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ROUTLEDGE ADVANCES IN SOCIOLOGY

Values, Economic Crisis and Democracy

Edited by
Malina Voicu,
Ingvill C. Mochmann
and Hermann Dülmer

Values, Economic Crisis and Democracy

For the past decade European countries have suffered a severe economic crisis, resulting in difficult consequences both for individuals and for governments. Unemployment and rising poverty have forced individuals to reconsider their own priorities and goals, while governments have had to reassess social policies on the national level, as well as their international economic and political agreements. The impact of the economic shortage has varied across countries and differed among individuals and governments, as a result of the contrasting magnitudes of crisis and the diverse reactions to contextual changes.

This book uses cross-national survey data to explore the impact of individual wealth and economic contexts on social values. In contrast to previous volumes on the subject which seek to explain how aggregate changes occur, this book focuses on micro-level effects and on their connection with macro-level changes. Analysing how attitudes and values can change as economic context is transformed, this book elaborates on several dimensions of value change:

- the measurement model and the way it changes under the impact of economic shortage;
- the connection between universal value orientations and attitudes towards different objects (e.g. the welfare state, immigrants and ethnic groups);
- the effects of economic factors and vulnerability on values and attitudinal orientations;
- how particular political and economic contexts produce changes in political orientations.

With a focus on the interrelationship of social values, attitudes and economic scarcity in the context of the last economic crisis, this book will appeal to scholars and students of sociology, political science, psychology and economics.

Malina Voicu has a PhD in Sociology and works at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. Her main research interests deal with social values and attitudes in the area of religion, political and family life. She is secretary of the Executive Committee and of the Theory Group of the European Values Study.

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Preface

Ingvill C. Mochmann

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The papers presented in this volume originated in the "Values, Crisis and Democracy" authors' conference, which took place at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences in Cologne, Germany, September 26–27, 2013. This was the third in a series of four such conferences, organized by the European Data Laboratory for Comparative Social Research (EUROLAB), Data Archive for the Social Sciences at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences in Cologne, in collaboration with other colleagues and academic partners between 2011 and 2015.

The aims of these authors' conferences, implemented at the EUROLAB in 2010, are (1) to produce advanced research in a range of pertinent societal topics, based on state-of-the art empirical evidence by (2) bringing together researchers and experts from all over the world working on the selected topic who (3) use a variety of empirical data which are (4) analyzed using a mixture of research methods. Contributors are encouraged to employ data from the huge national and comparative data collections provided by the GESIS Data Archive and are given the opportunity to use the facilities of the EUROLAB in the preparation of their papers. Contributions applying other data sources are also welcome.

The world has been experiencing a severe economic crisis since 2008, which has had large-scale repercussions in areas beyond the purely economic ones. A range of social groups have been unevenly affected by this crisis, and this holds for the European countries and the wider world as well. Rising unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, cuts in social services and welfare benefits, work migration, and the collapse of financial institutions, to cite a few examples, are consequences often addressed in relation to this economic crisis. But what has been insufficiently explored is how and to what extent it has impacted on the values held by the people of these countries and how that may affect democracies, both at the conceptual and institutional levels. Therefore, this highly relevant topic was chosen for the authors' conference from which the following discussions originated.

The open call for contributions that laid the foundation of this volume was followed by a double-blind review process. The papers selected by that process were presented at the "Values, Crisis and Democracy" authors' conference held in Cologne in September 2013. A second evaluation and review process took

place after the conference. The selection of papers was endorsed by an external review board of leading experts in the area of values research, who also had inspired the conference discussions with their comments following a stimulating keynote speech by Eldad Davidov. The members of the review board were (in alphabetical order): Amy C. Alexander (University of Göttingen), Jaak Billiet (KU Leuven), Eldad Davidov (University of Zürich), Jacques Haagenaars (Tilburg University), Dominique Joye (University of Lausanne), Wolfgang Jagodzinski (University of Cologne), Oddbjørn Knutsen (University of Oslo), Peter Schmidt (University of Gießen). We are extremely grateful for their invaluable contributions to this volume.

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Part I

Introduction

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1 Values and attitudes in times of economic scarcity

Malina Voicu and Hermann Dülmer

Values and attitudes are acquired during early socialization, but they are exposed to changes during adult life. Special transformative historical moments, such as economic crises, wars or revolutions, imprint upon individual values and attitudes. Great transformations in an individual's life, such as changes in the life cycle or migration, can also reshape values. Sometimes a combination of both contextual and individual factors leads to a deep restructuring of an individual's value system. European countries over the last decade have experienced a severe economic crisis which has had many consequences both for individuals and for governments. Unemployment and rising poverty have compelled individuals to reconsider their own priorities and goals, while governments have been forced to rethink social policies on the national level, as well as their international economic and political agreements. Some countries have been more deeply affected by the crisis than others, and the impact of economic shortage on individuals and governments has differed, not only because of the different magnitudes of the crisis, but also because individuals react differently to the contextual changes.

The most recent economic crisis began in 2008 and has since affected countries in Europe and North America to different extents. Some, like Germany, recovered rather quickly, while in others the effects of the crisis can be traced over a much longer period of time. To what extent has the crisis reshaped individual value orientations and the connection between values and attitudes? Do Europeans even share the same value orientations after having undergone a period of economic shortage and societal transformations? And what about attitudes towards different political objects? The literature on values and attitudes points out that values are more stable, while attitudes are rather volatile and easily changed under the impact of environmental changes. However, most of the scales intended to measure value orientations use attitudes as indicators for latent value orientations. So if attitudes have changed as a result of the economic crisis, what has happened to the relationship between values and attitudes, and what is the impact on the 'classical measurement models' of values? Moreover, does the magnitude of the crisis actually matter?

Although the impact of wealth and economic contexts on social values is a long-standing topic in the social sciences, previous works have approached the topic more at the aggregate level, elaborating general explanations (Weber,

Marx, Inglehart, Welzel, Wilensky). In contrast, the present volume tries to benefit from the particular circumstance produced by the last economic crisis and to make use of the cross-national survey data that provides relevant information concerning this topic. We do not attempt to explain how aggregate changes occur; instead we focus on micro level effects, interrogating more deeply the interplay between attitudes and values and the way both can change as a result of the transformation in economic context. In sum, this book elaborates on several dimensions of value change. The first dimension is the measurement model and the way it changes under the impact of economic shortage. The second aspect is related to the connection between universal value orientations (such as materialism/post-materialism as conceptualized by Inglehart, or basic human values as proposed by Schwartz) and attitudes towards different objects, such as national and EU government, the welfare state, or immigrants and ethnic groups. A third aspect concerns the effects of economic factors and economic vulnerability on values and attitudinal orientations. The last aspect treated in the book is how particular political and economic contexts produce changes in political orientations, focusing on transformations that have occurred in the countries most affected by the crisis.

This introductory chapter is structured in three sections. The first describes the economic crisis and how it evolved over time, while the second elaborates on the theoretical background of values and values change, paying special attention to the dynamic of values, attitudes, and the connection between the two under the impact of changes in economic circumstances. The third section lays out the plan of the book, with brief introductions to each part and chapter.

Economic crisis and its impact on European markets and societies

The crisis of 2008 was the biggest financial crisis since World War II. It was triggered by events in the American banking sector, where subprime mortgage lending had sharply increased during the years 2004 to 2006 (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. 70). When interest rates began to rise (the U.S. base rate increased steadily from 2.50 percent in the beginning of 2005 to 5.25 percent in August 2007; Fubra Limited, 2015), more and more people were unable to pay their mortgages, leading to the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble. The financial crisis in the housing market rapidly extended to bank investments. In order to prevent its bankruptcy, Bear Stearns, one of the largest U.S. investment banks, was acquired in March 2008 by JP Morgan Chase. That takeover, however, was possible only by means of special financing provided by the U.S. Federal Reserve System (Fed). Thus, the U.S. government bailed out the investment bank, sparing shareholders a total loss (Michel, 2013). At the same time – 2008 – Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank, faced unprecedented losses. This time, however, the British bank Barclays and the Bank of America were unable to acquire the investment bank in order to protect it against losses (Michel, 2013). Without special financial support from

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the U.S. Federal Reserve System, Lehman Brother went into bankruptcy on September 13, 2008.

As a result, the European banks that had invested heavily in the American mortgage market were also seriously affected by the financial crisis. The fear that more banks could go bankrupt made both investors and banks extremely cautious. Diminishing trust within the financial sector stopped banks lending to each other, which in turn triggered rises in market interest rates. In response European governments provided urgent support to the European banks to protect the banking system from a potential collapse. However, the costs of these bail-outs were very high. By the time Europe began slipping into a deep recession in 2009, some governments in the Eurozone had already accumulated massive debts in their efforts to save the local financial market (European Commission, 2015). Because the markets worried that some countries would be unable to afford to rescue struggling banks, they became less willing to lend them money, which in turn raised the costs of borrowing from the governments. This resulted in increased government debts: the banking crisis thus turned into a sovereign debt crisis (European Commission, 2015), affecting to different degrees all the countries of Europe. Figure 1.1a illustrates the development of the gross debt as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 2005 and 2013 in those countries frequently called 'PIIGS' (**P**ortugal, **I**taly, **I**reland, **G**reece, **S**pain) by the mass media, as well as that of Romania, a non-Eurozone country



Figure 1.1a Gross debt of government in 'PIIGS' and Romania, 2005–2013 (% of GDP).

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which suffered severely from the economic crisis. For the purposes of comparison Figure 1.1b illustrates Eurozone countries which were less affected by the crisis.

The differences between the two groups of countries in 2005 were not particularly significant. That proves that the gross public debt was only one risk factor among several others contributing to the Eurozone crisis. The Eurozone crisis started in 2009; when the center-left PASOK party in Greece won the national election in October 2009, the new government revealed that the previous Greek government had under-reported their budget deficit (Nelson *et al*., 2012, p. 4).[1] Subsequently the financial distress spread to Ireland and Portugal, while concerns escalated about Italy and Spain and more generally about the European banking system and the Eurozone (Nelson *et al*., 2012, p. 4). Greece was the first Eurozone country unable to borrow from the financial markets at reasonable interest rates, soon followed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus (European Commission, 2015). Greece had requested financial assistance in April 2010, and the Eurozone Member States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began providing financial support to Greece through an Economic Adjustment Program in May 2010. The Greek parliament in return accepted a series of policy measures, including further reductions in public sector wages and pensions (European Commission, 2010c, pp. 8–9, 15). In November 2010



Figure 1.1b Gross debt of government in EU countries less affected by the economic crisis, 2005–2013 (% of GDP).

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Ireland requested financial support (European Commission, 2011a, pp. 5, 17), followed by Portugal in April 2011 (European Commission, 2011b, pp. 4, 15), Cyprus and Spain in June 2012 (European Commission, 2015). Whereas Ireland and Spain were both affected when their housing bubbles burst (European Commission, 2011a, pp. 5–9), Portugal had large fiscal imbalances and higher private debts. Italy did not ask for international assistance since a larger part of the government's debts were locally owned (European Commission, 2010c, p. 11).

In addition to these Eurozone countries, the financial crisis also severely affected other EU countries. Latvia, Hungary, and Romania received financial assistance from the EU (through its Balance of Payment program), from the International Monetary Fund, and from the World Bank (European Commission, 2015). Hungary was the first one to ask for international financial support in October 2008. Faced with a rapidly deteriorating economic situation and concerns over its banking sector, Latvia did the same in November 2008. Romania was the third country to follow. The increasing risk aversion during the financial crisis made market players more and more concerned about Romania's large budget deficits. The consequence was a marked drop in capital inflows which in turn led to falling exchange rates from RON to Euro of more than 30 percent between August 2007 and January 2009. In spring 2009 the Romanian government applied to the EU, the IMF, and other international financial institutions for financial aid (European Commission, 2015).

While the economic crisis initially had a financial character, it also touched on human rights (Saiz, 2009) and consequently heightened social insecurity. Increasing unemployment and insecurity in working conditions affect the right to work and reduce incomes, while cuts in public spending hinder access to education and healthcare. The changes in the unemployment rate highlight some of the social consequences of the previously mentioned economic trends (see Figure 1.2). European Union (EU) countries, undergoing deep economic crises, reacted in different ways depending on their welfare regime, the ideological perspective of their governments, and the pressures they felt from their EU partners.

Faced with the effects of the economic breakdown, governments were confronted with 'difficult' options: they had to reduce public spending or increase taxation or do both (Immervoll and Llena-Nozal, 2011). Welfare regimes played an important role in this decision. Liberal regimes preferred to decrease public spending, while the social-democrat and the continental/corporatist ones chose to increase taxation. More seriously affected Mediterranean regimes combined decreasing public spending with increased taxation. A similar pattern was followed by some post-communist countries. The level of economic and existential insecurity varied from one country to another depending on the magnitude of the crisis and how each country reacted. Accordingly, the present volume attempts to capture the general impact of economic scarcity on values and attitudes and to understand how this impact varies depending on the country's characteristics. Beyond the cross-sectional analyses, the current research project employs three different cases studies intended to illustrate the differing impact of economic hardship on political values and attitudes in different political and economic contexts.

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

Figure 1.2 Trends in unemployment rate in 'PIIGS' countries and Romania, 2005–2013.

Values and attitudes

Values and attitudes are closely connected but not completely overlapping concepts. They differ with respect to generalizability, stability, and availability for direct measurement. "A value is a conception, explicit and implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influence the selection of available modes, means and ends of actions" (Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 395). Values help in selecting goals and determine the means to attain these goals while serving as latent guides in order to evaluate the social world (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004). Values operate as a guiding mechanism, motivate behavior (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; Bardi and Schwartz, 2003), and are hierarchically organized at the level of the individual.

Attitudes are "organizations of beliefs focused on a specific object or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner" (Rokeach, 1972, p. 159). Values are more abstract than attitudes (Rokeach, 1973) because they refer to the general selection of goals or to modes of action, outreaching a specific situation (Schwartz, 1992). While attitudes are more exposed to change, values are durable over time and they change at slower pace (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004).

Because they are connected to a specific action or object, attitudes can be directly measured. Values are latent concepts, difficult to capture by themselves.

Consequently some direct measurable proxies are needed. Values and attitudes are strongly linked, the connection being a bidirectional one (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Values influence the assessment of a specific situation or object and are re-shaped by attitudes. Therefore, attitudes are used as proxies in order to measure values. Moreover, attitudes can turn into behavioral predisposition and can influence action; consequently, behavior can serve as a proxy for measuring value orientations.

Social change: cohort replacement versus intra-cohort change

Social change is usually attributed to two different mechanisms: cohort replacement and intra-cohort change. These two mechanisms can be used to explain how aggregate change in values and attitudes occurs. The first mechanism relies on the assumption that values and beliefs are formed during childhood and youth and remain stable during adult life. Thus, early formative experiences leave an imprint on the values and attitudes of generations or cohorts (Mannheim, 1952; Ryder, 1965). Each cohort significantly differs from the others depending on the context experienced during the formative period. Social change results from cohort replacement, younger cohorts socialized in a different social and political context replacing the older ones. Inglehart (1991, 1997) found empirical support for cohort replacement in the case of post-materialist value orientation among the population of countries in Western Europe and North America. Similar results have been reported for political attitudes (Sears and Valentino, 1997).

The second mechanism is based on the assumption that both values and attitudes might change during adult life under the combined effect of switching from one individual life-cycle to another and of contextual effects (Voicu and Tufiș, 2012). Regarding the first path towards changing, studies show that aging makes people more religious (Argue *et al*., 1999; Greeley, 2003) and more conservative regarding gender roles (Misra and Panigrahi, 1996), while marriage produces an alignment in attitudes shared by partners. When partners have divergent attitudes, they may change their attitudes directly or they can change their view as consequence of behavioral change (Kalmijn, 2005). Additionally, parenthood and labor market experiences reshape family values and gender ideology (Vespa, 2009). Contextual effects such economic, political, or social transformations might occur at a definite moment in time and exert similar effects across all birth cohorts, changing values and attitudes in the same direction for the entire population (Crockett and Voas, 2006, p. 567). Large-scale and highly salient events such as the Great Depression, World War II, the Velvet Revolution, or even regular elections may cause changes in early orientations, because they involve exposure to new contexts and make different issues salient for individuals reshaping the orientations they acquired in early formative years (Dalton, 1994; Mason and Lu, 1988; Sears and Valentino, 1997).

Mechanisms that produce changes in values and attitudes during adult life are different. As mentioned previously, values are less open to change and are more

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stable over time. After they have been acquired in early socialization, they tend to stay the same over the life course (Fjellvang, 2011). However, changes in values can occur due to acclimation and compensation (Schwartz and Bardi, 1997). The acclimation mechanism is connected to contingencies that life circumstances afford at one moment in time, for example, people upgrading the importance of those values they have attained and downgrading the importance of those values they have been unable to attain (p. 387). Therefore, the position of values inside the individual value system might change due to external circumstances that transform individual priorities. The second mechanism, compensation, occurs mainly in connection with material well-being and security that are beyond the control of the individual (Schwartz and Bardi, 1997). In the case of deprivation, the strength of these needs increases and pushes toward the value goals to which they point (Bilsky and Schwartz, 1994). Consequently, in the case of economic shortage and social insecurity, individuals give priority to materialist values, such as the achievement of affluence and preservation of social order (Inglehart, 1990).

Social learning theory provides another framework for explaining changes of values and attitudes during adult life. According to Bandura (1977), human behavior should be understood within the framework of "the reciprocal interaction between cognitive, behavioral and environmental determinants" (Bandura, 1977, p. vii). Consequently, individual orientations change when the environment changes. Direct interaction with others exposes individuals to different values, norms, and attitudes and may lead to the adoption of these orientations via the process of imitation or the process of vicarious reinforcement (Akers and Jennings, 2009; Bandura, 1977). Social identification with spouses, work groups, friends, or even with virtual groups, such as mass media or social media, reshapes individual value orientation because people tend to observe and imitate their fellows (Akers and Jennings, 2009). According to the social learning theory, people do not necessarily need first-hand experiences of one specific situation; they can learn from others' experiences (Bandura, 1971). Therefore, values shared by those who were not directly exposed to higher vulnerability may nevertheless become more materialistically orientated as a result of the effects experienced by their fellows.

Several different models are used to explain how individuals change their attitudes and beliefs. These include cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), interest-based explanations, ideological learning (Brooks and Bolzendahl, 2004), and control models (Kroska and Elman, 2009). Cognitive dissonance occurs when external circumstances change, creating a gap between attitudes shared by individuals and the external world. If the individual cannot change the context, then an adaptation mechanism takes place to put the attitudes in line with the external world. The control models explanation builds on the cognitive dissonance theory and relies on the assumption that individuals seek to maintain meanings and that "they adjust their attitudes to match their behavior" (Kroska and Elman, 2009, p. 379). Thus, if the background and the behavior are in contradiction to the attitudes, the attitudes will change accordingly to preserve internal consistency.

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The ideological learning perspective assumes that changes in attitudes are linked to each other and consequently that changes in attitudes towards one object may produce changes in other attitudes (Brooks and Bolzendahl, 2004). Therefore, stronger support for gender equality occurs as a result of a larger process that increases individualism and civic liberalism (Brooks and Bolzendahl, 2004). Interest-based explanations rely on the idea that individuals maintain positive attitudes towards a specific object when they can benefit by it, and their attitude will change depending on the gratification that they can get (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004).

From previous studies one can conclude that although both attitudes and values are exposed to change during adult life, such change may occur at a different pace and under different circumstances. However, changes in one may produce changes in the other. Since values are more enduring and attitudes more volatile, attitudes towards an object occur more often without necessarily generating a change in the latent value orientation. For instance, in the case of political attitudes, a political system's negative actions can have negative consequences on attitudes towards that political system without eroding support for the general principles guiding it (Lipset, 1960). However, if the political system produced negative outputs for an extended period of time, then the negative attitude engendered may change the latent value orientations, ultimately eroding support for the general principles supporting it (Easton, 1965).

On the other hand, changes in values can reshape attitudes towards specific objects. As a result of acclimation or compensation, value priority may change at some point, and the motivational goals associated with these values will change as well. In such a context, values will influence the attitudes towards specific objects that are relevant for the attainment of the motivational goals (Davidov *et al*., 2008). In this way, the reorganization of the general value system has an impact on attitudes reshaping them.

Social values and economic development

The connection between culture and economy is already well documented in the social sciences. Although there is no consensus regarding the direction of causality between the two phenomena, scholars agree on the existence of this relationship. While Max Weber stated that culture and values shape economic development, Marx and his successors emphasized the opposite relationship. Weber shows that religious culture and the values promoted by it can boost economic development, pointing out the role of the Protestant ethic on the development of capitalism (1992). In contrast, Marx (1976) underlined the impact of technological development on culture, arguing that technological development shapes the economic system which in turn transforms culture and society. Inglehart's revised version of modernization theory makes no claim regarding the direction of causality. For Inglehart "economic development, cultural change and political change are linked in a coherent and even, to some extent, predictable pattern" (1997, p. 10).

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Various versions of modernization theory focus on what happens in cases of economic prosperity and how wealth can occur under certain circumstances. For Weber (1992), Protestant culture contains key elements allowing the development of capitalism and boosting economic growth. Inglehart (1990, 1997) points out that wealth and stability during early socialization incline people to share post-materialist values as opposed to materialist values. Prosperity during the early years of life makes individuals more concerned about self-expression and environmental protection; furthermore they are more tolerant because their basic needs are fulfilled and they can focus on post-materialist values.

On the other hand, economic shortage experienced in early life socializes individuals into more materialist values, because they are mainly concerned with the fulfillment of basic needs (Inglehart, 1990). Moreover, if economic scarcity occurs later in life, individual value orientation might turn more materialist as a result of existential insecurity. Consequently, one can assume that changes in the economic context will usually associate with changes in value orientation; this holds for the younger generation as well as for adults experiencing scarcity later in their life. Although too little time has passed since the last economic crisis for it to be investigated in terms of its effect on early socialization under economic shortage, research on value transformation can focus on what has happened over the last decade to values shared by adults experiencing economic scarcity and social vulnerability.

Although all European countries have been affected by the economic recession since 2008, the level of economic hardship, the timing, and the social and political consequences have not been the same everywhere. In some countries the recession lasted just for few months or a year, while in others, such as those in Southern Europe, the crisis deeply affected economic, political, and social life for a longer period of time. Thus, this context provides the opportunity to investigate how values and attitudes and the nexus between them change under the impact of economic hardship. Moreover, the varying degrees of economic scarcity from one country to another provides the opportunity to investigate whether differences in economic deprivation translate into comparable transformations in values and attitudes and the connection between them.

Contributions to this book

The last economic crisis provided a good basis in order to investigate the impact of economic hardship on values and attitudes. Values and attitudes are both exposed to changes during adult life, especially in times of economic vulnerability. However, values change more slowly than attitudes, and in times of severe economic hardship changes in attitudes may be highly significant. Therefore, the classical model employed to measure values via attitudes might be outdated or incompatible with the social reality. Accordingly, our approach takes into account three different dimensions in the investigation of such changes: the measurement model, the nexus between values and attitudes, and the particular contextual effects. As a consequence, the present volume is structured in three

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parts, the first one being dedicated to measurement issues. The two chapters of Part II assess the validity of the model used to measure basic human values and trust. Part III investigates the changing nexus between values and attitudes, targeting domains such as political life, attitudes towards the European Union, and attitudes towards immigrants. Part IV includes case studies focused on countries most affected by the last economic crisis, namely Greece, Portugal, and Romania. All these chapters approach values connected to political life, investigating how economic scarcity affects left–right ideological orientation in Greece, how values shared by politicians have been reshaped by the crisis in Portugal, and how economic conditions have influenced support for democracy in Romania.

Stability and change of measurement model

In Chapter 2, Rudnev, Magun, and Schmidt test the measurement invariance of the Basic Human Values Scale proposed by Schwartz using Latent Class Analysis. The chapter uses three successive waves of the European Social Survey to test the stability over time of the Latent Class Models. The results point out that the measurement model is configurally invariant in both cross-sectional and longitudinal design. However, in spite of the economic crisis, the empirical results do not indicate a change in the measurement model, which proved to be stable over time. The authors conclude that either the economic crisis was an insufficiently relevant event to bring about the reshaping of social values, or the effects of the crisis have yet to occur and will be observable only after more time has elapsed.

Chapter 3 by Coromina and Bartolomé Peral focuses on political trust, investigating both the changes over time of the measurement model and the covariates of political trust. The chapter makes use of two waves of the European Social Survey (2008 and 2010) in order to compare the effect of the crisis on political trust in six countries, three deeply affected by it (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) and three less affected (Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). The results of the Structural Equation Models show no changes of measurement model of political trust overtime, but point out a decrease in political trust in countries experiencing higher levels of economic hardship.

Values and attitudes in time of crisis: nexus and variation over time

Kulin and Seymer investigate the nexus between two basic value dimensions, namely self-transcendence and conservation, and political attitudes. Their Chapter 4 makes use of multi-group structural equation models and growth curve models run on five consecutive waves of the European Social Survey to capture changes in the link between basic human values and attitudes towards redistribution and towards immigrants, and thus to capture the ‘crisis effect’. The empirical data indicate that the crisis has had an impact on the nexus between basic value orientations and political attitudes, but different mechanisms are employed

to reshape the connection depending on the attitude's object. While the connection between values and attitudes towards redistribution changed immediately as a result of the crisis, the linkage seems to be more durable in the case of attitudes towards immigrants.

Chapter 5 by Ramos, Pereira, and Vala focuses on the connection between social values and attitudes towards immigrants. Using data from five rounds of the European Social Survey (2002 to 2010), their chapter investigates how the relationship between social values and attitudes towards immigrants changed as a result of economic hardship. They consider two different dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants: immigrants as an economic threat and immigrants as a cultural threat, investigating trends over time concerning these two dimensions. Using multilevel regression models, the authors show that economic threat changed over time depending on the cultural values shared by the majority of population, while cultural threat remained unchanged. Economic threat decreased in countries with a greater number of post-materialists, but stayed at the same levels in countries with a larger share of materialists in their population.

In Chapter 6 Harzenetter and Kurti approach the relationship between basic human values and attitudes towards the European Union in times of crisis. Using data from two waves of the European Social Survey (2006 and 2008), they show that although value orientation remains stable, its effect on political attitudes changes over time. Using empirical data, they conclude that economic crisis shifts the impact of security and universalist value orientation onto attitudes towards European Union. The relation between basic human values and attitudes towards European Union is moderated by the economic context and varies together with it. For instance, higher levels of unemployment reduce support for European Union among those who favor security values.

Chapter 7 by Kern, Marien, and Hooghe investigates the change over time in non-institutionalized political participation during times of economic hardship. Using European Social Survey data coming from four successive waves (2002 to 2010), they investigate the overlap between the heterogeneity in the social composition of groups of citizens affected by the crisis and the social composition of citizens who participate in the political process. The authors prove how economic context moderates the impact of individual socio-economic status on participation in protest activities and that this alters the traditional composition of the protest movements' standard audience.

In Chapter 8 Eichhorn, Hensing, and Hübner investigate the political legitimacy of national parliaments and of the European Union, namely the overlap between national political culture and institutional architecture. Using data from the 2008 European Values Study and a two-stage hierarchical model, they first establish whether individual-level factors influence evaluations of confidence in national parliaments and the European Union and then proceed to identify which national-level domains of political culture moderate these individual-level relationships. The empirical results point out that the differences in national political culture among the European Union member states are highly relevant for understanding how legitimacy evaluations are constructed differently across the European Union.

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Case studies: increased scarcity and value change

Katsanidou in Chapter 9 approaches the effect of economic crisis on ideological left–right political identification in one of the most affected countries, namely Greece. Using data from the Voting Advice Application 'Choose4Greece', she investigates how crisis reshapes the content of left–right political identification and imposes a new dimension of political identification. Due to particular factors such as high salience of economy, low clarity of blame allocation, and absence of party loyalties, left–right political identification is based on an additional dimension related more to cultural factors than to economic ones.

Freire, Tsatsanis, and Lima focus on the Portuguese case and test 'representation from above' theory in times of economic crisis. Using surveys carried out before and after the crisis on the general population and on Parliament members, their Chapter 10 investigates the match between the value orientations shared by the voters and those shared by the political elite. The empirical data highlight a disconnection between elite and voters in times of crisis, with the radical left being more affected than those on the right of the political spectrum. Moreover, the increase in polarization exists mainly at the elite level, while the voters are less affected.

In Chapter 11 Comșa and Tufiș focus on support for democracy during the economic crisis in Romania, still a fragile and unconsolidated democracy. Using panel data collected between 2009 and 2013, the authors test Easton's classical theory of support of democracy in the context of economic decline. The empirical data point out that in spite of a relatively short democratic past, the Romanian population prove to have a strong diffuse support for democracy that remained unaffected by the economic crisis. The economic shortage has produced a decline only in specific support and in the combination of elements of specific and diffuse support.

Note

1 According to the EDP (European Deficit Procedure of EUROSTAT) notification of April 2009 the estimated general government deficiency was 3.7 percent of GDP; in October it amounted 12.7 percent (European Commission, 2010c, p. 6).

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Part II

Stability and change of measurement model

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2 Basic human values

Stability of value typology in Europe

Maksim Rudnev, Vladimir Magun and Peter Schmidt

Introduction

The formation and testing of typologies has long been a neglected issue but is becoming a fast growing area of social science research (Hagenaars and Halman, 1989; Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 2002; Hancock and Samuelsen, 2008). This method has three advantages for the analysis of values:

- First, in contrast to variable-centered methods like factor analysis, it is a holistic approach. Typologies capture the whole system of values by classifying people into classes instead of looking at the scores of distinct items, scales or latent variables.
- Second, because people are classified into types on the basis of all the item scores taken together, it is a parsimonious method.
- Finally, the differentiation between types provides a natural criterion for studying within-country value heterogeneity.

A neglected topic in research has been the validity and reliability of classifications. Nearly all typologies until now are used in an ad hoc and descriptive way and are never used again (Finch and Bronk, 2011). For example, Lee *et al.* (2011) developed a typology based on a modified Schwartz instrument, but it is unknown whether this typology can be reproduced with other samples, with a second wave of a panel study, or by using other Schwartz instruments. The same problem is relevant in Klages and Gensicke's (2005) study. In other words, the validity and reliability of these classifications are questionable since they were not assessed.

Typologies lacking validity and reliability may lead to oversimplification (in the case of artificial classification) or data-driven conclusions (in the case of a natural one) that may be wrong due to inductive generalizations or random fluctuations in empirical data, respectively. Such typologies do not allow and do not intend to test explicit hypotheses in a confirmatory way, since their nature is predominantly exploratory. To the best of our knowledge, the development of typologies with proven validity and reliability, used more than once and by more than one author, is very rare in the social sciences. This is very unlike the

variable-centered approach in which repeated assessments of measurement properties are widespread. Examples are the Big Five personality instrument and the Schwartz value measures (Schwartz, 2007; Schwartz *et al*., 2012); these have been used and reproduced by hundreds of authors, and their validity and reliability are continually assessed and discussed.

Magun *et al*. (2016) developed a classification of Europeans based on their values assessed in the 4th round of the European Social Survey (ESS). The purpose of this chapter and its added value is to determine how robust this classification is or, in other terms, how invariant it is. We aim to extend the validity and the robustness of the specific classification to several time points with different samples of the ESS. It is a simultaneous comparison over three time points from 2008 to 2012. The objective is to test the robustness of the initial typology across different samples of the European population assessed at different time points.

In their study, Magun *et al*. classified European respondents using Schwartz's Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) data gathered within the 4th round of the ESS in 2008. The data from 28 countries were pooled, weighted by their population and design weights, and classified using latent class analysis (LCA). Five value classes were found, and the first value class was labeled Growth values. Its members emphasize the importance of Openness to Change as well as Self-Transcendence values. The members of the other four classes are somehow in opposition to the Growth class and are aligned to the Social Focus/Personal Focus dimension. After determining the value classes, the authors demonstrated that every country has a probability of almost every value class. The membership of the Growth value class was highly and positively correlated with the level of economic development of the country, and this correlation was even higher than the correlations of the single value variables with economic development. Membership in the other four classes was higher in less economically advanced countries, and its correlations with economic development were weak and negative. To assess the robustness of the new typological approach to studying values across time points, we test the invariance of the five value classes across three time points.

Due to the existence of an exploratory study conducted by Magun *et al*. for the 4th round of the ESS, it is possible to test explicit hypotheses about value typology for the 5th (2010) and 6th rounds (2012) of the ESS. Our main hypothesis is that the initial class solution, with all its properties, is robust across three time points. The first two hypotheses refer to the dimensionality and the reliability of the value class solution itself; they extrapolate the features found for the 4th round data to the 5th and 6th round data of the ESS.

H1: There are five value classes in Europe.
H2: The substantial differences between value classes are the same as have been found in the previous study, i.e., the Growth values class, the Strong and Weak Social Focus classes, and the Strong and Weak Person Focus classes.

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The next two hypotheses concern the reliability of the relations between the latent classes and external variables, namely, respondent country of residence and country level of economic development. We expect that these relations discovered in the 4th round of the ESS and indicating external validity of the class structure remain the same in the 5th and 6th rounds of the ESS.

H3: The relations between the country probability of the Growth values class and the level of economic development are stable across rounds and are strongly positive. The country probability of the other value classes are negatively and weakly related to country economic development.

The period between the 4th and two subsequent rounds of the ESS was a time of economic crisis and included some time interval shortly after the crisis (2008–2012). Although values are considered to be stable, it is possible that the crisis affected the distribution of country populations between classes. Extrapolating relations between the level of economic development and the size of the Growth values class, there is a chance that after the economic crisis took place, a probability of the Growth values class decreased. Still, this is very unlikely, especially in such a short-term perspective. Attitudes, not values, are prone to change in response to a changing situation, they are seen as less stable than values (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993); see, for example, the study of the effects of the economic crisis on attitudes toward immigration (Billiet *et al*., 2014). Thus, the next hypothesis states the stability of country values.

H4: The probability of the value classes in European countries are approximately the same in the 4th, 5th and 6th rounds.

The rest of the chapter is organized in three sections. In the next, we discuss value measures, procedures of classification and levels of invariance; in the third section we test the invariance of classes across the three ESS rounds; and in the fourth section we relate an outcome invariant classification to external variables, namely, country and its level of economic development, in order to prove the robustness of external validity of the typology.

Data and methodology

Data

The analyses are based on data from the 4th, 5th and 6th rounds of the European Social Survey (2008–2012) for 32 European countries (Jowell *et al*., 2007). The data for 22 countries were available for all three ESS rounds and included in the

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present analyses. In addition, data from Croatia, France, Greece and Ukraine were available for the 4th and 5th ESS rounds; data from Latvia, Romania, Turkey and Lithuania for the 4th round; data from Lithuania for the 5th round; and data from Iceland and Kosovo for the 6th round. For a full list of countries, see Table 2.A3 in the Appendix. In total, data were available for 155,467 respondents. The samples of individuals were the national representative ones. The sample of countries was not random, hence it has certain limitations in representing Europe in its entirety. The sample excludes 2,402 respondents (1.6 percent) who did not reply to value questions. We included in our analysis only three of the six available ESS rounds, mostly because of technical limitations: a model that uses a numerical integration in combination with a very large sample size results in a very high computational load. From the substantial point of view, we believe that the three most recent rounds were enough to test the stability of typology.

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Value measures

We employed Schwartz's approach to studying values, since it was used in the initial Magun *et al.* paper and because it is up-to-date theoretically, and an easily measurable concept. Following Schwartz, basic values are "desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity" (Schwartz, 1994, p. 21). Values differ by the type of goal that they express, so values can be differentiated by an underlying goal. The central idea of Schwartz's theory is continuity of value universe and stability of relationships between values in most cultures in the world. These ideas are best represented by a value circle separated into sectors, where each sector designates a value (see Figure 2.1). Adjacent values in this circle share the same motivational emphases and are, therefore, compatible, while values that are further away from one another are less related or even conflicting (Schwartz, 1992). Following the idea of continuity of values, any number of distinct values can be potentially measured depending on the instrument. Initially, Schwartz distinguished 11 basic values, but later this number changed several times. For the ESS he postulated ten values (Schwartz, 2007).

