study

It is in *The Oxford Dictionary of the English Language* of 1828 that the expression *to socialize* makes its first appearance, referring to a process whose aim is "to render social, to make fit for living in society" (Clausen 1968: 21). According to this first definition, it cannot be taken for granted that individuals naturally fit into a given social order. To behave in such a manner as might be required by a given social environment, they need to be prepared and to undergo a process of adaptation and apprenticeship controlled by those considered to be the competent members of society.

Half a century later, it was Georg Simmel who introduced the term *socialization* (Simmel 1894: 54) in social theory, but emphasizing aspects other than those in the first definition given above. Simmel thought of society (or unity) as something that existed and was produced wherever several individuals are engaged in *reciprocal relationships*, or *Wechselwirkungen* (Simmel 1909: 296). According to Simmel, reciprocity between individuals is generated by specific impulses—of a sexual or religious nature, or arising out of specific purposes or interests such as defense, attack, gain, or instruction—that lead individuals to act for or against each other, or more generally bring them to various forms of "being-together." However, Simmel also argued that these generic conditions of association (impulses, purposes, and so on) not only influence individuals' engagement in reciprocal relationships, but also are shaped (brought into being) by individuals' engagement in reciprocal relationships. Accordingly, it is through these reciprocal relationships that society—being the "sum of these reciprocal relationships"—is perpetually realized (Simmel 1890: 131). Simmel considered *the form(s) of socialization* (*Vergesellschaftung*) to be a more appropriate concept than society for designating something that is perpetually produced through a dynamic, interactive process (Simmel 1917: 13). He felt that the analysis of these forms of socialization should be the priority object of study for sociology: "If, therefore, there is to be a science, the object of which is to be 'society' and nothing else, it can investigate only these reciprocal influences, these kinds and forms of socialization" (Simmel 1909: 297–8).

These first uses of the notion *to socialize* (Clausen 1968: 21) and the term *socialization* (Simmel 1909: 297) foreshadowed the two main lines of investigation that were developed within the different theories and studies of socialization over the course of the twentieth century (Terrail 1995: 118). The first one looks at the processes through which individuals are integrated into a given society and/or social order (Grundmann 2006: 9). Its main question can be summarized as follows: "How are human beings produced as social beings that conform to a pre-existing

social order?" This line of investigation presumes first that individuals are mainly socialized, shaped, and modeled by others, and second, that the socialization consists of producing individuals that produce or reproduce a given pre-existing social order (Terrail 1995: 118). Its adepts are thus predominantly concerned with the individual's attachment to a larger community. They seek to examine and to understand the different social contexts within which socialization takes place and to show their distinct impact on the individual's development (Grundmann 2006: 19; Hurrelmann, Grundmann and Walper 2008).

The second line of investigation is interested in revealing how individuals produce, negotiate, and modify social order and society, and in showing how the to-be-socialized individual actively participates in dynamic process(es) of this kind (Grundmann 2006: 9; Hurrelmann, Grundmann and Walper 2008: 14; Terrail 1995: 118). Consequently, this line of investigation seeks to answer the following questions: How are individuals enabled to produce social actions? How are they brought to actively participate in the production of social life? (Grundmann 2006: 9, 19). It is primarily concerned with individuals' self-development, examining it as something that is achieved and transformed through social interactions, and which exists in a relationship of mutual interdependency with the social and material environment in which individuals come into adulthood. In contrast to the first line of investigation, whose analytical focus seeks to reveal the environmental (social, economic, and cultural) factors that shape individuals' development, the second line of investigation highlights the agency of developing individuals and aims to show to what extent and how they are active contributors and/or producers of their own development and socialization (Hurrelmann, Grundmann and Walper 2008: 14–15). In its broadest sense, and as Cromdal puts it, socialization thus refers to an infinite "array of social events" taking place in ordinary family life, on the playground, on the football pitch, and/or in institutional settings such as the school, the nursery, the university, or the workplace, "through which people become skilled in the ways of society" (Cromdal 2006: 462).

Socialization: Everyday Parent/Adult–Child Interactions

In their paper "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions," Garfinkel and Sacks (1986)—the founders of ethnomethodology (EM) and conversation analysis (CA), respectively—declare that the notion of being a competent "member" of society does not refer to a person, but to the "mastery of language" (Garfinkel and Sacks 1986: 163). According to the authors, a member is thus not just any person that happens to live and interact in a given society. Instead, being a member amounts to being a competent user of natural language, for example, someone who is able to use language to achieve practical actions such as greetings, requests, or offers, and to display practical reasoning, practical circumstances, and common-sense knowledge in a way that is understandable for other members of society. Concretely, this means that a greeting is not only to be accomplished in a way that ensures it is understood

by the intended recipient, but also that it is interactively effective—that is, it gets a greeting in return. In this sense, the acquisition of the interactional and linguistic competences and common-sense knowledge needed to competently use natural language constitute the central aim of childhood socialization (Heritage 1984a: 239).

In recent years, a large number of EM/CA studies on children's everyday interactions with others have been carried out. Based upon audiovisual recordings, these studies describe and analyze the concrete organization of the everyday interactions of children and adolescents taking place at their homes (Butler and Fitzgerald 2010; Cekaite 2010; Fasulo, Loyd and Padiglione 2007; Filipi 2009, 2013; Forrester 2008, 2013; Goodwin, M. 2007; Wootton 1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2010), at the playground (Butler 2008; Butler and Weatherall 2006; Goodwin, M. 2006), and in or around the school or nursery (Cekaite and Aronsson 2005; Coob-Moore, Danby and Farrell 2008; Emanuelsson and Sahlström 2008; Kidwell 2005, 2009, 2012; Kidwell and Zimmerman 2006, 2007; Macbeth 2003, 2011; Pekarek Doehler 2010b; Sahlström 2002, 2009; Sidnell 2010a). A central aim of these detailed descriptions is to reveal children's competences in methodically deploying gaze, gestures, and language to produce meaningful and intelligible actions and in understanding the actions of others for what they are. Taking young children's mobilization of embodied resources into account makes it possible to demonstrate that even before fully mastering natural language, young children deploy a whole range of linguistic, cognitive, and interactive competences: they might identify a problem in their own talk and propose an appropriate repair without parental intervention (Corrin 2010; Forrester 2008), or they might very early on in life (from the age of 11 months onwards) combine gestures, gaze, and vocalization to produce a recognizable action, such as a request, that projects a response from the intended recipient, and to pursue a response if none is forthcoming (see Chapter 4; see Filipi 2009; Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Wootton 1997). *Beyond contributing to a better understanding of the embodied organization of social interaction, these studies show how, from an early age, the child initiates sequences of interactions, and is not merely reacting to the actions of (more competent) others.* This line of research thus provides evidence of young children's non-trivial contribution to their own socialization/acquisition of interactive competences.

Young Children's and Parents' Organization of Assessment Sequences and its Relevance for the Study of Socialization

On the basis of a large audio-visual corpus of everyday parent–child interactions, my study looks at the embodied ways in which young children (between 2 and 3 years-of-age) achieve initial assessments and examines how parents respond. The existing EM/CA literature on children of this age range is very limited. Indeed, quite a few studies look at the interactions of very young children—between nine and 18 months-of-age—(Corrin 2010; Filipi 2007, 2009; Jones and Zimmerman 2003: 178; Kidwell 2005, 2009; Kidwell and Zimmerman 2006, 2007; Lerner and

Zimmerman 2003; Lerner, Zimmerman and Kidwell 2007, 2011), or examine the organization of interactions involving children of 3 years old and above—somewhat older than those of my study (Butler 2008; Butler and Weatherall 2006; Cekaite 2006, 2010; Church 2009; Coob-Moore, Danby and Farrell 2008; Goodwin, M. 1990, 2006, 2007; Sidnell 2010a; Wootton 2006b, 2007). Very few studies focus on interactions involving children who are between 2 and 3 years old, and if they do, they concentrate on a few extracts produced by one child (Butler and Fitzgerald 2010), or constitute single case studies following the developmental trajectory of one child (Forrester 2008; Forrester and Cherington 2009; Wootton 1997, 2010) or of a few children ranging from 10 months to 5 years-of-age (Laakso 2010). For example, Forrester (2008) and Cherington (Forrester and Cherington 2009) examine the emerging capacity of the first author's child to repair her own talk, and Wootton (1997) examines his own daughter's developing practices for accomplishing requests. There is thus a research gap that warrants the selection of this particular age group for the central focus of my study.

Furthermore, I am particularly interested in young children's emerging interactive competence—especially their use of natural language—and in the way young children's language use is treated by their parents. Between the ages of 18 and 24 months, young children undergo a period of rapid lexical growth (Bassano 2000; Petitto 1993, Veneziano 2000). From their second birthday onward, natural language becomes more and more important for communicating with others (Filipi 2009). It thus seemed most promising to choose an age group in which children's linguistic (and, presumably, interactive) competences undergo significant changes.

In everyday family life, young children recurrently produce *initial assessments* such as "yuck," "that is beautiful," "[the man] is tall," and "that's difficult" (Keel 2012): in the corpus as a whole, I identified 483 occurrences of this. By deploying assessments, speakers display their normative "position" and express their "affective involvement" toward the object, activity, or person being referred to (Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. 1987: 9). As Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. (1987: 7–10) argue, to make their assessment understandable for others, speakers might deploy a whole array of embodied resources ranging from various facial expressions, postures, or intonations, to linguistic and syntactic constructions of varying degrees of complexity. Studies on adults' production of assessments have shown that depending on the embodied, sequential, and linguistic resources speakers mobilize when producing initial assessments, a whole range of so-called *non-canonical* actions (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 9; Chapter 4; see also Keel 2015) such as noticings, announcements, informings, complaints, and compliments, might be achieved (Keel 2011; Lindström and Heinemann 2009; Mondada 2009a: 352, 2009b; Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori 2006; Pomerantz 1978, 1984a: 63; Ruusuvuori and Peräkylä 2009). It has been suggested that in terms of getting a response from the intended recipient, *non-canonical actions* might imply more interactive work by the speaker than *canonical actions* (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 5).

Furthermore, it has been stressed that assessments imply a claim of access to and/or knowledge of the referent (Mondada 2009a; Pomerantz 1984a). If an adequate response is to be obtained from the intended recipient, he or she must have this access and/or knowledge. To be interactively effective, the producer thus needs to ensure the recipient's access to or knowledge of the referent. For all these reasons, my analytical work on young children's production of initial assessments first aims to answer the following questions:

- How do young children mobilize and coordinate different interactive resources, such as sequential positions, gestures, facial expressions, and language, to accomplish different social actions (assessments, noticings, or self-praise)?
- How do young children coordinate these resources to ensure the intended recipient's access to/knowledge of the referent?
- More generally, how do children make a response from the intended recipient observably relevant? That is, how do they organize their assessment in such a way that the addressed participant is obliged to respond?

The existing EM/CA studies on young children's participation in social interactions referred to above focus on young children's production of so-called *canonical action types* (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 5–6) such as offers, questions, or different types of requests (Butler and Wilkinson 2013; Filipi 2009; Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Wootton 1997, 2007). In contrast, the three research questions outlined above make it possible to offer a methodical analysis of young children's embodied accomplishment of initial assessments that achieve a wide range of *non-canonical* actions (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 9). It thus focuses on a conversational phenomenon that has not yet been systematically examined in the scope of EM/CA studies on parent–child interactions and makes it possible to shed some new light on young children's embodied display of cognitive, linguistic, and interactive competences that have not yet been addressed in these terms.

Second, my analytical work is devoted to the ways in which parents respond to their young children's initial assessments (Chapters 5–6). Systematic studies of assessment sequences produced by adults (Pomerantz 1975, 1984a) suggest that the production of a first assessment by speaker A makes relevant a response by speaker B, and that this response most frequently comes in the form of a second assessment:

A: That's a r- a (rerry good buy)
B: Great buy. (Pomerantz 1975: 22)

With his or her immediate second assessment, B expresses his or her understanding/ interpretation of the previous turn as one that calls for a response: with the use of the qualifier "great" (instead of repeating A's "rerry"), B's second assessment

is *upgraded*. As such, it expresses his or her clear agreement with A's initial assessment. As highlighted by Pomerantz (1975, 1984a), B's second assessment can be upgraded or downgraded with respect to the initial one; this would express B's strong agreement or disagreement with it, respectively. Alternatively, B's response can take the form of a *same evaluation* (see Pomerantz 1975: 21) and thus manifest B's weak agreement or even indicate his or her incipient disagreement with the initial assessment. Furthermore, it has been argued that both the frequent use of upgraded second assessments by adults to respond to initial assessments and the formal production of these assessments—they are produced in a clear and straightforward manner and come immediately after completion of, or in slight overlap with, the initial assessment—show the adults' preference for agreement over disagreement (Pomerantz 1984a, 1975) and index their orientation toward solidarity and "face" maintenance (Heritage 1984a: 265, 2008: 18–19).

More recently, Heritage and Raymond have suggested that detailed investigation of assessment sequences makes it possible to reveal how participants orient toward interactants' different *epistemic rights* to assess something (Heritage and Raymond 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006). According to the authors, participants in a conversation tend, for example, to treat a child's grandmother as having greater epistemic rights to assess the grandchild, and thus to assert her normative stance and to claim direct epistemic access, than would a simple acquaintance of the child's family. It has been argued that interactants' orientation toward distinct epistemic rights is demonstrated in the sequential and formal production of their responses to initial assessments (Heritage and Raymond 2005).

As put forward by Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. (1992: 184), interactants' organization of assessment sequences thus constitutes a key opportunity to analyze participants' normative positioning, affective involvement with the surrounding world, and negotiation and/or demonstration of a shared understanding of this world. In this sense, their systematic examination constitutes an interesting conversational object for studying "cognition in action" (Jones and Zimmermann 2003; Wootton 1997, 2006a), and for investigating the interplay between cognition, language, and culture (Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. 1992: 181–4).

Hence, the analytical work on parents' responses to their young children's initial assessments seeks to offer a systematic examination along the following research lines:

- How do parents treat initial assessments produced by their young children? Do they respond at all?
- How do they formally and sequentially produce their responses? Do they adhere to the preference for agreement over disagreement?
- What might observed particularities (in terms of sequencing or formality) tell us about the relationship between parents and children?

In summary, this study seeks first to uncover the methodical uses of the embodied resources by which young children render intelligible their evaluative positions and affective implications to the referent, and through which they are able to understand others' responses and normative stances. Moreover, it aims to reveal how very young children—not yet fully mastering natural language—participate actively (and not merely re-actively) in the assessment of their here-and-now reality, and how they thus acquire and display a sense of themselves as effective, competent social actors who contribute to a shared understanding of their surrounding world. Second, the study seeks to examine parents' most frequent responses—agreements and disagreements—and to look at the implications of these responses for the further course of action. Examining in detail how children's evaluative actions—as attempts to communicate their normative position, and their affective implication with respect to their environment—are treated by the parents reveals not only the parents' emic understanding of their children's participation in assessing the world they jointly inhabit, but also allows some new light to be shed on the ways in which shared understanding is eventually achieved. By investigating young children's and parents' particular organization of assessment sequences in light of studies that examine their accomplishment in adult–adult interactions (see for example Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. 1987; Lindström and Heinemann 2009; Mondada 2009a, 2009b; Pomerantz 1975, 1984a), the study moreover offers a window into the particular ways parents and children deal with delicate issues of epistemic rights to assess, solidarity, and "face" (alignment/disalignment), and makes their tacit, yet observable, orientation toward matters related to their respective membership categories available for inspection, raising empirically grounded questions and reflections regarding socialization studies in general, and studies on parent–child interactions in particular.

In contrast to previous studies of socialization, this analysis stresses that young children's displays of competences, for example when they pursue a response from their parents to their initial assessment, are not necessarily triggered, stimulated, or otherwise engendered by the latter's adoption of scaffolding practices but are the emergent products of children's understanding of, and orientation to, observable, interactive, and local configurations. It thus argues that children's embodied expressions of competences (of whatever kind) cannot be tracked and examined independently of the ways in which they are rooted in social interactions. More generally, this study finds that looking at the organizational, formal details of everyday family interactions instead of providing empirical evidence for the omni-relevance of an asymmetrical relationship between parent and child—often presumed to be one of the most salient characteristics—highlights their observable sensitivity to very local, practical matters of everyday family life, such as parents' and children's need to eat and thus to complete a family meal, and shows that the interactive achievement of shared understanding of the here-and-now situation/action often seems to have top priority for the children and their parents, everything else being of secondary importance.

Organization of the Book

Chapter 2: The Study of Socialization: Historical Context and
Respecification by Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

The aim of Chapter 2 is to contextualize EM/CA studies on children's interactions within the wider field of investigations on socialization, and to highlight their essential contributions to the study of socialization. I first briefly present the predominant sociological theories of socialization of the 1950s and 1960s. I then outline how, in the 1960s and 1970s, a larger movement in social and human sciences engendered new approaches to the study of socialization that shared a common interest in the interactive momentum of socialization, children's active participation, and interactants' ordinary language use. Finally, I offer an account of EM/CA criticism and the proposal to respecify the study of socialization, and discuss some studies of child–child and adult/parent–child interactions in more detail—with a focus on Sacks' work—to give the reader a better understanding of the approach adopted for this book.

Chapter 3: Data/Collection/Transcription

My study is based on a large corpus of audiovisual data. Moreover, its analytical part is grounded in collections of different occurrences of the same interactive phenomena—for example, a parent's agreement with a child's initial assessment. In Chapter 3, I offer an account of the practical process that led to the constitution of the corpus (participant recruitment, setting, and data collection) and the creation of collections and transcriptions. At the same time, I also discuss the methodological implications of these practices.

Chapter 4: Young Children's Repetitions of Initial Assessments and
their Orientation toward Conditional Relevance

The fourth chapter presents an analysis of the ways in which young children produce initial assessments, and how they repeat them if a satisfactory response from the recipient is not immediately forthcoming. With consideration for the praxeological context, detailed examination of 12 extracts shows how the immediate interactive context provides young children with essential resources for identifying recipients' distinct problem in responding and how the children organize their pursuit of a response accordingly. In this chapter, I argue that when producing assessments in everyday interactions, young children orient toward "conditional relevance:" they treat their assessments as fundamentally social activities that make a response from the recipient relevant, instead of dealing with them as mere expressions of their private stance toward an object, an activity, or an experience.

Chapter 5: Parents' Agreements with Children's Initial Assessments:
What About the Preference for Agreement in Everyday Family Life?

The fifth chapter offers an analysis of parents' most frequent response to children's initial assessment: agreement. The findings are discussed in light of literature on adults' preference for an unequivocal (strong and immediate) agreement over disagreement. This discussion reveals that in terms of sequential and formal characteristics, parents' agreements do not fundamentally differ from those produced in adult–adult conversations. Strikingly, however, instead of using strong agreements (as is the case in adult–adult interactions), parents use different types of weak agreements to respond to their children's initial assessment. The chapter seeks to examine how parents' use of different types of agreement shapes the further interaction, arguing that the way in which parents and children handle preference organization in assessment sequences reflects the praxeological context in which the studied agreements are produced and manifests interactants' orientation to their respective membership categories.

Chapter 6: Parents' Disagreements with Children's Initial Assessments:
What About the Dispreference for Disagreement in Everyday Family Life?

The sixth chapter expands and develops the discussion on preference organization in everyday parent−child interactions by examining parents' responses that disagree with the child's initial assessment. In symmetrical relationships between adults, disagreements are usually produced in a dispreferred format: they occur with delay, are produced in a mitigated form, comprise elements of agreement, and/or are accompanied by an account. Many occurrences of parents' disagreement correspond to this finding. However, parents might also disagree immediately with the child's turn, opting for the preferred format for producing a dispreferred action. The comparison between parents' disagreeing responses that present the preferred format and parents' disagreements that are produced in the dispreferred format indicates that issues regarding the praxeological context and matters of parenting might be at stake.

Chapter 7: Discussion and Concluding Comments

The closing chapter brings together the themes and observations of the analysis and discusses the implications of the findings for studies on children's socialization in general and for ethnomethodological and conversation analytical study of parent−child interactions more particularly.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 2

The Study of Socialization: Historical Context and Respecification by Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

As mentioned in the introduction, this study adopted an EM/CA approach to analyze and describe the organization of naturally occurring everyday interactions between parents and their 2-year-old children with a view to raising some empirically grounded questions and reflections on the study of socialization in general, and investigations of young children's everyday interactions with their parents in particular. Before offering my own analysis of parent–child interactions, I will in this chapter attempt to contextualize EM/CA's proposal to investigate socialization via detailed examination of adult–child or child–child interactions in the very broad field of sociological and psychological studies of socialization. A look at the Anglophone context during the period from the 1950s to the early 1970s makes it clear that EM/CA's early investigations of children's interactions emerged in a wider movement of change occurring in the social and human sciences. This movement was characterized by the appearance of new sociological approaches that sought to review the by-then predominant paradigms of structural functionalism (Parsons 1951, 1960, 1966) and reproduction theory (Baudelot and Establet 1973; Bourdieu 1966; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964, 1970; Bourdieu, Passeron, and Saint-Martin 1965; Coleman 1966). In the broadest sense, and schematically put, this movement implied that:

> … terms to do with structure, reproduction, statistics, combinatorial analysis, invariance, universality, and binary logic fade away, in favor of notions of organizational chaos, fractality, events, process, meaning, complexity, auto-organization, construction, strategy, convention, autonomy, actioning … (Dosse 1995: 13, translated by Duncan Brown)

At the same time, developmental psychology became increasingly interested in examining mother–child interactions, focusing on the question of how it shapes the young child's development. To illustrate the bearing that this general movement had on the study of socialization, I will offer a very brief account of some of the socialization studies/theories it generated, paying more attention to the ones based on audiovisual or audio recordings of parent–child interactions. Finally, I

will discuss EM/CA's investigations of naturally occurring everyday adult–child or child–child interactions in more detail, with a special focus on Sacks' work. The general aim of this more in-depth discussion is to emphasize the methodological originality of these investigations and their specific contributions to the study of socialization. More particularly, it seeks to provide a better understanding of how I approach the study of socialization in this book.

2.1   Predominant Sociological Approaches to the Study of Socialization in the 1950s, 1960s, and Early 1970s

2.1.1   *Durkheim's Concept of Socialization as a Point of Departure*

One of the main concerns of sociology is to explain how social cohesion, or social order, is possible. Assuming that human beings are born into society as *tabulae rasae*, that is, as "egoistic, asocial individuals" (Durkheim 1973 [1922]: 52), Durkheim argues that mutual economic dependency and the attribution of a specific function for each member of the society do not sufficiently explain how social cohesion is possible. In his view, there must be a consensus among society's members regarding a certain set of *social facts*, in other words fundamental norms, values, rules, and feelings (sentiments) which exist externally to individuals somehow but inform their actions and more importantly constrain individuals' egoistic tendencies. Consequently, the question of how society transmits these values and norms to its newcomers becomes crucial. According to Durkheim, for education or transmission to take place, a generation of adults must voluntarily orient their educative actions toward a generation of youngsters (Durkheim 1973 [1922]: 47). Although these actions may vary considerably in different temporal periods and/or social contexts, their universal aim is to inculcate a certain number of fundamental values, ideas, and feelings (Durkheim 1973 [1922]: 49). These voluntary actions that parents orient to their children, with the aim of creating "a new being, a social being," are considered to constitute what Durkheim calls *methodic socialization* (Durkheim 1973 [1922]: 51).

Socialization activities are influential, and Durkheim gives two explanations for their power to lead children to overcome their individualistic tendencies: First, children are in a "natural state of passivity" similar to that of a hypnotized person, and have a natural inclination to imitate the actions of adults. Secondly, the parents and/or teachers initiating the educative activities have a natural superiority or authority over the child due to their experience and knowledge. In the methodical socialization of children, adults' authority and children's passivity and inclination to imitate induce the latter to accept and internalize what they are taught by the adults (Durkheim 1973 [1922]: 64–5). It is interesting to note that Durkheim already highlights that it is through each of the "thousands of small actions" that parents and teachers orient toward a child at every moment that the child is gradually socialized: "With the words we utter, with the activities we

accomplish, we continuously shape our children's souls" (Durkheim 1973 [1922]: 69, my translation), and adds that because of the apparent insignificance of each of these small actions, their influential force generally remains unnoticed (Durkheim 1973 [1922]: 65). Moreover, Durkheim emphasizes that despite adults' superiority over children, they themselves are not free in their educative acts, or in the values, norms, and other things that they transmit to the younger generations. On the contrary, the values considered relevant are constrained by the morals of a given society (Darmon 2007: 15; Terrail 1995: 118), and in this sense adults in turn obey a higher *moral personage*—the society in which they are living (Durkheim 1973 [1922]: 68). For Durkheim, socialization is thus a process in which children—being in a state of passivity ("*cire molle/soft wax*," Terrail 1995: 119)—internalize the fundamental values, norms, and so on that the parents and teacher—incarnating a natural authority—transmit to them to create a socially-integrated being, or in other words, a being that resists its natural egoistic tendency so as to contribute in an adequate way to (a pre-existing) social cohesion or social order.

2.1.2 Parsons' Development of an Influential Socialization Model in the Late 1950s and Early 1960s

Parsons built upon Durkheim's theory that socialization's aim is the normative integration of children into a given society's social order (Parsons 1951: 208). Like Durkheim, Parsons conceived of socialization as a process that is controlled by parents and adults, and that essentially takes place in the nuclear family and the school. For Parsons, individuals have to internalize socially shared *value orientation patterns* that are ascertained in specific roles, such as "father" or "teacher." The internalization of these roles implies the individuals' orientation toward specific expectations and values that are associated with them, and that in somehow exist independently of the individuals' concrete actions. These values serve to "define the main directions of action without reference to specific goals or more detailed situations or structures" (Parsons 1960: 171). In this sense, socialization refers to a developmental process in which the to-be-socialized individual is required to adopt a set of roles considered relevant in a given society. To socialize an individual to a specific role involves continuous tacit or explicit shaping of his or her competences and orientations to these implied normative expectations. Unlike Durkheim, however, Parsons believed that neither the authoritarian, constraining force that society and the central socialization agents (parents and teachers) have over the newcomers nor the newcomers' natural passivity is sufficient to explain why individuals internalize and adopt these constraining value-orientation patterns and roles in the first place. According to Parsons, for the individual to enforce a given social order in a continuous way, he or she needs adequate motivation and willingness (Abels and König 2010: 106–7, 112). In his socialization theory, Parsons thus integrates Fromm's idea, which states that a well-functioning society stands in need of members that "want to act in the way they have to act" (Fromm 1944: 381).

In Parsons' view, one thing that might explain why individuals do things in the way they are expected to by society is the power of custom: by being accustomed to the fact that having a role implies doing things in a certain way, individuals adopt a passive stance, in which things are automatically done as expected. But for Parsons, the individual's real commitment to a system of value patterns involves his or her life-long learning, development, and maintenance of an adequate "motivation to participate in socially valued, and controlled forms of actions" (Parsons 1966: 24). As Parsons sees it, the real purpose of socialization is to produce individuals who have this required motivation and willingness to participate, not only by taking the roles that are provided by society, but also by considering as reasonable the way of doing things implied by these roles. Although for Parsons, "many features of the actual process of socialization are obscure" (Parsons 1951: 214), its crucial importance for the maintenance of social order is unquestionable, since the child is not only biologically but also "socially immature," and thus not naturally motivated or competent to orient toward a set of social expectations associated with specific roles (Parsons 1951: 208).

According to Durkheim and Parsons, social order is essentially based on a collectively shared set of values and norms, or value orientation patterns, which inform and constrain the members' actions. The socialization process is primarily controlled and organized by the adult generation, and its aim is the young generation's progressive internalization of the normative expectations implied by these shared values, norms, and so forth. Another very influential socialization theory from the 1960s has been labeled the theory of reproduction (Coulon 1988; Sirota 1993, 1998). In this theory, as its name suggests, the socialization process was essentially seen in terms of reproduction: through the process of socialization, the younger generation was brought to reproduce the social order and structures, and thus the social inequalities, already experienced by their own parents.

2.1.3   The Theory of Reproduction and its Development in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s

The work of Bourdieu (1966, 1967), together with that of Passeron (1964, 1970, 1977), specifically addresses the process of social reproduction. When the child starts to experience the everyday conditions and practices of his or her social environment, he or she is confronted with objective relationships: structures characteristic of his or her socio-economic environment that exist independently of social interactions, or intersubjective relationships between its members (Bourdieu 1980: 90). Through the daily experiencing of specific socio-economic conditions and participating in everyday practices peculiar to his or her social environment, the child incorporates a class-specific *habitus*—"a structured system of dispositions, and schemes of perceptions" that generates and structures the child's actions and practices from within (Bourdieu 1980: 88). In reproduction theory, socialization thus refers to a process of incorporation. For example, Bourdieu emphasizes that masculinity or femininity is acquired through a corporal

apprenticeship that implies the individual's adoption of a specific way of shaking hands, walking, looking, lighting a cigarette, eating, and so on. (Bourdieu 1997: 168–9). The importance that Bourdieu attributes to the bodily dimension of the socialization process explains why he considered the socialized individual to be unconsciously impregnated by the social and normative expectations of his or her environment (Darmon 2007: 17–21), thus contrasting with the conception of Parsons (Parsons and Bales 1956), who argued that socialization results in individuals' motivation and willingness to act according to existent societal norms and rules. It also accounts for the fact that in contrast to Durkheim (1973 [1922]), the norms and values are not conceived as exterior social facts that constrain individuals' actions from the outside, while at the same time being inaccessible to them, but are understood as being inside the individuals' bodies and minds; these individuals are therefore understood, so to speak, as acting from within.

According to Bourdieu, the process of incorporation produces not only bodies and minds, or ways of being in the world, but also implies a specific relationship to the social world. By being exposed to different ways of shaking hands, the child unconsciously learns that the ways of shaking hands might differ depending on the person one is shaking hands with; or by being exposed to different ways of looking at works of art, the child might unconsciously learn that depending on the particular piece of art, different ways of perceiving art are considered appropriate (Bourdieu, Darbel and Schnapper 1969: 106). This explains why, when incorporating a (bodily) way of being in the world, the child also acquires a *cultural* and *social capital* (knowledge of and relationship to the social and material world) that is peculiar to his or her socio-economic milieu (cf. Bourdieu and Passeron 1964). Children entering school are consequently equipped with different styles of dressing, ways of speaking, thinking, and understanding the world, different manners, sensitivities, and know-hows. Depending on their family context, they are impregnated by different patterns of relevance and relationships that eventually ensure a reproduction of their class position and the ideological framework that goes with it. As Jenks (2008) argues, for reproduction theory, individuals' incorporation of a particular habitus—peculiar to their own socio-economic environment—thus necessarily leads to the reproduction of existing social structures and power hierarchies, whereas the socialization of individuals "serves to transform the cultural heritage into a common individual unconscious" (Jenks 2008: 90).

In accordance with the other predominant socialization theories of the 1960s, reproduction theory (see Baudelot and Establet 1973; Bourdieu 1966; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964, 1970; Bourdieu, Darbel and Schnapper 1965; Coleman 1966) used the notion of socialization to account for the reproduction and maintenance of social order, and as Cromdal (2006: 462) puts it, as a convenient axiom to explain the individual's development in a given society. However, as an intimate collaborator of Bourdieu remarked, the concept of habitus, and thus the process of socialization and incorporation as theorized and examined by Bourdieu, was reminiscent of a "black box" (Boltanski cited in Dosse 1995: 56).

2.2 The Emergence of Alternative Ways of Conceiving and Studying Socialization in the 1960s and Early 1970s

As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the above-mentioned approaches to the study of socialization were partially redeemed by alternative ways. These alternative ways were part of a larger movement occurring in social and human sciences that was characterized by the emergence of new sociological approaches such as ethnography of communication (Hymes 1964), symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969a), social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1966), and last but not least, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Garfinkel 1967; Sacks 1992 I+II). At the same time, Vygotsky's work, which emphasized the importance of social interaction for the development of individuals, was translated from Russian into English (Vygotsky 1962, 1978), engendering increased interest in the study of parent–child interactions and giving rise to a large number of publications on the subject in the field of developmental psychology. Before discussing EM/CA's approach to the study of socialization in more detail, I will briefly outline some studies of socialization generated by these alternative approaches and provide a more in-depth presentation of a few studies based on video recordings of everyday interactions between parents and children. The aim is not to discuss these approaches and their contributions to the study of socialization in extensive detail here, but rather to highlight their common characteristics and relationship to EM/CA. Furthermore, these brief presentations will show how the new approaches sought to break away from the hitherto predominant way of studying socialization. With the special attention paid to everyday interactions between adults and children, the central aim of these new approaches was to provide empirical evidence regarding the concrete daily working of the socialization process, and to open the "black box" that the process was previously considered to represent (Coulon 1988; Sirota 1998).

2.2.1 The Onset of the Linguistic Turn in Social and Human Sciences

In 1964, a special issue of the *American Anthropologist* titled "The Ethnography of Communication" was published. Although the diversity of the phenomena investigated in this issue was significant, its central aim was quite concise: these articles argued that an investigation into the cultural and social world needs to take into account ordinary people's language use and their face-to-face communication, and sought to show that the analysis of linguistic phenomena cannot ignore the fact that language is an inextricable part of the cultural and social world that people inhabit (Hymes 1964). The most notable consequence of the significance attributed to ordinary people's language use by those advocating the linguistic turn had already been succinctly summarized by the philosopher Wittgenstein in the early 1920s: "*Die Grenzen meiner Sprache* bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt." (*The borders of my language*

are the borders of my world; Wittgenstein 1984: 5.6, my translation, italics are the author's; see also Wiesing 2003: 114–15).[1] From this point of view, examining ordinary people's everyday language use gives us access to their understanding of social reality and their interpretation of their own being in the world. In investigating ordinary people's face-to-face language use, the ethnographers of communication ultimately aimed to provide descriptions of these *emic* understandings—in other words, understandings from within a culture (Leeds-Hurwitz and Sigman 2010: 243). The ethnographers were thus "committed to following the actors' interpretative work as closely as possible, without reducing or disqualifying their work by opposing another, stronger interpretation" (Boltanski 1990: 57, my translation).

Moreover, the ethnographers of communication promoted openness toward different theories and methods of investigation and considered interdisciplinary research as something normal, generated by their interest in developing an approach that provides for the interplay between language, culture, and social order (Leeds-Hurwitz and Sigman 2010: 237). Goffman and Hymes, for example, used an attributed grant to found the Center for Urban Ethnography, and to finance research projects involving scholars who either belonged to the *Chicago School* (see section 2.2.2 below), such as Everett Hughes and Robert Park, or founded CA, such as Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson (Leeds-Hurwitz and Sigman 2010: 254–5). Furthermore, as De Fornel and Léon (2000: 139) point out, Gumperz and Hymes (1972) not only opened their publications to anthropologists, sociolinguists, ethnomethodologists, and conversation analysts, but Gumperz also functioned as a mediator between the "ethnography of communication," interactionist approaches, and conversation analysis, himself integrating CA methods, such as the use of audio-recordings of naturally occurring talk-in-interaction, into the sociolinguistic approach he developed.

Through their studies, as published in this 1964 issue and elsewhere (Goffman 1981; Gumperz and Hymes 1972; Labov 1972; Labov et al. 1968; Labov and Fanshel 1977), and by collaborating in the training of a large number of scholars who are currently well known internationally for their work on situated talk-in-interaction, including C. Goodwin, M. Goodwin, and E. Ochs (see especially section 2.4.; see also Leeds-Hurwitz and Sigman 2010), Goffman, Hymes, Gumperz, and their colleagues collaborated with ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts to introduce the *linguistic (or communicative) turn* (Cuff, Sharrock and Francis 1998) in social and human sciences in the Anglophone context. In France and Germany, the onset of the linguistic turn was a little delayed (Dosse 1995). In Germany it is intimately bound to the work on language-in-use that Habermas published in the late 1970s (Habermas 2009). In France, scientists such as Ferry (1987), Quéré (1999), and Widmer (2010) introduced Habermas and EM/CA in the 1980s and early 1990s,

---

1 I thank Philippe Sormani for drawing my attention to this famous Wittgenstein citation.

and thus considerably contributed to the introduction of the linguistic turn in social and human sciences.[2]

With respect to the study of socialization and school education, Hymes argued that his "ethnographic monitoring program" for "children's acquisition of reading/language arts skills in and out of the classroom" should contribute to our knowledge of learning and teaching (Hymes 1980, 1981: 5). In consulting with teachers, observing practices in and out of the classroom, and finally discussing those findings with the teachers, Hymes' aim was to "make visible emic knowledge from educational voices that are vulnerable," focusing mainly on black urban school settings, and "giving back" this observed knowledge to those who made it available for inspection in the first place, namely the teachers and students of these schools (Van der Aa and Blommaert 2011: 5). As such, his project not only sought to investigate concrete learning and teaching practices, but also pursued a kind of empowerment strategy with respect to the teachers and children in black urban school settings, which were known to be areas neglected by official policy.

Apart from studies on institutional settings, such as school, ethnographers of communication also advocated for the examination of families' everyday language use to analyze socialization. In his article on gender socialization, Goffman (1977) stressed for example the importance of detailed analysis of talk-in-interaction in understanding how everyday family (household) life constitutes an important place for gender socialization:

> Consider the household as a socialization depot. Take as a paradigm a middle-class pair of cross-sexed sibs. The home training of the two sexes will differ, beginning to orient the girl to taking a domestic supportive role, and the boy to a more widely based competitive one. This difference in orientation will be superimposed on a fundamental quality in many matters that are felt to count. So from the start, then, there will be two basic principles to appeal in making claims and warranting allocations. One is the equality of sibs and beyond this of participating members—the share and share alike theme realized in its strongest form in many wills and in *its most prevalent form in turn-taking systems. [...] All of this is perfectly well known in principle, although not adequately explored in detail.* (Goffman 1977: 314, my italics)

Goffman's insistence on exploring the details of the household's specific turn-taking system reveals Sacks' and Garfinkel's influence (see sections 2.4 and 2.5 below). As De Fornel and Léon (2000: 139) pointed out, in his research praxis, however, Goffman himself never endorsed EM/CA's insistence that any interactive detail, and/or the examination of the form of conversation, might be relevant in providing an emic analysis of face-to-face interactions—in other words, an

---

2   For an overview and a more thorough discussion of the onset of the linguistic turn in the French context, see Dosse (1991, 1995).

analysis that reveals the participants' own perspective and understanding of a particular social phenomenon.

2.2.2 Active Actors and Subjective Meaning

The work of the social psychologist Mead (1934a, 1934b) constituted another cornerstone for the emergence of new approaches in the social and human sciences of the 1960s. As a psychologist working in the beginning of the twentieth century, Mead was influenced by the then-predominant theory of human conduct known as "behaviorism" (Watson 1913). According to behaviorism, human conduct—like that of animals—consists of undelayed and unreflected reactions to exterior stimuli. Psychology should therefore focus on the observable interactions existing between stimuli and reactions, instead of speculating about something that was not available for observation: the meaning people give to a stimulus. Mead also thought of human beings as reacting to a given environment. However, he countered that in contrast to animals, human beings are capable of delaying their responses, of thinking about and reflecting on the stimuli they are exposed to in their everyday life before they produce a response. Furthermore, he emphasized that humans integrate and communicate their thoughts and reflections in their responses to the stimuli.

> A person threatens you, and you knock him down on the spot. There has been no ideal element in the situation. If you count ten and consider what the threat means, you are having an idea, are bringing the situation into an ideal setting. It is that, we have seen, which constitutes what we term mind. (Mead 1934a: 181)

Instead of focusing on quasi-automatic, reflex-like human conduct, as advocated by behaviorism, Mead insisted on assuming that he was investigating active, mindful subjects who, through a process of reciprocal communication, continuously formed social order and at the same time integrated society. The discovery or rediscovery of the active, mindful self and social communication and interaction as the generic moment of social order induced Blumer (1966, 1969a, 1973 [1969b]) to develop a new sociological approach in the late 1960s that was known as symbolic interactionism. Drawing on Mead's work, Blumer stressed that it is through the social process of cohabitation and interaction that rules are brought into being and social order is produced (Blumer 1973 [1969b]: 99), clearly contrasting with Parsons' view, which was that a set of commonly held norms and values govern our actions and thus constitute the origin of social order: "It is the social process in group life that creates and upholds the rules, not the rules that create and uphold group life" (Blumer 1969a: 18).

According to Blumer's reading of Mead, instead of examining society's normativity and the structure or roles that shape the conduct of individuals, symbolic interactionism should focus on individuals' capacity to create the conditions of their actions. This line of investigation rests on the following three key premises

(Blumer 1969a: 2–3): first, humans act towards things according to the meaning they attribute to them—"things" encompassing whatever humans can perceive, be that physical objects, other human beings or social categories, institutions, ideals, social actions, or everyday situations. Second, the meaning attributed to things is derived from, or generated through, social interactions. Meanings are thus social products. Third, meanings are dealt with and modified through an interpretative process deployed by a person to handle the things he or she encounters.

According to symbolic interactionism, social interaction implies that at least two individuals act together and toward each other in a state of reciprocity (Abels and König 2010: 95). Through their use of language and embodied conduct, they are continuously communicating to each other how they understand the situation and how they understand each other. They interpret the other's actions, thus identifying him or her, and they express their own identity through their reactions. The examination of concrete social interaction is thus key to understanding the workings of society. Another key symbolic interactionist, Everett Hughes (1956, 1958), wrote very little of a theoretical or conceptual nature, but he and his colleagues, such as Becker (1952, 1963; Becker et al. 1961), Goffman (1959, 1961a, 1961b, 1963), Rist (1970, 1977), Strauss (Becker and Strauss 1956), and Whyte (1967), generated a large number of influential ethnographic studies that mainly concentrated on urban contexts and were also known as the "Chicago school" studies (see Cuff, Sharrock and Francis 1998: 137–41).

With regard to the study of socialization, these ethnographic works were mainly interested in the examination of adults' socialization[3] when entering a new social group or social milieu, such as the jazz scene (Becker 1963), the street corner society (Whyte 1967), or a professional/educational setting (Becker et al. 1961; Hughes 1956, 1958; Rist 1970, 1977). In these studies, the newcomer was not considered a passive subject whose socialization is organized and controlled by parents, teachers, or more competent, experienced peers. On the contrary, through his or her participation in interactions with others, the newcomer not only acquires the necessary competences to develop an identity and a career that is in accordance with the newly entered milieu, but also contributes to the constitution, maintenance, or modification of the here-and-now social order (Becker and Strauss 1956).

In the same period,[4] Berger and Luckmann published a very influential book titled *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966), in which they introduced the notions of *primary* and *secondary socialization* to distinguish the socialization

---

3 One exception is found, for example, in Goffman's reflections on gender socialization (1977), which are briefly invoked in section 2.2.1 above.

4 This time indication is true for the Anglophone context only. In France, ethnographic studies adopting a symbolic interactionist or constructivist approach for studying socialization (primary or secondary) started to appear in the late 1980s, and at the beginning of the 1990s (Dubet 1991, 1994; Haicault 1994; Perrenoud 1988, 1994; Rochex 1995; Sirota 1988; for an overview, see Sirota 1993: 91, 1998; for a discussion of the reason for this delay, see Coulon 1988; Sirota 1998).

process undergone by young children (primary socialization) from the one that refers to already socialized actors (secondary socialization) that are confronted with a part of objective reality that is new to them, such as a new working environment (1966: 129). Drawing on G.H. Mead's work on the development of the self (1934a, 1934b) as well as Schütz's work on social phenomenology (1945), they sought to outline a new way of conceptualizing the socialization process. According to the authors, newcomers (be they children or adults) certainly perceive and understand the social reality they enter as an objective one that (objectively) precedes their own appearance (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 13). From the point of view of society, the newcomer has to adapt to this pre-existing social reality, and needs to be socialized if he or she is to participate adequately in it (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 128). For the individual, socialization implies a process of internalization through which the object world is incorporated (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 128), while "language constitutes both the most important content and the most important instrument of socialization" (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 133). Every individual is, moreover, born in an objective social structure in which he or she happens to encounter *significant others* who are in charge of his or her socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 131). In primary socialization, the child is presented with a "predefined set of significant others" and—for obvious reasons—has no possibility of opting for or choosing significant others apart from those that he or she happens to encounter (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 134). Moreover, in primary socialization, the individual comes to identify emotionally with the significant others, takes on their roles and even comes to see himself or herself through the eyes of these significant others (Berger and Luckman 1966: 131–2). Therefore, the particular way these significant others have of seeing, understanding the world, and acting in this world is adopted and internalized by the child; it thus acts as a "filter" (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 131).

> Since the child has no choice in the selection of his significant others, his identification with them is quasi-automatic. For the same reason, his internalization of their particular reality is quasi-inevitable. The child does not internalize the world of his significant others as one of many possible worlds. He internalizes it as *the* world, the only existent and only conceivable world, the world *tout court*. (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 134, italics are the authors')

In this respect, the way Berger and Luckman conceived of primary socialization is strongly reminiscent of Parsons' concept of *internalization*, as well as the concept of *habitus*, as promoted by reproduction theory (see sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3). However, as suggested by Mead's theory, Berger and Luckman (1966: 132) argued that throughout primary socialization, children are active; they take on the role of the significant others, and at the same time adopt their vision of the world. Moreover, in primary socialization, children actively learn to replace local and personalized rules (those of the significant others) with more general ones. So at the end of primary socialization, instead of identifying with concrete significant

others, individuals come to identify with a larger social entity, the *generalized others* (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 143). "Primary socialization ends when the concept of the generalized other (and all that goes with it) has been established in the consciousness of the individual" (Berger and Luckman 1966: 148).

In a similar way to symbolic interactionism, social constructionism thus emphasizes the newcomer's participation in the socialization process, implying active learning on the individual's part. Newcomers are not simply shaped and formed by the pre-existing reality or the socializing institutions (family, school, and so on); rather, their own actions are also oriented towards, and aimed at, internalizing the objective reality that surrounds them (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 139). Through their active participation, newcomers not only collaborate in the construction of social reality but also in the construction of their own socialization. Furthermore, like symbolic interactionism, social constructionism seeks to reveal the subjective meaning that newcomers attribute to the social reality they encounter (Sirota 1998: 11). However, whereas for the former, the ethnographic examination of face-to-face interactions—considered to be the generic moment of socialization—was crucial, researchers working in the framework of "social constructionism" would tend—in addition to ethnographic methods—to use different interview techniques or quantitative surveys to investigate how social reality is constructed by social actors and at the same time impacts these actors' conduct.

2.2.3　The Vygotskyan Impact on Studies of Adult–Child Interactions

In this same period, developmental psychology also underwent some significant changes. The Russian psychologist Vygotsky (1962) became a central figure in studies whose aim was to examine adult/parent–child interactions and to investigate their relevance to children's cognitive, linguistic, social, and cultural development. In contrast to Piaget's understanding of child development—in which the child's cognitive development necessarily precedes the child's acquisition of new competences/knowledge—Vygotsky (1962, 1978) pleads for a conception of development in which social learning precedes development:

> Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychological) and then inside the child (intrapsychological). This applies equally to voluntary attention, to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. All the higher functions originate as actual relationships between individuals. (Vygotsky 1978: 57)

According to Vygotsky, infants essentially develop their linguistic and cognitive competences through interactions with *More Knowledgeable Others* (MKOs); he advocated the idea that the way in which language is actually used by the MKOs in a particular activity has an impact on the child's development of higher mental

states (Pontecorvo 1993; Wertsch 1985; Wertsch and Sohmer 1995). Furthermore, post-Vygotskyan studies on interactions between Western mothers and their young children provided empirical evidence that mothers significantly change and simplify their way of talking when interacting with their young children (Bruner 1975, 1983; Ervin-Tripp and Mitchell-Kernan 1977; Ochs and Schieffelin 1979; Snow and Ferguson 1977). They thus adapt their talk to the presumed state of their children's linguistic and cognitive development. Indeed, they might treat their children as if they have something to say long before they actually produce their first word (Trevarthen 1979: 340). Mothers might use a simplified language called *baby talk* when interacting with their children (Snow 1972); they might greet their 24-hour-old babies (Stern 1974) and engage in *proto-conversations* with their young children (Bates, Camaioni and Volterra 1979), for example by taking the child's communicative role and providing his or her responses (Trevarthen 1979). To borrow the terms of Wood, Bruner, and Ross (1976), these adaptations might be part of *scaffolding* practices deployed by caregivers when interacting with young children to guide and stimulate the child's acquisition of new linguistic competences (Rogoff 1990: 93–4).

Drawing on these empirical works generated by post-Vygotskyan developmental psychologists (Snow 1972; Snow and Ferguson 1977; Treverthan 1977, 1979, 1982, 1985) and influenced by the linguistic turn, the cultural anthropologists Elinor Ochs[5] and Bambi Schieffelin developed a very influential "model of language socialization" in the early 1980s (Makihara and Schieffelin 2007; Ochs 1982, 1983, 1988, 2002, 2004; Ochs and Schieffelin 1979, 1983, 1984, 1995; Schieffelin 1990). Based on recordings of naturally occurring conversations between caregivers (mothers) and children, its aim is to understand "how sociocultural knowledge, linguistic knowledge, and the process of socialization and language acquisition impact each other" (Ochs 1988: 4). In this model, socialization is considered to be a general notion that refers to the process by which a newcomer becomes a competent member of society (Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Schieffelin and Ochs 1983). The authors emphasize that children develop in a social environment that is linguistically and socioculturally structured: the way in which caregivers talk to children, or talk in children's presence—for example, mothers' use of baby talk (see above)—is structured and organized by cultural expectations related to the child's incompetence and the role and status attributed to him or her.

Moreover, they argue that since the central medium for the acquisition of sociocultural knowledge or for socialization more generally is talk, it is through their participation in conversation that children acquire their linguistic and sociocultural competences and become competent members of their community. "If language is a meaning-making system and speaking and listening are meaning-

---

5   Elinor Ochs acquired her PhD at the University of Pennsylvania in 1974. At that time, the scientific environment there was impregnated by the presence of scholars such as Goffman, Hymes and Birdwhistell, who co-founded the *ethnography of communication* briefly outlined above (see section 2.2.1; Leeds-Hurwitz 2010: 239).

making activities, then accounts of these phenomena must at some point draw on accounts of society and culture" (Ochs 1988: 4). Consequently, the adoption of Ochs' and Schieffelin's analytical approach to studying socialization implies the close examination of naturally occurring everyday verbal interactions between caregivers and children with consideration for the *formal properties* and *functional dimensions* of these interactions (Ochs and Schieffelin 1983: IX–X).

The studies carried out by Ochs and Schieffelin on mother–child interactions emphasize that the above-mentioned adaptations by mothers are by no means observable in all cultures (Ochs 1983: 185; Schieffelin and Ochs 1986).[6] On the contrary, in her studies comparing and contrasting Samoan and American household interactions, Ochs shows, for example, that when talking to their young children, Western caregivers (usually mothers) frequently produce an *expansion*, which is to say the "utterance of [a] caregiver that follows an utterance of a child in which the child's utterance is recouched in more appropriate, that is, adult, grammatical form"—whereas Samoan caregivers make no use of such expansions (Ochs 1982: 86–7). Ochs argues that the recurrent use of these expansions by Western caregivers carries specific cultural assumptions and manifests a specific attitude toward the child.

The Western caregiver acts as if the child's utterance is directed toward a social goal. In reformulating the child's utterance, she provides an interpretation of the child's intention; to reach this interpretation, she adopts the child's perspective, thus adjusting to his or her egocentrism (Ochs 1982: 88). The author remarks that Samoan caregivers do not share these cultural assumptions. Young children are assumed to be incapable of responding, and so their vocalizations/gestures are not treated as social acts and their utterances are instead "treated as unalterable through social response" (Ochs 1982: 91). Moreover, Ochs remarks that Samoan caregivers do not usually guess at the meaning or propose an interpretation of the young child's unintelligible talk, but simply treat the child as "having guku," or "talking Chinese," which is to say in a way that is not intelligible to Samoan native adults. The author argues that through their recurrent use of *expansions*, Western mothers indulge their children in their "egocentric perspective," whereas Samoan children are socialized earlier to a "sociocentric perspective" whose central aim is to induce the child "to focus on properties and actions of others," instead of paying too much attention to himself or herself (Ochs 1982: 98).

The "sociocultural model" for studying socialization developed by Elinor Ochs and Bambi Schiffelien views the acquisition of linguistic knowledge and the acquisition of sociocultural knowledge as a mutually elaborative and interactive process that can be examined and accounted for through a detailed investigation of caregivers' and children's actual participation in everyday language interactions.

6　This observation and its implication for the study of children's linguistic and cognitive development is discussed in detail by developmental psychologists such as Rogoff (1990, 2003); see also the discussion by Veneziano (2000).

Since the development of this model in the 1980s, Ochs has become the director of the UCLA Department of Anthropology's Center on the Everyday Lives of Families (CELF),[7] which is one of the six Sloan Centers on Working Families. Its research aims are to carry out detailed, ethnographic studies on the home life of middle-class working families and to create an archive of video recordings concerning everyday family life.

The CELF maintains an institutional collaboration with the interdisciplinary Department of Child Studies at Linköping University in Sweden (chaired by Professor K. Aronsson) and the Psychology Department at La Sapienza in Rome, Italy (chaired by Professor C. Pontecorvo). Based on video-recordings of naturally occurring family life, and adopting the sociocultural research framework developed by Ochs and Schieffelin, a significant number of studies on parent–child interactions (Aronsson 2006; Aronsson and Cekaite 2011; Blum-Kulka 1997; Fasulo, Loyd and Padiglione 2007; Goodwin, M. and Cekaite 2013; Gordon 2009; Pontecorvo and Arcidiacono 2007; Pontecorvo and Fasulo 1999; Pontecorvo, Fasulo and Sterponi 2001; Ochs 2002, 2004; Ochs and Shohet 2006; Ochs, Solomon and Sterponi 2005; Schieffelin 1990; Sterponi 2009) and peer interactions (Aronsson 2011; Goodwin, M. 2006) have been conducted within this framework (for an overview of the settings investigated, see Duranti, Ochs, and Schieffelin 2011).

Some of these works seek to further elaborate Ochs' and Schieffelin's interactive conception of the socialization process. Indeed, in Ochs' study (discussed above) comparing Western and Samoan socialization practices, she remarks:

> Members' understandings of family roles are modified through joint activities with infants and children. Despite the asymmetry of their relationship and their competence, children and caregivers may jointly construct these domains of knowledge with each other. In this sense, caregivers may be socialized by the children they are socializing. (Ochs 1988: 224)

Ochs thus argues that adults, like children, may acquire new knowledge through their interaction with children, and may even be socialized by their children while socializing them. In their empirical analysis, however, the authors focus on the competences that children may develop through their interactions with caregivers or other adults. Pontecorvo, Fasulo, and Sterponi in turn propose conceiving of socialization as a *mutual apprenticeship*, introducing a "bidirectional model of socialization" (2001: 341). This notion emphasizes the fact that it is not only children that develop new sociocultural knowledge through their conversations and interactions with their caregivers/parents—as is widely asserted by developmental psychologists—but that the caregivers/parents also acquire new knowledge and a new identity—that of caregiver or parent—through their interactions with the child (Pontecorvo, Fasulo and Sterponi 2001: 341–4).

---

7 http://www.celf.ucla.edu/index.html accessed on July 28, 2015.

Through their analysis of naturally occurring interactions between children and their parents, the authors seek to show that children's and parents' ways of participating in family interactions may constitute a challenge for either of them and consequently stimulate the acquisition of new competences or knowledge on either's part and provide for children's and parents' development as children and parents, respectively (Pontecorvo, Fasulo and Sterponi 2001: 347–59; Sterponi and Pontecorvo 1997).

Other CELF researchers emphasize that beyond providing a window into socialization practices, detailed examination of everyday parent–child interactions sheds some new light on the ways participants' organization of everyday activities reflects and at the same time fosters a particular family culture and moral understanding (Aronsson and Cekaite 2011; Cekaite 2010; Fasulo, Loyd and Padiglioni 2007; Goodwin, C. 2006). The detailed analysis of how, for example, parental directives are produced and dealt with in Swedish family contexts (Aronsson and Cekaite 2011; Cekaite 2010) shows that parents' initial directives rarely engender children's immediate straightforward compliance; instead, the parents' deployment of mitigated formats opens up a space for negotiation or bargaining between the child and the parent. These studies thus evidence in detail how in directive sequences, the authoritarian parent (who imposes his or her values and norms on the child) is not typical for contemporary middle-class Swedish families, in which a family culture of children speaking up on their own behalf is the norm.

By emphasizing children's participation in the process of acquisition and demonstrating its implication for the organization of family interactions, norms, and culture, these CELF works constitute an invaluable complement to studies that focus essentially on parents' contributions to the child's development—in other words, that concentrate on parental scaffolding (Rogoff 1990, 2003; Wood, Bruner and Ross 1976), and/or argue that parents' natural (biological) inclination is to engage in pedagogical activities when interacting with young children (Gergerly and György 2009).

2.3   Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis as an Approach to the Study of Socialization

The movement outlined above, which occurred in the social and human sciences of the 1960s and early 1970s, was thus characterized by a particular interest in the examination of the everyday interactive momentum of socialization, an emphasis on the language use of children as active participants and the meaning they attribute to their actions (cf. Sirota 1998). In the following section, a detailed discussion of EM/CA studies on child–child and adult/parent–child interactions in the same period aims to show that while sharing similar interests, this way of studying socialization was (and, I argue, still is) in significant respects distinct from the

approaches outlined thus far. Moreover, the following sections will establish the terms and framework for the analytical part of the book (Chapters 4–6).[8]

EM/CA's review of the study of socialization draws upon Garfinkel's fundamental criticism of the way that the predominant social and human theory of the 1960s (see section 2.1 above) tends to construe the "man-in-the-sociologist's-society" as a "cultural dope" who simply "produces the stable features of the society by acting in compliance with pre-established and legitimate alternatives of action that the common culture provides" (Garfinkel 1967: 68). Ordinary members are thus understood as being constrained and manipulated by certain forces and having no control upon their environment. According to Garfinkel, treating ordinary members as "cultural dopes" leads sociology to develop research procedures that do not provide for members' practical concerns in social situations. Moreover, they do not make it possible to reveal the interpretative methods through which ordinary members render their understanding of something or somebody observable and intelligible, and through which they competently manage their everyday affairs. He argues that as a result, social and human sciences fundamentally neglect what should primarily be investigated (Garfinkel 1967: 68; Button 1991): "What we are interested in is, what is it that people seem to know and use" (Sacks in *Proceedings of the Purdue Symposium on Ethnomethodology*). The aim is thus to examine members' use of natural language and the (ethno)methods through which people manage their daily practical business and make "observable-reportable, i.e. *account-able*" their practical reasoning, common-sense knowledge about the social world, and their orientation[9] toward something, somebody, or each other's actions (Garfinkel and Sacks 1986: 163, italics are the authors'). It was in this

---

8   The discussion focuses once more on studies conducted in the Anglophone context. To date, the impact of EM/CA in France and Germany remains very limited in the study of socialization; for a discussion of possible reasons, see Coulon 1988; Sirota 1993. Indeed, apart from a few exceptions, such as the works of La Valle (2006, 2010a, 2010b, 2014), Relieu, Zouinar, and La Valle. (2007), and the studies focusing on language acquisition in the school setting (Lentin 2009; Mondada 2001; Pekarek-Doehler 2010a), or adolescents' apprenticeship (Fillietaz, Saint-Georges and Duc 2008), French social scientists have thus far mainly used ethnographic methods, based on (participant) observation and different interviewing techniques, when conducting studies on the socialization of children. For gender socialization, see Cromer 2005; for children's play activities, see Delalande 2001; for multidimensional socialization, see Lahire 1995; for children's school experiences, see Montandon 1997, 2002; Rayou 1999; for children's games, see Vincent 2001; for a sequential analysis of parent–child interaction not directly influenced by EM/CA, see Bergonnier-Dupuy 2002.

9   To *orient* toward something or somebody refers to the ways in which participants understand and treat an event, each other's actions, and/or each other's belonging to a social category. The expression *displaying one's orientation* relates to EM/CA's fundamental assumption that participants build their own meaning into the way they package and produce their actions, and thereby make it intelligible to each other and the analyst (cf. Watson 1992).

context that Sacks developed CA as a method that would allow the investigation and detailed description of the sense in which the mastery of natural language is essential for interacting intelligibly and competently with others (see Lee's introduction in Button and Lee 1987).

Intrinsically linked to this first criticism is a second one that targets social and human science's tendency to discuss the question of social order in very general and theoretical terms. Garfinkel argues that the careful observation of concrete social interactions permits a non-trivial discovery: "there is order in the plenum" (Garfinkel 1967), or in Sacks' terms: "there is order at all points" (Sacks 1984b). This preliminary observation promoted Sacks' collaboration with Schegloff and Jefferson on the organization of turn-taking in ordinary conversations (1974). The 1974 study by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson used the analysis of talk (among other things) to gain an analytical handle on silences, demonstrating how participants in multi-party conversation manage to minimize overlap and the occurrence of overly long pauses between each participant's contribution, and how they organize their conversation in an orderly and fluent way—that is, turn by turn. Instead of discussing general theories of the preconditions of social order, the authors propose to examine how participants concretely produce orderliness and intelligibility when they engage in talk-in-interaction (Heritage 1984a). As we will see in the following section, EM/CA's criticism of the predominant approaches to the study of socialization that were formed in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, and their proposal to respecify it, bears on the two criticisms EM/CA addressed to the social and human sciences of that period more generally.

2.3.1   *EM/CA Criticism of the Study of Socialization*

In their research project titled "Studies of Kids' Culture and Kids' Talk" (Garfinkel, Girton, Livingston and Sacks 1982),[10] the authors remark that social and human sciences tend to investigate the processes of socialization by adopting a *developmental scheme* that emanates from common sense. The authors summarize the *scheme* as follows: "Children are not adults; they are different from adults; they are adults-in-becoming. They are incompetent in the ways of adults. Child training practices are ways of socializing children" (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 2). Its adoption thus consists of observing, analyzing, understanding, and explicating children's participation in social interaction as essentially deficient compared to the participation of adults (Mackay 1975: 181).

---

10   This unpublished research project (hereafter Garfinkel et al. 1982) was developed after Sacks' death in 1975. However, it is essentially based on the lectures and oral presentations concerning children's interactions with others that Sacks gave in the 1960s, but which were only published much later (1972, 1982, 1985, 1992 I+II; see Garfinkel et al. 1982: 6). For a similarly prominent criticism addressed to studies of socialization in the early 1960s, see Wrong (1961).

According to Garfinkel et al. (1982: 4), ordinary members' use of the developmental scheme to explicate and understand children's actions in everyday situations seems quite reasonable. EM/CA's criticism by no means targets this ordinary use by ordinary members. What they criticize, however, is its unexamined application in scientific socialization theory and/or descriptions. The authors argue that its unexamined use by sociologists/psychologists in scientific theory engenders an *a priori* view of children's doings as being "naturally, normally, obviously, objectively, really and observably faulted" (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 4). As Jenks remarks, this perspective on children even constitutes developmental psychology's *raison d'être* (2008: 80):

> Developmental psychology is wholly predicated on the notion of childhood's 'naturalness' and on the necessity, normality, and desirability of development and constructive change through 'growth.' Children are thus routinely constructed as partially rational, that is, in the process of becoming rational. (Jenks 2008: 80)

First, to conceive of children as incomplete or deficient engenders a view of parents/adults as the predominant socialization agents of the child. It follows that the socialization process is understood as being "one-way," which is to say from the adult/parent to the child. This view precludes the researcher's examination of what children might competently contribute—from their birth on—to the organization of intelligible and ordered interaction, and insinuates that children's utterances may merely be "faulted replicas" of those that emanate from adults (Watson 1992: 264). Second, instead of treating the ordinary use of the developmental scheme as a "topic of investigation," sociologists and psychologists tend to use it as a "glossing resource" for rendering their own scientific description coherent and intelligible. However, as Mackay stresses, to confound resource and topic causes studies of socialization to lose sight of the phenomenon they intended to investigate in the first place: "… the confounding of the common-sense world as topic and resource has resulted in the unavailability for sociologists of interaction between adults and children as a phenomenon of study" (Mackay 1975: 182). Finally, it has been remarked that apart from some studies in cultural anthropology, research studies committed to the study of socialization have neglected the examination of children's social life in its own right (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 1). Consequently, children's everyday interactions have not been seriously investigated, nor have the possible competences that children bring to bear when they interact with each other been systematically and rigorously described. The authors thus argue, therefore, that social and human sciences are not in a position to approve or dismiss the fact that children may socialize themselves in their own company, and may even produce a specific culture of their own that is inaccessible to adults (Garfinkel et al. 1982; Speier 1971). These criticisms of the predominant theories of socialization from the 1960s and 1970s induced EM/CA to propose respecifying the study of socialization.