Values were measured by a modified version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-21) developed by Schwartz (Schwartz, 2005; Schwartz *et al*., 2001). Respondents were provided with 21 descriptions of people for whom different things were important, and they assessed each of the portraits using a 6-point scale ranging from "very much like me" (6 points) to "not like me at all" (1 point). The full wordings of the value portraits, as well as labels of the items used throughout the paper, are listed in Table 2.A1 of the Appendix. The PVQ-21 was designed to measure the ten basic values which are calculated on the basis of the 21 initial items (Schwartz, 2007). Given the dynamic relations between basic values, the same items can be used to calculate the four higher-order values and the higher-order value dimensions of Conservation – Openness and Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence. The scores for the two value



Figure 2.1 Schwartz value circle depicting the relations between ten values and several value groupings (Schwartz, 1992, 2006).

dimensions are calculated by subtracting the individual score for Conservation from the Openness score and the score for Self-Enhancement from the Self-Transcendence score. Hence, the two value dimensions measure a preference for Openness over Conservation and for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement.

Statistical procedure

To classify the respondents on the basis of their values, we used the LCA technique, first introduced by Lazarsfeld and Henry (1968). Compared to classical clustering methods such as *k*-means, LCA is a model-based technique which takes into account measurement error, uses a probability-based approach instead of ad hoc criteria to estimate cluster centers, and provides a formal statistical test of the number of latent classes. LCA allows the researcher to identify a set of

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discrete latent classes from observed indicators (McCutcheon, 1987; Muthén and Muthén, 2010). LCA has three kinds of parameters:

1 the fundamental one – the number of classes;
2 the response probabilities for each of the classes; and
3 the probabilities of classes themselves.

Response probabilities are the key parameters in LCA, which define the class by representing the chances for the respondents of a given class to choose one of the responses. Probability of the class is different from response probability and refers to the size of class.

In the following analysis, LCA is based on the 21 Schwartz value items, which were treated as ordinal variables. To adjust for an individual response style influencing a person to use a certain part of the rating scale (e.g., assigning only low, high, or medium ratings to all the questions), Schwartz suggested the so-called centering procedure (Schwartz *et al*., 1997). Following this procedure, each value score for each individual respondent is centered by subtracting the individual average for all the 21 value items from the raw score. However, it requires the assumption that a 6-point Likert-type scale has an interval level of measurement. Recently, instead of centering, Schwartz and co-authors used a method factor that loaded on all the value items (Schwartz *et al*., 2012). Adding a method factor (or random intercept, as referred to by Vermunt, 2010) to LCA allows for controlling an individual response style. Although the introduction of a method factor is more complex than centering, it does not require the assumption of the scales' continuity and it corrects for response style, keeping the initial distributions of respondent answers (Billiet and McClendon, 2000; Lubke and Muthén, 2004; Van Herk *et al*., 2004). We extended the classic LCA model by adding a method factor. All the 21 loadings of this factor as well as the factor mean were fixed at one. The variance of the method factor for all classes and rounds was set free. Every LCA model, including LCA models with covariates, described below has this method factor.

In our LCA procedure, the data were weighted with the population weights, since we were interested in determining the all-European latent class structure and not in simply classifying the respondents in the sample. The population weight reshapes the sample of respondents to make proportions of respondents from different countries equal to the proportions of populations of these countries. The results, which were obtained using design weights only or no weights at all, were very similar to those presented here, although conceptually it is more reasonable to use population weights, since it allows extrapolating results to most of the European populations.

The data were also weighted by the design weight. Design weights correct for differences in probabilities of respondent selection, "thereby making the sample more representative of a 'true' sample of individuals aged 15+ in each country" (Weighting European Social Survey Data, 2013).

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Levels of typology invariance and confirmatory latent class analysis

The general purpose of establishing a level of measurement invariance (or equivalence) is to estimate the degree to which "the instrument measures the same concept in the same way across various subgroups of respondents" (Davidov *et al*., 2014, p. 9). There are several levels of measurement invariance of typologies across different groups, e.g. across different ESS rounds. Based on the existing literature (Eid *et al*., 2003; Kankaras *et al*., 2011; Siegers, 2011), we outlined the following levels of invariance of typologies.

Full invariance (structurally homogeneous model) holds when a number of classes and all the thresholds (or response probabilities) of all classes are the same across all groups. This situation is hardly empirically tenable, although highly desirable, since it fully proves the robustness of the typology.

Full invariance of specific classes is held when only some of the classes have the same response probabilities across groups. Unlike multiple group confirmatory factor analysis, it is not necessary to keep all the classes the same across groups in order to be able to compare group shares of some of the classes. That is, if a researcher has a substantial interest in only one class, and if the response probabilities for the members of this class are equal across groups, this class can be claimed robust and invariant regardless of the number and response probabilities of the other classes.

Partial invariance is another way to deal with the data in case the full invariance was not confirmed. It relaxes the equality constraint of some response probabilities across groups. It is similar to partial factor invariance (either metric or scalar). In this case, a researcher may allow some response probabilities to be different across groups (Eid *et al*., 2003). Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998) suggested that, for the factor models, two items' loadings or two intercepts that are equal across groups are enough to keep the latent factor unbiased at the metric and scalar invariance level, respectively. However, in case of latent class analysis, it is not clear how many response probabilities should be held equal and how many may be allowed to vary across groups in order to keep the class membership unbiased. Further statistical experiments are needed to determine this.

Partial invariance of specific classes is an even lower level of invariance that is held when only some classes have some response probabilities that are equal across groups.[1]

Configural invariance (or *construct equivalence*, or the *heterogeneous model* as referred to by McCutcheon, 1987) means a similarity of a general configuration of class response probabilities across groups. Configural invariance implies satisfying two requirements: there should be the same number of latent classes in each group and similar patterns of class response probabilities in all groups. Configural invariance can be assessed in two steps: independently estimated models in each group for identifying the number of classes and with a single model that allows differences between groups, i.e., the multiple group LCA model or an LCA with a group as a predictor covariate without

restrictions. The literature does not discuss statistical criteria for the similarity of patterns; we suggest using a correlation of class profiles (i.e., the whole set of response probabilities of a class) between groups and a comparison of response probabilities between-classes ranks across groups.

Configural invariance of specific classes: sometimes it is not even necessary to obtain the same number of classes to proceed with invariance testing; such a situation is possible when it is important, from a substantial point of view, to test invariance of some classes only (Kankaras *et al*., 2011). In this case, a different number of classes are allowed in different groups, and it has already been shown that full invariance does not hold.

No invariance occurs when the classes obtained in different groups with the same items have notably different response probabilities, which leads to a different meaning of classes across groups.

A traditional procedure of invariance testing is described by McCutcheon (1987) who suggested simultaneous or confirmatory multiple group LCA. Confirmatory LCA (CLCA) is a relatively rarely used method that mimics the logic of a confirmatory factor analysis. Until now there have been few studies using CLCA beyond a couple of methodological applications (cf. Eid *et al*., 2003). To test the invariance, a multiple group LCA, which builds several LCA models in all the groups simultaneously, is computed. It allows for setting different kinds of constraints, mainly equality of response probabilities of the corresponding classes across groups (Kankaras, 2011; Siegers, 2011). However, we found the multiple group approach to be computationally too demanding, so, in this chapter, we turned to a group-as-covariate approach. Instead of treating the group variable as an indicator of a group in a multiple group LCA, we added a group variable as a predictor of response probabilities given the value class in a single-group LCA. The chosen model is more parsimonious since it estimates the unified item response probability for all groups together and the effect of group whereas the multiple group LCA estimates response probabilities for each group separately. A drawback of the group-as-covariate approach is that all the groups are compared to the reference one and are not compared to each other. This problem is easy to resolve if we have a small number of groups by changing the reference group and repeating the computations: in this case, the model fit stays exactly the same and the parameters reflecting necessary differences are estimated. However, these procedures could be tedious when there are many groups to consider.

The strategy of invariance analysis includes the comparison of the fit statistics for models with different sets of constraints. A model corresponding to a configural level of invariance does not constrain the effects of group and thus gives a general overview of the degree of level of invariance: non-significant effects of a group variable indicate invariance of an item's class response probabilities between reference group and the other groups, significant effects indicate non-invariant items. Testing of the higher levels of invariance involves constraining some or all the effects of group to be zero (this tests the hypothesis that the group has no effect on some or all of the response probabilities). A model

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selection problem is found in the fact that the fit statistics are not standardized, so judgments about which model is the most appropriate can only be made based on the relative values of the fit indices and the likelihood. Specifically, the comparison is done using the likelihood ratio test with a scale factor correction implemented for likelihoods and obtained with the maximum likelihood robust (MLR) estimator. However, some authors have pointed out that the likelihood ratio test has a low power in large samples because high sample size by itself can make the test significant (Kelloway, 1995). This is why the LRT test must be used cautiously with large sample sizes.

We started with the estimation of the number of classes using exploratory LCA models in three groups (i.e., ESS rounds) independently, then we compared the response probabilities by correlating class profiles and ranks of the items between classes. Then we proceeded with the confirmatory approach, assessing configural (or heterogeneous or unrestricted) invariance with a single group LCA model including the variable "ESS round" as a predictor. This was used as a baseline model and provided hints when choosing a set of constraints. Next, the fully invariant (homogeneous) model was estimated, and we had to relax some of the parameter constraints to get the model fit closer to the one found in the configural model.

The models were computed using an analysis of the mixture type in the Mplus software version 7.11 (Muthén and Muthén, 2010) and maximum likelihood robust estimation, which is robust to non-normality and non-independence when estimating standard errors and chi-square statistics. By default, Mplus uses full information maximum likelihood for treatment of missing values.

When assessing classification invariance within the multiple group LCA framework, both Kankaras *et al*. (2011) and Siegers (2011) were interested in finding a class solution that would be comparable across countries. Our case was different. First, we were not interested in cross-country comparability, since the typology we were looking for was pan-European. Second, we were interested in testing a certain class solution across time points. The grouping variable was the ESS round, which was the time when the data were gathered. This is why we emphasized the comparisons of the prototypical solution based on the data from ESS round 4 (Magun *et al*., 2016) with the latter rounds' solutions and looked for the extent to which this original solution held in the data of the 5th and 6th ESS rounds.

Results

Number of value classes across the three ESS rounds

In order to identify an optimal number of classes, ten similar models were computed differing only in a number of classes, i.e., from 1 to 10. This was repeated for each ESS round separately. The fit statistics are listed in Table 2.1. This part of the study was conducted in an exploratory way; however, its purpose was confirmatory, testing the hypothesis of whether there are the same number of

Table 2.1 Fit statistics for exploratory LCA models obtained separately from ESS rounds 4, 5 and 6 data

Number of classes	*Number of parameters*	*Log-likelihood*	*AIC*	*BIC*	*Entropy*	*Significance of likelihood ratio VLMR test (p values)*
ESS Round 4 (2008)						
1	106	–1,699,838	3,399,888	3,400,834	–	–
2	213	–1,634,999	3,270,424	3,272,325	0.81	0.00
3	320	–1,609,434	3,219,508	3,222,364	0.81	0.00
4	427	–1,589,266	3,179,386	3,183,197	0.81	0.00
5	534	–1,580,538	3,162,145	3,165,213	0.81	0.00
6	641	–1,573,548	3,148,377	3,154,098	0.80	0.56
7	748	–1,567,665	3,136,826	3,143,501	0.80	0.58
8	855	–1,563,055	3,127,820	3,135,451	0.79	0.37
9–10	Models did not converge					
ESS Round 5 (2010)						
1	106	–1,690,709	3,381,631	3,382,577	–	–
2	213	–1,630,935	3,262,296	3,264,197	0.80	0.00
3	320	–1,605,615	3,211,870	3,214,726	0.80	0.00
4	427	–1,588,096	3,177,046	3,180,857	0.80	0.00
5	534	–1,580,586	3,162,240	3,167,005	0.80	0.00
6	641	–1,573,726	3,148,734	3,154,455	0.79	0.74
7	748	–1,475,234	2,951,965	2,956,208	0.79	0.10
8–10	Models did not converge					
ESS Round 6 (2012)						
1	106	–1,391,768	2,783,747	2,784,673	–	–
2	213	–1,345,113	2,690,652	2,692,513	0.78	0.00
3	320	–1,326,422	2,653,485	2,656,280	0.79	0.00
4	427	–1,310,896	2,622,646	2,626,376	0.79	0.00
5	534	–1,303,815	2,608,697	2,613,362	0.79	0.01
6	641	–1,298,253	2,597,787	2,603,387	0.79	0.41
7	748	–1,293,584	2,588,665	2,595,199	0.78	0.49
8	855	–1,290,278	2,582,265	2,589,734	0.79	0.76
9–10	Models did not converge					

Notes
Each row represents an independent model.
AIC: Akaike information criterion; BIC: Sample adjusted Bayesian information criterion; Entropy: a measure of certainty of classification.

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classes in each of the three ESS rounds data. (Alternative hypotheses include an indeterminate number of solutions with the number of classes other than 5, so it was not possible to perform this test in a fully confirmatory way).

The usual way of identifying the number of classes is by choosing a model with the lowest Bayesian information criterion (BIC) or Akaike information criterion (AIC), where the smaller values of these indices point to the better fit of the model. In the present analysis, each step which adds one more class to the model leads to smaller BIC and AIC. At the same time, the reduction in the BIC

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and the AIC becomes increasingly smaller with every step, which makes it hard to determine whether the decrease of BIC and AIC values is substantially important or not. For these reasons, we applied the Vuong–Lo–Mendell–Rubin (VLMR) likelihood ratio test, a measure that provides a formal testing of the difference in model fit (Lo *et al*., 2001). The VLMR test identifies whether the fit of a model with k classes is significantly higher than the fit of a model with $k-1$ classes. Significant values of the VLMR test show that the fit of k classes model is higher than the fit of $k-1$ classes model, thus, the k classes model is the one to choose. If the fit of k classes model is not significantly higher than the one for $k-1$ classes model, it is not necessary to add an extra class and, following the parsimony rule, we can conclude that $k-1$ is the optimal number of classes for a given pair of LCA models.

The significance of the VLMR test presented in Table 2.1 demonstrates a very similar pattern in each of the three ESS rounds: it is significant until the number of classes is 6. When the number of classes is 6, the VLMR becomes insignificant at the 0.05 level, indicating that the 6-class solution does not have a better fit than the five-class solution. Fewer than 5 classes is not a choice either, since the models with 4 classes or less have significantly poorer model fit. Therefore, the 5-class solution is optimal for all three ESS rounds. The entropy measure demonstrates a degree of certainty of classification, and this value becomes lower in solutions with more than 5 classes, indicating the appropriateness of the 5-class solution as well.

Taken altogether, we can conclude that the 5-class solution is the best solution for each of the three ESS rounds. This finding was confirmed with tests that are independent and exploratory in nature.

Invariance of content of value classes across the three ESS rounds

Configural (heterogeneous) models

As we found the same number of classes present in all three ESS rounds, we now turn to examining the similarity of their content. First, we assess the response probabilities from three independent exploratory models and then repeat the analysis using a single confirmatory model that uses the ESS round as a covariate.

Class profiles, i.e., the whole set of response probabilities, were compared for the similar classes across the three ESS rounds. The correlations are very high, ranging from 0.976 for the Strong Personal Focus class in rounds 5 and 6 to 0.997 for the Strong Social Focus class in rounds 4 and 5. Hence, the value profiles of the classes are very alike for the three ESS rounds. Figure 2.2 demonstrates cross-round similarity between the classes as described by average scores on the two higher-order value dimensions. The averages for all the classes are rather similar although there are fluctuations between rounds. The Weak Personal Focus class is the most stable, the Strong Personal Focus and Growth classes show a little fluctuation, and the two Social Focus classes demonstrate larger fluctuations between rounds.

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

Figure 2.2 Value classes in the space of the Schwartz higher-order value dimensions.

Note
Location is determined by a mean score on both dimensions; size of bubbles corresponds to proportion of class size in population.

For reasons of simplicity, we will not describe the differences between the specific response probabilities in detail here. Specifically, the six response categories of 21 items for five classes compared between three rounds would result in about 2,000 comparisons. Instead of this, we considered two responses to each item only, namely, the responses "very much like me" and "like me," summing up the probabilities of these responses, and compared them between rounds. In addition, a difference in the rank of class by the item importance was computed. It reflects the logic of interpretation of the classes. Comparisons of response probabilities for the corresponding classes between rounds as well as the difference in ranks are listed in Table 2.A2 of the Appendix. Although there are some significant differences in absolute values of response probabilities between rounds, there are few differences in class ranks exceeding 1 for the corresponding classes between ESS rounds 4 and 6. There are no differences at

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all in class ranks between rounds 4 and 5. So, the between-round differences indicate only minor changes in the value profiles of each class and do not affect the general interpretation of each class in its relations to the other classes.

In general, we can see that the number of classes is the same, value profiles of the classes are very alike, and the ranks of class response probabilities are very similar across ESS rounds. These facts are enough for the conclusion that at least configural invariance of value classes is supported. However, there is another, more parsimonious way to test the configural invariance which is necessary for testing the higher levels of invariance.

This is a single group LCA model (model M1) including ESS round variable as a covariate, using round 4 as a reference group for covariate and dummies for rounds 5 and 6. Since it is a configural model, none of the round effects are constrained. To estimate the difference between the 5th and 6th ESS rounds, the model was recalculated with the 5th round as a reference group. The model M1 generally reproduces the three 5-class models described above. The fit statistics are listed in Table 2.2 (the fit statistics are of minor interest at this point since none of them are standardized). The parameter estimates are presented in Table 2.3. The effects of the ESS round repeat, in many respects, the differences found in the three independent models (see Table 2.A2 of the Appendix), demonstrating the same difference of response probabilities across rounds in a more efficient way. The magnitude of the effects indirectly refers to differences between rounds in response probabilities for the corresponding classes: the value of 0.5 corresponds approximately to difference of response probabilities between rounds, which is not greater than 0.12 (it corresponds to a lower difference when it is applied to the comparison of very low and very high response probabilities, e.g., 0.5 effect converts to a difference of 0.02 for probabilities about 0.05). In Table 2.3, a negative effect in the “ESS-5 vs. ESS-4” column implies that the distribution of the class response probabilities for the given value item decreased in importance in ESS-5 as compared to ESS-4. A positive effect means that the response probabilities of the current value item increased in importance. The figures in other columns in Table 2.3 can be interpreted analogously.

Almost a quarter of regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the $p<0.001$ level,[2] and most of them are indicative of the cross-round non-invariance of the Growth values class (8 percent of all coefficients), the Weak Social Focus, and the Weak Personal Focus classes (7 and 5 percent, respectively). The least invariant items are “follow rules”, “modesty” and “success.” There are no differences between rounds in terms of the degree of invariance since all the rounds have the same number of invariant and non-invariant items.

The magnitude of effects is relatively low – out of 315 there are only five effects that are greater than 0.5 in absolute value and seven effects in the range of 0.4–0.5. All the other effects, i.e., 96 percent, are less than 0.4, which at a maximum point corresponds to 0.10 difference in response probabilities. For example, the significant coefficient of –0.55, which demonstrates differences between the 4th and 5th round in response probabilities for the item “own

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Table 2.2 Fit statistics for LCA invariance models with ESS round as predictor

Model	*Npar*	*AIC*	*BIC*	*–2LL*	*LL ratio test significance*
M1. Configural invariance model Class response probabilities can differ (effects of ESS round number on response probabilities are estimated freely)	752	8,753,581	8,758,665	8,752,077	[baseline]
M2. Full invariance model Response probabilities for all classes are constrained to be equal across three rounds (effects of ESS round variable on response probabilities are fixed equal to zero)	542	8,782,091	8,763,596	8,757124	0.000
M3. Partial invariance model Some response probabilities are constrained to be equal across ESS rounds (those that are not significantly different from zero in Table 2.3)	593	8,755,408	8,759,417	8,754,222	0.000

Notes
AIC: Akaike information criterion; BIC: Sample adjusted Bayesian information criterion; Entropy: a measure of uncertainty of classification.

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Table 2.3 Effects of ESS round on class response probabilities for five value classes (model M1)

Value class	*Growth*			*Strong social focus*			*Weak social focus*			*Weak personal focus*			*Strong personal focus*		
Item/ESS round	*ESS-5 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-5*	*ESS-5 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-5*	*ESS-5 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-5*	*ESS-5 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-5*	*ESS-5 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-4*	*ESS-6 vs. ESS-5*
Openness to change															
Creative	–0.04	–0.27*	–0.23	0.17	0.09	–0.08	–0.10	–0.30*	–0.20*	0.21	0.02	–0.19	0.03	0.09	0.06
Own decisions	–0.04	–0.55*	–0.51*	0.12	–0.23	–0.35*	–0.13	–0.46*	–0.33*	0.27*	–0.09	–0.37*	–0.10	–0.06	0.04
New things	–0.03	–0.36*	–0.34*	0.06	0.20	0.15	–0.14	–0.26*	–0.12	0.17	0.02	–0.15	–0.004	0.09	0.10
Adventures	–0.04	–0.43*	–0.39*	0.22	0.14	–0.08	–0.27*	–0.44*	–0.17	0.17	0.05	–0.12	0.01	0.01	–0.001
Good time	–0.06	0.001	0.06	0.06	0.24	0.18	–0.14	–0.22	–0.09	0.26*	0.05	–0.22	0.02	0.01	–0.01
Fun	–0.05	–0.30*	–0.24	–0.04	–0.05	–0.02	–0.23*	–0.36*	–0.13	0.04	–0.17	–0.21	0.09	0.06	–0.03
Conservation															
Secure surroundings	–0.16	–0.25	–0.10	0.11	–0.06	–0.18	–0.08	–0.07	0.01	0.15	–0.06	–0.21	–0.22	–0.20	0.03
Security by government	–0.25*	–0.57*	–0.32*	0.13	–0.01	–0.14	–0.18	–0.05	0.13	0.10	–0.01	–0.11	–0.30*	–0.17	0.14
Rules	–0.10	0.01	0.11	0.42*	0.10	–0.32*	0.28*	0.20	–0.08	0.46*	0.06	–0.40*	0.24	–0.01	–0.24
Behave properly	–0.14	0.04	0.18	0.19	–0.01	–0.20	0.01	–0.24	–0.24*	0.28*	0.01	–0.27	–0.01	–0.30	–0.29
Tradition	–0.01	–0.13	–0.12	0.08	–0.03	–0.10	0.08	0.15	0.07	0.21	0.03	–0.19	0.06	–0.19	–0.25
Modesty	–0.26*	–0.23	0.03	0.04	–0.19	–0.23	0.10	–0.39*	–0.49*	0.26*	–0.07	–0.33*	0.01	–0.35*	–0.36*
Self-transcendence															
Help people around	–0.16	–0.50*	–0.35*	–0.06	–0.24	–0.17	–0.08	–0.36*	–0.28*	0.20	–0.04	–0.24	–0.18	–0.35*	–0.17
Friends	–0.13	–0.33*	–0.20	–0.19	–0.15	0.03	–0.22*	–0.39*	–0.17	0.08	–0.13	–0.20	–0.26	–0.42*	–0.16
Understanding	0.02	–0.33*	–0.35*	0.10	0.04	–0.06	0.03	–0.21	–0.24*	0.37*	0.06	–0.31*	0.11	–0.05	–0.17
Nature	0.001	–0.32*	–0.33*	0.09	–0.21	–0.30*	–0.09	–0.26*	–0.17	0.21	0.07	–0.14	–0.04	–0.10	–0.06
Equality	–0.35*	–0.39*	–0.04	–0.07	0.05	0.13	–0.11	–0.28*	–0.16	0.12	–0.19	–0.31*	–0.31*	–0.25	0.06
Self-enhancement															
Abilities	0.16	–0.23	–0.39*	0.18	0.12	–0.06	–0.03	–0.22*	–0.19	0.30*	–0.02	–0.31*	–0.13	–0.08	0.04
Success	0.22	–0.39*	–0.61*	0.26*	0.05	–0.21	–0.02	–0.23*	–0.21	0.35*	0.01	–0.34*	–0.08	–0.11	–0.04
Wealth	0.05	–0.07	–0.12	0.26*	0.40*	0.14	–0.17	0.06	0.23	0.30*	0.04	–0.27	0.03	0.18	0.16
Respect	0.05	–0.15	–0.19	0.28*	0.21	–0.07	–0.04	0.01	0.04	0.26	–0.03	–0.29*	–0.004	–0.28	–0.28

Notes
Group noted after “vs.” is a reference group.
* Effect is significant at $p<0.001$ level.

decisions" given membership in the Growth values class (see Table 2.2), translates into a 0.09 difference in terms of probabilities to respond with "very much like me" or "like me" (see Table 2.A2 of the Appendix).

Taken altogether we can conclude that configural invariance is fully supported since the cross-round correlations of the class profiles are very high, and the between-class ranks based on response probabilities are very similar in the different ESS rounds as well. In addition to these *relative* measures of similarity in response probabilities, the group-as-covariate approach provided us with the coefficients demonstrating the *absolute* differences between class response probabilities across rounds. These coefficients also indicate the high similarity of profiles. Since the results reveal the high level of invariance between ESS rounds and despite the fact that some of the round effects are significant (they may not have a significant impact on the overall model fit), it is reasonable to test the fully invariant model.

Full invariance

This is the same as the model just described with constraints imposed on the effects of the ESS round on class response probabilities. These effects are set to zero, i.e. the response probabilities for corresponding classes are kept the same across rounds. The full invariance model (M2 in Table 2.2) is the most restrictive one and constrains all the class probabilities across ESS rounds. As expected, the fit statistics for the constrained model are much worse than for the unconstrained models, and the likelihood ratio test (LRT) is significant indicating that the unconstrained model significantly better describes the data than the fully constrained one. Since the configural model has definitely demonstrated a similarity of value class structure across rounds, it is now reasonable to turn to the model with fewer equality constraints across rounds and test it against the unrestricted one.

Partial invariance

The partial invariance model is an intermediate one between the configural and fully invariant model. We fixed the effects of ESS round to zero for the most invariant items detected in the configural model and kept free the effects for the least invariant ones, i.e., for those items which were significantly different from zero in the configural model (see Table 2.3). The LRT between the partial invariance and the configural invariance model is significant. It formally rejects the hypothesis about the partial invariance of value classes between ESS rounds. However, as we noted above, the LRT is sensitive to a large sample size, making any change in the model significant. In the present study, the sample size is huge (well over 150,000), therefore, the results of the LRT could be biased and the other model fit statistics would need to be examined. BIC and AIC increased only slightly: BIC increased by 0.01 percent as compared to the configural model (it was a 0.06 percent increase for the full invariance model); AIC increased by

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0.02 percent (it was a 0.33 percent increase for the full invariance model). The results for both BIC and AIC demonstrate that the differences in model fit between the configural and partially invariant models are very small.

Based on the comparison of the fit statistics of the three models considered here (M1, M2 and M3), we can stop at this point and select the partial invariance model as the final one. As these analyses have demonstrated, the general meaning of five value classes expressed in class response probabilities is very similar between the three ESS rounds. This is evidence of a stability of value classes across samples, which implies that the typology developed in our earlier work is feasible. Although the measurement of classes is not fully invariant across rounds and the degree to which shares of classes can be directly compared across rounds is open to discussion, the meaning of the classes is stable.

The invariant value class solution

In the following two sections we describe in more detail the LCA model M3 that is partially invariant across ESS rounds and that was accepted as the most appropriate. The significant effects of the ESS round provide an indication of the cross-round *differences* allowed in that model between similar classes (Table 2.3). Now we describe the value profiles of these classes averaged across rounds.

The resulting classes are described in the LCA output in terms of thresholds, which are logged ratios of the respondent's probability to give a certain answer compared to the probability of choosing the last option in the set of responses. Thresholds were converted into probabilities for a respondent to provide a certain answer given this respondent's class membership.

The sums of probabilities of the respondents' answers "very much like me" and "like me" for each of the 21 value items conditioned by the class membership are listed in Figure 2.3. For instance, given that the respondent is a member of class 1 (Growth), there is an 0.85 probability that this respondent would claim his or her similarity to a person who believes that people should be treated equally and should have equal opportunities.

Since there are too many differences between classes in terms of items, and these differences are very consistent within broader values, we demonstrate differences between classes in terms of higher-order values. For example, class 1, as compared to the other value classes, has the lowest probabilities for five of the six value items measuring Conservation. One exception (modesty item), like the other exceptions, does not change the general interpretation. Overall, exceptions are found for about 6 percent of comparisons.

The members of class 1 (15–16 percent[3] of the population, as estimated in the three ESS rounds) are characterized by two minima; they display the weakest commitment to both Conservation and Self-Enhancement values. They also indicate relatively strong commitment (i.e. the second highest probabilities) to values which belong to the higher-order values of Openness and Self-Transcendence. In Schwartz's terms, the members of this class prefer Growth values over Self-Protection. In short, this class may be labeled "Growth."

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

Figure 2.3 Estimated probabilities of respondents' answers "very much like me" and "like me" conditioned by class membership (LCA model M3 partially invariant across ESS rounds; the class value profiles are averaged across three ESS rounds).

The members of class 2 (17–19 percent of the population, as estimated in the three ESS rounds) are characterized by two maxima; they indicate the strongest commitment to both Conservation and Self-Transcendence values and moderate commitment to the values of both Openness and Self-Enhancement. Commitment to Conservation and Self-Transcendence values emphasize the strong social focus of the people who share them, and these values are clearly preferred by these class members over the personally focused Openness and Self-Enhancement values. The concise label for this class would be "Strong Social Focus."

Class 3 (the largest one, consisting of 26–29 percent of the population) is similar to class 2 in its value profile although with a slightly lower importance of all values for its members. Its members indicate the weakest commitment to Openness and relatively strong commitment (i.e., the second highest probabilities) to Conservation values. Moreover, they have contrasting levels of commitment to Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement values. Their commitment to

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Self-Transcendence values is relatively strong (i.e., the second to highest probabilities), and their commitment to Self-Enhancement is relatively weak (i.e., the second to lowest probabilities). As this class is quite similar to the Strong Social Focus class while differing only with a degree of preference for socially focused values, we designate it the "Weak Social Focus" class.

The members of class 4 (22–24 percent of the population) are characterized by their lower (i.e., second or third lowest probabilities) commitment to Openness along with their lower (i.e., second to the lowest scores) commitment to Conservation values. They also indicate the weakest commitment to Self-Transcendence and a relatively strong (i.e., second highest probabilities) commitment to Self-Enhancement values. This class is labeled "Weak Personal Focus."

The members of class 5 (15–18 percent of the population) are characterized by two maxima; they indicate the strongest commitment to both Openness and Self-Enhancement values, and they are moderately committed to Conservation and display only relatively low commitment (i.e., second to lowest level) to Self-Transcendence values. In contrast to the strong socially focused value class, this class can be labeled "Strong Personal Focus."

Differences in the class sizes between rounds reported above were calculated using the effects of the ESS round on class and are not larger than 3 percentage points (p.p.). These differences are mostly due to differences in the samples of countries, which varied between ESS rounds. The other reason for these differences is non-invariance of some of the items.

The specific class response probabilities in the partial invariance model (M3) are very similar to the ones that have been found and described using the data from the 4th ESS round only (Magun *et al.*, 2016). The findings from the present analysis are similar enough to the ones found in the aforementioned study to allow us to keep exactly the same interpretations of the classes. Moreover, the main hypothesis of the current study is confirmed: the value typology of Europeans is robust and stable across ESS rounds. Taking together the support of partial invariance and the rejection of full invariance, it may be further hypothesized that the lack of full invariance originates from the minor problems of value measurement and not from the instability of the value typology itself, as a construct.

Invariance of country effects on value classes across ESS rounds

To test the hypotheses H3 and H4 concerning external variables, namely, country and country's economic development and the cross-round stability of their relations with value class probability, we focus on the differences of country effects on respondent class membership between rounds, using both the ESS round and country dummies as well as their interactions as predictors of the LCA class membership.

We employed a three-step approach initially proposed by Vermunt (2010) and described in Asparouhov and Muthén (2013). This technique allowed us to

account for the uncertainty of class membership and to avoid disturbing the classification procedure by adding covariates into an LCA model.

1 The first step is described above and involves the partially invariant LCA model for three ESS rounds.
2 In the second step, the estimated class membership is assigned with uncertainty rates. These are based on the average probability of class members to be a member of this class and the sizes of the classes (for details, see Asparouhov and Muthén, 2013).
3 In the third step, the covariate (the interaction between country of residence and ESS round, referring to the changeability of country effects between rounds) was included in the model as a predictor, so that the LCA model is fixed, uncertainty of class membership is accounted for, and the predictors of interest are added to the model. In this step, a multinomial logistic regression is run. To achieve convergence of the regression model, some of its parameters were fixed to –15, because –15 on the logarithmic scale translates into a value which is very close to zero.

The regression coefficients of the resulting model are the interactions between the ESS round and country, reflecting the differences of country class membership probabilities between rounds.[4] These regression coefficients are hard to interpret, since each of them have three reference groups: ESS round 4, one of the countries and one of the classes. For the interpretation, country and round coefficients were converted to probabilities of class membership given residence in a certain country and round of ESS. These calculated probabilities for each of the three ESS rounds are listed in Table 2.A3 of the Appendix. They indicate that, in each round, all of the 32 countries are internally diverse in their value class composition, and most of the countries have a non-zero probability of having members of all five value classes in its population. Residents of Kosovo, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine have a very small probability of being a member of the Growth class, however, their residents have notable chances to be represented in the four other classes. Just as in the ESS round 4, the most contrasting differences between countries are found in the probabilities of membership in the Growth class. Its membership in most Nordic (varying from 24 to 30 percent for the different rounds) and Western European (31–35 percent) countries is remarkably higher than in Mediterranean (10–15 percent) and post-Communist countries (6–7 percent), and most of these differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. All the other classes are better represented in the Mediterranean and post-Communist than in the Nordic and Western European countries (although the country differences of membership probability are not very salient for these classes). For example, average membership probability for the Weak Social Focus class for post-Communist and Mediterranean countries for all three rounds is 29–33 and 27–30 percent, respectively; and it is lower in the Nordic and Western European countries, with 22–24 and 24–30 percent probability of membership,

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respectively. Statistically significant negative correlations between country membership probability for the Growth class and each of the four other classes confirm the gap between the Growth class and all the others. (All the correlations between country membership probabilities for the other four classes are insignificant.)

The membership probabilities for the individual countries are rather robust between rounds. The average difference of country probabilities for corresponding classes between ESS rounds is 4 percent. In most cases, the effects of round on country probability are small and translate into variations of not more than 10 percent. The difference of class country probabilities exceeds 10 percent only in eight out of 160 comparisons between rounds. The correlations between country membership probabilities in different rounds are stable, ranging from 0.70 to 0.98 with an average of 0.87; all of them are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$, $N = 22$). Out of 22 countries that participated in all three ESS rounds, Growth class probabilities slightly decreased in nine countries, increased in two countries and the other countries demonstrated an inconsistent tendency (increase in 5th but decrease in 6th ESS rounds, or decrease in 5th and increase in 6th ESS round). Coming back to the alternative hypothesis, considering influence of the economic crisis on country value class probabilities, we can conclude that a consistent tendency of decreasing Growth values class has not been found.

The correlations of calculated country probabilities of the value classes with gross national income (GNI) per capita indicating country level of economic development are remarkably stable across all three rounds (Table 2.4). They indicate that in more economically advanced countries probability of membership in the Growth class is much higher (the magnitudes of these coefficients are 0.80–0.90) and that in economically less advanced countries the probabilities of membership are higher in all the classes except the Growth one (though these correlations are not so high by their magnitude and not so consistent across rounds).

Table 2.4 Correlations between calculated country value class probabilities and country GNI per capita (in 2008, 2010 and 2012 assessed in ESS rounds 4, 5 and 6, respectively)

Class label	*Round 4*	*Round 5*	*Round 6*
Growth	0.91*	0.86*	0.81*
Strong social focus	–0.48*	–0.43*	–0.51*
Weak social focus	–0.39*	–0.49*	–0.46*
Weak personal focus	–0.38*	–0.35	–0.27
Strong personal focus	–0.46*	–0.48*	–0.27
N	28	26	23

Note
* Significantly different from zero at $p < 0.05$ or stricter level. Norway is excluded as an outlier.

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Discussion and conclusions

The analyses presented in this chapter have demonstrated a high level of robustness for the value classification of Europeans, initially described by Magun *et al*. (2016) across three ESS rounds.

Three completely independent LCA models based on the data from the 4th, 5th and 6th ESS rounds detected the same number of value classes initially reported for the 4th ESS round. It has been demonstrated that the value classes found in each of the three ESS rounds under consideration have very high cross-round correlations in their corresponding value class profiles, very similar between-class item ranks, and similar response probabilities that differ by no more than 0.10, with a few exceptions. The substantial similarity of classes between the ESS rounds is clearly demonstrated by very similar average scores of the corresponding classes on two higher-order value dimensions. Based on the results reported here, exactly the same substantial interpretation of the typologies found previously for one ESS round can be extended to encompass all three ESS rounds. The analysis supported configural or construct invariance, pointing out the feasibility of the proposed value typology.

External validity of the typology was supported by relating value class membership with country of residence and country level of economic development. The evidence regarding the validity of the typologies based on the data from the 5th and 6th ESS rounds appeared the same as has been detected for the 4th ESS round data. The correlations between country class probabilities, with the level of economic development (measured by GNI per capita), are relatively stable across three consecutive ESS rounds. Probability of membership in the Growth class is much greater in more economically advanced countries, and this is true for all three ESS rounds. The country probabilities of membership in the other four classes are higher for the economically less advanced countries.

In most countries, the effects of round on country class membership are small and translate into variations of not more than 10 percent. It is noteworthy that in spite of the economic crisis, a consistent tendency in value change was not found. Values are claimed to change only in really harsh conditions, such as psychological trauma, war, migration, etc., and probably this was not the case with the mentioned crisis. The other reason might be that values require a longer time to change, and probably there will be a postponed effect of the crisis. However at this point, such an effect on value classes was not detected.

As we mentioned above, the sample of countries analyzed here is not representative of Europe in its entirety and, strictly speaking, is limited to a certain set of countries that participated in each ESS round. However, the latent class solution is surprisingly stable given that the set of countries differs from round to round. It supports the robustness of the value class solution and confirms the stability of the relationship between the value classes and different kinds of countries.

Confirmatory analysis was performed using single group LCA models that use ESS round as a covariate. These results supported configural invariance as well. Still some deviations from strict full invariance were demonstrated. BIC

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and AIC were used to detect whether partial invariance holds, and inspection of these values confirmed that this was indeed the case. However, strict statistical criteria for accepting or rejecting the hypotheses about a certain level of invariance in the context of latent classes have not yet been developed. Due to a lack of empirical studies dealing with latent class invariance, we cannot conclude if there is enough similarity between response probabilities to be entirely certain that the class membership is unbiased across the three ESS rounds.

At this point, it is useful to differentiate the concepts of measurement invariance and construct invariance. Construct invariance is a feature of typology validity, implying that the classification is feasible and reflects the social reality as being different from an accidental product of the data analysis. The measurement invariance assesses the precision with which the constructs are measured in different groups. Thus, the construct invariance is a matter of theoretical construct validity, whereas measurement invariance refers to a degree of between-group validity of measurement. Kuha and Moustaki (2013) share the view that "even when all the true measurement probabilities are such that each latent class would be given the same qualitative interpretation in every group, the class probabilities estimated under equivalence can still be substantially biased" (p. 21). Therefore, although a degree of measurement invariance of the value classes is still an open issue, the substantial similarity of the value classes across ESS rounds is notable. It provides evidence of construct invariance, that is, the existence of the stable and feasible 5-class structure of the European population.

Although the results of this study do not allow strict conclusions to be made about the specific sources of non-invariance of some items, we suggest that full invariance of value classes has not emerged first of all due to the measurement issues and differences in samples across the three ESS rounds.

Overall, we can conclude that there are five value types in the European population. These are: Growth class, emphasizing Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence values, and four value classes along the Social-Personal focus dimension, namely, two Social Focus classes, emphasizing a combination of Conservation and Self-Transcendence values (at the expense of Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values) and the two Personal Focus classes emphasizing the combination of Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement (at the expense of Conservation and Self-Transcendence values).

These results clearly imply that the value classification of Europeans is not an ad hoc study and, although its measurement varies in different ESS rounds, it reflects a stable and feasible value-based structure of the European population that can be used in future studies.[5]

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Appendix

Table 2.A1 ESS portrait values questionnaire item wording, their labels and values they are supposed to measure

Values	*Item label*	*Item wording*
Openness to change		
Self-direction	creative	Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way.
	own decisions	It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others.
Stimulation	new things	He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.
	adventures	He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life.
Hedonism	good time	Having a good time is important to him. He likes to "spoil" himself.
	fun	He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.
Conservation		
Security	secure surroundings	It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.
	safety government	It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
Conformity	follow rules	He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.
	behave properly	It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
Tradition	traditions	Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family.
	modest	It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself.
Self-Transcendence		
Benevolence	help people	It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being.
	friends	It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him.
Universalism	understand	It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.
	nature	He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.
	equally	He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.
Self-Enhancement		
Achievement	abilities	It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.
	success	Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his achievements.
Power	rich	It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.
	respect	It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says.

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Table 2.A2 Differences in classifications of European population into five value classes by three independent LCA models for three ESS rounds

Item	*Growth*		*Strong social focus*		*Weak social focus*		*Weak personal focus*		*Strong personal focus*	
	ESS-5	*ESS-6*	*ESS-5*	*ESS-6*	*ESS-5*	*ESS-6*	*ESS-5*	*ESS-6*	*ESS-5*	*ESS-6*
Openness to change										
Creative		0.07 (+0.5)	–0.07	–0.05		0.06				(–0.5)
Own decisions		0.09 (+0.5)				0.11			0.05	(–0.5)
New things		11 (+1)	–0.06	–0.09 (–1)		0.05		(+1)		(–1)
Adventures		0.06								
Good time				–0.08 (–0.5)		0.05		(+0.5)		
Fun		0.09				0.06				
Conservation										
Secure surroundings										0.06
Security by government	0.05	0.12 (+0.5)						(–0.5)	0.06	
Rules			–0.09		–0.05	–0.06	–0.09		–0.09	
Behave properly										0.08
Tradition		0.05				–0.06	–0.05			
Modesty	0.07	0.05				0.06				0.06
Self-Transcendence										
Help people around		0.09				0.06			0.06	0.09
Friends		0.05 (+0.5)			0.05	0.05			0.07	0.08 (–0.5)
Understanding		0.08				0.05	–0.07			
Nature		0.08						–0.05		
Equality		0.06 (+0.5)							0.08	0.06 (–0.5)
Self-Enhancement										
Abilities			–0.05	–0.05		0.05			0.05	
Success		0.07	–0.09	–0.06						
Wealth			–0.05	–0.07						
Respect			–0.08	–0.06			–0.05			0.05

Note
The differences are described in the table through deviations of response probabilities for answers "very much like me" and "like me" in ESS rounds 5 and 6 from ESS round 4; the cross-round deviations of the class rank of item importance are noted in parentheses. Empty cells refer to lack of differences given a 95% confidence interval.

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Table 2.A3 Probabilities of value class membership given country of respondent's residence for three ESS rounds (%)

Class	*Growth*			*Strong social focus*			*Weak social focus*			*Weak personal focus*			*Strong personal focus*		
ESS round	*4*	*5*	*6*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*4*	*5*	*6*
Belgium	26	26	23	11	9	8	26	28	30	26	24	28	11	12	11
Bulgaria	5	3	4	28	24	24	29	33	35	19	22	19	19	19	19
Croatia	9	6		23	23		30	37		23	19		16	15	
Cyprus	12	9	11	16	25	29	35	36	29	14	12	10	24	18	22
Czech Republic	7	6	5	14	11	11	26	27	28	29	32	33	24	24	22
Denmark	35	37	32	11	13	11	19	21	20	16	12	17	18	17	20
Estonia	17	18	16	16	10	13	28	36	36	21	24	22	18	12	13
Finland	29	29	33	15	12	14	24	25	27	21	22	16	11	12	10
France	38	41		28	25		14	14		12	12		8	9	
Germany	32	30	31	12	14	12	28	31	31	14	13	12	14	13	14
Greece	8	10		17	21		26	31		24	18		25	19	
Hungary	10	12	8	21	21	15	24	25	24	22	19	29	24	24	25
Iceland			46			8			21			10			16
Ireland	21	15	15	18	17	14	30	21	33	17	28	24	15	18	15
Israel	6	9	9	23	21	18	18	19	22	28	28	20	25	23	31
Kosovo			1			31			30			15			23
Latvia	6			13			26			21			34		
Lithuania		5			17			29			26			22	
Netherlands	26	28	24	7	8	8	22	20	22	32	32	32	13	12	13
Norway	22	30	26	9	7	8	29	33	33	27	17	18	14	13	15
Poland	9	6	6	13	14	16	42	44	46	24	22	19	13	15	13
Portugal	10	10	7	10	8	7	26	24	29	43	50	46	10	8	11
Romania	2			16			21			41			20		
Russia	3	3	2	21	17	20	30	29	24	25	29	28	21	23	26
Slovakia	2	3	2	19	17	16	39	40	39	29	25	27	11	16	16
Slovenia	16	12	12	15	15	19	27	28	38	28	31	17	15	14	14
Spain	21	28	25	22	17	26	35	33	34	15	13	8	8	8	7
Sweden	38	46	38	8	10	13	17	18	20	25	14	16	13	12	13
Switzerland	37	34	32	13	13	11	21	26	26	14	14	14	15	13	17
Turkey	3			16			24			42			16		
Ukraine	2	3		31	26		27	25		17	22		23	24	
United Kingdom	27	23	22	13	14	14	28	32	36	17	16	15	14	15	14

Notes

An empty cell indicates that the country did not participate in corresponding ESS round.

Percentages denote conditional class probabilities given a country. Instead of conventional decimal format of probabilities, we use percentages since these probabilities are estimates of value class shares.

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Notes

1 Sometimes equality constraints in testing measurement invariance are referred to as too strict and unrealistic, since they require exact equality between parameters across groups (Davidov *et al*., 2014). So the *approximate invariance* has been suggested for each of the levels mentioned above that does not require the strict equality of probabilities across groups, instead it allows for a small difference between probabilities across groups. The range of response probability differences across classes should be set based on former studies or substantial theorizing. This approximate invariance has been initiated in the context of Bayesian approaches (Muthén and Asparouhov, 2013) in which a researcher should set the prior probabilities' variance of differences between parameters across classes.

2 The large confidence interval or 99.9 percent was chosen for two reasons: first, it corresponds to a very large sample size involved in computing standard errors; and second, the magnitude of the significant regression coefficients at the $p<0.001$ level is not lower than 0.2, and 0.2 translates into maximum of 0.05 difference in response probabilities between rounds, which traditionally could be considered negligible.

3 These percentages denote probabilities. Instead of conventional decimal format of probabilities, we use percentages since these probabilities are estimates of value classes' shares in population.

4 The probability of membership is very close to descriptive shares of classes in each country. However, the membership is predicted in LCA with some degree of uncertainty which is not accounted for when working with membership instead of membership probability. That is why we use the term "membership probability."

5 In order to facilitate using the value classes for future studies we provide the most likely membership of every respondent in a supplementary file, which can be requested directly from the first author at mrudnev@hse.ru.

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3 Trust in political institutions

Stability of measurement model in Europe

Lluis Coromina and Edurne Bartolomé Peral

Introduction

Political trust is considered to be a key factor related to a country's social capital and democracy (Hardin, 1999; Uslaner, 1999; Warren, 1999). The extent to which people trust their political institutions is one of the pillars of democracy, and the decline of trust in institutions is one of the most evident and shared symptoms of the economic crisis affecting Europe in recent years, especially in those contexts in which the crisis has been particularly acute. Political trust is an important resource for our democracies, in the sense that strong political trust contributes to a structured and stable voting behaviour (Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011) and reinforces citizens' compliance with the law and with governmental demands (Rudolph and Evans, 2005). It has also been widely claimed that no political system could survive without the generalized support of its citizens (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1999). Therefore, political trust and trust in institutions are of great relevance for good democratic governance.

A growing body of literature agrees that the emergence of an effective democracy and a prosperous economy imply that citizens trust their fellow citizens and, more significantly, trust their social institutions (Fukuyama, 1995; Offe, 1999; Sztompka, 1999; Uslaner, 2002). Thus, to establish social and economic order, it is crucial that citizens identify themselves with their political system and trust their institutions, in the sense that they trust their procedures, functioning and outcomes. In the absence of legitimacy, any old or new democracy rests on weak foundations (Delhey and Tobsch, 2003). The way in which a citizenry feels and thinks about democracy matters, and such attitudes influence the chances of achieving a healthy and lasting democracy (Bartolomé Peral, 2010).

In situations of deep economic crisis, in which there is a perceived deprivation of rights and resources, individuals tend to look at institutions as the entities mainly responsible. A deep and rapid decrease of trust in these institutions is a clear consequence of the crisis, followed in some cases by a deeper crisis of legitimacy, with a greater distrust in the performance of democracy, and even a decrease in the support for the principles of democracy.

The main research question of this chapter asks to what extent the economic crisis has changed the levels of trust in political institutions and whether trust in

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institutions relies on the same factors both prior to and during the crisis. In this sense, we aim to analyse how citizens' evaluations of performance affect their trust in institutions prior to and during the crisis, whether trust in institutions significantly decreases in situations of deep economic crisis and whether trust in institutions is explained by the same factors present in situations with no such deep crisis. In order to answer this research question, we study a number of European democracies which have been particularly affected by the crisis and analyse trust in political institutions during two points in time in order to assess public perceptions of the institutions by those individuals most affected by the economic crisis.

The concept of political trust and political support

In order to study the evolution of trust in institutions during crisis, we use the concepts of *political support* and *political trust*. This will help to construct the theoretical discussion on the sources and correlates for the presence or absence of those factors, followed by an empirical test to examine how these correlates have affected the countries before and during the crisis, and whether these correlates impact trust in institutions in the same way.

Newton (2008, p. 242) defines political trust as "the belief that those in authority and with power will not deliberately or willingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible". Another popular definition of political trust is a basic evaluative orientation toward the government founded in how well the government is operating according to the people's normative expectations (Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974). It could therefore be expected that if citizens perceive that the incumbents and institutions are not trustworthy and have not acted according to their interests when making decisions, they may be more likely to be permissive towards law-breaking behaviour as a response.

Political support is used as a conceptual framework to study attitudes towards government, democracy and institutions (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1975; Norris, 1999). Easton's contribution claims that political support can be divided into two distinct pillars: diffuse and specific. *Diffuse support* refers to the public's attitude towards regime-level political objects regardless of the performance (Hetherington, 1998) and reflects citizens' attitudes towards the more general and permanent aspects of political systems. *Specific support* refers to the specific and short-term viewpoints of the more concrete elements of the political systems, such as policy, office and institutional performance. Norris (1999) and Dalton (2004) make a more complete distinction of Easton's original political objects by classifying the regime into three aspects (from the most diffuse to the most specific): principles of democracy, performance of democracy (Norris, 1999) or democratic process (Dalton, 2004) and political institutions.

Within this framework, trust in institutions is a crucial object of political support and therefore a very relevant political object in the political system, which needs systematic public support. Discussions of diverse forms of trust

have proliferated in the literature as they relate to various entities that are not necessarily individuals or groups. Institutional trust may refer to legitimate power (e.g. in the Parliament), authority (e.g. in the government) or economy (e.g. in the mode of production). Institutional trust relates to procedures and to basic practices more than to expectations towards reciprocity. Interpersonal trust is assumed to form the basis of all other types of trust (Offe, 1999). This kind of trust is based on the expectation that the trustee will act in the specific way expected by the person who trusts. Therefore, we assume that interpersonal trust facilitates social interaction and that trust in others should promote collective action (Luhmann *et al*., 1979). Democratic institutions and trust go hand in hand because citizens need to trust one another to ensure representation and resistance to non-democratic forms of governance (Inglehart, 1999).

Theoretical explanations for the decline of trust in institutions: the link between trust and institutions and political performance

In recent years, we have witnessed a persistent trend in the decline of political trust in Western democracies (Bowler and Karp, 2004; Hetherington, 1998; Newton, 2006; Rudolph and Evans, 2005; Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011). Several authors (e.g. Klingemann, 1998; Norris, 1999) argue that the decline of political trust in Western democracies is the result of a greater political sophistication and cognitive mobilization of citizens, who therefore tend to raise their expectations of the government; however, this does not necessarily imply a decline of the system's support (Easton, 1975, 1976; Newton, 2006; Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011). There are several theories which try to explain the recent and continuous decline of political trust. Some of them rely on the perception of policy performance and political outcomes; others focus on expectations, in the sense that the level of political trust tends to be higher when there is congruence between citizens' expectations and policy outputs (Miller, 1974; Rudolph and Evans, 2005). Several scholars have worked more specifically in linking political trust to policy performance (Hetherington 1998; Rudolph and Evans 2005). In this sense, Hetherington (2006) argues that political trust is also conditional to individual material sacrifices and to expectations of the future return on those sacrifices.

This chapter focuses on what is called the *sociotropic approach*, which measures the subjective perceptions of political and economic performance on trust in institutions in different economic scenarios. As Cohen (2004) points out, the literature and empirical evidence on the link between political trust and performance have mainly been based on two different approaches. Initially, the main focus was on objective economic indicators and on measuring their effects on support for authorities and on voting behaviour. A second perspective, called the *egocentric approach*, moves from the effects of objective economic indicators towards the measurement of the effect of individual perceptions, given their own economic circumstances (Cohen, 2004). The egocentric approach can

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be particularly problematic, as it assumes that the citizens have a specific level of knowledge about the economy. According to Weatherford (1987), the link between political performance, political trust and political support is not a simple relationship and is relatively difficult to test empirically. According to this author, the first relevant condition has to do with the relevance of the policy pitfall, which can be considered as such if (1) it is not attributable to "exogenous constraints" in the ability or within the power of the political authorities, (2) it is not attributable to differences between the ideologies of the party and the citizens, (3) either the situation has persisted long enough so that more than one leader or government has failed in solving the situation and (4) the policy shortfall should produce a pattern of social disadvantage and social differentiation in terms of social class or income (Weatherford, 1987). Given the situation in Europe during this crisis, we can assume that the four conditions exist.

According to Miller (1974), the performance of institutions determines their legitimacy, and the evaluation of events and experiences is the main source of public support for the political system. As a consequence, policy-related discontent is a source of political cynicism and focuses on (a) the meaning of political trust as such, manifested as a decline on public trust, (b) political cynicism at the individual level and (c) a re-examination of the claim that "centrist" policies will solve the problems, that is, the radicalization of views (Citrin, 1974). Therefore, the persistence of widespread mistrust in government and in institutions would suggest that "the normal means by which conflict is managed in the political system are not fully operative" (Miller, 1974).

In the European context, in which the impact of the recent crisis is clear, we aim to analyse the effects of the crisis on the level of trust in institutions and to analyse how the notion, or the impact of different correlates on trust in institutions itself, significantly varies among countries depending on how the crisis has affected them. Trust in institutions, understood as a clear measure of public support, will very much depend on a set of correlates measuring citizens' opinions and attitudes at different points in time. Therefore, the effects of these variations in time and the effects of these variables are expected to be significantly different depending on how the crisis has affected citizens in different countries.

According to these theories, political trust is very likely to strongly rely on satisfaction with economic and personal performances based on short-term evaluations and on personal experiences (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Cohen, 2004; Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1999; Listhaug, 1995; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Rohrschneider, 1999). In this way, individuals would articulate their attitudes towards political institutions only by evaluating their personal situations with a strong relevance for their economic ones. It would be expected, therefore, that variables measuring evaluations of personal or political performance, such as satisfaction with one's personal economic situation, would have a strong impact on political trust and on trust in political institutions.

A relevant aspect explaining trust in political institutions is the short-term evaluation of the government by measuring to what extent citizens would agree with the result in the elections. Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Anderson and

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Tverdova (2001) explain, in this regard, how individuals who voted for the government party feel that they are the winners of the electoral process, tend to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and demonstrate greater trust in institutions.

A more long-term explanation relies on lasting aspects which persist in a society, such as religious tradition, history and values on which the state and political system have been settled. These factors determine a set of values and attitudes shared by the citizenry, perceivable in the way citizens establish their views of political community, regime and authorities.

Generalized trust, or trust in others (Delhey and Newton, 2003), is an important factor which refers to the extended trust people have in others whom they do not necessarily know and which measures the trusting links in a society beyond family ties. Other key indicators of the long-term explanation are external and internal political efficacy (Craig *et al*., 1990; Finkel, 1985; Gabriel, 1995; Niemi *et al*., 1991) and life satisfaction (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), among others. In this chapter, we take into account internal efficacy as the main correlate for trust in political institutions, as no data for the measurement of external political efficacy were available.

Age, level of education and self-placement on a left–right political scale are also relevant factors for the analysis. Age is a relevant factor in terms of political attitudes, as observed in some transitions (Dalton, 2004): young people are more susceptible to political change, as they have less experience with a specific political system. Education plays a central role when explaining political trust. According to Zmerli and Newton (2008), the winner–loser theory would suggest that those who see themselves as winners in the society (the more educated, the more satisfied, the wealthier), given their successful life experiences, would tend to trust more in people and in institutions. One's self-placement on the left–right political scale would be expected to have an impact on political trust. This can be related to satisfaction, political trust and political support in terms of group-related beliefs or particular group interests. On the other hand, in European democracies, "extreme right" and "extreme left" could represent a profoundly dissatisfied group in terms of democratic support, since they feel that their demands are almost never fulfilled (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007).

Hypotheses

Our expectation is that the levels of trust experienced changes over time as a consequence of the crisis. The low economic performance in a significant number of countries in Europe and the public perception of this failure in performance by individuals are expected to have a direct effect on trust in institutions, as there is a greater gap between institutional outcomes and citizens' expectations. This economic crisis has been accompanied by an increase in citizens' efforts as measured by higher taxes and cuts in services. It is also explained by the theory that trust in institutions is conditional on individual material sacrifices and on expectations of the future return on those sacrifices.

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In addition, we claim that the correlates impacting trust in institutions are significantly different among some European countries depending on the degree to which they have been affected by the economic crisis.

The first working hypothesis presented in this chapter suggests that the levels of trust in political institutions are expected to decrease significantly in those countries more affected by the crisis (H1). A second hypothesis proposes that the predictive factors of trust in political institutions are not constant over time due to the changing context (H2). The third hypothesis is that significant differences in the effects of predictive variables are expected due to the unequal extent to which the crisis impacts countries (H3).

Data and methods

Data from the European Social Survey (ESS) were used to test whether the indicators for trust in political institutions hold across different time periods in six different countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, Portugal and Spain). Table 3.1 shows the sample size for each country (for 2008 and 2010).

The countries were selected in response to the requirement for a comparison of trust in institutions as demonstrated in countries that have been affected differently by the economic crisis. An additional condition for selection was the availability of data from the time points required. Even if it can be claimed that all European countries have been affected by the economic crisis, we hypothesize that there are significant differences in the way it has affected the southern European countries (e.g. Greece, Portugal and Spain) in terms of strong and painful austerity measures and dramatic unemployment rates. In other European countries, such as Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, even if financial problems have occurred as a result of the crisis, we expect significant differences in the intensity to which the crisis has affected these countries.

Accordingly, ESS data were used to test whether the indicators for trust in political institutions hold across different periods and for those countries affected differently by the crisis. In this chapter we analyse to what extent trust in political institutions can be compared across time in countries with significantly different levels of crisis impact.

In order to study the comparisons, tests for measurement invariance via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were used. Once measurement invariance was established, latent means at two time points were also studied (2008 and 2010) across the mentioned countries. The chapter then presents an analysis

Table 3.1 Sample size for each country

	Germany	*Netherlands*	*Sweden*	*Greece*	*Portugal*	*Spain*
2008	2,276	1,606	1,538	1,603	1,442	1,816
2010	2,499	1,620	1,274	1,859	1,372	1,459

and comparison of the effects of key variables for trust in political institutions in different countries and at different points of time.

Consistent with previous theoretical arguments, trust in political institutions was measured as latent factors with three reflective indicators using structural equation modeling (SEM) (Bollen, 1989; Kline, 2011). A specific SEM model, known as the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model (Brown, 2006), was used to estimate the measurement model for each type of trust. A generalized form of the measurement model is shown in Figure 3.1, where y_is are three observed indicators, τ_i is the intercept of each of the three observed indicators, η_j is the latent variable, λ_{ij} is the factor loading or slope from the j latent variable to the y_i observed indicator and e_i is a random measurement error for the responses for each of the three indicators. Covariances between the latent variable (η_i) and the error variance (e_i), or among the error variances themselves, are constrained to zero.

The estimation of each observed variable is based on the general equation

$$y_i = \tau_i + \lambda_{ij}\eta_j + e_i \quad (3.1)$$

which in this case can be decomposed into the following three equations for each of the two factors:

$$y_1 = \tau_1 + \lambda_{11}\eta_1 + e_1 \quad (3.2)$$

$$y_2 = \tau_2 + \lambda_{21}\eta_1 + e_2 \quad (3.3)$$



Figure 3.1 Generalization of CFA model (source: Coromina and Davidov, 2013, p. 41).

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$$y_3 = \tau_3 + \lambda_{31}\eta_1 + e_3 \qquad (3.4)$$

where y_1, y_2 and y_3 stand for the three indicators of political trust in Figure 3.2.

In order to study the comparison of groups (countries and periods), tests for measurement invariance of CFA were performed. The procedure compared groups using multiple groups confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) (Bollen, 1989), in which measurement invariance for some parameters is required (Ariel and Davidov, 2012; Coromina and Davidov, 2013; Davidov *et al*., 2011; Meredith, 1993; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). Some recent applications of measurement invariance were conducted by Davidov (2010), who used MGCFA for human values items in 25 countries, and by Byrne and Vijver (2010), who compared large-scale cross-cultural studies.

Establishing measurement invariance permits meaningful comparisons of the latent means of social and political trust, as well as their relation to other theoretical constructs of interest across groups (time and countries, in this case), while ensuring that the latent constructs, political and social trust, have the same meaning and scaling across groups. Three hierarchical levels of invariance that have to be tested are configural, metric and scalar invariances (Allum *et al*., 2010; Meulemann and Billiet, 2012; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998).

An MGCFA model was analysed for each region at different time points using the robust maximum-likelihood (MLR) estimator to test for cross-regional and longitudinal invariances. A bottom-up strategy for the test (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998) was used, starting with the least constrained model (configural



Figure 3.2 CFA model for political trust.

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invariance) and then introducing more constraints to the model (metric and scalar invariance, respectively).

For the evaluation of model fit for each level of invariance, different goodness-of-fit measures were applied. The first two criteria used were the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) measures. Those SRMR values of 0.09 or lower, and RMSEA values of 0.06 or lower, are indicators of an acceptable model fit (Chen, 2007). Incremental fit indices, specifically the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker–Lewis Index (TLI), are widely used to calculate improvements over competing models. Values greater than 0.90 for these two indices are indications of an acceptable model fit (Chen, 2007). Evaluation of these fit measures is combined with the examination of modification indices (MI), expected parameter change (EPC) and the power of the test for possible misspecification (Saris *et al*., 2009). Mplus 7 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998–2010) was used for the analyses.

After the trust in political institutions was tested, external validity was evaluated using multiple groups in structural equation modeling (MGSEM). In this case, the interest was the effect of theoretically related factors (voting behaviour, interest in politics, satisfaction with life, age, gender etc.) on trust in political institutions over time for the countries examined.

Results

Measurement invariance for political trust

The first part of this section shows whether a comparability of latent factors means for trust in political institutions is possible over time for the six countries analysed; therefore, results for the measurement invariance are obtained separately for each country.[1] Table 3.2 shows the fit indices for each MGCFA model with different measurement invariance levels. The MLR estimator is used, and missing values are dealt with using the maximum-likelihood estimation procedure, which uses all available information from the variables.

Table 3.2 shows the goodness-of-fit measures for the different levels of measurement invariance. Metric invariance (model A) holds for all countries. All factor loadings are positive and statistically significant. Thus, relationships can be studied and interpreted across all periods; this means that the effect on political trust will be accurate.

Scalar invariance holds for the three indicators in four countries. In the case of Greece and Spain, the intercept for the variable trust in the legal system has to be released from its invariance. Thus, scalar invariance holds for all countries (partial scalar invariance for Greece and Spain), as it is the case that when at least two indicators are fully scalar invariant, estimates are accurate. These findings permit the comparison of latent means across groups. Latent means are not estimated in absolute scores but an arbitrary “adimensional” means, which reflect average differences in the level of the latent factor across time periods.

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Table 3.2 Fit measures for measurement invariance for political trust

	χ^2	*df.*	*P*	*CFI*	*TLI*	*RMSEA*	*SRMR*
Model invariance: Germany							
A. Metric full	10.631	2	0.005	0.998	0.993	0.039 (CI 90%: 0.018, 0.065)	0.014
B. Scalar full	27.953	4	0.000	0.993	0.990	0.046 (CI 90%: 0.031, 0.062)	0.018
Model invariance: Netherlands							
A. Metric full	6.348	2	0.042	0.998	0.994	0.035(CI 90%: 0.006, 0.067)	0.019
B. Scalar full	23.624	4	0.000	0.991	0.987	0.052 (CI 90%: 0.033, 0.073)	0.030
Model invariance: Sweden							
A. Metric full	2.529	2	0.282	1	0.999	0.013 (CI 90%: 0.000, 0.052)	0.014
B. Scalar full	4.646	4	0.325	1	1	0.010 (CI 90%: 0.000, 0.040)	0.011
Model invariance: Greece							
A. Metric full	5.750	2	0.056	0.999	0.996	0.028 (CI 90%: 0.000, 0.056)	0.014
B. Scalar full	33.860	4	0.000	0.990	0.986	0.056 (CI 90%: 0.040, 0.074)	0.030
C. Scalar partial	5.874	3	0.118	0.999	0.998	0.020 (CI 90%: 0.000, 0.044)	0.014
Model invariance: Portugal							
A. Metric full	1.712	2	0.425	1	1	0.000 (CI 90%: 0.000, 0.040)	0.008
B. Scalar full	3.851	4	0.426	1	1	0.000 (CI 90%: 0.000, 0.031)	0.011
Model invariance: Spain							
A. Metric full	8.895	2	0.012	0.997	0.992	0.039 (CI 90%: 0.016, 0.067)	0.017
B. Scalar full	119.162	4	0.000	0.955	0.932	0.114 (CI 90%: 0.097, 0.132)	0.050
C. Scalar partial	9.184	3	0.027	0.998	0.995	0.031 (CI 90%: 0.009, 0.054)	0.017

Table 3.3 Latent means for trust in political institutions

	2008–2010
Greece	–1.527*
Spain	–0.650*
Portugal	–0.543*
Germany	–0.309*
Netherlands	–0.068
Sweden	0.515*

Note
* p-value < 0.05 compared with 2008.

Table 3.3 displays the latent mean difference between the two periods (2008 and 2010) for trust in political institutions for the six countries.

Results from Table 3.3 show comparable latent means for the latent means. Trust in political institutions has different trends in crisis countries versus non-crisis countries. Citizens of countries in crisis (Greece, Spain and Portugal), especially Greece, clearly reduced their levels of political trust. With respect to the other group of countries, Germany also decreased its level of trust in political institutions but to a lower degree. This fact may have been related, among other things, to the Hypo Real Estate crisis and to the nationalization of the HRE Bank, which occurred in 2009 and was heavily criticized by the citizens. Different behaviour is perceived for the citizens of the Netherlands, where no significant trend effect is observed, and Sweden, where the level of political trust increased from 2008 to 2010. Thus, these results show that H1 (trust in political institutions is expected to decrease significantly in those countries more intensely affected by the crisis) holds.

Predictors of political trust

In this section, the effect of theoretically studied factors on trust in political institutions is studied. To identify significant factors effecting trust in political institutions over time for the different countries analysed, SEM will be carried out. Since invariance requirements for trust in political institutions were fulfilled, comparisons of relationships on the latent factor can be accurately measured and interpreted.

Predictive factors and their measurements, which are the same for all time periods, are as given in Table 3.4. Table 3.5 shows the descriptive statistics for the predictors of trust in political institutions.

Results from Table 3.5 show that most of the predictors were quite stable for the periods 2008 and 2010. However, variables related to government performance behaved differently depending on the groups of countries (crisis versus no crisis). Satisfaction with the economy and with government was reduced in the countries in crisis (Greece, Portugal and Spain). A different trend was seen in the three other countries in which citizens' satisfaction with the economy was

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Table 3.4 Predictive factors and their measurements

	Question	*Measurement*
Trust in others (Hereinafter referred to as "people trust")	"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"	Participants were asked to respond on a scale of 0 ("You can't be too careful") to 10 ("Most people can be trusted")
Satisfaction with life	"On the whole, how satisfied are you with life in general?"	Participants were asked to respond on a scale of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied)
Satisfaction with the country's economic situation	"On the whole, how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?"	Participants were asked to respond on a scale of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied)
Satisfaction with government	"Now, thinking about [the country's] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?"	Participants were asked to respond on a scale of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied)
Interest in politics	"How interested in politics are you?"	Participants were asked to choose their responses from four options (not at all interested; hardly interested; quite interested; very interested)
Left–right scale	"In politics, people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right' "	Participants were asked to place themselves on a scale in which 0 signified "left", and 10 signified "right"
Age	Five age categories	15–29 years; 30–44 years; 45–59 years; 60–74 years; 75 years and over
Level of education	Four education categories	Less than lower secondary education; lower secondary education completed; upper and post-secondary education completed; tertiary education completed

Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics for predictive variables

	Germany		Netherlands		Sweden	
	2008	*2010*	*2008*	*2010*	*2008*	*2010*
Trust in others	4.926	4.666	5.944	6.059	6.445	6.422
Satisfaction with life	6.839	7.110	7.631	7.708	7.882	7.947
Interest in politics	2.846	2.802	2.725	2.770	2.669	2.737
Satisfaction with economy	4.138	5.241	5.490	5.727	4.946	6.499
Satisfaction with government	4.139	3.560	5.484	5.301	5.134	6.116
Vote	0.850	0.837	0.870	0.848	0.921	0.951
Left–right placement	4.560	4.547	5.179	5.316	5.147	5.564
	Greece		*Portugal*		*Spain*	
	2008	*2010*	*2008*	*2010*	*2008*	*2010*
Trust in others	3.908	4.135	3.816	3.777	4.972	5.169
Satisfaction with life	5.957	5.652	5.613	5.794	7.299	7.283
Interest in politics	2.178	2.116	2.164	2.039	2.112	2.144
Satisfaction with economy	2.370	1.394	2.908	2.426	3.617	2.635
Satisfaction with government	2.716	1.913	3.456	2.499	4.009	2.873
Vote	0.888	0.841	0.813	0.822	0.867	0.850
Left–right placement	5.123	5.130	4.816	4.970	4.552	4.627

increased, while with respect to satisfaction with the government, more diverse trends were found (decreased in Germany, was stable in the Netherlands and increased in Sweden).

After a description of predictors, the model was estimated. Factor scores from the latent variable "political trust" were computed and used as a dependent variable. Table 3.6 shows the effects[2] of predictor variables on the latent variable "trust in political institutions" for each model. Since the interest was to study the influence of the predictors across time for each country separately, analyses were carried out for each country. Therefore, six multiple group analyses were carried out while considering the points of time (2008 and 2010) as a grouping variable.