2.3.2   *EM/CA's Respecification of the Study of Socialization*

Instead of adopting a conception of children with respect to socialization that is founded on notions of "common sense," EM/CA proposes recording naturally occurring interactions in which children are involved (at home, in school, or on the playground) and using these audio/video recordings as a basis for studying children's competent participation in society, where the notion of *competence* refers to the interactants' ability to produce their actions in such a way that they are intelligible to others for what they are. The aim is to describe in detail how children participate with other children or with adults in the interactive organization and production of social interaction, and to account for the methods that children and adults use, mobilizing language and other embodied resources such as gestures, gaze, posture, and intonation to produce intelligible actions and to understand each other's actions (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 35–9). The proposal "to respecify" the study of socialization is thus consistent with EM/CA's general concern, which is "the analysis of the competences which underlie ordinary social activities. Specifically it is directed at describing and explicating the competences which ordinary speakers use and rely on when they engage in intelligible, conversational interaction" (Heritage 1984a: 241).

    Furthermore, according to Garfinkel et al.'s research project (1982), respecifying the study of socialization implies two concrete working conjectures. The first one is based on Iona and Peter Opie's work in the 1950s and 1960s (Opie and Opie 1959, 1969) evidencing how one generation of children orally transmits specific games, rhymes, and songs to the next generation without the interference of typical socialization agents such as parents and teachers. Inspired by their work, Sacks conjectures that children may have specific methods and procedures that they use to integrate other children into their social activities—in other words, a specific "kids' culture" (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 6). Consequently, he proposes to examine and analyze interactions between children in the absence of adults (Sacks 1992 I: 363–9, 489–506; Garfinkel et al. 1982: 1–2). The aim is to account for children's interactive participation in terms of competences (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 19) and to describe what they are capable of achieving interactively, when conversing and interacting among themselves: "… we are talking throughout, and in a certain way, about the communicative skills of children. A preliminary description of what those skills would and do consist of […] is at the heart of our research enterprise" (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 19). In observing/describing children's deployment of specific procedures to organize their activities in the absence of adults, Sacks suggests that children may participate in their own socialization in a non-trivial way. The aim of this first working conjecture is to demonstrate that the procedures deployed by children may possibly be different from those of adults, but that the children are nevertheless interactively effective and competent.

    The second working conjecture seeks to examine the way that ordinary adults (parents, teachers, psychologists, and sociologists) use the developmental scheme when they are confronted with children in their everyday life, and to see

how children deal with adults' use of the scheme. Ordinary adults' use of the developmental scheme to explain or understand children's doings or to organize their interactions with them is indexed in the way that adults (including sociologists and psychologists) "see" children's actions and "hear" their talk in terms of "deficiency"—in that they are produced by a not-yet-fully-developed being. The argument of the second working conjecture runs as follows: as a *member's phenomenon*, the use of the developmental scheme and its interactive implications have to be taken as seriously as other "interpretative resources and methods of sense-making" that interactants may use to organize their activities with those of others (Sacks' oral contribution, cited in Garfinkel et al. 1982: 9). The aim of the investigation into the ordinary use of the developmental scheme is to provide sociological explications for children's other-than-adult behavior. Indeed, instead of ascribing every particularity of children's behavior in interaction to their special state of development, the idea is to look at them in terms of interactive competences that children deploy to deal with the specific social position they have in society (see also Sidnell 2010a). Instead of using the developmental scheme as a resource for describing or explaining children's doings, it would be better to examine it as a topic with a view to shedding new light on the organization and production of ordinary concrete socialization practices.

As will be shown more concretely in the following sections, for the discovery and description of children's and adults' competent—that is to say, interactively effective—deployment of sense-making procedures when interacting with each other, respecification implies working from the bottom up (cf. Watson 1992), grounding the analytical work in the examination of audio and/or audiovisual recordings of naturally occurring peer interactions (2.4) or adult–child interactions (2.5).

2.4 Studies on Children's Interactions

As previously mentioned, EM/CA criticized structural and reproduction theory of socialization for neglecting to examine children's activities and use of language in their own right. The central argument of this criticism refers to the possibility that social and human science is therefore unable to provide any empirical account elucidating the question of whether or not children may have their own "kids' culture" and contribute to their own socialization in a non-trivial way. In his lectures, Sacks paid special attention to children's play interactions (see Butler's discussion of Sacks' work on play and games 2008: 77–91). He was interested to see if games provide children with an ideal training ground for coming to terms with certain essential requirements of social life. Indeed, as we will see in more detail below, Sacks sought for example to analyze and discuss how, by participating in game/play activities, children may get a sense of the *observability* and *accountability* of their actions and come to terms with the fact that they have to behave in such a way that knowing a person's membership category ("teacher,"

"child," "adolescent," "mother," or "butcher," for example) is enough to infer what he or she is up to (Sacks 1985: 18). According to Sacks, acquiring an understanding of the observability of both actions and the implications of incumbency to a specific membership categorization is an essential requirement for participating in a competent way in social interactions, and thus for being considered a full member of society by others (for discussions of Sacks' approach to categorization activities, see Bonu, Mondada, and Relieu 1994; Eglin and Hester 2003; Hester and Eglin 1997).

2.4.1   Children's Games as a Training Ground for Grasping the Observability of Actions

Button, Button, Who's Got the Button? is a game played all over the world, typically by children between the ages of 5 and 10 years. It is played in a number of different variations, for example with a coin substituting for the button, but the basic principle remains the same. In his lecture of the same name, Sacks reveals how the game is ideal for analyzing how an apprenticeship in the observability of actions takes place when children are playing together in the absence of adults (Sacks 1992 I: 363–9).

To explain Sacks' argument, I need to first give a rough overview of how the game Who's Got the Button? works. All the children line up in a row, each of them with both hands out, palms together, apart from one child, who is "it" and conceals a button in his or her hand. "It" goes from one child to the next, placing his or her hand between each child's hands, one by one, eventually passing the button on to one of them without letting the others see. Once the round is completed, all the children (apart from the original "it") have the chance to guess who has the button now. When the guess is made correctly, the round is over and a new one can start. Depending on the version of the game, the new "it" is either the child who guessed correctly, the one to whom the button was given, or some other child (Sacks 1992 I: 363).

The aim of the game is thus to figure out which player has received the button from "it." However, if the button is passed on correctly by "it," and skillfully concealed between the hands of the child that received it, the button (or coin)—which has the physical property of being flat—cannot be seen. Consequently, the detection can be made in two ways. Either the guessing players seek to observe and identify changes of appearance in the potential receiving party at the moment of a possible transaction (a short smile, a disappointed look), or immediately afterward. As becomes clear, the notion of the observability of actions is essential for this game. In both cases, the aim is to use identified changes in a player's outward appearance as a basis on which to infer whether he or she has received the button. The detection thus implies "seeing that they know they have the button," and refers to the "basic sense of 'observable' for social" or "for moral phenomena" (Sacks 1992 I: 364). In this sense, the game constitutes a sort of "training ground" for detecting and inferring others' implication in a specific

action based on their appearance. The game also constitutes a good opportunity to test one's ability to successfully deceive others by modifying one's appearance, for example by smiling at the moment when "it" is potentially engaged in passing on the button, even if one did not actually receive the button. Playing this game thus not only provides children with the opportunity to acquire an understanding of how our appearance reveals our knowledge and our thoughts, but also provides them with a sense of how one can deceive others and "appear as if …"—and how deception can be an effective and successful option in their interactions with others (Sacks 1992 I: 366).

Sacks points to certain limits to his own discussion, especially with respect to the relevance of appearances in the participants' organization of the game. His self-criticism is inherent in the fact that his analysis was not grounded in the details of recordings of naturally occurring interaction. He claims to handle the issue "very generally, very abstractly," mentioning that he is not "in a position to say" how it is actually done—in other words, how children actually use the appearances of others to detect the whereabouts of the button or the identity of the deceiver (Sacks 1992 I: 369). Moreover, Sacks points to another issue that his analytical discussion does not cover: it does not explain in which sense the procedures used by children to accomplish these activities—to detect a deceiver or to deceive—may differ from those used by adults. He is thus not in a position to indicate to what extent children possess and orient toward these procedures as constituting their own culture.

In recent years, very detailed studies based on audiovisual recordings of naturally occurring interactions have taken up Sacks' interrogation concerning the way that the observability of actions is dealt with by very young children, and how this can be discussed with regard to children's development of competences considered essential for their adequate participation in social life, and thus for their socialization (Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Kidwell 2005, 2009; Kidwell and Zimmerman 2006, 2007; Lerner and Zimmerman 2003; Lerner, Zimmerman, and Kidwell 2007).

Lerner and Zimmerman (2003) begin with the following preliminary observation: "Young children engage in orderly, recognizable conduct with peers before they are able to speak. Early-appearing forms of peer communicative action are carried out through visible body behavior (including the deployment of objects) and nonverbal vocalization" (2003: 441). To discuss this observation and its implications for the study of the way very young children deal with the observability of actions, the authors analyze situations in which a very young child (around the age of 1 year and 6 months) uses the "appearance of an action" (presenting an object) to "accomplish another action" (teasing another child) (Lerner and Zimmerman 2003: 441).[11] Indeed, the authors describe in detail three extracts in which a young child (child 1) presents an object to another

---

11   The investigation is based on a large audiovisual corpus (500 hours) of naturally occurring interactions taking place in four different toddler nurseries.

child (child 2), as if to give him or her the object. Usually, this first action—the giving—makes relevant a second action by the intended recipient—the action of accepting/taking the object. However, just when the initial action accomplished by child 1 induces child 2 to engage in grasping and taking the object, child 1 retracts it quickly and teases child 2, the ostensibly intended recipient (Lerner and Zimmernan 2003: 444–51).

To succeed, the teasing requires very precise timing from child 1. He or she has to present the object long enough for child 2 to be able to recognize the action as a possible "giving" and engage in "taking" it, but at the same time, child 1 has to retract the object quickly enough that child 2 cannot actually take it. In line with Sacks' observations (1992 I: 363–9), Lerner and Zimmerman suggest that young children's interactions (in the absence of adults' interference) may constitute a training ground for deceiving others and thus for grasping the observability of action. The study presented here demonstrates in detail how child 1 deceives child 2, and how the former might even mark the success of the teasing—namely by laughing (Lerner and Zimmerman 2003: 448; for a more complete discussion of very young children's management of observability, see section 2.5 below). In this sense, the authors show in detail how young children—through their interaction with each other (that is, through play)—acquire essential competence/knowledge for participating adequately in social life, and thus contribute to their own socialization.

In the following section, I turn to studies that have taken up Sacks' second research question, which sought to investigate in which sense the procedures used by children to deal with the observability of their action might differ from those deployed by adults. Focusing on children's categorization activities and orientation toward membership categories in their play activities, as well as their implications for children's production of a particular identity *qua* children, these studies aimed to provide some evidence of the existence of a "kids' culture" that differs from that of adults.

2.4.2   Children's Games as a Training Ground for the Competent Use of Membership Categories

In his lecture "Button Button …" already described in the previous section, Sacks argues that playing the game competently requires the participants to come to terms with another essential condition of everyday social life. Recurrent changes occur in terms of "the category of player you are" ("it" or "not it"); that is, every round implies that another child is "it" (Sacks 1992 I: 366). By playing the game, children come to understand the fundamental properties of each category from two perspectives—as an incumbent and a non-incumbent of each category—and they learn that a "category is not a person" (Sacks 1992 I: 367). This means on the one hand that a category is not equivalent to a person, and on the other hand that a person is not an incumbent of a single category in a definitive way. As Sacks argues, by participating in the game, not only are children confronted with certain instabilities of the category, since category-incumbency regularly changes, but

they also come to see that the stability of the category, or the order of the game, lies in the fact that particular activities, rights, and obligations are attached to each category, and not to individual persons. Indeed, the child who is "it" is always supposed (obliged) to move from one child to the next, independently of whether he or she is Elisabeth, Martin, or Rolf, speaks English, French, or German, is age 5, 6, or 10, and so on. Children's understanding and management of this central requirement of the game—instabilities or stabilities concerning the constitutive categories of the game—is highly relevant for their competent participation in everyday social interactions. Through their engagement in play activities, children may thus contribute to their own socialization in a non-trivial way.

Since Sacks' first attempts to examine children's play activity in its own right, focusing on (among other things) children's way of handling membership categories, such as play or gender categories, and the way they accomplish categorization activities, a large number of studies taking up these issues have been published (Butler and Weatherall 2006, 2011; Cromdal 2001a, 2001b; Danby and Baker 1998, 2000; Evaldsson 2005, 2007; Evaldsson and Corsaro 1998; Goodwin, M. 1982, 1990, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006).

Very generally speaking, these studies seek to show that through their way of organizing their play activities in the absence of adults, children "construct their own ideas of valued behaviors and identities in their peer or kin groups" and treat constitutive membership categories of their play activities accordingly, thus becoming "agents of their own socialization" (Goodwin, M. and Kyratzis 2007: 280). However, as we will see in the following paragraphs, the resources children use to accomplish constitutive membership categories and the way they orient toward them in play activities have a bearing on procedures deployed by and observed in adults' interaction too. As such, these studies do not confirm Sacks' *conjecture* regarding the existence of an exclusive "kids' culture" (Garfinkel et al. 1982).

Butler examines a children's activity that takes place on a primary school playground and is called "fairy club" by the children (2008). Analyzing their talk-in-interaction in detail, the author describes the methods and practices children deploy to establish constitutive membership categories in the "fairy club," such as "teacher" and "students," and shows how children treat their membership of these categories as relevant—as having implications for the organization of the "club" activities and as being consequential to the production of the play (Butler 2008: 1). More particularly, in her examination of assessment activities produced by participants of the "fairy club," Butler analyses in detail how a girl, herself a "student" in the "fairy club," addresses her negative assessment of the "club" to another "student-girl," cautiously preventing the "teacher" of the "club" (the "authority" of the "club") from hearing it by deploying a low voice (Butler 2008: 165–9). Butler thus provides evidence for the fact that when interacting with each other, children treat category incumbency as relevant for organizing and achieving their negative assessments: they address their negative assessment concerning the "club" activities to an incumbent of a category belonging to their own hierarchical level, and do not address it overtly to the "authority" of the club. In a similar way to adults, children seem to take into account

the kind of object their negative assessment is referring to, as well as its importance, its implications for other categories of the activity, and their own relationship to these other categories of the activity (subordinate vs. superordinate) when organizing and producing their negative assessments or complaints (Sacks 1992 II: 103).

Another way of studying children's use and treatment of membership categories in their play activities was proposed by Marjorie Goodwin. From as early as the 1980s, Goodwin has provided rigorous empirical analysis throughout her work, which is based on girls' (and boys') naturally occurring everyday interactions. This analysis shows in detail how children deploy an array of embodied resources (such as language, posture, gestures, facial expression, and intonation) to organize their play activities in an orderly way (Goodwin, M. 1982, 1990: 109–37, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006). M. Goodwin (1990) shows how young children use play activities to establish symmetrical or asymmetrical relationships with each other—the girls used directives to implement symmetry in their group, while the boys used them to accomplish asymmetrical relationships. In this sense, play activities contribute to the production of the children's group structure, which might be "egalitarian" or "hierarchical." Through her analysis, Goodwin demonstrates that these structures are the product of systematic and continuous work accomplished interactively by the members constituting the group, implying and displaying their orientations toward categories of "authority" and "subordination" (Goodwin, M. 1990: 46–8).

M. Goodwin (1990) suggests that one of the major contributions of studies examining how children organize their play activities and manifest their orientation toward and produce categories such as "teachers," "students," "authority," and "subordination" has been to challenge some strong assumptions concerning working-class and black children's linguistic incompetencies, and to spread doubt concerning prejudices that social and human sciences tend to maintain about these children's ways of being in the world:

> It has frequently been assumed that the speech of working-class children, and black children in particular, is deficient, and that talk produced in actual situations of use is too degenerate for systematic analysis (Chomsky 1965: 3–4). The present analysis demonstrates that, to the contrary, the speech of children at play […] constitutes a powerful manifestation not only of linguistic competence, but of social and cultural competence as well. (Goodwin, M. 1990: 287)

The author notes, for example, that "egalitarian" or "hierarchical" structures are not necessarily bound to girls' or boys' groups, but are observable in both of them (1990: 47). Moreover, her detailed work on preadolescent girls' talk-in-interaction and accomplishment of activities such as "gossip," "conflict," "disputes," "arguments," and "exclusion" has demonstrated that girls are not essentially oriented toward "care, responsibility" and "solidarity," as has often been suggested, but may be as effective as boys in taking oppositional stances, dominating or excluding another child, or resisting another's argument. (Goodwin, M. 1990: 141–272, 284, 2002, 2006; Goodwin, M., Goodwin, C. and Yaeger-

Dror 2002). She convincingly shows that in their everyday social interactions, instead of complying with stereotypical adult categorizations regarding children or adolescents, children seem to be competent, making "visible for each other their perspectives on events, categorizing the behaviour of others and displaying their alignments towards events" (Goodwin, M. 2006a: 3).

However, M. Goodwin and Kyratzis also stress that the linguistic resources children use to organize their own social interactions and to produce membership categories such as "authority" and "subordination," and social reality in general, are not fundamentally different from those of adults. On the contrary, children seem to draw on adults' sense-making procedures to create their own procedures, and consequently to produce different "forms" of interaction (see also section 2.5.1 below):

> Our work analyzes how children make use of linguistic resources from the adult culture, for example, control act forms, accounts, person descriptors, assessments, teases, greetings, *palabras* (types of verbal dueling), and forms of parallel language structures to provide their own rendering of these practices, often subverting adult forms. (Goodwin, M. and Kyratzis 2007: 280)

Although it could be argued that the subversion of adult forms constitutes a form of "kids' culture" (see also section 2.5.1 below, and Sacks' lectures on adolescents' use of the category "Hotrodders" to designate themselves in Sacks 1992 I: 169–74), the authors clearly decline Sacks' conjecture of a "kids' culture" that might exist independently of the adult one and that might thus be inaccessible to them.

The conjecture provided the impetus for a growing body of empirical studies (Butler 2008; Butler and Weatherall 2006, 2011; Church 2009; Cobb-Moore, Danby and Farrell 2008; Cromdal 2001a, 2001b; Danby and Baker 1998, 2000; Evaldsson 2005, 2007; Evaldsson and Corsaro 1998; Goodwin, M. 1982, 1990, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006; Kidwell 2009; Sidnell 2010a; Tholander 2002, 2005) further revealing children's communicative competences and eventually providing evidence of the fact that children might be "agents of their own socialization" (Goodwin, M. and Kyratzis 2007: 208). These studies constitute a major contribution to a field of research that experienced a significant theoretical revitalization in the 1990s and was referred to as the "new paradigm for the study of childhood" (James and Prout 1990: 5; Sirota 1998, 2006), but which still stands in need of more rigorous empirical analyses of children's everyday doings (Cromdal 2006: 464).

2.5 Studies of Adult/Parent–Child Interactions

As outlined earlier, the predominant theories of socialization in the 1950s and 1960s emphasized the asymmetrical relationships that existed between the to-be-socialized child and the adult. The adult was considered to be inculcating and transmitting commonly held norms and rules, and the child was seen as passively,

unconsciously incorporating them. In these last sections, I will first offer a deeper discussion of early EM/CA studies on adult/parent–child interactions that took up the asymmetrical relationship issue, albeit attacking it from quite a different angle. Indeed, as outlined in 2.3.2, beyond the analysis of concrete adult/ parent–child interactions and the examination of the procedures through which the participants organize and render these interactions intelligible, the respecification implies a second working conjecture. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Sacks (1992 I+II), Speier (1971, 1973, 1976), and Wootton (1981) investigated this second conjecture: the examination of adults' use of the developmental scheme to organize their everyday interactions with young children, and/or the investigation of adults' and children's observable orientations toward the developmental scheme and its implications, as they are manifested in their daily interactions. As we will see (sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2), their studies showed that adults' uses of categorical resources and their ways of treating young children's participation in interactions may manifest their orientation toward children as inferior—that is, not yet fully competent actors. Furthermore, it demonstrated that to interact with adults, children may use available sequential, temporal, or categorical resources and deploy interactive procedures which may be similar, but also ingeniously different from those used by adults, thus showing interactive competences that are adapted to their social position. Parallel to these early studies, developmental psychologists and their examination of mother–child interactions have become increasingly influential in the field. In section 2.5.3, I will therefore discuss the impact that these works undertaken in developmental psychology have had upon more recent EM/CA studies on adult/parent–interactions.

2.5.1   *Sacks' Work on Adult–Child Interactions:*
The Developmental Scheme as a Members' Phenomenon—
Its Use and Implications in Everyday Adult–Child Interactions

In his lectures, Sacks remarks that adults confronted with children in their everyday activities often characterize children's actions using the category "imitation" (Sacks 1992 I: 70–71, 503–4). When children are, for example, engaged in playing "House" or "Mommies and Daddies," adults tend to characterize their activities as an imitation of everyday family life, or in French, "faire comme si"—"to act as if"—they were mothers and fathers. Adults thus use what Sacks calls an **MIR** device, where **M** refers to *membership*, **I** to *inference-rich*, and **R** to *representative* (Sacks 1992 I: 40–48) when they describe children's activities.[12] Sacks argues that the use of an MIR procedure is a powerful sense-making method because to

---

12   In his lecture, Sacks does not specify or further discuss the *ontological status* of devices such as the MIR. Instead, he observes their (recurrent) occurrence in naturally occurring interactions, describes their interactive organization, shows what participants produce (in terms of actions) by deploying them, and discusses their interactive implications—that is, their impact on the further course of action.

categorize a member of society in a certain way, for example as a *mother*, provides for a whole set of inferences concerning:

- A specific way of acting—for example, a mother picks up her baby when it cries;
- Her rights—a mother has the right to decide when her children go to bed, what they eat for lunch, which nursery they attend, and so on;
- Her obligations—a mother has to feed her children, provide them with a bed and adequate clothing;
- Other predicates conventionally associated with the category of mother, such as specific competences—she takes care of her children's hygiene in a reasonable way (for example by not using water warmer than 100.4°F/38°C when bathing them); she disciplines them using reasonable methods (for example without physical violence).

To categorize somebody as *mother* therefore makes inferentially relevant a significant amount of knowledge concerning the categorized member, going far beyond the simple fact that she is considered to be the mother of somebody. Moreover, Sacks stresses that every member to whom an inference-rich category is ascribed is considered to be a representative of it. Consequently, the inferences (rights/obligations/competences) associated with the category of mother are made irrespective of the so-categorized member's concrete actions (Sacks 1992 I: 41).

In contrast, by categorizing a child playing "House" or "Mommies and Daddies" as an "imitation," adults merely refer to the child's capacity to imitate somebody else's doings with greater or lesser accuracy, since the category of "imitator" does not itself provide for specific rights/obligations or other competences. For adults to use the category "imitation" when describing children's play is thus one way of tacitly invoking the *developmental scheme*, since "imitation seems to involve a way of characterizing some actions which somebody does when they are not entitled to do that class of activities (child imitates adult, etc.)" (Sacks 1992 I: 70). The use of the category "imitation" results in the child being unauthorized to accomplish certain activities properly and competently. Instead, the child is understood to be doing these activities as mere "imitations of …". Consequently, children are "not found to be 'responsible' for what they do in a non-trivial sense" (Sacks 1992 I: 70). On the one hand, this may protect them from the seriousness of everyday contingencies; for example, children imitating a "mother" do not face the same sanctions as an adult mother does when they do not treat their "babies" appropriately. On the other hand, not being considered as responsible for one's actions also implies that one is not considered a full member. Indeed, as Sacks notes: "categories like 'imitation,' and 'phoney' provide us with something very central, in that they serve as boundary categories around the term member" (Sacks 1992 I: 71, 503–4). In this sense, to categorize children's activities as "imitations" is morally not trivial, since it constitutes one way of denying them the full membership of a given society.

Sacks argues, therefore, that adults' use of categories like "imitation" when describing children's activities has to be taken seriously as a topic of investigation by sociologists. Its analysis brings to light the way adults orient toward children's activities and the inferences they make relevant concerning children's production of social action/order. However, an uncritical adoption of the "imitation" category to describe children's activities in socialization theory is ill-conceived. As Sacks highlights, its use in social sciences has major consequences for the examination of children. Indeed, approaching children's behavior as "mere" play, misses the point: competences that children bring to bear when engaged in interaction with others remain unnoticed. Instead of examining children's activities as possibly implying distinctive competences compared to adults' way of organizing their activities, social science thereby contributes to the rendering of children as incompetent, and thus operates on the same level as ordinary adults do in their everyday life (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 19). In contrast, the observation and study of children's playing-house activities in their own right (and not as an imitation of something) allows us to realize that children organize their activities around particular rules, events, and categories which children administrate and negotiate not as simple imitations of the adult world, but as constitutive elements of their play activities, and toward which they orient to produce their activities in an intelligible and ordered way (Sacks 1992 I: 503; see also Sacks' discussion in the lecture: "On Some Formal Properties of Children's Games" 1992 I: 489–506). Sacks' first working proposal to examine adults' use of interpretative procedures—like the use of the **MIR** device "imitation"—thus induces the researcher to study something which otherwise remains generally unnoticed.

In his lecture "The Baby Cried. The Mommy Picked it Up," Sacks aims to show "that starting to talk to adults is, for small children, a rather special matter" (Sacks 1992 I: 263), and that "kids take it that they have restricted rights which consist of a right to begin, to make a first statement and not much more. Thereafter they proceed only if requested to" (Sacks 1992 I: 265). According to Sacks, children's "restricted rights to talk" may best be understood as a consequence that children face because of adults' use of the developmental scheme when interacting with them: children are not considered full members of society with what might be called "full rights." However, instead of analyzing the way adults implement these restricted rights when interacting with children in everyday life (see section 2.5.2 below; Speier 1976), Sacks discusses children's deployment of specific procedures that allow them to circumvent these "restricted rights" (Sacks 1992 I: 255, 1972: 344). He thus invites us to see/consider something which is usually not noticed—children's competence for acquiring an extended "right to talk." As he remarks, at the age of around 3 years old, children recurrently begin "any piece of talk they make to adults" by using something like: "'You know what, Daddy?' or 'You know something, Mommy?'" (Sacks 1972: 343).

Child: "You know something, Mommy?"

This open question constitutes a *first pair part* (FPP) of the question–answer (Q-A) *adjacency pair* (Schegloff and Sacks 1973). As an FPP, it makes relevant the *second pair part* (SPP) of the same pair *type*, in this case question–answer type,[13] from the intended recipient (Mommy). In other words, as soon as a question is completed, the intended recipient has the obligation/right to answer.

The normativity of this sequential order lies in the *sequential implications* that a non-response engenders; in other words, if B does not answer the question, this non-response is *noticeably absent*, and A might repeat the question until an answer is given by B (Heritage 1984a: 248), or A might infer reasons for B's non-response, such as: B does not know the answer. Instead of making relevant a simple answer by Mommy, the particularity of the child's open question "You know something, Mommy?" consists of its capacity to make relevant in the next turn another open question from the mother:

Child: "You know something, Mommy?"
Mommy: "What?"

This open question by the mother then makes an answer by the child relevant in the next turn. Not only does the child thus acquire the right to talk as long as it takes him or her to say what he or she has to say, but the open question produced by the adult also obliges him or her to do so (Sacks 1972: 343). The child "is thereby provided with the opportunity to say whatever it is he wanted to say in the first place" (Sacks 1992 I: 265).

Child: open question, which projects another open question (FPP)
Mommy: produces the projected open question (SPP is produced as an FPP).
Child: acquires right/obligation to answer (SPP).

By using an open question (OQ) to begin a conversation with an adult, the child *turns around* the otherwise operative *chaining rule* question–answer: Q-A to OQ-OQ-A, and so acquires a particular right/obligation to speak extendedly (Sacks 1992 I: 264). In deploying *sequential resources*, the child thus competently produces an ingenious device for bypassing his or her restricted right to talk when interacting with adults.

In the same lecture, Sacks discusses another procedure that young children use to deal with their limited rights to talk when participating in conversations with adults. It consists of the child producing a story beginning which projects a continuation and thus tacitly requests the recipient to leave the child the floor

---

13   Other typical adjacency pairs occur in interactive sequences in which a summons is followed by an answer and a request by either a granting or refusal, or an invitation engenders an acceptance or refusal by the intended recipient.

for as long as it takes him or her to finish the story (Sacks 1992 I: 255). The child's deployment of this procedure implies not only sequential resources, but also resources provided for by the use of social categories. Sacks begins his demonstration by citing the short story of a 3-year-old child:

> "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up." (Sacks 1992 I: 223–66)

The central aim is to answer this question: how is it that we (any native-speaking recipient of the story) come to hear the fragment as we do? While on the one hand, Sacks takes it that we understand the "mommy" as being the "mommy of the baby" and not any accidentally present "mommy" (Sacks 1972: 330), he remarks, on the other hand, that any hearer presumes that the first sentence S1 is heard as reporting a first occurrence O1, and as projecting a second sentence S2, which is understood as the report of the occurrence O2 induced by O1 (Sacks 1972: 330). More specifically, Sacks seeks to show what procedure the child deploys to produce a sentence (S1) which is understandably a proper beginning of a story, in other words, projecting a continuation and an end, and whose use by the child constitutes an efficient way of assuring extended speaker's rights.

It is through the use of what Sacks calls an **MCD**, or *Membership Categorization Device*, that the child produces the intelligibility of his or her story, and that the recipient understands it, in the way outlined above (Sacks 1972: 332). An **MCD** is composed of a set of *membership categories* that go together and thus constitute a *collection*, plus *rules of application* (economy, consistency rule) and their corollary, *hearer's and viewer's maxims* (Sacks 1972: 332–3). As a device, the **MCD** provides for ordinary members' "doing" intelligible describing and for the correlative activity, which consists of recognizing a description for what it is (Sacks 1972: 329). The *economy rule* states that for referring to somebody, a single reference term, such as "baby," is sufficient: "A single category from any membership categorization device can be referentially adequate" (Sacks 1972: 333). This means that by using the category "baby," the child proposes a description that is sufficient for the practical task at hand, and that to be understandable, there is no need to add references to another category other than "baby," such as "boy," "rich," or "black."

The use of the corollary *viewer's maxim* makes it possible to understand and see certain actions like "crying" as properly bound to a particular category: "baby." "If a member sees a category-bound activity being done, then, if one can see it being done by a member of a category to which the activity is bound, see it that way" (Sacks 1972: 338). We ordinarily expect a "baby" to cry (when hungry or experiencing some other kind of trouble). We thus take it that the activity of crying is a "typical" activity for a "baby" and have no trouble understanding the proposed sentence as coherent. As Sacks mentions, the orientation toward seeing a certain activity (crying) as bound to certain categories (baby), can for example be observed when an older child's behavior is degraded: "Don't cry like a baby," or when a young child's behavior is praised: "Bravo! You're eating like a big boy" (see Sacks 1972: 336 for similar examples). In this sense, the adequate reference

"baby" and the invocation of an activity that is conventionally "seen" as *bound* to the category "baby" allows the recipient of the story to understand the child's first sentence S1: "The baby cried" as a coherent and reasonable description of an occurrence O1.

The recipients' use of *the consistency rule* demonstrates their understanding that the "baby" referred to in S1 and the "mommy" talked about in S2 belong to the same collection "family":

> If the first person has been categorized as 'baby,' then further persons may be referred to by other categories of a collection of which they are a member, and thus that such categories as 'mommy' and 'daddy' are relevant given the use of 'baby.' (Sacks 1972: 333)

However, the consistency rule as defined above in its weak form does not exclude any category from being part of the same collection: any category like "witch" or "lion" can be understood as being relevant in relation to "baby," and understood as building a collection, such as a fairy-tale collection, with "baby." A corollary *hearer's maxim* is therefore needed to understand how "baby" and "mommy" are un-problematically assembled in the collection "family":

> If two or more categories are used to categorize two or more members of some population, and those categories can be heard as categories from the same collection, then: Hear them that way. (Sacks 1972: 333)

The hearer's maxim provides a solution for the ambiguity that the use of a first category like "baby" implies. Indeed, the category "baby" can be attached to several collections: "family," "lovers," "stage of life," and so on. However, as soon as the second category "mommy" is invoked, the hearer's maxim eliminates certain collections, since "mommy" is not a membership categorization that refers to the collection "lovers" or "stage of life" but is associated with the collection "family" (Sacks 1972: 333). Consequently, the "mommy" is heard as being the "mommy" of the baby (belonging to the same family) and not as any accidentally present adult (Sacks 1972: 330).

But how do we come to understand the young child's first sentence (S1): "The baby cried" as a proper beginning of a story—that is, projecting a continuation and/or an end (S2, S3)? Or to come back to our initial concern: in which sense does the child's first sentence constitute an efficient way of assuring extended speaker's rights? For adults, a proper way of *beginning* a conversation, when the situation itself does not really provide it—when two strangers are waiting for a bus, for example—consists of using what Sacks calls a *ticket* (1992 I: 265). One such prototypical ticket is the announcement of a trouble (ibid.: 257), which is "relevant" for the other participant in the situation (ibid.: 265), such as: "around this time of the day, the bus is regularly caught up in traffic jams." Similarly, the child's first utterance: "The baby cried" announces a trouble that is relevant for the

"mommy" of the "baby." Indeed, as we have seen in the discussion of the **MIR device**, ordinary members conventionally attribute specific rights/obligations to social categories. On the one hand, the baby is thus not only considered to have the right to cry when something is troubling him or her, but also to be comforted by his or her mother when crying. On the other hand, the category of "mother" is understood as being the relevant person to give this comfort, or even as the person obliged to do so. By producing the first sentence (S1), which announces a trouble (crying baby) that is relevant for the baby's mother, the child creates a ticket projecting a second sentence (S2) in which the relevant category "the baby's mommy" accomplishes the projected action of giving comfort (see also Sacks' discussion of the viewer's maxim, which provides the sequential order of reported occurrences and activities, in Sacks 1972: 339). The child thus manages to produce a proper beginning of a story, and thus gains the right to continue—to finish the story—despite his or her restricted rights to talk (Sacks 1992 I: 265).

To summarize: for Sacks, analyzing the recurrent use of the category "imitation" when confronted with children's actions, and discussing how this categorization participates in the production of the child as a "boundary category," in other words not being considered a full member of society, constitutes one way of studying ordinary members' use of the developmental scheme as an interpretative method. Another way of studying adults' orientation toward children as "inferior" (not fully developed) actors consists of examining the way that children deal with the consequences such an orientation implies for them when participating in a conversation with adults. He begins his analytical argument with an observation—young children's recurrent use of a phrase, such as "do you know what?" when talking to adults—and then analyzes what this particular phrase accomplishes in terms of interaction, proposing that it not only gives the child the right to talk, but obliges him or her to do so, and finally suggests that with its sequential properties, the phrase constitutes a handy ticket for circumventing restricted rights to talk. His argumentation thus does not invoke children's particular inferior state of cognitive, psychological, or linguistic development. Instead, he remarks that in terms of interactive effectiveness, it observably constitutes a competent way of dealing with the particular rights that adults conventionally attribute to (or withhold from) children. The sensitivity and fascination for children's ingenuity accounts for both the importance Sacks attributes to what children do (competently) when interacting with others, instead of looking at them essentially in terms of incompetence, and his proposal to examine what they actively contribute, in a non-trivial way, to the orderly organization of everyday interaction, and thus to their socialization.

2.5.2   *Adults'/Parents' Treatment of Children's Participation in Social Interaction*

Apart from Sacks and his early work on adult–child interactions, Speier is one of the first researchers to adopt an EM/CA approach to examine naturally occurring everyday adult/parent–child interactions (1971, 1976). Analyzing audio-

recordings, Speier describes in detail how children competently use reference terms (Speier 1971: 209–13) and sequential procedures (Speier 1971: 213–16) to make themselves understandable to an adult in an everyday encounter. Beyond demonstrating children's deployment of categorical and procedural competences when interacting with adults, Speier also emphasized that ordinary adults neither recognize nor take into account these competences when interacting with children: they answer or talk for the child instead of letting the (demonstrably competent) child speak for himself or herself (Speier 1971: 195). Moreover, because adults treat the child as having restricted rights to talk (to participate in a conversation), adults not only enforce silence upon the child when they want to talk to another adult or when the child engages in challenging behavior (Speier 1976: 101), but they also exclude the child from the further interaction (Speier 1976: 102). Referring to anthropological works that describe colonial situations as implying routine contact between two distinct cultures, Speier uses his above-mentioned description of the particular features of adult–child interaction to conjecture the following: children and adults have distinct, separate cultures, wherein children's culture is subordinated to that of adults (Speier 1971: 99ff.). Through the unavoidable contact between the two cultures (culture-contact), and because of adults' dominion over children's culture, the latter is, by and by, condemned to disappear (1971, 1973, 1976). Indeed, according to Speier, adults' attribution of restricted rights to children when participating in conversational activities constitutes one manifestation, among others, of how adults seek to override children's culture (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 31).

In my opinion, Speier's use of notions such as "culture-contact" and the "subordination" of one culture to another to describe the organization of adult–child interactions is problematic. These notions have been introduced by cultural anthropology—Uriel Weinreich (1953) utilized them to describe the asymmetrical relationship between colonists and indigenous populations; these notions are thus theoretically, morally, and historically highly charged. Instead of analyzing and describing in detail how interactants' deployment of sense-making procedures locally produce social order, the use of these normative notions gloss adult–child interaction. As a gloss, these notions collaborate in transforming a locally situated and interactively produced relationship into a naturally given asymmetrical one. Hence, essential aspects of the interactive event—in which immediate interactive contexts parents "dismiss their children," how they actually accomplish it, and how children in turn treat their parent's move—are easily overlooked or go unnoticed, and one finds oneself readily producing what predominant social and human sciences have been criticized for: theory-driven studies of socialization (see Watson 1983).

In this respect, Wootton's approach concerning parents' treatment of their children's requests is more cautious and allows for a more nuanced description of parents' orientation toward their children's participation in social interaction (1981). On the basis of audio tapes recorded "in the homes of 4-year-old children" (Wootton 1981: 61), Wootton examines the different ways that addressed parents

respond to their children's requests. The author demonstrates that parents' initial *non-granting turns* after children's requests are accomplished in such a way—with a delay, not stating a refusal, or stating a refusal using mitigated formats—that they minimize the occurrence of strong refusals and maximize granting of the requests. This indicates that when confronted with a request, parents generally seem to give priority to granting it and avoid a stated refusal, as is the case in adult–adult conversations.

> So whereas speech act analysis suggests that one can turn down requests by referring to relevant preconditions in an unlimited number of ways, in fact the formats employed seem to have orderly properties, properties consistent with the view that a major feature governing their selection is a preference for granting. (Wootton 1981: 81)

Contrary to assertions made by speech act studies on requests (Labov and Fanshel 1977), Wootton's study demonstrates that parents interacting with their 4-year-old children do not index their superior position toward the children in their way of responding to their requests. Instead, as in adults' conversations, they respect the preference for granting a request. Moreover, the author remarks that the studied parents' recourse to a definite array of formats for responding to their children's request, as well as their general orientation toward preference organization, may permit them to use an initial firm rejection (the dispreferrred format for accomplishing a rejection) in situations in which they want to display unequivocally that there is no margin for negotiation. At the same time, he highlights the fact that children seem to use parents' different ways of producing their "nongranting responses" to distinguish those responses that are negotiable to greater or lesser degrees (Wootton 1981: 83). Instead of relating parents' use of a specific format to grant/refuse their children's request to a presumed asymmetrical relationship between the interactants, Wootton suggests that different formats may allow parents to express different positions: manifesting firmness versus openness to negotiation, for example. In this sense, he proposes nuances for Speier's account of parent–child interaction and at the same time opens up a huge field of investigation whose first aim is to discover and analyze particular interactive patterns in adult/parent–child interactions, and whose second is to compare and discuss them in light of EM/CA findings on adult–adult conversation.

To sum up: In this section, I have discussed two early EM/CA studies on parent–child interactions. The first of these (Speier 1971, 1976) seeks to show that the way in which adults/parents treat their children's active participation in social interaction collaborates in the production of a view of children as inferior to adults and as having restricted rights compared to adults. Wootton's study, however, tries to demonstrate that parents' use of greater or lesser authoritarian methods for granting/refusing a child's request may simply be grounded in different parental tasks and does not necessarily index an asymmetrical relationship between the two categories (Wootton 1981).

Apart from a few exceptions (see for example Butler and Wilkinson 2013), further development of EM/CA studies on adult/parent–child interactions (including Wootton's own work) took a slightly different tack. From the 1970s onward, experimental investigations, ethnographic studies, and/or laboratory observations of interactions between newborns or young children and their mothers, carried out by developmental psychologists, increasingly emphasized their relevance for children's development and thus for the study of socialization. In the last section of this chapter, I discuss how these studies emanating from developmental psychology influenced EM/CA studies, generating new ways of conceiving and analyzing socialization in general, and children's cognitive, linguistic, social, and cultural development more particularly.

2.5.3 Adult/Parent–Child Interaction and Its Relevance for Children's Development of Mind (Cognition)

In the last 10 years, theoretical reflections and empirical works focusing on the cognitive abilities that underpin children's acquisition of linguistic, social, and cultural competences (Liszkowski 2006; Liszkowski et al. 2006; Tomasello 2003; Tomasello and Farrar 1986; Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner 1999; Tomasello et al. 2005; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007) have become very influential in studies on adult/parent–child interactions. Very generally speaking, these (mainly experimental) studies agree on the fact that children do not develop their beliefs and knowledge about the world in a "social vacuum," at the same time emphasizing the cognitive capacity the child brings to bear in his or her acquisition of new competences and knowledge (cf. Clément, König and Harris 2004: 360; König, Clément and Harris 2004).[14] With regard to this line of investigation, one central figure is Michael Tomasello, director of The Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology of the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig.

In their account of children's "cultural learning," Tomasello, Kruger, and Horn Ratner (1999) draw on Vygotsky's conception of human development, which locates the acquisition of culture (language) in human interactions. The authors criticize cultural developmental psychologists such as Bruner (1971, 1996; Wood, Bruner and Ross 1976), Rogoff (1990, 2003; Rogoff, Ellis and Gardner 1984), and Wertsch (1985) for neglecting "what the individual organism brings to the process of enculturation" (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 102). Tomasello and his team emphasize that instead of merely focusing on the conduct of caregivers and parents when interacting with very young children, and the way that impacts children's development, the researchers should also examine children's ability to acquire culture, taking into account recent research and theories on children's development of social cognition (1999: 105). The authors advocate a concept of cultural learning that implies three different types of learning—imitative,

---

14   See also Tomasello and Racoczy (2007) for an account of "what makes human cognition unique" in comparison to other animals.

instructed, and collaborative. Each type of learning requires specific cognitive abilities from the child, implying different concepts of persons as intentional, mental, and reflective agents (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 116–17). As a consequence, the three types of cultural learning occur in "a highly predictable order in human ontogeny" (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 105).

The capacity to learn through imitation implies, for example, the child's cognitive capacity, starting at the age of about nine months, to "take the other's perspective" and to understand the caregiver or parent as an intentional agent in order to engage in joint attention (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 106–9). The authors argue that the acquisition of culture through instruction from others (instructed learning), however, requires more complex cognitive abilities from the child. Indeed, instructed learning is distinct from learning "by means of adult task simplification (scaffolding)" (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 109). While children may learn practically from birth onward thanks to adults' scaffolding, and also simply by mimicking adults' embodied instructions, instructed learning implies that the children regulate their own learning behavior, for example through self-oriented speech, and at the same time understand the others as mental agents that can also engage in activities such as deception. According to Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner (1999: 109–13), children acquire these relatively complex cognitive competences that allow self-regulation around their fourth birthday, and consequently it is around this age that the child is ready for instructed learning. Age four is usually invoked in discussions focusing on children's acquisition of a *theory of mind* (TOM) (see Frye and Moore 1991; Meltzoff and Gopnik 1993). It is at this age that children are said to be in possession of TOM in reference to their capacity to attribute mental states and knowledge to others, or to infer others' knowledge of something. However, Tomasello and his collaborators argue that the focus on children's acquisition of a theory of mind is not a very useful basis for researching their understanding of others "as it changes from infancy through childhood: The theoretical vocabulary only allows for a transition from 'no theory of mind' to 'theory of mind' around 4 years with perhaps some 'precursors' prior to that" (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 116–17). In their view, it is children's development of social cognition that enables them to engage from nine months on, and then step-by-step, in increasingly complex social and cultural learning activities (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 131–4).

Very recent EM/CA studies on adult/parent–child interactions (Filipi 2007, 2009, 2013; Forrester 2008, 2010, 2013; Forrester and Cherington 2009; Kidwell 2005, 2009, 2012 for an overview; Kidwell and Zimmerman 2006, 2007; Lerner, Zimmerman, and Kidwell 2011; Wootton 1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2010) explicitly refer to the empirical and conceptional work on children's cognitive development carried out by Tomasello and his team (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999; Tomasello et al. 2005; for children's development of *shared intentionality*, see Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; for children's capacity to engage in *joint attention*, see Tomasello and Farrar 1986).

As outlined above in section 2.4.1, in their article on very young (18-month-old) children's management of the observability of each other's actions, Lerner and Zimmerman showed that even at this very young age, children already manifest the success of their teasing activity in an embodied way, for example by laughing (Lerner and Zimmerman 2003: 448). In this way, they render their understanding of how their own activity constitutes a teasing activity, and not a misunderstanding or a pure coincidence, publicly available for the other participants in the interaction, as well as for the researcher. In contrast to the account offered by Tomasello, Kruger, and Horn Ratner—which suggests that children engage in the deception of others around the time of their third birthday, by which time they have acquired the cognitive ability considered necessary to engage in intersubjectivity (1999: 111, 119)—Lerner and Zimmerman thus demonstrate how children may engage in deceiving actions in an embodied way when interacting with other children at a much earlier age: around 18 months. Lerner and Zimmerman suggest that the ability to engage in deception depends on children's practical management of the observability of actions and is not, as suggested by Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner, bound to the possession of relatively complex specific cognitive abilities (1999: 119). Moreover, the authors confirm the conjecture that Sacks put forward in his lecture "Button Button Who's Got the Button?" (see section 2.4), referring to children's play activities as an important training ground for the acquisition of essential capacities required for competent participation in society. To better understand children's management of observability, Lerner and Zimmerman thus recommend further examination of how very young children deal with observability when interacting with adults such as their parents or caregivers. In this way, the authors seek to answer the following question: "What are the earliest traces and forms of the observability of action?" (Lerner and Zimmerman 2003: 456).

In her studies on interactions occurring between very young children (12–30 months) and their caregivers, Kidwell (2005) takes up this last point raised by Lerner and Zimmerman (2003). To do so, she examines situations in which a very young child looks at the caregiver when the child is engaged in a reprehensible action such as "biting, hitting, pushing, or taking toys away from their peers" (Kidwell 2005: 417). On the basis of a detailed analysis, Kidwell demonstrates that very young children (of around 18 months) already take into account such details as the direction and length of a gaze to organize their interactions with others. The author distinguishes two ways the caregiver might look at children when they are engaged in a punishable action, the distinctive features of these looks being: 1) their duration; 2) whether they "fix" the target or not; and 3) their relationship to other activities the caregiver might be involved in while looking at the child (2005: 424). According to Kidwell, "the mere look" is of a shorter duration than "the look"; it "alights briefly on a target" instead of fixing on a target, and finally is produced "concurrently with other activities that the caregiver is involved in," whereas "the look" is produced as a "'new' activity" (Kidwell 2005: 428–9).

The author demonstrates that the type of "look" the caregiver is deploying when looking at the child influences the further development of the child's action.

The caregiver's deployment of "the look" is treated as projecting a more serious intervention by the caregiver, and the child ceases the reprehensible activity, whereas the caregiver's deployment of "the mere look" seems not to be oriented in the same way, and the child might continue the punishable activity (hitting or pushing for example) as soon as the caregiver shifts his or her gaze away from the child (Kidwell 2005: 442–3). Kidwell argues that her empirical studies evidence children's early use of the visible and observable features of a "look" and "its occurrence relative to a sequence of ongoing events" to assess "*what another will do next*" and thus to organize their own actions accordingly (Kidwell 2005: 443–4; italics are the author's). Kidwell thus concludes that children's grasping of others' intentions—"what they [others] intend *to do*"—should be understood and discussed by analyzing the way children treat others' observable actions and how their understanding of these actions in turn influences their own actions (Kidwell 2005: 443, italics are the author's). Along with a number of recent studies that examine very young children's participation in interactions, Kidwell and Zimmerman suggest that children's engagement in deception of others (Lerner and Zimmerman 2003), joint attention (Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Kidwell and Zimmerman 2007), and their understanding of others' intentions (Filipi 2009; Kidwell 2005, 2009) is provided for by their understanding of the observability of action or of structures of actions, and its interactive implications:

> Along the lines of Tomasello (1995: 107) we have asked, how is it that parties to a joint attention event "know" or "see" that the other is attending to the same selected features of an object (or by extension, a person or event)? As our analysis of cases in this paper suggests, the practices of achieving mutual attention to an object also project a place for a response. In this way, participants treat the act of being shown an object as not merely a perceptual one, but as one that is socially consequential. Further, the response displays an orientation—or lack of one—by show-recipient to the social action that is intended by the shower. Joint attention to the "same" object, then, is accomplished: (1) through the various practical actions by show-er designed to draw show-recipient's attention to an object, and (2) by the sequential places afforded parties for visibly displaying their alignment to the object, and critically, to the action it is being used to accomplish—what has been termed the proof procedure. (Kidwell and Zimmerman 2007: 609)

From this point of view, the observability and recognizability of actions or structures of actions provide the interactants with the fundamental resource for understanding the organization of human sociality and for engaging in predictable actions in response (Lerner and Zimmerman 2003: 456).

To sum up: the importance that EM/CA gives to analyzing the observable and recognizable features of adult/parent–child interactions allows for a respecification of intentionality such that it is not conceived as belonging to the mental domain as suggested by Tomasello, Kruger, and Horn Ratner (1999), but as "parading around in full public view" (Jones and Zimmerman 2003: 157).

As I have discussed above, interactants accomplish the public availability of intentionality through the way they mobilize observable resources such as gaze (Kidwell 2005, 2009), pointing (Filipi 2009; Jones and Zimmerman 2003), or a combination of different embodied resources including vocalizations, gestures, and body postures. At the same time, intentionality, which is usually referred to in mental terms (Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; Tomasello and Rakoczy 2007) is shown to be "… visible in, interaction between the child and the caregiver as it unfolds in a particular," orderly, structured, interactive, and material situation (Jones and Zimmerman 2003: 157). As put forward by experimental works focusing on children's cognitive and social development (Clément, Bernard, and Kaufmann 2011: 1), children's capacity to understand others as intentional, reasoning agents is not necessarily grounded in the children's capacity to engage in "mind reading" (Clément, Bernard and Kaufmann, 2011: 1),[15] that is, attributing mental states to others, as is usually suggested by developmental psychology. Instead, Lerner and Zimmerman argue that it seems to be "bound up with the acquisition of commonly held practices for producing and observing action" (Lerner and Zimmerman 2003: 456). Therefore, detailed examination of children's observable engagement in such interactive practices should constitute a special object of study for research that is interested in children's development of mind.

2.6   Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined how EM/CA studies of naturally occurring everyday talk-in-interaction between children and children or between children and adults/parents emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s, along with other new sociological approaches to the study of socialization, symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1966, 1969a; Goffman 1961a, 1961b; Whyte 1967), ethnography of communication (Goffman 1977; Hymes 1980, 1981; Labov 1964), and constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1966), and an increasing interest in the study of interaction by developmental psychology (Snow 1972; Snow and Ferguson 1977; Stern 1974; Trevarthan 1977, 1979; Wood, Bruner and Ross 1976). Furthermore, I emphasized that these new approaches to the study of socialization were distinct from the hitherto predominant paradigms of functional structuralism (Parsons 1951, 1960;

---

15   The experimental findings of Clément, Bernard, and Kaufmann (2011) suggest that young children's "deontic reasoning" about other peoples' conduct may not necessarily involve "mind reading," as is often argued by developmental psychologists, but that 3-year-old children might instead use observable rules or publicly available regularities to determine what others may be thinking. See also Kaufmann and Clément (2003) concerning an account of "naïve theories" that do not imply "mind reading" but nevertheless enable children to acquire social, physical, or other knowledge (see also Clément and Kaufmann 2011 (eds); especially Clément and Kaufmann 2011).

Parsons and Bales 1956) and reproduction theory (Bourdieu 1966, 1967; Bourdieu and Passeron 1970, 1977) in a number of important aspects. As mentioned in section 2.1, the latter authors stressed that the relationship between the to-be-socialized child and the adult was by default an asymmetrical one: the adult was considered to control the process of socialization by inculcating and transmitting commonly held norms and rules, and the child was seen as incorporating them passively and unconsciously. In section 2.2, I emphasized that although highlighting different aspects and deploying different methods of investigation, these new approaches of the 1960s and early 1970s insisted that the study of socialization should look at participants (including the to-be-socialized) as active participants who collaborate in the construction/production of social reality and order, and thus contribute to their own socialization. These approaches also shared an interest in the everyday interactive momentum of socialization, and the meaning the interactants attribute to their own doings. Finally, they agreed with EM/CA on the importance of looking at participants' use of language.

> Given the discursive turn across disciplines, CA has family resemblances to a number of other approaches. One commonality is a shift away from the search for causes of human conduct and toward the explication of how conduct is produced and recognized as intelligible and sensible. (Pomerantz and Fehr 1997: 65)

I then presented a few early and more recent EM/CA studies on child–child interactions and adult/parent–child interactions in more detail. The aim was to make their methodological singularities and specific contributions to the study of socialization concretely available.

Indeed, in section 2.4, I emphasized how early studies in the 1960s and 1970s addressed the general absence of studies examining children's activities in their own right. I showed that as first attempts, they included some quite speculative conjectures, such as the existence of an exclusive "kids' culture" to which adults had no access. This conjecture, based on their investigations on audio and audiovisual material, has not been confirmed by more recent studies on naturally occurring children's interactions (Goodwin, M. and Kyratzis 2007). At the same time, the early studies sought to examine how, through their interactions in the absence of adults, children contribute to their own socialization (and to that of their parents) in a non-trivial way. Meanwhile, a large number of researchers have demonstrated how even very young children actively contribute to their own socialization, and that the close examination of video-recorded peer interactions contributes to a better understanding of the socialization process (Jenks 2008; Goodwin, M. and Kyratzis 2007; Lerner and Zimmerman 2003).

In section 2.5, I first discussed early EM/CA studies on adult/parent–child interactions (Speier 1971, 1973, 1976; Wootton 1981) with a special focus on Sacks' work of the early 1960s and 1970s (1972, 1982, 1985). These analysts sought to abandon the developmental scheme as an explicative resource, instead examining its mostly tacit yet observable use by ordinary adults—sociologists,

psychologists, and parents—and investigating the ways that young children deal with it in an interactively effective and competent way. They demonstrated that adults and children may deploy particular categorical resources—adults' recurrent use of the category "imitation" when talking about children's doings, or children's use of a story beginning to enter a conversation with adults—or they may use specific sequential or temporal resources, such as adults' omission of a delay before refusing a request, or children's inversion of the chaining rule provided by the adjacency pair structure, to organize their interactions with each other. The authors of these studies argued that manifesting their orientation toward the developmental scheme implied participants' display of interactive competences that they used to deal with the particular social position they have *qua* parents and *qua* children.

Moreover, I offered an account of more recent EM/CA studies on adult/ parent–child interactions that maintained a generative dialogue with experimental and ethnographic studies by developmental psychologists who focus on the relationship between children's participation in social interactions and their cognitive, social, linguistic, and cultural development (Rogoff 2003; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; Tomasello and Rakoczy 2007; Vygotsky 1978). EM/CA respecifies the study of children's pragmatic development by basing their studies on video-recordings of naturally occurring everyday interactions between adults/ parents and children and by producing very detailed descriptions and analyses of naturally occurring parent–child interactions (see, among others: Filipi 2009; Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Kidwell 2005, 2009; Kidwell and Zimmerman 2007; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Wootton 1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2007), thus demonstrating that children's pragmatic development of social, interactive, linguistic, and cognitive competences is accountable in the ways that children actively contribute to the organization of meaningful interactions.

I conclude this chapter by stressing that EM/CA's most essential contribution to the study of socialization has been the production of detailed descriptions and analysis of naturally occurring interactions involving children, providing for an endogenous, emic understanding of children's and parents' perspectives, and evidencing the local accountable character of their interactive organization and their embeddedness (situatedness) in a praxeological environment (for example, the playground or the home). Throughout this chapter, I have thus tried to explain that by focusing on children's talk-in-interaction with others and by revealing and explaining how the interplay between social organization, talk, and mind is recognized and managed by the interactants themselves, EM/CA has contributed to a profound process of rethinking and renewing the study of traditional objects of study in social sciences, such as socialization (Pekarek Doehler 2010a: 19).

As we have seen in this last section, rather than proposing a theory of socialization, EM/CA provides a set of research practices and questions for investigating children's talk and embodied interactions with others in detail. Before turning to my own analysis of parent–child interactions, I will give a pragmatic account of my fieldwork and the way I organized my own research practices (Chapter 3).

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 3
Data/Collection/Transcription

Adopting an ethnomethodologically informed conversation analytic (EM/CA) approach to study the organization of parent–child interactions implies close observation, detailed description, and examination of their naturally occurring interactions—"interactions that have not been orchestrated by the researcher, which would have taken place even if she would be absent—but which represent people's ordinary business" (Mondada 2006: 53). The goal is to discover and to demonstrate the local, interactive, and methodical organization of social order: "It is possible that study of small phenomena may give an enormous understanding of the way humans do things and the kinds of objects they use to construct and order their affairs" (Sacks 1984a: 24). As a corollary, the analytical process is based on the combined use of video- or audio-recorded, naturally occurring interactions and detailed transcriptions (Atkinson and Heritage 1984: 12).

An initial group of arguments for using audiovisual data as a basis for analysis is related to the object of study, and has to do with the fact that the complexity and diversity of what might actually happen in naturally occurring social interactions largely exceeds our limited and typified imagination (Heritage 1984a: 236–7; Mondada 2006: 53). Therefore, traditional scientific methods are not considered adequate (see Mondada 2012): the level of complexity of an actual conversation (interaction) is impossible to recollect from ethnographic notes, nor does a participant's retrospective accounts within a directive or semi-directive interview situation constitute a detailed description of what actually happened, but can merely be considered as one discursive version of it (Gülich and Mondada 2008: 28). Finally, experimental methods imply specific settings in which participants have to accomplish particular tasks. The way a task is accomplished is always *context-sensitive* (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 699). That means that the accomplishment of any given action always manifests participants' orientation toward a specific context. Consequently, the experimental or semi-structured interview setting allows us to analyze the interactive organization of a specific task (giving/following instructions, asking/answering a question) in a particular (experimental or interview) setting, but does not provide for the organization of that same task in another setting, for example in a family's everyday life at home.

Furthermore, the aim of recording naturally occurring interactions is to preserve the complexity of interactions and make them available for repeated inspection. The preservation and availability of participants' use of embodied resources, such as gestures, pauses, and gazes, is necessary if we are to

determine the "details to which participants orient when they produce and interpret their own and the other's conducts" (Mondada 2006: 54–5), and thus obtain an *endogenous view* of social interaction. Indeed, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in order to account for and evidence the participants' emic perspective empirically, the analyst needs, for example, to show that young children treat the caregiver giving them a long look—"the look"—in a way that is different from how they would treat a short look—a "mere look" from the caregiver (see Chapter 2; Kidwell 2005). The preservation of details not only constitutes a crucial argument for the use of recordings, but as we will see throughout this chapter, is also central to all of the practices that make up the analytical process.

The second group of arguments is linked to the *data-driven* (Heritage 1984a: 243) approach and the *bottom-up* (Sacks 1984a) methodology of conducting an EM/CA analysis. Instead of deciding to study a phenomenon derived from theory, Sacks advocated for beginning an analytical process with the close and rigorous examination of recorded, naturally occurring talk-in-interaction. He argued that close inspection might make it possible to identify and at the same time evidence the occurrence of an (interactive) phenomenon whose detailed examination might then lead to "theorizing" about the organization of interaction more generally (Sacks 1984a: 25). He stressed that audio or video-recorded material is advantageous in that it can be played, heard, viewed, transcribed, and studied repeatedly, as many times as necessary: "I started to work with tape-recorded conversations. Such materials had a single virtue, that I could replay them. I could transcribe them somewhat and study them extendedly—however long it might take" (Sacks 1984a: 26; on this issue, see also Pomerantz and Fehr 1997: 70). Furthermore, recordings and transcriptions can serve as a basis for the collaborative and critical examination or re-examination of an analysis put forward by a researcher (Sacks 1984a: 26).

The adoption of an EM/CA approach thus requires the researcher to resolve a series of practical and technical issues. In the following, I will give a brief account of the way that the video recordings used in this study were made. Next, I will describe the process used to put together the collections of sequences that constitute the basis for the analytical Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Finally, I will explain the transcription-production method and present the transcription conventions. I will also point out and discuss the related methodological implications of these three analytical practices when they are relevant.

3.1   Data Collection

The objective of the study presented here was to video-record naturally occurring interactions in eight French-speaking families with at least two children per family, one of whom had to be between 2 and 3 years old. The first thing I had to do to build the corpus was thus to find the 8 families.

3.1.1   Finding Families to Take Part in the Study

My approach for seeking families to observe consisted of asking friends if they knew families (not acquainted with me) living in or around the city of Fribourg, Switzerland, that were willing to participate in a research project that would involve video recordings of their everyday family life and that matched the above-mentioned criteria regarding the age of the children, number of children per family, and so on. I asked these friends if they could get in touch with candidate families, explain the research project to them very briefly, and ask their permission for me to contact them.

In this way, I obtained the contact information of 12 French-speaking families who showed interest in participating in my research project. When I contacted the families by phone, I outlined the aims of the research project in general terms: to analyze naturally occurring parent–child interactions in order to describe their organization and to investigate young children's emerging communicative and interactive skills. I also described the recording conditions: two camera operators would video-record the family's everyday interactions at home on four separate occasions of their own choosing, for periods of three to four hours at a time (each of which would include a family meal). Finally, I explained how the audiovisual material would be used once collected: the names of all family members would be anonymized in every written document (transcriptions/texts based on the audiovisual material); the audiovisual material might be shown to a larger scientific community in the framework of data sessions or public talks, and video stills taken from these materials in combination with transcriptions might be published in scientific publications (books and journals, including online journals), or presented during data sessions and public talks.