Explained variance for political trust is high for all countries, from 0.38 (2008 in Greece) to 0.70 (2008 in the Netherlands). One of the main explanations we contemplate for explaining the levels of trust, and the decrease in those levels, is related to the short-term evaluation of personal and governmental performance. According to this explanation, we focused on the effect of satisfaction with the personal economic situation and satisfaction with the performance of the government. Regarding the effect of satisfaction with the economy, it is interesting to note that with respect to countries in crisis, the effect of satisfaction with the economy on political trust was larger than in the other countries. In Germany and in the Netherlands, this effect was not significant in 2008, but it was significant in 2010. For the remaining countries and periods, this effect is significant. It increased in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain; it was stable in Sweden and Portugal and decreased in Greece. These

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Table 3.6 Estimates for political trust

	Germany		*Netherlands*		*Sweden*	
	2008	*2010*	*2008*	*2010*	*2008*	*2010*
Trust in others	0.17**	0.16**	0.14**	0.19**	0.28**	0.20**
Satisfaction with life	0.01	0.03*	–0.02	0.03*	0.06*	0.06*
Interest in politics	0.18**	0.31**	0.33**	0.39**	0.45**	0.30**
Satisfaction with economy	0.02	0.13**	0.03	0.11**	0.07**	0.09**
Satisfaction with government	0.53**	0.49**	0.61**	0.49**	0.39**	0.41**
Vote	0.51**	0.33**	0.14	0.23*	0.27*	0.18
Left–right placement	–0.02	0.00	0.01	–0.05**	–0.11**	–0.10**
Age	–0.10**	–0.09**	–0.13**	–0.08*	–0.06*	–0.06*
Gender (0 = female)	0.02	–0.02	0.05	0.05	–0.07	–0.21**
Education	0.01	0.05	0.15**	0.15**	0.18**	0.10**
R^2	0.64	0.63	0.70	0.65	0.57	0.53
	Greece		*Portugal*		*Spain*	
	2008	*2010*	*2008*	*2010*	*2008*	*2010*
Trust in others	0.10**	0.15**	0.04*	0.13**	0.16**	0.12**
Satisfaction with life	0.08**	0.01	0.09**	0.04*	0.05*	0.03
Interest in politics	0.44**	0.27**	0.41**	0.28**	0.36**	0.42**
Satisfaction with economy	0.26**	0.15**	0.27**	0.28**	0.16**	0.24**
Satisfaction with government	0.21**	0.46**	0.30**	0.31**	0.37**	0.34**
Vote	0.32*	0.09	0.04	–0.04	0.22**	0.35**
Left–right placement	0.07**	0.08**	0.07*	0.04*	0.10**	0.12**
Age	0.23**	0.16**	–0.01	0.09*	0.05*	0.01
Gender (0 = female)	–0.26**	0.01	–0.33**	–0.01	–0.12*	–0.28**
Education	–0.04	0.04	0.10**	0.14*	–0.06*	0.01
R^2	0.38	0.50	0.50	0.43	0.61	0.58

Notes
* p-value < 0.05.
** p-value < 0.01.

effects, in general, may suggest that in situations of crisis, the evaluation of performance tends to strongly shape institutional trust; the exception is Greece. Even in countries with no such strong crisis, such as Germany or the Netherlands, the impact of satisfaction with the economy became stronger during years of more acute crisis.

The effect of satisfaction with government was significant and positive for all countries; this effect was seen to increase in Greece; the effect was stable in Sweden, Portugal and Spain; it decreased in Germany and in the Netherlands. The effect of satisfaction with government on trust in political institutions was greater for non-crisis countries (except for Greece in 2010) that experienced a large increase in that effect from 0.21 in 2008 to 0.46 in 2010. These effects suggest that the evaluation of government performance is a very relevant correlate for trust in political institutions, although its effect is not as sensitive to variations as the evaluation of personal performance.

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If we focus on long-term factors and its impact on trust in institutions, results show that generalized trust (trust in others) had a positive and significant effect in all countries, although it can also be observed that, for Greece and Portugal, the effect was lower. Over time, the effect was not homogeneous, since it increased in the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal for the period between 2008 and 2010. It can also be observed that, generally, those countries less affected by the crisis tended to show a higher impact of generalized trust on trust in political institutions.

We observed that in countries not so intensely affected by the crisis, the effect of life satisfaction on political trust increased or remained stable during the period between 2008 and 2010, while for those countries more affected by the crisis, this effect decreased. In the cases of Greece and Spain, the effect of life satisfaction on trust in political institutions was not significant in 2010.

The effect of political efficacy, measured by interest in politics, was statistically significant for all countries and for both periods. It increased in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. In this case, Spain was the exception, in comparison with the effects for Portugal and Greece, showing that in 2010, when the crisis was more intense, the impact of the interest in politics on trust in political institutions was significantly weaker. Conversely, in Germany and in the Netherlands, such effects increased between 2008 and 2010, although no such increase was demonstrated in Sweden.

No clear pattern was found with respect to the effect of voting behaviour. Germany and Spain demonstrated significant effects in both periods. A greater political engagement and conventional political participation did not make a difference over time. Moreover, in the Netherlands, the effect increased from non-significant to significant, while in Sweden and Greece, it decreased from significant in 2008 to non-significant in 2010. In the case of Portugal, voting had no effect in any of the periods.

The effect of ideology was stable across time except in the Netherlands, whose citizens placed more to the left in 2010. The effect of ideology was stable, stronger and significant for all periods, mostly in those countries more intensely affected by the crisis, whereas in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, the effect of ideology was low, and even non-significant. It is also interesting to note that, on the scale, the sign of the effect on trust in political institutions was negative (more to the left) or non-significant, for non-crisis countries, while it was positive (more to the right) for countries in crisis. Interestingly, in those countries more affected by the crisis, those individuals more on the left demonstrated a greater trust in institutions; in those countries that experienced less crisis, those more to the right tended to demonstrate more trust.

Those countries less affected by the crisis had a negative and quite stable effect with respect to age; this means that the older the citizens were, the lower their trust in institutions. Conversely, in those countries more affected by crisis, the effect was positive, meaning that the older people got, the more they trusted institutions, although for Portugal and Spain this effect was non-significant (2008 in Portugal and 2010 in Spain), and the variation between periods was

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larger than that of non-crisis countries. The effect of age on trust in institutions seemed to be particularly strong and persistent in Greece.

For Germany and for the Netherlands, no gender differences existed in relation to trust in political institutions. In Sweden, there was no gender effect in 2008; however, in 2010, this effect was significant, with females demonstrating higher levels of trust. In Greece and Portugal, the situation was inverse, with a non-significant gender effect in 2010. In Spain, the gender effect (female) was larger than in the other countries.

Level of education does not seem to have a clear pattern across countries and over time. Contrary to our expectation, no effect related to education was found in Germany or in Greece. In the Netherlands, Sweden and Portugal, this effect was positive. In Spain, a negative effect was found (the more education, the less trust in political institutions) in 2008 but became non-significant in 2010. In the Netherlands, Sweden and Portugal, we found the expected effect of the level of education on trust in institutions, and in these countries this effect was also quite stable over time. In Germany and Greece, trust in political institutions seems to be stable across all levels of education. In the case of Greece, deep institutional distrust has impregnated all strata of population, and this may be the reason why no significant effect was found. A plausible reason for non-significant effects of education on trust in political institutions has to do with the distribution of the education variable in Germany and in Greece: we found that the lowest and highest levels of education show higher levels of trust in institutions than do the middle levels of education. Given these distributions, it is not possible to claim that the higher or the lower the educational level, the higher or lower the institutional trust; therefore, the effect remains non-significant.

From the analyses of all these differences on the effects of the predicting variables, H3 is supported, which claims that there clearly are significant differences in the effects of the predicting factors on trust in institutions between those countries which have been more intensely affected by the crisis and those countries which have experienced it with less intensity.

These results revealed that H2 can be confirmed by the countries more intensely affected by the crisis, since the predictors for trust in political institutions are not stable over time. Regarding the countries less affected, we observed that these factors tend to be more stable. Moreover, we also observed that short-term predictors focusing on performance evaluations are the ones which tend to be no longer constant, whereas long-term cultural factors are less sensitive to change. Precisely, these long-term predictors tend to be more relevant predictors in countries less affected by the crisis.

Conclusions

From the analyses carried out, we can draw several important conclusions regarding an understanding of how, when and where the crisis has affected trust in political institutions.

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First, we can conclude that, in all the countries analysed, the latent variable "trust in political institutions" is sustained over the two time periods examined, allowing us to compare the effects of the correlates by country and period.

A second relevant conclusion is that focusing on the variation in the latent means, the individuals' perception on the trust in political institutions between 2008 and 2010 in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Germany has eroded significantly as a result of the effects of the economic crisis. In the Netherlands, no significant variation was observed, and, in Sweden, the difference has been positive, meaning that, contrary to most countries, trust in political institutions has increased. We can also observe that this erosion of trust in institutions has clearly affected those countries which have experienced the crisis with more intensity. This confirms H1.

From the effects of trust in political institutions, we can conclude that the strongest predictors for trust in political institutions are generalized trust, interest in politics, satisfaction with the economy and satisfaction with government, age and level of education, with the exceptions of Greece and Germany, as previously explained. These effects are different depending on the extent to which the crisis has affected the countries. For those countries which have experienced the effects of the crisis more intensely, the most relevant predictors are trust in others, interest in politics (although with not as much impact as in those countries less affected by crisis), satisfaction with the economy, satisfaction with government (significantly stronger than in countries less affected by crisis) and ideology. In this sense, short-term performance evaluations, especially of the economy and the government, tend to be significantly more relevant over time in those countries affected by the crisis, reinforcing the expectation that trust in institutions, in a situation of crisis, is more sensitive to performance evaluations.

In addition, relevant differences between countries in crisis and those not in crisis might be age and level of education effects (relevant in countries where the crisis has hit with less intensity) and left–right scale effects (relevant for countries more affected by crisis).

Regarding the differences of the effects on the main predictors over time, we observed that most long-term predictors tend to be stable over time, even in those countries in which the crisis has been more acute. Conversely, short-term evaluations of performance, such as evaluations of the economic situation and of the government, tend to have stronger effects over time, which are particularly visible in countries that have experienced the crisis to a greater extent.

In conclusion, we may argue that the crisis has indeed eroded trust in political institutions, especially in those countries in which the crisis has been particularly acute, such as Portugal, Spain and Greece. The crisis has also made trust in political institutions very sensitive to short-term evaluations in these countries, whereas in the countries that have not experienced the crises so intensely, the people's trust in institutions rely more significantly on long-term factors, such as trust or political efficacy.

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Notes

1 A model with 12 groups (six countries at two time points) was studied. Goodness of model fit (not shown) presented a poor fit when comparing across countries and over time points; consequently, the model was not interpretable. Since the aim was to study the effects at specific points in time, six models with two groups were finally analysed.

2 Usually, the interpretation of estimates in social science studies is made using standardized coefficients for its best relationship interpretation for a model. However, standardized coefficients are not very useful for models when the goal is comparison across groups, because the original estimates are compared across groups; therefore, unstandardized estimates are used (Bollen, 1989; Brown, 2006; Byrne 2012).

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Part III

Values and attitudes in time of crisis

Nexus and variation over time

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4 Economic crisis, human values and political attitudes

Joakim Kulin and Alexander Seymer

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Introduction

European welfare states' redistributive schemes have been greatly challenged by the austerity policies implemented by the EU in response to the economic crisis (Bieling, 2012; Theodoropoulou and Watt, 2011). Despite the results from research indicating little institutional change so far (Armingeon, 2012; Vis *et al.*, 2011), economic development and labour markets in Europe are undeniably deteriorating, fuelling public demand for governments to increase public spending and expand social security programmes. Meanwhile, whereas immigration rates and ethnic diversity in the European countries have increased (Castles and Miller, 2003), the emergence of nationalistic parties in many national parliaments indicates that intolerant and culturally conservative sentiments are spreading across Europe. Hence, redistribution and immigration are two key social issues at the very heart of contemporary European politics. To further our understanding of European democracies, it is important to study public responses to the crisis in terms of their views on redistribution and immigration. In particular, it is crucial to increase the knowledge about the processes that drive attitude formation, i.e. why people hold the attitudes that they do, and to relate these processes to the crisis of 2008.

This chapter investigates how political attitudes form by examining which underlying values drive attitudes. More specifically, we investigate time trends in the relationship between basic human values and attitudes towards two of the most central political issues in contemporary Europe, redistribution and immigration. We argue that temporary changes in key contextual factors such as economic performance (e.g. GDP) and unemployment rates may have important implications for the values underlying public attitudes towards redistribution and immigration. In this chapter, we ask two sets of questions:

1 Do public attitudes become increasingly value driven as a consequence of the economic crisis? Does the crisis evoke particular values in relation to immigration and redistributive attitudes, or are some values suppressed by competing factors that mitigate the impact of values on attitudes? In other words, do we observe changes over time in how values influence political

attitudes, and can potential deviations from long-term trends be related to the economic crisis?

2 Are there differences in the types of values that underlie political attitudes across European countries? Does the relative importance of various values change as a response to the crisis? In other words, we are curious whether there are cross-country differences in how the crisis influences the relationship between values and attitudes.

To address these questions, we apply multi-group structural equation modelling (MGSEM) and growth curve modelling (GCM) to data from the first five rounds (2002–2010) of the European Social Survey (ESS) in order to estimate the effects of values on attitudes. Specifically, we focus on the higher-order value types of self-transcendence and conservation – the two most fundamental value dimensions in the theory of basic human values (Schwartz 1992) – and examine time trends in these dimensions' impacts on attitudes towards redistribution and immigration. In order to investigate national differences in how the crisis has influenced the values–attitudes link over time, we relate these trends to country-level contextual factors (GDP and unemployment) by contrasting countries that were hit harder by the crisis with those that performed better.

Theoretical framework and previous research

Although our main interest is sociological, we consider values to be potentially crucial components in the processes that lead to broader public-opinion patterns. Hence, although values are highly individualistic and psychological as a concept, they can have considerable consequences in the aggregate, and thus be of crucial sociological interest. In their most basic form, values are personal, abstract and motivational goals that guide attitudes and behaviour (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). According to the theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992), ten universal human value types can be identified that cluster into four higher-order types along two orthogonal dimensions: self-transcendence versus self-enhancement, and openness to change versus conservation. The *self-enhancement* higher-order value type refers to motivational goals promoting individual success, achievement, social recognition and power (in the theory, these are labelled "power and achievement values"). *Openness to change* comprises motivational goals promoting individual freedom, independence of thought and novelty (self-direction and stimulation). *Self-transcendence* refers to motivational goals promoting transcendence above the self in favour of the collective by focusing on equality and helping other people (universalism and benevolence) in opposition to self-enhancement values. Finally, the *conservation* higher-order value type encompasses motivational goals promoting social order and security while conforming to authority, conservative norms and traditions (conformity, tradition and security), thereby opposing openness to change values in the circular structure (for a detailed account, see Schwartz, 1992).

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Empirical tests show that the measurement instrument for basic human values, in addition to its theoretical appeal, displays cross-cultural validity; the same structure of values has been verified in most human cultures (Schwartz *et al*., 2001; see also Schwartz, 1992, 1994). As fairly stable predispositions closely linked to an individual's personality (Hitlin, 2003), values are clearly distinguished from attitudes, which relate to concrete objects and are therefore more volatile (see also Ajzen, 2001). In this sense, values constitute a universal set of abstract criteria that is drawn upon in order to evaluate specific objects (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).

This study aims to explore the relationship between basic values and political attitudes during times of economic crisis. Whereas values are relatively stable, their consequences for attitude formation are highly context-dependent, one reason it is especially important to consider situational factors when studying the values-attitudes link (Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995). While there are some studies investigating time trends in values or political attitudes (e.g. Edlund and Svallfors, 2011; Inglehart, 1997; Meuleman *et al*., 2009; Svallfors, 2004, 2011), very few studies focus on time trends in the *relationship between* attitudes and their underlying values (for a few exceptions, see, for example, Davidov *et al*., 2008; Kulin and Svallfors, 2013). Even fewer studies investigate which contextual factors may account for differences in the values-attitudes link across time (for an exception, see Davidov and Meuleman, 2012).

General expectations about crisis effects on the values-attitudes link are based on theories of institutional feedback (Mettler and Soss, 2004; Pierson, 1993) and symbolic politics (Sears, 1993; Sears *et al*., 1980). According to theories of institutional feedback, institutions are not only the result of parliamentary elections where public values and attitudes are seen as affecting the input side of politics, but institutions also constitute normalising and normative frameworks that shape values and attitudes (Mau, 2003; Rothstein, 1998; Svallfors, 1996, 2007). From this perspective, one would expect that failing labour markets, constricted productivity and growth, and austerity measures in basic social security programmes all might influence individual orientations such as values and attitudes. Furthermore, theories of symbolic politics and political articulation (Jacoby, 2000; Kumlin and Svallfors, 2008) stress that politicians invoke more fundamental values to promote specific political causes (Sears *et al*., 1980; Sears and Funk, 1991). This suggests that the way in which politicians frame political issues such as unemployment and budget deficits also has important implications for public opinion formation. Considering the austerity measures in the wake of the crisis as well as how politicians have framed its causes, consequences and remedies, it is very likely that a clear "crisis effect" is discernible when focusing on the values underlying attitudes towards redistribution and immigration. However, institutional change often lags, and we very likely have not yet seen the full institutional consequences of the crisis. Furthermore, regarding symbolic politics and political articulation, data on how politicians framed the crisis and its consequences are scarce. To the extent that such data exists (e.g. the Manifesto Project database, Volkens *et al*., 2013), it is only available for a limited number of countries at scattered time points.

There are, however, several contextual factors, such as GDP and unemployment, that can be directly linked to the presence of a crisis and thus serve as viable crisis indicators. Furthermore, several previous studies have corroborated the link between both GDP and unemployment, on the one hand, and political attitudes on the other (Jaeger, 2013; Pfeifer, 2009). Hence, we believe that these two contextual factors may have particular relevance to our problem. For instance, GDP not only serves as an indicator of the average productivity and prosperity of the people in a given country, it also hints at what resources governments can draw on when addressing various social issues such as poverty and immigration. From this perspective, the relevance of GDP for public opinion formation is quite clear, especially in relation to self-transcendence values, which concern the welfare of all people. For instance, under budgetary pressures it is more difficult to sustain generosity in social expenditure, hampering the extent to which the public perceives that self-transcendence values have been attained. Another more direct consequence of the crisis, which may have crucial implications for attitude formation, is unemployment. Since jobs become a scarce commodity under times of high unemployment, such as during a crisis, the existence or threat of unemployment during times of crisis may prompt certain values (such as security) more than others.

Whereas previous research on attitudes towards redistribution and immigration has very rarely studied their relationship to underlying values, the few studies that do this predominately employ cross-sectional analyses and devote little attention to changes in the values-attitudes link over time. However, a few studies related to redistribution and immigration are of particular interest here. In a study of class differences in the link between self-transcendence values (universalism and benevolence) and redistributive attitudes, Kulin and Svallfors (2011) find that these values among lower-class people have a weaker impact in countries where inequality and poverty levels are high than in countries with lower levels. This suggests that the influence of values is sensitive to material circumstances, which is in line with a body of literature supporting the idea that material conditions have important implications for values and their consequences in terms of more concrete attitudes (e.g. Welzel and Inglehart, 2008). For instance, Inglehart (1997) argues that people tend to hold more traditional and conservative values in the face of material insecurity. Based on these arguments, one might expect that self-transcendence values would have a weaker impact and conservation values a stronger impact on redistributive attitudes, especially in countries that were hit harder by the crisis in terms of unemployment rates and productivity decreases. On the other hand, it was frequently claimed, especially during the initial stages of the 2008 crisis, that capitalism was failing and that increased market regulation as well as more socially oriented reforms were needed (e.g. Streeck, 2011). This suggests that the crisis might in fact have elicited a stronger influence of self-transcendence values on redistributive attitudes as a response. The existence of two plausible yet contradicting scenarios, with regard to the effects of self-transcendence values on redistributive attitudes, certainly merits empirical investigation.

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In a second study using cross-sectional data from before the crisis and focusing on the relationship between values and attitudes towards immigration, Davidov *et al.* (2008) find that self-transcendence values were positively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes, and that conservation values were negatively correlated. Predictably, people who value the welfare of others are more likely to be in favour of immigration while people who value preserving the status quo will oppose it. However, the authors also identify substantial differences in effect sizes between countries related to cross-national differences in economic performance, among other factors. In low GDP countries, self-transcendence values generally had stronger positive effects and conservation values had stronger negative effects. Hence, contextual variables like GDP can simultaneously promote and impede various motivational goals and therefore have very mixed effects on attitudes. Based on these results, one might expect that the impact of self-transcendence values on attitudes towards immigration would increase and the negative effect of conservation would strengthen as a result of the crisis. This change should be particularly pronounced in countries that were hit harder by the crisis. In another paper, Davidov and Meuleman (2012) tested these hypotheses across time, with data from the first three ESS rounds between 2002 and 2006. They confirm their findings about the values-attitudes links from the earlier paper and find differences across countries and time but no empirical evidence for a link between the values–attitudes relationship and contextual factors such as GDP. However, the authors only had data points from before the crisis under a period of relative stability, especially compared to the crisis. This leads us to anticipate a possible relationship once contextual factors are studied over the more volatile period that also extends through and beyond the crisis.

Based on the arguments above, we expect a general crisis effect in the values–attitudes relationship in terms of deviations from long-term trends. Yet we also expect the crisis effect to differ across countries, depending on the country's performance during the crisis in terms of factors like GDP and unemployment. Hence we ask first whether there is a general crisis effect in terms of changes in the values–attitudes links following the crisis, and second whether there are cross-country differences in how the link between values and attitudes changes over time.

Concerning self-transcendence values and attitudes towards redistribution, we have dual hypotheses. While we hypothesise that the general effects of self-transcendence values on attitudes towards redistribution are positive, we ask whether self-transcendence values become increasingly important drivers of redistributive attitudes (H1a) or whether the crisis undermines this relationship (H1b). Concerning conservation values and redistributive attitudes, we hypothesise, based on the arguments above, that there is a positive effect and that it is strengthened as a response to the crisis (H2). When it comes to immigration attitudes, we hypothesise that there is a positive effect of self-transcendence values and a negative effect of conservation values on pro-immigration attitudes, and that these effects are accentuated by the crisis (H3 and H4). To the extent that a

general response to the crisis is detected, we explore these findings further by investigating the role of GDP and unemployment in explaining potential cross-country differences. If the crisis is responsible for the deviations from the long-term general trend in the link between values and redistribution/immigration attitudes, then these changes should be more accentuated in the low-performing countries, i.e. the countries with low GDP and high unemployment.

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Data and methods

Several international survey programmes such as the European Social Survey (ESS) have now continued over many years, enabling researchers to study key indicators, as well as relationships between them, over time. Nonetheless, studies that focus on time trends with regard to political attitudes are rare, and even rarer are studies that focus on temporal changes in the extent to which values influence attitudes. Considering the challenges following the crisis, the possibility of relating public values and attitudes to these changing societal characteristics becomes especially intriguing. We aim to take advantage of this situation by studying the relationship between basic human values and political attitudes in Europe across the time period from 2002 to 2010. Using multi-group structural equation and growth curve modelling, we analyse time trends in the impact of two higher-order value types from the theory of basic human values – self-transcendence and conservation values – on attitudes towards redistribution and immigration across national contexts.

In order to compare the relationship between value orientations and attitudes across time, we employ the first five rounds of the ESS, covering a period spanning before and after the crisis. Table 4.1 indicates the number of respondents for each country sample, as we included all countries with data available for all five rounds, which limits the number of countries to 16. All rounds of the ESS include the basic human values scale, a well-regarded and widely used theory-based measurement instrument for measuring values cross-nationally. Additionally, all rounds also include an item measuring redistributive attitudes as well as indicators for measuring immigration attitudes. To measure attitudes towards redistribution, we use an item asking respondents to what extent they agree with the statement "The government should take measures to reduce income differences", measured on a 5-point Likert scale where higher scores indicate stronger agreement (5=Completely agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 2=Disagree, 1=Completely disagree). To measure attitudes towards immigration, we model a latent variable with three indicators measuring the extent to which respondents would state that (1) immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live, (2) immigrants enrich or undermine cultural life and (3) immigration is bad or good for the economy. Each item is based on an 11-point scale coded so that higher scores represent pro-immigration attitudes. To measure values, the basic human values scale is used, based on items relating to the higher-order value types of self-transcendence and conservation. Self-transcendence values include benevolence and universalism and have five

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Table 4.1 Number of respondents by country and ESS round

Round	*BE*	*CH*	*DE*	*DK*	*ES*	*FI*	*FR*	*IE*	*NL*	*NO*	*PL*	*SE*	*SI*	*UK*
2002	1,861	2,004	2,876	1,403	1,618	1,973	1,487	1,977	2,341	2,030	2,050	1,947	1,495	2,024
2004	1,768	2,104	2,764	1,405	1,607	2,000	1,800	2,193	1,866	1,755	1,680	1,916	1,416	1,865
2006	1,794	1,787	2,824	1,461	1,845	1,877	1,976	1,741	1,871	1,746	1,671	1,886	1,435	2,358
2008	1,751	1,784	2,709	1,568	2,499	2,176	2,070	1,754	1,766	1,544	1,589	1,804	1,273	2,325
2010	1,700	1,490	2,980	1,536	1,864	1,858	1,721	2,531	1,816	1,540	1,717	1,470	1,376	2,336

Note
BE: Belgium; CH: Switzerland; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; ES: Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; IE: Ireland; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; PL: Poland; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; UK: United Kingdom.

manifest indicators, whereas conservation values include conformity, tradition and security and consist of six indicators. All value items are measured on a 6-point scale coded so that higher values correspond to a strong emphasis on each respective value. In Figure 4.1 we provide an example of our models representing the relationship between the two higher-order value types (conservation and self-transcendence) and attitudes towards redistribution. The estimated multi-group structural equation models (MGSEM) differ only in the attitude measure under consideration, where attitudes towards immigration are measured using a latent construct based on the three aforementioned indicators.

This study analyses 16 countries, which means that we run into the well-known small-*n* problem in statistical analysis. Instead of employing a multi-level model, we follow a two-step procedure to analyse the data. In a first step, we estimate a MGSEM model for each time point. In doing so, we impose measurement invariance for the value constructs across countries (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000), which means that factor loadings are set as equal across groups (countries) ensuring the comparability of our measurements across countries. As seen in Table 4.2 (Byrne, 2008), the model-fit measures all indicate a good fit of the data.

As we estimate the relationship between two value types and two attitudinal variables (four relationships) in five time-points across 16 countries, the original MGSEM results are not easy to interpret (see Figure 4.3). Thus in the second step, we estimate a growth curve model (GCM) based on the unstandardised regression weights obtained in the MGSEM by splitting the sample into high- and low-performing countries and analysing the changes in average effect sizes in each group across time points. Obviously, this growth curve model suffers in



Figure 4.1 Multi-group structural equation models including both latent value constructs and a generalised representation of the two different political attitudes.

Notes
Attitudes towards immigration are modelled as a latent variable. Three different indicators show a perfect model fit for measurement invariance across time and country samples (CFI = 0.992).
BE: benevolence; CO: conformity; SEC: security; TR: tradition; UN: universalism.

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detail and accuracy, but it provides a parsimonious and more easily interpreted picture of changes in the link between values and attitudes over time.

To be more precise, we arrange different groupings and compare three different GCMs for each grouping: a group with all countries pooled into one sample as well as two additional models that split the sample around the median of the grouping criteria. The GCM including all countries suggests the general trend over time based on the unstandardised regression coefficients of all countries and serves as reference point. Hence, we can also test for a general crisis effect since the development in the grouping with all countries can be interpreted as deviation from a linear long-term trend in the values–attitudes relationships. The two other models reflect differences across groups relative to this overall development. With a fair degree of caution, we can then interpret the deviations as a result of the group selection criteria.

In the theoretical section, we identify several country-level contextual features that may have important implications for the values–attitudes link and how that link changes over time, particularly in relation to the economic crisis of 2008. The analyses will focus on economic performance in terms of GDP per capita. However, since previous research has also identified unemployment as a crucial factor influencing both redistributive attitudes (Blekesaune, 2007) and trends in immigration attitudes (Meuleman *et al*., 2009), we will also include this macro-indicator in our analyses. Moreover, we employ a "maximum divergence approach", grouping countries according to the time trends in the values–attitudes links themselves: on one side, those that display a pronounced change in the values–attitudes links in relation to the crisis and, on the other side, those that were more resilient in this regard. By interpreting the results from the maximum divergence approach, we track the magnitude of the differences across countries and can compare the GDP-based and unemployment rate-based grouping to these figures. Consequently, we apply three different groupings for each value–attitude relationship: GDP per capita, unemployment rates and the values–attitudes relationships themselves. All three together enable us to draw some conclusions about the deviations from the general trend and whether those deviations might be related to the crisis.

The calculations for assigning countries to groups are mathematically similar across the different grouping characteristics. We assign countries to groups by comparing their scores to the median – separating countries that are higher than the median (Hi) from those lower than the median (Lo) – for the post-crisis year of 2010. For instance, the median of the GDP per capita identifies the position of each country as above (Hi) or below (Lo) the GDP median. Also for the maximum divergence approach, the median of the values–attitudes links differentiates the countries into the two groups. Table 4.3 summarises the grouping for all countries and grouping criteria.

To account for changes over time, we estimate a GCM according to the standard definition, which is essentially a two-factor model with cross-loadings where both factors are defined by all different time points. In our GCM model, the regression weights from the five different MGSEMs are treated as the manifest

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Table 4.2 Model fit statistics for MGSEMs[1]

	Redistribution MGSEMs[2]						*Immigration MGSEMs*					
	CMIN	*DF*	*CMIN/DF*	*CFI*	*RMSEA*	*PCLOSE*	*CMIN*	*DF*	*CMIN/DF*	*CFI*	*RMSEA*	*PCLOSE*
ESS1	5,413.947	817	6.627	0.916	0.015	1	8,299.916	1,179	7.040	0.913	0.015	1
ESS2	5,070.050	817	6.206	0.918	0.015	1	7,390.238	1,179	6.268	0.925	0.015	1
ESS3	5,576.671	817	6.826	0.907	0.015	1	8,213.818	1,179	6.967	0.916	0.015	1
ESS4	5,621.955	817	6.881	0.911	0.015	1	7,711.486	1,179	6.541	0.925	0.015	1
ESS5	5,970.094	817	7.307	0.906	0.016	1	8,017.279	1,179	6.800	0.923	0.015	1

Notes

1 We test for measurement invariance of all latent constructs across time and countries with a slightly smaller CFI = 0.9 for value constructs and a CFI = 0.992 for immigration attitude. Redistribution attitude was measured using a single item and not as a latent construct.

2 In the models with attitudes towards redistribution, paths towards redistribution item are freely estimated and not constrained to be equal across groups. Furthermore, based on the modification indices, a theoretically justified correlation is introduced between the error terms of security items and both of universalism items. A detailed account of the models can be obtained from the authors (alexander.seymer@sbg.ac.at).

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Table 4.3 Grouping of countries by values–attitudes relationship, GDP per capita and unemployment rate

Group	*BE*	*CH*	*DE*	*DK*	*ES*	*FI*	*FR*	*GB*	*IE*	*NL*	*NO*	*PL*	*SE*	*SI*
ST ⇒ RED	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Hi	Lo	Lo	Hi	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo
CO ⇒ RED	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Lo	Lo	Lo	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Hi	Hi	Hi
ST ⇒ IMM	Hi	Hi	Hi	Lo	Hi	Hi	Lo	Lo	Lo	Hi	Hi	Lo	Lo	Lo
CO ⇒ IMM	Hi	Lo	Lo	Lo	Lo	Lo	Hi	Hi	Hi	Lo	Lo	Hi	Hi	Hi
GDP (PPP)	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Lo	Hi	Hi	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo
Unemployment	Hi	Lo	Lo	Lo	Hi	Hi	Hi	Lo	Hi	Lo	Lo	Hi	Hi	Lo

Notes
ST: self-transcendence; CO: conservation; RED: redistribution attitude; IMM: immigration attitude; Hi: above median of 2010; Lo: below median of 2010; Unemployment: unemployment rate in percent.

variables while two latent constructs represent the initial level factor and the growth factor (see Kline, 2011; Reinecke, 2005). The factor loadings of the initial level factor capture what is known as intercept in regression analysis, while the factor loadings for the growth factor can be understood as the slope.[1] As in a regression equation, the intercept is defined as the common start value, so all factor loadings for the initial level factor are set to 1 for all five time-points. However, in a linear regression model, the link between slope and time points is defined as continuous linear growth. In a GCM, the factor loadings, and therefore the growth or slope, can be freely specified or even estimated. In our example, a linear growth from time point 1 to 5 can be defined by setting the factor loadings to any numerical series with constant steps, using the smallest number for the factor loading for time point 1 and the highest number for time point 5. Often the first time point is coded to 0 and the last time point to 1, defining the steps as equally spread in that space. In the context of five points a linear growth of the slope is defined by factor loadings of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1.

The advantage of GCM over standard regression estimation is that the slope can be fitted to the data, allowing us to estimate growth. As we are mainly interested in estimating the trends for 2008 and 2010, we estimate the respective parameters for time points 4 and 5 freely. More precisely, the factor loadings for the first time point of the slope is fixed to 0, for the second time point 0.25 and for the third time 0.5 (see Figure 4.2). We estimated the predicted regression weights based on the factor loadings of the slope in the GCM and the means of the slope and intercept. Our interpretation is based on these predicted regression weights, which we refer to as values–attitudes relationships over time based on a GCM estimation. The results can only be understood as descriptive time trends, but as we are more interested in national differences, our main focus is on differences between the various groupings applied.



Figure 4.2 Growth curve models based on the regression weights derived from the MGSEM.

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Results

In analysing the data, our aim is to investigate the consequences of the economic crisis for attitude formation by focusing on the link between values and attitudes over this time period. First, we expect a general crisis effect in the values–attitudes relationship in terms of deviations from more stable long-term trends, depending on crisis performance in terms of GDP and unemployment. Concerning self-transcendence values and attitudes towards redistribution, we have dual hypotheses: either self-transcendence values become increasingly important drivers of redistributive attitudes (H1a), or the crisis undermines this relationship (H1b). Our second hypothesis (H2) refers to the link between conservation values and redistributive attitudes, which we expect to be strengthened as a response to the crisis. When it comes to immigration attitudes, we hypothesise that there is a positive effect of self-transcendence (H3) and a negative effect of conservation on pro-immigration attitudes (H4). Further, we investigate the role of two crucial crisis indicators – GDP and unemployment – in explaining potential cross-country differences. If the crisis is responsible for the deviations from the general trend regarding the link between values and redistribution/immigration attitudes, it should be explained, at least partly, by GDP and unemployment levels.

We start the analyses using MGSEM to estimate the effects of self-transcendence and conservation values on attitudes towards redistribution and immigration. This way we obtain country-level effect sizes for each country separately. We then proceed by using growth curve models throughout the remainder of the analyses in order to identify deviations from longer-term trends more clearly. This enables us to isolate and distinguish short-term fluctuations in the values–attitudes links, as would be expected if the crisis has an impact, from longer-term time trends in the values–attitudes link.

Figure 4.3 displays the results of the multi-group structural equation models. Four diagrams show each of the values-attitudes relationships across the five time points (ESS 1–5) in 14 countries. The diagrams reveal a mixed picture. As seen in the first two diagrams (ST⇒RED and CO⇒RED), the relationships between the two higher-order value types and redistributive attitudes appear fairly similar in strength and relatively constant across time in most countries. The effects of self-transcendence values on redistributive attitudes are positive ranging from 0.1 to 0.5 and mostly significant in most countries, and the effects of conservation values are around 0 in most countries (see Appendix A for details). Consequently, people who hold self-transcendence values are generally more positive towards redistribution. Only Poland (the lowest trend line in the first diagram of Figure 4.3) and Slovenia (the second lowest trend line in the same diagram) deviate from this picture.[2] As seen in the last two diagrams (ST⇒IMM and CO⇒IMM), the relationships between the two higher-order value types and immigration attitudes display a more dispersed pattern. Here, countries differ considerably in effect sizes, and potential crisis effects are clearly visible (for instance in Poland, Germany or Switzerland). However,

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

Figure 4.3 MGSEM results for all value attitude relationships across time for all 16 countries (for details see Appendix Tables 4.A1 and 4.A2).

change is not always in the same direction nor do the lines over all five time points reveal a clear pattern across countries. Hence, some countries show an upward trend while others show a downward trend. We also discern some pronounced shifts in Round 4.