Asking friends of mine to make the first contact proved to be a successful way of proceeding. When agreeing to be contacted by me, the families were already clear on the most intrusive and constraining aspects of their participation in the project. The fact that the families were contacted by a person who was a friend of a friend seemed moreover to have a bridging effect—building a feeling of trust toward me and my project from the outset. Of the 12 families that agreed to be contacted by me, only four ultimately decided not to participate. Three families (out of the remaining eight) immediately agreed to participate in the project; we set an initial recording date without delay. Five families showed a very positive attitude toward the project, but wanted some more information. I arranged to meet with them in a more personal face-to-face setting so we could further discuss the aims and framework of the project, as well as issues related to the use of the audiovisual data. After this encounter, the remaining five families eventually agreed to participate, and we were able to set the recording dates. Five of the families recruited in this way had two children, and three of the families had three children.[1]

------

1   See Appendix for the composition of each family, the anonymized names and the exact ages of the children.

During the first encounter, or on the first day of recording, I furthermore discussed the informed consent form with the parents. Apart from again explaining the research project and its aim, including the planned uses of data, I emphasized the families' right to withdraw their participation at any point in the process without needing to give a reason, and stressed that they could moreover ask me to delete part or all of the material filmed at their home at any time. Given the young ages of most of the children involved, I left it up to the parents to discuss the project with their children in greater detail. The parents in each family also signed a consent form.

3.1.2   Filming

The filming took place over two periods, from May to July and then from October to December 2008. To film the families with two moveable cameras (on tripods), I hired a student to assist me during all the recording sessions. When arriving at each family's home, we usually took some time to talk with the parents and children. To help break the ice, we also offered the children the chance to assist us as we set up the cameras. We would generally repeat the same "ritual" after the shooting session, allowing the children to aid us in packing our equipment up. I found these relatively short (10–15 minute) interactions with the family members beneficial in building a relationship of mutual trust and understanding. Filming with two cameras offered us the advantage of being able to shoot two complementary views of the same scene. As there were two of us operating cameras, we had to develop methods to somehow become "invisible," sometimes in a very limited space. Before filming, no instructions were given concerning specific activities to be video-recorded, nor were the family members asked to spend their time in specific rooms during our video-recording. They were just asked to live their life normally (see Extract 1), and we explained to them that whenever we (the camera operators) had our headphones on, we were no longer available for conversation/interactions. We followed them as discreetly as possible without interfering in their activities in any way. During mealtimes, we positioned the cameras strategically and then left the dining room for the rest of the meal. Apart from the meals, we were present throughout the filming to adjust the cameras as needed to capture the various family activities. In this way, we managed to record about 200 hours of naturally occurring everyday family interactions, including four meals in each family.

Before closing this description of the data collection, I will analyze and discuss one particular extract in which the video recording was the focus of an interaction between a mother and her daughter. As the discussion of this extract will show, recording participants' interactions and analyzing the organization of these interactions step-by-step, as they unfold in real time, makes it possible to examine the way in which each action is *context shaped*, or in other words, produced as a response to the immediate context—the

prior utterance, silence, and so on—and simultaneously *context renewing*, meaning that each action constitutes the (immediate contextual) basis on which the next action is built (Heritage 1984a: 18). Moreover, this extract is a case showing how a parent and a child might deploy different methods to deal with the recording situation and therefore to display their belonging to the specific membership categories of parents and children (see Relieu, Zouinar, and La Valle 2007).[2] The illustration thus shows how the practice described in this section—data collection—constitutes an inextricable part of the analytical process. With respect to the practices discussed in the following sections—compiling collections by selecting particular interactive sequences, producing transcriptions—data collection constitutes the starting point of the analytical process: it makes possible repeated inspection and thus identification of a particular phenomenon, the creation of a collection, and the production of detailed transcriptions. Furthermore, the following analysis provides an initial glimpse of, and anticipates to some degree, the aim of the analytical part of this book.

The following extract[3] was video-recorded during our first filming session at the home of family 3. Before the extract starts, we had already video-recorded the target child, Elio (2 years, 1 month) and his mother for about one hour. Shortly before 12 p.m., when Alma, Elio's older sister, was expected home from school, the mother, the father, and Elio went outside, in front of the house, to wait for her. When she appeared, the father and Elio went out to meet her and then walked back with her on the last bit of her way home (figure 1 below: view from CA2). The sound quality of this extract is not very good: it is recorded outdoors and there is a lot of wind. Furthermore, neither of the cameras was filming the interactions taking place between the mother and daughter, on whom the following analyses focus; instead, both camera operators were filming the father and the target child, Elio. To compensate for the poor sound quality and the lack of visual data, I deployed *next action analysis* (Watson 2008 [2011]: 227), using the interactants' own understanding/analysis/interpretation of a previous turn/action, which they make available for inspection in the immediately subsequent turn, whenever this was possible.

---

2 EM/CA analysts have offered very rich descriptions and analysis of participants' treatment of recording situations (among them, see Butler 2008; Mondada 2003; Relieu, Zouinar and La Valle 2007).

3 The transcription conventions are provided in the section below (3.3.1).

Extract 1 (dater3_1a)
Participants: MO: mother; FA: father; C1: Alma (7 years, 11 months); C2: Elio (2 years, 1 month);
CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
 1  c1    <<-is walking toward her MO->
 2  MO    c'est rigolo hein. c'est sara:: et pis stefan.
           that's funny huh. that's sara:: and also stefan.
 3        (2.2)
 4  FA    ((one turn at talk omitted=))
 5  MO    =faut faire comme s'ils étaient pas là.
           =have to act as if they were not there.
 6        (0.4)
 7  CA1   salu:t [Alma, ((laughing))]
           hello: [Alma, ((laughing))]
 8  MO           [((laughing heart]ily))=
 9  CA1   =tu fais comme si on était pas là [exactement,((laughs))]=
           =act as if we were not here [exactly. ((laughs))]=
10  MO                                       [((laughing heartily))]=
11  CA1   =[elle a tout compris ta ma]man. ((laughing))=]
           =[she has understood everything your m]om. ((laughing))=
12  MO     [((continues laughing heartily))]
13  MO    =ça fait bizarre mais après, [(0.4)] °après on oublie.°
           =that is strange but then, [(0.4)] °then you forget.°
14  fa    ((2 turns at talk and a (0.7) pause omitted))
15  C1    =ça c'est quoi?
           =what's that there?
16  MO    (0.5) ça c'est un micro.
           (0.5) that that's a mike.
17        (0.6)
18  MO    PFFF .h ((laughing heartily)) c'est un peu bizarre, viens=
           PFFF .h ((laughing heartily)) it is a little bit strange,
           come=
19  C1    =((laugh[ ing))]
20  MO            [((laugh]ing))=
21  C1    =xxxx oublier xxx micro::=
           =xxxx to forget xxx mike::=
22  MO    =oui, on va oublier.
           =yes, we're going to forget.
23        (0.7)
24  C1    (et moi j'en ai pas de micro.=)
           (and i, i don't have a mike.=)
25  MO    (=non.)
```

```
          (=no.)
26        (0.6)
27 MO     j'sais pas, j'crois- j'me rappelle plus c'quelle a dit=,
          i don't know, i think- i no longer remember what she said=,
28 MO     =j'crois qu't'en as pas besoin.=
          =i think you don't need one.=
29 fa     ((one turn at talk [omitted]))]
30 MO                      [eh!] ça été?
                           [hey!] was it okay?
31 C1     (0.6) ouai:s=
          (0.6) yeah:=
32 MO     >=t'as fait quoi? t'as eu quoi?<
          >=what did you do? what did you have?<
33 c1     (4.7) ((during these 4.7 seconds, wind is audible and C1's
          voice can be heard very softly, but nothing of what she says
          is clearly audible))
34 MO     hein?
          huh?
35 C1     (0.3) xxxx (comme ça=)
          (0.3) xxxx (like that=)
36 MO     <HA ::h j'te pasch- j'te- pourquoi j'te parle comment?
          ((laughing))>
          <HA ::h i tal- i- why how do i talk to you? ((laughing))>
37 C1     (0.4) xxx=
38 MO     =bizarre?=
          =strangely?=
39 C1     =(°°ouais bizarre°°)=
          =(°°yeah strangely°°)=
40        ((a car is approaching, closing the talk about the filming))
```

At the beginning of the extract, Alma leaves her little brother and her father behind and walks toward her mother (line 1, figure 1). As she is still approaching her mother, the latter describes the situation as "funny" and introduces the two camera operators to the girl using their first names (line 2). The mother thus orients to the fact that Alma has not previously met the camera operators or seen them in action. Moreover, this way of presenting the people involved creates a rather informal setting in which the camera operators are treated as friends not yet known to the child. According to our audio track, Alma does not respond to this introduction. Following it, there is a silence (line 3), before the mother then instructs her daughter that she should "act as if they [the camera operators] were not there" (line 5). Her instruction provides a possible explanation for the previously emerging silence. If two people are introduced to each other by a third, this makes relevant an exchange of greetings (Sacks 1992 I: 308). If an exchange of greetings is *noticeably absent*,[4] participants might infer or give a justification for why this might be so. At the same time, the mother's instruction provides the girl with the necessary knowledge to behave appropriately in the situation at hand. As mentioned above, before beginning a recording, the camera operator usually

---

4 This notion will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4. For a comprehensive discussion of it, see also Heritage (2008: 11).

instructed the members of the family to ignore the camera operators and to go about their everyday activities as normally as possible. The girl was not at home when the camera operator gave this instruction, so the mother's instruction serves to bridge the girl's knowledge gap.

After a 0.4-second silence (line 6), the camera operator greets Alma (line 7). She thus eventually treats the mother's introduction in line 2 and repetition of her own instruction in line 5 as making relevant an exchange of greetings between herself and Alma. In overlap with it, the mother starts laughing heartily (line 8), immediately triggering the camera operator's laughter, which might manifest her alignment with the mother (see Jefferson 2006), but also manifests the interactants' embarrassment with the situation. After they have laughed together for a moment, the camera operator takes up the instruction repeated by the mother at line 5 and closes her turn with an upgraded agreement token:[5] "exactly" (line 9). In overlap with the end of the camera operator's turn, the mother begins to laugh heartily again (line 10), leading to another outburst of laughter from both women (lines 9–10). The camera operator then resumes talking, complimenting the mother's understanding of the situation (line 11), while the mother continues to laugh (line 12), joined in the laughter by the camera operator after the completion of her turn (line 11).

Following this collaborative joking and laughing, the mother remarks that at first the situation might be perceived as "strange" (line 13), but that "then you forget" (line 13). The mother's noticing differs from her description of the situation at line 2: instead of being described as "funny," the situation is now categorized as "strange." As such, it manifests the mother's practical problem with the situation at hand: how to behave as if Sara (camera operator 1) and Stefan (camera operator 2) were not there (as suggested at line 5), when the situation (Alma's arrival) requires an exchange of greetings between the camera operators and the newcomer? However, the mother then deploys a very soft voice and uses the *contrastive conjunction* "but" to project a contrasting next to her previous noticing: "then you forget" (line 13). With the deployment of this contrastive statement, the mother downgrades her previous noticing, while at the same time positioning herself as the "expert" talking to the "novice" who has not yet had any personal experience with the "funny" and/or "strange" situation and cannot know that the "strangeness" might fade away with time.

Interestingly, all the parents participating in this research project made a similar statement at one point or another in the filming procedure, but they

---

5   In the study of natural language use, interactants' deployment of tokens has been shown to be a vast and complex phenomenon. It is not possible to deal with it extensively in the framework of this study. Nevertheless, parents' use of agreement tokens such as "yeah" or "yes" (Pomerantz 1975: 82) to respond to their young children's assessments will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5.

usually did so off the record (while we were chatting before or after recording). Following the mother's contrastive statement, the transcription indicates a silence (line 14). According to the transcription, the girl thus seems not to respond or otherwise comment on her mother's previous turn. After a pause, she instead makes a request for identification by using the indexical "that" to designate the referent (line 15). Since we have no audiovisual material for the situation, we cannot see how the girl manages to identify the referent she designates with the indexical "that"—she may be pointing to or even touching the object she is referring to. As becomes observable in the mother's next turn, the mother herself treats Alma's turn as a request for identification to which she responds with a candidate identification: "that, that's a mike" (microphone; line 16). The mother's identification seems to be treated as a satisfactory response by Alma—the girl does not pursue another response from her mother.

After a silence, the mother first snorts with laughter once again and then acknowledges that it is "a little bit strange" (line 18). The mother's response triggers shared laughter (lines 19–20) between her and her daughter, displaying mutual alignment again. After that, the girl seems to recycle her mother's previous turn; although what she says is not fully audible, Alma seems to adopt her mother's previous expert statement: you "forget" the presence of the "mike" after a while (line 21). Indeed, latching onto Alma's turn, the mother responds with an agreement token followed by a partial repetition of the girl's turn; in contrast to her daughter, the mother does not specify the referent (line 22). After a silence (line 23), the girl notices that she does not have any "mike" herself, pointing to a possible asymmetry between herself and her mother (line 24). The mother first responds with a minimal agreement (line 25), and then accounts for the asymmetry Alma is pointing to by explaining that the researcher did not plan for her to have a microphone (lines 27–8). The mother's justification for the asymmetry thus refers to something that is beyond her control. Shortly thereafter, the mother proposes an activity shift: instead of continuing to discuss the "strange" situation, she asks her daughter: "was it okay?" (line 30). With this question, the mother accomplishes two locally relevant parental duties: when a child is coming home from school, the parent typically asks about the child's time at school. Moreover, the mother's question brings her daughter back to the setting-specific task: "being normal," as if the camera operators and their recording equipment were not there (see Relieu, Zouinar and La Valle 2007: 9).

Especially during the first recording session, this method—using a topic or activity shift to bring the children back to the "normal" activity when they were concerned about the recording situation, camera operators or equipment—was recurrently used by the parents. They mostly succeeded in rapidly "normalizing" the situation. At the same time, they made observable their orientation toward the fact that parents' agreement to participate in a research project creates specific responsibilities for the parents concerning the children's behavior.

At line 31, the girl responds to the mother's request with a mere agreement token. This response is treated as insufficient by the mother: she asks the girl to give some more specific information about her morning at school (line 32). However, at this point the girl begins to sabotage the mother's plans. Although we cannot understand the girl's talk (line 33), the mother's reactions clearly show that the girl has started to qualify the mother's previous actions as not being normal, as per the request of the camera operator, but rather as somehow different from normal, or "strange[ly]" (lines 36 and 38).

On the one hand, the girl displays her ability to "undermine" her mother's parental authority. Instead of aligning with her mother's attempt to resume a routine course of action, the girl points to something that causes a return to the previous topic: her mother's embarrassment with the recording situation as manifested in her abnormal way of behaving. Were there not an approaching car that required the mother to shift her attention and abandon the issue (line 40), she would have had no choice but to resume talking about the recording situation and its effects on her behavior. On the other hand, the girl's sabotage displays her sensitivity toward a "normal" way of doing things, a "normal" course of action, or behaving "normally." When I asked parents if the way they interacted with their children while we were recording matched their "normal" way of going about everyday activities, the parents usually invoked their children's sensitivity to deviations from "normality" and explained that if they were not doing things normally, this would very quickly lead to remarks like those made by Alma above, or to chaotic situations in which daily routine activities, such as eating together or washing, would be difficult to accomplish.

The detailed analysis and discussion of this extract provides for a *situated view* of social interaction (see Mondada 2006: 54) by demonstrating how participants' actions are reflexively structured: they are *shaped* by a particular context—here, the context of recording naturally occurring interactions—and participants' tacit knowledge about categories and category-bound activities and attributes (rights and obligations), such as the mother's obligation to normalize a situation, or the daughter's right to subvert her mother's attempted course of action. At the same time, the participants are *renewing the context* with their respective actions or, to use Heritage's words (1984a: 280), the context is *talked into being*. By analyzing the participants' way of organizing their interaction as a local, interactive, and methodical achievement—as an *accountable* matter in its own right—the discussion of the extract moreover illustrates how I understand and seek to follow Garfinkel's recommendation in the analytical chapters (4–6):

> Any social setting [should] be viewed as self-organizing with respect to the intelligible character of its own appearances. Any setting organizes its activities to make its properties as an organized environment of practical activities detectable, countable, recordable, tell-a-story-aboutable, analyzable—in short, accountable. (Garfinkel 1967: 33)

After this brief account of the filming process, I will now turn to the practices I used to organize my preliminary observations and show how this work led to the emergence of distinct collections, each of which constitutes the basis of one of the analytical chapters.

3.2   From Preliminary Observations to the Development of Collections

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, approaching a social phenomenon by working bottom-up implies starting the analytical process with observations (see Sidnell 2010b: 28ff). In the following, I will therefore describe how I sought to organize my preliminary observations (3.2.1) in a way that would allow me to create so-called "collections" (3.2.2) upon which the analytical chapters (4–6) of this book are based.

3.2.1   *Making Preliminary Observations*

Once the audiovisual material was collected, I took a close look at the whole corpus, simultaneously producing a synopsis, which is to say noting observations that seemed interesting in relation to the families' organization of everyday family interaction in general, and regarding my phenomenon of study more particularly: children's production of initial assessments and parents' responses. To create the synopsis, I used the transcription software program CLAN.[6] This program allows observations to be made in the form of rough transcriptions of a sequence, including observations/comments on the praxeological context and other features of the sequence, and a click on the corresponding bullet point (see Figure 1 and the arrow in Figure 1) grants immediate access to the associated audiovisual material. In addition to rough transcriptions of assessment sequences, my synopsis thus included comments on (and rough transcriptions of) families' everyday activities that were not directly related to my object of study.

---

6   CLAN is a transcription software program developed by researchers who study interactions using audiovisual data (http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/clan/ accessed on July 28, 2015).

```
-
10    S1_01_220508
11
12    ((lunchtime - family at table))
13
14    *C2:    chaud?
15            hot?
16    *FA:    non c'est froid. ( ) mais oui c'est chaud. ((irony))
17            no it's cold ( ) but yes it's hot. •
18                                                              bullet
19    *C2:    fort
20            strong
21    *FA:    fort?
22            strong?
23    *C2:    ouais
24            yeah
25    *FA:    ah mais ça va?
26            ah but it's okay? •
27    *C2:    ouais.
28            yeah.
29
30    *C2:    fait mal.
31            hurts.
32    *FA:    t'as mal où? c'est trop fort. alors il faut boire un p'tit peu.
33            it hurts where? that's too hot. so you have to drink a little. •
34
35    *C2:    pas chaud.
36            not hot.
37    *FA:    c'est pas chaud. Alors ça c'est déjà une bonne nouvelle. •
38            that's not hot. so that it's already good news.
39
```

Figure 1   Assessment sequences in Family 1/hour 1

To accomplish observations in an EM/CA spirit, the researcher must get the analytical process started by adopting an *unmotivated look* (Gülich and Mondada 2001: 202). This implies, on the one hand, that the researchers' observations should not be guided by theoretical assumptions on the interactive organization that he or she is investigating. On the other hand, this means that no detail of the interaction should be *a priori* dismissed as irrelevant (Gülich and Mondada 2001: 202–3). The way I produced the synopsis cannot be qualified as the product of unmotivated looking in the full sense of the term, since it is grounded in previous work on assessment sequences and family/children's interactions (see introduction to this book) and thus influenced by findings and conceptual reflections generated by these studies. However, as will become clear in what follows, throughout the analytical process, I avoided the *a priori* exclusion of interactive details on the basis of presumed irrelevance to the further process of investigation. From this point of view, my look might be qualified as "unmotivated."

In the following, I will explain how the creation of a synopsis permitted me not only to get an excellent grasp on the whole corpus, but also constituted the observational basis upon which I drew up a rough initial outline of the collections I was going to examine in more depth. The CLAN file in Figure 3.1 constituted the starting point of this analytical endeavor.

3.2.2 Developing Collections

In EM/CA studies, two analytical procedures are commonly used: the *single case analysis* and the *analysis of a collection* (Schegloff 1987: 101). As its name suggests, the single case analysis focuses on one single extract of talk-in-interaction. The aim is to uncover its interactive complexity and to use existing work on various phenomena and types of interactions as resources to explain how they might bear upon its unfolding organization (Schegloff 1987: 101). For this study, I opted for the second analytical procedure. The analysis of a collection is based on a set of extracts in which a particular phenomenon occurring in a specific sequential position is identified: for example, a parent's agreement with (Chapter 5), disagreement with (Chapter 6), or questioning repeat of (see Keel 2011) a child's initial assessment. The goal of analyzing the phenomenon's interactive organization across various occurrences is to discover and describe systematic features of a phenomenon, or to put it differently, systematic, recurrent patterns of interactions (Mondada 2005, 2008 [2011]: 26), and eventually to explain the impact systematic organizational/formal features, such as parents' use of immediately produced weak agreements to agree with their children's assessments (Chapter 5), or delayed strong disagreements to disagree with their children's turn (Chapter 6), have on the (further) course/organization of interaction.

In his critical discussion of comparison and analysis of collections in CA, Watson (2008 [2011]) argues that from an EM and phenomenological point of view, assembling and analyzing instances of talk *as* instances of a collection is fundamentally problematic: on the basis of a finite number of identical formal properties, it involves 1) lifting instances from their natural "*gestalt* contexture," and 2) treating them as *equivalent* and *comparable*, while the distinctness of a gestalt contexture lies not in a unique composition of sequential, contextual, and formal details, but in their mutually elaborative and reflexive sense-making: "Each phenomenal detail at once gains its sense from its affiliation with a texture of other details and lends its sense to them: and this sense emerges, develops and transforms over a texture-specific *durée* as endogenously apperceived by participants" (Watson 2008 [2011]: 235, italics are the author's). According to Watson, treating an instance of talk as equivalent to (N) other instances of talk misses the point: examining and revealing the orderly methods through which participants achieve intersubjectivity requires the analyst to take the reflexive relationship between gestalt contexture details seriously and to "locate meaning as *interior* to the *particular* interactional sequence under consideration" (Watson 2008 [2011]: 229; italics are the author's). Stripping an instance of talk of its gestalt contexture, and forcing it into an equivalent class, makes this impossible. Although Watson is clearly not in favor of analyzing collections that are based on equivalent classes, he nevertheless proposes to tackle intra-collection comparison in a "*family resemblance model*," giving "due-attention-to detail-differences" (Watson 2008 [2011]: 230–31, italics are mine): while a

first instance of such a collection might manifest some properties that overlap with the properties of a second instance, it may at the same time have some other properties that do not overlap with the properties of the second instance, and so on.

Watson is skeptical of his own suggestion, especially with respect to its capacity to resolve the "intersubjective-transitivity" question, which involves "the carrying over" (Watson 2008 [2011]: 231) of contextually grounded and intersubjectively accomplished meaning "into a characterization of the next" instance. However, I decided to give it a serious try, but before my understanding and working out of the intra-collection comparison in the family resemblance model will become fully apparent, namely in the analytical part of this book (Chapters 4–6), I would now like to turn back to my practical account of how I developed the collections of this particular study in the first place.

Using the above-mentioned CLAN file (see Figure 3.1), I produced a word chart (see Figure 3.2 below) that listed all the identified assessment turns that had been produced by one of the eight target children (see column titled "initial assessment"). In the "second assessment" column, I gave the parents' responses to the child's turn. In contrast to the column that listed the child's "initial assessments," I did not reproduce the parents' response literally. Instead, I indicated what the response accomplished in terms of actions, such as agreement or disagreement, and/or I indicated what format parents deployed to respond to their children's assessment, for example, a questioning repeat (repeat/ interrogation), or another kind of observation about the quality of its production, such as the use of irony.

fam/h	line	initial assessment	second assessment	collections	
S1_01	12	fort	repeat/interrogation	1qr	
	14	chaud?	disagreement/irony	1dagr	
	25	cassé ça	confirmation/agreement	1agr	
S1_05	205	lourd, lourd	agreement/repeat	10agr	3cr
	213	bon, bon	repeat/interrogation	4qr	
S1_06	332	pas belle voiture	disagreement/ « jolie »	2dagr	

Figure 2   Provisional classification

The compilation of this word chart rendered visible the existence of recurrently occurring features of the children's initial assessment, for example children's repetition of an assessment term and/or of recurrent responses by parents. As such, it allowed me to perform a kind of summarization in the column entitled "collections," which was crucial for pursuing my analytical aim. Indeed, using the word chart in Figure 2, I produced four new CLAN files, in which I transposed all the rough transcriptions of the initial CLAN file (see Figure 1 above), and this revealed a similarity: in one, I combined all the transcribed extracts in which the

child's initial assessment was not immediately responded to, engendering the child's repetition (cr). The second, third, and fourth CLAN files were devoted to the most frequent responses by parents, thus comprising all of the roughly transcribed extracts in which the child's initial assessment was responded to by a parent's agreement (agr/Chapter 5), disagreement (dagr/Chapter 6), or questioning repeat (qr/Keel 2011). These new CLAN files established a good foundation for the systematic examination of children's repetition of initial assessments (see Chapter 4), parents' responses (see Chapters 5–6; Keel 2011), and the ways young children in turn treat their parents' responses (Chapters 4–6; Keel 2011).

In this section, I have given a short (and obviously simplified) account of the way I dealt with the large audiovisual corpus and how I organized my preliminary observations. I have mentioned how establishing a rough synopsis was useful to me as a basis for organizing/systematizing my observations regarding my object of study, by producing two distinct summarizations (see Figures 1 and 2 above), while the summarization in Figure 2 allowed me to identify frequently occurring features of the target child's initial assessment or the parent's response. Frequency can be used as a criterion for deciding to investigate a particular phenomenon (Sidnell 2010b). However, frequency alone does not make it possible to evidence if/how interactants orient to specific features as being relevant for understanding others' actions or organizing their own, and thus to reveal their emic understanding of social conduct/order. To evidence this, the availability of details such as the intonation used for a repetition (Curl 2005), the length of a gaze (Kidwell 2005), or the temporal unfolding of a pointing (Mondada 2005) may be crucial. These kinds of details can be noticed and identified only through an analytical process that includes the production of meticulous transcriptions/descriptions of participants' talk and embodied conduct. In the following, some rather technical information concerning my transcribing practice is thus presented. Although this information might at first seem a little obvious, the discussion shows how the practice of transcribing is the result of a reflexive process involving the intertwining of "analytic practices" and "practices of technologically enhanced transcription and annotation" (Mondada 2007b: 810).

3.3 Transcription Practice

To illustrate how the practice of refining a transcription and the analytical process were mutually elaborating each other, I will describe how I came to produce the transcription of an extract that belongs to the "disagreement" collection, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 (see Chapter 6, Extract 8).

As explained above, for the purpose of creating a collection, I regrouped the rough transcriptions of, for example, parents' disagreeing responses to their young children's initial assessment in a new CLAN file, giving me easy

access to the corresponding audiovisual extract (see Figure 3 below). To refine the transcription of talk, the software Sound Studio proved to be helpful as it offers some convenient tools for working on the audio track, measuring the length of silences, identifying rising/falling intonations, and so on. For the integration of the newfound observations on talk, together with approximate descriptions of interactants' use of gestures, gaze, mimicry, etc. in a new transcription, CLAN alignment software was very convenient (see lines 57 and 60 in Figure 3):

**Figure 3   Refined transcriptions of 3dagr and 5dagr in the
                    "disagreement" collection**

In combination with the easily accessible audiovisual material, the transcription refined in this way (see Figure 3 above) constituted the basis for re-systematizing my observations on the "disagreement" collection: in a word chart (see Figure 4), the "C2 initial assessment" column listed their exact wordings and indicated formal features, such as their volume of production and sound stretches, the "action" column gave a candidate description of the action accomplished by the child's turn, the following column indicated the measured silence (in seconds and tenths of seconds) that followed the child's turn, and the last column listed the exact wordings of the parent's responses.

Short silence (<0.5) after initial assessment

dagr nr	tape	C2 initial assessment	action	pause length	parent's disagreement
5dagr	S2_01	°°il est cassé::°°	complaint	0.3	MO: non, c'est pas cassé.

Longer silence (>0.9) after initial assessment and/or repetition of initial assessment

| 3dagr | S1_06 | tout sale (0.3) tout sale | noticing | 1.2 | MO: non, c'est l'autre bout qui est sale celui-là il est tout propre. |

Initial assessment occurring within a disagreeing context

| 17dagr | S4_11 | ça pi::que | complaint | 0.6 | MO: qu'est-ce qui est- non, mais Clara ça pique pa::s. |

Initial assessment with interrogative intonation

| 1dagr | S1_01 | cassé ? | request for confirmation (?) | 0.9 | MO: non, c'e[st pas cassé:↑] FA: [pas cassé n]on non ça marche. |

Initial assessment as a response to a parent's question/parent's suggestion

| 33dagr | S6_04 | voilà c'est bon | self-praise (?) | 0.6 | MO/GM: Non comme il faut |

Figure 4   Word chart systematizing observations made on the basis of refined transcriptions

Based on this word chart (Figure 3.4 above), different sub-collections became apparent, with distinguishing features pointing to sequential, formal, and/or praxeological differences. The systematization of the observations revealed for example that parents' disagreeing responses to children's initial assessments might occur immediately or with a delay, thus indicating some further line of investigation. At the same time, it raised further questions: What happens during the "longer" silences? Is there a relationship between the action accomplished by the child's initial assessment and sequential/ formal features of the parents' responses? How does parents' deployment of either format impact the further course of interaction? As a corollary, it became obvious that the first refinement of transcriptions (see Figure 4 above) did not sufficiently render available the detailed organization of interaction, in which participants' bodily conduct was for example simply described in double parenthesis, such as ((withdrawing Q-tip, looking at Q-tip)) (line 57). To sharpen the analysis, transcriptions needed to be further refined and to indicate how interactants' deployment of embodied resources such as gaze, gestures, and postures "unfold incrementally over time" (Hepburn and Boldin 2012: 70).

The ELAN software proved to be a convenient tool for reaching this requirement of a more finely detailed transcription/description of audiovisual data (see Figure 5 below).

Figure 5   ELAN screenshot of 3dagr in the "parent's disagreement" collection

In contrast to the CLAN software (see Figures 1 and 3 above), in which each transcribed line has a delimited length, and in which the presentation of the interaction resembles that of a play script, ELAN includes a presentation of time that is organized into different tiers: "ME parole" (MO talk), "E2 regard" (C2 gaze), and so on. Each of these tiers is accorded an endless line of time, or rather corresponds to the length of the audiovisual data that they are linked to.[7] On this timeline, every stretch of transcribed gesture or action is delimited by landmarks. This different presentation of the temporal unfolding of interaction has a crucial advantage: it allows the transcriber to relate the occurrence of different gestures or actions to each other in a very precise way without necessarily using talk as the reference tier (Mondada 2007b: 816). However, to use the newfound observations about participants' embodied conduct for further analysis, and to render the transcription intelligible to the analyst herself (and her readers), it needs to be implemented in a reader-friendly

_____

7   For a more thorough discussion of the use of different types of transcription software—*CLAN* versus *ELAN*—and its impact upon the analysis, see Mondada 2000, 2007b.

way. Depending on the object of study, and the availability of audiovisual data, an indefinite array of solutions might be designed to achieve this goal (see for example Kidwell's (2005, 2012) work on interaction among very young children (and the relevance of gaze); Goodwin, M., Goodwin, C. and Yaeger-Dror's study on girls' disputes (2002); Butler and Wilkinson's paper on children's pursuits (2013)). For this book, the conventions used to transcribe participants' talk are those of Jefferson (2004: 24–31), and for participants' visible conduct, those of Mondada (2007a, 2009a; see below). Participants' embodied conduct is also rendered available using a combination of written transcriptions/descriptions and black-and-white line drawings made from video stills (see Extract 2 below).

The final representation of the extract furthermore contains a two-line transcription in which the first line represents the original talk in French and the second line an idiomatic English translation which seeks to render the local and interactive meaning of the original as thoroughly as possible. In Chapter 6 (Chapter 6, Extract 8), you can see the analysis yielded by this refined transcription.

Extract 2 Final transcription of extract 3dagr in the "disagreement" collection
Participants: MO (+): mother; C2 (*): Susanne (2 years, 5 months); CA1: camera 1


```
 1  C2 → #**tout sale,
               all dirty
    fig   # figure 1
 2  c2       *shifts gaze, looks at MO->
 3  c2        *rh: directs Q-tip toward MO's eyes->
 4            (0.3)
 5  C2→  tout s#ale,
              all dirty,
    fig        # figure 2
 6   ⇒    (1.2)
 7  MO➔  non+, c'*est l'autre +bout qui est sale=
              no, it's the other end that is dirty=
 8  mo       +rh/lh: direct toward Q-tip->
 9  c2            *rh: withdraws the Q-tip from MO's approaching hands->
10  mo                 +rh: directs toward C2's right ear ->
11  MO   =c+e*lui-là il est tout +propre.
             =this one is all clean.
12  mo       +rh: vaguely points to C2's right ear, holds C2's head->
13  c2         *rh: directs Q-tip toward her own right ear->
14  mo               +lh: grasps C2's rh, endorses its movement->
```

15   (0.3)

16 MO   **vas-y#.**
          go ahead.
    fig   # figure 3

This refined transcription, in combination with the audiovisual material, served as an indispensable basis for developing a multimodal analysis of the extract (see Chapter 6, Extract 8 (3dagr)). However, to read and understand these complex transcriptions, one requires at least an understanding of the transcription conventions, and better yet, some practice at decoding them.

3.3.1   Transcription Conventions

The conventions used to transcribe the talk-in-interaction in this book are those developed by Gail Jefferson (2004: 24–31):

[A left bracket indicates the beginning of overlapping talk.
]   A right bracket indicates the end of overlapping talk.
(1.0)   Numbers in parentheses indicate a timed pause (measured in tenths of seconds) within or between utterances.
(.)   A dot in parentheses indicates a brief interval (+/- a tenth of a second) within or between utterances.
OUI   Upper case indicates extra loud sounds relative to the surrounding talk.
oui   Underscoring indicates some stress, via pitch and/or amplitude.
°oui°   Degree signs bracketing an utterance or parts of it indicate that the sounds are softer than the surrounding talk. The more degree signs there are, the softer the sound.
>oui<   Right/left carats bracketing an utterance or utterance part indicate that the bracketed material is sped up compared to the surrounding talk.
((smile)) Double parentheses contain transcriber's descriptions.
::   Colons indicate prolongation of the immediately prior sound. The longer the row of colons, the longer the prolongation.
par-   A dash indicates a cut-off.
=   Equal signs indicate no break or gap (latching talk).
.h   A dot-prefixed row of h's indicates an in-breath. Without the dot, the h's indicate an out-breath.

xxxxx	A row of x's indicate that the transcriber was unable to grasp what was said. The number of x's reflects the length of the missing talk.
(a little)	Parenthesized words indicate a guess at the talk.
?	A question mark indicates upward intonation.
.	A dot indicates a downward intonation.
,	A comma indicates a continuing intonation.
↓↑	Arrows indicate shifts into especially high or low pitch.

A line-by-line translation is provided to help with comprehension of the original.

Descriptions of gestures and actions are transcribed using an adapted version of the conventions developed by Mondada (2007a, 2009a).

c2	The participant doing the described gesture or action is identified.
* *	An asterisk signals a described gesture or action by the target child (usually C2). The "*" indicates the moment in which the action begins in relation to the transcribed talk (or silence). If there is more than one transcribed action, they are listed chronologically. The first asterisk marks the beginning and the second one the ending of the described gesture or action.
+ +	A plus sign signals a described gesture or action by a mother (MO). The "+" indicates the moment in which the action begins in relation to the transcribed talk (or silence). If there is more than one transcribed action, they are listed chronologically. The first plus sign marks the beginning and the second one the ending of the described gesture or action.
/ /	An oblique signals a described action or gesture by a father (FA). The "/" indicates the moment in which the action begins in relation to the transcribed talk (or silence). If there is more than one transcribed action, they are listed chronologically. The first oblique marks the beginning and the second one the ending of the described gesture or action.
%	A percent sign indicates a gesture or action by the sister or the brother of the target child (usually C1 and/or C3). The "%" indicates the moment in which the action begins in relation to the transcribed talk (or silence). If there is more than one transcribed action, they are listed chronologically. The first percent sign marks the beginning and the second one the ending of the described gesture or action.
rh	"rh" stands for a gesture or action accomplished by the participant's right hand.
lh	"lh" stands for a gesture or action accomplished by the participant's left hand.
-->	Double dashes and a right carat indicate that the described gesture or action continues across subsequent lines.
#	A "#" indicates the exact point within a turn at talk where a figure has been taken.

Adopting an EM/CA approach does not imply the analyst's adherence to a specific theory of social action, but it does require him or her to adopt a number of specific working practices. In this chapter, I have tried to give a very concrete and personal account of my practices related to the data collection, the practices I used to develop the various collections, and finally the practices that made it possible to produce detailed multimodal transcriptions. Finally, I introduced each of these practices by outlining their central methodological implications. The aim of this praxis-oriented account was to show that collecting data, developing collections, transcribing extracts, and analyzing small sequences of social interactions constitute practices that are inextricably and reflexively linked to each other. In this sense, they are mutually elaborative: to carry out a data-driven analysis of social interaction, it may be necessary to produce all of them with the same seriousness and rigor.

After this presentation and discussion of the theoretical background of my study (Chapter 2) and its practical and methodological implications (Chapter 3), we are now ready to attack the analytical part, which offers a multimodal analysis of young children's and parents' interactive organization of assessment sequences in everyday family life. A detailed look at young children's embodied production of initial assessments and their pursuits of a response (Chapter 4) allows some new light to be shed on young children's interactive, cognitive, and linguistic competences, while a focus on parents' responses and their impact on the further course of action (Chapters 5–6) reveals how young children's assessment actions and evaluative positioning is in turn treated by their parents. On the one hand, the study thus seeks to describe in detail how in everyday family life young children and their parents manifest their respective positions and/or affective implications toward a person, object, or action, and eventually manage to reach a shared understanding of the world they jointly inhabit. By investigating how young children's and parents' organization of assessment sequences may differ (or not) from their production in adult–adult interactions (see for example Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. 1987; Lindström and Heinemann 2009; Mondada 2009a, 2009b; Pomerantz 1975, 1984a), the study seeks on the other hand to offer a comparative perspective. Indeed, investigating young children's and parents' organization of assessment sequences not only demonstrates the local and interactive achievement of intersubjectivity, but also provides a window into participants' particular ways of dealing with delicate questions of alignment/disalignment and agreement/disagreement, and manifests their tacit, yet demonstrable, orientation to membership in the categories which make up the "family" collection—child and parent—in the moment-by-moment unfolding of action sequences (see also Keel and Sormani 2014).

Chapter 4

Young Children's Repetitions of Initial Assessments and their Orientation toward Conditional Relevance

As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 3, in the 1980s, Garfinkel et al. (1982) worked on a research project on "kids' culture" which aimed to investigate and render visible children's interactive competences. On the basis of a small number of cases, the author remarked that young children (around 2-and-a-half years of age) may already use the adjacency pair organization as a resource for coordinating their own activities with those of others, and seem to orient toward the central property of adjacency pairs: *conditional relevance*:

> Preliminary investigations of our corpus of tapes, indeed shows that for somewhat older children, about two and a half, the conditional relevance of utterances is realized and that adjacency organization is already utilized for what appears to be a significant number of interactions, that is, at least extensively. But, the number of cases in our own corpus upon which these and other observations like them might depend is relatively small. (Garfinkel et al. 1982: 49)

An adjacency pair is composed of two parts/utterances by two speakers, while conditional relevance[1] refers to the fact that speaker A's production of a first pair part (FPP)—for example, a question—is sequentially implicative (Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 296), which is to say it makes a type-fitted second pair part (SPP)—an answer—by the recipient of the FPP unavoidably relevant (see Sacks 1992 II: 17–31; Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1974: 238). As Heritage (2008: 9–10) points out, detailed analysis of how participants interactively produce adjacency pairs leads to more general issues of how the organization of everyday activities is locally managed and treated by the interactants. Firstly and prospectively in time, the adjacency pair organization provides a mechanism through which one interactant "can get another to do something" (Heritage

---

1   EM/CA's understanding of "conditional relevance" has been briefly outlined, and notions such as "noticeably absent" and "sequentially implicative" have been introduced in the discussion of children's use of the adjacency pair structure when "starting to talk" to adults (see section 2.5.1, and Chapter 3, Extract 1 in section 3.1.2). The issue is discussed in more detail here because of its centrality to the understanding of this chapter's main analytical argument.

2008: 12). A, by addressing a question to B, makes a type-fitted response—an answer—from the intended recipient (B) normatively relevant: if the answer is not forthcoming, it is noticeably absent and has implications for the rest of the interaction. For example, A might repeat his or her question in an attempt to obtain an answer from B, and/or make inferences concerning the grounds for its absence (Sacks 1992 II: 17–31; Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1974: 238). Secondly and retrospectively in time, adjacency pairs and their central property constitute a sequentially organized interactive architecture through which understanding can be displayed, checked, and repaired, and through which intersubjectivity, or shared understanding, can eventually be achieved: B, by answering A's question, displays his or her understanding of said question (Heritage 1984a: 254ff., 2008: 10ff.).

This chapter focuses on situations in which a young child (between 2 and 3 years old) produces an initial assessment and pursues a response from the intended recipient if the latter does not spontaneously respond to it. Recently, the question of how very young children interacting with others organize *adjacency and proto-adjacency pairs*[2] has regained increased interest in conversation analysis and ethnomethodology (see Filipi 2009, 2013; Forrester 2008, 2013; Jones and Zimmerman 2003: 178; Lerner, Zimmerman and Kidwell 2011; Lerner and Zimmerman 2003; Wootton 1997, 2007). In these studies, it is well documented that very young children, while not fully mastering natural language, are able to produce recognizable proto-first pair parts and seem to orient toward conditional relevance. When interacting with adults (parents, caregivers), very young children (around 12 months) treat their proto-requests (for an object or a labeling action) as making relevant a particular response from the intended recipient (handing over the object, proffering the label). Indeed, when confronted with the absence of a satisfactory response, they might maintain/repeat a pointing and combine it with the repetition of a vocalization, possibly getting a response from the adult (Filipi 2009: 127, 146; Jones and Zimmerman 2003: 178; Wootton 1997: 27–31). These studies demonstrate that young children's and adults' interactive organization of adjacency and proto-adjacency pairs and orientation toward its sequential implications stand in need of an analytical approach which takes into account all the embodied resources (such as gaze, pointing, vocalization, or body posture) that interactants deploy to produce a contextual configuration in which their (and the intended recipient's) respective expectations (of what comes next) become observable and intelligible to the interactants themselves, and thus for the analyst (Goodwin, C. 2000: 15; 2003: 218).

---

2 The notion of the *proto-adjacency pair* was introduced by Jones and Zimmerman (2003: 178). According to them, it might be premature to describe very young children's use of repeated pointing for requesting, for example, as equivalent to a FPP. However, since it has the same interactive consequences as a FPP, they suggest calling it a *proto first pair part*.

The studies referred to above focus on interactions involving children that are younger or older than those in my study (see Butler 2008; Filipi 2009, 2013; Filipi and Wales 2010; Goodwin, M. 2006), and/or primarily analyze children's productions and embodied repetitions of so-called *canonical action types* (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 5–6), such as offers, questions, or different types of requests (Butler and Wilkinson 2013; Filipi 2009; Forrester 2013; Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Wootton 1997, 2007).[3] In this study, young children's deployment of assessments serves to achieve a whole range of *non-canonical actions* (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 9), such as noticings, informings, complaints, and announcements. As mentioned in the introduction, in their paper on the mobilization of a response, Stivers and Rossano (2010: 9) argue that *canonical action types* make relevant a type-fitted response, while *non-canonical action types* do not have as powerful normative implications. On the basis of 50 hours of English and Italian everyday conversations, the authors examine the normative implications of canonical and non-canonical actions and provide three different types of evidence to back up their argument. Their first type of evidence refers to frequency distribution: canonical actions routinely and reliably receive a type-fitted response,[4] whereas it is easy to find instances in which a non-canonical action is not responded to. The second and third arguments refer to treatment of non-response by speakers and recipients, respectively. Indeed, when producing canonical actions, speakers and recipients treat the intended recipient's omission of a response as a failure (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 6–9). In contrast to canonical actions, the absence of a response to a non-canonical action type—for example, an assessment—is not treated as problematic by either speaker or hearer; in other words, speakers do not pursue a response when one is not spontaneously forthcoming, nor do they otherwise sanction the occurrence of a non-response, and recipients do not account for their failure to produce a response (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 10).

In my corpus on parent–child interactions (see Chapter 3), the young child's initial assessments (483 identified occurrences) are in a large majority of cases (95 percent) responded to by the intended recipient. This first observation thus counterbalances Stivers' and Rossano's first type of evidence—frequency distribution—regarding the distinct sequential implications of canonical versus non-canonical action types. However, to base a counter-argument on frequency distribution alone seems too easy a solution. Furthermore, Stivers' and Rossano's central argument for distinguishing canonical from non-canonical action types

---

3   Studies examining children's assessments (Butler 2008; Filipi and Wales 2010; Goodwin, M. 2006) concern children that are older than the ones studied here, and do not focus on children's pursuits of a response.

4   With regard to the examination of canonical actions, the authors do not provide precise frequency distributions. However, they refer to other studies, such as Stivers et al. (2009), in which requests for information are responded to with a type-fitted response in 90 percent of the cases.

refers to the fact that a non-response to the former is neither sanctioned nor treated as a failure by the interactants, whereas it is treated this way if it follows a canonical action type (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 9).

As Heritage (1984a: 248–9) stresses, interactive situations in which the adjacency pair structure is not fully or unproblematically implemented—so-called deviant cases—constitute interesting instances of participants making their orientations toward the expectation of a response publicly available to each other, and thus becoming accountable to each other and to the analyst. When an intended recipient for example does not respond to a speaker's initial action (FPP), such as an assertion, the latter might make sense of it "in terms of the recipient having some problem in responding" (Pomerantz 1984b: 152). Following a non-response, the speaker thus might pursue a response in such a way that the intended recipient's (inferred) problem of understanding, knowledge, or position (Pomerantz 1984b: 153, 156, 159) is remedied, and that the adjacency pair structure is completed by the recipient's production of a type-fitted SPP, for example, a "confirmation" or "disconfirmation" of the initial assertion (Pomerantz 1984b: 152).

In this chapter, to reveal young children's embodied competences in terms of locating recipients' possible problems in responding to their initial assessment and in proposing embodied solutions for successfully pursuing a response from them, I examine situations in which the child's *initial assessment* does not immediately engender a spontaneous response from the intended recipient (49/483 identified occurrences). With its focus on a phenomenon that has not yet been systematically examined, this chapter goes beyond providing detailed descriptions of young children's pursuits and their interactive implications, raising questions regarding young children's embodied displays of cognitive, linguistic, and interactive competences that have not yet been addressed in these terms by studies on parent–child interactions.

4.1   Children's Orientation to Recipients' Lack of Attention in Pursuing a Response

To produce an adequate response to an assessment, the intended recipient has to pay attention to it and hear/understand what is being evaluated in the first place. In everyday family life, children are often confronted with the fact that their parents are busy doing other things and cannot devote their full attention to conversing with them. Parents might be busy reading the newspaper, cooking dinner, focusing on the drawing they have just been asked to do by the child (Extract 1), or adjusting a young child's garments (Extract 2); they might be preoccupied with feeding a younger sibling (Extracts 3–4) or eating themselves, and/or be involved in an argument with another sibling (Extract 4) or a discussion with their spouse. In describing how young children organize their pursuits of a response to their initial assessment when it is not immediately forthcoming, the analysis of Extracts 1–4 aims to show how children take into account their parents' multiple involvements.

4.1.1 *Pursuing a Response by Highlighting the Referent*

In the following two extracts, the child's assessment accomplishes " *'environmental' noticings*" (Sacks 1992 II: 89–90). It is a very common thing for participants to use a noticing to comment on things that exist or are happening around them, and thus to use local resources to induce others to enter a conversation (see Sacks 1992 II: 87–97; Bergmann 1988). As Sacks argues, noticings cannot be uttered at just any point in a conversation; instead, "The fact that it was talked about last time can set up its being talked about this time" (Sacks 1992 II: 93). Producing a noticing whose referent has been the topic of previous talk might thus be an especially effective way to engage others in a conversation. In Extract 4.1, the child's assessment produces a noticing that concerns "cars" when the intended recipient is about to draw a car. In Extract 2, the child's noticing relates to "the man" her mother was just talking about. The analysis of these first two extracts seeks to investigate how young children confronted with a non-response to their environmental noticing organize their embodied pursuits of a response.

The acronyms and symbols for multimodal descriptions of the participants always appear at the beginning of the extracts. For the target child (C1, C2, or C2), the symbol for multimodal description is an asterisk: "*," where the first "*" indicates the onset of a gesture, gaze, or posture, and the second one its termination in relation to the transcribed talk (or silence). "#" indicates the exact point in a turn at talk for which there is a corresponding figure.[5] To highlight particular turns in transcriptions, in this chapter "→" indicates the young child's initial assessment, "⇒" marks the repetition, and "➜" highlights the parent's response to it.

Before the following extract starts, Faffa (2 years, 7 months) asks his mother to draw a car. While she draws the car, the little boy closely observes the progress of his mother's endeavor (see figures 1–5 below).

Extract 1
Participants: MO (+): mother; C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1        (11.1)
2  C3→   très vi##tes les voitures
         very fast     the cars
   fig           # figure 1, 2
3        (0.8)
```

---

5   For a complete explanation of the transcription conventions, see section 3.3.1.

```
 4    MO      hein?
              huh?
 5    C3⇒    (.) très vites les voitures
              (.) very fast   the cars
 6            (2.1)
 7    C3⇒    est très vites les voitures#
              is very   fast   the cars
      fig                                    # figure 3
 8            (2.2)
```



```
 9    C3⇒    tr[ès] vite (0.3) cette voiture=
              ve[ry] fast (0.3) this car=
10    MO      [(comme) ça?]
              [(like) that?]
11    MO      =j'fais la porte aussi?
              =i make the door also?
12    C3      (#1.0) fais la po(r)te+
              (1.0) make the doo(r)
      fig      # figure 4
13    mo                              +withdraws pencil, straightens up->>
14            (0.7)
15    MO      voilà.
              done.
```

After observing the progress of his mother's drawing for roughly 11 seconds (line 1), Faffa re-engages turn-by-turn talk by producing a noticing: "very fast the cars" (line 2, figures 1–2). After a silence (0.8 seconds), the mother responds with an *open-class repair initiator* (see Corrin 2010: 23)—"huh?" (line 4)—to Faffa's turn. As Corrin argues (2010: 39), parents may use open-class repair initiators to stimulate their young children to repair their previous turn. In this extract, the boy treats his mother's "huh?" (line 4) as expressing only difficulty hearing what he said: immediately following it, he produces a simple full repeat of his initial turn (lines 5). However, this first repetition does not engender a response from the mother: after 2.1 seconds of silence (line 6), the boy produces a second repetition, prefixing it with the verb "to be" in the third-person singular form (line 7), interpreting the absence of a response from his mother at line 6 as pointing to a problem in the construction of his noticing. Nevertheless, his mother still does not respond. Following another pause of 2.2 seconds (line 8), during which the mother just continues drawing, the boy repeats his assessment a third time (line 9). This time, he first utters the assessment segment "very fast," and after a short pause (0.3 seconds) invokes the referent in a modified form: he replaces the article "the"

in plural form, which points to cars in general, with the more specific pronoun "this" plus the "car" in its singular form, and thus points to the very car the mother is about to draw. He thus clarifies the referent (Pomerantz 1984b: 153–6) by shifting it from something general to something specific to which the mother certainly has epistemic access.

However, in overlap with his third repetition, the mother produces a request for confirmation (line 10), and latching with the boy's reiteration (line 9), she asks him to specify whether she should also draw the door (line 11). As figure 4 shows, before the boy responds to her question, the mother begins to draw it, and when his positive answer is eventually produced (line 12), she is already disengaging from the activity of drawing the car by straightening up from the table she had been leaning over. Finally, she closes the drawing sequence with the *terminal marker* "done" (line 15). In this sequence, the boy is not very successful in his pursuit of a response. However, instead of "withholding" her response (see Filipi 2013), the mother seems just to prioritize the completion of the requested drawing. At no point does Faffa use intonation, volume, gaze, or body language to make his pursuit of a response more salient (see figures 1–3), and apart from a short hesitation after his mother's question at line 11, he finally just agrees to go with the line of action proposed by the mother (line 12). In these respects, Faffa's unsuccessful pursuit of a response stands in contrast to the way Clara, in the next extract, manages to get a response.

Extract 2
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Louis (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1   MO      ah il f'sait comme ça l'm'sieur tu crois
            ah he went like  that the man you think
2           (1.1)
3   C2→     est# gra*nd#
            is tall
    fig      # figure 1
4   c2            *orients toward mother->
    fig              # figure 2
5           (1.1)
6   C2⇒     (le mon) le monsieur,* il est ** gr#and
            (the ma) the man, he is tall
    fig                                    # figure 3
7   c2                   *orients toward "man," pointing*
```

```
8   c2
                                                        *orients back toward MO->>
```



```
9            (0.4)
10 MO        c'est un# grand monsieur?
             it's a tall man?
   fig              # figure 4
11 C2        (0.2) <mh ((affirmative))>
12           (0.2)
13 MO        ah d'accord.
             ah okay.
```

The family is about to have dinner. Clara (2 years, 4 months) is standing on her high chair, having a conversation with her mother, who is busy adjusting her daughter's pants and bib.

At the beginning of the sequence, Clara is standing on her high chair, oriented toward the dining table (figure 1). Her mother is busy adjusting Clara's pants when the girl notices that something (that she does not name) "is tall" (line 3). At the end of her noticing, Clara orients slightly toward her mother and looks at her (figures 1–2). As Lerner (2003: 179) points out, a speaker's gaze can be used to select the next speaker, who then has an obligation to respond. Nonetheless, a silence emerges. After 1.1 seconds, Clara repeats her initial turn, prefixing it with the referent: "the man, he" (line 8). She highlights the referent, which has just been evoked by the mother at line 1, using *left dislocation* (Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. 1987: 18–19): "the man, he is tall." Simultaneously with this candidate self-repair, she orients toward the direction in which the man has last been seen, and vaguely points toward it, achieving an *embodied identification* (Mondada 2009a: 334) of the referent at line 7, figure 3. Clara thus seems to attribute her mother's non-response to her initial noticing to a difficulty in grasping the referent. At the end of her repetition, she turns back toward her mother, selecting her as the next speaker (line 8, figure 4). After a short silence (line 9), the mother responds with a questioning repeat (for parents' use of questioning repeats, see Keel 2011). This induces Clara to produce an affirmative "mh" (line 11), which is followed by the mother's display of a new understanding and a minimal agreement with the girl's assessment: a *change-of-state token* "oh" (Mondada 2009a: 334 the "ah" in French corresponds to the English "oh"; Heritage, 1984b) and an agreement token "okay" (line 13). In this extract, the girl treats her mother's eventual response, although minimal (composed of two tokens), as satisfactory and thus as closing implicative.

4.1.2 Pursuing a Response by Establishing Mutual Attention through Embodied Means

In the following extract (3), a boy uses an assessment to close a story that has been talked about. In Extract 4, a girl deploys an assessment to comment on an immediately preceding event involving herself and her mother. However, the timing of their respective actions is particular, since the intended recipients are respectively oriented to and preoccupied with feeding a younger sibling (Extracts 3–4) and arguing with an older brother (Extract 4). The analysis of the following two extracts seeks to understand how children deal with a parent's involvement with another sibling when no response to their initial turn is immediately forthcoming.

In Extract 3, the whole family is having dinner together. Martin (2 years, 6 months) is sitting between his mother and father and eating soup, while his mother is feeding little pieces of bread to his younger brother (9 months), who is sitting on her left (see figures 1–2, line 3).

Extract 3
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (*): Martin (two years, six months); C2 (&): Antoine (nine months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1          (*4.9)
2   c1     *rh:takes some soup, withdraws spoon, lh:lifts fist->
```



```
3   C1→   #p*as *bien#
           not good
    fig    # figure 1
4   c1       *drops fist, lifts and drops it two more times*
5   c1           *shifts gaze toward MO->
    fig             # figure 2
6          (0.9)
```



```
7   C1⇒   *+pas bie/n#
           not good
8   c1     *lifts fist, drops it twice
9   mo     +picks up her glass->
10  fa           /shifts gaze to C1->
```

```
    fig                  # figure 3
11         (0*.3)
12 cl        *gazes at FA->
```



```
13 MO→  #pas bien *hein↑
          not good huh↑
    fig   # figure 4
14 cl              *gazes toward MO->
15         (1+.8)
16 mo      +starts drinking, shifts gaze toward C1->
17 C1⇒  *ça va pas bien# mettre
          it is not good putting
18 cl      *shifts gaze down, directs spoon toward plate->>
    fig                   # figure 5
19         (0.6)
20 C1      °dans°
           °in°
21         (0.4)
22 FA      pas bien de mettre au frigo
           not good to put in the fridge
```

Just before the above sequence, Martin's mother asks him to tell his father what the fictional character Tschuppi does with his freshly baked cake. The little boy does as his mother asks, explaining to his father that Tschuppi puts the cake in the fridge to cool it down. Following this, a silence emerges (line 1): everybody is focused on eating or feeding. Then, Martin withdraws his spoon, lifts his left fist (line 2), and produces a negative assessment (line 3). Contrary to the noticing in Extract 1, in which Faffa's turn came somewhat out of the blue—in other words, was not tied to a previous turn—Martin orients toward his assessment as being part of a more complex "gestalt" that he seeks to close. As he produces his assessment, he simultaneously drops his fist, then lifts/drops it again twice more, and shifts his gaze toward his mother, thereby selecting her as a next speaker (lines 5–6, figures 1–2). Using gaze as a method for selecting a next speaker is a risky device (see Lerner 2003: 179; see also Extract 2 above), since the intended recipient must see it. Martin's mother cannot see his gaze, as she is still orienting to his little brother, whom she is feeding (figures 1–2): a silence emerges. After 0.9 seconds, Martin repeats his assessment with a simple full repeat (line 7), again moving his fist up and down twice (line 8). Since he is still looking at his mother, he may have observed that she is not oriented toward him (figure 3) and thus cannot see that he has selected her as a next speaker once again. In contrast, his father has stopped eating and is looking at him (line 10, figure 3).

Martin shifts his gaze toward his father after the completion of his repetition (line 12). He thus changes the intended recipient from a recipient who is not paying him any attention to a recipient who is oriented toward him. He seems to identify the source of non-response in the current "unavailability of the recipient" to whom he had initially oriented (Goodwin, M. 1997: 91). In his search for an available recipient, he is not only successful in establishing mutual attention, but also in getting a response. Immediately after his gaze shifts away from his mother, she confirms his negative comment by simply repeating it and adding a *tag particle* with rising intonation, "which morphologically marks the turn as seeking response" (line 13) (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 11). This brings the boy's gaze back to her (line 14). On the one hand, he treats his mother's response as repair implicative: he starts to reformulate his initial assessment, putting it in relation with the assessed conduct (lines 17 and 20). On the other hand, he orients toward it as closing implicative: he does abandon his reformulation, and resumes eating (line 18, figure 5), while his father eventually completes the utterance that Martin began (line 22).

As we will see in the following sequence, after the absence of a response to her initial positive comment, Clara (2 years, 4 months) deploys means that are more radically embodied than a simple shift of gaze to re-establish mutual attention.

Extract 4 takes place in the bathroom, where Clara (C2) and her older brother Louis (C1) have just taken a bath and are now about to get ready for dinner. Their mother sits on the floor and is involved in multiple activities: she is breast-feeding her little baby, simultaneously helping C1 and C2 to towel themselves off, apply body lotion, and so on. Throughout this extract, the older brother, Louis, is oriented toward the sink, turning his back to his mother and little sister (see figures 1–5), singing, and at the same time banging repeatedly on the sink with an object (lines 3–6, 13, 19, and 21). In doing so, Louis gets his mother's attention (lines 8–10, 22 and 26, figure 3) and thus makes it difficult for his sister Clara to get it herself. Before the extract starts, Clara (C2) has dropped a round cheese,[6] and her mother has indicated to her where it is lying so the little girl can retrieve it.

---

6   In this family, they have a ritual which consists of giving each of the two children (C1 and C2) a small round Babybel cheese once they have finished their bath.

Extract 4

Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Louis (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months); C3: baby (1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
 1  C2     ((*rigole))* il a roulé:#
           ((laughing))it rolle:d
 2  c2       *picks up the cheese-*-*orients toward mother->>
 3  c1       <<-& makes noise by hitting sink with an object->
    fig                      # figure 1
 4         +(0.3)
 5  mo     +looks down at the floor on her left, picks up a towel->
 6  MO     il a r:ou&lé.
           it r:olled
 7         (0.2)
 8  MO     +louis s'il te plaît tu sais qu'ça n'est=
            louis please you know that it is=
 9  mo     +orienting toward C1->
10  MO     =[pas perm+is] d'fai[re ça.]
           =[not allowed] to d[o that.]
11  mo               +orients toward C3->
12  C3     [wêh-êh ::]
13  c1                    [((singing))] [((singing))]
14  C3                    [wêh-êh :: ]
```



```
15  C2→                     [c'est rigo↑lo#]
                            [that's funn↑y]
    fig                              # figure 2
16         (0.2)
17  C2     hein dis?
           huh say?
18         (0.3)
19  c1     ((hum[ming]))
20  C2          [maman, &il&] roule+. h=
                [mom, it] rolls. h=
21  c1                 &makes noise by hitting the sink with an object&
22  mo                       +directs lh toward him, grasps him, and
           gives him a stern look->
23  MO     =mh
```

```
24          (0.2)
25 C2       mh (0.3) hei::n=
            mh (0.3) hu::h=
26 MO       =TU SAIS QU'ÇA N'EST [+PAS PER]MIS=
            =YOU KNOW THAT THAT'S [NOT ALLOWED=
27 mo                             +gives C1 an angry look->
```



```
28 C2⇒                           [(c'est)rigolo#]
                                 [(that's)funny]
   fig                           # figure 3
29 C1       =ɟm[h :::::::] ::::::ɟ ɟxxxxxxxxxxxxxxɟ]
```



```
30 C2⇒      *[MA#↑M+a::n]# (0.3) *[(hein dis)* c'est] rigolo.=
            *[MO↑::m] (0.3) [(huh say) that's] funny.=
31 c2       *directs rh toward MO's chin, and lifts it up ->
   fig          # figure 4
32 mo              +shifts gaze toward C2->
   fig                  # figure 5
33 MO→      =oui::, c'est rigolo comme il a roulé.
            =yeah::, that's funny how it rolled.
```

At the beginning of the extract, Clara laughs while picking up the cheese, and comments on the rolling of the cheese in a playful voice (lines 1–2). She treats the "rolling cheese" as a humorous event, simultaneously orienting toward her mother and selecting her as the next speaker (lines 2–3, figure 1). Still looking down at her baby (line 5), the mother repeats the comment on the cheese after a brief pause (line 4) and thus confirms it (line 6). But she accomplishes her confirmation in a neutral voice, in contrast to Clara's displayed pleasure. Moreover, immediately after her confirmation, the mother shifts her attention toward her son Louis, asking him to stop hitting the sink with the object (lines 8–10). While the mother is preoccupied with her baby and Louis (lines 8–11), Clara produces an assessment: "that's funny" (line 15), in overlap with her brother's singing (line 13). And after a short silence (0.2 seconds), the little girl uses the tag particle "huh say?" to solicit a response (line 17).

Instead of responding, her mother is primarily preoccupied with C1 and the baby (figure 2), inducing the little girl to repeat the cheese-is-rolling utterance, prefixing it with the address term "mom" (line 20). Clara's pre-positioned address term is designed to establish her mother's availability when she has identified this as being problematic (see Lerner 2003: 187). However, latching with the girl's utterance, her mother produces only a very weak acknowledgement "mh" (line 23). Filipi (2007: 33.14) argues that from 18 months onward, young children offer clear displays of whether they accept as sufficient their parents' use of minimal responses, such as "mh," to respond to their initiations: one way of manifesting that a response was unsatisfactory is to pursue a response by repeating the initial turn and/or by adding attentionals such as "look." In this extract, the little girl seems to treat her mother's minimal acknowledgment as unsatisfactory: it is followed by Clara's use of another tag particle (line 25) before she produces a full repeat of her initial assessment: "that's funny" (line 28), in overlap with the mother's loud reprimanding of Louis because of his activities and her angry look in his direction (lines 26–7, figure 3).

For obvious reasons, this first repeat does not get any response from the mother. So, the little girl combines a whole series of interactive ways to ensure her mother's availability before she finally repeats her initial assessment: Significantly increasing her volume, she prefixes her turn again with the address term "MOM" (line 30). She simultaneously directs her hand toward her mother's chin and lifts it up, thereby literally forcing her mother to look at her (figures 4–5). Through the deployment of an *embodied summons* (see Schegloff 2007: 49), Clara is successful in bringing her mother's attention back to her. Moreover, with the addition of a tag particle, inviting her mother to "say"—in other words, agree—(line 30) before uttering the second full repetition of her assessment, Clara produces three actions:[7] Firstly, this invitation induces her mother to maintain her attention to her. Secondly, it identifies what is to come—namely, "that's funny"—as something about which she expects that her mother has something to say. Thirdly, it invites the mother to participate in her activity, which consists of commenting on the "cheese event." Clara eventually manages to get a response from her mother in the form of an agreement (line 34) that closes the assessment sequence.

4.2   Children's Orientation to Recipients' Epistemic Access in Pursuing a Response

So far, we have seen that young children might determine that either the intended recipient's lack of focus on their talk (Extracts 1–2), or the recipient's lack of attention to them (Extracts 3–4) is the cause of a noticeable absence of a response to their initial action. Assessments imply a claim of epistemic access/knowledge regarding the object that is being assessed. Before producing a (satisfactory) response to an

---

7   For a detailed discussion of interactants' use of summons to achieve different actions, see Szymanski (1999: 7).

assessment, the recipients require access to the assessed object so that they can verify the claim being made by the first speaker (Pomerantz 1984a: 61–3). When children produce an initial assessment, parents are not always in proximity (Extracts 5–6), or the child might be referring to an object to which the parent has no direct access (Extracts 7–8). The analytical description of Extracts 5–8 seeks to show how, in their ways of organizing their pursuit of a response that is not forthcoming, young children deal with their parents' lack of access to the referent.

4.2.1 Pursuing a Response by Ensuring Visual Access to the Referent

In the next extract (5), a girl's positive assessment achieves an informing concerning the successful accomplishment of an activity she has just completed. In Extract 6, a boy positively assesses a model car he is holding in his hand. In both cases, the child is distant from the other family members when producing his or her initial assessment. Confronted with a non-response, children could infer the intended recipient's lack of hearing and simply repeat their initial turn by shouting. However, an examination of the extracts (5–6) shows that children use embodied methods rather than simply shouting to get a response: they provide the intended recipient with visual access to the assessed object.

In Extract 5, Clara (2 years, 4 months) and her father are in the bathroom, where they have just finished putting a card game back into its box. After the completion of this activity, Clara takes the box with the card game in it and walks toward the kitchen, where the mother and Clara's older brother Louis are sitting on the floor. They discuss whether Louis should continue painting or stop.

Extract 5
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Louis (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months); C3: baby (1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1   C2→   on a tout rangé[::#]
2         we have put everything [away::]
3   c2    <<-walking, extending her rh, in which she holds the
          box, toward CA1->
    fig                      # figure 1
4   MO             [Louis],* est-c'que tu veux=
                   [Louis], do you want to do=
5   c2                       *turning right, lowering rh->
```

```
 6   MO      =encore faire la peinture?#=
             =some more painting?=
     fig                              # figure 2
 7   C2⇒     =°on a [tout rangé°]
             =°we have [put everything away°]
 8   MO             [>autrement on enlève le tabli]er<
                    [>otherwise we take off the painting apr]on<
 9           *(0.4)
10   c2      *appearing around the corner, visible to MO & C1->
11   MO      +hein?=
              huh?=
12   mo      +shifts gaze toward C2 ->>
```



```
13   C2⇒     =#on a#* tout rangé=
             =we've put everything away=
     fig     # figure 3
     fig        # figure 4
14   c2             *speeding up pace ->
```



```
15   MO      =A::#h ça c'était une très bonne idée alors.
             =O::h that was a very good idea then.
16           (0.6)
17   C1      moi+ j'veux plus faire la peinture.
             i don't want to paint anymore.
18   mo       +shifts gaze toward C1->>
```

As one can see in figure 1, Clara is walking toward the other participants when she initially produces her assessment, which achieves an informing concerning the successful accomplishment of her previous activity: putting a card game back into its box with her father (line 1). While walking, Clara holds the box out toward camera operator 1: she exhibits it as a trophy incarnating this achievement (line 3, figure 1: see full extension of the arm). The camera operator is standing at quite a distance from the girl, is oriented toward the other family members, and is wearing headphones (figure 1). Clara seems to infer that she is not available to respond: instead of waiting for or pursuing a response from the camera operator, the girl turns to the right and walks toward her mother and the other children (line 5). The mother is still discussing the painting issue with C1 (lines 4 and 6).

Although Clara accomplishes this first repetition as she walks toward her mother, the girl is not yet visible to her, and her mother continues talking with her brother in overlap with Clara's first repetition (lines 8 and 11). Clara may have used these available resources to accomplish the first repetition, using a lower tone of voice and lowering her right hand, which is holding the box (lines 6–7), as if she were talking to herself and not expecting any response. However, immediately after Clara comes around the corner (line 10), thereby becoming visible to her mother, the mother shifts her gaze from C1 to Clara (line 12, figure 3). At this moment, Clara repeats her initial utterance (in the form of a full repeat) a second time (line 13). She simultaneously continues walking toward her mother (and C1 and C3), holding the box out in front of her and increasing her speed[8] (line 14, figure 4). The way that Clara *sets the stage* (Szymanski 1999: 8)—bringing the box into the recipient's *field of vision* (Mondada 2009a: 330)—while repeating her informing seems to be successful. It not only establishes mutual attention (line 12, figures 3 and 5), but also immediately obtains a change-of-state token from the mother: "o::h," which indicates the mother's new understanding. Furthermore, the mother adds a compliment addressed to Clara: "that was a very good idea then …" (line 15). Visual access to the box (evidencing the completion of the activity) is thus treated as sufficient grounds for proffering a compliment that is closing implicative: it is followed by C1's taking up the painting issue again and the mother's shift of attention back to him (lines 17–18). That children may identify a recipient's lack of visual access as a trouble source and remedy this to organize their pursuit of a response becomes even more evident in the following extract (6).

At the beginning of this extract, Faffa (2 years, 7 months) is on his own, standing in front of a bookshelf on which his father's model-car collection is displayed. He has taken two model cars (one red and the other black) off the shelf and is inspecting them attentively.

---

8 She probably simultaneously extends the box she is holding in her hand toward the mother and C1/C3. Unfortunately, neither of the two cameras captured this moment in the interaction.

Extract 6
Participants: MO (+): mother; C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1        (3*#.3)
2  c3     *looks at red car, starts walking down the corridor->
   fig     # figure 1
3  C3→   ça (t')elle est be#lle
          that (t')it is nice
   fig                       # figure 2
4        (2*.2)
5  c3     * looks at black car, still walking toward kitchen->
```



```
6  C3⇒   (.)*pis ça (t') elle est belle#
          (.)*and that it is nice
7  c3        * looks up and extends his lh, holding the black car->
   fig                            # figure 3
```



```
8  C3⇒   (0.2) *regarde ma+man comme ça *(t') elle est be::lle#.=
          (0.2) look mom like that it is nice.=
9  c3        * increases his speed-> *stands still->
10 mo                    +freezes in the middle of cutting ham,
       looking at C2->
   fig                                    # figure 4
11 MO    =elle est très belle, ouais.
          =it is very nice, yeah.
12.      (0.7*)
13 c3        *withdraws black car, directs red car toward MO->
```

```
14 C3    ça (t')elle est rouge?#
         that it is red?
   fig                          # figure 5
15 MO    (0.2)elle est rouge ouais.
         (0.2)it is red yeah.
```

Looking at the red car (figure 1), Faffa starts walking toward the kitchen, producing an initial positive assessment (lines 2–3, figure 2; floor plan). No response is forthcoming; a silence of 2.2 seconds emerges (line 4). The boy does not treat this absence of a response as problematic and does not repeat his first assessment. Instead, he continues walking, then shifts referents by gazing at the black model car (line 5), assessing it as "nice" as well (line 6). While assessing the black car, the boy continues walking toward the kitchen, looks up, and slightly extends his left hand, which is holding the car (line 7). Toward the end of his assessment, he reaches the corner of the kitchen (figure 3; floor plan). Looking toward his mother, who is now visible to him, he shows the black car, holding it out toward her (line 7). The boy thus displays his awareness that in order for him to get a response, the recipient needs to have epistemic access to the object he is assessing. Moreover, after only 0.2 seconds of silence, the little boy summons his mother: "look mom" (line 8), simultaneously accelerating his steps toward her (line 9). With his embodied summoning, the boy obtains his mother's attention (line 10), identifies his following assessment as something that can be visually appreciated, and induces the mother to participate in his activity, which consists of looking at cars.

He then comes to a halt (line 9) before repeating his positive assessment of the black car he is showing her, in the form of a full repeat (line 8, figure 4). Finally, latching with the boy's repetition, the mother responds with an *upgraded assessment* (Pomerantz 1984a: 65–6), using the intensifier "very" (line 11), and thus achieves a strong agreement with the boy's initial assessment. By withdrawing the black car at line 13, he displays his interpretation of his mother's agreement as a satisfactory closing of the assessment sequence concerning the black car. Moreover, by showing her the red car, he indicates a shift of referent. By asking his mother to confirm its color, the little boy initiates a new activity (line 14, figure 5), to which his mother adjacently responds with a simple confirmation (line 15).

4.2.2 Pursuing a Response by Proposing a Common Experience of the Assessed Object

In Extracts 7–8, a child produces an assessment of an object he experiences sensorially. Although the parent is sitting just next to the child, she lacks sensorial access to the assessable. Having no direct access to the assessed object can be used as a justification for not responding to an initial assessment (Pomerantz 1975: 12). The description of Extracts 7–8 aims to demonstrate how the children's embodied pursuits differ significantly from the ones discussed in the previous section (Extracts 5–6).

In Extract 7, Elio (2 years, 1 month) and his mother are sitting on the ground in front of their house. Before the extract begins, the little boy has a blade of grass in his mouth, and is looking at his mother with a smile.

Extract 7
Participants: MO (+): mother; C2 (*): Elio (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1              (2.#5)
     fig          #figure 1
2   C2→    *BEURK*.
             YUCK.
3   c2     *throws blade of grass energetically onto the ground*
4          (0.*7)
5   c2        *shifts gaze toward blade of grass->
6   MO     +beurk.
             yuck.
7   mo     +shifts gaze toward blade of grass->
8          (0.*4)
9   c2        *leans forward over blade of grass->
10  C2⇒   ma*man*, (0.2)* c'est* (0.3) pas+ bon.
             mom, (0.2) that's (0.3) not good.
11  c2       *picks blade of grass up*
12  c2         *shifts gaze, turns toward MO->
13  c2                  *directs blade of grass toward MO->
14  mo                         +gives C2 a serious look->>
```



```
15  MO     (0.#7) >c'est pas bon?<
           (0.7) >that's not good?<
     fig       #figure 2
16  c2     (0.6) *pfh.**
17  c2           *shakes head once*
18  c2              *drops blade of grass on the ground->
```

At the beginning of the extract, Elio takes the blade of grass out of his mouth, holds it out for 0.7 seconds between himself and his mother, who smiles back at him (figure 1), and then finally throws it energetically onto the ground (line 3), simultaneously uttering the negative *gustatory assessment* "YUCK" at line 2. Following the example of the *gustatory "mmm"* introduced by Wiggins (2002), the term *gustatory assessment* is used to refer to a sound which is produced during a meal or in a conversation about food and/or drink, and which conveys a positive or negative evaluation, in particular via the emphasis applied to the "mmm" or "yuck." After a silence of 0.7 seconds (line 4), during which the boy shifts his gaze from his mother to the blade that is now lying on the ground (line 5), the mother simply repeats the boy's gustatory assessment, likewise shifting her gaze to the ground (lines 6–7). Producing a second assessment in the form of an identical evaluation constitutes a weak agreement (Pomerantz 1984a: 68). On the one hand, the boy treats his mother's agreement as repair implicative (see Chapter 5). On the other hand, it is interesting to note that before repeating his negative assessment of the blade of grass by using more formal language, the little boy picks the blade of grass up again and holds it out between himself and his mother (lines 11–13). By "showing/giving"[9] the blade of grass to his mother, Elio seems to identify the trouble source for his mother's unsatisfactory response in her lack of direct experience of the referent. After another pause (0.7 seconds), this response comes forth in the form of a *questioning full repeat*[10] at line 15, which gives Elio the opportunity to confirm his initial assessment (line 16), underscoring it with a lateral shake of the head (line 17). The boy seems satisfied with his mother's questioning repeat. Indeed, after his confirmation (line 16), Elio merely lets the blade of grass drop to the ground, and thus out of their shared focus of attention (line 18), discarding the object as something not meriting further attention.

In Extract 8, Martin (2 years, 6 months) and his mother are sitting on the sofa, putting a jigsaw puzzle together before the boy has to go to bed. The little boy has repeatedly interrupted the puzzle activity with other activities, and thereby markedly postponed the moment he will have to go to bed.

---

9 Studies on young children suggest that they deploy embodied means to render their distinction between a showing (Kidwell and Zimmerman 2007) and a giving action (Kidwell 2012) intelligible to others: while for a showing action the child tends to direct the object to the recipient's field of vision, a giving action means directing it to the recipient's hands (Kidwell 2012: 527). In Extract 7 above, C2 holds the grass blade mid-way between his mother's eyes and her hands (see figure 2), making the distinction between giving and showing less than absolutely clear. However, the boy does not treat the mother's failure to take the grass blade as problematic. On the one hand, this suggests retrospectively that the mother understood his previous gesture as a showing rather than a giving. On the other hand, it emphasizes that participants' achievement of an action remains a fundamentally local and interactive matter.

10 For a detailed examination of parents' deployment of questioning repeats to respond to their young children's initial assessment, see Keel 2011.

Extract 8
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (*): Martin (2 years, 6 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1         (*2.0)
2   c1    *re-adjusting his position on the sofa->
```



```
3   C1→  a plus pied (f)*roid#
          have not anymore cold foot
4   c1                      *removes blanket that was covering his feet->
    fig                      # figure 1
5         (2.*7)
6   c1    *grasps his left foot with rh, and holds it out to MO->
```



```
7   C1⇒  eh tou#che
          hey   touch
    fig         # figure 2
8         (1+.6)
9   mo     +directs her attention toward C1 and touches his foot->
10  MO    o::+h ils sont bon chaud maintenant
          o::h they are  nice and warm now
11  mo      +withdraws her hand quickly->
12        (0.5)
13  MO    plus froid
          not cold anymore
14        (0.7)
```



```
15  MO    +montre voir l'#autre
           show the other one
16  mo    +directs hand to C1's other foot, grasps it->
```

```
    fig                     # figure 3
17      (0.4)
18 MO    oh + ils sont tout chaud
         oh they are completely warm
```

At the beginning of the above sequence, the boy sits back on the sofa and re-adjusts his position (line 2). By discontinuing his participation in assembling the puzzle, he creates an opportunity to re-engage in doing something else (see Szymanski 1999: 8). He then announces that his foot is not cold anymore (line 3). At the end of the assessment, he grasps the blanket and uncovers his feet (line 4). Although he thus sets the stage for getting a response, he does not obtain any reaction from the mother, who continues to assemble the puzzle (figures 1–2). The boy then grasps his left foot, holds it out toward his mother (line 6), and after 2.7 seconds of silence (line 5), invites her to "touch" it (line 7, figure 2). His invitation simultaneously accomplishes three things (see also Extracts 4 and 6 above). First, it secures his mother's attention; second, it identifies the previous evaluative announcement as something that is sensorialy accessible and can be appreciated, and third, it explicitly invites the mother to participate in touching his foot. The mother even pursues the sequence: she summons the boy to show her his other foot (line 15), then grasps it (line 16) and assesses it as "completely warm" (line 18).

In terms of the pursuit of a response, the boy seems to orient to his mother's lack of tactile access as the trouble source. The use of a shortcut—summoning the mother to touch his foot—not only seems very efficient interactively, but also provides the recipient with the opportunity to verify the correctness of the boy's initial assessment (line 9, figure 3) before producing an upgraded second assessment (lines 10–11). Martin thus displays his understanding of the relationship between the recipient's first-hand experience of the referent (possibility of verifying) and the recipient's right/obligation to proffer an adequate response to his assessment (Pomerantz 1975: 12).

4.3 Children's Orientation to Recipients' Position in Pursuing a Response

The production of assessments makes publicly available one's normative position toward the assessed object or activity, and constitutes the basis upon which "a congruent view of the events that they [interactants] encounter in their phenomenal world" can be negotiated and interactively constructed (Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. 1992: 181–4). When an assessment is not responded to, its producer might infer that the recipient does not agree with his or her position (Pomerantz 1984b: 153). Research on adults' ways of organizing assessment sequences has demonstrated that participants tend to avoid overt disagreement. One method of circumventing the occurrence of overt disagreement consists of

changing position (downgrading or upgrading the initial assessment) to lessen the distance from the recipient's presumed disagreeing position (Pomerantz 1984b: 153; Schegloff 2007: 151). In the following section, I seek to investigate how children might organize their pursuit of a response when they seem to identify issues of position and matters of affiliations/disaffiliations as being the grounds for the recipient's non-response.

4.3.1 Pursuing a Response by Changing Position

In Extracts 9–10, the child's assessment concerns the very activity in which he or she is engaged. In the first extract (9), the child is blowing soap bubbles and his positive assessment achieves a *self-praise* (Pomerantz 1978: 88) concerning this activity. In the second of these extracts (10), the child is just about to move a wooden rocking horse, and her assessment achieves a *complaint* about its heaviness. From other studies, it is known that participants tend to treat both types of activities as interactively delicate matters (see Butler 2008: 160; Pomerantz 1975: 112 ff.). As the analysis of these extracts shows, young children might identify the recipient's failure to respond in a satisfactory way to these actions as incipient disagreement.

In Extract 9, Elio (2 years, 1 month) and his mother are sitting on the ground in front of their house. They are blowing soap bubbles.

Extract 9
Participants: MO (+): mother; C2 (*): Elio (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1          (2.8)
2   C2     *h p*fh.
3   c2     *blowing a soap bubble->
4   c2         *follows the bubbles with his gaze->
5          (1.0)
```



```
6   C2→  #oh grosse
           oh big
    fig  # figure 1
7          (0.*5)
8   c2         *shifts gaze toward MO->
9   C2⇒  #↑grosse
            ↑big
    fig  # figure 2
10         (0.5)
```

```
11 MO     hein*? (.) +elle était grosse ouais.
          huh? (.) it was big yeah.
12 c2        *shifts gaze toward the soap bottle->
13 mo             +directing the soap bottle to C2 ->
14        (0.9)
15 MO     +°vas-y°
           °go ahead°
16 mo     +holds the soap bottle in front of C2 ->
17        (1.3)
```



```
18 C2     gosse (e h) gosse#* h pfh.
          big (e h) big h pfh.
   fig                # figure 3
19 c2             *blowing another soap bubble->
20 c2                 *orients toward MO->
21        (0.5)
22 C2     GROSS#E*
          BIG
   fig       # figure 4
23 c2       *starts moving his lh toward nose->
24        (0.4)
25        ((the sound of an approaching car can be heard))
```



```
26 MO     +t'en as une# sur le nez ((laug*hing)) (0.6) là.
           you have one on your nose ((laughing)) (0.6) there.
27 mo     + directing a pointing toward C2's nose ->
   fig            # figure 5
28 c2                           *wipes the soap-bubble off ->
29mo/c2 ((attention is caught by the passing car))
```

At the beginning of the extract, the mother is holding a soap bottle toward Elio and watching him blow soap bubbles (lines 2–3). The little boy follows the bubbles with his gaze (line 4) and produces a *surprise token* (Wilkinson and Kitzinger 2006) followed by the assessment term "big" (line 6, figure 1). In using a surprise token, the boy displays his astonishment and produces the assessment—concerning the large size of the bubble he has just blown—as a self-praise. At the end of his turn, Elio shifts his gaze to his mother (line 8) and

selects her as the next speaker. After 0.5 seconds of silence (line 7), he repeats his assessment (line 9, figure 2). However, he does not prefix it with a token as he did initially, and produces it in a lower tone of voice and with a slightly rising intonation, which implies an interrogative dimension. This downgraded repetition of the initial assessment indicates that Elio is dealing with the absence of a response by changing his position; in other words, he is *backing down* (Pomerantz 1984b: 159–61) from his initial self-praise and so lessening the possible difference between his own and the recipient's position. After another pause (0.5 seconds), Elio gets a same evaluation by his mother (line 11). It does not display any particular astonishment, and thus constitutes a weak agreement with his initial self-praise. As the further development of the interaction indicates, Elio treats this weak agreement as somehow unsatisfactory. Indeed, at the end of it he shifts his orientation toward the soap bottle his mother is holding in her hand (line 12), and thus induces her to invite him to continue blowing soap bubbles (line 15) by directing the soap bottle toward him (lines 13 and 16).

The boy accepts his mother's invitation immediately, but before blowing any more bubbles he repeats his evaluation segment twice (line 18, figure 3). After completion, he orients back toward his mother (line 20). While looking at her, he repeats his initial assessment segment, now using increased volume: "BIG" (line 22, figure 4). This time he *exploits prosody* (Mondada 2009a: 349) to produce an upgraded version of his self-praise, projecting an agreement from his mother in the next turn. By addressing an upgraded self-praise toward his mother, he indicates that in his opinion, a stronger agreement with (or even a compliment on) his upgraded self-praise is now due. However, after this repetition, other trouble (soap-bubble on boy's nose, noise of passing car) provides for the interactants' shift of attention to something else (lines 23–9).

The next sequence takes place in a rather complex interactive situation. The father has just come home from work and is taking some time to play with his two children. Susanne (2 years, 5 months) is preoccupied with a wooden rocking chair, while her older brother Léon is hiding under some blankets (figure 1).

Extract 10
Participants: FA (/): father; C1 (&): Léon (3 years, 6 months); C2 (*): Susanne (2 years, 5 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1  C2      *po(r)te:r=
            to ca(rr) y=
2  c2      *lifts up the rocking chair, moves it to the right->
```



```
3  C1      =xxxxx[((laughs))]
4  C2→          [LOU/:::#r*d]
                [HEA:::vy]
5  fa            /shifts his attention toward C2->
   fig                # figure 2
6  c2                   *chair hits bed, destabilizes C2->
7          (0.4)
8  C1      xxxx=
```



```
9  C2⇒     =*lou[#::rd]
            = hea[::vy]
10 c2      *lets go of the rocking chair
   fig         # figure 3
11 FA          [>/pas sur les livres] (alors)=
               [>/not on the books] (so)=
12 fa           /removes a book from under rocking chair->
13 FA      =pas sur les livres<
            =not on the books<
14         (0.2)
```



```
15 C2⇒     L*OU/↑::*#RD
            HEA/↑::VY ((shrill voice))
16 c2      *turns toward FA and C1
17 fa       /shifts attention toward C2->
18 c2           *lifts her arms theatrically in the air->
   fig             # figure 3
19         (0.2)
20 FA      *[bien sûr que c'est lourd].
            [of course it's heavy].
```

```
21 C1     [xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx]
22 c2     *lets her arms fall down heavily
23        (0.4)
24 C1     Xx[*xxxx]=
25 C2       [mh((weepy))]
26 c2        *lifts her arms, lets them fall down
27 FA     =tu sais pas par hasard où sont ces piles
           =you don't know by any chance where those batteries are
28        (0.3)
29 C1     non*
           no
30 c2        *lets herself fall down on the mattress->>
```

Before the above sequence begins, the father is kneeling on the floor and interacts with Léon, while Susanne, her back turned to them, gets up from her rocking chair. She then lifts the rocking chair, hitting a toy, and moves it to her right (line 2). She simultaneously describes her action (line 1) and loudly complains about the heaviness in overlap with Léon's laughing (lines 3–4). As she moves the rocking chair to the right, it hits the bed, and this destabilizes Susanne slightly (line 6). As one can determine from the transcription, Susanne's initial complaint induces the father to shift his attention toward her (line 5, figure 2). However, Susanne is not oriented toward him, and does not see that she already has his attention. She merely seems to realize that no response is forthcoming (line 7). Latching with Léon's (unintelligible) talk at line 8, Susanne repeats her complaint using a lower voice, thus backing down from her initial position (line 9, figure 3). However, she simultaneously lets the rocking chair drop on the floor (line 10), upgrading her complaint in an embodied way: it is not merely heavy, but too heavy for her to carry. On the one hand, she might simply have been asserting the validity of her initial complaint after a disagreement-implicative silence (non-response to her initial turn). On the other hand, she might also have been expressing a request for help.

However, neither of the possibly intended recipients, her father or older brother, seem to interpret the little girl's embodied upgrade as a pursuit of a response or as a request for help. Indeed, in overlap with Susanne's repetition, the father proffers a protest concerning the fact that the rocking chair has dropped onto some books lying on the floor (line 11), and immediately removes them (line 12), repeating his protest (line 13). The father's disaligning action induces the little girl to repeat her complaint "HEAVY" again: she does this in a shrill voice, and massively increases the volume (line 15). She simultaneously turns toward her father and brother (line 16). Showing a facial expression of despair, she lifts her arms up theatrically (line 18, figure 4). By exploiting prosody and theatrical enactment, she produces this second repetition as a clear upgrade. As such, it finally induces the father to respond immediately: he reframes Susanne's turn as something obvious: "of course it's …" (line 20), thus establishing the independence of the position that he asserts—a weak agreement. A weak agreement is often treated as disagreement implicative: following it, a speaker might reformulate his or her initial assessment to avoid

overt disagreement (see Chapter 5). In this extract, the father's weak agreement eventually induces Susanne to abandon the rocking chair issue altogether: first, she utters a weepy acknowledgment (line 25), twice dropping her arms heavily (lines 22 and 26) and letting herself fall onto the mattress shortly after that (line 30).[11]

4.4   Children's Repetitions of Initial Assessments Implying a Request for Help

As we have seen so far, young children may use assessments to accomplish a whole range of non-canonical action types such as noticings (Extracts 1–3), comments (Extract 4), informings (Extract 5), assessments, including gustatory ones (Extracts 6–7), announcements (Extract 8), self-praises (Extract 9), and complaints (Extract 10). In this final section, we will look at situations in which the child produces a negative assessment that concerns the activity he or she is engaged in: pulling down sleeves (Extract 11) and opening a game box (Extract 12). In contrast to Extract 10 above, the parents treat the child's assessment in Extracts 11–12 as accomplishing a request (for help), and thus as a canonical action type (see Stivers and Rossano 2010). The examination of these last two sequences allows me to further emphasize how participants' treatment and interpretation of each other's actions are fundamentally interactional and local matters. To reveal participants' perspectives and determine the distinction between canonical and non-canonical action types, a researcher must pay particular attention to the praxeological context in which an action is accomplished, and examine in detail the sequential unfolding of the participants' embodied actions through which a praxeological context is sustained or renewed.

The next extract takes place in the bathroom. In preparation for dinner, Faffa (2 years, 7 months) and his mother have come into the bathroom to wash Faffa's hands. The other family members are already at the table waiting for them. As suggested by Hester (2007), asking children to "wash hands" (and/or helping them to do so) is one activity in a series that mothers (or parents in general) typically accomplish before family meals. Instead of leading to further hygienic activities, such as brushing teeth, its routinized accomplishment before a meal is understood as getting ready to eat and as projecting walking to and sitting down at the table as the next relevant activities.

---

11   With her dramatic fall onto the mattress, she also metaphorically abandons the rocking chair issue.

Extract 11

Participants: MO (+): mother; C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1   MO     #+viens chouchou*
             come darling
    fig    # figure 1
2   mo       +strokes C3's head, directing C3 to the door ->
3   c3                   * starts walking to the door ->
4          (3*. 1)
5   c3       *stands still, starts pulling down his right sleeve->
6   MO     vas-y
             go ahead
7          (0.6)
8   C3→    c'est du::r.
             it's ha::rd.
9          (1*.4#)
10  c3       *begins nibbling on his left sleeve->
    fig          # figure 2
```



```
11  C3→    mettre la+# manche+#.
             to put the sleeve.
12  mo             +grasps C3's left sleeve ->
    fig              # figure 3
13  mo                    +pulls C3's left sleeve down ->
    fig                      # figure 4
14         (0.8*)
15  c3          *is slightly destabilized by MO's maneuver, stumbles
             against the plastic pot on the floor=
```

```
16 C3⇒   =mettre la (ma-)manche c'est dur#
17       =to put the (my/sl-)sleeve it's hard
   fig                                   # figure 5
18       (0.9+)
19 mo        +pulling on C3's sleeve, causes C3's arm to lift ->
```



```
20 MO    voi#là vas-y+#
         done    go ahead
   fig       # figure 6
21 mo                +rh/lh: shepherds C3 to the door->
   fig              # figure 7
22       (0.4)
```



```
23 C3⇒   (mettre la manche)+# c'est dur.
         (to put the sleeve) it's hard.
24 mo                    +lh/rh: "push" C3 out the door->>
   fig                  # figure 8
```

At the beginning of the extract, the mother invites Faffa to "come" (lines 1–2, figure 1), after he finishes washing his hands. Faffa initially follows the invitation, turns around, and walks toward the door of the bathroom (line 3). However, after a few steps he stops, stands still, and starts pulling down his right sleeve (line 5). This halt induces his mother to formulate a directive (line 6), "go ahead," thus asking him to continue making his way to the dining table. Instead of complying with her directive, Faffa continues to pull down his sleeve, whilst simultaneously uttering: "that's difficult" (line 8). Retrospectively, this embodied assessment accounts for the boy's dispreferred action to his mother's directive.[12] Prospectively, it seems to imply a request for help.

Following its production, a silence emerges (line 9) during which the boy manages to pull down his right sleeve, and then shifts his focus to his left sleeve (line 10, figure 2). After 1.4 seconds, he produces a *repair-like increment* (Wootton

───────────

12 The production of a dispreferred action is regularly accompanied by an account or justification; see Church (2009: 43).

2007: 190):[13] "to put the sleeve," and thus specifies the activity he is evaluating as "hard" (line 11). Faffa thus treats the silence after his initial assessment as displaying the mother's failure to grasp the referent. However, before the boy completes his specification, the mother takes hold of his left sleeve and pulls it down (lines 12–13, figures 3–4). In contrast to the previous extract (10), in which the child's turn was treated as a mere complaint about the heaviness of the rocking horse, the mother's way of responding to her son's assessment in this extract (11) manifests her understanding of it as a request for help. Indeed, she responds to it with an embodied granting—pulling down his sleeves—without using natural language. The two distinct interactive developments of Extracts 10–11 indicate how young children's assessments are performed in the service of a larger goal, such as a request for help; they are an inextricable part of a larger structure of interaction and therefore cannot be analyzed and/or dealt with in general terms.

The mother's help slightly destabilizes the boy, causing him to stumble against the plastic container on the floor and to end up standing with his back to the camera (line 15, figures 4–5). While being pushed around, the boy repeats his assessment, highlighting the referent with a left dislocation (line 16; see also Extract 2). His repetition is achieved in one go, and the term "difficult" is produced without vocal elongation. The mother seems to treat Faffa's repetition as an acknowledging comment on the way she grants his presumed request for help. Following it, a silence emerges (line 18) during which the mother continues to tug on the boy's left sleeve, now using both hands, and also pulls his arm up (line 19, figures 5–6). Altogether, the mother's way of pulling down the sleeve makes observable some difficulties she is having in accomplishing the task (lines 15 and 19). In this sense, she not only grants the request implied by the boy's initial assessment, but also confirms his initial assessment in an embodied way. However, Faffa seems not to treat these embodied confirmations as fully satisfactory.

As soon as the mother has managed to pull the sleeve down, she closes the activity initiated by the boy's initial assessment by using a terminal marker and encouraging him, in an embodied way, to make his way to the kitchen, where the other family members await them (line 20, figures 6–7). Although Faffa readily lets himself be *shepherded* (see Cekaite 2010 for a very detailed analysis of parental shepherding actions in directives) to the door by his mother, he simultaneously produces a full repeat (line 23) of his previous turn (line 16), making a final attempt to get something more from his mother, beyond an embodied granting, in

---

13   Wootton introduces this notion to refer to an increment that the speaker produces to repair his or her previous talk: namely, "bits of talk by a speaker that are added by that same speaker after the end of a TCU that has already formed a recognizable turn ending" (Wootton 2007: 176). Furthermore, in his analysis of a request and an offer sequence initiated by a child aged 2 years and 1 month toward another child of 2 years and 3 months, Wootton shows that children of this age are capable of using an increment to repair their initial turn when no response is spontaneously forthcoming by the intended recipient (see also Wootton's discussion regarding children's use of increments 2007: 176–80).

response to his initial assessment. However, she again treats Faffa's repetition as an acknowledgment of her help and thus as closing implicative. Faffa eventually aligns with her interpretation. Indeed, following his repetition at line 23, mother and son simply continue on to the dining room (figure 8), and the "sleeve issue" is pursued no further. As Cekaite points out (2010: 7), parental shepherding often occurs when verbal directives have failed to secure a child's compliance. The mother's directive at line 6, "go ahead," is not followed by Faffa, who prioritizes his attempts to pull down his sleeves. After helping Faffa to pull down his sleeve, the mother repeats her directive at line 20, engaging in shepherding him toward the door at the end of her turn. She thus successfully prevents him from coming up with another line of action diverging from the one projected by her directive.

In Extract 12, Clara (2 years, 4 months) is sitting on the sofa, about to open a game box. The other members of the family are in various parts of the living room and the (open) kitchen, but are not in direct proximity.

Extract 12
Participants: FA (/): father; C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1        (4.9)
2   c2   <<-tries to open a game box->
```



```
3   C2→  #il va pa:s le jeu
         it does no:t work the game
    fig  # figure 1
4        (1.4)
5   C2⇒  il va pa::s=
         it does no::t work=
6   C1   =clara, clara xxx pa::s.=
         =clara, clara xxx no::t.=
```



```
7   C2⇒  =le jeu:#.
         =the ga:me
    fig              # figure 2
8        (2*.2)
9   c2      *(after 0.8) shifts attention toward FA who is approaching
         from the left#->
    fig               # figure 3
10  C2⇒  *il va pas.
         it does not work.
```

```
11 c2    *shifts gaze to the box->
12       (1./3)
```



```
13 fa       /directs rh, then lh toward box, leans over it #slightly->
   fig                                                      # figure 4
14 C2⇒   /cô↑té/.
          si↑de.
15 fa    /grasps box/
16       (/8*.2)
17 fa    /turns box to horizontal position, opens it, sets cover aside->>
18 c2       *takes game's figurines and list of rules out of the box->
19 FA    tu veux faire quoi?
         what do you want to do?
```

While trying to open the game box (line 2), Clara makes a negative assessment, using a structure dislocating the referent to the right (see also Extract 2 above): "it does not work the game" (line 3). She does not address her utterance to anybody in particular but produces it in a rather loud voice, so that anybody in proximity can potentially hear it. After a silence of 1.4 seconds, she repeats only the assessment segment (lines 4–5). Latching with it, her older brother proffers an incomprehensible utterance that is probably addressed to Clara, or that otherwise concerns her (C1 begins his utterance by repeating her name twice, at line 6). Whichever might be the case, Clara, latching with it, produces the increment: "the game" at line 7. She seems to interpret her brother's interjection as indicating some trouble understanding/ grasping the referent (see Extracts 10–11). Another silence emerges (line 8); after 0.8 seconds, Clara orients toward her father, who is approaching from the left (line 9), and then produces a repetition of her initial assessment (line 10).

The way she achieves this repetition indicates on the one hand that she identifies her father's trouble hearing (or otherwise understanding) her assessment as being the reason for his lack of response so far. This is evidenced by her production of a full repeat, at line 10, of her assessment segment, which she produces while looking at him. As she begins her repeat, Clara simultaneously shifts her gaze back to the box. With the timing of this gaze switch, she achieves an embodied identification (see also Extract 2 above) of the referent: "the box" at line 11, and by proposing an increment she further specifies the referent (line 14) as soon as the father's hands touch the box (line 13). On the other hand, the way Clara treats her father's embodied actions shows that with her second repetition she was primarily seeking his help to open the box and not pursuing another response from him. Indeed, after this repetition, her father opens the game box (line 17), but does not otherwise respond to the girl's initial assessment. In doing so, he treats her initial turn as implying a request for help and nothing more. In contrast to Extract 11 below, the girl, by keeping silent after

her second repetition (line 16), which engenders the father's help in opening the box, makes it clear that she goes along with this interpretation.

4.5   Conclusion

Previous studies looking at children's pursuits of a response have observed that during their second year of life, children discover various turn formats and actions with which they can repair their initial turn at talk, and/or pursue a response (Filipi 2013; Forrester 2008; Wootton 2007). Wootton shows, for example, that between the ages of 2 years and 1 month through to 2 years and 3 months, children may pursue a response to their initial request by giving some additional information in the form of an incremental addition to their prior turn (Wootton 2007: 181). However, according to the author (Wootton 2007: 181), this developmental trajectory still needs to be fully uncovered. Offering an analysis of 12 situations in which young children's initial assessments do not immediately engender a satisfactory response from the intended recipient, and revealing how this failure of uptake induces the child to repeat his or her initial assessment and pursue a response from the recipient, this chapter looks at a phenomenon that has not yet been examined systematically by studies on parent–child interactions. It also tackles the research gap mentioned by Wootton.

In Extracts 1–4 of this chapter, the parents are busy doing things other than conversing with their child when he or she produces the initial assessment, achieving a noticing and/or a comment. In these situations, the children seem to identify the recipient's problem in responding (non-response) in his or her lack of adequate attention. Like adults, children may pursue a response by attempting an "interactively easy solution first" (Svennevig 2008), offering a full repeat and/or highlighting, specifying the referent first, and progressively developing their pursuit when this first solution does not bring about the projected success (see especially Extract 1).[14] With respect to children's display of linguistic competences in their pursuits, the children in Extracts 1–2 search for the adequate syntactic construction required to get a response. In her work on young children's ability to repair their own talk, Laakso (2010: 93) remarks that in Finland, the repairs of older children (aged 2 and up) display an orientation toward grammatical completeness,

---

14   In Extract 1, the boy's three repetitions make available an orderly organization involving the deployment of increasingly complex solutions for overcoming the parent's non-response: first, he treats his mother's open question "huh?" as indicating her lack of adequate hearing (repetition 1), then as a lack of adequate attention (repetition 2), and finally as a problem of adequate access to the referent (repetition 3). This order confirms what has been observed in adult–adult interactions (see Pomerantz 1984b: 156; Svennevig 2008; for older children, see Marcos and Bernicot 1997): when confronted with non-response(s)—or open-class repair initiators—interactants may opt for the (interactively) "easy solution first" before producing more complex and more interactively costly ones.

whereas for English-speaking children, syntactic self-repair emerges later (around 3 years and up). In their pursuits of a response, the French-speaking children in this study also display an orientation toward syntactic issues, as well as grammatical completeness (Extracts 1–2, but also 7, 11, and (12)).

In Extracts 3–4, the parents are preoccupied with another sibling (feeding or arguing with the sibling) when their young child produces an initial assessment. Following the parent's non-response, the child's repeat of the initial assessment takes the form of a full repeat. However, before/after the repetition is accomplished, the child secures a recipient's availability and establishes or re-establishes mutual attention, eventually managing to get a response from the parent. The children in Extracts 3–4 do not wait for a long silence to emerge before they pursue a response. Instead, they seem to view their mothers' observable involvement with their other siblings as constituting sufficient grounds for inferring that some particular interactive work needs to be performed by them to get a response. Beyond the response's noticeable absence, children seem to use the observability of the whole contextual configuration as a crucial resource for building up their pursuit of a response.

Studies on young children's pursuits (Butler and Wilkinson 2013; Filipi 2013; Forrester 2008) have convincingly shown that to get a response from their parents, young children competently deploy embodied means to establish recipiency in the first place. As Filipi remarks (2009: 127, 135), very young children (of around 1 year, 2 months) may already use the summons "look" to get their parents' attention. Slightly older children (1 year, 5 months) use the same summons to "narrow the referent" and to "move on to commenting or conducting some other action" (Filipi 2009: 186).[15] In contrast to younger children (around 22 months), who might abandon their pursuits as soon as they have successfully secured recipients' attention (Filipi 2013: 148, 155), older children (around 5 years) address a summons to their parents "to achieve a cause" (Schegloff 2007: 49): after obtaining recipiency, they build up their pursuits further until they get a type-fitted response to their initial action (see Butler and Wilkinson 2013; see Extracts 4, 6 and 8).

This study suggests that depending on the interactive context in which they produce their initial assessment, children between 2 and 3 years not only *distinguish* between establishing recipients' attention to the referent that is being assessed (Extracts 1–2) and securing recipients' attention to them as speakers in general (Extracts 3–4), but also orient to securing recipiency as a necessary first step for successfully pursuing a type-fitted response to their initial assessment (Extracts 2–4), while a parent's response in the form of a weak agreement and/or acknowledgment seems to be oriented to as sufficient, and thus as closing implicative.

---

15   For older children's use of summons to get another participant's attention, see also Marcos and Bernicot (1997: 790).

Studies focusing on very young children's initiation and pursuit of action sequences have moreover demonstrated that even before fully mastering talk, children use the observability of actions and/or of the structures of routine actions as the fundamental resource for rendering their own action intelligible to others, and for understanding what others may perceive (or not), know (or not), agree on (or disagree with), and intend to do (or not) (Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Kidwell 2012; Lerner and Zimmerman 2003; Lerner, Zimmerman and Kidwell 2011). By empirically evidencing young children's practical competence for inferring others' observable "intentions" (Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Kidwell 2012; Lerner and Zimmerman 2003), "desires," and "beliefs" (Wootton 1997: 188), these studies provide a crucial argument regarding the relevancy of detailed descriptions of very young children's participation in concrete interactions for the study of children's development of mind. As mentioned earlier, these studies look at young children's initial requests, questions, and invitations, which differ from initial assessments since the production of the latter displays not only the speaker's normative position and affective involvement toward the object, person, or activity that is being assessed, but also implies a claim of direct (visual/sensorial) access (see also the Introduction to this book).

This chapter examines four extracts (Extracts 5–8) in which the child identifies the recipient's visual/direct access to the referent as being essential for a response to be obtained. In Extracts 5–6, the child is at a distance from the other family members when accomplishing the initial assessment. Confronted with a non-response, the child first brings the referred-to object into the recipient's field of vision, and shows it to her (Extracts 5–6). After the stage is set, the repetition of the initial assessment might take the form of a simple full repeat (Extract 5), or it might be combined with a summons inviting the intended recipient to participate in the activity of "looking" at the assessed object (Extract 6). In Extracts 7–8, the children assess a sensorialy-experienced referent. When the parent does not immediately respond, the child might pursue a response by proposing a repaired repeat in combination with a "showing/giving" of the assessed object (Extract 7), or by summoning the mother to "touch" the foot that he is holding toward her (Extract 8). To pursue a response, the child ensures the intended recipient's visual access to (Extracts 5–6) and/or direct access to/experience of (Extracts 7–8) the referent.

According to Tomesallo, Kruger and Horn Ratner (1999), it is only around children's fourth birthdays that they are capable of attributing mental states (knowledge or understanding of a state of affairs) to others: the authors argue that this new ability is reflected in children's production of language that refers explicitly to "mental states" and in their successful prediction of what another child will do when the information given to him or her is known to be false; in other words, when children pass the "false belief" task successfully (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 111–12). By focusing on children's embodied work, this analysis of young children's pursuits of responses provides some demonstrations of how—in their embodied actions—children display the distinctions and

attributions (to others) that they make regarding epistemic knowledge of, or access to, referents, or the lack of such knowledge or access, long before they reach their fourth birthday. In this sense, following the suggestion of Garfinkel et al. (1982) and looking at what children actually do and how they do it when they engage in naturally occurring social interactions with others might provide some empirically grounded evidence relating to children's (embodied) competences for dealing with others' knowledge and understanding—as something which is publicly available—despite the fact that these competences are reflected neither in the ways in which children use language that explicitly refers to mental states, nor in their ability to pass a "false belief" task.

Finally, this chapter examines four extracts in which a child produces an assessment concerning his or her own action: blowing soap bubbles (Extract 9), carrying a wooden rocking chair (Extract 10), pulling down sleeves (Extract 11), and opening a game box (Extract 12). While the child's deployment of an assessment achieves a non-canonical action in Extracts 9–10 (self-praise, complaint), the assessment is treated by the parent as implying a request (for help) in Extracts 11–12, and thus as accomplishing a canonical action type. In Extracts 9–10, the child seems to identify the parent's non-response as indicating incipient disagreement. By exploiting prosody (Extracts 9–10) and theatrical enactment (Extract 10),[16] the child's repeat downgrades his or her initial self-praise (Extract 9) or upgrades the complaint to lessen/heighten the possible distance between his or her own position and the recipient's presumed disagreeing stance, and thus to avoid overt disagreement. Young children thus organize these pursuits in such a way that an interactive negotiation of the respective positions and an eventual agreement is more likely to occur (see Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M. 1992: 181–4).

In Extracts 11–12, the children seem to identify the recipient's problem of hearing and/or identifying the referent as the source of the non-response. The child moreover deploys further repetitions to acknowledge the parent's help (Extract 11; see Lindström and Heinemann 2009) or abandons the repeating altogether as soon as the parent engages in granting the request by opening the box (Extract 12). In contrast to the previous extracts (1–10), the absence of a spoken response to their repetitions is not considered problematic by the children in these last two extracts; instead, either immediately or after a delay, the children treat their parents' embodied (and thus silent) help as a satisfactory response to their initial assessment. The analysis of these last two extracts seeks to further highlight the fact that children's orientation toward conditional relevance and their embodied pursuit of a response needs to be analyzed in an integrated way, as inextricable from children's and parents' overall and embodied engagement in

---

16   It is striking that the children in this study seem not to use qualifiers, such as "very" or "a little bit" to upgrade or downgrade their initial assessment. Instead, they achieve their reviews of position by exploiting prosody and enactment (see also Chapter 5, Extracts 26–7, and Chapter 6, Extracts 9–10).

the organization of social interaction (for a similar argument, see also Couper-Kuhlen 2010; Schegloff 2010).

Forrester (2008: 122, 125) points out that there is a "certain ambiguity over whether a non-response by a participant is typically dealt with using procedures akin to repair or whether it is […] a pursuit of a response." In his study of young children's emergent competences in self-repairing, he adopts the view that when, following a non-uptake on the part of the intended recipient, a child reinitiates a first action, modifying it in some way, this constitutes a self-repair of some form, while the form of a repair might indicate young "children's sensitivity to sequential implicativeness" (Forrester 2008: 124). Detailed analysis of 10 assessment sequences (Extracts 1–10) shows that young children treat recipients' non-response to their initial assessment (accomplishing a non-canonical action type) as fundamentally problematic: its occurrence induces them to pursue a response from the intended recipient by reinitiating their first action *until* they eventually get a type-fitted response from the recipient (Extracts 2–10). In some cases, their pursuits may imply children's repair of the initial assessment itself (Extracts 1–2, 7 and 11); however, for the most part, the child's reinitiations come in the form of a full repeat of the assessment, accompanied by deployment of embodied attentionals and/or other embodied means for securing recipients' access to the assessed object (Extracts 2–10). *This suggests that from their emic point of view, children seem to deploy repair to achieving recipients' type-fitted response to their initial assessment and not for the sake of repairing their own talk.*

In contrast to Stivers' and Rossano's (2010) argument, according to which interactants treat non-responses to non-canonical action types such as assessments, noticings, and informings as unproblematic, this chapter demonstrates children's competent and methodical organization of pursuits. When confronted with a non-response to their initial assessments, young children not only distinguish different sources that might be the cause of the recipients' problem in responding, but also deploy a range of interactional tools to get a response. This suggests that instead of using assessments to express their individual, private stance toward a person, object, experience, or activity, young children treat assessments as important tools with which to *engage or re-engage others in social interactions* and to build up a shared understanding or evaluation of the world they are encountering and/or the activities they are engaged in.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 5

Parents' Agreements with Children's Initial Assessments: What About the Preference for Agreement in Everyday Family Life?

In the previous chapter, various methods that young children deploy in pursuing a response to their initial assessment if no response is immediately forthcoming were described and discussed. In this chapter, I will be analyzing extracts in which parents respond to their children's assessments with an agreement. I will first present preliminary observations on the frequency and the sequential/formal organization of parents' agreements and discuss these preliminary observations—in particular, the fact that weak and delayed agreements are recurrently used—in light of the existing literature regarding adults' organization of assessment sequences and their orientation toward the preference for agreeing responses over disagreeing ones. The discussion of these preliminary observations makes apparent that parents' agreements present structural/formal traits that are different from those observed in research covering the preferred way in which adults produce an agreement following an initial assessment. In the second part of this chapter, I will therefore investigate the implications that parents' use of different types of agreements have on what follows in the interaction. Taking into account the actions children achieve with their initial assessments and the embodied resources participants deploy to organize the sequences of interaction initiated in this way, this second part aims to determine the perspectives of the participants, which is to say the relevance and meaning that the children and parents themselves respectively attribute to the different types of agreements formulated by the parents.

5.1 Preliminary Observations on Parents' Agreements

As mentioned in the introduction, assessment sequences produced interactively are a special opportunity to investigate issues of alignment and solidarity, and to reveal how matters of "face" are dealt with by the interactants (Heritage and Raymond 2005: 15–16). In her studies on the interactive organization of assessment sequences involving adults, Pomerantz (1975, 1984a) has argued that the ways in which an initial assessment by speaker A is responded to by speaker

B is evidence that a preference organization is operative: an agreeing response is preferred, whereas a disagreeing response is usually dispreferred (Pomerantz 1975, 1984a). According to her, the alternative responses made relevant by an initial assessment (agreement versus disagreement) are thus not symmetrical or equivalent. Introducing the concept of preference organization to the study of social interaction, Sacks aims not to reveal participants' psychological preferences, for example their personal wishes, likes, and desires, but seeks rather to bring our attention to "an abstract or formal preference for agreement" (Sacks 1987: 63; see also Schegloff 2007: 61). Participants' orientation toward a preference for one action over another is observable (and evidenced) first in terms of frequency—in a response to a FPP, the preferred action is produced much more often than the dispreferred action (see Levinson 1983: 341; Sacks 1987: 57)—and second in terms of the actions' sequential and formal production (Sacks 1987, 1992 II: 367–9; see also Church 2009; Heritage 1984a, 2008; Levinson 1983; Pomerantz and Heritage 2012; Sacks 1987; Schegloff 2007). With regard to adults' organization of assessment sequences, Pomerantz shows that an agreeing response to an initial assessment is produced as the preferred action: it occurs without any (intra- or inter-turn) delay and is formulated in a clear and direct manner—for example by including a stronger descriptor than the initial assessment, or an intensifier such as "very" or "incredibly"—while a disagreeing response is produced with an inter- and/or intra-turn delay, takes a mitigated form (containing elements of agreement) and may be accompanied by an account (Pomerantz 1975, 1984a: 66ff.; Pomerantz and Heritage 2012: 214–16). According to Pomerantz and Heritage (2012: 215), adults thus display their orientation toward the principle: "Avoid or minimize disagreements, disconfirmations and rejections if possible."

In this study, the frequency distribution of parents' responses to an assessment by their child constitutes an initial indicator of the parents' preference for agreement: the responses take the form of an agreement in 134 cases (28 percent), a disagreement in 60 cases (12 percent), and in 87 sequences (18 percent), the parents use a questioning repeat (Keel 2011) to respond to the child. An initial investigation of assessment sequences in which parents respond *with an agreement* (indicated by ⇒) to their young children's initial assessment (indicated by →), moreover allows a few preliminary observations regarding *their formal and sequential features* to be made.

1 68agr

```
1  C1→   c'est  be↑au:[↓::]
         that's ni↑ce:[↓::]
2  FA⇒              [c'est b]eau: h↑ein.
                    [that's n]ice: h↑uh.
```

2 117agr

```
1  C2→   mange moi mm[mh↑]
         eat me mm[mh↑]
2  MO⇒              [<m::] ↑:h. ((affirmative))>
                    [<m::] ↑:h. ((affirmative))>
```

3 29agr

```
1  C2→   c'est saud les carottes.
         that's hot the carrots.
2        (0.1)
3  MO⇒   oui, c'est aussi chaud.
         yes, that's also hot.
```

4 113agr

```
1  C3→   t'as des voitures, as plein.
         you've got cars, got lots.
2        (0.2)
3  FA⇒   <ouais ((laughing))>
         <yeah ((laughing))>
```

5 127agr

```
1  C2→   >(j') aime aller vite.<
         >(i) like going fast.<
2        (0.2)
3  MO⇒   °(t'aimes) aller vite.°
         °(you like) going fast.°
```

6 51agr

```
1  C1→   m-[°s-] s- sais-° sais bien faire un puzzle.
         m-[°c-] c- can-° can do a puzzle well.
2  FA       [°mh°]
3        (0.2)
4  FA⇒   °toi tu sais bien faire ouais.°
         °you you can do it well yeah.°
```

7 50 agr

```
1  C2→   grand garçon.
         big boy.
2        (0.2)
3  MO⇒   <ouais, t'es un grand garçon, ouais. ((laughing))>
         <yeah, you're a big boy, yeah. ((laughing))>
```

8 61agr

```
1  C1→   (voilà/cela) (0.1) petit.
         (done/that) (0.1) small.
2        (0.3)
3  MO⇒   ouais.
          yeah.
```

9 15agr

```
1   C2→   a pas bon.
            a not good.
2           (0.3)
3   MO⇒   non, c'est pas °bon°.
            no, that's not °good°.

 10 73agr

1   C1→   GROS mou::che.
            BIG fly::.
2           (0.3)
3   FA⇒   OUI:.
            YE:S.

 11 42agr

1   C2→   il va bi↑en
            it goes we↑ll
2           (0.3)
3   MO⇒   <oui, il va bien. ((laughing))>
            <yes, it goes well. ((laughing))>
```

First of all, we see that the agreement from the parent following a child's assessment either overlaps with the child's utterance (Extracts 1–2) or immediately follows the child's turn (Extracts 3–11).[1] Moreover, the agreements in Extracts 1–11 are produced in a clear and direct way. In terms of their temporality and clearness, the parents' agreements present the characteristic traits of a preferred action. Yet it should be noted that the parents' agreements take the form of an *agreement token* (cf. Pomerantz 1975: 82; see Extracts 4, 8 and 10); a *same evaluation*—in other words, a repetition of the child's turn— (cf. Pomerantz 1975: 21; see Extracts 1–2 and 5), an agreement composed of a combination of these two approaches (Extracts 3, 6–7, 9 and 11), or a *downgraded agreement* (Pomerantz 1984a: 68, Extracts 4, 7 and 11) displaying a certain amusement on the part of the parent, although the children show no sign of amusement during the production of their initial turn.[2] These different forms of response resemble one another in that they produce a *weak agreement*, while an utterance including an intensifier such as "it is *very* beautiful" in response to "it is beautiful" accomplishes an *upgraded agreement* of the preceding assessment. Of all 134 agreements from parents, only two take the form of an upgraded agreement.

Secondly, in an initial inspection of the 134 agreements from parents I identified a small number of sequences (N=13) in which the agreement occurs

---

1   Of the 134 total occurrences of a parent's agreement, 44 sequences were identified in which the agreement is produced immediately (overlapping or latching with the child's assessment (N=14) or after a short pause of between 0.1 and 0.4 seconds (N=30)).

2   Of the 134 total occurrences of a parent's agreement, 13 sequences in which the agreement displays amusement were identified.

with an inter-turn delay—in other words, after the child has repeated his or her initial assessment (Extracts 12–13) and/or after the emergence of a remarkably long[3] silence: longer than one second (Extracts 14–15).

```
12 36agr

1  C2 →  (j') aime ça,
           (i) like that,
2          (0.3)
3  C2 →  j:' aime ça,
           i: like that,
4          (0.3)
5  MO ⇒  ouais, (0.1) toi tu aimes ça.
           yeah, (0.1) you you like that.

13 43agr

1  FA    <loui[st, pâtes ou du t]aboulé ? ((to C1))>
           <loui[st, pasta or some t]abbouleh ? ((to C1))>
2  C2 →       [c'est chau::d]
                [that's ho::t]
3          (0.1)
4  C2 →  c'est chaud.=
           that's hot.=
5  MO ⇒  =oui, elle est encore un peu chaude la:- la joue Clara.
           =yes, it is still a little hot the:- the cheek Clara.

14 130agr

1  C3 →  mais la verte elle (0.8), elle marche pas la verte.
           but the green one it (0.8), it doesn't work the green one.
2          (1.1)
3  MO ⇒  non
           no
4          (1.4)
5  MO ⇒  elle marche pas.
           it doesn't work.

15 23agr

1  C2 →  trouvé belles carottes moi.
           found nice carrots me.
2          (0.2)
3  mo     ((laughs))
4          (1.2)
5  C1     °°k-°° (0.7)°°to[u xxxxxxx°°]
           °°k-°° (0.7)°°fo[u xxxxxxx°°]
6  MO ⇒                   [ouais on a tro]uvé des be↑lles carottes h↑ein.
                            [yeah we fo]und some ni↑ce carrots h↑uh.
```

---

3   For the characterization of an inter-turn silence as remarkably long, see Jefferson's (1988) paper: "Preliminary Notes on a Possible Metric which Provides for a 'Standard Maximum' Silence of Approximately One Second in Conversation."

Research on the way in which adults organize assessments has shown that participants treat a delay in response as projecting a dispreferred action, a disagreement with the initial assessment that is not aligned with the preceding action (Pomerantz 1984a: 78–9). The fact that B's response is not forthcoming provides speaker A with additional opportunities to take back the floor and to produce a modification of his or her initial turn, downgrading or upgrading his or her assessment and thus "reversing the *valence* of the assessment" (Pomerantz and Heritage 2012: 2016) to reduce the distance between his or her own position and the presumed position of the person addressed. Consequently, the occurrence of a stated disagreement is *interactively* minimized, while the occurrence of a stated agreement is *interactively* maximized (see Schegloff 2007: 70).

On the one hand, the preference for an immediate and unequivocal agreement reflects the interactants' tendency to favor supportive actions aligned with each other, which is to say actions reflecting solidarity among the interactants (Heritage 2008: 18–19). On the other hand, the preference for immediate and upgraded approval is always relative to the actions that the participants are accomplishing through their utterances (Church 2009; Atkinson and Drew 1979; Lindström and Heinemann 2009). As was highlighted in the last chapter, by producing assessments while deploying various embodied resources such as facial expressions, prosody, handling of an object, gestures, and sequential positions, the interactant can accomplish a wide range of social actions, such as paying a compliment, formulating a request, producing noticings, complaining, closing a story or making an accusation (see also Schegloff 2007: 73–4). Depending on the action achieved in the first turn, the preference for agreement may be modified or even inversed; disagreement then constitutes the preferred action and is produced without delay, takes a clear and direct form, and is not accompanied by an account. The inverse is true for an agreement (Pomerantz 1984a: 77). When, for example, a first turn produced by A marks the emergence of a conflict or dispute (Bilmes 1988, 2014; Church 2009), produces an accusation (Atkinson and Drew 1979), or constitutes self-deprecation (Pomerantz 1978, 1984a), the preferred action may take the form of a clear and direct disagreement to mark B's opposition to what is being said to him or her.

> Agreement is not *invariably*—across all initial assessments—a preferred next action. What is the preferred next action is structured, in part, by the action performed with the initial assessment. For example, subsequent to a self-deprecation, the usual preference for agreement is nonoperative: An agreement with a prior self-deprecation is dispreferred. (Pomerantz 1984a: 64, italics are the author's)

In the literature dedicated to preference organization, much criticism has been leveled at approaches in which analysis is restricted to frequency distributions and numbers of structural and formal markers for the purpose of discussing interactants' orientation toward a preference for agreement (Bilmes 1988: 172,

2014; Boyle 2000; Church 2009; Filipi and Wales 2010). The main argument is based on the fact that such an approach would not make it possible to describe the orientations toward preference organization that participants make mutually visible through the way in which they organize their actions.

To take into account the fact that preference organization may be altered depending on the interactive context in which the initial assessment is produced and also on the action it accomplishes, the second part of this chapter adopts a praxeological approach. The aim is to account for the action-based context that the interactants recognize (and institute) when they produce assessments and respond to them with an agreement, as well as the embodied resources they deploy to achieve a particular interactive context. Furthermore, going beyond frequency distribution and formal distinctions, Pomerantz has suggested that adults' preference for lexically upgraded agreements over weak agreements is manifested by the fact that the two types of agreement have distinct implications for what follows in the interaction. While an upgraded agreement is generally treated as satisfactory by the speakers and implies closure of the adjacency pair initiated by the initial assessment, a weak agreement prefaces or projects a dispreferred action (the disagreement) and/or engenders a disagreement (Pomerantz 1975: 82; 1984a: 67–73). To reveal participants' perspectives, the following analysis also seeks to investigate the implications that different types of agreement—upgraded, weak, delayed—have for what follows in the sequence initiated by the child's assessment. The ways parents and children themselves treat the various types of agreements teaches us first of all about their orientations toward preference organization in various praxeological contexts. Furthermore, examining how parents and children deal with various forms of agreements manifests how they treat matters of alignment and disalignment and issues of solidarity. Finally, these empirical observations shed light on the relationships between the parents and children, and in particular on the practices of mutual categorization on which they seem to be organized.

5.2 Parents' Responses in the Form of Upgraded Agreements

In adults' conversations, it has been suggested (see Pomerantz 1984a: 66, 70) that unlike responses that take the form of a weak agreement, upgraded agreements imply closure of the sequence initiated by an assessment (Extract 17) and/or a series of sequences during which the interactants display their alignment with each other (Extract 16).

In Extract 16,[4] Faffa is looking at some small model cars on a shelf while his mother prepares dinner. The boy moves closer to his mother, orients to her, shows her a black car and says: "*look mom like that it is ni::ce*" (line 1).

---

4   This extract has already been discussed in Chapter 4, Extract 6. In Chapter 4, the analysis sought to reveal how young children deal with non-responses and/or unsatisfactory

Extract 16
Participants: MO (+): mother; C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1  C3→   *regarde ma+man comme ça **(t') elle est be::lle#.=
          look mom like that it is ni::ce.=
   fig                                              #figure 1
2  c3    *walks toward MO*        *stands still in front of MO->
3  mo            +freezes in the middle of cutting ham, looking at C2->
4  MO⇒   =elle est très belle, ouais.
          =it is very nice, yeah.
5        (0.7*)
6  c3          *withdraws black car, holds red car toward MO->
```



```
7  C3    ça (t')elle est rouge?#
          this it is red?
   fig                       #figure 2
8  MO    (0.2)elle est rouge ouais.
          (0.2)it is red yeah.
```

While moving closer to his mother (line 2), Faffa invites her to look at the black car. He shows her the car (figure 1) and assesses it: "like that it is nice" (line 1; see Chapter 4). The boy first obtains his mother's attention (line 3) and then a response to his assessment in the form of an upgraded agreement (line 4): unlike Faffa, the mother uses the qualifier "very." As a silence sets in (line 5), Faffa changes referents (line 6) and asks his mother to confirm the red color of another car that he shows her (line 7, figure 2). Retrospectively, the boy thus shows that his mother's response to his positive assessment was *satisfactory* and that the conversation about the cars may continue. Prospectively, his question makes relevant a response from his mother, and this response takes the form of a confirmation (line 8). It thus engenders the continuation of the conversation. The description of the extract shows that Faffa

responses to their initial assessment, and how they manage to eventually get a response from the intended recipient, whereas in this chapter the focus is on the parent's agreement and its implications for the further interactive development.

performs significant interactive work—moving closer to his mother, inviting her to look at the car (line 2), showing her the car (figure 1)—to obtain her upgraded response. In Chapter 4, Extract 6, I have focused on what happens before the above extract starts—the boy walks toward the mother, directs the car into the mother's field of vision, repeats his initial assessment, and forth—I suggested that if Faffa had not performed this preliminary work, his mother would probably not have produced any response, let alone an upgraded one.