Based on the relatively complex picture in the diagrams of Figure 4.3, we conclude that it is very likely that there are similarities in trends and shifts in some countries, but that opposing shifts and trends in other countries may obscure them. One might argue that the graphical representation indicates random fluctuations rather than clear shifts and trends. We believe, however, that a more formal test is required to make such a claim. Therefore, we proceed by grouping the countries according to the approach laid out in the data and methods section, and employ growth curve models to assess with more confidence whether and where a crisis effect exists.

Figure 4.4 shows the results regarding the effects of self-transcendence values on redistributive attitudes for the three different groupings with a total of seven different time trends; the reference trend including all countries without grouping (straight line, identical in all three diagrams) and six grouping-based trend lines (dotted for Hi/above-median and dashed for Lo/below-median countries, i.e. two in each diagram). The time trend for all countries is identical in all charts, as no grouping is applied, and is best understood as a point of reference identifying the general pattern in terms of the time trend for all countries. The line indicates a continuous decrease in the influence of self-transcendence on redistributive attitudes from ESS1 to ESS3, but then breaks from this trend in Round 4. In Round 5, however, the impact of values reverts to the general trend, although we lack data from future rounds to fully support such a claim. Still, we can conclude that ESS4 deviates from the otherwise approximately linear trend.

This suggests that we can confirm H1a, as self-transcendence values are more closely correlated with attitudes towards redistribution in Round 4. There is no evidence for H1b as the trend over time is almost linear with exception of the deviation in Round 4, which is a shared trend across all countries. All groupings result in very similar time trends, with a clear deviation from the linear trend in Round 4, followed by a return to it in Round 5. For the maximum divergence approach and GDP, the deviation in Round 4 is less accentuated in the Hi group. For unemployment, we also find that the influence of self-transcendence values decreases considerably in Round 5 for this group. In general, however, the groupings do not yield substantively different results compared to the time trends for the pooled sample (straight line). Hence, when it comes to the influence of self-transcendence values on redistributive attitudes, we cannot find any considerable cross-national differences with regard to how the crisis moderates this relationship. Instead, it seems as if the crisis had a very similar effect on the influence of self-transcendence values on redistributive attitudes, with an initial increase in importance in 2008 followed by a return towards the linear trend (weaker influence) in 2010. Our interpretation is that the crisis had a general effect on the link between self-transcendence values and redistributive attitudes. More self-transcendence-oriented individuals also became more supportive of

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

Figure 4.4 GCM estimates for self-transcendence value effects on redistributive attitudes across time for three different groupings.

redistribution as a direct response to the crisis, after which it was "business as usual" in the sense that the influence of self-transcendence values reverted to pre-crisis levels.

Turning to the effects of conservation values on redistributive attitudes, Figure 4.5 shows a slightly different picture. First, the general trend for all countries

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

Figure 4.5 GCM estimates for conservation value effects on redistribution attitudes across time for three different groupings.

indicates an increasing influence of conservation values on attitudes towards redistribution over time, with a clear deviation in Round 4 where the influence of conservation values decrease considerably followed by a recovery to the linear trend in Round 5. This trend is slightly more pronounced for countries with a GDP below the median and an unemployment rate above the median. This

finding matches our expectation from H2, as we interpret the deviation in Round 4 as a shock and the results of Round 5 as response. Meanwhile the results for better-performing countries are the intriguing deviations from the general trend across countries. The well-performing countries (the above-median GDP group) have an astonishingly stable time trend all the way up to ESS4, while the below-median group shows some clear divergence towards weaker links between conservation values and redistributive attitudes in Round 4. Interestingly, the trend alters between ESS4 and ESS5 as well-performing countries display a decrease in the importance of conservation values for redistributive attitudes. Meanwhile, during the same period, countries with less favourable conditions return to the linear time trend, whereby the importance of conservation values increases. The maximum divergence approach separates the two groups almost perfectly; in comparison to the corresponding chart in Figure 4.4, both groups diverge in Round 4 in a clear and consistent manner. Consequently, both changes over time and cross-national differences in the relationships between values and redistributive attitudes are more pronounced for conservation values than for self-transcendence values. However, since the effects of self-transcendence values are comparably larger than those of conservation values, and therefore have considerable implications for redistributive attitudes, one should perhaps assign greater importance to the relatively smaller shifts in the link between self-transcendence values and attitudes towards redistribution.

Summing up the results thus far, we find a similar general pattern across both value dimensions with a rather linear development and a clear deviation from the linear trend in Round 4. For the crisis countries, we find a substitution effect as the importance of self-transcendence values decreases while the importance of conservation values increases over time. In other words, it seems that values remain similarly important after the crisis, yet with a slight shift from self-transcendence towards conservation values. Hence, conservative values are becoming more important drivers of redistributive attitudes, while people do not seem to draw as heavily on self-transcendence values when making up their minds about redistribution. Due to the post-crisis deviations as well as the pronounced patterns in low-performing countries (with low GDP and high unemployment), we believe that a clear link can be made to the 2008 crisis. Finally, although the magnitude of the values-attitudes links is subject to discussion, we surmise that our results confirm hypotheses H1a and H2.

The below-median group in our maximum divergence approach for the link between self-transcendence values and redistributive attitudes consists of Belgium, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Poland and Slovenia (see Table 4.3). With the probable exception of Germany, all of these countries faced severe challenges throughout the crisis while the countries sampled in the other group showed more stable trends. Even Poland, which performed rather well in macroeconomic terms, was severely affected by the crisis (Trapmann and Meardi, 2013). Based on the theory of human values, we would expect a similar grouping for the links between conservation values and redistributive attitudes, except that countries grouped into the above-median group for self-transcendence

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should fall into the below-median group for conservation. In general, our findings confirm this expectation with some minor deviations, as Spain and the United Kingdom fall into the below-median group both times and Norway and Sweden fall into the above-median group both times. Thus values are more important in the two Scandinavian countries, while the value–attitude links are the least pronounced in Spain and the United Kingdom compared to the other countries. As the maximum divergence approach differentiates the countries in line with the GDP and unemployment rate grouping, we conclude that the relevance of values for redistribution attitudes and the observed shifts is clearly related to the economic developments in 2008. Countries with lower economic performance (lower GDP and higher unemployment) show an immediate response in 2008 while better-performing countries demonstrate a delayed change in the values–attitudes relationship.

We now continue by investigating time trends in the relationship between values and immigration attitudes. Theoretically, an economic crisis could lead to closure effects in societies that we would expect to go along with a decreasing prominence of self-transcendence and an increasing influence of conservation values. Figure 4.6 displays striking results, as the model for all countries indicates stability over time while the groupings show clear differences in terms of time trends. To be more precise, the values–attitudes links can be considered equal across time in the model for all countries. The maximum divergence approach reveals the relevance of the difference with a wide gap opening at ESS4 and continuing to broaden over ESS5. At this point, a weakness of our approach may mislead the reader as the two groups, below-median and above-median, are estimated in one multi-group model with equality constraints for the first three time points. Hence, the difference from the first three time points between the all-countries model and the multi-group model is due to the freely estimated factor loadings for time points 4 and 5. In other words, although the above-median group seems to fluctuate, the real change over time is overstated. We interpret these movements as fluctuations around the constant all-countries model and therefore as less of a deviation than that of the below-median group, which shows a clear change in the values–attitudes link.

Comparing the maximum divergence approach to the GDP grouping, we conclude that GDP partially explains the trends, as the gap is much smaller than in the maximum divergence figure. Richer countries as measured by GDP per capita (above-median group) seem to be more stable in the link between self-transcendence values and attitudes towards immigration compared to poorer countries, indicating an increasing influence of self-transcendence values. However, the results for unemployment appear contradictory, as countries with higher unemployment rates show greater stability compared to the group with lower unemployment rates, for whom the influence of values increases. The link between self-transcendence values and immigration attitudes seems highly stable across time when considering all countries, while grouping along the values–attitudes links reveals clear differences. As we find changes over time only in the below-median groups, the results indicate that for better-performing countries,

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

Figure 4.6 GCM estimates for self-transcendence value effects on immigration attitudes across time for three different groupings.

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unemployment seems to strengthen the values–attitudes link, while GDP seems more relevant for crisis-inflicted countries. Consequently, we see H3 partially confirmed in the sense that the crisis can be related to the shift, given that all countries show crisis affects either related to GDP or unemployment rate. Furthermore, the general trend for all countries is stable over time, indicating that

the increasing importance of self-transcendence values for pro-immigration attitudes is relatively weak compared to the more dominant stable trends.

Finally, we investigate the relationship between conservation values and immigration attitudes and find only minor changes over time in Figure 4.7. Over the first three rounds, the relevance of conservation values for immigration attitudes increases slightly. At Round 4, we identify a general shift for all groups

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

Figure 4.7 GCM estimates for conservation value effects on immigration attitudes across time for three different groupings.

except the below-median group in the unemployment rate chart, which we interpret as a clear crisis effect. Nonetheless, the maximum divergence approach fails to differentiate as cleanly as the GDP grouping, whereas only the unemployment rate chart illustrates group differences comparable to Figure 4.6. Countries with lower unemployment rates display a continuous increase in the importance of conservation values for immigration attitudes, while we identify a crisis effect lowering the impact of conservation values in countries with higher unemployment rates. The shift in the levels from ESS3 to ESS4 contradicts our expectations from H4 in terms of the direction of the effect, since the relationship values and attitudes weaken rather than strengthen. Nonetheless, the shift itself supports our idea of a clear crisis effect and the results for countries with low unemployment levels also match our expectations.

Although the directions and magnitudes of the effects reveal only partial support for our hypotheses, the strongest evidence for a crisis effect rests in the comparison of the different groups. We consider the changes in the time trends to be more severe for countries with high unemployment or low GDP per capita. Consequently, we conclude that the relevance of values for redistribution and immigration attitudes changes under crisis conditions, i.e. more unfavourable economic circumstances such as lower GDP and higher unemployment. Concurrently, people living in better-performing countries (relatively speaking) display greater stability in the time trends of value–attitude relationships, with a slight decrease in value relevance over a longer period. We therefore interpret the general results as confirmation of our argument that the relationship between values and the political attitudes under investigation is indeed susceptible to influence by crisis conditions.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we investigated the evolving value basis of attitudes towards the two central political issues in contemporary Europe, redistribution and immigration. More specifically, we studied the influence of self-transcendence and conservation values on these attitudes and how they were impacted by the economic crisis in 2008. All in all, our results strongly indicate that the link between values and attitudes was markedly affected by the crisis. In the link between values and redistributive attitudes, we found an immediate response to the crisis with a shift back towards the initial trend in ESS5. In contrast to these findings, the crisis effect on the link between values (in particular self-transcendence) and attitudes towards immigration appears more durable, lingering into Round 5. Meanwhile, we interpret the response in the value basis of redistributive attitudes as a shorter burst, which relaxed as early as 2010. The argument for such a burst is somewhat supported by the fuzzy relationship between GDP or unemployment rates and the time trends. The change in the value basis of immigration attitudes seems more substantial and more visibly correlated with GDP and unemployment rates. In fact, the maximum divergence grouping reveals a huge divide between countries regarding the link between self-transcendence values and

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immigration attitudes. In particular, time trends for this link are clearly related to economic performance. Accordingly, we consider the post-crisis change of the value basis of immigration attitudes to be more clearly correlated with economic circumstances than the value basis of redistribution attitudes, which is more clearly correlated with the actual strength of the value–attitude relationship.

While we believe that we have shed some light on the possible evolution of the value basis behind some of the most crucial political attitudes in contemporary Europe, we also believe that more empirical research is needed to confirm our results. Furthermore, we are also aware of several limitations of our approach. For instance, running a GCM on a small-n sample and then splitting it up into two groups bears some significant risks of misinterpretation. Still, besides the fact that our results may not be applicable to each and every country under consideration, it is fairly reasonable to assume that our results reflect the general trends in European countries, especially since we carefully estimate GCMs based on four different MGSEMs, which are highly reliable and comparable between countries. Meanwhile, the findings are also largely consistent with our expectations. It should be noted, however, that we make no claims regarding the time trends in the attitudes themselves, but focus on the influence of values on attitudes and how that influence evolves over time. In addition, we only interpret the result from the GCM graphically in a comparative manner as deviations from the general trend. Accordingly, the extent to which our results can be generalised is limited, and even the interpretation of the developments from Round 4 to Round 5 has to be considered with caution as further data points are needed to support our claims.

Beyond the methodological arguments of our approach, our results are in line with previous research to a great extent. The relationships between self-enhancement and conservation and immigration attitudes recall the results from Davidov *et al.* (2008), who find similarly directed relationships along with an association with GDP. Although our results confirm the findings of Davidov and Meuleman (2012), we are hesitant to compare the studies since they base their theoretical considerations on group threat theory and use an empirical measure relating to the inflow of immigrants rather than the perceived consequences of immigration. Hence, while Davidov and Meuleman (2012) find no link between contextual factors and the value–attitude link, we do not necessarily see any conflict between our results. With respect to the relationship between values and attitudes towards redistribution, we had dual hypotheses. Our findings support the second hypothesis, since the general trend in the declining relevance of self-transcendence values is only half of the story, as conservation values actually seem to be substituting in for them. Despite the time trends themselves, this substitution effect is perhaps one of our most important findings.

Our results reveal at least three directions for future research. First, as previously stated, the results need validation with more data points. This could be achieved either by including future ESS rounds or alternate data sets covering the crisis period. However, this is not easy to achieve, considering the absence of international survey programmes that measure values on the basis of reliable and

theoretically grounded measurement instruments. Hence, including future rounds of the ESS would be a fruitful way to confirm whether the crisis did in fact have longer-term effects. Second, while the relationship between self-transcendence values and redistributive attitudes peaked in 2008, we find little support for the idea that this is caused by hard crisis factors such as GDP and unemployment rates. However, in a recent study using data from ESS Round 4, Kulin and Seymer (2014) provide evidence of a clear link between political articulation at the country level and the relationship between values and socio-political attitudes (e.g. attitudes towards redistribution and immigration), which suggests that the peak in 2008 might actually be explained by a shift in how politicians frame these issues cross-nationally. Finally, the substitution effect needs further examination as it seems to contradict arguments from the value change literature (e.g. Inglehart, 1997), where attitudes are supposed to be less driven by conservation values. Our results indicate a stable relevance of values for redistribution attitudes, but with a substitution of conservation values for self-transcendence values in the long run. Hence, we strongly encourage future research that delves deeper into the extent, as well as the underlying mechanisms, of this substitution process and how it evolves in relation to larger societal trends and shifts such as the 2008 crisis.

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Appendix A: MGSEM results with measurement invariance across countries

Table 4.A1 Unstandardized effects of self-transcendence and conservation values on redistribution attitudes

Self-transcendence						*Conservation*					
Country	*Round*					*Country*	*Round*				
	ESS1	*ESS2*	*ESS3*	*ESS4*	*ESS5*		*ESS1*	*ESS2*	*ESS3*	*ESS4*	*ESS5*
BE	0.131	0.204	0.454	0.244	0.247	BE	0.127	0.145	0.055	0.094	0.085
CH	0.302	0.415	0.421	0.225	0.368	CH	–0.068	0.010	0.077	0.035	–0.018
DE	0.267	0.210	0.106	0.086	0.279	DE	0.058	0.057	0.084	0.161	0.080
DK	0.167	0.168	0.345	0.501	0.415	DK	0.070	–0.064	–0.051	–0.067	0.061
ES	0.288	0.276	0.160	0.236	0.298	ES	0.000	–0.149	0.104	0.014	0.016
FI	0.480	0.491	0.253	0.434	0.081	FI	0.007	–0.001	0.102	–0.064	0.113
FR	0.237	0.316	0.399	0.295	0.375	FR	–0.027	–0.116	–0.055	–0.034	–0.030
GB	0.340	0.362	0.064	0.318	0.158	GB	–0.056	0.045	0.083	0.060	0.009
IE	0.172	0.354	0.148	0.078	0.066	IE	0.089	–0.111	0.098	0.142	0.209
NL	0.364	0.591	0.169	0.146	0.408	NL	–0.060	–0.138	–0.040	0.140	–0.027
NO	0.297	0.337	0.300	0.258	0.266	NO	0.072	0.026	0.032	0.121	0.066
PL	–0.446	–0.349	–0.674	–0.550	–0.899	PL	0.522	0.568	0.748	0.588	0.923
SE	0.212	0.352	0.434	0.300	0.221	SE	0.037	0.088	0.003	0.039	0.101
SI	0.084	0.056	–0.277	0.094	–0.088	SI	0.247	0.253	0.458	0.139	0.354

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Table 4.A2 Unstandardized effects of self-transcendence and conservation values on immigration attitudes

Self-transcendence						*Conservation*					
Country	*Round*					*Country*	*Round*				
	ESS1	*ESS2*	*ESS3*	*ESS4*	*ESS5*		*ESS1*	*ESS2*	*ESS3*	*ESS4*	*ESS5*
BE	–1.442	–1.777	–1.542	–1.499	–0.949	BE	1.057	1.429	1.171	1.256	0.632
CH	–1.114	–1.223	–1.246	–0.813	–1.092	CH	0.773	0.913	0.925	0.709	1.016
DE	–1.346	–1.790	–1.566	–1.652	–1.766	DE	0.985	1.015	0.903	1.250	1.090
DK	–1.654	–1.597	–1.640	–1.476	–1.841	DK	0.992	1.083	1.167	1.112	1.095
ES	–1.246	–1.380	–1.366	–1.510	–1.472	ES	0.873	1.128	0.995	1.035	1.109
FI	–1.420	–1.537	–1.515	–1.314	–1.506	FI	0.901	1.038	1.111	0.895	0.934
FR	–1.891	–1.729	–1.956	–1.622	–1.890	FR	1.468	1.454	1.751	1.375	1.548
GB	–1.782	–1.591	–1.891	–1.520	–1.808	GB	1.366	1.003	1.515	1.160	1.171
IE	–1.796	–2.150	–1.244	–1.498	–1.787	IE	1.312	1.328	0.851	1.188	1.372
NL	–1.371	–1.412	–1.354	–1.198	–1.142	NL	1.003	0.950	0.893	0.901	0.771
NO	–1.434	–1.524	–1.197	–1.214	–0.953	NO	1.027	1.183	1.100	0.820	0.624
PL	–1.971	–2.087	–2.518	–1.187	–1.765	PL	1.362	1.548	1.614	0.718	1.331
SE	–1.487	–1.716	–1.707	–1.709	–1.680	SE	0.923	1.204	1.190	1.153	1.080
SI	–1.183	–1.693	–2.146	–2.199	–2.654	SI	1.065	1.446	1.359	1.792	1.784

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Appendix B: GDP per capita and unemployment rate figures

Table 4.B1 GDP per capita according to the multi-level dataset by European Social Survey (ESS5e2 Multilevel Data)

Country	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*
BE	22,767.39	24,654.37	30,250.72	34,922.24	36,224.87	38,167.10	43,585.65	47,822.34	44,356.12	43,814.79
CH	35,375.69	38,403.92	44,484.49	49,311.30	50,232.83	52,385.42	57,716.10	66,446.84	64,590.91	68,880.22
DE	22,830.55	24,343.44	29,384.10	33,036.82	33,513.80	35,169.43	40,280.65	43,936.66	40,029.36	39,857.06
DK	29,961.57	32,376.93	39,488.02	45,317.67	47,546.49	50,412.44	56,940.97	62,115.25	55,915.38	55,830.23
ES	14,941.06	16,590.90	21,018.96	24,438.29	26,043.51	28,051.51	32,327.36	35,305.54	32,080.38	30,542.83
FI	24,022.47	25,992.48	31,497.38	36,149.19	37,302.35	39,460.49	46,523.15	51,153.01	45,062.04	44,501.71
FR	21,891.51	23,595.20	28,916.63	32,936.52	34,001.85	35,668.82	40,585.70	44,245.11	40,772.91	39,545.88
GB	24,886.05	27,160.55	31,212.41	36,756.58	37,880.97	40,380.83	46,191.41	43,021.71	35,219.85	36,326.76
HU	5,176.46	6,534.27	8,242.96	10,081.28	10,937.09	11,181.45	13,552.51	15,389.67	12,660.32	12,883.98
IE	27,342.45	31,405.36	39,674.57	45,756.67	48,888.39	52,921.97	60,577.82	60,570.17	50,564.20	46,220.28
NL	25,113.73	27,285.86	33,356.15	37,589.31	39,156.87	41,378.30	47,591.33	52,766.02	47,914.53	46,909.68
NO	37,865.64	42,315.81	49,380.69	56,371.67	65,324.05	72,123.80	82,070.04	93,156.84	76,679.92	84,588.70
PL	4,976.14	5,183.80	5,675.70	6,621.30	7,963.10	8,949.29	11,132.03	13,851.72	11,256.34	12,263.18
PT	11,564.06	12,653.63	15,422.62	17,589.03	18,131.83	19,008.08	21,845.87	23,689.20	21,975.71	21,437.60
SE	25,612.05	28,191.97	35,220.98	40,330.95	41,041.71	43,899.30	50,485.10	52,632.39	43,347.46	48,906.21
SI	10,309.36	11,618.42	14,616.79	16,936.17	17,840.30	19,405.60	23,507.06	27,058.15	24,235.28	23,109.83

Table 4.B2 Unemployment rate in per cent for all age groups according to multi-level dataset by European Social Survey (ESS5e2 Multilevel Data)

Country	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*
BE	6.6	7.5	8.2	8.4	8.4	8.2	7.5	7.0	7.9	8.3
CH	2.5	2.9	4.1	4.3	4.4	4.0	3.7	3.3	4.1	4.5
DE	7.8	8.5	9.8	10.7	11.1	10.2	8.6	7.5	7.7	7.1
DK	4.6	4.6	5.4	5.5	4.8	3.9	3.8	3.3	6.0	7.4
ES	10.5	11.5	11.5	11.0	9.2	8.5	8.3	11.3	18.0	20.1
FI	9.1	9.1	9.0	8.8	8.4	7.7	6.9	6.4	8.2	8.4
FR	9.1	9.2	8.9	9.3	9.3	9.3	8.4	7.8	9.5	9.7
GB	5.0	5.1	5.0	4.7	4.8	5.4	5.3	5.6	7.6	7.8
HU	5.7	5.8	5.9	6.1	7.2	7.5	7.4	7.8	10.0	11.2
IE	3.9	4.4	4.7	4.5	4.3	4.4	4.6	6.0	11.7	13.5
NL	2.3	2.8	3.7	4.6	4.7	3.9	3.2	2.8	3.4	4.5
NO	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.4	3.4	2.5	2.5	3.1	3.5
PL	18.2	19.9	19.6	19.0	17.7	13.9	9.6	7.1	8.2	9.6
PT	4.0	5.0	6.3	6.7	7.6	7.7	8.0	7.6	9.5	10.8
SE	4.8	5.1	5.7	6.5	7.5	7.1	6.2	6.2	8.4	8.4
SI	6.2	6.3	6.7	6.3	6.5	6.0	4.8	4.4	5.9	7.2

Notes

1 For the sake of simplicity, the initial level factor will be referred to as the intercept and the growth factor as the slope. Another set of terms often used is initial status and change.

2 Whereas Poland and Slovenia are the only countries that display substantial and positive effects of conservation values on redistributive attitudes, the effect is stronger in Poland. This means that in these two countries, people who hold conservation values tend to be more positive towards redistribution. Both countries indicate a possible crisis effect, as an increase in the effects can be found up to the third round, with a considerable drop in the fourth round followed by a recovery in the fifth round. It should be noted that other patterns might exist among the more similar countries, which are not discernable from visually observing the diagram. Considering the generally positive effects of self-transcendence values in most countries, the negative effect in Poland is particularly conspicuous, for which we do not currently have an explanation. We will return to this issue in the next section, where we analyse the trends in countries that share similar characteristics in terms of how they experienced the crisis.

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5 Economic crisis, human values and attitudes towards immigrants

Alice Ramos, Cicero Roberto Pereira and Jorge Vala

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The importance of studying threat perceptions associated with immigrants

Recent decades have seen some European countries experiencing a new wave of migratory rates that have sustained economic growth and simultaneously contributed to changes in the patterns of customs, life styles, values and religions. Alongside this new European setting, ambivalent positions in the attitude domain have emerged. This occurs because in contemporary democratic societies people are embedded within cultural environments that disseminate a social discourse stressing that good people are egalitarian and non-discriminatory.

The normative discourse of anti-racism and tolerance towards immigrants has become more salient and an increasing number of people do not feel comfortable, or 'educated', simply saying that people from other 'races' or ethnic groups are inferior. These feelings are motivated by egalitarian values that people have integrated into their self-concept and they therefore consider that acting in a prejudiced-based manner may lead to them receiving negative reactions with damaging personal and social consequences. For instance, when people are asked why they are not in favour of more immigrants entering their country, they tend to deny the prejudiced base of their opposition. Otherwise, they would be acting inconsistently with the anti-prejudice norm prescribing that the correct way to act is to promote egalitarianism and fight discrimination. However, individuals can reframe the meaning of their opposition to immigration by saying that it is not motivated by prejudice but rather that it reflects their genuine concern about the values, customs and traditions of their country. They may even argue that the socio-economic situation of the country means that it can no longer receive more people because immigration rates increase competition for very scarce resources (see Pereira *et al*., 2010; Stephan and Stephan, 2000).

These strategies indicate that there exist alternative ways to transmit concern about the presence of the 'Other' which are perceived as more 'correct'. Instead of arguing that immigrants have a natural inferiority compared to the country's citizens, people say that those humans are so different from 'us' that a co-existence without tension is impossible. In other words, people tend to use the perception that immigrants represent a threat as a justification for the discriminating attitudes

they hold against them, and they do so because threat perceptions are conceived as a legitimate argument to discriminate against out-group members (see Crandall *et al*., 2002; LaPierre, 1936; Pereira *et al*., 2009). Threat-based discrimination against immigrants can be used by people as a legitimate reason because it is grounded in immigrants' different ways of life, different values, different perspectives on marriage, raising children, religion; it is grounded in everything that characterises 'our' western, civilised, way of life. This discourse lives in the streets, in the bakery, on public transport, in the newspapers, on the afternoon TV shows. But it also inhabits the 'educated' world:

> Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies.
>
> (Huntington, 1996, pp. 304–305)

In face of such a scenario, "the principal responsibility of western leaders is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West, which is beyond their declining power, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilisations" (ibid., p. 311). Although dated, these remarks about the incompatibility (and hierarchy) of cultures are alive, and the idea that immigrants bring more trouble than benefits to Europe continues to be frequently expressed in European societies.

What this means is that people perceived as belonging to a different race or ethnic group represent a threat in the economic, security and identity domains (e.g. Coenders, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2004; Green, 2009; Vala *et al*., 2006), a threat that is pervasive across European countries.

These aspects reflect distinct dimensions through which threat can be expressed. One dimension is realistic threat perceptions, i.e. threats to the existence, the (economic and political) power and the (physical or material) well-being of the in-group (Stephan *et al*., 2002). The other is symbolic threat perceptions, i.e. threats that are related to differences between groups in terms of values, morals and standards, and the way these differences challenge the in-group's worldview (Sears and Henry, 2003). These two types of threat represent two theoretically differentiated dimensions: while realistic threat is more affected by the economic aspects introduced by immigrants, symbolic threat is mainly influenced by cultural aspects of the host society and by the need to defend a unique identity, distinct from all others.

Our immediate concern is to investigate whether threat perceptions have been increasing or not during the last decade and to identify the individual and contextual factors that are related with the different types of threat associated with immigrants by European citizens. Since each type of threat represents a specific aspect of economic and cultural life domains it is likely that realistic threats are mainly sensitive to economic changes while symbolic threats are mainly affected by changes in value patterns.

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In this chapter, we intend to answer these questions by proposing a multilevel model in order to understand the impact of two dimensions on threat perceptions associated with immigrants over the last decade: one is objective – the individual socio-economic situation and the national socio-economic situation; one is symbolic – the individual adherence to human values and the national salience of materialism/post-materialist values. Is the perception of the 'Other' as an enemy mainly a result of individual motivations or does the context have an influence in some way? To what extent does the economic crisis that has been affecting European countries over recent years increase feelings of threat from immigrants? Is this impact similar in materialist and post-materialist countries? Does the interaction between individual values and cultural values produce specific outcomes on threat perceptions? This chapter is an attempt to contribute to the existing literature on threat perceptions associated with immigrants by carrying out an analysis that, as far as we know, has not been carried out before: the role of individual and cultural values and of individual and contextual economic situations on public threat perceptions associated with immigrants, from a comparative and longitudinal perspective. This analysis will focus on the 16 European countries that participated in all five rounds of the European Social Survey (2002 to 2010), allowing for the introduction of time as a criterion to assess attitudinal changes.

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How values shape perceptions of 'the Other'

Values as individuals' guiding principles

According to our analytic model, human values are central elements in the construction of threat perceptions, particularly in their symbolic dimension. This hypothesis follows the idea that values constitute a set of structuring principles acting upon peoples' lives and societies' organisation. A number of different definitions of values have been offered. Kluckhohn (1951) defined values as explicit or implicit conceptions of the desirable. Parsons (1952) described the concept according to their functional characteristics: a value is an element of a "shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation" (Parsons, 1952, p. 12). Rokeach characterised values as individual beliefs, a perspective that has guided most of the empirical research on values over the last four decades. "A 'value' is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to a diametrically opposed or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5).

Some years later, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) proposed a theory about the nature and organisation of human values that integrated the main characteristics identified by Kluckhohn (1951) – a value as a conception of the desirable, by Parsons (1952) – a value as an element of the cultural system that transcends specific situations – and by Rokeach (1973) – a value as a belief about a mode of

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conduct or end-state of existence. The conception of the model began with Schwartz and Bilsky's studies (1987, 1990) and was based on the assumption that values represent three universal needs of human existence, to which all individuals and societies have to respond: the needs of individuals as biological organisms; the requisites of coordinated social interaction; and the survival and welfare needs of groups. One of the main challenges was to identify the basic motivations that determine individuals' adherence to a set of values and how they integrate them into their own value system.[1]

The model organises values in a bidimensional structure representing the incompatibilities and congruencies between four types of high-order values, which form two basic and bipolar conceptual dimensions. Two values are compatible insofar as they express similar psychological motives. For example, according to Schwartz (1992), autonomy and creativity values are compatible because both represent individuals' motivation to promote the free expression of thought and the search for new experiences. A conflict between values occurs when they represent two contrasting motivations, for instance in the opposition between the values that reflect individuals' motivation for *openness-to-change* (representing the compatibility of self-direction, stimulation and hedonism) and their motivation for *conservation* (representing the compatibility between enhancing security, tradition and conformity). The axiological principle that organises this opposition is a conflict between the individuals' motivation to express their thoughts by engaging in activities that promote social change, and the motivation to behave in a submissive manner to the authorities and to promote stability in their personal and social life by engaging in activities that maintain and preserve cultural traditions and the religious family. A typical example of this conflict is individuals' contrasting adherence to the values of autonomy and tradition, in that the first serves the motivation to engage in action promoting the free expression of thought and action regardless of what others think or do, while the second denotes a contrasting motivation, characterised by the individuals' desire to maintain cultural traditions as they are.

The other motivational conflict opposes the values of self-transcendence (representing the compatibility between universalism and benevolence) to the values of self-enhancement (representing the compatibility between power and achievement). The axiological principle that organises this dimension is the conflict between the motivation to accept others as equals by promoting universal fairness and transcending personal interests in favour of the common good, and the motivation to achieve personal success and achieve means to exercise dominion over other individuals and social groups. A prototypical example of this conflict is the contrasting adherence to *equality* and *power* values, since the value of equality represents the motivation to promote social equity, while the value of power denotes the motivation to promote mastery over others and social groups through the control of material and social resources.

Of special interest for our model, previous research has shown different relationship patterns between the motivational values type and attitudes toward immigrants (e.g. Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Davidov *et al.*, 2008; Green,

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2009). The most consistent pattern concerns the role played by self-transcendence and conservation motivational types. For instance, because self-transcendence values motivate individuals to pursue equality, high adherence to these values is associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration. Indeed, those who ascribe to humanitarian-egalitarian values are sensitive to the difficulties experienced by disadvantaged groups, are more likely to support affirmative action programmes, are more receptive to diversity (Leong and Ward, 2006) and are less prejudiced towards minority groups (Biernat *et al*., 1996). According to Feldman's findings, "support for equality leads to support for a broad range of government social service spending and aid to minorities" (Feldman, 1988, p. 429). The result of the effect of self-transcendence in more positive attitudes towards minority groups is mainly due to the effect of universalism rather than that of benevolence, since the motivational principle of universalism is specifically oriented to the pursuit and promotion of egalitarian relationships between social groups. On the other hand, the principles underlying benevolence encompass motivations more focused on the good functioning of the in-group, such as the promotion of happiness, trust and well-being of family members and close friends. For this reason, we will include in our analytical model only universalism as a representative of self-transcendence motivations.

There is, then, enough evidence to expect that those who value the humanitarian principles of *universalism* should also look at people of different groups as sources of diversity and enrichment, and not as dangers to society, in other words, as enemies. Therefore, we hypothesise:

H1: The higher the adherence to universalism, the lower the perception of economic and cultural threat.

In contrast, people who hold conservative values are more likely to display negative attitudes towards minority groups (e.g. Rokeach, 1960) because these values motivate individuals to preserve the *status quo* by engaging in activities aiming to maintain and preserve cultural traditions. This motivation is expressed in the individuals' support for the superiority of the *status quo* of their own culture. Moreover, conservative political rhetoric often refers to the past, and emphasises stability and tradition. Political conservatism is based, in part, on a preference for stability and the maintenance of the *status quo*, which in turn can support the relative elevation of whites, heterosexuals, males and so on, compared to other groups (e.g. Lambert and Chasteen, 1997). Conservatism is associated with a social dominance orientation (Pratto *et al*., 1994), as well as Protestant Ethics (e.g. Feather, 1984). Endorsing these values, and perceiving their violation, can form the basis of the justification of a wide range of prejudice (e.g. Kinder and Sears, 1981) and of the feelings of threat that arise from prejudice.

Accordingly, we derive the following hypothesis for the role played by conservation values on threat perceptions:

> H2: The higher the adherence to conservation values, the higher the perception of economic and cultural threat.

Unlike *universalism*, that is a human value in itself, *conservation* is a dimension of human values that represents those who praise their family and religious traditions, who believe that one must follow the rules and obey authority, who give importance to living in safe surroundings and ensuring that the authorities ruling their countries have as a priority national defence against enemies (e.g. terrorism). People who identify themselves with *conservation* values are more motivated to agree with the anti-immigration discourses that use fear and threat as rhetorical weapons. As a consequence of the strong relevance of aspects linked to the maintenance of traditions that are present in *conservation*, we admit that its effect on the perception of immigrants as a cultural threat may be higher than the effect on the perception of immigrants as an economic threat.

Note that our hypotheses predict that values underpin the two types of threat perceptions. However if, as the theory predicts, cultural threat is mainly related to symbolic aspects of social life, then the impact of values should be greater on cultural threat than on economic threat.

Additionally, based on previous research (Duriez *et al*., 2002; Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995), there is not enough evidence to justify the inclusion of the human values pertaining to the high-order dimensions of *self-enhancement* and *openness to change* values as predictors of threat perceptions associated with immigrants.

As already stated, intergroup attitudes are primarily motivated by two different value domains, representing a tension between egalitarian motivations and *status quo* preservation motivations. The values pertaining to the dimensions of *self-enhancement* and *openness to change* do not express those motivations: *self-enhancement* represents individualistic motivations towards personal success and *openness to change* represents the need for excitement and sensual gratification through the pursuit of change and adventure.

Values as cultures' guiding principles

Two main assumptions guide research in the field of values: (1) values represent fundamental principles that guide people in their different life domains, leading to the study of individual differences; (2) the importance that a society in general attributes to values also reflects the fundamental principles that guide that society, leading to the study of shared values in different countries and cultures.

Accordingly, the role of values may be analysed on two different (although not independent) levels. They represent individual motivations, serving as

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guiding principles for personal actions and choices. However, at a country level, values express shared conceptions of what is good and bad, what is considered to be desirable and unfavourable in the culture; consequently, they serve as guiding principles for national priorities and public policies. Geert Hofstede (1980) and Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1997) called this second conception of values, cultural values. This distinction has important implications not only from a conceptual point of view but also concerning its measurement, as we will show in the methodology section.