Besides achieving assessments, as Faffa does in Extract 16, a child may use an assessment to produce a noticing of something that in his or her view is worthy of attention. By responding to this turn with a strong agreement, the person responding confirms the noteworthy aspect of the utterance's referent. In the following extract, Faffa and his aunt are sitting on his parents' bed. They have just agreed that she will read to him from a picture book that she holds in front of her.

Extract 17 (106agr)
Participants: AU (+): aunt; C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1


```
 1  AU    +regarde+,(1.0) depuis *quelques jou[::rs]
           look,(1.0) for the past few day[::s]
 2  au    +opens the first page of book+
 3  c3                          *lh: pointing->
 4  C3->                              [EST T]R#I::STE=
                                      [IS S]A::D=
 5  C3->  =(0.1)/#ba(r)bapapa/*=
           =(0.1)/#ba(r)bapapa/=
    im         #figure 1                    #figure 2
 6  c3                     *md: pulls hand back from book->
 7  au         /nods head/
 8  AU=>  =exactement↓ il est triste.
    AU=>  =exactly↓ he is sad.
 9        (0.6)
10  AU    et pis y'a françois et ses parents qui sont très inquiets.
           and then there's françois and his parents who are very
           worried.
```

At line 1, the aunt invites Faffa to "look" at the first image in the book. After a silence (1 second), she begins to read the story aloud. Faffa treats his aunt's invitation as an assignment: while the aunt is producing her utterance, Faffa indicates the main character Barbapapa (line 3) and then produces the noticing, "IS SA::D (0.1) ba(r)bapapa" (line 4). As in Extract 16, Faffa projects his noticing with an embodied action, in particular by *pointing* at the character.[5] As Faffa produces the noticing, the aunt supports him by nodding her head (line 7). After he has completed his turn, instead of using a simple "yes," she responds with an agreement token that is upgraded both lexically and in terms of its prosodic production: "exactly↓" followed by a repetition of Faffa's assessment (line 8). As in the preceding extract, the strong agreement concludes the sequence that was initiated by Faffa's noticing. Indeed, after a 0.6 second silence (line 9), the aunt continues reading the story and Faffa listens attentively (line 10). The two extracts above—the only two responses by a parent/adult that take the form of an upgraded agreement in lexical terms—validate the above-mentioned observations of Pomerantz: an upgraded agreement in the second position closes the sequence initiated by the initial assessment. We will now turn to parents' agreeing responses that incorporate formal and sequential features of a weak agreement.

5.3   Parents' Responses in the Form of Weak Agreements

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Pomerantz (1984a: 72) suggests that in conversations between adults, a weak agreement implies a continuation of the sequence initiated by an assessment. According to her, this continuation often takes the form of a series of disagreements or dispreferred actions. In this sense, the interactants use and treat the weak agreement as a preface announcing a disagreement/disalignment. With the exception of particular interactive contexts which are often of an institutional or more formal nature—for example, medical interactions (Lindström and Heinemann 2009) or interactions between a car salesman and his customer (Mondada 2009a)—this implication of the weak agreement seems to be fairly systematic. In sections 5.3.1–5.3.4, we will see that this tendency is also observable during interactions taking place between children and parents, but that it presents itself with much greater differentiation. The analysis will focus on extracts in which the parent's agreement takes a non-preferential form, such as a delayed agreement (5.3.1) and/or a weak agreement (5.3.2–5.3.4), to reveal the different implications these types of agreements have on the further interactions.

---

5   In her paper on participants' use of pointing in work meetings, Mondada (2007a) shows that pointing may for example allow participants to signal imminent speakership.

5.3.1 Weak and Delayed Agreements from Parents Serving as a Preface to a Dispreferred Action

In this first section, I will analyze extracts in which the child's initial assessment implies a request addressed to the parent. In adults' conversation, the preferred response to an initial request is granting the request and the dispreferred response is refusing to grant it (see Heritage 1984a: 269). As we will see in the following extracts, the parent's weak (Extract 18) and/or delayed agreement (Extracts 19–20) may signal the production of a dispreferred action: in this case, the parent's refusal to grant the child's request.

In the following extract, the father is putting a puzzle together with Martin before sending him to bed. Martin succeeds in diverting his father's attention several times—by talking about a fly in the room—instead of focusing on the puzzle.

Extract 18 (73agr)

Participants: FA (/): father; C1 (*): Martin (2 years, 6 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
 1   C1→    GROS # mou::che.
            BIG fly::.
     fig          #figure 1
 2          (0.3)
 3   FA⇒    *OUI:.
             YES:.
 4   c1     *orients toward FA->
 5          (0.3)
 6   FA     là::/=
            here::=
 7   fa         /brings puzzle box closer->
```



```
 8   C1     =*ma maman dit (0.3) *M: #ECHANT
            =my mom says (0.3)   N:ASTY
     fig                             #figure 2
 9   c1      *walks toward FA*
10   c1                        *stands still*
11          (0.2)
12   FA     alors on met [où le:s eh-]
```

```
            so we put [where the: eh-]
13 C1                 [(hein)d]is
                      [(huh)s]ay
14          (0.7)
15 C1       (°dis°) (0.2) c'est méchant/(l)
            (°say°) (0.2) that's nasty(t)
16 fa                                   /grasps C1 under the arms, lifts
            him up to place him on the sofa->>
17          (1.0)
```



```
18 C1       no:n#
            no:
  fig          #figure 3
```

At line 1, Martin produces a noticing about the fly being "BIG." After a short silence (line 2), the father responds with an agreement token (line 3) as Martin simultaneously orients to him (line 4). As the father produces the agreement token, however, he keeps his gaze on the puzzle and vocally displays a certain annoyance (high volume, falling intonation). The knowledge and/or epistemic access claim implied by environmental noticings (Sacks 1992 II: 90; see also Chapter 4, Extracts 1–2) not only makes relevant the recipient's response, but also requires him or her to look somewhere to verify the claim being made (see Szymanski 1999: 6). By not complying with this requirement, the father thus indicates that he is not committing himself to the line of action proposed by the boy. The father also follows his weak agreement with a "here" (line 6) which he produces as he moves the puzzle box closer (line 7). The father indicates with embodied action that he aims to involve Martin in the puzzle rather than comply with the boy's tacit request to turn his attention to the fly. By refusing to grant the request, he produces an action in disalignment with what Martin has proposed. While Martin continues to assess the fly (line 8)[6] and tries to obtain a response from his father (lines 13 and 15), the latter invites him a second time to join in the activity of putting a puzzle together (line 12), but without success. Finally, the father opts for a more radical method to make Martin comply: he lifts him up and places him on the sofa facing the puzzle (line 16). In response to his father's embodied action, Martin openly expresses his objection to cooperating and resists his father's efforts to continue the puzzle (line 18). Here, the weak agreement at line 3 thus allows the father to delay an overt refusal of the request implied by Martin's initial assessment/noticing.

---

6   The child may also be invoking his mother's voice in an attempt to induce the father to react to the fly.

In the following extract, the family has just finished their noontime meal, which included a dessert. Elio's mother tries to take him to the bathroom to wash his hands (lines 1–4, figure 1).[7]

Extract 19 (36agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C2 (*): Elio (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   MO      viens on va nettoyer
            come we go to clean up
2           (+5*.3)
```



```
3   mo      +gets up, tries to shepherd C2 toward the kitchen exit#
4   c2        *frees himself from MO's grasp, orients toward chocolate bar#
    fig             #figure 1
5   C2→     =(j') aime* ça,
            =(i) like that,
6           (0.3)
```



```
7   C2→     j*:'*aime ça#
            i: like that
    fig                #figure 2
8   c2        *bends down toward chocolate->
9   c2          *rh: further directs toward chocolate->
10          (0.3)
11  MO⇒     +ouais, (0.1) toi tu aimes ++ça, *ouais ça c'est le ch#ocolat+
            yeah, (0.1) you you like that, yeah that that's the chocolate
    fig                                            #figure 3
```

---

7   As Hester (2007) suggests, the members of the family render a meal observable for what it is by accomplishing certain activities in a certain temporal order: before the meal, mothers for example usually request that their children go wash their hands (see Extract 11 in Chapter 4), and in this extract the mother closes the meal in a similar fashion, by shepherding Elio to the bathroom to take care of "washing hands."

```
12 mo    +rh: directs toward chocolate+
13 mo                          +rh: grasps it, pushes it back+
14 c2                            *rh: withdraws, rests on table->
15       (0.5)
16 MO    +viens, on l'laisse +là
          come, we leave it there
17 mo    +shepherds C2 toward the kitchen exit ->>>
```

At the beginning of the sequence, Elio resists his mother's attempts to shepherd him to the bathroom (lines 1–4, figure 1). He simultaneously orients to a bar of chocolate that is lying on the table (line 4), producing a positive assessment of it (line 5). The absence of a response from his mother leads the boy to repeat his assessment (line 7). At the same time, his upper body leans further toward the chocolate and his right hand reaches toward it: he thus accomplishes an embodied identification of the referent (lines 8–9; see also Extracts 2 and 12 in Chapter 4). The mother interprets her son's positive assessment as a tacit request for permission to eat a piece of this chocolate. Indeed, after Elio's repetition, the mother hastens to respond to him with an agreement composed of two parts, the first an agreement taking the form of an agreement token and a repetition of the initial assessment (line 11), and the second an agreement token followed by an identification of the referent using the appropriate referent term. She simultaneously moves her right hand toward the bar of chocolate to place it out of her son's reach (lines 12–13, figures 2–3), and asks him to "leave it there" (line 16), eventually succeeding in shepherding him toward the kitchen exit (line 17). In this extract, the mother uses the weak and delayed agreement as a preface to a dispreferred action concerning the request that the initial turn tacitly conveys: the mother does not grant the child permission to eat a piece of chocolate.

In the following extract, sisters Manon and Anna are playing with a neighbor girl, Séverine.

Extract 20 (140agr)

Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Manon (4 years, 1 month); C2 (*): Anna (2 years, 6 months); C3 (%): Séverine, a neighbor girl; CA1: camera 1

```
 1  C3    aurevoi ::r (0.8) caca (0.2) >caca<
          goodbye:: (0.8) poop (0.2) >poop<
 2        (%1%.6)
 3  c3     %hangs up toy phone%
 4  C1    NO&%::[:n]
          NO:::[:]
 5  c3       %looks at C1 with a crafty smile->
```



```
 6  C2       [c'est] pas beau* caca:#.
             [that's] not nice poop.
 7  c2                      *leans toward C3->
    fig                          #figure 1
 8        (0.*5)
 9  c2       *looks at C1, then at C3->
10  C3    ou*ais=
          yeah=
11  c2       *straightens up->
12  MO    =no:n
          =no:
13        (1*&.3)
14  c2      *turns, looks at CA1->
15  c1         &looks at MO->
16  MO    >(c'est) pas beau. <
          >(that's) not nice. <
17        (0.7)
```



```
18  C2    *°c'est# pas beau caca#°
          °that's not nice poop°
    fig          #figure 2       #figure 3
19  c2    *looks down, walks toward MO->
20        (2*.1)
21  c2       *looks at MO->
```

```
22 C2      °c+'est pas beau# ca#ca°=
           °that's not nice poop°=
   fig                        #figure 4
   fig                           #figure 5
23 mo        +bends over toward C2, re-orients her toward C1, C3->>
24 C3      =ding dong t'salut#
           =ding dong hello
   fig                           #figure 6
```

At the beginning of the sequence, the two sisters are looking at Séverine as she ends an imaginary telephone conversation: "goodbye:: (0.8) poop (0.2) poop" and then hangs up the toy phone (lines 1–2). After a fairly long pause (line 3), Manon produces a disagreement token (line 4) in a high volume. In overlap with this response, Anna produces a negative assessment of Séverine's word choice while leaning in her direction (lines 6–7, figure 1). The two reactions from Manon and Anna are disaligned with Séverine's turn and indicate that the girls are sensitive to the desirability or undesirability of doing/saying a given thing. As Sidnell (2010a) argues, displaying one's normative positions toward the actions of others is quite a common thing among children, and should be examined as a socialization practice that is not engaged in only by adults/ parents. After a 0.5 second pause (line 8), Séverine responds to Anna's negative comment with a minimal agreement (line 10). It is only after these exchanges between the girls that the mother produces a "no:" with a slightly lengthened vowel (line 12). Her weak agreement (in the form of a token) with Anna's turn thus occurs with a delay. As a silence emerges (line 13), Anna turns toward the camera operator and Manon briefly looks at her mother (lines 14–15). After a 1.3 second silence, the mother adds a hurried repetition of her daughter's assessment, but omitting the word "poop" at the end (line 16). As a delayed (and minimal) production, the mother's agreement is deemed insufficient by Anna.

Indeed, Anna walks toward her mother, repeating her initial assessment. In contrast to her mother, she does not omit the word "poop" and produces the whole turn in an amused manner (lines 18–19, figure 2; see facial expression in figure 3). In the absence of a response from the mother (line 20), Anna utters her turn a second time (line 22). She is now standing directly in front of her mother (figures 4–5). Her posture (see figure 4) indicates that she is trying to get her mother to somehow collaborate with her in an admonition of Séverine's provocation, but at the same time her whimsical smile (see facial expression in figure 5) might indicate that she is enjoying the repeated enunciation of the word "poop."

Rather than deploring Séverine's provocation, playing the role of the guardian of the norm, the mother places her hands on Anna's shoulders and turns her gently toward her sister and friend (line 23, figures 4–6). In this sense, first the delayed (and minimal) agreement (line 12), then the absence of an agreement (line 20), and finally Anna's embodied reorientation all manifest the mother's refusal to grant her daughter's request to collaborate in reprimanding Séverine.

In contrast to Extract 11 in Chapter 4, Extract 19 above and Cekaite's study (2010: 7), in which parental shepherding occurs when parents' verbal directives have failed to engender the child's compliance, the mother's deployment of shepherding in Extract 20 and the more radical embodied means in Extract 18 allow the parents to render their refusal of the request implied by the child's initial assessment unequivocal, but without using talk. Whereas parental shepherding in Extract 20 eventually engenders the children's alignment, the deployment of more radical means in Extract 18 leads to the child's overt objection.

In this section, I have discussed cases in which the initial assessment implies a (tacit) request that the child addresses to the parent. We have seen that when the weak agreement expresses the parent's annoyance (Extract 18) or occurs with a delay (Extracts 19–20), it is used by the parent to delay the production of a dispreferred action (see Heritage 1984a: 269): the refusal to grant the child's request. As in the research focused on adults (Pomerantz 1984a: 72), the parent's production of a weak and delayed agreement in responding to the child's assessment may signal the emergence of an action that is in disalignment with the initial turn. However, further analysis of parents' responses that are in disagreement with the children's assessments shows that this use of weak agreement is rare (see Chapter 6). I will now examine some cases in which the production of a weak agreement by the parent may engender a continuation initiated by the child or the parent, yet does not display the emergence of a dispreferred action.

5.3.2 *Parents' Weak Agreements Leading to a Repair by the Child*

In this section, I will focus on cases in which the parent's weak agreement leads the child to offer a repair of his or her initial turn (Extracts 21–2), and/or to repeat it (several times) to obtain a more engaged agreement from the parent (Extracts 23–5). The examination of these cases seeks to reveal what children's subsequent actions might teach us regarding their interpretation of their parents' weak agreement.

In the following extract,[8] Elio and his mother are sitting on the ground. Before the extract begins, Elio pulls a blade of grass from his mouth.

---

8 This extract has already been discussed in Chapter 4 (Extract 7), where the analysis focused on the way the child treats the mother's first response, "yuck," to his assessment (the repetition of a gustatory assessment) as not satisfactory. It sought to highlight and discuss the embodied resources Elio mobilizes to pursue a more elaborate response by the mother, while in this chapter the focus is on the parents' responses (a weak agreement and a questioning repeat) and their implications for the further interactive development.

Extract 21
Participants: MO (+): mother; C2 (*): Elio (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
 1             (2.#5)
    fig          #figure 1
 2  C2→       *BEURK*.
              YUCK.
 3  c2        *throws blade of grass energetically onto the ground*
 4            (0.*7)
 5  c2           *shifts gaze toward blade of grass->
 6  MO        +beurk.
              yuck.
 7  mo        +shifts gaze toward blade of grass->
 8            (0.*4)
 9  c2           *leans forward over blade of grass->
10  C2⇒       ma*man*, (0.2)* c'est* (0.3) pas+ bon.
              mom, (0.2) that's (0.3) not good.
11  c2          *picks blade of grass up*
12  c2            *shifts gaze, turns toward MO->
13  c2                        *directs blade of grass toward MO->
14  mo                             +gives C2 a serious look->>>
```



```
15  MO        (0.#7) >c'est pas bon?<
              (0.7) >that's not good?<
    fig          #figure 2
16  c2        (0.6) *pfh.**
17  c2            *shakes head once*
18  c2               *drops blade of grass on the ground->
```

At line 2, Elio produces a negative gustatory assessment: "YUCK." He simultaneously throws the blade of grass he has just taken out of his mouth to the ground, and follows it with his gaze (lines 3 and 5). After an extended pause (line 4), the mother repeats her son's assessment in a rather monotone voice (line 6). The mother's weak agreement leads Elio to pick the blade of grass up from the ground and hold it out to his mother (lines 9 and 11–12). At the same time, the boy addresses a summons to his mother before repeating his assessment, this time using more formal language (line 10). With this repair of his initial assessment, the boy engenders a questioning repeat by his mother (line 15; see Keel 2011). In terms of actions, the mother produces neither an agreement nor a disagreement with Elio's assessment. Nevertheless, Elio treats her response as sufficient. He produces a strong exhalation, nods his head, and lets the blade of grass fall to the ground (lines 15–17), thus closing the assessment sequence.

The next extract presents a similar structure. The family is at the table having dinner. The child of focus, Luc, is seated at the end of the table between his mother and father.

Extract 22 (117agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (&): Lily (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Luc (2 years, 10 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1  C2→    *#mange, (1.4) mange moi mm[mh↑]
            eat, (1.4) eat me mm[mh↑]
2  c2     *orients toward MO, makes a circular motion with his fork->
   fig     #figure 1
3  MO⇒                              <[mm::]↑h.=((affirmative))>
4  C2→    =c'est bon.=
           =that's good.=
5  MO     =<mm:: ↑h. ((affirmative))>
```

Making a circular motion with his fork (line 2, figure 1), Luc produces a positive gustatory assessment (line 1), to which the mother responds with a repetition: "mm::↑h" (line 3). In contrast to the previous extract (21), the mother's repetition is produced in overlap with Luc's initial turn and in a fairly assertive voice, thus constituting an upgrade of the previous turn. Nevertheless, as in the previous extract (21), Luc treats his mother's response as an *other-initiation of repair* (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977: 364ff.): he repairs his initial turn using more adult-like language (line 4). The mother responds to this

with a second repetition of the initial gustatory assessment, again using prosody to give it an affirmative character (line 5). This second agreement, although identical to the first one, is treated as sufficient by both interactants, who do not further pursue the assessment sequence.

In the following extract, Faffa and his father are standing in front of a bookcase in which the father's small model cars are displayed.

Extract 23 (113agr)
Participants: FA (/): father; C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   C3→   t'as des voitures, as plein.
           you've got cars, got lots.
2          (0.2)
3   FA⇒   <ouais h((amused))>
           <yeah h((amused))>
4          (0.4)
```



```
5   C3→   t'as plein voitu:res#.
           you've got lots ca:rs.
    im                          #figure 1
6          (0.5)
7   FA⇒   PLEIN d'voitures, ouais.
           LOTS OF cars, yeah.
8          (0.3)
9   C3    oui:.
           ye:s.
10  FA    plein.
           lots.
```

At line 1, Faffa produces a noticing: "you've got cars, got lots." Immediately afterward, the father produces an agreement token with an air of amusement (line 3). The little boy treats this utterance as unsatisfactory. In fact, he reformulates and repairs his initial turn, emphasizing the evaluation term "lots" and using a syntactical construction underscoring the fact that these cars belong to the father (line 5). After a pause lasting a bit longer than the preceding ones (0.5 seconds), the father responds with an agreement which—compared to the first formulation (line 3)—may be characterized as being upgraded by prosody, with emphasis on the evaluation term "LOTS" and a higher volume (line 7).

In response to this upgraded agreement by his father, Faffa produces a simple reaffirmation (line 9), which engenders a series of agreements between father (line 10) and son, gradually accomplishing closure of the sequence.

In Extract 24, the father supervises Luc, who is seated beside the coffee maker and is preparing coffee for his mother.

Extract 24 (118agr)
Participants: FA (/): father; C2 (*): Luc (2 years, 10 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1   FA       #voilà, c'est bon.
              done, that's fine.
    fig      # figure 1
2            (*1*.3*)
3   c2       *orients toward, looks at coffee maker->
4   c2         *turns coffee maker off*
5   FA       >bravo[:<=
6   C2→            [beaucoup, beaucoup, beauc[oup=
                   [lots, lots, lo[ts=
7   FA⇒                                      [beaucoup, beaucoup,=
                                             [lots, lots,=
8   FA⇒      =beaucoup, ouais h=
             =lots, yeah h=
9   C2→      =i'y a ↑beaucoup de bulles.
             =there are ↑lots of bubbles.
```

At the beginning of the sequence, Luc responds to the request implied by his father's utterance (line 1): he turns the coffee maker off (lines 3–4). Immediately afterward, his father compliments him (line 5).[9] In overlap with this, Luc repeats the assessment term "lots" three times, achieving a noticing, without specifying the

---

9   At the beginning of this extract, we observe a classic pedagogical sequence (Mehan 1979). First, the adult initiates (I) the sequence by asking the child to perform an action (stopping the coffee maker) (line 1). The child then responds (R) by producing the action projected in the request (lines 3–4). Finally, the adult evaluates (E) the action performed by the child (line 5). A positive assessment from the adult generally closes the pedagogical sequence (Mehan 1978, 1979, 1985).

referent (line 6). In overlap with Luc's third "lots," the father repeats his son's turn, adding an agreement token at the end (lines 7–8). He produces this repetition with a flat intonation and accompanies the agreement token with an exhalation conveying a bit of amusement. As in Extract 22 above, Luc treats the father's weak agreement as an other-initiation of repair. Indeed, before a silence emerges following the father's agreement, Luc produces a repaired repetition of his initial turn: he utters "lots" with greater emphasis and includes it in a complete sentence invoking the referent "bubbles" (line 9). Luc underscores the referent, thus indicating that he expects greater participation from his father. Rather than using qualifiers such as "very" or "extremely" to strengthen an assessment, children tend to use prosody, embodied methods such as facial expressions, or repetition of the evaluation term (see also Chapter 4, Extracts 8–9). In this extract, Luc seems to treat his initial turn as being inadequate in form and therefore inadequate for an adult to repeat identically. With the repair of his initial turn, he may be trying to obtain a "more adult" response from his father. Nevertheless, the repair does not engender a response from his parent and Luc does not try to obtain any other responses.

In the final extract of this section, the mother and her two daughters Aurélie and Noëmi are discussing merry-go-rounds. Before the extract begins, Noëmi affirms that she likes riding on merry-go-rounds.

Extract 25 (140agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Aurélie (4 years); C2 (*): Noëmi (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   C2→   >(j') aime aller vite.<
           >(i) like going fast.<
2          (0.2)
```



```
3   MO⇒   °>(t'aimes) aller vi#te<°
           °>(you like) going fast<°
    fig                      #figure 1
4          (0*.3)
5   c2        *jumps#->
    fig          #figure 2
6   C2→   *BOUM*=
           *BOOM*=
7   c2    *touches down*
8   MO    =oup=.
           =oop=.
```

```
 9  C2     =to+lolo=
           =tololo=
10  mo        +rh: grasps C2's right hand, holds it->
11  MO     =>oh ben dis voi+r<.
           =>oh well say see<.
12  mo                     +rh: lets go of C2's right hand->
13         (0.2)
14  C2     <huh((amused))>
15         (0.3)
16  MO     <hehehe ((laughing))>
```

At line 1, Noëmi uses an assessment to express that she likes "going fast." Immediately afterward, the mother repeats her daughter's turn in a voice so low it is barely audible (line 3). Noëmi treats this weak agreement as insufficient. Indeed, using her body and voice, she demonstrates what "going fast" implies, and accompanies this demonstration with a facial expression that visually displays great pleasure (lines 6 and 9, figures 1–2), thus using theatrical means to render her initial assessment more salient (see also Extract 10 in Chapter 4). Following Noëmi's upgraded repetition, the mother responds with surprise (lines 8 and 11), accompanying her response with a body movement underscoring her participation in Noëmi's story (line 10). This second agreement engenders laughter initiated by Noëmi (line 14), and joined into by the mother (line 16), displaying their mutual alignment (on the use of laughing to display alignment, see also Chapter 3, Extract 1).

To conclude this section, after children's assessments, including gustatory ones (Extracts 21–2 and 25) or noticings (Extracts 23–4), parents might respond with a weak agreement: when the parent's weak agreement[10] is produced in a monotone voice and without engagement (Extracts 21–2 and 24–5), or conveys an aspect of disalignment on the parent's part (Extract 23), the child orients to the weak agreement as being unsatisfactory. Indeed, rather than abandoning the assessment sequence after obtaining the parent's weak agreement, the child treats the parent's response as an other-initiation of repair and continues the sequence initiated by his or her initial assessment by offering a repaired repetition of it—by replacing the negative or positive gustatory assessment with a complete utterance (Extracts 21–2), by proposing a more adult-like syntax than the one used in the initial turn (Extracts 23–4)—and/or by producing an upgraded repetition of the initial turn using embodied resources such as prosody, mimicry, or gestures (Extracts 24–5). This repaired/upgraded repetition by the child may engender no response from the parent at all (Extract 24) or a simple repetition of the child's initial gustatory assessment (Extract 22). In spite of this, in the two cases examined (Extracts 22 and 24), the child does not continue trying to obtain a more elaborate response from the parent. In contrast to Chapter 4 (Extracts 2, 7 and 11), in which the

---

10   These are weak agreements that take the form of a repetition of a gustatory assessment (Extracts 21–2), an agreement token plus amusement (Extract 23), or a repetition of the child's turn (Extracts 24–5).

children used repaired repetitions of their initial assessment to pursue a more elaborate response from their parents, here the children may be repairing their initial assessment just for the sake of repairing.

5.3.3   Weak Agreements Engendering Parents' Repair or Initiation of Next Action

In the following section, we will see that after the production of a weak agreement, the parent may himself or herself speak again (immediately, or after a pause) to produce an increment, to add an upgraded agreement (Extract 26), to continue the conversation on the topic of the referent invoked by the child (Extract 27), or to grant the request that the child's initial assessment may imply (Extracts 28–30). They thus indicate in every case that they consider their first weak agreement to be an insufficient response to the child's initial turn.

In the following extract, Faffa, his mother, and his grandmother are discussing an animated film—*One Hundred and One Dalmatians*—that Faffa has watched earlier that same afternoon. The father observes the scene from his desk (figure 1).

Extract 26 (92agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; GM (%): grandmother; C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1   C3→      *est **méch#ant(e) cruella
             is  mean    cruella
    fig                  #figure 1
2   c3       *orients toward MO/GM*
3   c3          *looks at MO->
4            (0.2)
```



```
5   MO⇒      [+o#uais+]
             [yeah]
6   mo       +nods+
```

```
 7   GM⇒    [%o#uais%]
            [yeah ]
     fig        #figure 2
 8   gm     %nods%
 9          (0.3)
10   GM⇒    très* méchante.
            very  mean.
11   c3          *looks at GM->
12          (0.4)
```



```
13   C3     tr#%ès méchant.%
            very mean.
     fig       #figure 3
14   gm       %nods%
15          (0.3)
16   FA     pis elle roule dans la neige*
            and she drives in the snow
17   c3                              *looks down->>
18          (0.1)
19   C3     ai ai ai
20          (0.3)
21   MO     ouais d[ans] la neige
            yeah [in] the snow
22   C3            [oui]
                   [yes]
23          (2.8)
24   MO     °(ben/hein) oui, (0.2) elle est très méchante.°
            °(well/huh) yes, (0.2) she is very mean.°
```

At line 1, Faffa uses an assessment to produce a noticing that the main character of the film (Cruella) is "mean." He first simultaneously orients to his mother and grandmother (line 2) and then looks at his mother (line 3, figure 1). Immediately after the completion of his turn, the mother and grandmother simultaneously produce a simple "yeah" (lines 5 and 7), using prosody and body language to render their agreement more salient (line 6, figure 2). Yet, after a brief silence, the grandmother speaks again to produce a repetition of the assessment (line 10), which she upgrades by adding and emphasizing the intensifier "very." Retrospectively, she thus treats her preceding agreement token as insufficient. Prospectively, it constitutes a bid to pursue the interaction initiated by Faffa's assessment, engendering his confirmation (line 13). Furthermore, after a sequence inserted by the father (line 16 ff.) and a long silence (line 23), the mother repeats the grandmother's upgraded agreement (line 10), confirming it. This confirmation from the mother eventually closes the sequence initiated by Faffa's noticing.

In the following extract, Faffa is sitting in front of the bookshelf, where a large number of collectible model cars are displayed (see Extract 23). The father is standing behind him.

Extract 27 (115agr)
Participants: FA: father; C3: Faffa (2 years, 7 months) CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   c3      ((holds a model car in his hand, looks at it))
```



```
2   FA      celle-ci f(ai)sait des #courses
            this one did races
    fig                         #figure 1
3           (0.5)
4   C3      (elle)f(ai)sait courses
            (it)did races
5           (0.3)
6   FA      ouais, (0.1) c'est une voiture de cou°rses.°
            yeah, (0.1) that's a °race° car.
7           (0.2)
8   C3→     elle est ↑BE::[:lle.]
            it is      ↑NI::[:ce.]
9   FA⇒                [voiture] de rallye ouais elle est be:↑lle,=
                       [rally] car yeah it is ni:↑tce=
10  FA⇒     =j'aime bien la couleur aussi. bleu[ ciel.
            =i like         the color also. sky[ blue.
11  C3                                         [*j'ai:me=
                                               [ i li:ke=
12  c3                                         *orients toward shelf,
            directs car toward shelf->
13  C3      =la coul↑eu::r (0.3)*(là)
            =the col↑o::r (0.3)*(here)
```

At the beginning of the sequence, Faffa is holding a model car in his hand and looking at it (line 1). Looking at the car over the boy's shoulder (figure 1), the father comments that this one "did races" (line 2). After a brief silence (line 3), the boy repeats the comment in a monotone voice (line 4). This leads the father to confirm and specify that it is a "race car" (line 6). Immediately after the father completes his turn (line 6), Faffa produces a positive assessment of the car (line 8) with falling intonation and a softer voice. In overlap with this, the father first uses a term that comes from the English language but is now a part of the French vocabulary— "rallye"—to designate the car (line 9). Next, he produces a weak agreement with Faffa's positive assessment. This is composed of an agreement token and a repetition of the assessment (line 8). As shown in the transcription, the father treats his own weak agreement as insufficient. In fact, without any silence taking place, he adds a positive assessment concerning the color of the same referent (he uses the connector "also"), separating the two actions by intonation alone. Retrospectively, this second assessment by the father constitutes an elaboration of his preceding weak agreement. Prospectively, it leads Faffa to produce an upgraded agreement using prosody (lines 11 and 13) and to close the assessment of the car in question: he takes it back to the bookshelf and places it there (line 14).

The three extracts that follow differ from the two preceding ones in that the parent treats the child's assessment as implying a request (Extracts 28–31). Unlike the extracts discussed in section 5.3.1, in which the parents used the weak agreement to delay their embodied refusal of the child's request, the parents in the following extracts add something to their weak agreement to grant the request implied by the child's assessment.

In the following extract, the mother and two children are on the patio, seated at the table in preparation for dinner, which has not yet begun. While the mother cuts some pizza for her son, Clara looks around her (figure 1).

Extract 28 (47agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Louis (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months);
CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1   C2→ *oh#,(0.3) il y a beaucoup du vent.
         *oh,(0.3) there is a lot of wind.
   fig       #figure 1
2   c2   *looks toward the yard->
```

```
 3        (0.1)
 4  MO⇒ oui.
          yes.
 5        (*2.0)
 6   c2   *looks at CA1->
 7  MO   le vent il +souffle.
          the wind it blows.
 8   mo               +brief gaze toward C2, continues cutting pizza->
 9        (0.+4)
10   mo      +looks down at pizza->
11  MO   t'as assez chaud ma fifille↑ t'es [pas trop habillée]=
          are you warm enough my darl↑ing you're [not very well
          covered]=
12  C2                                      [no::↑::n↓]=
                                            [no::↑::↓]=
13  MO   =+toi.
          =you.
14   mo    +looks at C2, continues cutting pizza->>
15        (0. 6)
16  MO   j'vais aller t'chercher un pantalon.
          i'm going to go get you a pair of pants.
```

Just after directing her gaze toward the yard (line 2), where hanging sheets are moving in the breeze, Clara produces a surprise token, thereby announcing something unexpected. After a silence (0.3 seconds), she produces a noticing that "there is a lot of wind" (line 1). In response to this noticing, the mother immediately produces a simple "yes" which she delivers in a very affirmative voice (line 4). She also continues cutting the pizza. Despite this response, Clara keeps on looking around her and resting her gaze upon CA1 (line 6). She thus tacitly indicates that the topic has not been exhausted. After a silence (line 5), the mother takes the floor again to produce an addition to her preceding agreement: "the wind is blowing" (line 7). On one hand, this constitutes an alternative formulation, an *other-repair* of Clara's initial turn (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977: 363). On the other hand, in this turn, the mother seems to also reinterpret the initial noticing (line 1) of her daughter as a possible request, for after the reaffirmation, she worries about her daughter's well-being and announces that she is going to get her "a pair of pants" (lines 11, 13, and 16). In both cases, the mother treats her agreement token at line 4 as insufficient and speaks again to remedy this.

In Extract 29, the mother is reading the newspaper when her son Luc discovers a "booger" in his nose (figure 1).

Extract 29 (116agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Lily (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Luc (2 years, 10 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
 1  C2     *#rega+::rde
             loo::k
 2  c2     *turns toward MO, walks toward MO and directs his left
           index finger toward her->
    fig     #figure 1
 3  mo            *looks up from the newspaper and at C2's finger->
 4         (*2*.7)
 5  c2      *stands still and shows his left finger to his MO->
 6  c2       *rh: directs to his nose, extracts another "booger"->
 7  MO     c'est quoi?
           what is it?
 8         (0.3)
```



```
 9  C2→    *b#-bêê::↑h[::]
             b- bee::↑h[::]
    fig      #figure 2
10  c2     *rh: directs closer toward MO->
11  MO⇒              [AH]#::: ouais, >ouais alors tu vas chercher un=
                     [AH]::: yeah, >yeah so you go get a=
12  MO⇒    =mouchoir.<
           =tissue.<
    fig                #figure 3
13         (1.3)
14  MO     va chercher dans la-, dans la
           go get it in the-, in the
```

Before the extract begins, Luc is inspecting the "booger" (figure 1). While turning toward his mother and moving closer to her (line 2), Luc tells his mother to "look" (line 1). He thus achieves three actions simultaneously (see also Chapter 4, Extracts 4 and 6): first, he obtains his mother's attention, interrupting her reading (line 3). Second, he makes it clear that there is something to be visually assessed on the finger he extends toward her (line 2). And finally, he successfully invites her to participate in his activity, which consists of inspecting the dried nasal mucus on his finger. With skepticism, the mother follows his instruction and then asks him for clarification (line 7). Luc responds with a negative assessment (line 9), lengthening the vowel (see Extract 18). In overlap with Luc's turn, the mother first produces a change-of-state token, which extends into an agreement token that she repeats afterward (line 11). We observe that in lexical terms the mother's agreement is minimal: "AH:::yeah, yeah." However, she amplifies this with her facial expression (figure 3). Furthermore, her response is not limited to the agreement: by adding a directive addressed to her son (line 11), the mother treats the boy's initial negative assessment as a request for advice/help from her. Luc obeys immediately and heads for the kitchen to get a facial tissue. The response as a whole, composed of an agreement token and enhanced by a facial expression and a directive from the mother, is therefore considered sufficient by the interactants for a closure of the assessment sequence.

In the final extract in this section, the family is at the table and the mother is serving Noëmi and her older sister (figure 1a). She then leaves the table to bring the meat from the kitchen.

Extract 30 (127agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; APG (%): Au Pair Girl; C1 (&): Aurélie (4 years); C2 (*): Noëmi (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1          (#1+*6*.5*)
   fig     #figure 1a
```



```
2  mo      +leaves the table, goes to kitchen->
3  c2          *blows*#
   fig            #figure 1b
4  c2            *lh: picks up a piece of pasta, eats it, picks up a
           vegetable#,drops it quickly*
```

```
fig              #figure 2
```



```
 5  C2→   a# *chaud#
          is  hot
    fig    #figure 3
    fig           #figure 4
 6  c2          *turns toward MO->
 7        (0.3)
 8  MO⇒   oui, >j'coupe juste la viande et j'arrive.<
 8        yes, >i just cut the meat and i come.<
 9        (1.5)
10  MO⇒   oui, c'est chaud noëmi. j'ai dis que c'était chaud la=
          yes, that's hot noëmi. I told you that that was hot the=
11  MO⇒   =viande *(0.5) pis ehm (0.+4)* hopla (0.3) les légumes.
          =meat(0.5) and then hem (0.4) here we go (0.3) the vegetables.
12  c2          *turns toward her plate ->
13  mo                          +drops a spatula on the floor+
14  c2                            *picks up a piece of pasta, eats it->
```

While the mother is placing food on her older sister's plate, Noëmi blows on the food on her own plate (line 3, figures 1a–b). Just as the mother begins walking toward the kitchen (line 2), Noëmi first eats a piece of pasta with her fingers (line 4) and then picks up a vegetable, which she drops, complaining "is hot" (line 5, figures 2–3). She simultaneously turns toward her mother (figure 4). After a brief silence (0.3 seconds), the mother produces an agreement token in an affirmative tone of voice (line 8). Moreover, she adds an account of her delayed reaction (line 8). Complaining about something that belongs to the parent's field of responsibility—the mother is responsible for the child's physical safety—is a delicate thing (this question will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). Indeed, the mother treats Noëmi's complaint as a request to come to her assistance, her minimal agreement therefore being considered as an insufficient response. After a pause of 1.5 seconds (line 9), the mother speaks again to produce a second agreement (lines 10–11). On the one hand, this second agreement is more detailed than the one at line 8. On the other hand, the mother follows it with a reason (lines 10–11)—she had warned Noëmi earlier—thus canceling Noëmi's legitimacy in making a complaint to her mother. At the same time, Noëmi reorients to her plate to eat another piece of pasta (lines 12 and 14). In this extract, mother and daughter treat the first agreement token accompanied by

an account as insufficient: they do not continue the activities in which they had been engaged until after a more detailed response is provided.

In conclusion: in the cases discussed above, it is the parents who treat their own weak agreement as insufficient. In the first two extracts, the child uses the assessment to accomplish a noticing or to assess something (Extracts 26–7). A parent and/or grandmother first produces an upgraded agreement token (Extract 26) in one case, and a repetition plus an agreement token (Extract 27) following the child's assessment in the other. Next, the grandmother adds an upgraded second assessment (Extract 26), and the father offers a new positive assessment linked to the same referent (Extract 27). With this second agreement, the parent and/or grandmother thus unequivocally express their alignment with the child's initial position. Moreover, in both cases, the first agreement can be designated as weak only in lexical terms. But in terms of prosody (very affirmative tone of voice) and embodied production (nodding head, facial expression), the parent's response takes on a certain intensity. In this sense, the weak agreement treated as insufficient by the parent is clearly distinguished from what was discussed in the preceding section.

Extracts 28–30 differ from the first two ones (Extracts 26–7) in that the parent treats the child's initial turn as an assessment implying a request addressed to the parent. After producing an agreement token (Extracts 28–30), the parent treats it as insufficient and takes a stand on the request implied in the child's initial turn. It would seem that in these cases, the parent prefers to elaborate on the positive response to the child's request rather than give further emphasis to the agreement. In other words, in this particular interactive context, the response to the requested activity is prioritized over upgraded agreement, as has been observed in other care interactions (Lindström and Heinemann 2009).

5.3.4   Weak Agreements Treated as Sufficient by the Interactants

In the two preceding sections, either the child, the parent or both treat the parent's first weak agreement as being insufficient as a response to the child's initial assessment. In this section, I will focus on extracts (31–36) in which the parent's weak agreement poses no problems for the interactants, which is to say that the parent's weak agreement closes the adjacency pair initiated by the child's assessment. In this sense, they differ appreciably from the extracts analyzed so far. Consequently, the aim of the analysis is to investigate whether these extracts manifest sequential, formal, and/or praxeological traits that are distinct from those we have seen so far.

The first extract takes place while two sisters, Manon and Anna, are drawing. The mother is not drawing with them, but comes over regularly to supervise them.

Extract 31 (23agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Manon (4 years, 1 month); C2 (*): Anna (2 years, 6 months);
CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1          (*1.8)
2    c2    *points at a cactus with her pen->
```



```
3    C2→  #°°il est à l'en*ver+s°°.
            °°it is upside down°°.
     fig   #figure 1
4    c2                        *withdraws the pen->>
5    mo                          +looks at C2->
6          (0.6)
7    MO⇒  °+oui++, (.) il est à l'envers.°
            °yes, (.) it is upside down.°
8    mo    +nods+
9    mo         +looks at drawing->>
10   mo/c2 ((continue to discuss other aspects of drawing))
```

In Extract 31, Anna deploys an assessment to achieve a noticing about a cactus she has just drawn, pointing at it with her pencil (lines 2–3, figure 1). On the one hand, she produces her turn in a very low, barely audible voice. Her noticing refers to something about her drawing that is faulty—the cactus is drawn upside down. As such, it implies a self-deprecative dimension. On the other hand, Heritage and Raymond (2005: 16) argue that producing an assessment in first position, as Anna does, is a way to claim independent access to the referred-to object and prior rights to assess it. In this sense, Anna's turn manifests her epistemic autonomy. At the end of her utterance, she withdraws her pencil (line 4), which leads the mother to orient her gaze toward Anna (line 5). After a pause (line 6), the mother produces her agreement (line 7), which is composed of an emphasized agreement token and accompanied by a nod of her head that becomes a reorientation of her gaze to the drawing (lines 8–9). After a micro-pause, the mother adds an identical repetition of Anna's initial turn (line 7). In terms of prosody, the mother's agreement is produced in a very low voice and is aligned with Anna's voice. However, as a whole it constitutes a weak agreement. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, after an initial self-deprecation, agreement is usually dispreferred (Pomerantz 1984a: 64; see also Schegloff 2007: 74). This might explain why the mother's agreement—although weak—closes the sequence initiated by the child's initial assessment (line 10).

In the following extract, Martin and his father are in the living room. Before Martin goes to bed, they work on a puzzle together.

Extract 32 (51agr)
Participants: FA (/): father; C1 (*): Martin (2 years, 6 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
 1  FA   çui-là,(0.2) va où?
          this one,(0.2) goes where?
 2        (0.2)
 3  C1   non moi j'dis.
          no me i say.
 4        (1.0)
```



```
 5  C1   #*là**.
              here.
    fig  #figure 1
 6  c1        *rh: pointing at the jigsaw puzzle*
 7  c1            *rh: pulls back toward chest, pointing at himself->
 8  c1                *straightens up->
 9        (0.3)
10  FA   °*d'acco/rd°
          ° okay °
11  c1        *moves away from the table->
12  fa            /rh: puts puzzle piece where C2 indicated->
```



```
13        (0.#5)
    fig        #figure 2
14  C1   *dis-moi
           tell me
15  c1   *approaching his FA->
16        (0.5)
17  C1-> m-*[°s-] s- sais-° */sais bien faire/ un# *puzzle.
          m-[°c-] c- can-° can do a puzzle well.
    fig                                   #figure 3
18  FA      [°mh°]
```

```
19 c1      *moves slightly away from FA->
20 c1                    *turns toward the sofa->
21 fa                        /withdraws rh/lh->
22 fa                              /turns toward C1->
23 c1                                    *takes puzzle piece->
24      (0.2)
25 FA⇒  °toi tu sais bien faire, ouais°
        °you you can do it well, yeah°
```

At the beginning of the extract, the father and Martin are working together to assemble the puzzle (line 1–11, figures 1–2). After indicating where the father should place the piece that he is holding in his hand (lines 5–6), Martin changes his position several times (lines 7–8, 11, and 15) and addresses a summons to his father (line 14). Martin thus sets the stage before producing the assessment (line 17) through which he achieves a self-praise, claiming to be able to assemble the puzzle all on his own. Before Martin has properly[11] completed his self-praise, the father puts his hands into a resting position (line 21, figure 3), or *home position* (see Sacks and Schegloff 2002), thus indicating that he withdraws from the game in response to Martin's affirmation of his autonomy. Turning to Martin (line 22), who has oriented to the pieces of the puzzle that are scattered on the sofa (line 19, figure 3), and after a short silence (line 24), the father responds with a weak agreement made up of a repetition of the initial turn and an agreement token that is produced in a fairly monotone voice (line 25) to Martin's self-praise. In spite of this, the agreement is treated as satisfactory by the interactants. Indeed, Martin continues to assemble the puzzle while his father watches him. Self-praise is also treated as dispreferred action; in other words, after its occurrence the preference for agreement is usually non-operative (Pomerantz 1975: 112). As in the previous extract, the dispreferred status of the action that the initial assessment accomplishes might explain why the participants treat the father's weak agreement as sufficient.

In Extract 33, a mother and her children are in the children's room. Clara wants to listen to a tape.

---

11   Martin stammers as he begins his turn, which gives his father more time to orient his attention to him.

Extract 33 (42agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Louis (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months);
CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   MO      voilà clara, viens tu peux mettre en route ton appareil?
            done clara, come can you start your tape player?
2           (0.9)
3   C2      <hem ((affirmative))>
            <mh ((affirmative))>
4           (1.9)
```



```
5   c2      ((pushes the button# to start the tape))
    fig                        #figure 1
6           (3.4)
7   C2→     >il va* bi↑en<#
            >it goes we↑ll<#
    fig                        #figure 2
8   c2         *orients toward MO->
9           (0.3)
```



```
10  MO⇒     ((r*igole)) <oui, il va bien#. ((laughing))>
            ((laughs)) <yes, it goes well. ((laughing))>
    fig                                    #figure 3
11  c2         *orients toward tape->>
```

After pressing the "play" button (line 5, figure 1), Clara orients to her mother (line 8) and, with a mischievous smile, produces the positive noticing "it goes well" (line 7, figure 2). She thus invokes a cheerful interactive context. Clara uses the correct pronoun, "it," to designate the tape player, which constitutes the referent of her assessment. With the use of a pronominal structure, she ties her positive assessment to the embodied action she has just performed on the tape player, and thus deploys what Marjorie Goodwin (1990: 177–88) calls a tying device. Clara rapidly accomplishes her turn, emphasizing the assessment term and using a rising intonation. Immediately after the completion of the turn, the mother first laughs and then produces an agreement which takes the form of an agreement

token followed by a repetition of Clara's initial assessment (line 10). This is quite different from the amusement manifested by the father's weak agreement in Extract 23, in which the boy's previous assessment, referring to his father's model cars, did not display any cheerfulness. On the contrary, it follows the amusement previously displayed by Clara (figure 2) and constitutes an action in alignment with her (see also Extract 25). Clara seems also to treat her mother's amusement as an action in alignment. Indeed, while her mother is laughing (line 10), Clara turns again to her tape player (line 11).

The next two extracts (34–35) present a particular form of the type of agreement I am examining in this section. Rather than taking the form of an agreement token plus a repetition of the initial turn, the agreement is in fact composed of a repetition of the initial turn and a *tag question* (Heritage and Raymond 2005: 28).

In Extract 34, the family is at the table having dinner. Before the extract begins, the father has gone to get an apple pastry made by Martin (2 years, 6 months).

Extract 34 (68agr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (*): Martin (2 years, 6 months); C2 (&): Antoine (6 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1  FA    +tu vois
          you see
2  fa    +sitting down and showing the pastry to C1->
3        (0.9)
4  C1    o:h
5        (0.8)
```



```
6  C1→   c'est be↑au#:[↓::]
         that's ni↑ce#:[↓::]
   fig                #figure 1
7  FA⇒                [c'est b]eau: h↑[ein.#]
                      [that's n]ice: h↑[huh.#]
8  MO                                 [((la#]ughs))
   fig                                   #figure 2
9        (0.8)
10 C1    coupe.
         cut.
11       (0.9)
12 FA    tu veux manger?
         you want to eat?
13       (0.6)
14 C1    couper un p'tit peu.
         to cut a little bit.
```

One way of inciting an interactant to produce an assessment of an object is to show him or her the object in question while summoning him or her to look at it (see Chapter 4, Extract 6). The father deploys this procedure successfully (lines 1–2, figure 1): he induces the child to produce a surprise token (line 4). After this first exclamation, there emerges a silence during which the father remains frozen in place (figure 2), thereby indicating that he is waiting for a more elaborate action on Martin's part. This tacit invitation incites Martin to positively assess the pastry with a significant lengthening of the assessment term (line 6). Martin himself helped make this pastry; with the use of prosody he therefore accomplishes a self-praise. In contrast to a previous extract (Extract 32), in which the boy spontaneously produced a self-praise regarding the action he was just engaged in (assembling a puzzle), the boy's self-praise in this extract is initiated by the father's invitation. This seems to have an impact on the further development of the sequence. Indeed, in the earlier extract (32), the father used a simple weak agreement, deploying a monotone voice to respond to the boy's self-praise. In this extract, the father repeats the turn identically before Martin completes his turn, adding a—"huh""—at the end (line 7). Heritage and Raymond (2005: 28) argue that the addition of such a tag question at the end of a response to an initial assessment produces a request for confirmation from the preceding speaker. Moreover, the authors suggest that this form of response to an initial assessment may indicate that the speaker grants himself or herself assessment rights that are greater than those held by the initial speaker. In this extract, the father seems to use it rather as an intensifier of his agreeing response. This is in any case how Martin treats his father's turn: rather than getting into a dispute with his father over questions of epistemic rights to authority, he targets the progress of the meal (line 10) and is joined by his father in this (line 12); the father engages in cutting the apple pastry as suggested by Martin (line 10).

In the following extract, Elio and his father are in the yard. They are taking turns spraying water into a basin with a garden hose.

At the beginning of the sequence, Elio is spraying water into a basin (line 2, figure 1). While continuing this activity, he orients to his father (line 3, figure 2). Next, he stops and utters the assessment term: "strong" (lines 4–5). With his change in orientation, which coincides with the discontinuation of the preceding activity, the child selects his father as next speaker (see Lerner 2003: 179). After a short pause (line 6), the father repeats the assessment term, integrating it into a standard syntactic construction: "it's strong," and adding a tag question at the end (line 7). As in the preceding case, the child treats his father's agreement as implying closure of the adjacency pair initiated by his assessment. After repeating his initial turn in overlap with the agreement by his father, Elio goes back to his previous activity: spraying water (line 10).

In summary, this section has examined extracts in which the interactants treat a weak agreement from a parent following a child's assessment as satisfactory. In the cases discussed in this section, the children's assessments are part of a

Extract 35 (133agr)
Participants: FA (/): father; C2 (*): Elio (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
 1        (*3.*5)
 2   c2   *(0.5) #sprays water into the basin->
 3   c2        *orients toward FA#->
     fig         #figure 1          # figure 2
 4   C2→  *fort
           strong
 5   c2   *stops spraying the water->
 6        (0.4)
 7   FA⇒  c'est fo[:rt] hein
           that's stro[:ng] huh
 8   C2             [fort]
                    [strong]
 9        (2*.2)
10   c2     *continues spraying water into the basin->>
11   FA    y'a ada qui va rentrer maintenant.
           there's ada who will come home now.
```

continued and prolonged course of action (eating or putting a puzzle together). More precisely, they refer directly to the action the children are just about to accomplish or that they just accomplished more or less autonomously: drawing a cactus (Extract 31), assembling a puzzle (Extract 32), putting on a tape (Extract 33), baking a pastry (Extract 34), or handling a garden hose (Extract 35). As such, they contrast with the rather isolated instances in which the assessment produces a noticing referring to something exterior to their own actions, as in section 5.3.2, or implies a request by the child, as in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.3.

Furthermore, in this section the children used assessments to achieve a self-deprecation (Extract 31) or a self-praise (Extracts 32–3). As mentioned earlier, in adults' conversation, these types of actions are treated as interactively delicate— or even dispreferred—actions after which the preference for agreement is non-

operative. However, in the interactive configuration studied here, producing an agreement which takes the form of an agreement token followed by a repetition of the assessment seems satisfactory for both interactants if the parent accompanies his or her turn with prosody conveying alignment with the child (Extract 31), a body posture displaying alignment (Extract 32), or laughter conveying affinity with the child (Extract 33). In the last two extracts of this section (Extracts 34–5), completion of the agreement with a tag question does not engender confirmation on the part of the child. On the contrary, the child seems to treat this form of agreement as a way of highlighting their mutual understanding (for a similar argument, see Lerner 1996: 317) and its occurrence leads the child to pursue the activity that was underway prior to the assessment: eating the pastry he made himself (Extract 34) or spraying water (Extract 35). The organization of these kinds of assessment sequences in parent–child interactions thus seems to reflect the fact that responding to children's assessments referring to their own actions and/or accomplishing self-deprecation or self-praise may be an especially tricky matter for parents. Indeed, on the one hand, parents might seek to support their children in engaging in various activities autonomously and to manifest their own apprehension regarding these actions by producing assessments in first position. Agreeing with self-praise, or more generally with assessments that refer to these actions, is thus a way to achieve this support. On the other hand, responding with a weak agreement might manifest parents' orientation toward assessments that accomplish self-praise or imply a self-deprecative dimension as a dispreferred action after which agreement is not preferred.

5.4   Conclusion

Certain studies suggest that the organization of verbal interactions between parents and children produces and reflects a fundamentally asymmetrical relationship (see for example Heritage and Raymond 2005; Ochs and Taylor 1992), which is to say an imbalance of power between the two interactants, to the detriment of the child—parents may interrupt their children much more often than they interrupt other adults, thus displaying their domination of and control over the children (West and Zimmerman 1977: 526–8). *The detailed analysis of parents' agreements following an initial assessment produced by a child offered in this chapter differs from the findings of these studies.*

In the framework of conversations between adults, an agreement following an assessment is normally produced as a preferred action*,* which is to say it overlaps with or immediately follows the completion of the assessment; is formulated in a clear, unequivocal, and direct way; and is not accompanied by an account. This preference organization therefore corresponds to a collection of methods in which the immediacy of the agreement is an essential characteristic promoting social solidarity. Furthermore, the preference for aligning actions manifests the interactive work interactants perform to help maintain each other's "face" (Lerner 1996: 304).

In this chapter, the parents' agreements that I have examined are almost always produced immediately and are clear and direct. From this point of view, the parents seem to respect the preference for agreement when they interact with their young children of between 2 and 3 years old (Extracts 1–11, 16–17 and 21–35). Contrary to what is seen in conversations between adults, however, the parent does not normally use an upgraded second assessment to produce an unequivocal agreement (exceptions: Extracts 16–17). On a recurring basis, the parent uses a weak agreement to respond to the child's assessment: an agreement token, a repetition of the child's turn, or an agreement composed of an agreement token and a repetition of the child's turn. Normally, the use of a weak agreement after an assessment indicates an emerging disagreement and/or engenders a series of actions in disalignment with the initial turn (see introduction to this chapter). Adopting a praxeological approach that takes into account the embodied resources deployed by the interactants, this analysis paints a slightly different picture.

First, in extracts in which the children's initial assessment produced a request, parents' weak agreement might preface, delay, and thus foreshadow their embodied refusal (Extracts 18–20). In Extract 19, for example, the child is trying to obtain a piece of chocolate by assessing it positively. Through the deployment of a weak agreement response, in combination with embodied means—pushing the bar of chocolate out of the child's reach—the mother eventually achieves refusal, without stating it overtly, at the same time avoiding further actions in disalignment with her son, such as the emergence of an open conflict (for a more thorough discussion of parents' disaligning moves following a child's initial assessment, see Chapter 6).

Second, children can use an assessment to produce a noticing (Extracts 23–4 and 26) and/or an assessment, including gustatory (Extracts 21–2, 25 and 27). When doing so, children seem to treat their parent's weak agreement responses as an other-initiation of repair if they are produced using a simple repetition of a gustatory assessment (Extracts 21–2), a syntactically incomplete assessment (Extract 24), or a rather monotone voice (Extract 25), or, alternatively, is accompanied by an amused attitude even if the child does not display any amusement (Extract 23). Indeed, after the occurrence of a weak agreement response, children produce a repaired repetition of their initial turn by using more adult-like language (Extracts 21–4), and/or upgrade it using prosodic or embodied resources (Extracts 23 and 25), thus getting a more engaged response from their parents. As with parents' non-responses (see Chapter 4, Extracts 1–2, 7 and 11–12), parents' weak agreements might also engender young children's display of an orientation toward grammatical completeness and/or more adult-like talk. However, in contrast to the previous chapter, in which the children repaired their initial assessment to pursue a response from their parents, the child in Extract 24 for example seems to repair his initial turn just for the sake of repairing it, not to further pursue a response when none is forthcoming.

Third, parents themselves might treat their minimal agreement as an insufficient response to their children's assessments that achieve a noticing (Extract 26) or

an assessment (Extract 27), although their agreement is intensified via prosody and/or embodied means, such as facial expression or a nod of the head. After a weak agreement and a pause, the parent adds an upgraded second assessment or an increment displaying an upgraded agreement which simultaneously encourages the child to continue talking. If parents treat the child's initial assessment as implying a request referring to their domain of responsibility, such as the child's trouble with a vegetable that was served to her at too high a temperature (Extract 28), the parents' response might be composed of *two turn constructional units*, or TCUs (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 702–3, 720–23). The first one—a minimal agreement—responds to the assessing dimension of the child's initial turn itself, whereas the second is used to add a piece of advice (Extract 29), or otherwise refers to the request implied by the child's assessment (Extracts 28 and 30).

Finally, a child's assessment referring to an action the child has just accomplished or is about to accomplish more or less autonomously might achieve a self-praise (Extracts 32 and 34) or self-deprecation (Extract 31). As Pomerantz (1984a: 64; 1978: 88) argues, these types of actions are treated as interactively delicate or even dispreferred actions: following them, the preference for unequivocal strong agreement is usually not operative; instead, they might engender an immediate and strong disagreement (see also Schegloff 2007: 74–6). After children's self-praise or deprecation, parents' weak agreements might be treated as a satisfying response by both children and parents. Indeed, when the parent composes his or her weak agreement in the form of an agreement token plus a repetition of the assessment and deploys prosody and other embodied resources (postures) to manifest his or her attention to and understanding of the child's initial turn (Extracts 31–2 and 33), or if the parent adds a tag question to the same end (Extracts 34–5), the child and the parent treat the weak agreement as unproblematic or sufficient for closing the sequence initiated by the child's assessment. Analyzing preference organization thus implies taking into account the different praxeological contexts that are produced through participants' embodied talk.

Butler and Wilkinson (2013: 49) argue that children's "(limited) rights to speak, engage, or launch action" constitutes a local, "interactionally situated" phenomenon. Such phenomena therefore cannot be examined or explained with reference to participants' orientation to children's young age, and thus to their not-yet-fully-competent way of speaking, engaging, or launching actions. In this same line of argumentation, I maintain that rather than reflecting participants' orientation to distinct (epistemic) rights to assess and/or to an asymmetrical relationship between children and adults, as for example suggested by Heritage and Raymond (2005), the way in which parents and children organize assessment sequences and, more specifically, the way they treat the parents' weak agreements, signals the existence of issues that are more complex. Questions of rights and obligations conventionally linked to the social categories involved seem to be at stake: the child has the obligation to correct his or her talk (Extracts 21–4), while at the same time having the right to be encouraged in his or her participation in the conversation (Extracts 26–7), or to be tacitly socialized into interactive practices

regarding delicate action types (Extracts 31–2 and 34)—while the parent has the obligation/right to stimulate young children's participation in conversation or acquisition of interactive principles related to the management of situations linked to his or her fields of responsibility (Extracts 28–30), such as the child's meals, physical well-being, and hygiene. Young children's and parents' respective ways of treating the weak agreement suggest that they both orient toward these rights and obligations as being relevant for the organization of assessment sequences (see also the discussion on Sacks' work in sections 2.5.1–2.5.2). Last but not least, my analysis strongly suggests that young children's and parents' ways of organizing assessment sequences may, apart from all the other issues mentioned here, manifest their orientation toward the achievement of mutual understanding and the joyful sharing of a little moment in an everyday interaction (see especially Extracts 33 and 35).

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 6

Parents' Disagreements with Children's Initial Assessments: What About the Dispreference for Disagreement in Everyday Family Life?

In the previous chapter, I examined sequences in which a parent responds with an agreement to a child's assessment. I showed that with regard to agreements following assessments, parents' and children's preference organization does not seem to be fundamentally different from what is known about adults' ways of dealing with it. Indeed, the preferred action—agreement—was usually achieved through the deployment of a preferred format; in other words, agreement occurred without delay, was direct, and expressed the agreement clearly. At the same time, I highlighted that instead of using strong agreements (as has been observed in adult–adult interactions), parents deployed different types of weak agreements in responding to their children's assessments. It has been suggested that parents' recurrent use of weak agreements manifests their sensitivity to the action that the child's initial assessment accomplishes (and more generally, their orientation to the praxeological context in which the child initiates an assessment sequence) and that parents' and children's ways of using and treating weak agreements indicate both interactants' orientations toward specific rights and obligations conventionally attributed to the categories of "parents" and "children."

Consequently, the ways in which parents and children organize the dispreferred alternative—disagreement—does not necessarily correspond to what is known about its organization by interactants considered to have a symmetrical relationship, like the one between an adult and another adult (see Pomerantz 1984a), or between a child and another child (see Church 2009). In their work on children's game disputes, Goodwin, M., Goodwin, C. and Yaeger-Dror (2002: 1645) argue that looking in detail at participants' embodied pursuits of conflict and disagreement might not only shed some new light on a crucial aspect of social life, and thus enhance our understanding of it, but might also call into question persisting stereotypes regarding the relationship between participants' disagreement management and their gender, ethnicity, and so on. To get a more complete picture of parents' and children's respective observable orientations toward preference organization and their understanding of disagreement in assessment sequences, this chapter investigates the ways in which parents' responses disagreeing with a child's initial assessment are organized and treated by the participants and how

they shape the further interactive development. However, before doing so, I will briefly discuss the dispreferred status of disagreeing responses to a target child's assessment by examining a single instance in which a child's disagreeing response to her younger sister's assessment is at the heart of the interaction.

6.1   Overt Disagreements as Responses to Children's Assessments

In my corpus, I identified one interactive sequence in which the preference for agreement over disagreement in a response to a young child's initial assessment constitutes the topic of an exchange between two sisters and their mother. As it is rare for preference issues to be overtly discussed, I am using this extract to introduce the analytical topic discussed in this chapter.

Noëmi (2 years, 1 month) and her older sister Aurélie are sitting in the living room drawing while their mother prepares lunch in the kitchen, which opens out onto the living room.

Extract 1 (60dagr)

Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Aurélie (4 years); C2 (*): Noëmi (2 years, 1 month)