In developing the study of cultural values, Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1997) proposed that cultural differences reflect a complex interaction between socio-economic development and the priority that society attributes to each of two sets of socio-political values, so-called ‘materialist’ and ‘post-materialist’ values. Inglehart’s proposal derived from an interpretation of Weber’s theses about the relationship between values and the rise of capitalism. According to Inglehart (1977, 1997), materialist values represent a change that occurred in modern industrial societies, characterised by the decreasing importance of religious values as societal guiding principles and by the rise of a secular state mainly oriented towards the fulfillment of populations’ basic needs. Societal priorities were economic growth and promotion of safety and order, both at the individual level (interpersonal and family relationships) and the national level (national security and control of crime). In this sense, the transition from the traditional feudal productive system to the capitalist one typical of modern societies would have been followed by successive changes in cultural values: religious values were giving place to materialist values.

The main assumption of Inglehart’s theory (1977, 1997) is that economic development produces changes in the cultural values’ system that, in turn, produces a feedback effect, changing the economic and political systems. Once economic stability and population security is achieved, a silent revolution of values will rise, transforming peoples’ priorities to more abstract needs and aspirations. Self-direction, freedom of speech, aesthetic and political expression and environmental protection will then be the priorities the country should achieve; post-materialist values will represent this phase of the cultural change process.

Based on these assumptions, it is plausible to expect that in countries where materialistic needs are guaranteed and societal priorities are oriented towards the achievement of higher levels of citizens’ well-being, people will be more open to immigrants and less predisposed to feel threatened by their presence. Therefore, our hypothesis is:

> H3: In countries where post-materialism is more salient than materialism, people will show lower perceptions of economic and cultural threats associated with immigrants.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the role of values in attitudes and behaviours may involve a highly complex process when individual motivations

interact with the specific socio-economic conditions of each social context. This means that individuals' motivation to promote equality may be expressed through a lower feeling of threat only when that same motivation is part of the cultural values commonly shared by the society. For instance, a greater adherence to universalism implies lower threat perceptions in the cultural contexts where post-materialist values are more prominent because individual motivations will be compatible with the cultural axiological principles. In contrast, in more materialist contexts individuals with greater motivation towards equality may find it harder to express their own values because they may be incompatible with the cultural values that promote attitudes contrary to the individual motivation to promote equality. In other words, the cultural context can function as a buffer to equality-based individual attitudes towards immigration. Following this reasoning, we derive our next hypothesis:

H4: The expression of economic and cultural threat is affected by a cross-level interaction between universalism (individual-level values) and materialism/post-materialism (country-level values).

Similarly, individuals' motivation to preserve the *status quo*, expressed by a greater feeling of threat, may find social support in cultural contexts where the values compatible with that same motivation are shared. For instance, in more materialist contexts, conservation values may imply greater perceptions of threat because the adherence to those values is compatible with the axiological principles that characterise more materialistic cultures. However, in contexts where post-materialism is more salient, and therefore value priorities are incompatible with the motivation to maintain the *status quo* and to preserve cultural unity, individuals who hold conservation values will find more obstacles to express feelings of threat. Therefore, according to our argument, we derive the following hypothesis:

H5: The expression of economic and cultural threat is affected by a cross-level interaction between conservation (individual-level values) and materialism/post-materialism (country-level values).

Socio-economic determinants of threat perceptions

Economic self-interest and material deprivation

The belief that immigrants are a threat to the economic well-being of the populations of the host countries is still transmitted by the media and is present in common-sense discourse. This belief reflects, for instance, the perception that

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immigrants "take jobs", "make salaries fall" and "abuse the social security system". We thus put forward the question: to what extent is the perception of immigrants as a threat actually determined by economic factors?

Some studies conclude that the opposition towards immigration results from the perception of an unfavourable economic position (Harwood, 1983; Simon and Alexander, 1993); moreover, the experience of economic fragility facilitates the expression of the perception of threat, namely of realistic threat (for example, Fetzer, 2000, in the case of the USA, France and Germany; and in the case of Portugal, Vala *et al*., 1999). Other studies, framed by the theories of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984), regarding either competition for material resources (e.g. wages) or for social resources (e.g. education, health and social security) (Malchow-Møller *et al*., 2006; Muller and Espenshade, 1985; Vala *et al*., 1999), also found a relationship between the perception of economic disadvantage and feelings of threat. Moreover, in the present context of economic crisis, it is plausible to think that those who have felt a severe degradation of their economic situation over the last few years will be more prone to see immigrants as a threat.

In contrast, research and theorising have suggested that economic resources are not the main explicative factor of negative attitudes towards immigrants but, rather, the way individuals actively interpret their social-economic environment in order to legitimise negative attitudes towards minority groups (Dustmann and Preston, 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2005; Vala *et al*., 2006).

From our point of view, many of the models based on economic factors concentrate on individual perceptions, either regarding people's interests, in-group (natives) interests or out-group (immigrants) needs and behaviours. In this sense, the measures used are not reflecting an objective situation, but a subjective perception of economic threat, since they result from subjective assessments in contexts of competition for economic resources. In order to overcome this limitation, we will focus on the impact that objective economic conditions have on the explanations given by people who consider immigrants as a threat to their lives. We therefore decided to include only objective indicators of individual economic resources (household income and employment situation) in our models, and derived the following hypotheses:

H6: People with lower incomes express higher levels of economic and cultural threat.

H7: The unemployed express higher levels of economic and cultural threat.

Considering the wide range of implications that immigration has in the domestic landscape of receiving countries, it is reasonable to predict that perceptions of

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immigrants will also vary between social categories. The feelings of competition for resources may be more salient among those who hold similar social positions to the immigrants. Younger people, as well as those with higher levels of education are, for contrasting reasons, expected to show lower levels of threat perceptions associated with immigrants. They do not compete in the same areas and, being younger or more educated, they may be more 'disposed' to look at issues from the immigrants' point of view and to develop more open attitudes concerning their presence in the country.

Micro-level non-attitudinal predictors are certainly important to understand the way people perceive immigrants, and they cannot be excluded from our analysis. Moreover, several studies have already shown that they are relevant predictors of opposition to immigration (Fetzer, 2000; Harwood, 1983; Malchow-Møller *et al.*, 2006; Muller and Espenshade, 1985; O'Connell, 2005; Scheepers *et al.*, 2002; Semyonov *et al.*, 2006, 2008; Simon and Alexander, 1993).

However, some studies support the hypothesis that symbolic factors may have a more important impact on opposition towards immigration than socio-economic aspects or material interests (Davidov *et al.*, 2008; Dustmann and Preston, 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2005; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Vala *et al.*, 2006). Our idea follows this direction: although important, non-attitudinal variables lose a significant share of their predictive power in the presence of the representations people construct about people from different racial and ethnic groups and the values they hold (universalism and conservation). Therefore, they will be introduced in the models as control variables.

Socio-economic performance

According to Blumer (1958), the dominant group develops a sense of group position according to which some resources are viewed as belonging exclusively to them. Bobo (1983, 1988) goes a step further and postulates that the subordinate group represents a threat to the real resources of the dominant group (see also Sherif and Sherif, 1953). The scapegoat theory (Hovland and Sears, 1940) states that the perception of declining opportunities and the perception of competition in the labour market can generate blaming attitudes towards immigrants.

Following the same line, Semyonov *et al.* (2006) found some evidence of a negative relationship between GDP and anti-foreigner prejudice in Western Europe. Framing his hypotheses within group-threat theories (Blalock, 1956, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo and Kluegel, 1997), Quillian (1995) concluded that the higher the GDP, the lower the racial prejudice. Nevertheless, when in interaction with immigrant population size, the effect became positive (the higher the GDP, the higher the racial prejudice). Moreover, concerning the impact of a country's unemployment rates on attitudes towards immigrants, Scheepers *et al.* (2002) found no effects.

Although GDP has been used frequently as a single measure of socio-economic development, we decided to use a broader measure, the Human

Development Index (HDI).[2] Based on these theories, we will consider HDI and unemployment rates not only in a comparative perspective but also in a longitudinal one, assessing the possible effects of their evolution and interaction, between 2002 and 2010. Our hypotheses are:

H8: The higher the HDI, the lower the perceptions of economic and cultural threats associated with immigrants.

H9: The higher the unemployment rate, the stronger the perceptions of economic and cultural threats associated with immigrants.

Immigration rates

Up to now, empirical evidence has not been consistent concerning the relationship between the number of immigrants in a country and the attitudes people endorse about them. For instance, a multilevel analysis carried out by Gijsberts *et al*. (2004) showed that an increase in the size of minorities generated a feeling of threat and of competition for rewards and resources. They concluded that discriminatory attitudes have a higher probability of rising when the number of immigrants increases. Against these findings, however, based on data from the Eurobarometer-30/1988, Quillian (1995) showed that an anti-immigrant orientation was not associated with the percentage of non-European Union residents. A multilevel analysis using data from Round 1 and Round 3 of the European Social Survey also showed that opposition towards immigrants in Europe was not influenced by their presence in the country (Ramos, 2011).

Following the same line of research, Semyonov *et al.* (2008) and Strabac and Listhaug (2008) concluded that the perceived size of immigrant populations determines anti-immigrant sentiments to a much greater extent than their actual size, the latter often being non-significant in statistical models.

Another theoretical perspective associating size of minority with anti-immigrant attitudes can be retrieved from contact theory. According to this theory (e.g. Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1986), different kinds of contact may produce different effects on attitudes towards minorities: while close, cooperative, equal status contact with individual newcomers (e.g. at the workplace) may have a positive effect and may reduce discriminatory attitudes and behaviours (Schneider, 2008), more casual forms of contact may have an inverse effect. In this study, we will only consider the casual level of contact induced by the mere presence of foreigners in each country.

Taking all these different theoretical perspectives into account, we put forward the following hypothesis:

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H10: The higher the number of immigrants, the stronger the feeling of economic and cultural threat.

Notice that our hypotheses predict that socio-economic determinants have an impact on both types of threat perceptions. However, as argued above (see also Pereira *et al.*, 2010), since realistic threat is mainly sensitive to economic changes, then the impact of socio-economic determinants will be stronger on economic threat than on cultural threat.

Methodology

Data

To analyse the impact of individual characteristics and contextual circumstances on economic and cultural threat perceptions over time, data from five rounds of the ESS[3] was used (2002–2010). The methodological standards followed in all participating countries guarantee a strong level of confidence in the data produced to perform comparative and longitudinal analysis, namely the strict probability sampling of the 15-year-old or older resident population and the rigorous translation process of the questionnaire into the several languages of participating countries. The countries used in the analysis are the following (total sample for the five rounds): Belgium (6,788); Denmark (6,142); Finland (7,726); France (6,262); Germany (10,213); Hungary (2,734); Ireland (1,717); Netherlands (7,730); Norway (7,395); Poland (5,679); Portugal (3,745); Slovenia (4,120); Spain (5,168); Sweden (6,977); Switzerland (6,749) and United Kingdom (7,742), making a total of 96,887 respondents. Only 16 countries participated in all five rounds.[4]

Variables

Dependent variables

ECONOMIC THREAT

Economic threat was measured by the only indicator common to all ESS Rounds:

> Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? (Scale: 0 – bad for the economy to 10 – good for the economy)

Scales were reversed in order to have a measure of threat (the higher the score, the higher the perception of threat).

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CULTURAL THREAT

Cultural threat was measured by the single indicator available on the ESS questionnaire:

> Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (Scale: 0 – cultural life undermined to 10 – cultural life enriched)

The scale was reversed in order to have a measure of threat (the higher the score, the higher the perception of threat).

It is important to stress that the use of a single indicator to measure each type of threat may be problematic and constitute a limitation in several respects. First, the use of a single indicator does not allow for the estimation of measure reliability or distinguishing between random error and method effect. A second limitation is the impossibility of testing empirically the separation of the two threat dimensions. In fact, studies using ESS data have shown that these two items are loaded in a common factor, measuring a diffuse feeling of threat (see Billiet *et al.*, 2014).

However, there is also evidence that these items are measuring two different factors. Using ESS R1 data, Pereira and colleagues conducted a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) with the indicators of threat perception, in which they specified a solution with two correlated latent variables (symbolic threat and realistic threat). They compared the goodness-of-fit of this solution with the goodness-of-fit of a unifactorial solution. Results indicated that the bi-factorial solution had a better fit than the unifactorial one. This means that the solution specifying symbolic threat perceptions as a latent variable different from realistic threat perceptions is more appropriate than the solution that specifies threat perceptions as a single factor. Moreover, the predictive validity of the items we are using to measure cultural and economic threat perceptions was demonstrated in Pereira *et al.* (2010), since economic threat predicted opposition towards immigration more strongly, while cultural threat predicted opposition to naturalisation more strongly.

Besides, the separation of the two types of threat is more consistent with research and theorising about intergroup threat (Stephan *et al.*, 2002) because it allows for the measurement not only of a diffuse feeling of threat but also to address different contents from which feelings of threat towards out-groups are expressed.

Independent variables – individual level

At the individual level, the independent variables considered in the analysis were: individual 'control' variables (age, gender, household income, unemployment, educational level and left–right orientation) and human values (*universalism* and *conservation*).

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The measurement of individual values was made from the Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire included in the ESS questionnaire. Past research showed that values we are using are equivalently measured throughout ESS countries (Davidov, 2010). Respondents were asked to say to what extent persons described as having specific characteristics are alike her/him (scale: 1 – very much like me to 6 – not like me at all).

According to the Schwartz model, universalism is a combination of three indicators. However, we used only two of them:

(1) Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. A person who thinks it's important for everyone to be treated equally. Believing that everyone should have the same opportunities in life.
(2) A person for whom it's important to listen to people who are different from oneself. Even when disagreeing with someone, there's still the desire to understand that person.

The third indicator measures environmental concerns. Since we do not have theoretical reasons to establish a link between this motivation and feelings of threat associated with immigrants, we decided to exclude it from the index.

Conservation is a high-order value composed of three basic values:

a Conformity
  (1) A person who thinks that people should do as they're told. People should always follow the rules even when no one is watching.
  (2) A person for whom it's important always to behave properly. Doing things others would say were wrong must be avoided.
b Security
  (1) A person who gives importance to living in a place where people feel safe. Anything that can put his/her security at risk is avoided.
  (2) A person for whom it's important that the Government guarantees his/her security, against all threats. A strong State is needed, so it can defend its citizens.
c Tradition
  (1) A person for whom it's important to be humble and modest. He/She tries not to attract attention.
  (2) A person who gives importance to tradition. Everything is done in accordance with religion and family.

Independent variables – aggregate level

Two aggregate levels will be introduced in the models: round level and country level. At the round level, the following variables will be used: time, human development index (HDI); unemployment rate; and immigration rates (proportion of foreigners). Data was collected from Eurostat.[5] At the country level, we introduced cultural values (materialism/post-materialism).

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The indicator of materialism/post-materialism was produced from the 2008 wave of the European Values Study. The questionnaire includes four out of the 12 indicators of Inglehart's original scale. Respondents were asked to answer these two questions:

> There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. If you had to choose, which of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most important?
> (a) maintaining order in the nation;
> (b) giving people more say in important government decisions;
> (c) fighting rising prices;
> (d) protecting freedom of speech.

The measure of materialism/post-materialism was operationalised as follows: first a score was attributed to each item (2 if the item was first choice, 1 if the item was second choice, 0 if the item was not chosen); then the materialism and post-materialism items were averaged; finally, the score of materialism was subtracted from the post-materialism score. Thus, for each respondent, we obtained a scale ranging from –2 to 2, where –2 stands for higher materialism and 2 for higher post-materialism. In order to have a country-level measure, the individual scores were aggregated by country. For us, it is important to use this indicator obtained from independent data set for two reasons: (1) cultural values are really measuring societal priorities, since the questions the respondents were asked addressed goals to be achieved by the society and not by the respondents themselves; (2) the independence of individual from cultural values is guaranteed, since they were measured from the answers of different respondent samples. In fact, the lack of independence is a 'chronic disease' of survey data in comparative research (Billiet, 2013). Using the country-level measure of values is theoretically meaningful because individual values are different from cultural values: while the first measure basic individual motivations (Schwartz, 1992), the second measure priorities that people believe are important as societal goals (Inglehart, 1977).

Results

Economic and cultural threat perceptions in Europe

Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show the mean values of threat perceptions in the 16 countries over five rounds of the ESS. Although there have been statistically significant changes between rounds in some countries, and a mean value erases that information, the figures give a general picture of the relative position of each country in the set of countries.

The first comparative result shows that economic threat is stronger and more uniform among the selected countries than cultural threat. Whereas, in the case

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of some countries we can state that they express low levels of cultural threat (namely Finland and Sweden), the same cannot be said concerning economic threat perceptions (the lower value, for Germany, is very near the midpoint of the scale). It is also very interesting to see that there is no clear tendency in the relationship between flux of immigrants and threat perceptions. For instance, Spain was the country that registered the highest annual variation rate of immigrants during the period under analysis (65.7 per cent) and scores lower than the midpoint of the scale in both types of threat. A contrasting example can be given by Belgium, a country that registered an annual variation of 4.9 per cent of

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

Figure 5.1 Economic threat in 16 European countries (mean value for the five rounds of the ESS).

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

Figure 5.2 Cultural threat in 16 European countries (mean value for the five rounds of the ESS).

immigration but that is among those that express stronger perceptions of economic threat.

To understand the predictors underlying these differences, we performed three-level interaction analyses that will be described in the next section.

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Impact of individual determinants and contextual conditions on economic and cultural threat perceptions

In order to test our prediction, we estimated a series of multilevel random models (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) using the Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modelling (HLM) software (version 7.01; Raudenbush, Bryk and Congdon, 2013). Since our main aim was to analyse the expression of economic and cultural threat in Europe over time, we used the five rounds of the ESS in a multilevel model, where individual data (level 1) is nested by round (level 2) and these are subsequently nested by country (level 3). We have then a three-level hierarchical structure. At level 1, data is composed by 96,887 individuals, nested in 5 rounds and 16 countries, which gives origin to 74 observations at level 2. Data from level 2 is nested in the 16 selected countries.[6]

We first ran one single intercept model for each threat perception aiming to describe how much of the total variance of these threats is allocated to each level of analysis, on the basis of which we calculated the intra-class correlations corresponding to levels 2 and 3 of data structure. We then estimated an exploratory model aiming to analyse the expression of economic and cultural threat in Europe over time. In this preliminary analysis, two models were run (one for each type of threat) including time as unique predictor in order to estimate the changes in threat across time. Results show that time had a significant effect only concerning economic threat perceptions (Figure 5.3), which decreased from 2002 to 2010.[7]

We then estimated five models, including the three levels of analysis. The level 1 models estimate the effect of the control variables (sex, age, education, individual unemployment, income and left–right political positioning; Model 1) and individual values-based explanatory variables (universalism and conservation value types; Model 2) on the outcome variables (i.e. cultural and economic threat perceptions). The level 2 models add the estimation of the effect of time-varying contextual predictors (time of round, country unemployment rate, country HDI and country foreigner rate; Model 3). In Model 4, we added a level 3 variable that estimates the effect of cultural materialism/post-materialism values (Model 4). Finally, cross-level two-way and three-way interactions were added in Model 5, aiming to test specific hypotheses concerning the conditional effect of each individual and contextual valued-based variables on each threat perception. In all models the time, universalism, conservation and materialism/post-materialism variables were grand-mean-centred in order to facilitate the interpretation of main and conditional effects (see Aiken and West, 1991; Nezlek, 2001). Finally, we estimated the models as either fixed or random slope error terms on the basis of the statistical significance from preliminary analyses to ensure the convergence of the models (see Nezlek, 2001).

Parameters estimated in Model 1 indicate that all individual control variables are significantly associated with economic threat, and only unemployment is not related with cultural threat. Looking at the impact of these variables in each threat perception, we verify that the more respondents place themselves on the

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Table 5.1 Predictors of economic threat in 16 European countries over time (parameter estimates)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Intercept	4.85 (0.140)***	4.83 (0.134)***	4.84 (0.142)***	4.83 (0.127)***	4.84 (0.124)***
Individual level (control variables)					
Left–right	0.10 (0.003)***	0.06 (0.003)***	0.06 (0.015)***	0.06 (0.003)***	0.06 (0.003)***
Gender	0.29 (0.014)***	0.34 (0.013)***	0.34 (0.026)***	0.34 (0.014)***	0.34 (0.014)***
Education	–0.13 (0.00)***	–0.11 (0.002)***	–0.11 (0.007)***	–0.11 (0.002)***	–0.11 (0.002)***
Unemployment	0.25 (0.037)***	0.27 (0.036)***	0.27 (0.059)***	0.27 (0.036)***	0.27 (0.036)***
Income	–0.08 (0.003)***	–0.07 (0.003)***	–0.07 (0.007)***	–0.07 (0.003)***	–0.07 (0.003)***
Age	–0.00 (0.009)***	–0.01 (0.000)***	–0.01(0.001)***	–0.01 (0.001)***	–0.01 (0.000)***
Individual level (explanatory variables)					
Universalism (Un)		–0.45 (0.009)***	–0.45 (0.028)***	–0.45 (0.009)***	–0.43 (0.009)***
Conservation (Co)		0.39 (0.009)***	0.39 (0.015)***	0.39 (0.009)***	0.38 (0.010)***
Round level					
Time (T)			–0.04 (0.023)	–0.04 (0.023)	–0.03 (0.023)
Unemployment rate			0.06 (0.013)**	0.06 (0.012)***	0.06 (0.013)***
HDI			0.00 (0.100)	–0.00 (0.098)	0.02 (0.096)
Foreigners rate			0.15 (1.82)	–0.38 (1.75)	–1.33 (1.77)
Country level					
Materialism/Post-materialism (M/PM)				1.08 (0.571)*	1.05 (0.559)*

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Cross-level interactions					
Un*T					–0.00 (0.001)
Un*PM					–0.38 (0.043)***
Co*T					–0.00 (0.007)
Co*PM					0.11 (0.046)**
T* PM					–0.14 (0.075)*
Un*T*PM					0.01 (0.031)
Co*T*PM					0.02 (0.033)
Variance components					
Individual level, *e*	4.50	4.34	4.34	4.34	4.34
Round level, r_0	0.06 (X^2_{58}=1,121.25, $p<0.001$)	0.06 (X^2_{58}=1,033.41, $p<0.001$)	0.03 (X^2_{54}=626.89, $p<.001$)	0.03 (X^2_{54}=630.26, $p<0.001$)	0.03 (X^2_{54}=590.83, $p<0.001$)
Country level, u_{00}	0.30 (X^2_{15}=300.12, $p<0.001$)	0.28 (X^2_{15}=309.40, $p<0.001$)	0.32 (X^2_{15}=584.54, $p<0.001$)	0.25 (X^2_{14}=445.40, $p<0.001$)	0.24 (X^2_{14}=460.01, $p<0.001$)

Notes
Level 1: N=96,887; level 2: N=74; level 3: N=16.
Intraclass correlation at round level=0.07; intraclass correlation at country level=0.06.
* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$ (one-tailed).
Left–right (0 left to 10 right); Gender (Man=0; Woman=1); Education (0 to 30 years of schooling); Unemployment (Unemployed=1); Income (0 lower to 9 higher); Age (15 and over).

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Table 5.2 Predictors of cultural threat in 16 European countries over time (parameter estimates)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Intercept	4.03 (0.154)***	4.02 (0.151)***	4.02 (0.149)***	4.02 (0.148)***	4.02 (0.148)***
Individual level (control variables)					
Left–right	0.16 (0.003)***	0.11 (0.003)***	0.11 (0.003)***	0.11 (0.003)***	0.11 (0.003)***
Gender	–0.09 (0.014)***	–0.02 (0.014)	–0.02 (0.014)	–0.02 (0.014)	–0.02 (0.014)
Education	–0.13 (0.002)***	–0.11 (0.002)***	–0.11 (0.002)***	–0.11 (0.002)***	–0.11 (0.002)***
Unemployment	0.07 (0.037)	0.09 (0.036)*	0.09 (0.036)*	0.09 (0.036)*	0.09 (0.036)*
Income	–0.07 (0.003)***	–0.07 (0.003)***	–0.07 (0.003)***	–0.07 (0.003)***	–0.07 (0.003)***
Age	0.00 (0.000)***	0.00 (0.001)**	0.00 (0.000)**	0.00 (0.000)**	0.00 (0.000) **
Individual level (explanatory variables)					
Universalism (Un)		–0.57 (0.009)***	–0.57 (0.009)***	–0.57 (0.009)***	–0.54 (0.009)***
Conservation (Co)		0.44 (0.009)***	0.44 (0.009)***	0.44 (0.009)***	0.42 (0.009)***
Round level					
Time (T)			0.02 (0.020)	0.02 (0.019)	0.01 (0.006)
Unemployment rate			–0.00 (0.011)	–0.00 (0.011)	–0.00 (0.011)
HDI			–0.00 (0.083)	–0.00 (0.083)	–0.01 (0.084)
Foreigners rate			1.35 (1.67)	1.40 (1.67)	1.79 (1.74)
Country level					
Materialism/Post-materialism (M/PM)				–0.24 (0.625)	–0.29 (0.661)

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Cross-level interactions					
Un*T					0.00 (0.006)
Un*PM					–0.29 (0.043)***
Co*T					–0.01 (0.006)*
Co*PM					0.23 (0.046)***
T* PM					0.05 (0.066)
Un*T*PM					–0.02 (0.031)
Co*T*PM					0.01 (0.033)
Variance components					
Individual level, e	4.59	4.36	4.36	4.36	4.35
Round level, r_0	0.03 (X^2_{58}=543.50, p<0.001)	0.03 (X^2_{58}=507.09, p<0.001)	0.02 (X^2_{54}=465.53, p<0.001)	0.02 (X^2_{54}=465.76, p<0.001)	0.02 (X^2_{54}=462.42, p<0.001)
Country level, u_{00}	0.37 (X^2_{15}=906.91, p<0.001)	0.36 (X^2_{15}=986.94, p<0.001)	0.35 (X^2_{15}=1,033.57, p<0.001)	0.35 (X^2_{14}=1,024.39, p<0.001)	0.34 (X^2_{14}=1,017.37, p<0.001)

Notes
Level 1: N=96,887; level 2: N=74; level 3: N=16.
Intraclass correlation at round level=0.08; Intraclass correlation at country level=0.07.
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (one-tailed).
Left–right (0 left to 10 right); Gender (Man=0; Woman=1); Education (0 to 30 years of schooling); Unemployment (Unemployed=1); Income (0 lower to 9 higher); Age (15 and over).

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

Figure 5.3 Evolution of economic and cultural threat perceptions over time.

right side of the ideological scale, the more they declare economic threat perceptions, but even more cultural threat. Higher schooling and higher income are associated with lower levels of both types of threat. The gender and age of respondents play a contrasting role according to the kind of threat: while economic threat is more perceived by women and younger people, cultural threat is more salient among men and older people. This pattern of findings holds equally through the other four estimated models and the aim of including them was precisely to take into account their effects and avoid spurious interpretations between variables for which we have specific hypotheses to test feelings of threat.

Model 2 shows that both individual-based values predict each threat perception. As we predicted, adherence to the values of universalism is associated with lower threat perceptions (H1), while adherence to the values of conservation boosts that same perception (H2). Notice that the impact of values was more expressive in the case of cultural threat than in that of economic threat.[8] Moreover, people with higher income expressed lower levels of economic and cultural threat. Concerning the unemployed, they expressed higher economic threat but not cultural threat, a finding that partially confirms H7 and that gives empirical support to our idea that the two kinds of threat are differently predicted by socio-economic factors.[9]

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Model 3 results show that the impact of individual-level variables remained significant even after we added the four predictors at level 2. From the set of variables included at this level, only the unemployment rate showed a significant effect on economic threat. This finding confirms our hypothesis, according to which the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the perception of economic threat (H9). Moreover, it confirms the idea that economic threat is more sensitive to socio-economic change than cultural threat. However, hypotheses H8 and H10 were not confirmed because the effects of HDI and foreigner rate were not statistically significant. Model 4 indicated a reliable positive effect of materialism/post-materialism values on economic threat perception, but not on cultural threat perception. Nevertheless, the effect goes in the opposite direction of the one predicted by us and by the theory of cultural values (Inglehart, 1997), since it is in more post-materialist countries that we find the highest expression of feelings regarding economic threat.

Also important for our prediction, the results of Model 5 demonstrate that the effect of cultural values on economic threat is qualified by a two-way cross-level interaction involving the time of the round (Figure 5.4). This interaction means that the impact of cultural values on economic threat perceptions is changing over time. More specifically, it means that the feeling of economic threat has been decreasing over time in the countries with higher scores on post-materialism (defined as those with +1SD from the mean of the M/PM measure), while it has



Figure 5.4 Effect of time and cultural values on economic threat perceptions.

been keeping stable in the more materialist countries (defined as those with –1SD from the mean of the M/PM measure).[10] This interaction is also important to better understand the positive correlation between post-materialism and economic threat perceptions. It means that in more post-materialist societies, the expression of economic threat was higher in the first rounds of the ESS (2002, 2004 and 2006) and became lower than in more materialist societies during the last rounds (2008 and 2010). More importantly, the decrease of economic threat observed in these countries is in line with the theory of cultural values (Inglehart, 1997) and corroborates our hypothesis (H3), according to which threat perceptions would be lower in post-materialist societies than in materialist ones.

The interactions between individual values and cultural values are also an important key to interpret the reason why the more post-materialist societies express more threat (economic and cultural) than the materialistic ones. In fact, this stronger feeling occurs only in individuals less identified with universalism values. Analysing the interaction from a different perspective, we found that in post-materialist societies only individuals who have a low identification with universalism reveal more threat feelings (Figure 5.5). The lower expression of economic threat actually occurs in individuals with higher adherence to universalism

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

Figure 5.5 Predicted economic threat by individual universalism and collective materialism/post-materialism values.

living in more post-materialist societies. This reflects the limitations that a single level of analysis can introduce in the understanding of the motivations underlying intergroup attitudes. As we have already mentioned, threat feelings encompass a more complex process, where individual motivations find the grounds to be easily expressed in social contexts with axiological principles compatible with individual motivations. The inexistence of a three-way interaction between these values and time indicates that the effects observed in Figure 5.5 are constant over time.

The interaction between M/PM and conservation values complements the understanding of the impact of values on threat perceptions. The pattern of relationships observed indicates that the threat perceived in more post-materialist countries occurs mainly in individuals with higher adherence to conservation values. In other words, living in post-materialist countries makes individuals who are more motivated to pursue the goals prescribed by conservation values feel they are more threatened by the presence of immigrants. From another point of view, we see that individuals with lower identification with conservation values express less threat, whether living in materialist or post-materialist societies, while those expressing higher levels of threat are highly identified with conservation values and live in more post-materialist societies (Figure 5.6). That

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

Figure 5.6 Predicted economic threat by individual conservation and collective materialism/post-materialism values.

is, the higher the adherence to the values of conservation, the higher the impact of M/PM on the feeling of threat. This also means that only strongly conservative individuals express more threat perceptions in post-materialist societies than in materialistic societies. Again, the inexistence of a three-way interaction between values and time indicates that the effects observed in Figure 5.6 are constant over time.

Looking at the interactions between individual and cultural values in cultural threat, the two-way interaction between universalism and M/PM measure indicates that post-materialism corresponds to lower perceptions of cultural threat only in the case of individuals who are more identified with universalism values (Figure 5.7). Corroborating our prediction (H4), this means that when analysed at the cultural level, post-materialist values may facilitate the expression of motivations represented by individual values based on equality, leading consequently to lower levels of threat. This interaction also means that individuals with less universalistic orientations always express higher feelings of threat, regardless of the cultural value orientation of the society where they live. Similar to what happened in the previous analysis, these results remain constant over time since the three-way interaction is not significant.



Figure 5.7 Predicted cultural threat by individual universalism and collective materialism/post-materialism values.

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Finally, the interaction between M/PM and conservation values shows that those less motivated by those values show lower levels of cultural threat, whether living in materialist or post-materialist societies; while individuals living in more post-materialistic societies and holding conservation values express higher levels of cultural threat (Figure 5.8). This is a similar effect to the one obtained with economic threat, confirming our hypothesis H5. In fact, the increase in the adherence of conservation values goes along with the increase of the impact of M/PM on cultural threat. The consequence is that only individuals that strongly endorse conservation values express higher levels of cultural threat in post-materialistic societies than in materialistic ones. This tendency is also constant over time.

Conclusions

Threat perceptions have been analysed in multiple circumstances as a correlate of discriminatory attitudes and behaviour. In this chapter, we have analysed the two main forms of expression of threat feelings associated with immigrants over time. We were able to integrate in the same analytical model hypotheses drawn

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

Figure 5.8 Predicted cultural threat by individual conservation and collective materialism/post-materialism values.

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from different theoretical perspectives that predict that those feelings arise from peoples' objective living conditions, mainly regarding competition for scarce resources (Bobo, 1983, 1988; Sherif and Sherif, 1953) and hypotheses that accentuate the central role that individual and cultural values play as guiding principles in peoples' lives and in the course that societies must follow (Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz, 1992). As far as we know, there has never been a simultaneous study of the individual and socio-structural predictors of threat, in articulation with the influence of individual and cultural values on the rising of threat feelings in the context of immigration.

The first conclusion was that economic threat perceptions have changed over time (decreasing), while cultural threat perceptions remained at the same level between 2002 and 2010. Nevertheless, the effect of time on economic threat is totally explained by the variables that were included in the model and follows the proposed hypotheses and previous research on the impact of socio-economic variables on intergroup relations. For instance, we found an interaction between time and cultural values, meaning that the feeling of economic threat has been decreasing over time in the countries with higher scores on post-materialism, while it has remained stable in the more materialist ones.

Moreover, according to the theoretical assumptions that underlie threat theories (for instance, the scapegoat hypothesis of Hovland and Sears (1940), and the group conflict theory of Blumer (1958) and later developed by Bobo (1983, 1988)), the experience of material deprivation would be the principal predictor of economic threat. People with fewer material resources and the unemployed would then be those who would see immigrants as the ones to blame for their situation. When we look at the variables that operationalise objective material deprivation, we find that it is mainly at the level of individual differences that those variables have influence. Indeed, and as predicted in H6, people with lower incomes express higher levels of economic and cultural threat. However, unemployment predicted a higher level of economic but not of cultural threat, which partially corroborates H7.

From the set of variables included at level 2, only the unemployment rate showed a significant effect on economic threat. This finding is in line with our prediction (H9), according to which the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the perception of economic threat. None of the level-2 variables was a significant predictor of cultural threat.

More important, the analysis of the value-based predictors of threat perceptions also allowed us to confirm the endorsement of the principles of equality and social justice that characterise the ethic of *universalism* as one of the most important elements (together with education) to fight the perception of immigrants as a threat, either in terms of distribution of material resources or of their subversive impact on the culture of the hosting countries. Conversely, the need for security and preservation of the *status quo* that the endorsement of *conservation* values represent, boosts the belief that immigrants are endangering the culture and the economy of the hosting society.

The interactions between individual and cultural values allowed for very interesting conclusions: (1) in post-materialist societies, only individuals that

have a low identification with universalism show higher economic and cultural threat feelings; (2) individuals with lower identification with conservation values express less economic and cultural threat, whether living in materialist or post-materialist societies; while those expressing higher levels of economic and cultural threat are highly identified with conservation values and living in more post-materialistic societies; (3) these effects were constant over time.

In sum, by considering the temporal level of analysis in integration with individual and contextual correlates of threat perception, this study constitutes an important contribution in three ways: (a) it gives support to the hypothesis that human values are central elements in the process of developing the options that individuals make concerning their views about the world and about the relations between human beings; (b) it clarifies the individual attributes that are important in the rise of feelings of threat associated with immigration over time; (c) it brings new insights on the interaction between individual and cultural values and how this combination affects threat perceptions.

Concluding, it can thus be argued that the main message to be drawn from the findings presented is that the effect of individual and cultural values on threat perceptions seems insufficient to properly understand the complexity of the phenomenon. Our analysis shows that it is necessary to combine the study of individual motivations with those of the axiological principles ascribed by the cultures. In fact, in countries with higher post-materialism scores, the higher expression of economic threat, that could call into question the theory of cultural values, becomes understandable when we observe that this effect only occurs with individuals with lower motivation regarding the promotion of equality and social justice. This is also the case when we detect that this effect is boosted by highly motivated individuals regarding the preservation of the *status quo*, a motivation that is expressed by conservation values.

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Notes

1 The European Social Survey includes a reduced version of 21 indicators of the Schwartz's Human Values scale (Schwartz, 1992).

2 HDI is a 'composite measure that includes indicators along three dimensions: life expectancy, educational attainment, and command over the resources needed for a decent living' (HDI report 2013: 23).

3 ESS Rounds 1–5 (2002–2010). Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.

4 Detailed information on ESS methodological procedures can be found at www.europeansocialsurvey.org. The figures correspond to the number of respondents without missing values on the variables included in the models.

5 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home.

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6 It is important to notice that with 16 countries and 5 observations over time (round 1 to 5) we should have 80 units at level 2. However, due to missing values on the selected variables, data from France in 2002, Hungary in 2002 and 2006 and Ireland in 2002, 2008 and 2010 is missing, resulting in a base with 74 valid observations at level 2.

7 In this preliminary model we obtained the following estimated parameter for economic threat:

intercept = 5.01, $SE = 0.144$, $p < .001$;
time effect = −.06, SE = .025, $p < .01$;

variance component:

$e = 4.88$ (level 1);
$r_0 = 0.06$, $p < .001$ (level 2);
$u_{00} = .33$, $p < .001$.

And we obtained the following estimated parameter for cultural threat:

intercept = 4.06, $SE = 0.159$, $p < .001$ (level 3);
time effect = .01, SE = .014, *ns*.;

variance component:

$e = 5.09$ (level 1);
$r_0 = 0.02$, $p < .001$ (level 2);
$u_{00} = .39$, $p < .001$ (level 3).

8 We ran a supplementary analysis comparing the regression weight of universalism and conservation on each type of threat, and results showed that differences are statistically significant in both cases: $t_{\text{universalism}}$ (96853) = –13.98, $p < .001$; $t_{\text{conservation}}$ (96853) = 5.50; $p < .001$.

9 The comparison between the effect of unemployment and income on economic and cultural threats revealed differences statistically significant: t_{income} (96853) = 2.07, $p < .05$; $t_{\text{unemployment}}$ (96853) = 4.90; $p < .001$.

10 To understand the meaning of the interaction effects, we used the steps suggested by Aiken and West (1991) to decompose the interaction effect.

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6 Economic crisis, human values and attitudes towards the European Union

Dafina Kurti and Karoline Harzenetter

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Introduction

Citizen support for the European Union (EU) varies across countries and between individuals because of various factors that occur at national and individual levels. Research on the role of economic factors has found that international economic agreements about the distribution of costs and benefits shape citizen expectations towards the EU and integration policy, in terms of increased employment rates and gains from free trade. Consequently, attitudes are affected by macroeconomic events such as the recent global financial crisis, which arose in the late summer of 2007 in the USA and affected Europe as a coherent entity in 2009, in the form of the sovereign debt crisis of single member states. Facing the consequences of the crisis in the Eurozone, scepticism emerged from national political scenes and civil society towards furthering the unification process[1] and the European Monetary Union. Using multilevel analysis with the European Social Survey datasets, we intend to answer the question of whether national economic performance before the recent economic crisis in 2006 and during the crisis in 2008 influences citizen evaluations of the European integration process. We elaborate two theoretical implications based on Schwartz's (1992) human-values approach and the utilitarian approach by Gabel (1998a, 1998b). The utilitarian model tests how individual economic utility (i.e. gains from expanded intra-European trade based on human capital) shapes opinions about the EU. Further, we classify human value types into materialist and non-materialist values, and test their association with individual support for further European unification. By comparing attitudes in the pre-crisis period in 2006 and in the crisis period in 2008, we explore whether economic changes at the national level influence the relationship between human capital and values and supportive EU attitudes, as well as if, during the crisis, there were other factors with greater influence on attitudes towards the EU.

This study makes three contributions to public-opinion research. First we address a gap in the EU research by focusing on the changes in EU support during the economic crisis period. Second, we apply a multilevel analysis with a random intercept and slopes model, which allows us to estimate the differences between aggregate and individual-level effects in 18 EU member countries on

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attitudes to European unification. We control for cross-level interaction effects and estimate the effects of individual- and national-level factors, assuming a linear relation of dependent and independent variables. Such a multilevel approach provides valuable insights into the complex relationships between individual economic cost/benefit calculus and materialist versus non-materialist values, respectively, as well as support for European integration (EI) and the moderated effect of economic context. We find evidence of the attenuated effects of the unemployment rate on human capital, and a moderating effect of economic growth on both the human values of security and universalism and citizens' support. Finally, we elaborate on Schwartz's value theory, by testing the effect of human values on attitudes towards the EU under changing economic conditions. To better understand how the economic context shapes attitudes towards the EU, as well as the influence of human values and socioeconomic background, we suggest tests to determine the long-term effects of the financial crisis. Moreover, we recommend further comparative social science research to account additionally for the role of perceptions of economic conditions.

The chapter is organised as follows. We first review the literature on EU public-opinion research, describe causal mechanisms and derive hypotheses about the influence of human values, and individual- and national-level economic factors on attitudes to European integration. The following section outlines the research design and describes the data and method used to test the hypotheses. We then present the main findings of the multilevel analysis. We conclude the chapter by discussing the results and limitations of the study and making recommendations for further research.

Theoretical approach

The devastating postwar situation in Europe led to the formation of EI movements, which were considered by the public as a means to rebuild the union of states, to ensure political and economic stability and peace on the continent. In the 1950s, supranational organisations between six central European states were created to pool the national markets for heavy industries and to establish a custom union to prevent further political conflicts between these member countries. The process of EI is represented by the formation and development of the two most influential and central institutions, the EU and the Council of Europe. Public-opinion surveys indicate variations in citizen support for EI over time as the result of historical events related to development of and in the EU (e.g. Anderson, 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Niedermayer, 1995). When looking at the trend and questioning whether EU membership is a good or bad thing, the Eurobarometer surveys record the first notable downward support for the European community during the recessionary period beginning in the late 1970s. From 1981, we observe growing citizen support, which is also present after the Single European Act (SEA) came into an effect in 1987 and reached its peak at the beginning of the 1990s (Figure 6.1).



Figure 6.1 Net support for European integration in 15 EU member countries, 1973–2002.

Because of the SEA, intra-European trade was expanding; however, public support for EI decreased again in the 1990s, to an unprecedented level, despite the general positive economic conditions in the EU. By the end of the 1990s, mainly with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European economic integration expanded both regionally and in its responsibilities. The EU developed a single-market policy, with standardised laws that apply in all member states, and established a monetary union, known as the Eurozone, comprising 17 member states. The legal structure of the EU expanded beyond its original economic purpose across time, carrying now not only the economic but also the political and social policy responsibilities of the Union. As Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) suggest, the altered nature of EU integration policy of not merely following economic goals exclusively but also creating a legal, political and cultural union of a federal structure changed the public opinion of citizens, because of their new cost-benefit situation. However, confronted with the global crisis of late 2007 followed by the Eurozone crisis in 2009, the EU functioned as a stabiliser in the form of the Euro 'Troika' (a control committee with representatives of three

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European institutions: the European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund) to ensure the stability of the EU and its currency. Once again in the history of the continent attention has been drawn to European policy and integration processes on the national and supranational levels regarding its economic activities. Because there is little research on the relationship between public opinion and economic factors in the post-Maastricht period, we attempt to fill this gap in the literature by investigating supportive attitudes towards further EI for the historically crucial period before and during the recent economic crisis in Europe.

Research on attitudes towards European integration

The EU's expansion in supranational governance has raised the interest of researchers in the attitudes, views and orientations of its citizens. After reviewing relevant literature on the public perceptions of EI, we identified six major research subjects that concentrate on individual, as well as national aspects: (1) the role of individual value orientations; (2) subjective social and economic situations; (3) macroeconomic performance of member countries; (4) national and European identity; (5) political orientation and institutional confidence; (6) political knowledge and interest. Certainly most of these factors are interrelated in their influence on the development of supportive or rejecting attitudes towards EI. For example, whereas the value system of an individual is determined by his/her subjective economic experiences during the formative years (Inglehart, 1977), the individual socioeconomic position is thought to influence public support for European institutions (Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2011), which is mainly driven by a country's economic performance and expected benefit from EU membership (Anderson, 1995; Carrubba, 1997; Diez Medrano, 2003; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 2007; Mahler *et al*., 2000). Additionally, public approval of the supranational institution of the EU might also be driven by the level of confidence someone has in the national regime (Anderson, 1998; Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2011; see also Kritzinger, 2003; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Sanders *et al*., 2012) and by feelings about national identity (Carey, 2002; McLaren 2002, 2004; see also Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 2004). As we consider the different approaches, we distinguish between factors that are stable over time, such as an individual's value system, and factors that are situational, such as the economic benefits from European membership, before and during the crisis. In addition, we differentiate between individual economic factors and those that operate at the national level. We are interested in the role they played during the economic crisis.

Individual economic situation and support for European integration

An explanation for the accelerated support for a common European market and integration process, as well as the shift in these attitudes, provides the utilitarian

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approach by Gabel (1998a, 1998b; Gabel and Whitten, 1997), which assumes that economic aspects, such as individual benefits from trade liberalisations, influence citizens' opinion about EI at both the national and individual level. Empirical research demonstrated a strong direct relationship between the evaluation of a subjective economic situation and being in favour of the European unification process, as a result of a dynamic rational decision process, based on the individual utility of EU membership (Gabel, 1998a, 1998b). Accordingly, the socioeconomic background of a person influences her/his utility of being a citizen of the EU and therefore shapes his/her position towards EI, defined by individual outcomes. Market liberalisation in the EU provides different benefits depending on physical proximity to EU neighbour states (more possible economic interaction), human capital (occupational skills and education: ability of adapting to competition) and financial resources (income: better opportunities for greater investment), while shaping attitudes towards the EU. Citizens who have high human capital are best placed to avail themselves of the emerging market-related opportunities and are therefore more likely to be positively disposed to the integration process (see also Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Inglehart, 1970). Hence, highly skilled individuals tend to report more positive attitudes towards EI than persons with low educational and occupational status (Gabel, 1998a). Gabel argues that if people benefit from EI, they will have supportive attitudes, but they will reject it if they do not benefit from the single market and occupational mobility.

However, individual economic factors alone are weak predictors for variance in support for EI. Brinegar and Jolly (2005) stress that the national context is an important determinant of attitudes of individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds. Under the condition of abundance of low-skill labour in a country, low-skill workers are more likely to approve EI than their counterparts in countries where low-qualified jobs are scarce, because the former benefit from the situation by having access to a bigger market for their products. Persons with high human capital living in countries with scarce job opportunities for highly qualified workers are more likely to oppose EI than their equivalents in countries with high-skill labour abundance, because their exclusive position of owning scarce resources is endangered by further market liberalisation (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005, p. 157). Not only labour endowment but also a country's welfare system show contextual effects on human capital. In residual welfare and social democratic states, citizens expect negative effects of redistribution within the EU member states. In liberal market economies with a residual welfare system, higher redistribution leads to job insecurities and higher taxation, whereas in coordinated markets, people expect more insecurities and less investment in labour specialisation and education from lower redistribution. Consequently, Brinegar and Jolly (2005, p. 159) state that especially the less educated, who usually profit from residual welfare policy, are concerned about negative consequences of lower redistribution. In our analysis we do not differentiate between the different European welfare systems to test for contextual effects, but we anticipate net contribution of member states to the EU budget to be a valid

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and reliable indicator for EU redistribution policy, which moderates the effect of socioeconomic background (educational level and occupational skills) on EI attitudes by changing the outcome calculation of individuals. We also assume that in countries that are more developed economically, the labour market has an abundance of high-skill labour and interest in skill specialisation, and a scarcity of low-skill workers, whereas in lesser-developed countries, the labour market conditions are the opposite. Therefore, EU membership offers more opportunities for low-skill workers in countries with an abundance of low-skill labour than for their counterparts in countries with low-skill labour shortages.

Drawing on findings of contextual effects, we expect to find the moderating effect of the national economic development and national benefits from EU membership on attitudes towards EU and socioeconomic background (SES). Specifically, we hypothesise in the first place that in affluent European countries (i.e. with a higher GDP growth rate), people with high SES are less likely to support European unification than people with high SES in a less affluent context (H1a). In countries that are net contributors to the European community budget, citizens with high SES are more likely to oppose further European unification than are their counterparts in countries that are net beneficiaries (H1b). In line with the reviewed literature, we predict a direct positive effect of living in a country that benefits from EU membership (Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993) and other objective national economic factors, such as the unemployment rate, GDP growth rate (Lewis-Beck, 1988), on support for the EU, when controlling for cross-level interaction effects.

From the perspective of the recent economic crisis in Europe, two types of cost-benefit analysis are plausible, either a trickledown effect of all citizens or a growing utility gap between those who profit and those who are disadvantaged. The former occurs when citizens within a country are equally affected by negative consequences of the crisis at the national level, and thus there will be a parallel decline in support for European unification and the effect of human capital itself on support for EI remains stable. Because there is more competition and fewer opportunities for members of lower socioeconomic status, especially during the crisis, the economic utility within the EU rises for privileged groups, whereas the cost of being part of the EU for those who barely benefited beforehand increases (utility gap). We assume that citizens of countries that suffer economic hardship most expect the EU to ensure financial and economic security and stability throughout crisis, whereas citizens in better-off countries, regardless of their human capital, believe that their state has to compensate for the financial and economic downfall of the affected countries and, therefore, they are less likely to support EI. First, we assume that the positive direct effect of a country being a net beneficiary member state on EI support is higher than before the crisis (H2). Moreover, we predict that the moderator effect of a country's economic development on the relationship between socioeconomic background and EI support (see H1a and H1b) is stronger in times of economic crisis.

During times of economic hardship we expect a greater competition for scarce resources like jobs in the low-pay sector, i.e. underprivileged citizens hold more

positive attitudes towards EI as EU membership compensates for higher personal risks and insecurities. Thus, during the economic crisis, in countries less affected by the crisis in terms of GDP growth rate, a higher SES of an individual has a stronger negative effect on his/her attitudes towards EI than before the crisis (H3a). Because of the economic instability at country level, we assume that citizens of states that profit from the EU membership fear to lose their benefits because of EU redistribution policy. Hence, in net beneficiary countries, people with low SES are more supportive (H3b).

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Human values and attitudes towards the EU

In explaining the relationship between value orientations and attitudes towards EI, we briefly elaborate Ronald Inglehart's (1977) postmodernist theory. According to him, the dimensional structure of the socialised and internalised value system ranges from economic and physical security (i.e. materialist values) on the one hand, to postmaterialist values (like self-expression and self-fulfilment) on the other, as basic human needs. Both materialist and postmaterialist values shape individual political attitudes towards institutions. EI represents a more egalitarian than nationalistic policy, and it embodies the idea of liberation and the expansion of democracy. Thus, supporting the integration process corresponds with human needs for freedom, self-actualisation and self-fulfilment, values that are usually given higher priority by postmaterialists (Inglehart, 1971, p. 19) because they are more highly educated and comprehend better the EU as a political/institutional unification model; they are therefore less sceptical about it compared with materialists, who typically favour subjective or in-group economic well-being over the social common good.

Datler *et al.* (2013) systematically compared Inglehart's postmodernisation theory and another well-established theory of human values by Shalom Schwartz (1992), and their external relationships with attitudes and behaviour. They found similar positive associations between self-transcendental values and, respectively, similar negative associations between security and tradition value concepts and political interest and political activities. By relying on these results, we aim to determine the effects of value orientations, based on the theoretical model of motivational types of human values presented by Schwartz (1992) and on another concept: the attitudes towards EI, assuming a similar relationship between Schwartz's values and attitudes towards EI. Schwartz (1994, p. 21) defines *human values* as desirable trans-situational goals that serve individuals as behavioural motivations and principles in life. The ten basic values described are self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence and universalism (Schwartz, 1992, pp. 5–13), and they vary in importance. This integrated structure of values can be summarised with two bipolar value dimensions, combining four higher-order value types: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservation (see Table 6.A1 in the Appendix). In line with Inglehart's structure of the materialist versus postmaterialist value dimension, Schwartz

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(1994, p. 37) assigns materialist values to value types of security and power, characterised by the motivational goal to ensure economic and physical well-being by maintaining social order and political and economic stability, and non-materialist values that correspond to universalism and self-direction value types, emphasising individual self-expression, equality, citizen involvement and environmental concerns. Based on Inglehart's theory of relationship between values and attitudes, we assume a relation, similar to Schwartz's materialist and non-materialist value priorities, to public opinion about European unification. We expect a negative relationship between power- and security-values types and support for EI (H4a) and a positive relationship between self-direction and universalism and support for EI (H4b).

In contrast with Inglehart's concept of an individual value hierarchy that is stable once built, Schwartz claims that people tend to adapt the importance of values to life circumstances, by prioritising attainable values and downgrading thwarted values. However, when it comes to changing economic life circumstances, the reverse occurs, with values concerning economic and physical well-being and stability on both the societal and individual level (power and safety values). Schwartz (2006, p. 5) states that for people who suffer financial hardship and social upheaval, the importance of material values increases. Conversely, these value types become unimportant when easily attainable (i.e. when people live in relative comfort and safety). Following this thesis, we may assume that in times of economic crisis, material and physical well-being is endangered, because the crisis affects not only the social and financial situation of individuals (e.g. part-time work, termination or welfare cuts) but also economic and political stability on a national level. Thus, in countries most affected by the economic crisis, it is likely that materialist values such as security and power become more important than non-material values that promote independent thought and action (self-direction) and social justice and equality (universalism). Combining these assumptions we expect an indirect relation of national economic performance on national-level attitudes towards EI because of a shift in the importance of material values. In countries with poor economic performance, citizens are more likely to develop materialistic values and consequently tend to oppose European unification (see H4a) rather than support an institutional model that stands for less conservative goals such as self-transcendence and openness. The final hypothesis is that the negative effect of materialist-value priorities on support for EI diminishes, whereas the positive effect of non-materialist values becomes stronger in countries that are economically better off (H5).

Another approach described by Inglehart (1970, 1977) explains that attitudes towards the EU are influenced by cognitive mobilisation (see also Almond and Verba, 1964; Dalton, 1984). This approach refers to the relationship between citizens' level of education, access to information and political participation. The mechanism behind this is that well-informed citizens with higher educational status tend to possess greater subjective competence and are more active politically. In terms of public opinion, people who are highly mobilised cognitively about the EU are (1) capable of understanding better the abstract idea of EI,

which reduces feelings of cultural and/or economic threat from the integration process, and (2) are more familiar with its nature and less hostile towards the EU because they have had more exposure to it (Gabel, 1998b; Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart *et al.*, 1991; Janssen, 1991; McLaren, 2004).

Drawing from the literature on regime support and confidence in institutions and the market at the national level, we control for the level of satisfaction with the national economy, as well as for trust in national institutions, because we are interested in the subjective perception of the threat of economic conditions within a country and a person's trust of national political institutions in general. Focusing on attitudes towards the EU, we find two different theoretical implications. One approach argues that individuals project their attitudes towards domestic political institutions onto EU institutions, and, therefore, a lack of confidence in and dissatisfaction with national government is projected onto the institutions on the supranational level, which then are considered equally not trustworthy (Anderson, 1995; see also Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2011). Other authors support the argument that European citizens who do not trust their national political institutions tend to have more confidence in EU institutions because they perceive the way national political institutions function as inefficient, weak and/or corrupt, and place trust more in EU institutions, which serve as substitutes for the negative perceived effectiveness of national governments (Kritzinger, 2003; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Sanders *et al.*, 2012). We test the two competing hypotheses about the relations of values and perceptions of national and supranational institutions by controlling for the effect of citizens' satisfaction with the economy in the country and to what extent people trust their national government. Respectively, we predict a positive correlation between trust in and satisfaction with national institutions and support for further European unification. However, we also test the alternative hypothesis of the substitution effect, that is, that people who have less trust in their national government and/or are not satisfied with the democracy and economic situation in the country are more likely to oppose the unification process.

Research design

Data, sample and method

We analyse data from two waves of the European Social Survey (ESS; www.europeansocialsurvey.org), round 3 (2006/2007) and round 4 (2008/2009). Using both of the integrated data files in the analysis enables a cross-national analysis of the attitudes about the EU before and during the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 for 18 EU[2] member countries, including 24,544 respondents in ESS round 3 and 26,519 in round 4. The criteria for choosing the countries were participation in both survey rounds, for comparison purposes, availability of the required data and continuity of the dependent variables on EI support. Country samples[3] were randomly drawn by a multistage method, with face-to-face interviews, including representatives aged 15 years or older.

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To test our hypothesis, we used hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) as the analytical method because it considers the hierarchical data structure of persons nested in countries. By using this method, we avoided violating the assumption of independence of observations (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). The HLM model estimates not only effects on the individual and group level but also cross-level interaction effects. The current multilevel analysis was conducted with the programme HLM 7 (Raudenbush *et al*., 2011). For estimation of the effects, we used restricted maximum likelihood estimation and performed Z-standardisation for all variables, for a better interpretation of the estimators (Hox, 2010). Missing values were deleted while running the analysis. Although the number of cases on the aggregate level is relatively small (i.e. $N=18$ countries), Snijders and Bosker (2011) provide a rule of thumb for models in which $N\geq 10$, stating that a random intercept model is preferable over a fixed model as a means of regression analysis. We followed the ESS's recommendation for analytical inferential statistics to apply the design weight, to correct for different probabilities of selection (ESS, 2012a, 2012b). We are interested in separating the between-group and within-group variance components from the total variation, to investigate how countries affect citizens' attitudes. We adopted group-mean centring for the individual-level predictor variables, to control for the covariate and improve the interpretation of main effects while testing for cross-level interaction effects.

Operationalisation

ESS integrated datasets provide only one question to measure the concept of public opinion on EI: "Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?" The scale ranges from 0 "Unification has already gone too far" to 10 "Unification should go further". The question refers to unification in terms of legal, political and social empowerment of the EU rather than as further geographical enlargement.

In our analysis we focused on individual social and economic background, as well as human values, as explanatory variables for EI attitudes. To indicate a respondent's human capital, we used the international classification standard for education (ISCED) to refer to respondent's highest completed educational degree, and recoded it into three dichotomous variables: basic education (ISCED 0–2), upper secondary and postsecondary/nontertiary education (ISCED 3–4) and tertiary education (ISCED 5–8). The group of respondents with basic education as the highest level completed served as the reference category for the other two groups. Occupational status was measured by the social-class indicator International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), on the basis of the international classification code for occupation (ISCO88), which we generated with help of the online tool of Ganzeboom and Treiman (2002).[4]

From the 21-item Human Values Scale introduced by Shalom Schwartz (2001), we used only seven items of interest to build four specific value types that are relevant for testing the hypothesis and to avoid problems of multicollinearity. Each of

the four selected values is ascribed to a specific higher-order dimension: power (self-enhancement), security (conservation), self-direction (openness to change) and universalism (self-transcendence). Each item represents a verbal portrait that describes in two sentences a gender-matched person in regard to his/her motivations, goals and aspirations, and it measures to what extent the respondent identifies him-/herself with that person on a 6-point scale. Higher priority values indicate similarity and lower-priority values indicate dissimilarity of the respondent with the described person. A particular combination of up to two specific items then built in the next step are the basis of the four motivational values used. These values can be characterised with the four higher-order values: conservation, self-transcendence, openness to change and self-enhancement, covering Schwartz's dimensional value system structure. An overview of relevant items, the structure of relations among the ten basic types of values and their ascription to the four higher-order values are given in Table 6.A1 in the Appendix.

The database for the macroeconomic information on unemployment and economic growth on the country level that influence EU attitudes (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, p. 511) is the statistics provided by European Statistics (Eurostat, 2014) and the International Monetary Fund (2014). We determined for each of the 18 countries, and each survey round, the figures of the official unemployment rates, to measure the extent to which a country is affected economically. These statistics refer to a percentage constructed from the population of active persons in the labour market between the ages of 15 and 64, using the means of figures of years of evaluation in the pre-crisis period in 2006 and the beginning of 2007, and the means of 2008 and 2009, when the financial crisis erupted. The same procedure was used to compute the GDP growth rate for each wave, to measure economic well-being. GDP growth rate and unemployment rate serve as measurement of the economic performance of countries included in the analysis and represent the contextual macroeconomic situation before and during the crisis. We also generated a dummy variable that indicates if a member state is a net beneficiary (1) of or net contributor (0) to the EU's annual budget for the given period. The total amount was calculated based on payments (including customs) and receipts between the member state and the EU, based on the Financial Reports on EU budget from 2006 to 2009. Based on the theoretical implications, we used both the macro information net beneficiary state and GDP growth rate as separate effects, to control for cross-level interactions with human capital, and we tested the moderator effect of GDP growth rate and unemployment rate on human values in explaining the variation of EU attitudes between countries as the consequence of value change.

Additionally, we controlled for the effect of respondent's trust in the national government, his or her satisfaction with the present state of the economy in the country, individual cognitive mobilisation in the form of political interest and the respondent's sex and age. A detailed overview of the operationalisation of all variables used is given in Table 6.A2 in the Appendix.

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Results

Descriptive statistics

In the first step, we examine the support for EI and its distribution across 18 European countries at two periods that are relevant to our analysis, before the global financial crisis in 2006 and during the crisis in 2008. Figure 6.2 shows that the level of support for further European unification differs across these EU member states. Based on scores ranging from 4 to 7.5, we can, say, generally, in most countries, citizens position themselves in the middle of the scale and report, on average, being neither a big supporter of nor specifically sceptical about EU unification policy. However, for some countries, a notable difference in public support is visible between time points 1 and 2. In contrast with the pre-crisis period, in 2008, citizens of countries such as Cyprus and Spain, and to a lesser extent Poland and Portugal, show considerably lower level of agreement to further European unification compared with the overall European average. In western member countries such as Belgium, Germany, Finland, France and Netherlands, we notice an increase in supportive attitudes towards EI after the crisis. The other countries show only a slight change in their opinion on EI. In



Figure 6.2 Supportive attitudes towards European integration across 18 countries.

the following section, we examine the factors that influence changes in attitudes towards the EU, between and within countries, before and during the economic crisis.

Explaining attitudes towards European integration

Based on the theoretical implications introduced, we assumed that public support for EI in a country is influenced by the individual socioeconomic and human value system, as well as the economic conditions of the country. However, before testing the effect of microvariables, we estimate the base or null model (see Table 6.1), an empty model, without accounting for the effect of any predictors. The base model represents the net variation between countries' average support for European unification. In 2006, the base model yields an intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of 0.10, meaning that 10 per cent is the proportion of the total variance in supportive attitudes about EI that can be explained by differences between countries, and 90 per cent by individual-level differences. In 2008, however, the ICC accounts for only 7 per cent. Although national-context variables influence attitudes, most of the differences in responses about support for the European unification stem from individual differences within countries.

In the following models, we investigate individual-level predictors of interest. Then we add macrolevel factors. Finally, we estimate cross-level interaction effects, whereby we test our hypotheses. A stepwise multilevel regression analysis was performed for different models at each step, combining certain sets of variables: Model 1 contains only control variables at the individual level; Model 2 includes value priorities and socioeconomic background; Model 3 includes indicators for macroeconomic conditions; Model 4 introduces cross-level interactions. To explain within- and between-country variations in levels of EI support, we estimated and interpreted random intercept and slope models that allow testing of the assumption of significant variation of regression intercepts and slopes, because of the different national contexts. The interpreted effects refer to regression coefficients with robust standard errors. The results of these models are summarised in Table 6.1. The reported coefficients are standardised effects and fixed effects are represented in italic.

The first linear-regression model explaining EI support includes only the control variables on the individual level: gender, age, trust in national parliament, satisfaction with the country's economy, and level of political interest of respondent. In both periods, in 2006 and 2008, the control variables accounted for only 6 per cent of the variance in attitudes. Based on the literature, we control for the assumption that citizens who trust the national institutions and are satisfied with the present economic situation in the country also have positive opinions about EI. In conformity with the projection mechanism (Anderson, 1998), the regression coefficients provided in both survey periods show a highly significant positive effect of being satisfied with the state of the economy in the country (β=0.09 in 2006, and β=0.10 in 2008) and trust in national parliament (β=0.15 in 2006, and β=0.16 in 2008) on support for further EI.

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In addition, we also argued that differences in public support are related to cognitive mobilisation, which means persons who are capable of understanding the complexity of political events and who invest time to accumulate knowledge are more likely to support the idea of EI (Inglehart, 1970). In this case we test the assumption that people with lower cognitive mobilisation (i.e. lower level of political interest) are less supportive towards further European unification than people with low interest in EU policy. This hypothesis is consolidated by the control variables model which reveals, in 2006 and 2008, a highly significant negative effect of low political interest (β=–0.06 and β=–0.07 on $p<0.001$ significance level) on EI support. Further, we note a weaker but also significant negative and stable effect of age (β=–0.07). Looking at age and gender as explanatory variables, we find that younger citizens are more likely to support EI than elderly people, and that female respondents do not differ significantly from male respondents in their attitudes to further European unification. In summary, we observe stable effects of all control variables in the expected directions on EI attitudes across all models, even after we account for socioeconomic status and values priorities on individual-level, as well as for macroeconomic indicators and cross-level effects.

In Model 2 we examine the effect of individual human capital and values on attitudes towards EI. According to Gabel's utilitarian approach, individuals with high occupational status and high level of education are more likely to approve further EI than their fellow citizens with lower human capital. As confirmed in previous research, this model shows a positive trend of high education (tertiary level completed) compared with the reference group of citizens, whose highest degree is lower-secondary education. This effect is stronger and statistically significant during the crisis. For individuals with upper- and postsecondary education, in comparison with those with a lower level of education, we note a negative association in 2006 and a positive relationship in 2008, with responses on EI support, but the differences in effects of these two educational levels are not significant. However, the higher the occupational status (ISEI) of the individual, the more supportive the respondent is regarding EI, regardless of the economic representation of the country and time.

Additionally, in this model, we test the microhypothesis on values and attitudes (i.e. the expected negative effect of security and power values (H4a) and the positive effect of universalism and self-direction (H4b)) on EI attitudes. The test of multicollinearity of the single value variables yielded no high intercorrelations. As predicted, European citizens who prioritise the values social safety and security are less supportive of EI compared with those citizens for whom these values are less important. However, people who prioritise non-material values, such as social justice and equality (universalism), have a more positive opinion about EI. This effect is significant in both periods. Nevertheless, the value priorities of power and self-direction do not influence the individual positioning on the EI-support scale. Hence, the results only partially support hypotheses 5a and 5b. An explanation could be that values such as self-direction and power are more egocentric than community-oriented. If we compare the underlying items that measure security

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Table 6.1 Explaining attitudes towards European integration: main effects and cross-level interaction effects

		ESS 2006					*ESS 2008*				
		Null Model	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Null Model*	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
		β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*	β *(s.e.)*
Control variables	Intercept	0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
	Female		–0.01 (0.01)	*–0.02 (0.01)*	*–0.02 (0.01)*	*–0.02 (0.01)*		–0.02 (0.02)	–0.03 (0.02)	–0.03 (0.02)	–0.03 (0.02)
	Age		–0.07 (0.01)***	–0.06 (0.01)**	–0.05 (0.01)**	–0.05 (0.02)**		–0.07 (0.01)***	–0.05 (0.01)***	–0.05 (0.01)***	–0.05 (0.01)***
	Political interest		–0.06 (0.01)***	*–0.03 (0.01)****	*– 0.03 (0.01)****	*–0.03 (0.01)****		–0.07 (0.01)***	–0.05 (0.01)***	–0.05 (0.01)***	–0.05 (0.01)***
	Satisfaction with economy		0.09 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.01)***	0.08 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.02)***		0.10 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.01)***
	Trust in national parliament		0.15 (0.02)***	0.14 (0.02)***	0.14 (0.02)***	0.14 (0.02)***		0.16 (0.02)***	0.16 (0.02)***	0.16 (0.02)***	0.16 (0.02)***
Individual SES	Lower secondary education	*Reference Group*					*Reference Group*				
	Upper secondary education			–0.03 (0.02)	–0.03 (0.02)	–0.03 (0.02)			0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
	Tertiary education			0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)			0.06 (0.03)**	0.06 (0.03)	0.07 (0.03)*
	ISEI			*0.03 (0.01)****	*0.03 (0.01)****	*0.03 (0.01)****			*0.03 (0.01)****	*0.03 (0.01)****	*0.03 (0.01)****
Human values	Security (SE)			–0.04 (0.02)*	–0.04 (0.02)*	–0.04 (0.02)*			–0.03 (0.01)*	–0.03 (0.01)*	–0.03 (0.01)*
	Universalism (UN)			0.07 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.01)***			0.07 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.01)***
	Self-direction (SD)			*0.00 (0.01)*	*0.00 (0.01)*	*0.00 (0.01)*			0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)

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	Power			0.00	0.00	0.00			–0.01	–0.01	–0.01
	(PO)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Macro-economic factors	GDP growth				0.02	0.04				0.03	0.03
					(0.04)	(0.04)				(0.04)	(0.04)*
	Unemployment rate				0.04	0.04				–0.10	–0.10
					(0.03)	(0.04)				(0.03)**	(0.04)*
	Net beneficiary				0.01	–0.03				0.17	0.17
					(0.04)	(0.03)				(0.03)***	(0.04)***
Interaction effects	GDP growth*ISEI					*–0.0*					*–0.01*
						(0.00)					*(0.00)****
	Net beneficiary*ISEI					*–0.02*					*–0.02*
						*(0.00)**					*(0.01)**
	GDP growth*SE					0.01					–0.01
						(0.01)					(0.01)
	GDP growth*UN					0.01					0.04
						(0.01)					(0.01)**
	Unemployment rate*SE					–0.02					–0.01
						(0.01)*					(0.01)
	Unemployment rate*UN					0.03					0.03
						(0.01)*					(0.01)*
Model fit	Micro R^2		0.06	0.06	0.10	0.10		.06	0.06	0.09	0.09
	Macro R^2				0.32	0.32				0.39	0.39
	χ^2	3,013.00	3,143.68	2,888.41	1,699.46	1,705.13	2,332.14	2,440.23	2,267.40	1,276.84	1,279.39
	N	29,568	28,282	24,844	24,844	24,844	31,371	30,473	26,936	26,936	26,936

Notes
ICC 2006 = 0.10; ICC 2008 = 0.07.
Level of significance: *** $p \leq 001$; ** $p \leq 01$; * $p \leq 0.05$; β – estimators, standardized regression coefficient; R^2 – share of dependent variable variance explained by model;
χ^2 – difference of observed and expected frequency distributions; goodness of fit measures are calculated with fixed slope. Fixed effects are marked in italic.

and power (see Table 6.A1 in the Appendix), it is obvious that the security value type refers to safety and security for all members of the society/group, whereas power value orientation does not entail such a social connotation. We find the same differences when we compare the relevant single items used to describe the non-materialist values universalism and self-direction, where the latter refers to individual fulfilment (creativity and freedom of actions) rather than implications for society, as is the case with universalism value orientation. However, comparing Model 2 with the previous model, the overall explained variance of the dependent variable in both periods is not improved because of individual educational and occupational status and human values ($R^2=0.06$), which implies that socio-economic background and human values do not contribute substantially to the variation of attitudes towards EI that exists between countries.

Before we continue to test the cross-level hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H3a, H3b and H5), we examine the main effect of the macroeconomic variables unemployment and growth rate on attitudes towards EI. When accounting for national economic indicators on a macrolevel in Model 3, we note a considerable improvement of the explanatory power of this model compared with previous models. While controlling for the effect of SES, value priorities and control variables in 2006, the introduced macroeconomic factors account for 32 per cent of the between-country variance in support for the EI, whereas the explained proportion of variance because of individual characteristics increases ($R_{micro}{}^2=0.10$). Changes of the economic context during the crisis seem to explain the variations in EI support better (39 per cent) than they do before the crisis.