```
 1   C1    °*noëmi:*:.°
 2   c2      *stops drawing, withdraws her felt-tip pen*
 3   c2            *changes pen from rh to lh->
 4         (0.7)
 5   C2  ⇒ (*là) joli&
           (here) nice
 6   c2    * lh: draws->
 7   c1            &looks at C2's drawing->
 8         (1.6)
 9   C1→ NON& il est pas joli, il est tout=
           NO it is not nice, it is all=
10   c1     &uncaps a pen, looks down at her drawing->
11   C1    =+noi&**:[:r
           = bla:[:ck
12   mo     +orients toward the children->
13   c1            &starts drawing->
14   c2          *shifts gaze toward C1->
15   c2             *stops drawing, withdraws her pen->
```



```
16   MO          [mais *aurélie tu trouves# que=
                 [but aurélie you find that=
17   c2               *leans toward C1->
```

```
   fig                                      # figure 1
18 MO  =[c'est symp]a comment tu +fais?
       =[that's ki]nd what you are doing?
19 mo                            +orients back to kitchen,
       continues cooking->
20 C2  [E::*:KH.]
21 c2      *sits back, looks at her drawing ->
22     (0.9)
23 C1  ton dessin il est pas *juste.
       your drawing it is not correct.
24 c2                        *takes drawing, turns it over->
25     (0.3)
26 C2  mh-mh non.
27     (*1.8)
28 c2   *starts drawing on other side->
29 C1  (tend bien l'oreille) il est joli ton dessin voilà:
       (listen up) it is nice your drawing do:ne
30     (0.5)
31 MO  ouais mais-
       yeah but-
32     (5.2)
33 MO  tu dois pas faire comme ça aurélie
       you should not act like that aurélie
34     (0.8)
35 MO  c'est pas sympa
       that's not kind
36     (0.3)
37 MO  de lui dire que c'est pas joli [son des]sin.
       to tell her that it's not nice [her dra]wing.
38                                    [xxxxxxx]
39     (&1.4)
40 c1   &stops drawing, withdraws pen, puts cap back on->
42 C1  &mais (0.2) pourquoi &elle elle me dit aussi ça:::=
        but (0.2) why she she tells me tha::t as well=
43 c1   &closes pen, looks toward pen box->
44 c1             &gets up, leans over table, looks into pen
       box ->
45 MO  =elle t'as rie:n dit&, moi je crois
       =she has'nt told you anything, i i think
46 c1                     &orients toward C2's drawing ->
47     (*0.7)
48 c2   *stops drawing, withdraws pen->
49 C1  NO[::N]
       NO[::]
50 MO  [tu sais] noëmi est petite elle=
       [you know] noëmi is little she=
51 MO  =[a encore de la peine]
       =[ still has trouble]
```



```
52 C1   [(C'EST)L'DESSIN D'MA]MA::*&N#
        [(THAT'S)MOMMY::'S DRA]WING
53 c2                         *orients toward C1->
```

```
54 c1                               &orients toward MO->
   fig                                # figure 2
55       (0.5)
56 MO    [à colorie]r
         [to colo]r
57 C2    [*a bo::::n]
         [is goo::d]
58 c2    *takes drawing, lifts it up, orients toward MO->
```



```
59 C2    #A +BO:::N
          IS GOO::D
   fig   # figure 3
60 mo       +walks toward the girls->
61       (0.7)
62 MO    c'est pas gra:ve.
         that's not so ba:d.
```

At the beginning of the extract, Noëmi withdraws her felt-tip pen (line 2) to move it from one hand to the other (line 3). While resuming her drawing with her left hand (line 6), she utters a positive assessment of her drawing (line 5) and thus produces a self-praise. She gets her older sister Aurélie's attention: after inspecting Noëmi's drawing for 1.6 seconds (lines 7–8), Aurélie proffers a very direct and unequivocal disagreement with Noëmi's self-praise, accounts for it (lines 9 and 11), and shifts her attention back to her own endeavors (line 10), resuming her drawing at the end of her turn (line 13). On the one hand, Aurélie's disagreement possibly relates to the interactants' orientation toward seeing self-praise as an action to be avoided, in line with what Pomerantz has observed in adult–adult conversations (Pomerantz 1978: 88ff.; see also Extracts 32 and 34 in Chapter 5). On the other hand, it comes after a delay (line 8) and is accompanied by an account (lines 9 and 11): the two most central features of a dispreferred format are thus respected.

In overlap with Aurélie's accounting, the mother first interrupts her work in the kitchen, turns toward the girls (line 12), and then self-selects to point to the dispreferred nature of Aurélie's action, asking her: "you find that that's kind what you are doing?" (lines 16 and 18), turning back to her kitchen work at the end of her turn (line 19). At the same time, Noëmi displays her disapproval of her older sister's disagreement: she first shifts her gaze toward her, then leans toward her and expresses her disenchantment by deploying a repudiative vocalization (lines 14, 17, and 20, figure 1). With its interrogative format, the mother's utterance gives Aurélie a good opportunity to back down or otherwise soften her disagreement. However, she doesn't use it. On the contrary, at line 23, Aurélie adds another

account for her initial response that justifies and at the same time upgrades her initial disagreement. Immediately following it, Noëmi displays her disapproval again (line 26), and then goes back to her initial activity of drawing (line 28). Her pullback engenders Aurélie's reaction: she summons Noëmi to listen to her and then agrees with her initial self-praise, using the terminal marker "done" to accentuate the completion of her action, as the fulfillment of a given task (line 29). Moreover, Aurélie's voice manifests petulance. In combination with the terminal marker "done," this indicates that her eventual agreement does not express her personal opinion. Instead, she seems to treat their mother's previous intervention (lines 16 and 18) as a request to achieve something other than an unequivocal disagreement with her little sister's self-praise.

By granting the request in a petulant way, Aurélie projects a disagreeing action that is accomplished after a long silence of 5.2 seconds (line 32): instead of simply acknowledging Aurélie's delayed agreement, the mother reformulates her own disagreement with the girl's disagreeing response to Noëmi's self-praise (lines 33, 35 and 37). After Aurélie's protest (line 42), the mother moreover accounts for her reprehension of Aurélie's unequivocal disagreement by invoking the fact that Noëmi is "little" (a baby/toddler) and that it is therefore difficult for her to color properly (lines 50–51 and 56).[1] In overlap with the mother's account, a new conflict between the two girls emerges (lines 52 and 59). While approaching the scene, the mother manages to downplay the conflict and to bring it to an end (lines 60 and 62).

To sum up: Aurélie's disagreeing response to Noëmi's self-praise at line 9 engenders a whole series of reprehending actions by the mother and refusals by Noëmi herself. In this sense, the mother and Noëmi overtly display their orientation toward Aurélie's unequivocal disagreement and thus toward her act of negatively assessing her little sister's work as a socially inacceptable, dispreferred action.

6.2   Parents' Disagreements as Responses to Children's Assessments

The following analysis focuses on situations in which the parents disagree with their young children's initial assessment. Its aim is to further investigate how parents' and children's ways of organizing assessment sequences may make it possible to determine and discuss their orientations toward preference organization in everyday family life interactions. As mentioned in Chapter 5, in the overall corpus, I identified 60 occurrences of parents' disagreement—compared to 134 occurrences in which they agreed. In terms of frequency, the preference for agreement, and the respective dispreference for disagreement, are thus affirmed.

A more substantial preliminary observation concerns the distinct actions that the children's initial assessments achieve. In the last chapter, we saw that young children's initial assessments might accomplish preferred actions, such as

---

1   On parents' tacit or explicit orientation toward their children as not-yet-fully-competent participants, see Keel and Sormani 2014.

a noticing, an announcement (Chapter 5, Extracts 17, 23–4, 26, 28, 31, 33 and 35), or a positive assessment regarding food, an object, or an activity (Chapter 5, Extracts 16, 22, 25, 27 and 34),[2] and that they engender a response from a parent that in turn respects the preference for agreement over disagreement. In contrast, the children's initial assessments discussed in this chapter nearly all accomplish dispreferred actions: young children might deploy assessments to blame or accuse a present participant for/of something (such as a previous action) (Extracts 2–4, and 17); to complain about a domain which falls under parental responsibility, such as food, or the temperature of shower water (Extracts 5–9 and 16); to refuse to comply with a parent's request or advice (Extracts 10–12 and 14); to achieve a self-deprecation (Extracts 11 and 18); or to make a positive assessment of their previous action, which is to say a self-praise (Extracts 13 and 15). It has been argued that participants not only avoid making and/or minimize dispreferred initiating actions in the first place (see Pomerantz and Heritage 2012: 217ff.), but that their occurrence also overturns the preference for agreement: they typically engender a disaffiliative action, produced in the preferred format, from the intended recipient (see Bilmes 1988, 2014; Pomerantz 1984a; Sacks 1992 I: 597–600).

Another observation refers to the format that parents' disagreements take. With adult–adult interactions, it has been demonstrated that disagreeing with an initial assessment that does *not* achieve a dispreferred action is usually accomplished through the deployment of a dispreferred format (Pomerantz 1984a: 70ff.; Levinson 1983: 333): disagreement occurs with inter- and intra-turn delay, takes a mitigated format (includes agreeing elements), and/or is accompanied by an account that might downgrade the disagreement's disaffiliative nature. Adults deploy different devices, such as "no talk, requests for clarification, partial repeats, and other turn prefaces" (for example weak agreements) to delay the production of disagreement after an assessment (Pomerantz 1984a: 65, 70 and 72). It is striking that in adult–child interactions, parents essentially use one device—a request for clarification to delay a disagreement—even if said disagreement responds to a dispreferred initial action. They thus mobilize a version of the "misunderstanding machinery" (Sacks 1987: 66) to delay their disagreement. Furthermore, it has been argued that adults' disagreements often contain elements of agreement (Pomerantz 1984a: 73). However, when parents finally disagree, they systematically use what Pomerantz (1984a: 74) calls a *strong disagreement* that "is directly contrastive with the prior assessment" and occurs in "turns containing exclusively disagreement components."

A final preliminary observation refers to the complexity/length of the analyzed extracts. A glance at the transcriptions in this chapter makes it clear that compared to the extracts in which the parent responds with an agreement to their children's assessment (Chapter 5), the extracts in which the parent responds

---

2 Interestingly, the children's initial assessments in Chapter 5 that parents treat as implying a dispreferred action—a—request (Chapter 5, Extracts 18–20 and 28–30) get either a weak agreement that delays disagreement or a weak agreement combined with an account of the delayed granting of the request.

with a disagreement are not only much longer, but also manifest a more complex development, often involving all the family members present, each of them taking sides with one party or the other. In her study on conflicts and disputes occurring in peer interactions between young children (aged between 3 years, 11 months and 5 years, 3 months) attending a daycare center, Church (2009) examines how children resolve their disputes without external intervention by an adult, and what relevance the preference organization has in their management of resolution. One main finding of her study refers to the fact that in disputes, children's use of the preferred format—without delay, with a direct, clear disagreement/objection—engenders the continuation of the dispute, whereas use of the dispreferred format—delayed occurrence, mitigated and justified disagreement/objection—seems to promote a rapid closing of the dispute (Church 2009: 190): "In the context of children's disputes, the term 'preferred' could be replaced with 'sustaining.' That is, turns produced in preferred turn shapes do provoke and sustain conflict, whilst dispreferred turn shapes are non-sustaining (designed to bring the dispute to a close)."

This brief discussion of preliminary observations in light of Pomerantz' and Church's findings concerning adult–adult or child–child management of disagreements aims to raise some analytical questions regarding the way that parents and children deal with disagreement. As is the case in child–child interactions (but in contrast to adult–adult interactions), parents seem to use either format (preferred or dispreferred) to disagree with their children's initial assessments. This begs a number of questions: how does the use of either format shape the development of the interaction? Might the praxeological context in which the child produces the initial assessment provide some explanation of why parents opt for a preferred rather than a dispreferred format in responding? Beyond issues of alignment/disalignment between the interactants, are any matters of category incumbency at stake? To facilitate the discussion of these questions in the conclusion, the first part of this chapter is devoted to analysis of sequences in which parents deploy the dispreferred format for organizing their disagreement (Extracts 2–9). In the second part of this chapter, sequences are examined in which the parent's disagreement is produced in the preferred format—occurring immediately after the child's assessment (Extracts 10–18).

6.3 Parents' Questioning Before Disagreeing with Their Children's Assessments

In his article "On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in Sequences in Conversation," Sacks notes (1987: 66) that "The 'persistence of the preference for agreement can be seen in part by the use of the 'misunderstanding machinery' to try to resolve disagreements when they occur." Sequentially, interactants' use of this misunderstanding machinery—as described by Sacks—follows the occurrence of a disagreement. The following section discusses extracts in

which parents deploy a version of this machinery *before* disagreeing with their young child's assessment. Instead of immediately responding to their child's assessments, parents point to a trouble concerning the child's turn by producing a so-called *wh-question* (see Corrin 2010; Fox and Thompson 2010; Schegloff and Lerner 2010). Moreover, parents might also engage in a verification procedure—they keep silent and attentively verify the child's claim—before they overtly express disagreement (Extracts 8–9). By delaying their disagreeing response, parents give the children additional opportunities to speak (or even oblige them to do so) and thus to modify their initial action. The analysis of the next few extracts will therefore address the following questions: How do children exploit these invitations—which may be formulated with varying degrees of explicitness—by their parents to resume talking? Do they revise their initial assessment position? How does the parent's deployment of a dispreferred format shape the further development of interaction? Responding to these questions and uncovering sequential patterns in participants' management of parents' disagreement responses produced in a dispreferred format will be the substance of the first part of the chapter.

6.3.1   Parents' Use of Who-questions to Delay Disagreement

In the following three extracts, the children deploy an assessment to accuse a (co-present) person of something: an older brother (Extracts 2 and 4) and an image: the lady the mother is just about to draw (Extract 3). To blame or accuse somebody is usually considered a dispreferred action, engendering disaligning actions by the intended recipient, especially if the recipient has not witnessed the event that led to the blaming or accusation. In Extracts 2–4, the parents respond with a *specific query* that is composed of a who- or a why-question and a repetition of the child's assessment, and that might be preceded by a series of *neutral queries* (Corrin 2010: 34), such as "huh?" or "what?" (Extract 3). As Corrin (2010: 34) points out, the qualifier "neutral" refers to the fact that a *neutral query* (or an open-class repair initiator) usually engenders merely a phonetically upgraded repetition from the initial speaker, while *specific queries* elicit revisions by the previous speaker (Corrin 2010: 34). Both terms, open-class repair initiator and neutral query, point to the fact that the repair initiating turn does not locate the source of the trouble in the previous speaker's prior turn (see also Drew 1997), but leaves it up to the speaker to do so.

   In Extract 2, Clara (2 years, 4 months) and her older brother are sitting on the floor and playing with a toy car garage. The father is also sitting on the floor, with the little baby (2 months old) in his lap. To highlight particular turns in the transcriptions, in this chapter a → indicates the young child's initial assessment, ⇒ marks the parent's question, a highlights the child's answer(s), and a the parent's (or other participant's) disagreeing response.

Extract 2 (14dagr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (&): Louis (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months); C3: baby (2 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
 1   C2→    t'es PAS gen#til.
            you're NOT kind.
 2   c2     <<-has stopped playing with car, oriented toward C1->
 3   c1     <<-oriented toward cars, playing with them->>
     fig                # figure 1
 4          (*4.1)
 5   c2      *shifts gaze down, resumes playing with cars->>
 6   FA⇒    qui c'est qui est pas gentil clara?
            who is it that's not being kind clara?
 7          (0.4)
```



```
 8   C2→    c'est loui#s
            it's louis
     fig                # figure 2
 9          (0.4)
10   FA→    mais oui il est gentil, (il l'a défaite).
            but of course he is kind (he has taken it apart).
```

Before the extract begins, Clara does not agree with her brother's way of constructing the garage and stops playing with the little cars. Looking at her older brother (line 2), she accuses him of not being kind, using the pronoun "you" (see figure 1). Instead of countering her accusation, the older brother continues playing (line 3), and a silence emerges (line 4). After this moment of silence, Clara shifts her gaze down to the floor and also continues to play (line 5), indicating that she is not going to pursue a response to her accusation (see Chapter 4). After a long silence (line 4) that represents an *adjacency lapse* (Jefferson 1972: 298) indicating that the action to come is potentially problematic, the father eventually produces a who-question that is a compound of a "who" and a repetition of the child's

assessment (line 6). As in the previous extract, the parent self-selects to enter into the dispute between the two children. However, in this extract the father does not reprehend Clara for her accusation but simply requests that she *clarify the referent* (Schegloff and Lerner 2010: 103). While continuing to play (figure 2), Clara grants this request immediately: "it's Louis" (line 8). Following this clarification, the father responds after a lapse (line 9) with a clear disagreement with the girl's initial accusation (line 10). The disagreement is introduced by a "but" (line 10) that indicates a *contrastive next [unit]* to come (Pomerantz 1975: 84). The next unit itself is composed of an agreement token and a positive assessment of Louis[3] that contrasts with Clara's initial negative assessment of him. Moreover, the disagreement is accompanied by an account, but its content is unfortunately not clearly audible. Although following a dispreferred initiating action (accusation), the parent's disagreement itself respects the two central features of a dispreferred format, namely delay and account (Church 2009: 42–3). Its occurrence does not imply further disagreeing actions by either of the participants.

In the next extract (3), Faffa (2 years, 7 months) and his mother are sitting on the sofa. Before the extract starts, Faffa had asked his mother to draw a lady for him, and he watches her throughout the whole extract (figures 1–2).

Extract 3 (31dagr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1            (11.1)
2   C3→      (lui ell-) elle (v) est mé#chant.
             (he sh-) she (v) is mean.
    fig                                      # figure 1
3            (0.5)
4   MO⇒      hein?
             huh?
5            (0.2)
6   C3→      mé-méchant.
             me-mean.
7            (1.4+)
```

---

3   The father uses the appropriate masculine pronoun to refer to Louis and so ties his own disagreement to Clara's previous turn.

```
 8  mo           +withdraws felt-tip pen (stops drawing)->
```



```
 9  MO⇒  +quoi#?
         +what?
    fig       # figure 2
10  mo    +orients toward C3->
11        (0.8)
12  C3→   méchant
          mean
13        (0.++4)
14  mo      +shifts orientation toward drawing->>
15  mo      +directs pen toward paper->>
16  MO⇒  >+qui c'est qui est méchant?<
         >who is it who is mean?<
17        (0.4)
18  C3→   la +da::me
          the +la::dy
19  mo       +resumes drawing->
20        (.)
21  MO⇒  elle est mé↑chante?
          she is me↑an?
22        (0.5)
23  C3    oui=
          yes=
24  MO→   =no:::n
          =no:::
25        (0.5)
26  C3    non.
          no.
```

At the beginning of the extract, Faffa just observes his mother's drawing (line 1; see figure 1). Somehow, out of the blue, he then accomplishes an accusation of the lady the mother is in the process of drawing, prefixing it first with the pronoun "he" and then correcting himself and using the pronoun "she" (line 2). Faffa's accusation in this specific sequential environment—turn-by-turn talk has lapsed—is interesting. It might indicate the boy's attempt to initiate a story by invoking a trouble, in an attempt to gain the right to talk for a longer stretch (see Sacks' discussion on children's use of a ticket to gain the right to continue talking in section 2.5.1). While continuing her drawing, the mother first uses an open-class repair-initiator: "huh?" (line 4) that leaves it to Faffa to find the trouble source. He seems to identify a problem of hearing: as a response to his mother's turn, he immediately produces a full repetition of his initial evaluation

term (line 6). His repair is not successful and after the emergence of a silence (line 7), the mother stops drawing (line 8), shifts her gaze toward Faffa (line 10) and simultaneously produces a second open-class repair initiator: "what?". This way of using gaze while simultaneously halting the drawing activity brings to mind "the look" (Kidwell 2005) used by caregivers to indicate to the child that a dispreferred action (reprehension) will follow if the child does not stop the activity he or she is engaged in (see also section 2.5.3).

However, as above, the boy seems simply to identify a trouble of hearing and repeats the evaluation term once again (line 12). Following this second repair, the mother re-orients back to her drawing and directs her felt-tip pen toward the paper before proffering a who-question that takes the same format as in the extract above: "who" plus a repetition of the child's assessment, produced with a rising intonation (line 16). As in the previous extract, the child identifies a trouble of understanding the referent, and invokes it: "the la::dy" (line 18; see Chapter 4, Extract 2). Immediately after this third repair, the mother produces a questioning repeat, deploying a marked rising intonation. In doing so, she indicates that the trouble source is not to be located in a trouble of hearing/understanding, but rather in a trouble concerning the acceptability of the boy's action as a whole (see Keel 2011). Latching with the boy's affirmation of his initial assessment (line 23), the mother unequivocally disagrees with the boy's initial turn by loudly uttering an elongated disagreement token (line 24). By refusing to accept the boy's negative assessment of the lady, with whom she has no particular connection, since Faffa did not ask her to draw a particular lady, but just any lady, the mother displays the power of dispreference for accusations. Following this lexically minimal but nevertheless very clear disagreement, the boy agrees with his mother, thus closing the sequence initiated by his initial negative assessment. As in the last extract, by making a request for the child to clarify the referent, the parent respects a central feature of the dispreferred format, significantly delaying the production of the overt disagreement and at the same time offering the child an additional slot in which to resume talking. This way of proceeding engenders a rapid closing of the disagreement sequence initiated by the child's initial accusation.

6.2.3   Parents' Use of Why-questions to Delay Disagreement

In the next extract (4), Susanne's assessment achieves an accusation regarding her brother. In response to this dispreferred action, their mother deploys a why-question. As with the who-questions discussed earlier, the parent can use the why-question to delay the overt expression of disagreement. However, while the parent's who-question combined with the repetition of the child's assessment indicates the parent's trouble in grasping the referent of the child's assessment, and a request for the child to clarify it, the why-question requests that the child justify, explain, or provide an account for his or her previous action.

Before Extract 4 starts, Susanne (2 years, 5 months) and her older brother Léon are in their room under a blanket, scuffling with each other, while the mother is in

the kitchen preparing dinner. At one point, Susanne moans a little bit, and shortly afterward, the brother appears from under the blanket and walks to the kitchen. Susanne follows him, carrying two bottles of water.

Extract 4 (5quest)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Léon (3 years, 6 months); C2 (*): Susanne (2 years, 5 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
 1            (2*.*6)
 2   c2     <<–walks into the kitchen–>
 3   c2       *stands still in front of table->
 4   c2          *puts a bottle on table->
 5   C1     (°ouais [mais°])
            (°yeah [but°])
 6   C2→          [méss]ant léon
                  [me]an léon
```



```
 7            (0*#.8)
 8   c2       *shifts gaze toward MO->
     fig        # figure 1
 9   MO⇒    comme[nt#?]
            pard[on?]
10   C2        [mé–](.)*+ch+a::nt.
               [me–](.)a::n.
     fig            # figure 2
11   c2               *shifts gaze to bottle in her lh->
12   mo                  +directs box toward table->
13   mo                     +shifts gaze toward her hands->
14            (*0*.6)
15   c2        *puts second bottle on table*
16   MO⇒    pourquoi il est méch+ant+?
            why is he mean?
17   c2        *moves away from table->
18   mo                  +puts box on table+
19            (*1*.5)
20   c2        *puts her thumb in her mouth*
21   C1     (j')a faim maman.
            (i)am hungry mom.
22            (0.4)
```

```
23 MO    t'as # faim?
         you're hungry?
   fig        # figure 3
24 Cl    oui.
         yes.
```

At the beginning of the extract, Susanne walks into the kitchen, stands still in front of the table, and puts a bottle on it (lines 2–4). In overlap with her brother's barely audible utterance that is probably addressed to his mother (line 5), Susanne accuses him of being "mean" (line 6). She then shifts her gaze to her mother (line 8, figure 1). In combining the accusation of her brother with a gaze shift toward her mother, the girl projects an action by the latter (for children's use of gaze shift to select a next speaker, see also Chapter 4, Extracts 2–4). The mother responds with an open-class repair-initiator: "pardon?" that is produced as she looks at her daughter at the end[4] of her interrogative turn (figure 2). In overlap with her mother's repair-initiator, Susanne repeats the evaluation term of her initial assessment (line 10) and directs her attention back to the second bottle that she puts on the table at the end of her repetition (lines 11 and 15). She seems to infer that her mother does not need any additional information concerning the referent to understand her initial accusation. The mother's following turn supports this interpretation: after directing the box toward the table, and shifting her gaze in this same direction (lines 12–13), the mother requests that Susanne provide an explanation/account for her accusation (line 16). Instead of using the boy's name as Susanne did at line 6, the mother refers to him with the appropriate personal pronoun "he." By doing so, the mother deploys a *tying device*; in other words, she ties her own utterance strongly to the one used by her daughter (on interactants' use of tying devices, see Goodwin, M. 1990: 177–88; Watson 1997: 59).

However, as her mother is speaking, Susanne simultaneously moves away from the table (line 17). Right after her mother's completion, as a silence emerges (line 19), Susanne puts her thumb in her mouth (line 20) and eventually stands still at a slight distance from her mother (figure 3). She thus indicates in an embodied way that she is not in a position to respond to her mother's request, abandoning her initial accusation of her brother. Her older brother then complains of "being hungry" (line 21) and thus initiates a new topic that is immediately picked up by the mother (line 23).

In these extracts, in which a parent responds to a child's accusation by asking the child to clarify the referent, the child readily produced the requested repair, engendering a delayed disagreement by the parent that was rapidly closed by the interactants (Extracts 2–3). In contrast, the mother's why-question in Extract 4 encourages the child to explain and justify her accomplishment of an accusation.

---

4 From the audiovisual material available, it is not possible to determine exactly when the mother begins looking at Susanne.

As such, it seems to cause the child some difficulties. After her mother's why-question, the child does not respond but instead abandons her initial accusation of her brother altogether, before overt disagreement can even occur.

6.3.3   Parents' Use of What-questions to Delay Disagreement

Generally speaking, complaints are a delicate matter: their interactive organization displays participants' orientations toward membership categorization and specific rights/obligations that are conventionally attributed to them (see Sacks 1992 I: 597–600). Depending on a) to whom they are addressed, b) the relationship between the speaker and recipient, and finally c) the recipient's relationship to the person or thing being complained about, these might be treated as *safe* (engendering alignment), or *unsafe* (see Sacks 1992 I: 597–600; Butler 2008: 160)—that is to say, complaints from the child that orient toward engendering disagreement about something that belongs to the parent's field of responsibility, such as food or the child's physical safety. In the next three extracts (5–7), parents treat their children's negative assessments as unsafe complaints, responding by deploying a what-question. This question is composed of either a "what" and the parent's guess at the referent (Extract 5), or a "what" and a repetition of the child's assessment (Extracts 6–7). As with the who-questions discussed previously, the specified what-questions indicate parents' trouble concerning the referent of the child's assessment, and request that the child remedy this trouble.

Extract 5 (40dagr.)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (&): Lily (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Luc (2 years, 10 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2


```
1  C2→   *ça on peut**# pas+ manger** mama::n.
          that one cannot eat mo:m.
   fig                  # figure 1
2  fa    <<-oriented toward C2->
3  c2    *lh:takes the apple*
4  c2              *lh: holds apple in front of him*
5  c2             *rh: points to it*
6  mo                  +orients toward C2*
7  c2                   *looks at MO->
8  c2                    *lh/rh: direct apple down on table->
```

```
 9          (0.3)
```



```
10 FA⇒   quoi, la # peau?
         what, the skin?
   fig            # figure 2
11       (0*.7)
12  c2    *looks at apple on the table->
13  C2→ °ouai:[:s.°
         °yeah:[:.°
14 FA→        [oui c'est bon la peau des pommes.
              [yes it's good apple skin.
15       (1.6)
16 C2    pa:s ça:.=
         no:t tha:t.=
17 FA    =/mais ça c'est tout=
         =but that that's very=
18 FA    =bon [ça °la pomme°]
         =good [that °the apple°]
19 fa     /lh: directs to C2's apple, strikes the skin->
```



```
20 MO         [/+moi j'ai] presque* tout ma++n*gé (r#'garde)=
              [me i've] eaten almost all of it (look)=
   fig                                    # figure 3
21 fa        /lh: withdraws->
22 mo          +directs her apple toward C2+
23 c2                    *lh/rh: direct apple to his mouth->
24 mo                        +holds apple in front of C2->
25 c2                          *is about to take another
         bite of the apple->
26 FA    =regarde maman elle mange.
         =look mom she is eating.
         (2.*8)
27 c2     *takes a bite of the apple, continues eating->>
```

In Extract 5, the family is having a "four o'clock snack." Luc (2 years, 10 months) and his mother are having an apple, while his father and older sister Lily are eating a pastry.

At the beginning of the extract, Luc takes the apple (line 3), holds it in front of him (line 4) and points at it with his left hand (line 5). At the same time, he produces a negative assessment that seems to refer to it (line 1) while looking at it (figure 1). By post-positioning the address term "mo:m" (line 1), and shifting his gaze to her (line 7), Luc explicitly addresses his negative assessment of the apple to his mother. This way of selecting the next speaker can be used as a device to demonstrate "a special relationship with the recipient under circumstances where that demonstration is particularly relevant" (Lerner 2003: 185). The mother is the only other family member who—like Luc—is eating an apple, and it is she who has prepared the afternoon snack. At the beginning of Luc's turn, the mother is oriented toward her daughter, shifting her gaze toward Luc in the middle of it (line 6, figure 1). Parents tend to treat negative assessments concerning something that relates to their domain of responsibility as unsafe complaints (see comment above), and their occurrence easily engenders disalignment/disagreement from them. This is also the case in this extract. Instead of the addressed mother, it is the father who first responds to the boy's turn, producing a what-question to which he adds a referent-guess (line 10). The what-question seems to work as a challenge to Luc's negative assessment of the food (see Wiggins 2004 for interactants' challenging each other's evaluation of food and Schegloff and Lerner 2010 for a discussion of wh-questions and their action implementations apart from requesting information): the boy's confirmation of the referent-guess is uttered in a low voice that might indicate a backing down. However, latching with the boy's confirmation, the father then overtly disagrees with the boy (line 14). His disagreement is clear and direct: it is composed of a disagreement token and followed by a positive assessment of the apple skin that contrasts with the boy's initial complaint.

After a pause (line 15) during which the boy inspects his apple, the father's overt disagreement induces the boy to downgrade his disagreement and produce a confirmation of his initial turn in a lower voice (line 16). Furthermore, the boy's disagreement disintegrates quickly. The mother, who had been selected by the boy as the relevant recipient of his initial complaint, shows her apple to the boy (lines 22 and 24), and simultaneously argues that she has eaten "almost all of it" (line 20). This induces the boy to direct his apple to his mouth (line 23) and to continue eating it instead of talking further about the issue of the apple's skin (lines 25 and 27, figure 3).

In the next two extracts, the parents also use a what-question to delay their disagreement, but unlike the previous extracts, one of the parents produces an overt disagreement immediately after its occurrence, before the girl actually answers the what-question. In Extracts 6 and 7, the family is having lunch and dinner, respectively.

Extract 6 (15dagr)

Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (&): Louis (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months); C3: baby (2 months) CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
 1  MO    elles sont bonnes ces cre**vettes*
          it is good this shrimp
 2  c2    <<-is chewing*
 3  c2                          *swallows*
 4        (0.4)
 5  FA    <*mmh ((affirmative))>
 6  c2    *begins to make a facial expression of dislike->
 7        (0.6)
```



```
 8  C2    A:#:HH
    fig     # figure 1
 9        (0.*7)
10  c2        *looks at her mother->
11  FA    (j'les ai pechés c'matin) qu'il disait=
          (i fished them this morning) he said=
12  c2        *looks down at her plate->
13  C2→   =ça* pi/que.
          =that prickles.
14  c2          *lh: puts fingers in her mouth->
15  fa            /shifts gaze toward C2->
16        (0.6)
17  FA⇒   >qu'est-ce qui pique (alors).<=
          >what is it that prickles (then).<=
18  MO→   =clara il y a *rien qui pique aujourd'*hui.
          =clara there is nothing that prickles today.
19  c2                  *sticks her tongue out->
20  c2                              *withdraws lh to the left->
21        (0.2)
```



```
22  C2    A::#H
    fig      # figure 2
23        (0.4)
24  MO    vous racontez des *farces.
          you two are talking nonsense.
25  c2                  *withdraws tongue->
26        (0*.+8)
```

```
27 c2      *shifts gaze to MO->
28 mo      +looks at C2->
```



```
29 C2   A::H (.) I::#H↑
   fig               # figure 3
        (%0.4)
30 c1   %lh: directs pointing toward C2's glass of water->
31 C1   (+MAIS)[*BOIS D'L'EAU.]
        (BUT) [DRINK SOME WATER.]
32 mo   +lh: directs pointing toward C2's glass of water->
33 MO        [*a#lors +bois% un p'tit] peu d'eau.
             [so drink a little bit] of water.
34 c2        *shifts gaze to her glass of water->
   fig         # figure 4
35 mo              +lh: withdraws pointing->
36 c2                  %lh: withdraws pointing ->
37      (*1.+7)
38 c2   *picks up her glass to drink some water->
39 mo      +picks up her glass to drink some water->
40 FA   à mon avis c'est des blagues.
        in my opinion these are jokes.
41      (0.7)
42 C1   °à mon ma- à [mon avi] (.)+ vis=°
        °in my mo- in[my op] (.)inion=°
43 FA                [coucou] ((toward C3))
44 mo                          +puts glass back on table->
45 FA   =couc[ou] ((toward C3))
46 C1        [°c'e]st vrai°
             [°that]'s true°
47      (0.2)
48 MO   non, non, non.=
        no, no, no.=
49 FA   =hé hé hé= ((toward C3))
        =hey, hey, hey=
50 MO   =+vous faites les coquins aujourd'hui.
        = you two are being naughty today.
51 mo     +puts food on her fork, directs it toward mouth->>
```

Before Extract 6 starts, Clara picks up some food from her plate with her fingers and puts it in her mouth. At the beginning of the extract, she chews, swallows, and begins to facially express dislike (lines 2–3 and 6), while the mother evaluates the food positively and the father agrees with the mother (lines 1 and 5). After a short silence at line 7, Clara produces an indefinite vocalization (line 8) while looking down at her plate (see figure 1), indicating that the food may be a source of trouble. In certain circumstances, an outcry such as this, combined with a facial expression of dislike, can function as an *attention-getting device* (Schegloff 1972: 357) and engender a parent's request for an account (see Keel 2011, Extracts 13–14). In this extract, however, this is not the case and the

parents continue their conversation, looking down at their food (line 11). Their silence may already project a dispreferred action to come. Clara looks briefly at her mother, noticing that the latter is not paying attention to her (lines 10 and 12). Treating her parents' conduct as a noticeable absence of a response to her outcry at line 8, she pursues a response: she repairs her previous vocalization and expression of dislike by using natural language to negatively evaluate the food (line 13) (see also Chapter 4, Extract 7 and Chapter 5, Extracts 21–2), and puts her fingers in her mouth to locate and identify the disagreeable prickling in an embodied way (line 14).

This time, she is more successful in getting a response: toward the end of her turn, the father shifts his gaze toward her (line 15), and after a silence of 0.6 seconds (line 16), he produces a what-question and repeats Clara's assessment (line 17). The tempo and prosody of his question (fast production, no rising intonation) indicate some irritation. Moreover, immediately after the completion of the father's turn, the mother self-selects to disagree directly and clearly with her daughter's turn but without looking at her (line 18). While the father's what-question gives the girl an extra slot, the mother's immediate overt disagreement deprives the child of the chance to actually use this slot, for example to back down, thereby engendering a series of disagreements between Clara, who repeats her complaint, upgrading it in an embodied way (lines 19, 22 and 29, figures 2–4), and her mother, who dismisses it (lines 18 and 24, figures 2–3). These disagreements between mother and daughter come to an end when Clara's older brother aligns with Clara by suggesting that she drink some water (lines 30–31, figure 4), and his suggestion is seconded by his mother (line 33, figure 4). Clara immediately complies with their advice (lines 34 and 38). Although the father, the mother and the older brother first pursue the issue (lines 40, 48 and 50: the parents accuse the children of joking, of being naughty "today"; lines 42 and 46: C1 counters his father's accusation), they eventually drop it in favor of orienting to the baby (lines 43 and 49), or just focus on eating and drinking again, and thus manage to exit the disagreement (lines 44 and 51) repeatedly initiated by Clara's embodied expressions of dislike (lines 5–6, 8, 13, 19, 22 and 29).

The interactive organization of the next extract is very similar; only a simplified transcription and account of it will be provided.

Extract 7 (17dagr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (&): Louis (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Clara (2 years, 4 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   MO    on est en train d'mang[er, c'est pas très pratique]=
          we are ea[ting, it's not very convenient]=
```



```
2   C2→                          [ça pi::#que.]
                                 [that pri::ckles.]
    fig                                 # figure 1
3   MO    =de t'porter.
          =to carry you.
4         (5.4)
5   C2→   ça pi::que.
          that pri::ckles.
6         (0.6)
```



```
7   MO⇒→qu'est-ce qui est#- non, mais clara ça pique pa::s.
          what is it that- no, but clara that does no::t prickle.
    fig                          # figure 2
          (0.3)
8   C2→   oui:, ça pique ça:.=
          ye:s, that prickles tha:t.=
9   MO    =(non) cla[ra, ça pique pas.]
          =(no) cla[ra, that does not prickle.]
10  PE              [ouh, louis t'as t]out man[gé.
                    [ouh, louis you've e]aten all[of it.
11  C2→                                        [oui::
                                               [ye::s
12        (0.2)
13  C2→   OUi:: (ça) i(1) pi[::que.]
          YE::s (that) i(t) pri[::ckles.]
14  MO                       [est-ce que] ça pique louis?=
                             [does] that prickle louis?=
15  C1    =non.
          =no.
16        (0.3)
17  FA    Xx c'qui pique (0.3) la mouche.
          Xx what prickles (0.3) the fly.
18  MO    y'a même Louis qui dit que ça pi[que pas (non   ).]
          there's even Louis who says that it does [not prickle (no).]
```

```
19 C2                                          [no↑::n.]
                                               [no↑::.]
20      (0.9)
21 FA   la pizza qui pi- qui pique?
        the pizza that pri- that prickles?
22      (0.3)
23 C2   oui:::.
        ye:::s.
24      (0.5)
25 FA   non, il y'a rien qui pique,=
        no, there is nothing that prickles,=
26 FA   =j'ai mi:s eh:: [ni anchoi]:s,=
        =i have not pu:t eh:: [either anchovie]:s,=
27 C2                          [[oui]:::↑]
                               [[ye:]::s↑]
28 MO                           [alors]
                                [then]
29 MO   =alors mange le jambon.
        =then eat the ham.
```

Before the extract starts, Clara is eating a piece of pizza. The mother is focused on the little baby (figure 1). In overlap with her mother's talk (addressed to the baby), Clara produces the same complaint as in the previous extract, greatly elongating the evaluation term: "pri::ckles::" (line 2). This first production does not engender any response from her parents (line 3). This induces the girl to infer a trouble of hearing, and to produce a full repetition of her initial turn (line 5; see Chapter 4, Extract 1 and Chapter 6, Extract 3), during which the mother comes back to the table (figure 2). Clara's repetition is successful in generating a response: the mother begins formulating a what-question while inspecting Clara's plate (figure 2), then interrupts herself and produces a clear and direct disagreement with her daughter (line 7). As in the previous extract, the mother does not give the little girl a real opportunity to revise her initial turn, engendering the girl's repeated disagreement (lines 11 and 13).

However, in contrast to the previous extract, in which the brother self-selected to support his little sister, in this extract it is the mother who recruits his opinion in order to preempt Clara's position and possibly challenge her initial assessment of the food (lines 14–15; see also Extract 5 above),[5] engendering the continuation of disagreement and involving the father (lines 18–28). Eventually, the mother treats Clara's complaint as a request for permission not to have to eat everything, but only the ham (line 29; see also Keel 2011: 82–6). By granting this request, she is successful in dissolving the disagreement that emerged between

---

5   Wiggins (2004) describes how children's assessments of food are often challenged by their parents in next turns. She argues that by challenging their children's initial assessments, parents may be socializing their children with regard to food, tasting food, and/or meals in general.

Clara and the other members of the family, and in bringing all participants back to the activity of eating.[6]

After a young child's complaint about food, in Extract 5, the parent's question engendered the child's repair action and further resulted in a rapid closing of the disagreement sequence. However, in Extracts 6–7, the what-question was merely used as a delaying device. It was not meant to give the child a real opportunity to revise his or her initial turn. In contrast to Extract 5, this way of using the what-question engendered a long series of disagreements that involved all the family members. This series eventually came to an end when the parent made a concession to the child.

6.3.4 Parents' Use of Verification Procedures to Delay Disagreement

In the next two extracts in this section (Extracts 8–9), the parents do not use a wh-question before overtly disagreeing with the child's initial assessment. Instead, after completion of the child's assessment, a silence emerges during which the parents verify the child's claim (marked by ⟹ in the transcription), inspecting the cleanliness of a Q-tip (Extract 8), or the temperature of water (Extract 9) before they disagree by providing an account (Extract 8) or by simultaneously granting the request implied by the child's complaint (Extract 9).

In Extract 8, Susanne (2 years, 5 months) is sitting on the changing table, and her mother is standing in front of her. The mother has just invited Susanne to clean her ear with a Q-tip that Susanne is holding in her right hand. Before Susanne grants her mother's request, she inspects the Q-tip (figure 1).

Extract 8 (3dagr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C2 (*): Susanne (2 years, 5 months); CA1: camera 1


```
1   C2 →  #**tout sale,
              all dirty
    fig    # figure 1
2   c2     *shifts gaze, looks at MO->
```

---

6   In her analysis of a family meal, Hester (2007) describes different devices that the mother deploys to organize the temporality of the meal and to keep the participants "on the set agenda." In this extract, the mother partially grants her daughter's request and thereby manages to ensure that all family members resume eating (see also Chapter 4, Extract 11 and Chapter 5, Extract 19).

```
 3  c2       *rh: directs Q-tip toward MO's eyes->
 4          (0.3)
 5  C2→   tout s#ale,
           all dirty,
    fig          # figure 2
 6   ⇒    (1.2)
 7  MO→   non+, c'*est l'autre +bout qui est sale=
           no, it's the other end that is dirty=
 8  mo        +rh/lh: direct toward Q-tip->
 9  c2            *rh: withdraws the Q-tip from MO's approaching hands->
10  mo               +rh: directs toward C2's right ear ->
11  MO    =c+e*lui-là il est tout +propre.
           =this one is all clean.
12  mo      +rh: vaguely points to C2's right ear, holds C2's head->
13  c2         *rh: directs Q-tip toward her own right ear->
14  mo             +lh: grasps C2's rh, endorses its movement->
15          (0.3)
```



```
16  MO    vas-y#.
           go ahead.
    fig          # figure 3
```

At the beginning of the extract, Susanne shifts her gaze toward her mother (line 2), and directs the Q-tip (line 3) into her mother's field of vision, complaining that the Q-tip she is invited to use is: "all dirty" (line 1). She displays her understanding of the fact that if the intended recipient is to respond to her complaint, the latter requires visual access to the assessed object (see Chapter 4, Extracts 5–6). However, no response from the mother is immediately forthcoming (line 4), which prompts the girl to repeat her complaint (line 5), bringing the Q-tip even closer to her mother's eyes (figure 2). Susanne maintains her position (figure 2) while a silence emerges (line 6) and the mother (apparently) verifies her claim concerning the Q-tip. The mother produces a disagreement token and then negates Susanne's claim (lines 7 and 11). Interestingly, she achieves her negation by accounting for the claim, admitting that the other end of the Q-tip is indeed dirty, but that the one Susanne is showing her is "all clean" (lines 7 and 11). The mother simultaneously directs her hands toward the girl's right hand, which is holding the Q-tip (line 8). The girl withdraws her right hand from her mother's approaching hands (line 9), and then starts to direct it toward her right ear at the very same moment that her mother vaguely points toward it (line 12). Shortly after this, the mother softly grasps her daughter's right hand, physically endorsing her daughter's movement to clean her right ear with the Q-tip in a collaborative way (lines 14 and 16; see Keel and Sormani 2014), encouraging

her to go ahead. Apart from Susanne's withdrawal of her right hand (line 9), the mother's disagreement does not engender any disaligning action from Susanne. Instead, the girl remains silent and seems attentive to her mother's argument, agreeing with her in an embodied way and engaging in cleaning her ear with the Q-tip (figures 2–3).

In Extract 9, three children are sitting in the bathtub, and the father is going from one child to the next to wash their hair. He has just finished rinsing Camille's hair, and Faffa (2 years, 7 months) is next in line.

Extract 9 (39dagr)
Participants: FA (/): father; C1 (&): Raymond (8 years, 1 month); C2 (%): Camille (6 years, 1 month);
C3 (*): Faffa (2 years, 7 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   FA    faffa la tête en arr//iè:re.=
          faff head ba:ck.=
2   fa    <<-rinsing C2's hair/
3   fa                        /directing showerhead to C3's head->
4   C3    =NON, NON
          =NO, NO
5         (0.8)
6   FA    (bon)
          (okay)
```



```
7         (#0.8)
    fig   # figure 1
8   C3    /NO::::
          /NO::::
9   fa    /starts rinsing C3's head->
10  FA    la tê[te en- en arrière. en arrière.] (.)**en arrière.
          he[ad ba- back., back.] (.)back.
11  C3→        [*c'est, (c'est, c'est) chau::d]
               [it's, (it's, it's) ho::t]
12  c3         *turns head away to the left*
13  c3                              *turns head back to center->
14        (.)
15  C3    EH,
          EH,
16        (0.2)
17  C3    /EH,
          /EH,
18  fa    /rh: withdraws flow of water from C2's head, directs
          showerhead to his lh->
```

```
19          (0.3#)
    fig        # figure 2
20 C3→  C'[EST] CHAU::D.=
        IT['S] HO::T.=
21 FA⇒         [xx]
22 FA⇒  =/°c'e[st chau:d.°]
        =/°i[t's ho:t.°]
23 fa⇒   /lh: tests the temperature of the water->
24 C2          [non, c'est] /froi:[::d.]
               [no, it's] co:[::ld.]
25 fa                  /lh: directs to faucet->
26 FA→                      [c'est] pas/ chau::d.
                            [it's] not/ ho::t.
27 fa                            /lh: adjusts faucet->
28          (0.2)
29 C2    °°c'est°° fr[oi::::::d.]
         °°it's°° co[::::::ld.]
30 FA          [/(voilà) j'ai //baissé, c'est b//on.]
               [(done) i've turned it down, it's fine.]
31 fa          /lh: withdraws from faucet/
32 fa                          /lh: tests temperature//
33 fa                                      /rh: directs
        showerhead toward C3's head->
34          (0.3)
35 C2    °c'est /froi:d.°
         °it's co:ld.°
33 fa          /rh: starts rinsing C3's head again->
36          (.)
37 FA    mets la tête en arrière.
         put your head back.
```

At the beginning of the extract, the father asks Faffa to tilt his head "back" (line 1). At the end of his turn, he directs the showerhead toward the boy's head (lines 2–3), indicating that Faffa is about to be doused with water. Faffa responds with a strong disagreement to his father's request, screaming "NO::" several times (lines 4 and 8). The father starts showering Faffa while he is still screaming (line 9), repeating his initial request a second time (line 10). In overlap with the father's repetition, the boy complains about the "high" temperature of the water, moving his head back and forth as if to escape the flow of water—but unsuccessfully

(lines 12–13). In this extract, the boy's initial refusal is thus transformed into a negative assessment of the water's temperature. By expressing his distress through vocal (lines 15 and 17) and embodied means (lines 12–13, figure 2), the boy induces the father to interrupt the showering of his head (line 18). Moreover, as Faffa repeats his complaint, he upgrades it using prosody (line 20). Latching with the boy's complaint, the father first repeats it in a way that conveys slight amusement and disbelief, and then clearly disagrees with the boy's initial assessment (lines 22 and 26). Between the father's two turns, Faffa's older sister evaluates the water's temperature as being cold, thus aligning with her father against her little brother (line 24). At the same time, the father verifies the boy's claim (line 23) and directs his hand to the faucet (line 25) to turn down the heat of the water (lines 27 and 30). Prefacing his clear disagreement (line 26) with an action that grants the request—to turn down the hot water—implied by Faffa's initial complaint is a very effective way of closing the disagreement. Indeed, Faffa neither disagrees, nor shows any sign of resistance when the father begins showering his head once again (line 33).

To summarize: in this first part of the chapter, I discussed extracts in which children's assessments accomplish dispreferred actions, such as accusations (Extracts 2–4) and complaints (Extracts 5–8), to which the parents respond either with a who-question (Extracts 2–3), a what-question (Extracts 5–7), or a why-question (Extract 4). I also looked at extracts in which the parent uses an embodied verification (Extracts 8–9) before he or she overtly disagrees with the child's initial assessment. In cases in which the "what?" occurs alone, it achieves a *neutral query* (Corrin 2010: 23, 34) and typically induces the speaker of the trouble turn to simply repeat his or her initial turn, increasing the volume (see Extract 3 above; Corrin 2010: 23, 34). In the extracts discussed in this section, the parents do not produce a neutral query but rather a *specific query* (Corrin 2010: 34). The wh-questions in Extracts 2–5 constitute specific queries in that they request the child either to clarify the referent (Extracts 2–3 and 5), or to account for his or her initial turn (Extract 4). By using a wh-question in their response, parents transform their second pair part (response to the child's assessment) into a first pair part (request for clarification/explanation) to which the child has an obligation to respond. In this way, parents gain talk control, as they do when they respond with a questioning repeat to their child's assessment (see Keel 2011).

As mentioned earlier (see Chapter 5, discussion of Chapter 6, Extracts 12–15), it has been argued that adults use such extra opportunities to soften their initial action to minimize the occurrence of overt disagreement, displaying an orientation toward solidarity and each other's maintenance of "face." Interestingly, children seem not to take the extra opportunity in this same way. On the contrary, apart from Extract 4, young children tend not only to use the extra slot to grant their parents' request for clarification, but also to confirm their initial assessment (see also Keel 2011), engendering

their parents' overt and direct expression of disagreement. Although not preventing overt disagreement, a parent's use of a wh-question (Extracts 2–5) or verification procedure (Extracts 8–9) seems nevertheless to be a handy tool for sidestepping a long series of disagreements between the interactants after the overt disagreement by the parent, except when the parent's wh-question does not give the child a real opportunity to use the extra slot provided in this way (Extracts 6–7).

6.4   Parents' Disagreements Occurring Immediately after Completion of Children's Assessments

In the previous section of this chapter, I argued that parents' use of a dispreferred format when disagreeing with their children's assessment manifests their orientation toward the avoidance or minimization of overt disagreement. I have moreover shown that this type of response engenders a rapid closure of the assessment sequence initiated by the child's accomplishment of a dispreferred action. In this second part of the chapter, the assessments discussed engender a parent's disagreement that is produced in the *preferred format* (see Pomerantz 1975: 87–102; Church 2009: 42–3): they occur without any delay—in slight overlap with the child's turn (Extracts 13 and 18), latching with it (Extracts 10–11), or immediately after its completion (Extracts 12, 14–17)—they are not accompanied by an account, and they are direct and clear (Extracts 10–18). Furthermore, an immediate disagreement from a parent generally constitutes a strong response to a child's assessment: a "same-referent contrastive assessment construction" (Pomerantz 1984a: 74). By taking into account the praxeological particularity of these extracts, the analysis seeks to reveal the context in which parents use the preferred format for disagreeing and the implications their unequivocal disagreement might have on the further development of the interaction.

6.4.1   Context of Disagreement Established by Children's Refusals of Parents' Requests

In this first section, I analyze extracts in which the context of disagreement is established by the child's refusal to grant a parent's request or suggestion—to eat lunch (Extract 10), to put a puzzle away (Extract 11), and to use a toy spatula as suggested by the mother (Extract 12). The child deploys an assessment which accounts for his or her refusal, and thus engenders the parent's immediate strong disagreement.[7]

---

7   In the previous extract (9), the child's assessment also occurs in a context of disagreement which is established by the child's refusal to comply with a parent's request. However, in this particular case it was not met by an immediate and strong disagreement from a parent.

   Before Extract 10 starts, Martin categorically refuses to eat his spinach and carrots, as repeatedly requested by his parents. Without finishing his lunch, he leaves the table, but then comes back to sit on his father's lap shortly after and agrees to continue eating. The boy thus simultaneously establishes a context of disalignment (refusing to eat the things on his plate) and a context of negotiation (leaving the table, then returning to it).

Extract 10 (28dagr)

Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (*): Martin (2 years, 6 months); C2 (&): Adrien (9 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2;


```
 1  C2     EH::::↑#:::::[::::::::.]
 2  fa     <<-lh: directs C1's plate toward him->
 3  c2     <<-looks at the plate FA is handing him->
    fig          # figure 1
 4  C1→                 [j'aime pas # ja][mbon,]
                        [i don't like h][am,]
    fig                              # figure 2
 5  MO                             <[ouai↑]::s.= ((toward C2))>
                                   <[yea↑]::h.= ((toward C2))>
 6  C1→  =j'aime pa:s/ //jambon.=
         =i do:n't like ham.=
 7  fa              /lh: puts down C1's plate in front of C1/
 8  fa              /lh: directs toward C1's original place->
 9  FA   =mais martin c'est bo::l l'jambo::n.
         =but martin ha::m is good.
10       (1.1)
11  C1   °non°
         °no°
12       (/2.1)
13  fa    /lh: grasps C1's fork, directs it to C1's plate->
    FA   r'garde voir /là//,
         look (see) here,
14  fa              /lh: spears piece of ham/
15  fa                   /lh: directs it toward C1's mouth->
```

```
16        (#1.2)
```



```
    fig     # figure 3, 4
17 C1      <m*m#h↓ ((repudiative))>
18 c1        *moves his head back abruptly ->
    fig        # figure 5
           (/0.6)
19 fa      /lh: retracts->
```



```
20 FA      no#n/?
           no?
    fig      # figure 6
21 fa        /lh: freezing its movement->
           (/0.6)
22 fa       /looks down->>
23 MO      (mais si) tu aimes le jambon marti::n.
           (but yes) you like ham marti::n.
```

At the beginning of the extract, the father is just about to put Martin's plate in front of him (lines 2–3, figures 1–2), indicating that he wants him to eat some more. While looking at his approaching plate (line 3), and in overlap with his little brother's loud exclamation (line 1), Martin utters: "I don't like ham" (line 4). After coming back to the table and displaying a kind of willingness to continue eating, his negative assessment projects the opposite. In overlap with his assessment, the mother responds to her baby's cry with an accentuated agreement token (line 5). Latching with this response, and deploying a continuing intonation, the boy's repetition (line 6) sounds like a continuation of his initial assessment. At the same time, the father puts Martin's

plate down in front of him (line 7), and just after the boy's completion of his utterance, the father assesses the ham positively (line 9), beginning his turn with the contrastive conjunction "but." The father's embodied actions show immediate and unequivocal disagreement with the boy's negative assessment (line 9). After the emergence of a silence (line 10), Martin's disagreement is produced in a low voice (line 11). He thus seems to back down from his initial negative assessment. The father, however, continues his attempts to make Martin eat: after getting Martin's fork, he spears some ham onto his plate and directs it toward Martin's mouth, provoking the latter's clear disagreement (lines 8 and 13–15, figures 3–4). As soon as the fork reaches his son's mouth, Martin deploys prosody to produce a repudiative "<u>mmh</u>"" (line 17) and moves his head back, successfully dodging the approaching piece of ham (line 18). He upgrades his initial assessment, employing embodied and prosodic means (see also section 4.3.1). The father finally abandons his attempt to feed Martin. He retracts the fork (line 19) and produces a "no" with an interrogative intonation (line 20). Martin does not respond to his father's question; instead, his mother responds to the father's question, also disagreeing with Martin's initial negative assessment (line 23). The series of disaffiliative actions engendered by the father's immediate disagreement continues, involving another member of the family (the mother), as was the case for Extracts 6–7 above.

In the next Extract (11), Luc counters the course of action projected by his mother and thereby establishes a context of disagreement before producing an assessment that accomplishes a self-deprecation. Luc and his mother are sitting on the floor and have just finished assembling a jigsaw puzzle. The mother and Luc (and the father) have agreed that Luc is going to put it back in the cupboard.[8]

Extract 11 (44dagr.)
Participants: MO (*): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (&): Lily (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Luc (2 years, 10 months)


```
1  C2⇨    *+tu veux (ch#r)anger (0.3) *ça↑#.
          you want (to put) that (0.3) away↑.
```

---

8   For parents' and children's achievements and negotiations of so-called "activity contracts" in Swedish everyday family life, see Aronsson and Cekaite 2011.

```
 2  c2     *getting up, directing the puzzle toward MO*
 3  mo     +getting up->
    fig                 # figure 1           # figure 2
 4  c2                              *stands in front of MO->
 5  MO     no:n↑ (.) toi.
           no:↑ (.) you.
 6         (0.2)
 7  C2→    *j'arrive pa↑::s.=
            i canno↑::t do it=
 8  c2     *starts to walk toward the corridor/cupboard->>
 9  MO➔    =oui t'arrives.
           =yes you can.
10         (0.4)
11  fa     ((laug[hs))
12  C2          [°eh↑:::::::n°
```

While getting up (line 2, figure 1), Luc directs the jigsaw puzzle toward his mother (line 2) and invites her to put it away (line 1, figure 2), even though they have just agreed that he was going to do it. He thus tries to negotiate to have his mother do it for him. Without hesitation, the mother refuses the invitation and instead requests once again that he do it (line 5). Immediately following his mother's refusal, Martin invokes an inability to do it: "i canno↑::t do it" (line 7). At the same time, he starts walking toward the corridor (cupboard), indicating that he is going to put the puzzle away after all (line 8), and thus contradicting what he has just said. On the one hand, his assessment accomplishes a self-deprecation. Following a self-deprecation, disagreement constitutes the preferred action. As a response to a self-deprecation, the mother's latching and clear disagreement constitutes the preferred action and does not engender any further disaffiliative action (see the discussion of Extracts 12–15 in Chapter 5; Pomerantz 1975: 91ff., 1984a: 64). On the other hand, the boy's embodied action (walking toward the cupboard) seems to indicate that the self-deprecation is not to be taken too seriously. In contrast to the mother, the father aligns with this interpretation: he laughs a little bit, treating the boy's turn as a laughable instead of a self-deprecation (line 11). Following his father's laughter, the boy continues walking to the cupboard, making no utterance apart from moaning very softly (line 12), and ultimately puts the puzzle away without further comment.

In the next extract, Martin and his mother are playing "meal preparation" with Play-Doh; they are making pizzas. Before the extract starts, Martin is walking around his toy kitchen looking for the right utensil to use to put the pizza he has just finished into the toy oven. The mother is sitting some distance away, observing the boy.

Extract 12 (24dagr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (*): Martin (2 years, 6 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   MO    tu peux pr'ndre la p'tite spatule.
          you can take the little spatula.
2         (0.6)
3   C1⇨   *non.
           no.
4   c1    *rh: remains still, orienting toward toy kitchen->
5         (1.0)
6   C1→   (va) pas bien la *spatule.
          (does) not work well the spatula.
7   c1                    *rh: directs to his toy kitchen utensils->
```



```
8   MO➜   mais# oui↑ ça va bien.
          but yes↑ it works well.
    fig      # figure 1
9         (0.1)
10  C1    no:n **(.)* xx # (0.4) *t'ili::se
          no: (.) xx (0.4) u::se
    fig                  # figure 2
11  c1         *rh: grasps spatula*
12  c1          *shifts gaze to MO->
13  c1                        *starts walking toward MO->
14        (0.7)
15  MO    [ouai:s ça    ça]    va bien.
          [yea:h that that] works well.
16  C1    [t'ili::se]
          [u::se]
17        (0.2)
```



```
18  C1    **no::n, (.) non-non t'ili::se bien # moi.=
          no::, (.)  no-no    u::se    well  me.=
    fig                                   # figure 3
```

```
19 c1    *stands still->
20 c1     *showing spatula to MO, waving it in the air->
21 MO    =ouai:s justement↑ ça va bien pour les pizzas.=
         =yea:h exactly↑ that works well for the pizzas.=
22 C1    =*non-non-non-non (.) no:n,
         = no-no-no-no (.) no:,
23 c1     *withdraws spatula->
24       (*0.4)
25 c1     *resumes walking toward MO->
26 C1    no[:n]=
         no[:]=
27 MO      [si]=
           [yes]=
28       (0.5)
29 C1    =*non-non (.)*non *xx, (0.3) prend a xxxx.=
         = no-no (.)   no   xx, (0.3) take a xxxx.=
30 c1              *changes spatula from the rh to lh*
31 c1                    *stands still->
32 c1                      *lh: performs the movement of taking the
         pizza with the spatula in an amplified way->
33 MO    =ouais, regarde*,(0.2) +*ça va bien là.
         =yeah, look,(0.2) that works well here.
34 c1                *lh: directs spatula to rh, holding it with both
         hands->
35 mo                      +rh: grasps pizza and lifts it up->
36 c1                       *resumes walking toward MO->
37 MO    *pour me[ttre d']ssus.
          to p[ut on ]it.
38 c1    *rh: directs spatula toward pizza->
39 C1        [non]
             [no]
40       *(0.2)
41 c1    *rh: holds spatula under the pizza->
```



```
42 MO    tu vois (0.1) +ho#p↑
         you see (0.1)  there you go↑
   fig                  # figure 4
43 mo                     +rh: puts pizza upon spatula->
44       (0.3)
45 C1    non
         no
46       (1.3*)
47 c1    *rh: inclines spatula to put pizza down on table->
48 C1    #<mhm: ((weepy tone, refusing))>
   fig   # figure 5
49       (0.1)
50 MO    *t'aimerais (l'autre)
          you'd like (the other)
51 c1    *lh: grasps pizza, puts it down on table->
52       (0.2)
53 MO    j'sais laquelle tu veux xx qu'on aille# la chercher dans la
         cuisine.
```

```
        i know which one you want xx us to go get it in the kitchen.
fig                                             # figure 6
```

At line 1, the mother suggests that Martin use his (toy) spatula. After a silence of 0.6 seconds (line 2), the boy opts for the dispreferred action, accomplishing it in the preferred format: he straightforwardly refuses this advice (line 3), and stands still in front of his toy kitchen at the end of his turn. As in the previous two extracts (10–11), the context of disagreement is established by the child: refusing advice is interactively a very delicate matter (see Heritage and Sefi 1992). After a one-second silence (line 5), Martin accounts for his refusal by negatively assessing the usefulness of the spatula (line 6). At the same time, he orients his right hand to the spatula (line 7, figure 1). The mother responds immediately, disagreeing clearly and directly with the boy's assessment (line 8), which engenders a long series of disagreements between the boy (lines 10, 18, 22, 26, 29 and 39) and herself (lines 15, 21, 27, 33, 37 and 42). At the same time, however, despite being involved in these disagreements, the boy also grants his mother's initial advice by grasping the spatula (figure 2) and walking with it toward her (lines 11–13).

Although he delays his arrival by interrupting his walk (line 19), stressing his disagreement by simply showing the spatula to his mother (line 20, figure 3) and then mimicking how one might correctly use a spatula to lift up the pizza (line 32), he does finally collaborate with his mother (lines 35 and 43) by putting the pizza on the spatula (lines 38 and 41). According to his mother, that collaboration effectively proves that the spatula is for lifting a pizza (lines 33, 37 and 42, figure 4). However, the boy seems not to agree (lines 45 and 48): according to him, this way of lifting does not count (lines 47 and 51, figures 5–6). Finally, the mother agrees to get another spatula—a real one—from the kitchen (lines 50–53). In this extract, the mother's retraction from her initial suggestion closes the long series of disagreements between mother and son.

6.4.2　Context of Disagreement Established by Parents

In the following section, I discuss extracts in which the child's initial assessment is preceded by a context of disagreement/disalignment established by the parent's actions. The parent may establish the context of disagreement/disalignment by refusing to grant the child's prior request to leave the table (Extract 13) or to get another pencil (Extract 16), by punishing/reprehending the child's behavior toward his little brother (Extract 14), or by accusing the child of just enjoying eating the food, instead of helping to prepare it for a meal (Extract 15).

In Extract 13, the family is sitting at the table and is just about to finish dinner.

Extract 13 (47dagr.)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (&): Lily (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Luc (2 years, 10 months)

```
 1  FA⇨   >et pis pour l'instant on a pas dit que vous pouvez descendre=
          >and also for the time being we have not said you could leave=
 2  FA⇨   =de table- a- /t'as pas t'as essuyé ta main.=<
          =the table- a- you haven't, you have wiped your hand.=<
 3  fa                 /lh: points to C2's lh->
 4  FA    =>*elle est encore /plein d'sauce à salade celle-//ci.<
          =>*it is still /covered with salad dressing this one he//re.<
 5  c2       *looking at his lh->
 6  fa                      /lh: withdraws pointing/->
          (0.1)
 7  C1    m[*a::s↑ on peu:*]:::*:::::t
          b[u::t↑ we ca:]:::::::::n ((toward MO; demanding tone))
 8  FA     [>/l'autre aus//si r'garde.<]
           [>the other one also look.<]
 9  c2      *lh: directs to bib, wipes on bib->
10  fa       /lh: points to C2's rh/
11  c2                *looking at his rh->
12  fa                   /lh: withdraws pointing/
13  c2                       *rh: directs to bib, wipes on bib->
14        (0.6)
15  C1    °xxxxxxx[xxxxxxxxx°]
```



```
16  C2→           [PA#*PA e#**lles sont ↑pl#us] (sa[les]).
                  [DADDY they are ↑no longer] (di[rty]).
17  fa    <-oriented toward C2->
18  c2    <-inspects his hands
    fig              # figure 1
19  c2              *clapping his hands*
    fig                 # figure 2
20  c2                  *stretches hands out toward father->
    fig                      # figure 3
21  FA→                       [/O:]H, non=
                              [O:]H, no=
22  fa                        /shaking head->
23  FA→   =elles sont pas encore p/ropres.
          =they are not yet c/lean.
24  fa                      /turns head toward glass, drinks->
25        (*1.7)
26  c2      *retracts hands slowly, while looking at them->
27  C2    oui/ *pour le boire
          yes/ *for the drinking
28  fa      /stops drinking, lowers glass->>
29  c2          *looks in front of him->>
30  MO    ben y'a des desserts pour personne.=
          well there's dessert for nobody.=
31  C2    <=OUI:::((weepy))>
          <=YE:::S((weepy))>
32  FA    ben non vous avez pas fini vos assiettes.=
          well no you have not yet finished your plates.=
33  C2    <=moi je veu:::x. ((weepy))>
          <=i i want. ((weepy))>
```

At the beginning of the extract, the father establishes a context of disagreement between himself and his son. He does not permit Luc to leave the table as the latter intended (lines 1–2); instead, he requests that he clean his hands, pointing first to the boy's left hand and then to his right one (lines 3 and 10), and arguing that his hands are "covered with salad dressing" (lines 4 and 8). At one level, Luc treats the father's actions as a request to clean his hands: he first looks at his left, and then at his right hand (lines 5 and 11), bringing first the former and then the latter up to his bib (lines 9–10) to wipe them (lines 9 and 13). At the same time, however, he treats the granting of his father's request as the condition for getting permission to leave the table: having wiped his hands, he first inspects them (line 18), then claps them together as if to show that he is pleased with the result (line 19, figure 2), before finally showing them to his father (line 20, figure 3) while simultaneously summoning his father loudly (line 16) and positively assessing the cleanliness of his hands (line 16).

However, in overlap with Luc's self-praise, the father clearly disagrees with him (lines 21 and 23). He emphasizes his disagreement by shaking his head (line 22), inducing the boy to inspect his hands once more (line 26) before he again disagrees with his father (line 27). Immediately following the boy's disagreement, the mother intervenes, announcing: "there's dessert for nobody" (line 30). That this announcement is meant to be a punishment rests on the fact that in this family, "no dessert" is routinely used to sanction certain eating behaviors—such as not finishing one's plate or refusing to eat a particular item of food. Moreover, Luc's objection (line 31) to his mother's announcement is immediately countered by his father, who adds the justification "no you have not yet finished your plates" (line 32). The mother's intervention brings to an abrupt end the disagreement between father and son concerning the cleanliness of the boy's hands. Unlike the last extract, however, instead of accomplishing an action signaling a compromise that might close the conflictual situation between the child and the parent, the mother's intervention (line 30) regenerates the disaffiliation/disalignment between parent and child, and engenders another series of disagreements (lines 31–3).

In the next extract, the mother has just punished Martin (2 years, 6 months); he has been given a timeout for his behavior toward his little brother Adrien.

Extract 14 (26dagr)
Participants: MO (*): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (*): Martin (2 years, 6 months); C2 (&): Adrien (9 months); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

⇨


```
1   C1    <j'veux pas rester eheh dans le #°petit *coin° pas rester
          petit coin=((weepy))>
          <i don't want to stay in the °small corner°, not stay small
          corner=((weepy voice))>
2   mo    <<--opens the window->
3   c1    <<--walks away from the corner->
4   c1                                         *turns toward MO,
          stands still in front of playpen ->
    fig                                  # figure 2
5   MO    =a:lors si- si tu veux *pas rester au p'tit coin tu es=
          =so: if-, if you don't want to stay in the little=
6   MO    =gentil avec adrien et pis c'est tout.
          =corner, you're kind to adrien, and that's it.
7   c1                              *turns away from MO->
8         (+1.0)
9   mo    +walks toward C1->
10  MO    c'est simple.
          it's simple.
11        (1.1)
12  MO    c'est tout +simple.
          it's very simple.
13  mo                 +lh: directs toward C1's head->
14        (0.3)
```



```
15  C1→   <non +(.) #pas tout simple+. ((voix tendue))>
          <no (.) not very simple. ((tense voice))>
16  mo               +lh: caresses C1's head+
    fig              # figure 3
17  MO➜  mais oui, c'est tout simple.
          but yes, it's very simple.
```

```
18       (3.0)
19 c1     *walks toward MO/C2->>
20 C1    m[mh::xxx ((weepy)) ]xxxxx lo::l
21 MO     [adrien il est là tout genti:l]
          [adrien he is here very kind:]
22       (0.5)
23 MO    mais on va tout de suite manger, martin tu sais dès que papa
         sera là....
         but we're going to eat very soon, martin you know as soon as
         daddy is here….
24       ((series of disagreements continues))
```

Before the extract begins, the mother's punishment establishes a context of disagreement: as one can see in figure 1, the boy resists his mother's attempt to send him to the corner, and she deploys embodied means (for parents' use of embodied means to re-orient their children, see Chapter 5, Extracts 18 and 20) to overcome his resistance. Still standing in front of her son, she then loosens her grasp on Martin and opens the window to throw something out of it (line 2). Martin seizes this opportunity to walk away from the corner, explaining: "I don't want to stay" (lines 1–2, figure 2), turning back toward the mother, and standing still at the end of his turn, as if to observe her reaction (line 4). The boy has escaped and the account he provides for his action induces the mother to back down from her initial position: instead of insisting on the punishment, she tells Martin the condition for not getting punished (again) (lines 5–6). While his mother is talking, Martin turns away from her, keeping silent after she has finished (lines 7–8). His silence at this point might project a dispreferred action. While approaching her son (line 9),[9] the mother—after a one-second silence (line 8)—adds that what she expects Martin to do to avoid getting punished is "simple" to fulfill (line 10). Martin does not respond to his mother's turn (line 11), engendering her upgraded repetition of her assessment (line 12). At the same time, she caresses the boy's head in a placating way and continues to walk past him toward the kitchen (lines 13 and 16).

The boy responds immediately to the mother's upgraded repetition, producing a negation of her assessment and engendering a strong disagreement from his mother (lines 15–17). Thereafter, a long silence emerges (line 18) during which the boy walks toward his mother and addresses her (line 20). In overlap with her son's weepy and incomprehensible turn, the mother invokes the kindness of Martin's little brother Adrien (line 21), adding fuel to the fire. Martin does not respond to the mother's provocation (line 22). After a silence of 0.5 seconds (line 22), the mother resumes talking and seems to refuse a request implied by Martin's prior weepy turn (line 23), engendering the continuation of disagreeing/disaligning actions. In a way similar to the previous extract (13), instead of attenuating the situation, the mother's responses to Martin's turns heighten the disaffiliation between her and her son.

---

9 The precise moment is not identifiable, since neither of the two cameras has filmed the mother. However, since she appears shortly after the moment indicated here, one can presume that she started walking at approximately this moment.

In Extract 15, Elio (2 years, 1 month) and his father are making pizza for dinner. Before the extract starts, the father had reproached Elio for repeatedly eating little pieces of mozzarella instead of cutting it into smaller pieces as he had asked him. He thus overtly pointed out some disagreement/disalignment existing between himself and his son.

Extract 15 (11dagr.)
Participants: FA: father (/); C2 (*): Elio (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1            (*9*.*//4)
2    c2      *cuts mozzarella in two halves, takes one*
3    c2           *lh: directs one half of mozzarella toward FA ->
4    fa             /lh: grasps cut pieces of mozzarella, puts them in bowl->
5    fa               /monitors C2->
6    C2→     */BON.
                 GOOD.
7    c2      *lh: holds cut piece of mozzarella between himself and FA->
8    fa      /rh: directs cutting board toward bowl, puts remaining pieces
             into bowl->
9            (0.2)
```



```
10   FA➔    non, ça c'est trop/ gros#. fais encore des *p'tits=
             no, that's too big. make some more small=
11   fa                        /monitors what C2 is doing->
     fig                        # figure 1
12   c2                             *lh: directs half of mozzarella
             toward bowl->
13   FA      =bouts /avec le couteau.
             =pieces with the knife.
14   fa            /lh/rh: withdraw from bowl->
15           (#1*.**5)
     fig      # figure 2
16   c2        *lh: puts half of mozzarella in bowl *
17   c2            *lh: withdraws->
18   FA      /fais des*- ben j'fais/- /Elio, fais des *p'tits bou/ts.*
             make some- well i make- Elio, make little pieces.
19   fa      /rh: takes half of mozzarella out of bowl, puts it back on C2's
             cutting board/
20   fa                           /rh: points to mozzarella on C2's cutting
             board/
21   c2           *lh: grasps remaining half piece of mozzarella*
22           (*0.7)
23   c2      *lh: lets go of half piece of mozzarella->
24   FA      */essaie de faire des touts petits **bouts.
               try to make very small pieces.
25   c2      *takes small pieces of mozzarella*
26   fa      /rh/lh: continue cutting mozzarella->
27   c2                           *directs small pieces toward
             mouth->
```

```
28          (1.#/*6)
   fig         # figure 3a+b
29 fa          /looks at C2->
30 c2          *eats small pieces->
31 FA    mh t'es un coquin hein elio.
         mh you're a rascal huh elio.
32          (1.0)
33 FA    d'abord couper, après tu pourras goûter.
         first cut, then you can taste.
```

At the beginning of this extract, the boy is just about to grant his father's prior request: he cuts the mozzarella into two pieces (line 2). Then, at lines 3 and 7, he takes one half and brings it into his father's field of vision (see section 4.2.1) evaluating it at the same time both positively and loudly (line 6). As in Extract 13, the boy thus achieves a self-praise regarding the action he had just been requested to do by his father. The father, who is monitoring Elio's actions (line 5), responds immediately with a strong disagreement (line 10), requesting that Elio "use the knife" to make "smaller pieces" (line 13). The father's immediate and strong disagreement induces Elio to produce a dispreferred action in response: instead of granting his father's request (make the pieces smaller), he directs the half-piece of mozzarella toward the bowl (line 12) and drops it inside (line 16). The father responds with an embodied disagreement, taking it out of the bowl and putting it back on his cutting board (line 19), while simultaneously repeating his request to make "smaller pieces" (line 24). He refuses to agree with his son's self-praise, inducing the latter to proceed with the ultimate provoking action: eating the mozzarella instead of cutting it (lines 25, 27 and 30). While Elio is eating, father and son are looking at each other (figure 3). The father treats his son's look as an invitation to say something: he first reproaches Elio for eating (line 31), and then formulates the relevant rule for the activity at hand (line 33). Eventually, Elio continues cutting the cheese and thus complies with his father's initial request. In this extract, the father's use of an immediate strong disagreement with his son's self-praise induces the latter to disagree by putting the piece of mozzarella in the bowl instead of cutting it into smaller pieces, thereby engendering a series of disaffiliative actions.

In the last extract of this section, the two sisters, Manon (4 years, 1 month) and Anna (2 years, 6 months), are drawing. The mother does not draw with them, but comes back regularly to check on what they are doing.

Extract 16 (5dagr)

Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Manon (4 years, 1 month); C2 (*): Anna (2 years, 6 months);
CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1            (+0.6+)
2    mo      +sits down next to C2+
```



```
3    C2→    *°°ça c'est- il est +tout p**eti#t.°°
              °°this it is- it is very small.°°
4    c2      *moves colored pencil from lh to rh*
5    mo                       +looks at the colored pencil->
6    c2                          *holding pencil toward MO->
fig                                    #figure 1
7            (0.5)
8    MO⇒    +°oui°, (0.3) il est tout peti#t. +
              °yes°, (0.3) it is very small.
9    mo      +rh: directs to pencil, grasps it, looks at it->
fig                                    #figure 2
10           (0.4)
11   C2→    °°il *est ca**ssé::*°°.
              °°it is broke::n°°.
12   c2          *moves colored pencil from rh to lh*
13   c2                *rh: directs to pencil point*
14           (*0.3)
15   c2       *rh: grasps pencil point->
```



```
16  MO➔     #non, c'est pas cassé.
              no, it's not broken.
fig          #figure 3
17           (0.3)
18  C2→     °°oui°°=
              °°yes°°=
19  MO       =c'e%st *saumon tu vois*%.
              =it's salmon you see.
20  c1           %beats on the pencil box with a pencil%
21  c2              *looks at MO->
22           (0.4)
23  C2→     ++°°(r'garde)* il est cassé[:°°]
              °°(look) it is broke:[n°°]
24  mo       +looks at C1->
25  mo       +rh: lets go of pencil, comes to home position->
```

```
26 c2               *looks at pencil->
27 MO                        [c']est joli ma↑no:n.
                             [t]hat's nice ma↑no:n.
28      (0.2)
29 C2→  °°est cas[sé:°°=
        °°is bro[ke:n°°=
30 C1           [xxxx]++
31 mo   <-looks at C1-++looks at C2->
32 mo                     +rh: directs toward her head,
        scratches->
33      (1.4)
34 C2→  +°°(t'as vu il)+ est+ ca[(ssé.)°°]
         °°(you've seen it) is bro[(ken.)°°]
35 mo   +rh: directs toward pencil, grasps it->
36 mo   +looks at C1   +looks at pencil->
37 mo                   +rh: pulls pencil toward her->
38 MO                   *[no]n, regarde j'vais=
                         [no], look i am gonna=
39 c2                   *rh: takes pencil from MO's hand->
40 MO   =+t'montrer c'est pas++ cassé.
        = show you it's not broken.
41 mo    +rh: follows C2's hand movement+
42 mo                     +rh: takes pencil from C2's hand,
        directs it to paper->
43      (+0.3)
44 mo    +shifts gaze down->
45 MO   tu vois↑
        you see↑
```



```
46      (+3#.*6)
47 mo    +rh: draws->
Fig        #figure 4
48 c2       *rh: directs toward pencil->
49 C2   °°(pas) [cassé°°]
        °°(not) [broken°°]
50 MO          [+*voilà↑]
               [done↑]
51 mo          +rh: withdraws from paper->>
52 c2           *rh: grasps pencil, takes it from mother, starts
        drawing->>
```

At the beginning of the extract, the mother sits down next to Anna (line 2). Bringing the pencil into her mother's field of vision (lines 4 and 6, figure 1; see section 4.2.1), Anna produces a complaint concerning the smallness of the pencil (line 3), indicating that she is asking for another pencil to draw with. Inspecting the pencil that Anna is showing her (lines 5 and 9, figure 2), the mother responds with a weak agreement composed of an agreement token and a repetition of Anna's turn (line 8). After a short silence (line 10), Anna utters another negative assessment concerning the pencil: "it is broken," grasping its point with her right hand (lines 11–13, figure 3). After her mother's rejection of the request implied by her first assessment (line 3), which establishes a context of disalignment, this second negative assessment may constitute another attempt to request a new pencil. The mother rejects this second attempt immediately, responding with a strong disagreement (line 16). The mother's strong disagreement first engenders a disagreement token from Anna (line 18). Latching with it, the mother then produces a noticing concerning the color of the pencil so as to distract Anna from her request for another pencil (line 19). Furthermore, the mother treats Manon's loud behavior as an attention-getting device: she lets go of the pencil that Anna is holding out to her, looks at Manon, and compliments her (lines 24 and 27). While the mother is involved with Manon, Anna repeats her initial assessment several times (lines 23, 29 and 34).

Anna's third repetition (line 34), which is prefaced with a barely audible summons addressed to her mother (see section 4.2.1) is eventually successful in bringing her mother's attention back to the pencil (lines 35–7) and to Anna's initial complaint concerning it (line 38). The mother's disagreeing response occurs in overlap with Anna's third repetition (line 38) and is achieved with a disagreement token, followed by the announcement that she will evidence her disagreement, and by a negation of Anna's turn (line 38). As she shows her disagreement, the mother takes the pencil from Anna's hand and directs it toward the sheet of paper (lines 37 and 41–2), thereby ignoring Anna's resistance (line 39), and exhibits—by drawing with the pencil—that the pencil is not broken (line 47). Anna watches her mother's actions attentively (figure 4). Before her mother indicates the closing of the proof procedure with the use of a terminal marker (line 50), and by stopping drawing, the little girl seems to revise her initial complaint in a barely audible voice (line 49), and directs her right hand toward the pencil (line 48) to take it from her mother and resume drawing with it (line 52). In this extract, the series of disagreements concerning the child's initial assessment is met by the mother's strong disagreement at line 16. This engenders a long series of disagreements which comes to an end as soon as the mother uses the proof procedure (see Extracts 8–9 above) to show that the girl's initial complaint involves a claim that is observably incorrect. The child seems to distinguish between warranted disagreements and unwarranted ones. She treats the first authoritative disagreement as unacceptable, and the proven disagreement as legitimate and thus as closing implicative.

6.4.3 Children's Assessments Occurring in a Context of Alignment, But Immediately Met by Strong Disagreement from Parents

In contrast to the previous section, in which the child's initial assessment is preceded by a context of disagreement/disalignment, in the last two extracts of this chapter, the child's initial assessment does occur in a context of alignment (Extracts 17–18). Nevertheless, following it, the parent immediately produces a strong disagreement.

In Extract 17, Noëmi and her mother are sitting on the floor, playing a board game. They both have two game boards in front of them, and they have to match images printed on game pieces to corresponding images on their respective game boards.

Extract 17 (57dagr)
Participants: MO (+): mother; C1 (&): Aurélie (4 years); C2 (*): Noëmi (2 years, 1 month); CA1: camera 1; CA2: camera 2

```
1   MO    +à moi+
           my turn
2   mo    +rh: directs toward the game pieces+
3         (+1++*.7)
```



```
4   mo    +rh: takes a game piece, directs it toward herself,
          +holds it in front of her#->
5   mo            +examines it#->
6   c2            *rh: slight movement toward game piece->
    fig                   #figure 1
7   MO    ++*là ça c'est à moi↑::
           here this it's for me↑::
8   mo    +shifts gaze toward her game board->
9   mo    +rh: directs game piece toward her game board->
10  c2      *rh: freezes->
11        (+0.4+)
12  mo    +rh: puts game piece down on her game board->
13  C2→   ouais=
           yeah=
14  MO⇒   +>=à toi noëmi.<+
           >=your turn noëmi.<
15  mo    +rh: withdraws her hand to home position+
16        (0.4)
```

```
17 C2→   *°à moi:°*,
           °my tu:rn°,
18 c2    *rh: directs toward game pieces->
```



```
19         (#0.2)
   fig    #figure 2
20 C2→   *>(tu l'as)* pas ju**:+st#e<**
           >(you don't) have it corre:ct<
21 c2    *rh: withdraws from game pieces*
22 c2            *leans toward her right*
23 c2                  *rh: puts it on floor*
24 mo                       +rh: makes a circular movement
         in front of her+
   fig                            #figure 3
25         (0.2)
26 MO➔   >oui c'est **ju+ste+.<
           >yes that's correct.<
27 c2                  *rh: directs toward game pieces->>
28 c2                *straightens up again->>
29 mo                   +rh: back to home position+
```

At the beginning of the extract, the mother picks up a game piece (lines 2 and 4) and inspects it (line 5) before shifting her gaze and directing the piece toward one of her boards (lines 8–9), announcing: "here this, it's for me." (line 7, figure 1). Noëmi attentively observes what her mother does, and while her mother is inspecting the piece (line 4), Noëmi makes a slight move toward it with her right hand, as if she were going to grab it (line 6, figure 1). However, as her mother directs the piece toward her board (line 7) and puts it down (line 12), Noëmi merely follows her mother's actions with her gaze, freezing the movement of her right hand (line 10), and agreeing with her mother's announcement at line 7 (line 13). Moreover, when the mother invites Noëmi to take her turn (line 14), retracting her own hand to home position—thereby indicating that she has completed her turn (see also Extract 32 in Chapter 5)—Noëmi immediately directs her right hand toward the game pieces (line 18) while she repeats her mother's invitation (line 17).

Noëmi's acceptance of her mother's invitation is accomplished in a mitigated format: she responds with a weak agreement, which she produces in a very low voice (line 17). Although her hand at first moves toward the remaining game pieces, her gaze continues to inspect the spot on which the mother has just put her piece (figure 3). This way of accepting may indicate Noëmi's dispreferred next action: she accuses her mother of not having it "corre:ct" (line 20). At the same time, she

withdraws her right hand from the remaining pieces, puts it on the floor next to her and leans to one side, as if to inspect her mother's previous move from another (more adequate) angle (lines 21–3, figure 3). This induces the mother to make a circular movement with her right hand (line 24), as if to wipe away Noëmi's skepticism. Moreover, the mother responds immediately with a strong disagreement which she utters rapidly and in an assertive tone. The mother's way of producing her disagreement induces Noëmi to accept it immediately. Indeed, before the mother has even completed her disagreement, the girl directs her right hand toward the remaining pieces, and straightens up once again (lines 27–8) to resume playing. In this extract, the child's initial negative assessment occurs in a context of alignment. The mother does not resort to a proof procedure (see Extracts 8–9 and 16 above) to allay Noëmi's doubts, but instead produces her disagreement in a preferred format to underscore her opposition, and succeeds in imposing her point of view.

In the last extract of this chapter, Luc (2 years, 10 months) and his mother are assembling a jigsaw puzzle together. The boy is actually doing the assembling and the mother is giving him advice on how to do it.[10]

Extract 18 (42dagr.)
Participants: MO (+): mother; FA (/): father; C1 (&): Lily (4 years, 3 months); C2 (*): Luc (2 years, 10 months)


```
1           (1#.7)
  fig        # figure 1
2   c2      <-rh: trying to place a jigsaw puzzle piece->
3   MO      (il) veut pas mettre son bonnet he[in↑
            (he) does not want to put on his hat hu[h↑
4   C2                                       [êhêhên
5           (*1.**1*)
6   c2      *lh: directs toward jigsaw puzzle*
7   c2         *rh: withdraws from puzzle piece that needs to be inserted->
8   c2            *lh: touches puzzle piece that needs to be inserted*
```

10　Next to the mother and son, the older sister and the father are also assembling a jigsaw puzzle, and are talking together. I did not transcribe their talk, since the boy and his mother do not seem to treat it as relevant to their own interactive organization.

```
 9 C2    *j'ai *pas **(a)#rri::[ves]
         i haven't (c)a::[:n]
10 c2    *rh: directs toward the floor*
11 c2         *leans to his right side->
12 c2              *rh: props on floor*
   fig              # figure 2
13 MO           [*mai]s c'est juste,(0.2) mais toi tu=
                [but] that's correct,(0.2) but you you=
14 c2                  *shifts gaze toward CA1*
15 MO⇒ =+arrives, ess++aie *un+ p'tit peu+,=
        =can, try a little bit,=
16 mo   +lh: directs toward C2's lh+
17 mo     +lh: touches C2's lh, pushes it very gently to the right+
18 c2                  *shifts gaze toward jigsaw puzzle->
19 mo              +shifts gaze toward C2+
20 mo                       +lh: withdraws from C2's lh,
        transforms into a pointing->
21 MO⇒ =*+regarde un peu#ce que *tu fais avec tes++ *doigts.
        =look a bit what you're doing with your fingers.
22 c2    *lh: withdraws from jigsaw puzzle, directs toward floor->
23 mo     +shifts gaze to jigsaw puzzle+
   fig                #figure 3
24 c2                   *straightens up->
25 mo              +lh: withdraws, directs to her nose->
26 c2                       *rh: directs toward jigsaw
        puzzle, handles jigsaw puzzle->
27      (+0.6)
28 mo    +lh: scratches her nose->
29 C2   *°mh°*
30 c2   *rh: pushes the jigsaw puzzle down slightly*
31      (0.2)
32 mo    +lh: directs toward jigsaw puzzle->
33 C2   mh:[:↑
34 MO     [+regarde. tu vas doucement.
          [ look. proceed carefully.
35 mo      +lh: holds jigsaw puzzle in place->
36      (1.4)
37 MO⇒ ti↑c.
38      (0.*9)
39 c2      *rh: withdraws from jigsaw puzzle*
40 MO⇒ *ti↑c. appui dessus il*** est pas tout à fait rentré=
        ti↑c. press on it it is not yet properly pushed in=
41 c2   *lh: directs toward remaining jigsaw puzzle pieces*
42 c2                  *lh: comes back*
43 c2                       *rh: thumb directs to puzzle piece, pushes
        it in->
44 MO⇒ =voi↑là *cette fois-ci elle est mise.
        =the↑re *this time it is in.
45 c2          *rh: withdraws from jigsaw puzzle->
```

At the beginning of the extract, Luc is trying to fit a piece into the puzzle (line 2, figure 1). His mother is observing him (figure 1), and comments on his difficulty in fitting the piece (line 3). At the end of her comment, the mother deploys a confirmation token. In overlap with it, the boy signals his despair with a vocalization: "êhêhên" (line 4). He then changes hands from right to left to handle the puzzle piece (lines 6–8). While uttering an assessment that achieves a self-deprecation, he directs his right hand toward the floor and leans to the side, using his right hand to prop himself up on the floor (lines 10–12, figure 2). As mentioned before (Extract 11 above), following a self-deprecation, disagreement constitutes the preferred alternative. The mother's response occurs in overlap with Luc's self-deprecation and is composed of two TCUs. Both TCUs are introduced with the contrastive conjunction "but" and clearly disagree with the boy's previous assessment (lines 13 and 15). Furthermore, the mother accompanies her second TCU (line 15) with a movement of her left hand (lines 16–17 and 20), bringing the boy back to the puzzle activity after he has briefly been distracted by the camera operator (lines 14 and 18). In this extract, the mother deploys an immediate strong disagreement with the boy's self-deprecation in an activity in which her competence is undeniable. Its occurrence engenders no further disagreement or disaffiliative action from the boy. Instead, he immediately grants the request that his mother accomplishes through several embodied actions of support (lines 16–17, 20–21, 32, 34–5, 37 and 40).[11] Indeed, he first straightens up again (line 24) and then continues to move the puzzle piece (lines 26, 30, 39 and 42–3) until his mother's positive assessment indicates the success of his endeavors (lines 44–5). Furthermore, in contrast to the previous extracts (10–15), the mother's use of the preferred format for disagreeing in a context of alignment does not engender a long series of disagreements or disaffiliative actions, but seems rather to be treated as the parent's non-availability for long negotiations.

To sum up: usually, *contiguity* (Sacks 1987) is associated with the preferred (and not with the dispreferred) next action. However, in this second part of the chapter, I have discussed extracts in which children's assessments are immediately responded to with a dispreferred action: strong disagreement from the parent (Extracts 10–18). Interestingly, detailed examination of these extracts has shown that apart from a few exceptions (Extracts 17–18), parents' unequivocal disagreements occur immediately when the child's initial turn, in addition to the dispreferred action it accomplishes, is proffered in a praxeological context of disagreement (Extracts 10–16). This context of disagreement can be established by the child's refusal to grant a parent's request or follow a suggestion (Extracts 10–12), or by a parent's request that contrasts with the child's actual behavior (Extracts 13–15). Following the child's assessment, parents seem to tend to immediately and clearly express their disaffiliative position instead of adhering to the central features of the dispreferred format: delay and mitigation. Apart from one exception (Extract 11)

---

11   The mother makes the sound "tic" at lines 37 and 40, imitating the sound of the puzzle piece locking into place.

in which the child's assessment accomplishes a self-deprecation (Pomerantz 1984a: 64), the immediate disagreement from the parent tends to sustain further disagreeing/disaffiliative moves (Extracts 10 and 12–16).

Furthermore, the analysis has shown that if the preceding context of disagreement is established by the parent, then their immediate and strong disagreeing response might imply the rapid closing of the disagreement concerning the child's turn, but engenders a long series of disaffiliative actions concerning the preceding context of disagreement, or some other matter (Extracts 13–15). In a context of disagreement established by the children themselves, the immediate and strong disagreement tends to imply a long series of disagreements concerning the child's initial assessment itself (Extracts 10 and 12). However, if the child's initial assessment occurs in a context of alignment (Extracts 17–18) and/or if it accomplishes a self-deprecation (Extracts 11 and 18) to which an immediate, strong disagreement constitutes the preferred response action, the immediate disagreement from the parent does not have these same implications. Instead, its use engenders a rapid closing of the assessment sequence.

6.5   Conclusion

To deepen our understanding of parents' and children's handling of agreement/ disagreement and their orientation toward preference organization in assessment sequences, I have in this chapter analyzed extracts in which the child's initial assessment is responded to by a parent's disagreement. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, studies concerned with adults' handling of assessment sequences have demonstrated that adults tend to use the dispreferred format for disagreeing with a prior assessment in order to delay and/or to avoid/minimize the occurrence of disagreement, thereby sustaining solidarity and maintaining "face" (Heritage 1984a: 265, 2008: 18–19). Moreover, Church's study (2009) on conflictual peer interactions has demonstrated that in young children's disputes, their uses of the dispreferred format for objecting to/disagreeing with a prior turn are designed to bring the dispute to a rapid resolution, whereas the interactants' deployment of the preferred format tends to engender the continuation of the dispute (2009: 191). In terms of parent–child interactions, this chapter has shown that parents do not systematically use the dispreferred format for disagreeing with their young children's initial assessment; instead they also quite regularly deploy the preferred format (Extracts 10–18). The analysis of Extracts 2–18 sought to reveal distinct interactive patterns that might be engendered by parents' use of either format and to provide some explanations for their use of distinct formats.

A first dimension that needs to be highlighted refers to the fact that parents' disagreeing responses manifest great sensitivity to the praxeological context in which their children's initial assessment is produced. In general, parents seem to opt for disagreement principally when their children's previous turn accomplishes

a dispreferred action.[12] More particularly, a parent's strong disagreement (preferred format) seems to occur mainly when the children's assessment, beyond accomplishing a dispreferred action, occurs in a context of disalignment between parents and children (Extracts 10–16): when the child refuses to comply with a previous request from a parent (Extracts 10–12) or when the parent refuses to grant a child's earlier request (Extracts 13 and 15–16) or punishes the child's behavior toward his little brother (Extract 14). Confronted with a situation of disagreement/disalignment, parents may find it important to deploy the preferred format to unequivocally manifest and defend their oppositional position.

As mentioned in section 2.5.1, belonging to a membership category such as parent or child implies some moral dimensions: "category incumbency" can be "transformed into a moral matter" (Jayyusi 1984: 63) if the incumbent of a particular category does not live up to "a set of category-relevant competences" and to "the sets of duties and rights that are oriented to as bound to specific social slots" (Jayyusi 1984: 43). Indeed, to choose one example, parents who do not have a clear position with respect to their children's nutrition and a certain control over what their children eat might easily be seen as incompetent, or even as acting in a morally reprehensible way, since having no clear line of action regarding food can have negative implications for children's health. In this sense, rather than treating the preference organization as an omni-relevant device, parents might, in certain praxeological contexts, be oriented toward the management of moral or practical concerns that they have in their capacity as parents as having priority. Or in other words, instead of indexing a disrespect of preference organization when interacting with their children, parents' use of the preferred format for disagreeing with their children's assessments thus might manifest their inclination to take their responsibilities as parents seriously, even if this implies immediate and clear resistance toward their children's normative position (for a similar argument concerning parents' use of the preferred format for refusing their children's requests, see the presentation of Wootton's work (1981) in section 2.5.2).

More generally, through disagreement (produced in either format) with their children's assessments that accomplish dispreferred actions, such as self-deprecation (Extracts 11 and 18) or a complaint concerning something which belongs to the parental field of responsibility (Extracts 5–9 and 16), beyond manifesting their parental authority and responsibility, parents may merely display their particular entitlement and legitimacy in controlling certain domains of everyday family life. As we have seen in this chapter, however, parents' implementing of their disagreement is a trickier matter. In a context in which the children negatively

---

12 As mentioned earlier, children might use their assessment to accomplish dispreferred actions, such as a complaint concerning a parental domain of responsibility (Extracts 5–9 and 16); a negative assessment of an object for which the parent is somehow responsible, and/or to account for the refusal of a parent's request (Extracts 10–12); a self-deprecation (Extracts 11 and 18); a self-praise (Extracts 13 and 15); or a blaming/accusing of a (co-present) person (Extracts 2–4 and 17).

assessed food, for example, thereby indicating that they might refuse to eat it, parents who delayed their disagreement with a wh-question (Extracts 5–7) and gave the child a real opportunity to respond to their request for clarification (Extract 5), managed to come to a rapid closing of the incipient disagreement. In contrast, parents who withdrew this extra opportunity to speak easily, and/or did not provide for it in the first place, instead responding immediately with a strong disagreement to their child's assessment of food (Extract 10), found themselves in endless discussions (see Extracts 6–7 and 10), to the point of eventually agreeing to let the child eat only what he or she pleases (see Extract 7, in which the child is allowed to eat only the ham). In this sense, our findings are in line with Church's (2009: 190) findings on children's disputes: in children's disputes, disagreement produced in a preferred format sustains the continuation of the dispute, whereas the deployment of a weak format for disagreeing brings the dispute to a rapid closure. As we will further discuss below, the question of how parents should package their disagreeing stance regarding food issues in order to reinforce their position is thus a rather complex matter.

Second, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, parents' disagreements all took the form of a strong disagreement (Extracts 2–18)—directly contrastive with the prior assessment, containing only disagreement components—which is characteristic of the preferred format. Instead of being the expression of an authoritative stance toward their children, parents' systematic use of a strong disagreement might display their inclination to ensure their children's understanding of their disagreeing position. Indeed, while a mitigated format (characteristic of the dispreferred format), such as questioning repeats, implies some ambivalence concerning the action it accomplishes (see Keel 2011), the strong disagreement does not leave any room for misunderstanding. That the mutual understanding might be the participants' top priority is further supported by children's ways of dealing with their parents' use of either format for disagreeing with their initial assessment. Parents' deployment of a specified wh-question to request that the child clarify the referent (Extracts 2–5), or a proof procedure (Extracts 8–9) before disagreeing with the child's assessment engendered the child's immediate granting of the request and/or a rapid closure of the disagreement initiated by the child's initial assessment.

However, in Extracts 6–7, the parents' wh-question did not provide the child with a real opportunity to remedy a possible lack of understanding on the parent's part, since the question was immediately followed by a strong disagreement from the parent. In contrast to the other Extracts (2–5), this way of deploying a wh-question generated a long series of disagreements between the child and the parents. But delaying the overt expression of disagreement and at the same time providing the child with another opportunity to speak, or demonstrating understanding of his or her initial claim with the use of a verification procedure seemed to help secure the child's rapid capitulation.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, in contrast to adults, children never used the extra opportunities to speak provided by their parents' wh-questions (Extracts 2–5)

or silence (Extracts 8–9) to revise their initial assessment position, or to move toward a compromise with their parents. Instead, they granted their parent's request for clarification and/or confirmed their initial position. However, although parents ultimately used a strong disagreement, the children in this study did not further oppose, or otherwise comment on, their parents' disagreeing position, but simply accepted it. In those cases in which the extra opportunity to make their own position clear was eventually withdrawn by a parent (Extracts 6–7), or in situations in which the parents responded immediately with a strong disagreement with the child's initial turn (Extracts 10–16), the children resisted their parents' disagreement and deployed different embodied means to make their own position unmistakably clear until the parents deployed a verification procedure (Extracts 16–17) or proposed a compromise (Extracts 6–7 and 12). Immediate disagreement from a parent (preferred format) thereby triggered a whole series of disagreeing/disaffiliative actions, apart from when the child's initial assessment accomplished a self-deprecation (Extracts 11 and 18), and/or when it occurred in a context of clear alignment between the interactants (Extracts 17–18). The children in our study seemed to distinguish between warranted disagreements that manifested some respect or at least interest in the child's distinct evaluative position, and disagreements that were not warranted in this way. Instead of treating their parents' disagreements as the simple expression of a more or less authoritarian position, the children seemed very sensitive to their parents' manifestation of comprehension of their point of view.

As was already outlined in the conclusion of the last chapter, examining parents' and children's preference management with consideration for the praxeological context in which children deploy assessments, and the actions that children accomplish with their turns, makes issues bound to category incumbency available for inspection. It becomes clear that in everyday activities, such as eating meals and making a pizza, parents' first-order relevance is not the transmission of abstract norms and principles to the younger generation, the adherence to some preference organization, or their invariable display of a superior (epistemic) authority and/or rights to assess. Instead, priority is given to the management of very banal practical concerns to avoid being involved in a never-ending back-and-forth regarding issues such as food, or the handling of everyday tasks such as the putting away of a puzzle.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 7
Concluding Comments

The notion of socialization refers to the process through which children acquire a status as competent members in the eyes of those in their social environment. In socialization theory and studies, it is widely acknowledged that children's participation in social interaction constitutes a generic moment of this process. Over the last 40 years, a large number of studies have examined interactions occurring between very young children and their parents, other adults (their caregivers and teachers), and/or other children. As outlined in Chapter 2 of this book, depending on the interactions that these studies have focused on, whether peer or adult/parent–child interactions, they have—in both naturally occurring everyday settings and controlled (laboratory) settings—examined and contributed to various questions regarding children's socialization. In the vast field of socialization studies, those concerned with parent–child interactions have sought to show how parents adapt their conduct to the child's state of development and thus *scaffold* (see Rogoff 2003) young children's acquisition of new social, cultural, linguistic, and cognitive competences and knowledge, and/or have aimed to uncover the cognitive, linguistic, and interactive resources children draw upon when interacting with others.

This study analyzed young children's and parents' organization and accomplishment of naturally occurring everyday activities. It by no means sought to examine the organization of the myriad activities that parents and children routinely share in as part of their day-to-day family life. On the contrary, though based on a large audiovisual corpus (see Chapter 3), the analytical part of this book (Chapters 4–6) focused on the one hand on interactive situations in which the young child produces an initial assessment, and on the other, on parents' agreeing or disagreeing responses to the child's initial turn. The primary aim was to describe and examine in detail what children and parents do—turn by turn, taking into account the embodied resources deployed by the interactants—when they produce assessment sequences. It sought to explain how, that is to say, in which ways, they display their understanding and interpretation of each other's actions in their next turn, and thus come to a shared understanding. As a corollary, the descriptive analysis provides accounts of what children already know and are capable of doing in order to produce actions that are intelligible for what they are when they interact with their parents. Furthermore, it aimed to reveal participants' orientation to issues of alignment and disalignment and matters related to their incumbency of the social categories of parent and child.

7.1   Children's Production of Assessments and Initiation of Assessment Sequences

Taking into account the praxeological and sequential context in which the children produced their initial assessments and the multimodal resources they deployed, I demonstrated throughout the analytical chapters that the young children studied used assessments to accomplish a whole range of social actions. First, we saw that children recurrently deployed an assessment to accomplish environmental noticings, referring to something that is available in the immediate context, such as the model car sitting on the shelf (Chapter 4, Extract 27), and/or to take up a topic that had been discussed shortly before, such as the man who had just gone past the house (Chapter 4, Extract 2), or the main figure of a children's movie (Chapter 5, Extract 26). Interestingly, children produced these noticings in particular sequential positions—when turn-by-turn talk had lapsed and/or in specific praxeological contexts—when their parents were involved with their siblings, or were busy doing something other than conversing with their young child. Besides using talk or environmental and sequential resources available in the immediate interactive context, they also deployed embodied resources such as pointing to the referent (Chapter 4, Extract 2; Chapter 5, Extracts 17 and 31) or looking at the referent (Chapter 5, Extract 24), to make their noticing salient. They thereby managed to use the noticings to get their parents' attention and re-engage in talk with them.

Second, the children used a positive assessment referring to an activity they had just accomplished on their own (Chapter 4, Extract 9; Chapter 5, Extract 35). Instead of overtly producing a self-praise of their ability to handle certain things autonomously (as in Chapter 5, Extract 32),[1] they opted for an action that "strongly invited" (Mondada 2009a: 352) the production of a compliment or a positive assessment from the intended recipient, thereby "fishing for a compliment" (see Pomerantz 1980). By circumventing overt self-praise, the children (like adults) seemed to orient toward this type of action as constituting a dispreferred action—that is, an action that is socially delicate and usually avoided (see Pomerantz 1975: 112ff.). In three extracts, children deployed a negative assessment referring to an activity they were engaged in (Chapter 5, Extract 31; Chapter 6, Extracts 11 and 18) to achieve another dispreferred action: self-deprecation (see Pomerantz 1984a: 64; Schegloff 2007: 73–4). In two of the three identified cases, the child had previously been asked to do something by the parent, such as finishing a puzzle (Chapter 6, Extract 18) or putting away a puzzle (Chapter 6, Extract 11). By using self-deprecation, the child clearly signaled incipient refusal to fulfil the parent's request, while nevertheless avoiding expressing a straightforward, clear refusal. As we will see below, while this method might seem to be a particularly ingenious strategy for circumventing the overt production of a dispreferred refusal response, its deployment did not prove to be a very successful way to sidestep a parent's request.

---

1   In this extract, the child unequivocally achieves a self-praise: "… can do a puzzle well."

Third, young children's initial assessments recurrently achieved a complaint. Indeed, in Chapter 6, I analyzed and discussed several extracts in which the children negatively evaluated a food item (Chapter 6, Extracts 5–7), the temperature of shower water (Chapter 6, Extract 9), or something else that fell into their parents' domain of responsibility (Chapter 6, Extracts 8 and 16). Before uttering their complaint—for example about a food item—children used attention-getting devices such as coughing or weepy vocalization, or expressing their negative stance toward the referent in an embodied way, thereby delaying its overt expression, while at the same time indicating that something problematic might be coming next. By preparing the intended recipient to receive a complaint about something that belongs to his or her realm of responsibility, they thus manifested their orientation toward this type of complaint as constituting interactively delicate actions, or in other words an *unsafe* complaint (see Butler 2008: 160; Sacks 1992 I: 597–600) whose overt expression should be minimized. In this sense, the young children in this study accomplished a significant amount of interactive work when they produced subversive actions that aimed to challenge parenting. A similar observation relates to a child's use of a positive assessment of chocolate (Chapter 5, Extract 19) and negative assessments concerning a fly, a neighboring girl's word choice (Chapter 5, Extracts 18 and 20), an activity the child is engaged in (Chapter 4, Extracts 11–12 and 28–30), and a pencil (Chapter 6, Extract 16), in order to achieve a request for, respectively, permission to eat chocolate, some parental collaboration/help in evaluating the fly (instead of assembling a puzzle), assistance with pulling down a sleeve or dealing with a "booger," and a replacement pencil. In all these extracts, instead of making an unequivocal request, the children deployed assessments as a vehicle for achieving a request addressed to their parents. It has been argued elsewhere that requesting in general (see Pomerantz and Heritage 2012: 217–18), and requesting help/advice in particular (see Heritage and Sefi 1992), is considered a dispreferred type of action: interactants might use different kinds of strategies, such as reporting a problematic situation or expressing a wish, to avoid the production of unequivocal requests.

This study did not focus on young children's accomplishment of dispreferred initiating actions. It would therefore be pretentious to draw some definite conclusion on their production of these actions. However, detailed examination of young children's embodied production of initial assessments revealed their recurrent use of assessments to achieve and/or to delay the production of dispreferred action types, such as complaints or requests. This finding strongly suggests that young children already have an incipient grasp of the interactive delicacy of certain initiating actions; they express this understanding in the ways they accomplish and/or avoid the unequivocal production of these same actions.

A last observation that I want to comment on is related to the person that the young children addressed (sometimes tacitly) when producing their assessment. In socialization theories, the debate concerned with the question: "What importance do different actors, such as parents, children, and teachers have for the child's development?" was revived in the recent past by the publication of a book by

J.R. Harris (1998). According to the author, it is peers—not parents—that have a real and sustained influence on children's development. This idea counters those socialization theories which have argued that although family structures have undergone considerable change, engendering a multiplication of socialization actors (such as nursery workers and day nannies), parents have maintained their special role in primary socialization. All the families examined in this study had two or more children—and so the target child always had at least one older or younger sibling; and yet, in all the extracts featured in Chapters 4–6, young children generally addressed their initial assessment to their parents. Indeed, for every extract, I described—sometimes at length—how the children went through considerable interactive work, which is to say, deploying gaze, body posture, sequential position, and talk, to make a response by a parent (and not a sister or a brother) relevant. Moreover, it struck me that whenever a young child from this study used an explicit address term in his or her initial assessment, he or she usually opted for "Mom" (Chapter 4, Extracts 4 and 6–7; Chapter 6, Extract 4), and for "Daddy" only on one occasion (Chapter 6, Extract 13). I cannot recollect a single instance in which a young child addressed a sibling in this way.

By no means do I argue that this observation indicates that parents have a greater impact on young children's socialization than their siblings, nor that mothers have a greater influence on their children's development of interactive competences than their fathers, but my analysis shows that young children tend to orient toward the parents as being especially relevant for responding to their assessments. From their point of view, parents thus seem to be the priority interactants in terms of exchanging, verifying, and building up a normative position of the surrounding world. Moreover, my detailed study of how children deploy assessments to achieve self-praise, noticings, announcements, complaints, or requests displays their orientation toward participants' membership categories, the responsibilities and rights that are bound to them, and the larger praxeological context, adapting their way of packaging their initial assessment and mobilizing different sequential, formal, linguistic, and embodied resources accordingly.

7.2 Children's Pursuits of Responses to Their Assessments: Relevance for the Study of Children's Pragmatic Development of Linguistic and Cognitive Competences

Studies focusing on very young children's initiation and pursuit of action sequences have demonstrated that even before fully mastering talk, children use the observability of actions and/or the structures of routine actions as the fundamental resource for rendering their own action intelligible to others, and for understanding what others may intend to do (Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Lerner and Zimmerman 2003; Lerner, Zimmerman and Kidwell 2011). The studies argue that young children's grasp of the concept of observability is thus of central importance for their competent engagement in joint attention and

social interaction, and consequently for becoming a competent member of society. By empirically evidencing young children's practical competence for dealing with others' observable "intentions" (Jones and Zimmerman 2003; Lerner and Zimmerman 2003) and "desires" and "beliefs" (Wootton 1997: 188), these studies demonstrate in which sense children's competences are publicly available for inspection. Wootton's work and the other above-mentioned studies thus provide a crucial argument regarding the relevancy of detailed descriptions[2] of very young children's participation in concrete interactions for the study of children's development of mind. Indeed, in his studies on younger children's management of requests, Wootton showed, for example, that they are able to make inferences about other peoples' desires when they are around 2-and-a-half years old and about other peoples' beliefs at around 3 years old (Wootton 1997: 188–90). He suggested moreover that these emerging competences rest on children's capacity to use local and public understanding:

> Around that time (aged two years old) the child develops the skill to identify and draw on local knowledge which has been made apparent within prior interaction. Because this knowledge is contingent and local I have chosen to use the term 'understanding' to describe it rather than a term like 'representation,' the latter indexing forms of knowledge which have a more enduring status within the mind. (Wootton 1997: 192–3)

According to Wootton, these local understandings are distinct from context-independent knowledge and representations in that they refer for example to previously-made overt agreements between the child and the parent. Tomasello, Kruger, and Horn Ratner advocate another view on the issue, remarking that young children's engagement in instructed learning occurs when children reach approximately four years of age and essentially rests on their cognitive ability to attribute mental states (perception, knowledge, and understanding) to others (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 111). Around the child's third birthday, he or she might use words that refer to the thoughts and knowledge (states) of others; however, Tomasello and his colleagues specify that a closer look at this language use reveals evidence that, at this age, children do not really use these terms to refer to "mental states" but instead use them merely as "rote formulae" (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 111). According to the authors, it is thus only around their fourth birthday that children are capable of attributing mental states to others. They argue that this new capacity is reflected in children's production of language that refers explicitly to "mental states" and in their successful prediction of what another child will do when the information given to him or her is known to be false, in other words, when children successfully pass the "false belief" task (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 111–12).

---

2   Descriptions that take into account such details as the length of a pause in order to provide for children's emic understanding of the ongoing course of action.

Paradoxically, the authors themselves stress that the use of "theory of mind"—a framework in which the child's capacity to pass the "false belief" task constitutes a central piece of evidence—does not provide an appropriate concept for research on children's cognitive basis of cultural learning, arguing that it:

> […] does not have strong developmental basis in children's understanding of other persons as it changes from infancy through childhood: goes from no theory of mind to theory of mind around 4 years with perhaps some 'precursors' prior to that (Metzoff and Gopnik 1993, Wellman in press). This view of development is simply too restrictive for current purposes, placing altogether too much emphasis on the transition at age 4. (Tomasello, Kruger and Horn Ratner 1999: 117)

As discussed in Chapter 4, the children in this study accomplished an entire range of so-called non-canonical actions (noticings, announcements, and assessments), which are said to be less constraining for the intended recipient to produce a response to than canonical actions (invitations, requests, and offers), which make a type-fitted response from the intended recipient more likely (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 5).

Another feature that distinguishes assessment actions from other types of actions refers to the fact that interactants orient toward them as implying a claim of epistemic knowledge and/or epistemic access. This claim can be made with greater or lesser assertion. Opting for the latter creates a situation of *recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry* (Stivers and Rossano 2010: 23), making a response by the intended recipient more likely to occur. The young children in this study, however, rarely produced their initial assessments by deploying an interrogative intonation or structure—whose *response mobilizing* effects have been demonstrated by a number of different studies (on this argument, see Stivers and Rossano 2010: 8). Moreover, they did not exhibit downgraded epistemic access or right to assess a particular state of affairs through the addition of so-called *evidentials* (Raymond and Heritage 2006: 68ff.) such as "it seems," "it looks," or "I think," thus producing a situation of recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry. Instead, the young children in this study usually produced their assessments using short declarative formats, such as "is nice," "I like chocolate," or "that's nice," and uttered them in a straightforward intonation, tacitly asserting their epistemic access and right to assess (on this last point, see Heritage and Raymond 2005: 21ff.). In general, the young children thus did not deploy specific turn design features—interrogative format versus declarative format, recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry versus speaker-tilted epistemic asymmetry—to heighten the pressure placed on recipients to respond.

Drawing upon deviant case analysis, I focused on situations in which the parent's responses were not immediately forthcoming (see Chapter 4). Confronted with the noticeable absence of a response, young children packaged and organized their pursuits of a response in ways that not only evidenced children's sensitivity to the immediate and local interactive context, but also displayed their orientation toward the intended recipient's lack of knowledge of the referent, and/or their visual or

sensory access to it (for a similar argument, see Wootton 2006a: 191). The children's pursuit of a response also manifested their understanding of the fact that this knowledge and/or access is required by the recipients if they are to accomplish an appropriate response. Indeed, when their initial assessment occurred in a situation in which the parent was busy doing something other than conversing with the child, the child pursued a response by highlighting the assessed referent through talk and/ or embodied means (for example, pointing; see Chapter 4, Extracts 1–2). When parents were involved in an argument with another sibling or preoccupied with feeding another sibling, the child ensured the recipient's availability: summoning him or her to "look" and simultaneously deploying bodily means of orienting the intended recipient's gaze to the evaluated event, eventually getting a response (Chapter 4, Extracts 3–4). When children produced their initial assessment when they were alone, or when the assessment implied sensory access, children brought the assessed referent into the intended recipient's field of vision before repeating their initial assessment (Chapter 4, Extracts 5–6) or provided the intended recipient with the possibility of visually and sensorily accessing the referent (Chapter 4, Extracts 7–8). Moreover, children attributed a noticeably absent response from the intended recipient to incipient disagreement (Chapter 4, Extracts 9–10). In these cases, they upgraded or downgraded their initial assessment to move their own position, possibly toward that of the intended recipient(s), thereby maximizing the occurrence of agreement. To achieve this kind of position change, they did not use qualifiers such as "very" or "enormously," but instead deployed only embodied and prosodic means, eventually getting a weak agreement in return.

By focusing on children's embodied work, my analysis of young children's pursuit of responses provides some demonstrations of how—in their embodied actions—children display the distinctions and attributions that they make regarding epistemic knowledge or access, the lack of such knowledge or access, and agreement and/or disagreement, long before they reach their fourth birthday (at the age of around 2 to 3). In this sense, looking at what children actually do and how they do it when they engage in naturally occurring social interactions with others might provide some empirically grounded pieces of evidence relating to children's embodied competences for dealing with each other's knowledge and understanding—as something which is publicly available—despite the fact that these competences are neither reflected in the ways that children use language that explicitly refers to mental states, nor in their capacity to pass a "false belief" task.

Furthermore, previous studies looking at children's pursuits of a response have remarked that during their second year of life, children discover various turn formats and actions through which they can repair their initial turn at talk. Wootton shows, for example, that between the ages of 2 years, 1 month through to 2 years, 3 months, children having failed to obtain a response to their initial request might pursue a response by adding an increment—"please"—to their prior turn (Wootton 2007: 181). However, according to Wootton, the developmental trajectory of these kinds of repairs still needs to be fully uncovered (Wootton 2007: 181). As mentioned earlier, in Chapter 4, I examined extracts in which the young

children interpreted a parent's non-response as implying the need for a repair of their initial turn (Chapter 4, Extracts 1–2 and 11–12). They treated the intended recipient as having some problems in comprehending or grasping the referent of their initial turn: the young children not only added the referent that was missing in their initial assessment, but further highlighted it with a dislocation to the left (Chapter 4, Extract 2) in combination with a pointing to the referent, or by using an incremental structure (see Chapter 4, Extracts 11–12).

More generally speaking, in their initial assessments children used embodied means (pointing, posture, or gaze) to point out the referent to the recipient, combining these means with a pronominal structure such as "it is upside down" (Chapter 5, Extract 31), a summons to "look" addressed to the mother (Chapter 5, Extract 16), and/or an indexical—"that"—in the first position of their turn (Chapter 5, Extract 19). The children thus deployed different turn and sequential formats, combining them with embodied means, to provide the intended recipient with the referent. These findings indicate that in order to draw a trajectory with respect to children's emerging competences to repair their own talk and their capacity to make a referent salient for the intended recipient, it is necessary to pay as much attention to their embodied actions as to their talk, as well as to the combination of both. Therefore, I join in the plea of other researchers, such as Wootton (2006a), Lerner, Zimmerman and Kidwell (2011), who argue that:

> Whatever cognitive capacities are found to underwrite the interaction order, the specification of the elements of the interaction order requires a close and systematic examination and independent analysis of naturally occurring interaction addressed to the manifold contingencies of everyday life. (Lerner, Zimmerman and Kidwell 2011: 56)

Moreover, the importance children attribute to the public availability of the referent of their assessment indicates that children pursuing a response from the intended recipient do not merely seek their parents' attention, as is often suggested—they also aim to provide their parents with the information and epistemic access required to make their talk and evaluative position understandable for others. While not fully mastering natural language, the children in this study deployed assessments to produce a wide range of social actions, successfully engaging their parents in interactively organized assessment sequences. The children thus treated evaluation actions as belonging to the publicly available social world—as local products of interactive negotiation and discussion—instead of orienting toward them as elements belonging to their own private mental domain that is inaccessible to others.

The second part of these concluding comments focuses on participants' actions following the young children's initial assessments. By systematically examining parents' agreeing and disagreeing responses to their children's initial turn, children's ways of dealing with these responses, and the implications for the further course of interaction, my analysis also allows a revelation of the ways in which parents treat their children's active participation in evaluating and commenting on the

world they inhabit together and shows what children in turn make of their parents' orientations toward them.

7.3   Parents' Most Frequent Responses: Implications for Further Development of the Assessment Sequence and Relevance for the Study of Socialization

As mentioned previously, the focus on children's and parents' interactive organization of assessment sequences aimed to show how they manage to achieve mutual understanding of the world they both inhabit. The close examination of children's production of initial assessments sought to reveal how they manage to render their actions and normative positions intelligible to their parents, whereas the detailed examination of parents' responses aimed to investigate how parents treated their children's accomplishment of evaluation actions. By examining parents' "own common sense analysis" (Watson 2011: 228) of their children's active participation, I sought to investigate whether parents possibly orient toward the developmental scheme in which they see and treat their children's doings as inferior or deficient (compared to those of adults) (see section 2.5.1). The focus on parents' responses to their children's assessments and the implications for the further course of interaction produces two phenomena that are especially interesting with regard to investigating interactants' management of issues of alignment/disalignment and thus matters related to "face," solidarity, and epistemic superiority and inferiority, respectively: interactants' handling of preference organization and the way that interactants deal with each other's epistemic access and rights to assess (see Heritage and Raymond 2005: 15–16). Finally, my decision to focus on interactively produced assessment sequences rested on the availability of some inspiring studies on 1) adults' preference for agreement over disagreement when producing assessment sequences (inter alia Pomerantz 1975, 1978, 1984a), 2) interactants' (adult–adult or child–child) differentiated orientation toward this preference depending on the praxeological context in which the initial action is achieved and/or which it constitutes (inter alia Bilmes 1988, 2014; Boyle 2000; Church 2009; Levinson 1983; Heritage 1984b, 2008; Sacks 1987), and 3) adults' repair practices—their preference for self-initiated self-repair over other-initiated other-repair—when interacting with their young children (Corrin 2010; Drew 1997; Forrester 2008, 2009; Laakso 2010; Laakso and Soininen 2010; Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977).

By taking into account the multimodal resources that interactants deploy, looking at the larger praxeological context in which young children and their parents produce assessment sequences, and viewing this in light of the above-mentioned literature, my study aimed furthermore to discuss participants' orientation toward the preference for agreement over disagreement, and for self-repair over other-repair, and to relate the relevance of these findings to the study of socialization.

As Heritage (1984a: 247) mentions, the most basic evidence for interactants' handling of preference organization refers to frequency distribution. In 95 percent of the identified occurrences, parents responded to their children's initial assessment using agreement far more often (on 134/483 occasions) than disagreement (on 60/483 occasions). This frequency distribution indicates that parents orient toward the preference for agreement over disagreement. Another piece of evidence supporting interactants' orientation toward preference organization relates to the formal and sequential structure that responses take (Pomerantz 1984a; Levinson 1983: 333). I have stressed that parents' agreements were generally produced in a preferred format: they occurred immediately after the child had completed the initial assessment, and the agreement was expressed clearly and directly, whereas parents' disagreeing responses displayed a central feature of the dispreferred format—that is, they were produced after some delay. I pointed out that, as is also the case in conversations between adults (cf. Pomerantz 1984a: 79; Schegloff 2007: 151), parents recurrently used a delaying device, such as silence, a wh-question or a verification procedure, before overtly disagreeing with their children's initial assessment, thereby giving the children an extra slot or opportunity to possibly review their initial assessment to minimize the occurrence of overt disagreement. Parents' recurrent deployment of a delay indicates their orientation toward the preference for agreement over disagreement. Participants' orientation toward the preference for agreement over disagreement was further demonstrated by a rare occurrence: an extract in which a mother and a young child overtly express and discuss the preference for agreement (see Chapter 6, Extract 1). At the beginning of this extract, an older sister disagrees unequivocally with her younger sister's positive assessment of her own drawing. Following the disagreement, the mother reprehends the older sister for disagreeing, even inducing her to eventually agree with her younger sister's initial positive assessment, whereas the younger sister manifests her refusal of her older sister's disagreement in an embodied vocalization.

To deepen our understanding of parents' and children's management of preference organization, I looked in more detail at the format adopted by the two examined types of responses from parents. With regard to agreeing responses, apart from two identified exceptions (Chapter 5, Extracts 16–17), all the parents' agreements took the form of different types of weak agreements, composed of same evaluations and/or agreement tokens, and not the preferred upgraded agreement. In adult–adult interactions, the use of a weak agreement in second position is usually brought into play to preface a disagreement or a dispreferred action, and/or its deployment might engender a series of disagreements. As we will see below, my analysis did not systematically confirm these interactive implications of weak agreements in parent–child interactions. As far as disagreeing responses are concerned, the more detailed examination moreover revealed that in terms of format, parents did not generally employ the preferred weak disagreement, but rather its dispreferred alternative: a strong disagreement. As Butler and Wilkinson emphasize (2013: 49), if one is to avoid simplified generalizations, the interactive constitution of such asymmetrical relationships, or more specifically the child's

"restricted rights of actions," needs to be analyzed and understood as a local phenomenon that always occurs in a specific interactive context.

One possible explanation for parents' systematic use of weak agreements and/ or strong disagreements may lie in these formats' unequivocal expression of their respective actions. Indeed, upgraded agreements may imply the use of upgrading qualifiers, such as "very" or "immensely," or the deployment of evaluation terms other than those used in the young child's initial turn: instead of "beautiful," for example, the second speaker might use the stronger evaluation term "gorgeous." In contrast, parents' weak agreements took the form of a simple agreement token, often combined with a repeat of the child's initial assessment. These formats may thus express the action they accomplish—agreement with the child's initial turn—more clearly than upgraded agreements. Similarly, strong disagreements mainly included a disagreement token in combination with a directly contrastive evaluation. As such, they expressed disagreement more straightforwardly than their weak alternative, which was characterized by its mitigated format—one that includes elements of both agreement and disagreement. At this point, it might be useful to recall that the children in this study never deployed upgrading or downgrading qualifiers or evaluation terms, but merely used embodied and prosodic resources to upgrade or downgrade their initial assessments (see Chapter 4, Extracts 9–10; Chapter 5, Extracts 25–6; Chapter 6, Extracts 9–10). Therefore, parents' use of lexically and/or prosodically unequivocal formats seems especially well suited for preventing misunderstanding between the interactants. Instead of essentially orienting toward preference organization, parents might thus orient toward shared understanding as the priority aim of their responses.

This conjecture is sustained by another observation that refers to the way epistemic access to the referent and rights to assess were indexed in parents' responses. Heritage and Raymond suggest that responses to those assessments that are uttered by a person with greater socio-epistemic rights than the person who produced the initial turn commonly exhibit upgraded epistemic authority (Heritage and Raymond 2005: 23ff.). In my study, the parents did not usually deploy particular resources to upgrade and display greater epistemic rights to assess in their responses, and if they did use response formats that possibly indexed superior epistemic authority and/or competition, the children did not treat them as such. Indeed, in extracts in which parents' agreeing responses were composed of a same evaluation followed by an agreement token (Chapter 5, Extracts 23–4), thus possibly indexing "epistemic independency and priority relative to a first assessment" (Heritage and Raymond 2005: 26), or in which parents' agreements were constituted by a same evaluation followed by a tag question (Chapter 5, Extracts 34–5), thus possibly "usurping a previous speaker's first positioned assessment with a new one that now commands the terms of agreement" (Heritage and Raymond 2005: 28), children did not orient toward their parents' responses as epistemicaly competitive. Instead, they either treated them as implying a repair action by them, in other words, signaling that they should use more adult–like language (Chapter 5, Extracts 23–4), or as being a way of asserting the agreement that parents accomplished with their response (Chapter 5,

Extracts 34–5). Furthermore, the young children in this study did not generally deploy resources that indexed epistemic subordination when they addressed their initial assessment toward their parents, as has been suggested by Heritage and Raymond (2005: 34). Instead, they mainly used an "epistemically unmarked" declarative format. Collectively, these observations indicate that the parents and children in this study seemed to give priority to the achievement of shared understandings, instead of primarily orienting toward preference organization and issues of epistemic authority and/or control.

To use Atkinson's words, beyond aiming at shared understanding, "members are faced with the problem of having to produce on each and every occasion of interaction their actual talk and activities in such a way as to make it witnessable by others as the talk and conduct of a member of whatever social category they are intending themselves to appear as" (Atkinson 1980: 34). As Sacks (1985: 18) argues, an essential requirement of social life consists of getting a sense of the observability and accountability of actions and in coming to terms with the fact that being considered a competent member implies behaving in such a way that others' knowledge of one's membership category is enough to infer what one is up to. Consequently, it is essential for children to learn what *programmatic relevance* of social categories—in other words, competences, rights, and duties—one is expected to have as an incumbent of a particular category, and the activities one is typically considered to engage in *qua* "parent," "child," "sister," or "grandmother." As Sacks put it: "For children to come to learn the phenomenon of relevance, its uses, and its import for the formulation of their own and the grasp of others' activities, is utterly core to their socialization" (Sacks 1992 I: 494).

To show how parents and children display their orientations toward issues of membership categories when accomplishing assessment sequences, I took into account the overall action that the young child's assessment and the parent's responses were part of and looked at the implications that the agreeing and disagreeing responses from parents had on the further interactive development. This praxeological view of the investigated sequences further nuanced the outlined findings that indicated parents' unrestrained orientation toward the preference for agreement over disagreement and for self-repair over other-repair when responding to their young children's assessments. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the atypicalities regarding preference organization—recurrent use of weak agreement and/or strong immediate disagreement—exhibited in parents' agreeing or disagreeing responses and in children's treatment of their parents' responses evidenced the fact that the interactants were not simply oriented toward the preference for agreement over disagreement, or for self-repair over other-repair, but that their organization of assessment sequences manifested more complex issues related to the moral implications of their respective membership categories (Jayyusi 1984: 43) and to a set of activities, competences, rights, and duties bound to them (see also sections 2.5.1 and 6.5 on this argument).

Indeed, after children's assessments that accomplished a noticing, and through which they managed to re-engage in turn-by-turn talk with their parents when it

had lapsed, or when the latter were busy doing things other than conversing with them, parents' responses tended to produce supportive actions. These supportive actions took the form of an upgraded agreement (Chapter 5, Extract 17) or a weak agreement immediately followed by an upgraded agreement (Chapter 5, Extract 27), or were composed by a same evaluation followed by a tag question (Chapter 5, Extracts 34 and 35) emphasizing shared understanding. In so doing, parents encouraged young children to verbally express their evaluative position and their affective implication with respect to the surrounding world. When the child's initial (positive) assessment took a form that was not very adult-like, such as "mmh" to assess an item of food (Chapter 5, Extracts 21–2), or when their noticing was composed of the repeated production of an evaluation term, "lots, lots, lots" (Chapter 5, Extract 24), parents' weak agreement (taking the form of a simple repetition and produced in a monotone voice) was treated as repair implicative, inducing the young child to repair their initial action by deploying a complete sentence, such as "that's fine" or "there are lots of bubbles." Instead of engendering disalignment, these responses from parents also included a supportive, stimulating dimension: they encouraged young children's more complex and sophisticated linguistic productions. These extracts thus showed instances in which participants used the assessment sequence as a locus of language acquisition.

In other situations, the children produced a positive or negative assessment of something in their surroundings, or of an activity they had just previously completed more or less autonomously, thereby achieving a self-praising or self-deprecating action. As mentioned before, in adult–adult interaction, self-deprecation or self-praise are usually treated as dispreferred actions: they are avoided in the first place, or engender disagreement when they occur (Pomerantz 1975, 1984a). In this study, the child's self-deprecation was met by a parent's weak agreement (Chapter 5, Extract 31) or a strong disagreement (Chapter 6, Extracts 11 and 18). With regard to self-deprecation, children treated either response by their parents as satisfactory; in other words, none of them generated further disaligning actions. To disagree immediately and firmly with self-deprecation constitutes a strong supportive act. However, in cases in which the young child's self-praise refers to an autonomously accomplished action, the matter is more complex. Indeed, parents' distinct responses to their children's self-praise seem to index their orientation to the praxeological context in which it was produced: they tended to respond with a weak agreement to their children's self-praise when it occurred in a context of alignment, such as blowing soap bubbles together (Chapter 4, Extract 9) or assembling a puzzle (Chapter 5, Extract 32), but dismissed it with a strong immediate disagreement when the child's self-praise was preceded by disalignment between parent and child, for example, regarding the appropriateness of leaving the table (Chapter 6, Extract 13) or the child's collaboration in preparing a meal (Chapter 6, Extract 15). Moreover, children treated their parents' strong disagreement as not satisfactory, engendering a complex series of dispreferred actions (see Chapter 6, Extracts 13 and 15). In contrast, when a child's self-praise was met by a parent's weak

agreement whose aligning character was emphasized by embodied means, or by the deployment of a tag question after the repetition of the initial assessment (Chapter 5, Extracts 32 and 34), these responses were treated as acceptable, and children did not pursue an upgraded agreement, as was the case, for example, when their noticing or positive assessment was responded to merely by a parent's weak agreement which took the form of an amused agreement token, or a simple, barely audible repetition of the child's initial turn (Chapter 5, Extracts 23 and 25).

In other extracts, the young child's assessment implied a request regarding a parental domain of responsibility such as food or the child's physical safety, a request for help with pulling down a sleeve or closing a game box, or a request for permission to eat (chocolate) or not to have to eat (ham). After requests for help and/or advice, parents either granted the child's request without using talk (Chapter 4, Extracts 11–12) or treated their own initial weak agreement (a simple agreement token) as constituting an insufficient response, therefore immediately adding an account concerning their delay in granting the request (Chapter 5, Extracts 28–30). Parents thus gave priority to responding to their children's request for help and/or advice more thoroughly, instead of emphasizing their agreement with the assessment itself, as was the case with extracts in which the child's assessment accomplished an environmental noticing. In situations in which the child's negative assessment implied a request for permission to eat or not to eat an item of food, or a request to engage the parent in a course of action other than the one he or she had proposed, parents used a weak agreement indicating incipient refusal of their children's request and delaying the production of the dispreferred action (Chapter 5, Extracts 18–20). Apart from Extract 18 in Chapter 5, where the parent's weak agreement was followed by an escalation of the disalignment between father and son, the use of a dispreferred format for denying the child's request leads to a rapid closing of the disalignment (see Chapter 5, Extracts 19–20). In Chapter 6, Extract 16, however, the child's negative assessment regarding a pencil achieved a request for permission to use another one to continue her drawing, and the parent disagreed immediately and strongly with the child's initial turn, engendering a long series of disaffiliative actions that were only closed by the parent's use of a proof procedure that demonstrated the pencil's good quality.

Similar observations were made with respect to situations in which young children produced negative assessments to complain about food, a beverage, or the temperature of the shower water; that is to say, about a domain for which the parent is usually considered responsible. I showed that in these cases parents easily treated their children's turn as an unsafe complaint, engendering disalignment (Chapter 6, Extracts 5–9). As with denials of requests, parents tended to delay disagreeing responses to their children's complaints. They did so by using a wh-question (Chapter 6, Extracts 5–7), or by deploying a verification procedure (Chapter 6, Extracts 8–9); thereby giving their children an extra opportunity to soften their initial complaint. As with refusals, so long as parents' disagreeing responses exhibited the most characteristic feature of the dispreferred format, that

is, delayed production, they did not engender a long series of contesting actions. Instead, children either responded to their parents' wh-question (Chapter 6, Extract 5), or took into account the parents' verification procedure (Chapter 6, Extract 8), eventually backing down from their initial position after their parents' overt expression of disagreement. However, if the parent's disagreement was produced immediately after the child had completed his or her initial assessment, or if an extra opportunity to speak provided by a parent's wh-question was eventually taken by one of the parents (Chapter 6, Extracts 6–7), it generated a series of disaffiliative actions (Chapter 6, Extracts 6–7, 10, 12 and 16). Apart from one exception, in which the parents' strong and immediate disagreement responded to a child's initial assessment that had been uttered in a context of alignment (Chapter 6, Extract 17), no further disaffiliative actions were observed and interactants came rapidly to a closing of the assessment sequence.

In emphasizing the praxeological implications of parents' and children's organization of assessment sequences, this analysis thus clearly demonstrates that parental (epistemic) authority in and control of certain everyday domains and/or the parental scaffolding of children's acquisition of communicative competences constituted matters that had to be locally accomplished. Parents' success in imposing or controlling a way of seeing, understanding, or assessing an item (such as food or the temperature of water), an action (accomplished by the child or the parent), or a person (real or imagined) rested on the fact that their epistemic authority was recognized by their children (for a similar argument, see Butler 2008: 197; Macbeth 1991). Indeed, when children—following their parents' strong disagreement—simply confirmed or even clearly asserted their initially held position, the parents' (epistemic) authority or superiority was not recognized, but was successfully challenged or even undermined by their children (see Chapter 6, Extracts 6–7, 10 and 12). I also stressed that when the child's initial assessment implied a request relative to a domain of parental responsibility, the real-time negotiation of epistemic authority had very practical implications: when children successfully resisted their parents' questioning of their initial assessment by simply confirming their initial assessment (see for example Chapter 6, Extracts 6–7 and 12), the parents had to come up with a compromise—such as a suggestion to drink some water instead of continuing to eat the negatively evaluated food item—if they wanted to continue the meal more or less peacefully.

Interestingly, Wootton (1997: 206) mentions that 4-year-old children do not usually withdraw an initial request. However, Wootton's findings contradict my own regarding the ways that children's requests are dealt with in everyday parent–child interactions: he remarks that in the rare occasions in which children do withdraw their initial request, such withdrawals seem to be prompted simply by the firmness of the parent's rejection, which is to say on the basis of the child forming a judgment as to whether or not the parent is likely to accede to the request. As mentioned above, in the extracts analyzed here, the parent's firm disagreement with the child's initial assessment seems to have exactly the opposite implications, engendering a long series of disaffiliative actions (see for example

Chapter 6, Extract 16). However, when the parent delayed the denial of the child's request (with a weak agreement), children seemed to be more inclined to give in (see Chapter 5, Extracts 19–20). My analytical descriptions of young children's enacted and often successful subversion of their parents' authority also differs from Montandon's study, which focuses on children's own perspectives and expectations regarding their parental authority (see Montandon 2002). The study reports that when children are encouraged to talk about their expectations toward their parents, they most frequently mention that they want them to perform control and authority when they (the children) consider themselves to have a specific problem (Montandon 2002: 109). In the examples I discussed above, the children's negative evaluation of a food item indicates a specific—very concrete—problem that they have with eating the evaluated food item. Although the young children systematically turned toward their parents with these types of problems, their way of implementing their parents' disagreeing stance in the further course of action—insisting on their own view and subverting the one manifested by their parents instead of simply recognizing their authority in the matter—does indicate, however, that children's orientation toward parental authority and/or control is a more ambiguous and contradictory issue than the study by Montandon suggests.

In this sense, the praxeological examination presented here of parents' and children's organization of assessment sequences uncovers how, through their participation in everyday family activities, young children might be confronted almost simultaneously with parental control and displays of authority on the one hand, and the parents' encouraging support and stimulating expectations on the other. At a very early age, young children may thus acquire a sense of certain ambiguities and contradictions that are inherent in the programmatic relevance of social categories and come to grasp that if category-bound activities, rights, duties, and competences are not effectively accomplished, they do not have any impact on the real-time interaction, and are vulnerable for subversion. This study thus shows how the incorporation process, which is at the heart of Bourdieu's social reproduction theory (see section 2.1.3) and of more recent (primary) socialization theories (see section 2.2.2), is by no means reducible to the impact a young child's continuous exposure to a particular economic, social, and cultural context has and/or the influence particular significant others have on his or her becoming a competent member of society. Instead, I have tried to open the "black box" further (see section 2.1.3) and to uncover how children successfully play their own part in this complex process: taking positions, displaying their affective implications with the surrounding world, engaging others to do so as well, negotiating with them, finally giving in to others' stances, or maintaining their own position until the significant other backs down or comes up with a compromise.

Appendix

Number of children per family – names and ages of the children.[1]

			Years	Months
Family 1	2 children			
	Léon	C1	3	6
	Susanne	*C2*	*2*	*4*
Family 2	2 children			
	Manon	C1	4	1
	Anna	*C2*	*2*	*6*
Family 3	2 children			
	Alma	C1	7	11
	Elio	*C2*	*2*	*1*
Family 4	3 children			
	Louis	C1	4	3
	Clara	*C2*	*2*	*4*
	Elise	C3	0	2
Family 5	3 children			
	Martin	*C1*	*2*	*6*
	Adrien	C2	0	9
Family 6	3 children			
	Raymond	C1	8	1
	Camille	C2	6	1
	Faffa	*C3*	*2*	*7*
Family 7	3 children			
	Lily	C1	4	3
	Luc	*C2*	*2*	*10*
	Laurent	C3	0	2
Family 8	2 children			
	Aurélie	C1	4	0
	Noëmi	*C2*	*2*	*1*

1　All the subjects' names have been anonymized. The name and age of the target child in each family is written in bold and italics.

This page intentionally left blank

References

Abels, H. and König, A. (2010). *Sozialisation. Soziologische Antworten auf die Frage, wie wir werden, was wir sind, wie gesellschaftliche Ordnung möglich ist und wie Theorien der Gesellschaft und der Identität ineinanderspielen*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Aronsson, K. (2006). "Doing Family. An Interactive Accomplishment." *Text & Talk*, 26(4–5), 719–38.

—— (2011). "Language Socialization and Verbal Play." In A. Duranti, E. Ochs and B. Schieffelin (eds), *Handbook of Language Socialization*, pp. 464–83. Oxford, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

Aronsson, K. and Cekaite, A. (2011). "Activity Contracts and Directives in Everyday Family Politics." *Discourse & Society*, 22(2), 137–54.

Atkinson, J.M. and Drew, P. (1979). *Order in Court: The Organisation of Verbal Interaction in Judicial Settings*. London: Macmillan.

Atkinson, M.A. (1980). "Some Practical Uses of 'A Natural Lifetime'." *Human Studies*, 3(1), 33–46.

Atkinson, M.A. and Heritage, J. (eds). (1984). *Structures of Social Action.* Paris, Cambridge: Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Cambridge University Press.

Bassano, D. (2000). "La constitution du lexique: le développement lexical précoce." In M. Kail and M. Fayol (eds), *L'acquisition du langage. Le langage en émergence. De la naissance à trois ans*, pp. 137–68. Paris: Presse Universitaire de France.

Bates, E., Camaioni, L. and Volterra, V. (1979). "The acquisition of performatives prior to speech." In E. Ochs and B. Schieffelin (eds), *Developmental Pragmatics*, pp. 111–31. New York: Academic Press.

Baudelot, C. and Establet, R. (1973). *L'école capitaliste en France*. Paris: Maspéro.

Becker, H. (1952). "Social Class Variations in the Teacher-Pupil Relationship." *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 25(8), 451–65.

—— (1963). *The Outsiders.* New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Becker, H. and Strauss, A. (1956). "Careers, Personality, and Adult Socialization." *American Journal of Sociology*, 62(3), 153–263.

Becker, H., Geer, B., Hughes, E. and Strauss, A. (1961). *Boys in White. Student Culture in Medical School.* New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge.* Garden City, New York: Anchor Books.

Bergmann, J.R. (1988). "Haustiere als kommunikative Ressourcen." In H.-G. Soeffner (ed.), "Kultur und Alltag," *Soziale Welt, Sonderband* 6, 299–312.

Bergonnier-Dupuy, G. (2002). "Analyse séquentielle d'une interaction de tutelle parent-enfant: essai d'opérationnalisation de la notion d''adéquation de l'aide parentale'." *La revue international de l'éducation familiale*, 6(2), 69–86.

Bilmes, J. (1988). "The Concept of Preference in Conversation Analysis." *Language in Society*, 17(2), 161–81.

⸺ (2014). "Preference and the Conversation Analytic Endeavor." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 64, 52–71.

Blumer, H. (1966). "Sociological Implications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead." *American Journal of Sociology*, 71(5), 535–44.

⸺ (1969a). *Symbolic Interactionism.* London: University of California Press.

⸺ (1973[1969b]). "Der methodologische Standort des Symbolischen Interaktionismus." In Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder Soziologen (eds), *Alltagswissen, Interaktion und gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit. Bd. 1: Symbolischer Interaktionismus und Ethnomethodologie*, pp. 80–146. Reinbek: Rowohlt.

Blum-Kulka, S. (1997). *Dinner Talk. Cultural Patterns of Sociability and Socialization in Family Discourse.* Mahwah, New Jersey, London: Erlbaum.

Boltanski, L. (1990). *L'Amour et la Justice comme compétences.* Paris: Métailié.

Bonu, B., Mondada, L. and Relieu, M. (1994). "Catégorisation: L'Approche de Sacks." In B. Fradin, L. Quéré and J. Widmer (eds), *L'enquête sur les Catégories*, pp. 129–48. Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

Bourdieu, P. (1966). "L'école conservatrice. Les inégalités devant l'école et la culture." *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 7(3), 325–47.

⸺ (1967). "Systems of education and systems of thought." *International Social Science Journal*, 19(3), 338–58.

⸺ (1977a). *Outline of a Theory of Practice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⸺ (1980). *Le Sens pratique.* Paris: Minuit.

⸺ (1997). *Méditations pascaliennes*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Bourdieu, P., Darbel, A. and Schnapper, D. (1969). *L'amour de l'art.* Paris: Minuit.

Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J.C. (1964). *Les héritiers.* Paris: Editions de Minuit.

⸺ (1970). *La reproduction*. Paris: Editions de Minuit.

⸺ (1977). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage.

Bourdieu, P., Passeron, J.C. and de Saint-Martin, M. (1965). *Rapport pédagogique et communication.* Paris: Mouton.

Boyle, R. (2000). "Whatever happened to preference organisation?" *Journal of Pragmatics*, 32(5), 583–604.

Bruner, J.S. (1971). *The Relevance of Education.* New York: Norton.

⸺ (1975). "From communication to language: a psychological perspective." *Cognition*, 3(3), 255–87.

⸺ (1983). *Child's Talk: Learning to Use the Language.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⸺ (1996). *The Culture of Education.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Butler, C.W. (2008). *Talk and Social Interaction in the Playground*. Surrey: Ashgate.

Butler, C.W. and Fitzgerald, R. (2010). "Membership-in-action: Operative identities in a family meal." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 42(9), 2462–74.

Butler, C.W. and Weatherall, A. (2006). "No We're Not Playing Families: Membership categorization in children's play." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 39(4), 441–70.

—— (2011). "Accomplishing a cross-gender identity: A case of passing in children's talk-in-interaction." In S. Speer and E. Stokoe (eds), *Conversation and Gender*, pp. 231–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Butler, C.W. and Wilkinson, R. (2013). "Mobilising recipiency: Child Participation and 'Rights to Speak' in Multi-Party Family Interaction." *Journal of Pragamatics*, 50(1), 37–51.

Button, G. (1991). "Introduction: ethnomethodology and the foundational respecification of the human sciences." In G. Button (ed.), *Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Button, G. and Lee, J. (eds) (1987). *Talk and Social Organization.* Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Cekaite, A. (2006). *Getting Started: Children's Participation and Language Learning in an L2 Classroom.* Sweden: Linköping University.

—— (2010). "Shepherding the child: embodied directive sequences in parent-child interactions." *Text & Talk*, 30(1), 1–25.

Cekaite, A., and Aronsson, K. (2005). "Language play, a collaborative resource in children's L2 learning." *Applied Linguistics*, 26(2), 169–91.

Chomsky, N. (1965). *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Church, A. (2009). *Preference Organisation and Peer Disputes.* Surrey: Ashgate.

Clausen, J.A. (1968). "A Historical and Comparative View of Socialization Theory and Research." In J.A. Clausen (ed.), *Socialization and Society*, pp. 18–72. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Clément, F. and Kaufmann, L. (2011). "Ouverture: Vers une sociologie cognitive 'intégrative'." In F. Clément, and L. Kaufmann (eds), *La sociologie cognitive*, 355–68 Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'homme.

—— (eds). (2011). *La Sociologie Cognitive.* Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.

Clément, F., Bernard, S. and Kaufmann, L. (2011). "Social cognition is Not reducible to theory of mind: When children Use deontic rules to predict the behaviour of others." *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 29(4), 910–28.

Clément, F., Koenig, M.A. and Harris, P.I. (2004). "The Ontogenesis of Trust." *Mind & Language*, 19(4), 369–79.

Cobb-Moore, C., Danby, S. and Farrel, A. (2008). "'I told you so': justification used in disputes in young children's interactions in an early childhood classroom." *Discourse Studies*, 10(5), 595–614.

Coleman, J.S. (1966). *Equality of Educational Opportunity.* Washington: US Government Printing Office.

Corrin, J. (2010). "Hm? What? Maternal repair and early child talk." In H. Gardner and M. Forrester (eds), *Analysing Interactions in Childhood Insights from Conversation Analysis*, pp. 23–41. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley.

Coulon, A. (1988). "Ethnométhodolgie et éducation." *Revue Française de Pédagogie*, 82(1), 65–101.

Couper-Kuhlen, E. (2010). "Commentary on Stivers and Rossano: 'Mobilizing Response'." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 43(1), 32–7. Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.

Cromdal, J. (2001a). "Can I Be with?: Negotiating play entry in a bilingual school." *Journal of Pragamatics*, 33(4), 515–43.

––– (2001b). "Overlap in bilingual play: Some implications of code-switching for overlap resolution." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 34(4), 421–51.

––– (2006). "Socialization." In B. Keith (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, 2nd edn, pp. 462–6. North-Holland: Elsevier.

Cromer, S. (2005). "Vies privées des filles et garçons: des socialisations toujours différentielles?" In M. Maruani (ed.), *Femmes, genre et sociétés*, pp. 192–9. Paris: La Découverte.

Cuff, E.C., Sharrock, W. and Francis D. (1998). *Perspectives in Sociology.* London, New York: Routledge.

Curl, T.S. (2005). "Practices in Other-Initiated Repair Resolution: The Phonetic Differentiation of 'Repetitions'." *Discourse Processes*, 39(1), 1–43.

Danby, S. and Baker, C.D. (1998). "How to Be masculine in the block area." *Childhood*, 5(2), 151–75.

––– (2000). "Unravelling the fabric of social order in block area." In S. Hester and D. Francis (eds), *Local Educational Order: Ethnomethodological Studies of Knowledge in Action*, pp. 91–140. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Darmon, M. (2007). *La Socialisation.* Paris: Armand Colin.

De Fornel, M. and Léon, J. (2000). "L'Analyse de Conversation, De l'Ethnométhodologie à la Linguistique Interactionnelle." *Histoire Epistémologie Langage*, 22(1), 131–55.

Delalande, J. (2001). *La cour de récréation.* Rennes Cedex: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Dosse, F. (1991). *Histoire du structuralisme. Le chant du signe, 1945–1966* (tome 1). Paris: La Découverte.

––– (1995). *L'empire du sens, l'humanisation des sciences humaines*. Paris: La Découverte.

Drew, P. (1997). "'Open' class repair initiators in response to sequential sources of troubles in conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 28(1), 69–101.

Dubet, F. (1991). *Les lycéens.* Paris: Seuil.

––– (1994). *Sociologie de l'expérience*. Paris: Le Seuil.

Duranti, A., Ochs, E. and Schiefflin, B. (eds). (2011). *Handbook of Language Socialization.* Oxford, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

Durkheim, E. (1973 [1922]). *Education et sociologie.* Paris: PUF.

Eglin, P. and Hester, S. (2003). *The Montreal Massacre. A Story of Membership Categorization Analysis.* Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Emanuelsson, J. and Sahlström, F. (2008). "The price of participation: Teacher control versus student participation in classroom interaction. *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research*, 52(2), 205–23.

Ervin-Tripp, S. and Mitchell-Kernan, C. (eds). (1977). *Child Discourse.* New York: Academic Press.

Evaldsson, A.-C. (2005). "Staging insults and mobilizing categorizations in a multiethnic peer group." *Discourse & Society*, 16(6), 763–86.

––– (2007). "Accounting for friendship: moral ordering and category membership in preadolescent Girls' relational talk." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 40(4), 377–404.

Evaldsson, A.-C. and Corsaro, W.A. (1998). "Play and games in peer cultures of preschool and preadolescent children: An interpretative approach." *Childhood*, 5(4), 377–402.

Fasulo, A., Loyd, H. and Padiglione, V. (2007). "Children's socialization into cleaning practices: A cross-cultural perspective." *Discourse & Society*, 18(1), 11–33.

Ferry, J.-M. (1987). *Habermas, L'*éthique de la communication. Paris: PUF.

Filipi, A. (2007). "A toddler's treatment of mm hm in talk with a parent." *Australian Review of Applied Linguistics*, 30(3), 33.1–33.17.

––– (2009). *Toddler and parent interaction: The organisation of gaze, pointing, and vocalisation*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub Company.

––– (2013). "Withholding and pursuit in the development of skills in interaction and language." *Interaction Studies*, 14(2), 139–59.

Filipi, A. and Wales, R. (2010). "The organization of assessments produced by children and adults in task based talk." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 42(11), 3114–29.

Filliettaz, L., Saint-Georges, I. and Duc, B. (2008). "'Vos mains sont intelligentes!' Interactions en formation professionnelle initiale." *Les cahiers de la Section des Sciences de l'Education*, 117, Université de Genève.

Foote Whyte, W. (1967). *Street Corner Society.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Forrester, M. (2008). "The Emergence of Self-Repair: A Case Study of One Child During the Early Preschool Years." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 41(1), 99–128.

––– (2010). "Ethnomethodology and adult-child conversation: Whose development?" In H. Gardner and M. Forrester (eds), *Analysing Interactions in Childhood Insights from Conversation Analysis*, pp. 42–58. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

––– (2013). "Mutual adaptation in parent-child interaction: Learning how to produce questions and answers." *Interaction Studies*, 14(2), 190–211.

Forrester, M. and Cherington, S.M. (2009). "The development of other-related conversational skills: A case study of conversational repair during the early years." *First Language*, 29(2), 166–91.

Fox, B. and Thompson, S. (2010). "Responses to Wh-Questions in English Conversation." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 43(2), 133–56.

Fromm, E. (1944). "Individual and social origins of neurosis." *American Sociological Review*, 9(4), 380–84.

Fryem D. and Moore, C. (1991). *Children's Theories of Mind: Mental States and Social Understanding.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Garfinkel, H. (1967). *Studies in Ethnomethodology.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Garfinkel, H. and Sacks, H. (1986). "On formal structures of practical actions." In H. Garfinkel (ed.), *Ethnomethodological Studies of Work*, pp. 160–93. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Garfinkel, H., Girton, G., Livingston, E. and Sacks H. (1982). *Studies of Kids' Culture and Kids' Talk.* Los Angeles: unpublished research project, University of California.

Gergely, C. and György, G. (2009). "Natural pedagogy." *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 13(4), 148–53.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* London: Penguin Books.

—— (1961a). *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates.* Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday.

—— (1961b). *Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril.

—— (1963). *Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings.* New York: Free Press.

—— (1977). "The arrangement between the sexes." *Theory and Society*, 4(3), 301–31.

—— (1981). *Forms of Talk.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Goodwin, C. (2000). "Action and embodiment within situated human interaction." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 32(10), 1489–522.

—— (2003). "Pointing as Situated Practice." In S. Kita (ed.), *Pointing: Where Language, Culture and Cognition Meet*, pp. 217–42. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Goodwin, C. and Goodwin, M.H. (1987). "Concurrent operations on talk: Notes on the interactive organization of assessments." *IPRA Papers in Pragmatics*, 1(1), 1–54.

—— (1992). "Assessments and the construction of context." In A. Duranti and C. Goodwin (eds), *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*, pp. 147–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goodwin, M.H. (2006). "Participation, affect, and trajectory in family directive / response sequences." *Text & Talk*, 26(4/5), 513–41.

Goodwin, M.H. (1982). "Processes of dispute Management among urban black children." *American Ethnologist*, 9(1), 76–96.

—— (1990). *He-Said-She-Said.* Bloomington and Indianapolis: University Press.

—— (1997). "Byplay: Negotiating Evaluation in Storytelling." In G. Guy, R.C. Feagin, D. Schiffrin and J. Baugh (eds), *Social Interaction and Discourse Structures*, pp. 77–102. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

—— (1998). "Games of stance: conflict and footing in Hopscotch." In S.M. Hoyle and C. Templer Adger (eds), *Kids Talk: Strategic Language Use in Later Childhood*, pp. 23–46. New York: Oxford University Press.

—— (2002). "Exclusion in Girls' peer groups: Ethnographic Analysis of Language Practices on the Playground." *Human Development*, 45(6), 392–415.

—— (2003). "The Relevance of Ethnicity, Class, and Gender in Children's Peer Negotiations." In J. Holmes and M. Meyerhoff (eds), *Handbook of Language and Gender*, pp. 392–415. Oxford: Blackwell.

—— (2006). *The Hidden Life of Girls.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

—— (2007). "Occasioned knowledge exploration in family interaction." *Discourse & Society*, 18(1), 93–110.

Goodwin, M.H. and Cekaite A. (2013). "Calibration in directive/response sequences in family interaction." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 46(1), 122–38.

Goodwin, M.H. and Kyratzis, A. (2007). "Children socializing children: Practices for negotiating the social order among peers." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 40(4), 291–391.

Goodwin, M.H., Goodwin, C. and Yaeger-Dror M. (2002). "Multi-modality in Girls' Game Disputes." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 34(10–11), 1621–49.

Gordon, C. (2009). *Making Meanings, Creating Family. Intertextuality and Framing in Family Interaction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grundmann, M. (2006). *Sozialisation Skizze einer allgemeinen Theorie.* Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft mbH.

Gülich, E. and Mondada, L. (2001). "Konversationsanalyse." *Lexikon der Romanistischen Linguistik*, 1(2), 196–250.

—— (2008). *Konversationsanalyse, Eine Einführung am Beispiel des Französischen* (Romanistische Arbeitshefte 52). Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Gumperz, J.J. and Hymes, D. (eds). (1972). *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.

Habermas, J. (2009). *Sprachentheoretische Grundlegung der Soziologie. Philosophische Texte Band 1. Studienausgabe.* Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

Haicault, M. (1994). "Interactions parents-enfants: une approche filmique de la socialisation." *Revue de l'institut de sociologie*, 1–2, 51–68.

Harris, J.R. (1998). *The Nurture Assumption: Why Children Turn Out the Way They Do.* New York: Free Press.

Hepburn, A. and Boldin, G.B. (2012). "The Conversation Analytic Approach to Transcription." In J. Sidnell and T. Stivers (eds), *The Handbook of Conversation Analysis*, pp. 57–76. Chichester, West-Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Heritage, J. (1984a). *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

—— (1984b). "A change-of-state token and aspects of its sequential placement." In M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds), *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*, pp. 299–345. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— (2008). "Conversation analysis as social theory." In B. Turner (ed.), *The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory*, pp. 300–320. Oxford: Blackwell.

Heritage, J. and Raymond, (2005). "The Terms of Agreement: Indexing Epistemic Authority and Subordination in Talk-in-Interaction." *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 68(1), 15–38.

Heritage, J. and Sefi, S. (1992). "Dilemmas of advice: aspects of the delivery and reception of advice in interactions between Health Visitors and first-time mothers." In P. Drew and J. Heritage (eds), *Talk at Work,* pp. 359–417. York, Los Angeles: Cambridge University Press.

Hester, S.A. (2007). "Local Orders of Family Life. A Study of Talk-in-Interaction in a Family Meal." Unpublished PhD Thesis. Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester.

Hester, S. and Eglin, P. (1997). *Culture in Action: Studies in Membership Categorization Analysis.* Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Hughes, E. (1956). "The Making of a Physician." *Human Organization*, 14(4), 21–5.

—— (1958). *Men and Their Work.* Glencoe: Free Press.

Hurrelmann, K., Grundman, M. and Walper, S. (2008). "Zum Stand der Sozialisationsforschung." In K. Hurrelmann, M. Grundmann and S. Walper (eds), *Handbuch Sozialisationsforschung*, pp. 14–31. Weinheim: Beltz Verlag.

Hymes, D. (1964). "Introduction: Toward Ethnographies of Communications." *American Anthropologist*, 66(6), 1–34.

—— (1980). *Language in Education: Ethnolinguistic Essays*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics.

—— (1981). *Ethnographic Monitoring of Children's Acquisition of Reading/ Language Arts Skills In and Out of the Classroom.* (Volumes I, II, III. Final Report.). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. Graduate School of Education.

James, A. and Prout, A. (eds). (1990). *Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood. Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood.* London: Falmer Press.

Jayyusi, L. (1984). *Categorization and the Moral Order.* Boston, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Jefferson, G. (1972). "Side Sequences." In D. Sudnow (ed.), *Studies in Social Interaction*, pp. 294–338. New York, London: The Free Press.

—— (1988). "Preliminary notes on a possible metric which provides for a 'standard maximum' silence of approximately one second in conversation." In D. Roger and P. Bull (eds), *Conversation*, pp. 166–96. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

—— (2004). "Glossary of transcript symbols with an introduction." In G.H. Lerner (ed.), *Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First Generation*, pp. 13–31. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

—— (2006). "A Technique for Inviting Laughter and its Subsequent Acceptance Declination." In P. Drew and J. Heritage (eds), *Conversation Analysis, Volume II, Sequence Organization*, pp. 281–95. London: Sage.

Jenks, C. (2008). "A sociological approach to childhood development." In P.K. Smith and G.H. Hart (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Social Development*, pp. 78–93. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Jones, S.E. and Zimmerman, D. (2003). "A child's point and the achievement of intentionality." *Gesture*, 3(2), 155–85.

Keel, S. (2011). "The parents' questioning repeats in response to young children's assessments." *Gesprächsforschung*, 12, 52–94.

—— (2012). "Socialization: Interactions between Parents and Children in Everyday Family Life." Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Neuchâtel/ University Lyon-2.

—— (2014a). "Des adultes et des enfants en situation d'interaction. Redécouvrir la socialisation." In A. Bovet, E. Gonzalez-Martinez and F. Malbois (eds), *Langage, activités et ordre social. Faire de la sociologie avec Harvey Sacks*, pp. 139–63. Bern: Peter Lang.

—— (2014b). "Les accords parentaux suite à un tour évaluatif de l'enfant. Qu'en est-il de l'organisation préférentielle dans le quotidien familial?" In L. Mondada (ed.), *Corps en Interaction*, pp. 145–90. Lyon: ENS éditions.

—— (2015). "Young Children's embodied pursuits of a response to their initial assessments." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 75, 1–24.

Keel, S. and Sormani, P. (2014). "Making it Explicit: Analyzing the 'Developmental Scheme' in Adult-Child Interactions." Paper presented at the Sociological Perspectives in Research on Education in Switzerland Conference, Fribourg, 14 November 2014.

Kidwell, M. (2005). "Gaze as Social Control: How Very Young Children Differentiate 'The Look' From a 'Mere Look' by Their Adult Caregivers." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 38(4), 417–49.

—— (2009). "Gaze Shift as an Interactional Resource for Very Young Children." *Discourse Processes*, 46(2), 145–60.

—— (2012). "Interaction among children." In J. Sidnell and T. Stivers (eds), *The Handbook of Conversation Analysis*, pp. 511–32. Chichester, West-Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Kidwell, M. and Zimmerman, D. (2006). "'Observability' in the Interactions of Very Young Children." *Communication Monographs*, 73(1), 1–28.

—— (2007). "Joint Attention as Action." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 39(3), 592–611.

Koenig, M.A., Clément, F. and Harris, P.I. (2004). "Trust in Testimony. Children's Use of True and False Statements." *Psychological Science*, 15(10), 694–8.

La Valle, N. (2006). "Redéfinitions du contexte domestique: la réorganisation des activités familiales suite à des appels téléphoniques." In L. Mondada (ed.), *La pertinence du contexte. Contributions de l'Ethnométhodologie et de l'Analyse Conversationnelle*, pp. 175–202. Nancy: PUN.

—— (2010a). "Technologie et objets usuels dans l'organisation temporelle du foyer." In B. Lelong and C. Vérité (eds), *Communication et sphère privée*, pp. 108–31. Paris: L'Harmattan.

—— (2010b). *Normalité temporelle, normalité familiale: le temps préoccupation et matière premières du care parental*. Paper presented at the Actes du Colloque International Actes éducatifs et de soins: entre éthique et gouvernance, Nice/Sophia Antipolis.

—— (2014). "L'organisation parlée et incarnée des activités. Le cas de la particule bon et des 'trajectoires parlées' à la maison." In L. Mondada (ed.), *Corps en Interaction*, pp. 259–88. Lyon: ENS éditions.

Laakso, M. (2010). "Children's emerging and developing self-repair practices." In H. Gardner and M. Forrester (eds), *Analysing Interactions in Childhood. Insights from Conversation Analysis*, pp. 74–99. Chichester, West-Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Laakso, M. and Soininen, M. (2010). "Mother-initiated repair sequences in interactions of 3-year-old children." *First Language*, 30(3–4), 329–53.

Labov, W. (1964). "Phonological Correlates of Social Stratification." *American Anthropologist*, 66(6), 164–76.

—— (1972). *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Labov, W. and Fanshel, D. (1977). *Therapeutic Discourse.* New York: Academic Press.

Labov, W., Cohen, P., Robins, C. and Lewis, J. (1968). *A Study of the Nonstandard English of Negro and Puerto Rican Speakers in New York City.* New York: Columbia University.

Lahire, B. (1995). *Tableaux de famille, heurs et malheurs scolaires en milieux populaires.* Paris: Le Seuil.

Lee, J. (1987). "Prologue: Talking organisation." In G. Button and J. Lee (eds), *Talk and Social Organisation*, pp. 19–53. Clevedan: Intercommunication Series.

Leeds-Hurwitz, W. and Sigman, S.J. (2010). "The Penn tradition." In W. Leeds-Hurwitz (eds), *The Social History of Language and Social Interaction Research: People, Places, Ideas*, pp. 235–70. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Lentin, L. (2009). *Apprendre à penser, parler, lire, écrire: acquisition du langage oral et écrit.* Issy-les-Moulineaux: ESF éditeur.

Lerner, G. (1996). "Finding 'Face' in the Preference Structures of Talk-in-Interaction." *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 59(4), 303–21.

—— (2003). "Selecting next speaker: the context sensitive operation of a context-free organization." *Language in Society*, 32(2), 177–201.

Lerner, G. and Zimmerman, D. (2003). "Action and the Appearance of Action in the Conduct of Very Young Children." In P. Glenn, C.D. Lebaron and J. Mandelbaum (eds), *Studies in Language and Social Interaction: In Honour of Robert Hopper*, pp. 441–57. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.

Lerner, G., Zimmerman, D. and Kidwell, M. (2007). *Microstructures of Social Life: Evidence from the Conduct of Very Young Children*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, TBA, New York City.

—— (2011). "Formal Structures of Practical Tasks: A Resource for Action in the Social Life of Very Young Children." In J. Streeck, C. Goodwin and C.D. Lebaron (eds), *Embodied Interaction. Language and Body in the Material World*, pp. 44–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levinson, S.C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lindström, A. and Heinemann, T. (2009). "Good Enough: Low-Grade Assessments in Caregiving Situations." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 42(4), 309–28.

Liszkowski, U. (2006). "Infant pointing at twelve months: Communicative goals, motives, and social-cognitive abilities." In N. Enfield and S. Levinson (eds), *The Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition, and Interaction*, pp. 153–78. Oxford: Berg.

Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Striano, T. and Tomasello, M. (2006). "Twelve- and 18-month-olds point to provide information for others." *Journal of Cognition and Development*, 7(2), 173–87.

Macbeth, D. (1991). "Teacher authority as practical action." *Linguistics and Education*, 3(4), 281–313.

—— (2003). "Hugh Mehan's 'Learning Lessons' Reconsidered: On the Differences between the Naturalistic and Critical Analysis of Classroom Discourse." *American Educational Research Journal*, 40(1), 239–80.

—— (2011). "Understanding understanding as an instructional matter." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 43(2), 438–51.

Mackay, R. (1975). "Conceptions and Models of Socialization." In R. Turner (ed.), *Ethnomethodology*, pp. 180–93. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Makihara, M. and Schieffelin, B. (eds). (2007). *Consequences of Contact: Language Ideologies and Sociocultural Transformations in Pacific Societies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Marcos, H. and Bernicot, J. (1997). "How Do young children reformulate assertions? A comparison with requests." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 27(6), 781–98.

Mead, G.H. (1934a). "The Background of the Genesis of the Self." In C.W. Morris (ed.), *Mind Self and Society*, pp. 144–52. Chicago: University of Chicago.

—— (1934b). "Play, the Game, and the Generalized Other." In C.W. Morris (ed.), *Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, pp. 152–64. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Mehan, H. (1978). "Structuring School Structure." *Harvard Educational Review*, 48(1), 32–64.

—— (1979). *Learning Lessons*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—— (1985). "The Structure of Classroom Discourse." In T. van Dijk (ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Volume 3, Discourse and Dialogue*, pp. 119–31. London: Academic Press.

Meltzoff, A.N. and Gopnik, A. (1993). "The role of imitation in understanding persons and developing theories of mind." In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg and D. Cohen (eds), *Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism*, pp. 335–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mondada, L. (2000). "Les effets théoriques des pratiques de transcription." *Linx*, 42, 131–50.

—— (2001). "Apports de l'Ethnomethodologie et de l'Analyse Conversationnelle à la Description de l'Acquisition dans l'Interaction." In M.M. Larruy (ed.), *Questions d'*épistémologie en didactique du français, pp. 111–16. Poitiers: Cahiers Forell & Université de Poitiers.

—— (2003). "Working with Video: How Surgeons Produce Video Records of their Actions." *Visual Studies*, 18(1), 58–73.

—— (2005). "L'analyse de corpus en linguistique interactionnelle: de l'étude de cas singuliers à l'étude de collections." In A. Condamines (ed.), *Sémantique et corpus*, pp. 97–108. Paris: Hermès Science Publications.

—— (2006). "Video Recording as the Reflexive Preservation and Configuration of Phenomenal Features for Analysis." In H. Knoblauch, B. Schnettler, J. Raab and H.-G. Soeffner (eds), *Video Analysis: Methodology and Methods*, pp. 51–67. Bern: Peter Lang.

—— (2007a). "Multimodal resources for turn-taking: Pointing and the emergence of possible next speakers." *Discourse Studies*, 9(2), 194–225.

—— (2007b). "Transcript variations and the indexicality of transcribing practices." *Discourse Studies*, 9(6), 809–21.

—— (2009a). "The Embodied and Negotiated Production of Assessments in Instructed Actions." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 42(4), 329–61.

—— (2009b). "The methodical organization of talking and eating: assessments in dinner conversations." *Food Quality and Preference*, 20(8), 558–71.

—— (2009c). "Videorecording and the reflexive constitution of the interactional order: uses of split screen in video practices." *Human Studies*, 32(1), 67–99.

—— (2008 [2011]). "L'analyse de collections de phénomènes multimodaux en linguistique interactionnelle: A propos de l'organisation systématique des ressources gestuelles en début du tour." In B. Bonu (ed.), *No spécial Comparer des pratiques dans l'analyse de l'interaction, Cahiers de praxématique*, 50, 23–70.

—— (2012). "The Conversation Analytic Approach to Data Collection." In J. Sidnell and T. Stivers (eds), *Handbook of Conversation Analysis*, pp. 32–56. Chichester, West Sussex: Blackwell-Wiley.

Montandon, C. (1997). *L'*éducation du point de vue des enfants. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan.

—— (2002). "Home and School Constraints in Children's Experience of Socialisation in Geneva." In R. Edwards (ed.), *Children, Home and School: Regulation, Autonomy or Connection*, pp. 106–20. London: Routledge Falmer.

Ochs, E. (1982). "Talking to children in Western Samoa." *Language and Society*, 11(1), 77–104.

—— (1983). "Cultural dimensions of language acquisition." In E. Ochs and B. Schieffelin (eds), *Acquiring Conversational Competences*, pp. 185–91). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

––– (1988). *Culture and Language Development: Language Acquisition and Language Socialization in a Samoan Village.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

––– (2002). "Becoming a speaker of culture." In C. Kramsch (ed.), *Language Acquisition and Language Socialization: Ecological Perspectives*, pp. 99–120. London: Continuum Press.

––– (2004). "Narrative Lessons." In A. Duranti (ed.), *Companion to Linguistic Anthropology*, pp. 269–89. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ochs, E. and Schieffelin, B.B. (eds). (1979). *Developmental Pragmatics.* New York: Academic Inc. Press.

––– (eds). (1983). *Acquiring Conversational Competence.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

––– (1984). "Language acquisition and socialization: three developmental stories and their implications." In R. Shweder and R. Levine (eds), *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion*, pp. 276–320. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

––– (1995). "The impact of language socialization on grammatical development." In P. Fletcher and B. MacWhinney (eds), *The Handbook of Child Language*, pp. 73–4. London: Blackwell.

Ochs, E. and Shohet, M. (2006). "The Cultural Structuring of Mealtime Socialization." In R.W. Larson, A.R. Wiley and K. Branscomb (eds), *Family Mealtime as a Context of Development and Socialization*, pp. 35–49. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Ochs, E., Solomon, O. and Sterponi, L. (2005). "Limitations and transformations of habitus in child-directed communication." *Discourse Studies*, 7(4–5), 547–83.

Ochs, E. and Taylor, C. (1992). "Family narrative as political activity." *Discourse & Society*, 3(3), 301–40.

Opie, I. and Opie, P. (1959). *The Lore and Language of School Children.* London: Oxford University Press.

––– (1969). *Children's Games in Street and Playground.* London: Oxford University Press.

Parsons, T. (1951). *The Social System.* New York: Free Press.

––– (1960). *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*. New York: The Free Press.

––– (1966). *Gesellschaften. Evolutionäre und komparative Perspektiven.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Parsons, T. and Bales, R. (1956). *Family Socialization and Interaction Process.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Pekarek Doehler, S. (2010a). *La parole-en-interaction: langage, cognition et ordre social* (cahier XIX). Bern: Académie Suisse des Sciences Humaines.

––– (2010b). "Conceptual Changes and Methodological Challenges: On Language and Learning from a Conversation Analytic Perspective on SLA." In P. Seedhouse, S. Walsh and C. Jenks (eds), *Conceptualising 'Learning' in Applied Linguistics*, pp. 105–26. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Peräkylä, A. and Ruusuvuori, J. (2006). "Facial Expression in an Assessment." In H. Knoblauch, B. Schnettler, J. Raab and H.-G. Soeffner (eds), *Video Analysis: Methodology and Methods*, pp. 127–42. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Perrenoud, P. (1988). *La fabrication de l'excellence scolaire*. Genève: Droz.

—— (1994). *Le métier d'*élève et le sens du travail scolaire. Paris: ESF éditions.

Petitto, L. (1993). "Modularity and constraints in early lexical acquisition: Evidence from children's early language and gesture." In P. Bloom (ed.), *Language Acquisition: Core Readings*, pp. 95–126. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Pomerantz, A. (1975). "Second Assessments: A Study of Some Features of Agreements/Disagreements." Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of California, Irvine.

—— (1978). "Compliment Responses." In J. Schenkein (ed.), *Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction*, pp. 79–111. New York, London: Academic Press Inc.

—— (1980). "Telling My Side: 'Limited Access' as a 'Fishing' Device." *Language and Social Interaction*, 50(3–4), 186–98.

—— (1984a). "Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: some features of preferred / dispreferred turn shapes." In M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds), *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*, pp. 57–101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— (1984b). "Pursuing a response." In M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds), *Structures of Social Interaction*, pp. 152–63. London, Paris: Cambridge University Press, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.

Pomerantz, A. and Fehr, B.J. (1997). "Conversation Analysis: An Approach to the Study of Social Action as Sense Making Practices." In T.A. Van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse as Social Interaction Vol. II*, pp. 64–91.

Pomerantz, A. and Heritage, J. (2012). "Preference." In J. Sidnell and T. Stivers (eds), *The Handbook of Conversation Analysis*. Chichester, West-Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Pontecorvo, C. (1993). "Forms of Discourse and Shared Thinking." *Cognition and Instruction*, 11(3 and 4), 189–96.

Pontecorvo, C., and Arcidiacono, F. (2007). *Famiglie all'italiana: parlare a tavola*. Milano: Collana di psicologia, Cortina.

Pontecorvo, C. and Fasulo, A. (1999). "Planning a Typical Italian Meal: A Family Reflection on Culture." *Culture & Psychology*, 5(3), 313–35.

Pontecorvo, C., Fasulo, A. and Sterponi, L. (2001). "Mutual Apprentice: The Making of Parenthood and Childhood in Family Dinner Conversation." *Human Development*, 44(6), 340–61.

Quéré, L. (1999). *La sociologie à l'*épreuve de l*'herméneutique*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Raymond, G. and Heritage, J. (2006). "The epistemics of social relations: Owning grandchildren." *Language in Society*, 35(5), 677–705.

Rayou, P. (1999). *La Grande Ecole*. Paris: Presse Universitaire de France.

Relieu, M., Zouinar, M. and La Valle, N. (2007). "At Home with Video Cameras." *Home Cultures*, 4(1), 1–26.

Rist, R.C. (1970). "Student Social Class and Teachers' Expectations: The Self-fulfilling Prophecy in Ghetto Education." *Harvard Educational Review*, 40(3), 411–51.

––– (1977). "On Understanding the Processes of Schooling: The Contributions of Labeling Theory." In J. Karabel and A.H. Halsey (eds), *Power and Ideology in Education*, pp. 292–305. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rochex, J.-Y. (1995). *Le sens de l'expérience scolaire.* Paris: PUF.

Rogoff, B. (1990). *Apprenticeship in Thinking.* New York: Oxford University Press.

––– (2003). *The Cultural Nature of Human Development.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Rogoff, B., Ellis, S. and Gardner, W. (1984). "Adjustment of Adult-Child Instruction According to Child's Age and Task." *Developmental Psychology*, 20(2), 193–9.

Ruusuvuori, J. and Peräkylä, A. (2009). "Facial and Verbal Expressions in Assessing Stories and Topics." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 42(4), 377–94.

Sacks, H. (1972). "On the Analyzability of Stories by Children." In J.J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds), *Directions in Sociolinguistics*, pp. 325–45. New York: Rinehart and Winston.

––– (1982). "Button Button Who's Got the Button." *Sociological Inquiry*, 50(3–4), 318–27.

––– (1984a). "Notes on methodology." In M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds), *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*, pp. 21–7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

––– (1984b). "On doing 'being ordinary'." In M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds), *Structures of Social Action*, pp. 413–29. London: Cambridge University Press.

––– (1985). "The Inference-Making Machine: Notes on Observability." In T.A. Van Dijk (ed.), *A Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Vol. III: Discourse and Dialogue*, pp. 13–22. London: Academic Press.

––– (1987). "On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in Sequences in Conversation." In G. Button and J. Lee (eds), *Talk and Social Organisation*, pp. 54–69. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

––– (1992). *Lectures on Conversation* (I + II). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Sacks, H. and Schegloff, E. (2002). "Home position." *Gesture*, 2(2), 133–46.

Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. and Jefferson, G. (1974). "A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn Taking for Conversation." *Language*, 50(4), 696–735.

Sahlström, F. (2002). "The interactional organization of hand raising in classroom Interaction." *Journal of Classroom Interaction*, 37(2), 41–57.

––– (2009). "Conversation analysis as a way of studying learning: an introduction to a special issue of SJER." *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research*, 53(2), 103–11.

Schegloff, E.A. (1968). "Sequencing in Conversational Openings." *American Anthropologist*, 70(6), 1075–95.

—— (1972). "Sequencing in Conversational Openings." In J.J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds), *Directions in Sociolinguistics. The Ethnography of Communication*, pp. 346–80. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

—— (1987). "Analyzing Single Episodes of Interaction: An Exercise in Conversation Analysis." *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 50(2), 101–14.

—— (2007). *Sequence Organization in Interaction: A Primer in Conversation Analysis.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— (2010). "Commentary on Stivers and Rossano: 'Mobilizing Response'." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 43(1), 38–48.

Schegloff, E.A. and Lerner, G. (2010). "Beginning to Respond: Well-Prefaced Responses to Wh-Questions." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 42(2), 91–115.

Schegloff, E.A. and Sacks, H. (1973). "Opening Up Closings." *Semiotica*, 8(4), 289–327.

—— (1974). "Opening Up Closings." In R. Turner (ed.), *Ethnomethodology*, pp. 233–64. Middlesex: Penguin Education.

Schegloff, E.A., Jefferson, G. and Sacks, H. (1977). "The Preference for Self-Correction in the Organization of Repair in Conversation." *Language*, 53(2), 361–82.

Schieffelin, B.B. (1990). *The Give and Take of Everyday Life. Language Socialization of Kaluli Children.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schieffelin, B.B. and Ochs, E. (1983). "Cultural perspective on the transition from pre-linguistic to linguistic communication." In R. Golinkoff (ed.), *The Transition From Pre-linguistic to linguistic communication.* Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

—— (1986). *Language Socialization across Cultures.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schütz, A. (1945). "On Multiple Realities." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 5(4), 533–76.

Sidnell, J. (2010a). "Questioning repeats in the talk of four-year-old children." In H. Gardner and M. Forrester (eds), *Analysing Interactions in Childhood Insights from Conversation Analysis*, pp. 103–27. Chichester, West-Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

—— (2010b). *Conversation Analysis.* Oxford, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

Simmel, G. (1890). "über sociale Differenzierung." In H.-J. Dahme (ed.) (1989), *Georg Simmel: Aufsätze 1887–1890*, pp. 109–295. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

—— (1894). "Das Problem der Sociologie." In H.-J. Dahme and P. Frisby (eds) (1992), *Georg Simmel: Aufsätze und Abhandlungen 1894–1900*, pp. 52–61. Frankfurt am Main: Surkamp.

—— (1909). "The Problem of Sociology." *The American Journal of Sociology*, 15(3), 289–320.

—— (1917). "Das Gebiet der Soziologie." In G. Simmel (ed.), *Grundfragen der Soziologie (individuum und Gesellschaft)*, pp. 5–32. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Sirota, R. (1988). *L'*école primare au quotidien. Paris: PUF.

—— (1993). "Le métier d'élève." *Revue Française de Pédagogie*, 104(3), 85–108.

—— (1998). "L'émergence d'une sociologie de l'enfance: évolution de l'objet, évolution du regard." *Education et Sociétés*, 2, 9–33.

—— (ed.). (2006). *Eléments pour une sociologie de l'enfance.* Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes.

Snow, C. (1972). "Mother's speech to children learning language." *Child Development*, 43(2), 549–65.

Snow, C. and Ferguson, C.A. (1977). *Talking to Children: Language Input and Acquisition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Speier, M. (1971). "The everyday world of the child." In J.D. Douglas (ed.), *Understanding Everyday Life: Toward a Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge*, pp. 188–217. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

—— (1973). *How to Observe Face-to-Face Communication: A Sociological Introduction*. Pacific Palisades: Goodyear

—— (1976). "The child as conversationalist: some culture contact features of conversational interactions between adults and children." In M. Hammersley and P. Woods (eds), *The Process of Schooling: A Sociological Reader*, pp. 98–103. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Stern, D.N. (1974). "Mother and infant at play: The dyadic interaction involving facial, vocal and gaze behaviors." In M. Lewis and C. Rosenblum (eds), *The Effect of the Infant on its Caregiver*, pp. 187–213. New York: Wiley.

Sterponi, L. (2009). "Accountability in family discourse: Socialization into norms and standards and negotiation of responsibility in Italian dinner conversations." *Childhood*, 16(4), 441–59.

Sterponi, L. and Pontecorvo, C. (1997). *Discourse in Family Dinner Talk: How Italian Parents Practice to Speak as Parents*. Paper presented at S.R.C.D. (Society for Research in Child Development) Biennial Conference, Washington, D.C., April, 3–7.

Stivers, T., Brown, P., Englert, C., Hayashi, M., Heinemann, T. and Yoon, K.-E. (2009). "Universality and cultural specificity in turn-taking in conversation." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science*, 106(26), 10587–92.

Stivers, T. and Rossano, F. (2010). "Mobilizing Response." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 43(1), 3–31.

Svennevig, J. (2008). "Trying the easiest solution first in other-initiation of repair." *Journal of Pragmatics*, 40(2), 333–48.

Szymanski, M.H. (1999). "Re-Engaging and Dis-Engaging Talk in Activity." *Language in Society*, 28(1), 1–23.

Terrail, J.-P. (1995). *La Dynamique des Générations.* Paris: L'Harmattan.

Tholander, M. (2002). "Cross-gender teasing as a socializing practice." *Discourse Processes*, 34(3), 311–38.

—— (ed.). (2005). *Children, Morality and Interaction.* Hauppauge: Nova Science.

Tomasello, M. (1995). "Joint attention as social cognition." In C. Moore and P. Dunham (eds), *Joint Attention: Its Origins and Role in Development*, pp. 103–30. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

—— (2003). *Constructing a language: A usage-based theory of language acquisition*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tomasello, M. and Carpenter, M. (2007). "Shared Intentionality." *Developmental Science*, 10(1), 121–5.

Tomasello, M. and Farrar, M.J. (1986). "Joint Attention and Early Language." *Child Development*, 57(6), 1454–63.

Tomasello, M. and Rakoczy, H. (2007). "What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality." *Intellectica*, 2–3(46–7), 25–48.

Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T. and Moll, H. (2005). "Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 28(5), 675–735.

Tomasello, M., Kruger, A.C. and Horn Ratner, H. (1999). "Cultural Learning." In P. Lloyd and C. Fernyhough (eds), *Lev Vygotsky: Critical Assessments (Vol IV)*. New York: Routledge.

Trevarthen, C. (1977). "Descriptive analyses of infant communication behaviour." In H.R. Schaffer (ed.), *Studies in Mother-Infant Interaction: The Loch Lomond Symposium*, pp. 227–70. London: Academic Press.

—— (1979). "Communication and cooperation in early infancy: a description of primary intersubjectivity." In M. Bullowa (ed.), *Before Speech. The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication*, pp. 321–47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— (1982). "The primary motives for cooperative understanding." In G. Butterworth and P. Light (eds), *Social Cognition: Studies of the Development of Understanding*, pp. 77–109. Brighton: Harvester Press.

—— (1985). "Facial expression of emotion in mother-infant interaction." *Human Neurobiology*, 4(1), 21–32.

Van Der Aa, J. and Blommaert, J. (2011). "Ethnographic monitoring: Hyme's unfinished business in educational research." *Urban Language & Literacies*, 69, 1–17.

Veneziano, E. (2000). "Interaction, conversation et acquisition du langage dans les trois premières années." In M. Kail and M. Fayol (eds), *L'acquisition du langage. Le langage en émergence. De la naissance à trois ans*, pp. 231–65. Paris: Presse Universitaire de France.

Vincent, S. (2001). *Le Jouet et ses usages sociaux*. Paris: La Dispute.

Vygotsky, L. (1962). *Thought and Language*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

—— (1978). *Mind and Society: The Development of Higher Mental Processes*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Watson, J.B. (1913). "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It." *Psychological Review*, 20(2), 158–77.

Watson, R. (1978). "Categorization, Authorization and Blame-Negotiation in Conversation." *Sociology*, 12(1), 105–13.

—— (1983). "Goffman, Talk and Interaction: Some Modulated Responses." *Theory, Culture & Society*, 2(1), 103–8.

—— (1992). "Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis and Education: An Overview." *International Review of Education*, 38(3), 257–74.

—— (1997). "Some general reflections on categorization and sequence in the analysis of conversation." In S. Hester and P. Eglin (eds), *Culture in Action: Studies in Membership Categorization Analysis*, pp. 49–76. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

—— (2008 [2011]). "Comparative sociology, Laic and Analytic: Some Critical Remarks on Comparison in Conversation Analysis." In B. Bonu (ed.), *No spécial Comparer des pratiques dans l'analyse de l'interaction, Cahiers de praxématique*, 50, 203–44.

Weinreich, U. (1953). *Languages in Contact: Findings and Problems*. The Hague: Mouton.

Wertsch, J.V. (1985). *Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wertsch, J.V. and Sohmer, R. (1995). "Vygotsky on learning and development." *Human Development*, 38(6), 332–7.

West, C. and Zimmerman, D. (1977). "Women's place in Everyday Talk: Reflections on Parent-Child Interaction." *Social Problems*, 24(1), 521–9.

Widmer, J. (2010). *Discours et Cognition Sociale.* Paris: Editions des Archives contemporaines.

Wiesing, L. (2003). "Nachwort: Merleau-Pontys Entdeckung der Wahrnehmung." In M. Merleau-Ponty (ed.), *Das Primat der Wahrnehmung*, pp. 85–125. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Wiggins, S. (2002). "Talking With Your Mouth Full: Gustatory Mmms and the Embodiment of Pleasure." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 35(3), 311–36.

—— (2004). "Talking about taste: using a discursive psychological approach to examine challenges to food evaluations." *Appetite*, 43(1), 29–38.

Wilkinson, S. and Kitzinger, C. (2006). "Surprise as an Interactional Achievement: Reaction Tokens in Conversation." *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 69(2), 150–82.

Williams, R. (2000). *Making Identity Matter.* Durham: Sociologypress.

Wittgenstein, L. (1984). *Tractactus Logico-Philosophicus* (Werkausgabe Bd. I 1921). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Wood, D., Bruner, J.S. and Ross, G. (1976). "The Role of Tutoring in Problem Solving." *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines*, 17(2), 89–100.

Wootton, A.J. (1981). "The management of grantings and rejections by parents in request sequences." *Semiotica*, 37(1/2), 59–89.

—— (1997). *Interaction and the Development of Mind.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— (2006a). "Children's practices and their connections with 'mind'." *Discourse Studies*, 8(1), 191–8.

—— (2006b). "Two Request Forms of Four Year Olds." In P. Drew and J. Heritage (eds), *Conversation Analysis, Volume III, Turn Design and Action Formation*, pp. 103–16. London: Sage.

—— (2007). "A Puzzle About Please: Repair, Increments, and Related Matters in the Speech of a Young Child." *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 40(2), 171–98.

—— (2010). "'Actually' and the sequential skills of a two-year-old." In H. Gardner and M. Forrester (eds), *Analysing Interactions in Childhood Insights from Conversation Analysis*, pp. 59–73. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Wrong, D.H. (1961). "The oversocialized conception of man in modern society." *American Sociological Review*, 26(2), 183–93.

Index

Note: figures and tables are denoted with italicized page numbers; footnote information is denoted with an n and note number following the page number.