Regarding direct effects in 2006, however, the economic performance on the country level in terms of high-unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, as well as the net beneficiary status, do not have a significant effect on the attitudes towards EI. One can argue that the attitudes that citizens develop towards the supranational institution of the EU and its integration policy are quite stable against small economic changes on the national level, such as economic growth or inflation, which, in turn, may occur unobtrusively in the background, without being noticed. Therefore, the EU support remains unaffected by these macroeconomic factors, but it accelerates when an easily perceived economic event such as the financial crisis takes place. In contrast with the period before the economic crisis, Model 3 shows a strong negative, significant effect of unemployment rate ($\beta=-0.10$), and a strong and highly significant positive effect of countries that benefit from the EU membership ($\beta=0.17$) on support for the integration process. GDP growth rate does not show a measureable influence on EI support. Hence, macroeconomic factors such as economic hardship and membership benefits from the EU have only a significant influence on EU attitudes during the crisis.

In the final model, we estimated cross-level interaction effects between national economic predictors and individual variables (Model 4) to test our context hypotheses. We predicted a moderator effect of the national economic performance and expected net benefits from the EU on the relationship of SES

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and support for EI (H1a). At first, we estimate the interaction effects between the indicator for national economic well-being, GDP growth rate and the country's net beneficiary status. In 2006 we note no significant interaction effect of country's economic performance, as well as a negative effect of net beneficiary status on the association between the individual SES and supportive attitudes for the EI, meaning that in member states that benefit from the EU, the socioeconomically better-positioned individuals tend to be less supportive of EI than the lower-skilled individuals in these countries are. This result does not support our hypotheses H1a and H1b in the pre-crisis period. If we compare the results before and during the crisis, we observe a highly significant negative effect of the GDP growth rate and a significant negative moderator effect of net beneficiary status on the relationship between citizen SES and their attitudes towards the EU in 2008. As predicted in H1a, under better economic conditions at the national level, the highly skilled are less supportive of European unification compared with those in countries that are more affected by the crisis. In contrast, in countries that are net beneficiaries from the EU, individuals with high SES are more likely to oppose EI. Thus, no evidence was found for H1b before and during the crisis. As a second step in Model 4, we test the hypothesis that the national economic situation changes the priorities of values, such that people are more materialistically motivated when economic resources are scarce (H5). To test this hypothesis the cross-level, interaction effects were estimated only for the security and universalism value types, because self-direction and power do not relate significantly with the supportive attitudes towards EI, as shown in Table 6.1. We predicted that the national economic situation alters the effect of security and universalism on EU attitudes. In line with our expectations, Model 4 shows a significant positive-interaction effect of GDP growth rate and universalism in 2008. This significant moderator effect suggests that individuals that view social justice and equality (universalism) as important tend to support the European unification process significantly more in countries characterised by a higher economic growth (β=–0.04) than in countries that are more affected by the financial crisis. Nevertheless, we cannot confirm statistically that this effect in 2006 was driven by the economic situation in a country. In 2008, however, prioritising universalism and supporting the EI seemed to be strengthened by the higher unemployment rate, as well (β=0.03), an effect that existed before the crisis. The macroeconomic conditions of a country in 2008 did not influence the relationship between people who are motivated by the goal of secure and safe living conditions and their attitudes towards EI. A significant cross-level interaction effect was found only for unemployment rate and security in 2006, but not in the expected direction (β=–0.02).

To conclude, the model supports the context effect on human values and support of the EI only partially. The moderator effect of GDP growth rate on the positive relationship between universalism values on EU attitudes is significantly stronger during the crisis. The expected negative interaction between economic growth and valuing security is not significant. However, the unemployment rate as an indicator for economic hardship of a country does have a significant

positive-interaction effect on universalism and a negative interaction with the valuing of security (significant only in 2006). Model fit indicates that interaction effects do not contribute substantially to the explanation of variation between countries in responses concerning further European unification.

Conclusion

We tested the contextual effect of national economic development on the relations between individual economic cost-benefit calculations and values on support for EI, to determine if the 2008 financial crisis changed these relations. The cross-national, two-level analysis provided new results on these interactions, by explaining how economic context operated before and during the crisis, as well as how economic events shift the roles of both value priorities and socioeconomic background in shaping attitudes towards the European unification process.

As for the validity of our findings, we note the correspondence of the theories and the data we used to test the derived hypothesis and the persuasiveness of our data and analysis. We summarise our conclusions regarding the effect of national economic context on public opinion about the EU. First is the economists' argument that supporting, as well as opposing, attitudes towards the EU are shaped by individual thoughts of utility. Our results for the effect of socioeconomic background support Gabel's utility hypothesis that there is a direct positive and stable effect of high education and high occupation level on agreement with further European unification. As predicted, the macroeconomic indicators, GDP growth rate and country's net beneficiary status, have shown significant negative moderating effects during economic crisis.

Further, our analysis also provides a response to the hypothesis based on Inglehart's theory of stable relations between values and attitudes towards the EU, which we adapted to Schwartz's value theory under consideration of the economic crisis in Europe starting in 2008. We argued that the economic crisis not only shifted the value priorities of individuals but also influenced their support of European unification. The analysis revealed a stable and significant main effect of security and universalism value types, which could be summarised as values of material and non-material orientations, on attitudes towards EI in both periods studied. We found evidence of the strengthening cross-level effects of national economic performance before and during the crisis. In countries with a high-unemployment rate, citizens who favour security and safety tend to support the integration process less than people with similar value priorities do in countries with lower unemployment rates. We assume that those persons probably perceive their job and financial security being endangered by a strong supranational European economic union, especially when national unemployment rates are low. This effect on the security value is significant only in 2006. However, during the economic crisis, in countries with high GDP growth rate, citizens who view universalism as a high priority support further European unification more so than those in economically disadvantaged countries. This

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finding can be explained by Schwartz's assumption that non-material goals, such as tolerance, equal rights, care for nature and the environment, lose importance when they are easier to obtain, and that people might emphasise their self-transcendent goals, perceiving them being endangered by a financial crisis.

Drawing on the robust main effects of both SES and human values on EU attitudes, we conclude that social background and value systems are stable throughout the changes of economic context and can be influenced by economic changes only to a certain extent. Because the period studied herein was only four years, long-term effects of the financial crisis could have been missed. For example, a possible consequence of the financial crisis for EI might be the positive turnout for Eurosceptic parties at the European Parliament Election 2014. This study, however, was the first to explain supportive attitudes towards EI with Schwartz's value types controlling for the context of the economic crisis. The applied multilevel analysis yielded consistent cross-level effects. Further, it showed how stable the values of security and universalism are and that power and self-direction do not measure the social component and therefore are not adequate indicators for materialist and non-material values, respectively, in cross-national research. Nevertheless, this study has some further limitations. First, although we used economic performance in a multilevel model as predictors of variation in support for the EU, the direction of causal effects may also be reversed: EU attitudes may affect the perceived political and economic situation within a country. This causality question cannot be answered properly in this analysis because of the cross-sectional structure of the data and the separated analysis of two periods. Studies that employ longitudinal or experimental data are more appropriate to disentangle factors that attribute crisis from the steady economic development of a country. Second, the ESS data provide only a single item to measure attitudes towards EI and, unfortunately, the ESS dropped this item from the follow-up survey in 2010. Future research would profit from using multi-item and multidimensional measures of public opinion on the EU: for example, critical/sceptical attitudes towards European institutions instead of EI. Such measures would help researchers to obtain more significant evidence for the causes of Euroscepticism and Eurooptimism, and their variation within and between the EU member countries. Further, because of the two periods to which the study was limited, shortly before and during the crisis, our findings show weak shifts and changes of influential factors and the strength of effects because of an economic event, the economic crisis. Therefore, we recommend studying postcrisis effects of societal developments, such as values and cultural changes, or the changing concept of EI over a longer period to disentangle the context-specific effects from other sociocultural effects.

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Appendix

Table 6.A1 Value structure according to Human Values Theory by Schwartz, 1992

Variable label and name (in parenthesis)		*Value types*	*Higher order values*
Important to live in secure and safe surroundings (impsafe)	Social order	Security	Conservation
Important that government is strong and ensures safety (ipstrgv)			
Important to understand different people (ipudrst)	Social justice	Universalism	Self-transcendence
Important to care for nature and environment (impenv)			
Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities (ipeqopt)	Equality		
Important to think new ideas and being creative (ipcrtiv)	Creativity	Self-Direction	Openness to change
Important to make own decisions and be free (impfree)	Freedom		
Important to get respect from others (iprspot)	Authority	Power	Self-enhancement
Important to be rich, have money and expensive things (imprich)	Wealth		

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Table 6.A2 Description of variables included in analysis

Variables	*Description/question*	*Coding*
Opinion about European integration (euftf)	Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?	0 – Unification has already gone too far 10 – Unification should go further
Self-direction (SDadd) Universalism (UNadd) Power (POadd) Security (SEadd)	Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you.	Additive index was build 6 – Very much like me 1 – Not like me at all
Highest level of education (edulvla)	0: Not possible to harmonise 1: Less than lower secondary completed (ISCED 0–1) 2: Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2) 3: Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3) 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) 5: Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5–6)	Recoded in dummy variables edu_prim – Less than lower secondary education edu_sec – Lower secondary and upper secondary education completed edu_post – Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed and tertiary education completed Other coded as missing
Highest occuptional status (@isei)	International Socio-Economic Index based on occupational classification ISCO88 (iscoco)	Codes from 16 to 90
Political interest (polintr)	Self-reported interest on politics	1 – Very interested 2 – Quite interested 3 – Hardly interested 4 – Not at all
Satisfaction with economy (stfeco)	On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?	0 – Extremely dissatisfied 10 – Extremely satisfied
Trust in country's parliament (trstprl)	Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out… …[country]'s parliament?	0 – Not trust an institution at all 10 – Have complete trust
Age (age, agea)	Calculation based on year of birth and year of interview	
Sex (gndr)	Sex of respondent	0 – Male, 1 – Female
GDP growth rate 2006 (gdp_gr_03)	Gross Domestic Product growth rate for 2006/2007	Source from official EU statistics
GDP growth rate 2008 (gdp_gr_04)	Gross Domestic Product growth rate for 2008/2009	Source from official EU statistics
Unemployment rate (unempl_0)	Unemployment rate for 2006/2007 (ESS round 3)	Source from official EU statistics
Unemployment rate (unempl_04)	Unemployment rate for 2008/2009 (ESS round 4)	Source from official EU statistics
Net beneficiary	Net calculation of the total EU expenditure allocated to member states minus their national total contribution on behalf of the EU (in million EUR)	0 – Net contributor, 1 – Net beneficiary

Notes

1 In the present paper we use the terminology *European unification* and *European integration* as synonyms, in both cases referring to the process of building unity between European states by joint resources and decision making in mainly economic, political and legal, but also social and cultural matters.
2 The countries included in the analysis are Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PG), Slovakia (SL), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), and Great Britain (GB).
3 The sample size (nESS3/nESS4) for single countries are as follows: Belgium (1,515/1,491), Bulgaria (795/1,530), Cyprus (736/898), Denmark (1,334/1,385), Estonia (1,121/1,296), Finland (1,557/1,792), France (1,704/1,769), Germany (2,403/2,326), Hungary (1,048/1,046), Ireland (1,257/1,548), Netherlands (1,701/1,599), Poland (1,281/1,241), Portugal (1,358/1,459), Slovakia (1,235/1,359), Slovenia (1,015/893), Spain (1,409/1,842), Sweden (1,359/1,401) and Great Britain (2,019/2,057).
4 The ISEI is an index developed by Ganzeboom *et al.* (1992), based on the income, education and occupation of individuals. It assumes that each occupation requires a certain level of education, and implies a certain income level. ISEI is used as a measure of socioeconomic status and can take values between 16 (agricultural assistants and cleaners) and 90 (judge).

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7 Economic crisis and non-institutionalised political participation

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Introduction

In 2008, the global financial and economic crisis that hit Europe initiated the worst recession Europe had experienced since the Second World War. In the wake of this so-called "Great Recession" (Cho and Newhouse, 2013; Elsby *et al.*, 2010; Verick and Islam, 2010), millions of jobs were lost resulting in rising levels of unemployment in most European countries. A wave of protests erupted particularly in those countries that were most severely affected by the consequences of the crisis. At first sight, this observation is in accordance with the grievance theory which predicts that people who experience collective deprivation express their grievances by "raising their voice or by exciting" (Kriesi, 2012, p. 518). However, the economic crisis did not affect all citizens in the same way. Preliminary results indicate that particularly men, less educated citizens and younger citizens suffer under rising unemployment (Elsby *et al.*, 2010; Eurostat, 2013; Verick, 2009). There are several explanations for why these specific groups were so severely affected by this crisis. First, it has been argued that men were especially vulnerable because they are more concentrated in those sectors that were most affected by the crisis (Eurostat, 2013; Verick, 2009). In addition, sectoral differences also depend on education, which can explain the higher vulnerability of low-skilled workers (Cho and Newhouse, 2013). Moreover, scholars argue that less educated workers are disadvantaged due to their lower average productivity (Cho and Newhouse, 2013). Finally, younger citizens might not always find sufficient opportunities to gain access to the labour market in times of crisis (Verick, 2009). The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether the heterogeneity in the social composition of groups of citizens affected by the crisis is reflected in the social composition of citizens that participate in the political protest.

In line with grievance theory, we would expect particularly those citizens to be active, who were most vulnerable to the consequences of the crisis. If this reasoning holds true, this crisis will alter the traditional composition of participants in non-institutionalised forms of political participation and consequently affect political equality in countries that were hit by the crisis. Hence, the question we aim to answer is whether the financial and economic crisis affected the

stratification of non-institutionalised political participation in Europe. We focus on non-institutionalised political participation because in the literature grievances are most strongly linked to forms of political participation that can be counted as non-institutionalised forms of engagement such as protest, involvement in social movements or boycotts (King, 2011; Klandermans, 1997; Opp, 1988, 2000).

This is a very important issue as a more equal distribution of political participation implies more political equality, which is a fundamental goal of every democracy. Participatory equality is of crucial importance if a society wants to achieve equal consideration for the legitimate interests of all citizens (Schlozman *et al*., 1999). However, no contemporary democracy fully lives up to this ideal. The reason is that substantive inequality in the use of political opportunities remains present even if a democracy ensured perfect equality in political rights. There is a wealth of literature indicating that individuals differ in the level and the intensity of political participation. Among the most prominent stratification factors that distort the equal distribution of political participation acts are sex, education level and age (Verba *et al*., 1995). We assume that the financial and economic crisis has affected the distribution of non-institutionalised political participation along those factors.

We aim to contribute to the literature on participatory equality by focusing on the effects of the economic crisis in Europe. The way the crisis affected highly developed democracies provides us with a unique opportunity to test this research question by comparing the impact of the economic downturn among different European countries. To answer this research question, we use the cumulative data from the European Social Survey (ESS 2002–2010) and combine it with economic indicators from the World Bank. This allows us to compare the social composition of participants in 25 European countries before the beginning of the crisis in 2008 with the situation in 2010 when the economic indicators were strongly negative. To this end, we conduct a multilevel analysis and examine whether the effect of the economic crisis on non-institutionalised political participation differs depending on the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants.

In the following section, we give a brief introduction to the grievance theory. Subsequently, we review the literature on inequality within non-institutionalised political participation and relate it to the preliminary findings on the effects of the economic crisis on different segments of the population. Then we present the data and methods we use to answer the research question, before we elaborate on what our results imply for the evolution of participatory equality within non-institutionalised political engagement in Europe.

Grievances and non-institutionalised forms of political participation

Generally this study builds on assumptions that are based on grievance theory. In line with this theory we argue that dissatisfaction and discontent motivate political

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participation (Barnes *et al*., 1979; Klandermans *et al*., 2008). These grievances can be provoked by different causes, such as declining social and economic progress or the perceived incapability of governments to maintain social order (Gurr, 1970). Consequently, people engage in various forms of non-institutionalised political participation in order to voice these grievances and frustrations (Gamson, 1968; Gurr, 1970). Once translated into political demands, grievances and discontent are thus seen as a central trigger for collective action and protest behaviour. Following this assumption, we expect that in countries that were strongly hit by the economic crisis, grievances and discontent come along with an increase in levels of political participation. Accordingly, our first hypothesis reads as follows:

> H1: The financial and economic crisis triggered non-institutionalised political participation in Europe.

Furthermore, we assume that it was especially those people engaged in non-institutionalised political participation who were particularily vulnerable to the consequences of the economic downturn (i.e. rising levels of unemployment). This might have shifted the social composition of citizens that typically participate in the political process in those countries that were most severely affected by the crisis. In the following section we elaborate on these more typical participants and on how the economic crisis might have affected the distribution of non-institutionalised political participation along individual characteristics.

The stratification of non-institutionalised political participation

Political participation is essential for the functioning of democracy. In fact, "if democracy is rule by the people […] then the notion of political participation is at the center of the concept of the democratic state" (Barnes and Kaase, 1979, p. 28). One main reason why political participation is so important is that it represents a way through which citizens communicate their interests, needs and preferences. Moreover, political participation allows citizens to put pressure on politicians to respond to their claims. Therefore, democracy can only function if people participate in the governing process. However, given that citizens differ in their preferences the equal consideration of all interests seems only achievable under equal participatory input (Oser *et al*., 2014; Schlozman *et al*., 1999; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba *et al*., 1995). Hence, democratic quality does not only depend on the level of political participation, but also on its distribution. This idea of equal input of each citizen in the political process is famously reflected in the "one person, one vote" principle. However, as a normative ideal, participatory equality should hold for all forms of political participation.

It is precisely because participatory equality is so important that it is crucial to investigate to what extent inequality is affected by the economic crisis. Focusing

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on participatory equality within non-institutionalised forms of political participation we make, by implication, a distinction between two forms of participation: institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation. This represents an established classification in the literature that builds on the classical distinction of Barnes and Kaase (1979) into conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. However, as many originally unconventional forms, such as protests or signing petitions, became mainstream (Dalton, 1996, 2000; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001), Marien *et al*. (2010) suggested that the dividing line should be drawn along institutionalisation rather than conventionality. Following this proposition, we use this classification and focus on forms of political participation that fall under the category of non-institutionalised participation. This means that we include modes of action that are elite-challenging and not organised by the political system. Citizens who become active in these forms try to exert influence on elites while keeping a certain distance from the political system. Within this study, we focus on the effect of the economic crisis on political equality within non-institutionalised forms of political participation because the grievance theory predicts that deprivation leads to forms of engagement that clearly can be considered as non-institutionalised (Gurr, 1970; Klandermans *et al*., 2008; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013).

Scholars have documented how various individual characteristics determine an individuals' likelihood of engagement in non-institutionalised participation. Non-institutionalised forms of participation are heavily biased with regard to age, sex and education level (Gallego, 2007; Marien *et al*., 2010; Stolle and Hooghe, 2011; Verba *et al*., 1995). In the following paragraphs we will briefly discuss these three sources of inequality and elaborate on whether their effect on non-institutionalised political participation is expected to change in times of crisis.

Previous studies have shown that *age* is an important source of stratification for non-institutionalised political participation, as younger citizens are more likely to engage in non-institutionalised political participation such as protests. Older citizens, on the other hand, seem to prefer institutionalised forms of political engagement such as contacting a politician or being active in a political party (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Marien *et al*., 2010; Norris, 2002; Stolle and Hooghe, 2011; Verba *et al*., 1995). It has been argued that young citizens are more attracted to non-institutionalised political engagement because of certain characteristics of these forms, such as their low entry cost or the sporadic nature of this form of engagement (Stolle and Hooghe, 2011). These features make it easier to recruit younger generations. In line with this literature we expect that younger people are more likely to engage in non-institutionalised forms of political participation. This reasoning leads to our first hypothesis regarding age as a predictor for political engagement:

H2a: Younger people are more likely to participate in non-institutionalised political participation than older people.

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This relationship could be particularly true in the context of the financial and economic crisis. Following the grievance theory, younger people should be particularly willing to become involved as they suffered disproportionately from the consequences of the crisis (Cho and Newhouse, 2013; Scarpetta *et al*., 2010). In Spain for example the youth unemployment rate rose to 34 per cent in 2009 (Eurostat, 2013). Assuming that deprivation leads to more political engagement, we should expect age to become a stronger predictor for non-institutionalised political participation in the context of the financial and economic crisis. Consequently, our second hypothesis reads as follows:

> H2b: The stronger a country is affected by the economic crisis, the stronger age becomes as a predictor of non-institutionalised political participation.

With respect to *sex*, it has been shown in previous studies that women are more likely to become engaged in non-institutionalised forms of political engagement such as signing petitions, boycotting products or joining protests (Burns *et al*., 2001; Marien *et al*., 2010; Norris, 2002; Stolle and Hooghe, 2011). One explanation why women are more attracted by these forms is that non-institutionalised participation corresponds more closely to the concept of 'lifestyle politics'. This concept implies that engagement takes place beyond political institutions and party politics and that it is more strongly linked to daily life activities rather than national politics (Marien *et al*., 2010). Based on this literature we expect that women are more engaged in these forms of political participation than men. This assumption leads to the third hypothesis:

> H3a: Women are more likely to participate in non-institutionalised political participation than men.

However, we know from previous studies about the consequences of the crisis that men have generally been more vulnerable to unemployment than women (Elsby *et al*., 2010; Eurostat, 2013). This is explained by the fact that sectors that traditionally employ mostly men have been severely hit by this crisis, such as construction, financial services and car manufacturing. This development has led to a sharp increase in the male unemployment rate in Europe. Following grievance theory we assume that those who are more strongly affected by the economic crisis will become more active in political participation, because economic grievances are seen as major motivation for political engagement (Gamson, 1968; Geschwender, 1968; Gurr, 2000; Wilkes, 2004). In line with this reasoning, it can be assumed that men will become more involved in non-institutionalised political participation in countries that are more severely affected by the crisis. Consequently, we expect that sex becomes less important

as determinant of non-institutionalised participation those countries. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:

H3b: The stronger a country is affected by the economic crisis, the weaker sex becomes as predictor of non-institutionalised political participation.

Finally, we turn to a characteristic that has been described as the most important source of inequality, namely the *level of education* (Marien *et al*., 2010; Verba *et al*., 1995). Highly educated citizens are more likely to become politically engaged than less educated citizens, and this seems to hold true for all types of political participation (Bovens and Wille, 2011). In fact, education appears to be even more important for non-institutionalised forms of engagement than for engagement in institutionalised acts (Dalton *et al*., 2003). One of the reasons why the level of education is so crucial for engagement is that highly educated people are more likely to acquire the necessary civic skills to become involved (Verba *et al*., 1995). Furthermore, it is argued in the literature that these skills are even more important for non-institutionalised engagement. Activities such as boycotting particular products require considerable knowledge about, for instance, politically incorrect products and their alternatives (Stolle *et al*., 2005). We assume accordingly that highly educated citizens are more involved in non-institutionalised forms of political participation:

H4a: Highly educated people are more likely to participate in non-institutionalised political participation than less educated people.

Regarding the vulnerability of citizens to the consequences of the economic crisis, we can expect low-skilled workers to suffer more from the recession than high-skilled workers, as they appear less attractive to the labour market due to their lower average productivity compared to high-skilled workers (Cho and Newhouse, 2013). If the less educated experience above-average deprivation and if these grievances are translated in political terms, this evolution will stimulate non-institutionalised engagement within this group. Such a dynamic will lead to more participatory equality in countries that are more severely affected by the crisis. In line with this reasoning the final hypothesis reads as follows:

H4b: The more strongly a country is affected by the economic crisis, the weaker the education level as a predictor of non-institutionalised political participation.

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To test these hypotheses, this article draws on data from the European Social Survey and from the World Bank. Before we discuss the results, we will briefly describe the variables and the models that we employed.

Data, method and measurement

We rely on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) for the dependent variable non-institutionalised political participation and the individual characteristics of citizens. The economic variables, on the other hand, are obtained from the World Bank. The ESS has been selected as a data source because it contains a wide range of indicators for political participation and most importantly because these data are comparable over time as well as across the different European countries. Moreover, the ESS is characterised by high standards concerning its survey design and data collection (Lynn, 2003). The ESS is an academically-led, representative and comparative cross-sectional survey, which started in 2002 and which has since then been conducted in more than 20 European countries on a biannual basis. Using this dataset, we aim to explain different forms of non-institutionalised political participation in 2010, when the economic crisis was in full swing, based on lagged economic indicators. Combining the ESS data from 2010 with the economic indicators from the World Bank, we obtain information for the following 25 countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.[1]

The structure of this data set is clearly hierarchical, as individuals are nested within countries, which requires multilevel modelling (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Multilevel modelling allows us to adequately test our hypotheses that postulate that the effect of the stratification factors age, sex and level of education depends on how severely a country is affected by the economic crisis. Due to the binary nature of the dependent variables (having participated in a certain form of non-institutionalised engagement versus not having participated), we use logistic multilevel models. In the following sections we provide a description of the variables that are included in the analysis and subsequently we proceed with the construction of these multilevel models.

Dependent variable: non-institutionalised political participation

Based on the political participation literature, we construct an index for non-institutionalised political participation. In this literature (Kaase, 1999; Marien *et al*., 2010; Stolle and Hooghe, 2011), signing petitions, taking part in public demonstrations and political consumerism are seen as typical modes of non-institutionalised participation and it has been shown that they load on one factor (Hooghe and Quintelier, 2013). Therefore, we count these three types of engagement as modes of non-institutionalised political engagement. These variables are dichotomous: respondents were asked whether they had participated in each of these modes during the previous

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12 months and they could answer with “Yes”, “No” or “Don’t know”. In our analysis we excluded those respondents who opted for “Don’t know” or refused to answer. The index of non-institutionalised political participation is based on a sum scale of these three modes. However, the distribution of the index is strongly skewed to the right (see Figure 7.1), because most respondents (73.5 per cent) did not participate in any of these three modes, about 17 per cent participated in one mode, 7.5 per cent was involved in two modes of action and about 2 per cent was engaged in all three modes of non-institutionalised engagement. Given the distribution of the sum scale, we decided to dichotomise this variable, contrasting those who did not become active in any mode of non-institutionalised participation (coded with 0) with those who became involved in at least one mode (coded with 1).

The average proportion of the population being engaged in at least one activity of non-institutionalised political participation varies quite substantially across the 25 different countries (Figure 7.2). The figure shows that levels of non-institutionalised political participation tend to be highest in Sweden, France and Germany, and lower in Southern and Eastern Europe. In Figure 7.2, we provide information not just about the participation level in 2010, but also on the average participation level in the period 2002–2008, i.e. the first four rounds of the ESS.

What also becomes apparent in this figure is that the average levels of non-institutionalised participation in 2010 differ from the average participation in the previous years (2002–2008). While it rose in 11 countries such as Poland, Estonia, Greece or Spain, it seems to have declined in other countries, for instance in Ireland, the UK, Switzerland and Sweden. However, no clear pattern seems to be observable.



Figure 7.1 Sum scale of non-institutionalised political participation.

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

Figure 7.2 Average non-institutionalised political participation per country.

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Individual-level variables: sources of participatory inequality and individual-level control variables

The three stratification factors in which we are interested are directly obtained from the ESS dataset as it contains the year of birth of the respondents, their sex and their education level. This final variable was recoded into three broad categories: (1) no formal or only primary education; (2) secondary education; (3) tertiary education. If our hypotheses were to be confirmed, the stratification of participants in these three factors should vary depending on how hard a country was hit by the economic crisis. Figure 7.3 provides the first insights concerning this assumption. In this figure the composition of participants is visualised for

two types of countries: countries that were less affected by the economic crisis and countries that were more severely affected by the economic crisis. We used the change in the unemployment rate between 2009 and 2010 to determine to which group a country belongs. The cut-off point represents an increase in the unemployment rate of 1 per cent. Countries whose unemployment rate rose by less than 1 per cent between 2009 and 2010 were counted as "less affected" and countries whose unemployment rate rose by more than 1 per cent were considered as "more severely affected". In line with the literature, Figure 7.3 shows that men are generally slightly less active than women in modes of non-institutionalised political participation. Regarding male participation in countries that were more severely affected by the crisis, we find only a small difference. In both types of countries, about 48 per cent of the participants are male. Concerning the participation of citizens under the age of 30, we find that they are more engaged in countries that were more affected by the crisis. In those countries about 22.5 per cent of the participants are under the age of 30. Regarding the level of education, the results of this descriptive analysis seem to support our hypothesis that education is weaker as a source of inequality in countries that

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

Figure 7.3 Composition of participants in non-institutionalised political participation in 2010.

were more severely hit by the crisis. In particular, the percentage of participants with primary education is higher in countries with a more pronounced rise in unemployment. Simultaneously, the percentage of participants with secondary and tertiary education is lower in those countries.

Apart from these sources of inequality, we control for additional individual characteristics that might also affect the probability to become engaged in the different forms of non-institutionalised political participation. First of all, we control for family income, as this has been shown to affect political participation (Brady *et al*., 1995; Verba *et al*., 1995). However, as the question on respondents' total household income is plagued by high rates of item-non-response and because income levels are difficult to compare across the different countries, we decided to introduce the respondent's satisfaction with their family income as a proxy for actual income. Second, we control for the respondents' political interest, because high levels of political interest are positively associated with political engagement (Neundorf *et al*., 2012; Verba *et al*., 1995). Third, we control with a categorical variable whether respondents are part of the active labour force or not. Respondents who are in paid work form the reference category of this variable, while the remaining categories are summarized in three dummy variables, capturing (1) students,[2] (2) the unemployed and (3) respondents who are not part of the labour force, such as people doing housework.[3] Finally, we include a variable that controls for the area in which a respondent lives. Regarding non-institutionalised political participation, urbanites might be more exposed to those forms of engagement compared to respondents who live in rural areas.

Country-level variables: measuring the economic crisis

As an indicator of the severity of the crisis we included two objective measures: the level of unemployment in 2009 and the change in unemployment between 2009 and 2010.[4] Unemployment thereby captures the share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Whereas the dependent variable non-institutionalised political participation is measured in 2010, we include time-lagged indicators for the economic crisis, in order to strengthen the causal inferences. We expect a rising unemployment rate to cause deprivation because we assume that rising unemployment is more directly tangible for citizens than, for example, a stagnated growth of GDP per capita. Moreover, as Singer (2010) shows, the salience of the economic performance of the government rises with unemployment and an individuals' economic vulnerability. Apart from that, Verick and Islam (2010) have found that unemployment is far more resistant to economic recovery than the level of GDP. For these reasons we focus on the unemployment rate. The figures, which we obtained from the World Bank, represent the national unemployment rates as percentage of the total labour force. As Figure 7.4 shows, both indices vary substantially across the 25 European countries.

It has to be noted, however, that if we were to include these two crisis indicators only as variables on the second level, we would implicitly assume that this

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

Figure 7.4 Two indicators of the economic crisis.

is the only relevant variable for the explanation of country-level differences in non-institutionalised political participation. This, however, seems rather unlikely as there are clear historically grown differences in political participation across nations. We thus have to introduce a country-level variable that controls for this background level of non-institutionalised political participation. We therefore include in each model a variable that represents the country-average of the respective form of non-institutionalised political participation in previous years (2002–2008). As a consequence by adding only one variable we control indirectly for other country-level variables that might potentially affect these forms of non-institutionalised political participation, such as welfare state expenditure, union density or the age of democracy. Therefore this procedure is not only very conservative but also particularly parsimonious. More detailed information about all variables that are included in this analysis can be found in Table 7.1.

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

Figure 7.4 Continued.

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Results

It is the aim of this chapter to examine whether the effect of the stratification factors age, sex and education level on non-institutionalised political participation changes along with the severity of the crisis. We consequently have to test whether the interactions between the stratification factors and the indicators of the crisis significantly affect non-institutionalised political participation. However, we will build up our logistic multilevel model step by step in the following paragraphs.

First of all, we run a null-model or 'empty model' (see Model I, Table 7.2) which splits the variance into two components: the variance between respondents within each country (individual-level variance, σ_e^2)[5] and the variance between the 25 countries (country-level variance, σ_{u0}^2). Containing only an

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Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics of variables included in analysis

Variable	*Number of observations*	*Mean*	*Standard deviation*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*	*Missings in %*
Dependent variable						
Non-institutionalised political participation	48,488	0.26	0.44	0	1	0.74
Individual-level variables						
Sex (Male=1)	48,829	0.46	0.50	0	1	0.04
Age	48,738	48.30	18.75	14	101	0.23
Level of education[a]						
Primary education	48,613	0.13	0.34	0	1	0.49
Secondary education	48,613	0.60	0.49	0	1	0.49
Tertiary education	48,613	0.27	0.44	0	1	0.49
Satisfaction with income	48,219	2.83	0.92	1	4	1.29
Political interest	48,632	2.32	0.92	1	4	0.45
Position within labour force[b]						
In paid work	48,216	0.47	0.50	0	1	1.30
Student	48,216	0.09	0.28	0	1	1.30
Unemployed	48,216	0.07	0.26	0	1	1.30
Not in labour force	48,216	0.37	0.48	0	1	1.30
Urbanisation	48,758	3.17	1.25	1	5	0.19
Country-level variables						
Unemployment in 2009	25	8.47	3.04	3.20	18	0
Rise in unemployment (2009–2010)	25	1.05	1.28	–0.90	3.40	0
Average non-institutionalised participation (2002–2008)	25	0.28	0.16	0.08	0.59	0

Source: ESS (European Social Survey) Round 5 Data 2010.

Notes
a Reference category is secondary education.
b Reference category is in paid work.
In total, the dataset contains 48,850 respondents.

intercept, this model can be used as a baseline to compare the model fit of the following models that contain independent variables. Looking at the random effects in Model I we find that the intraclass correlation (ICC), which reflects the similarity between respondents from the same country, is 0.165. This means that 16.5 per cent of the total variance is found at the country level, whereas 83.5 per cent is located at the individual level.

In a second step, we introduce the individual-level variables of interest together with all control variables (see Model II). Contrary to the literature, we find that age has a positive effect on the probability to participate in non-institutionalised modes of political participation. However, the effect is also curvilinear in the form of an inverted U-shape, meaning that the probability to become active rises through the younger age groups, peaks in the middle-age groups and then falls again with older age. In line with hypothesis 3a, women have a higher probability to become engaged in non-institutionalised political participation than men. Also, the level of education affects the probability to become involved in non-institutionalised participation in the expected direction (H4a). Citizens with secondary education are more likely to become engaged, compared to citizens with primary education, but both are less likely to become involved compared to citizens with tertiary education.

In a third step, we introduce the two indicators for the crisis, the level of unemployment in 2009 (Model III) and the change in unemployment between 2009 and 2010 (Model IV).

The first crisis indicator, unemployment rate in 2009, does not affect the probability to become involved in non-institutionalised participation. The second indicator, change in unemployment, however, raises the probability to become engaged in non-institutionalised forms of participation. This is in line with the grievance literature and provides evidence for the first hypothesis: grievances motivate political participation.

Additionally, we tested whether individuals have to be affected personally in order to experience deprivation and to become engaged. In order to test this, we included the interaction between the stratification factors and unemployment at the individual level in the analysis (see Table 7.A1 in the Appendix). This analysis shows that none of these interactions has a significant effect on the probability to participate in non-institutionalised participation except for the interaction between being unemployed and having primary education. The negative effect of having primary education (compared to secondary education) even enhances for citizens who are also unemployed.

Turning to the main research question of this study, we investigate whether the crisis changed the effect of the stratification factors of inequality on the probability to become engaged. Therefore, we first need to test whether the effect of age, sex and education on non-institutionalised participation is different across the different countries. In order to verify whether this is the case we allowed – one by one – the slope coefficients of these variables to vary across the 25 countries for Model III and Model IV. Subsequently, we tested using a likelihood ratio test, whether the models with random slopes had a better model fit than the ones without

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Table 7.2 Effect of economic crisis on non-institutionalised political participation

	Probability to participate in non-institutionalised forms of political participation			
	Model			
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*
Constant	–1.141*** (0.161)	–4.782*** (0.176)	–5.109*** (0.244)	–5.039*** (0.196)
Individual-level variables				
Age		0.046*** (0.004)	0.046*** (0.004)	0.046*** (0.004)
Age^2		–0.001*** (0.000)	–0.001*** (0.000)	–0.001*** (0.000)
Sex (Male = 1)		–0.150*** (0.024)	–0.150*** (0.024)	–0.149*** (0.024)
Level of education[a]				
Primary education		–0.488*** (0.047)	–0.489*** (0.047)	–0.487*** (0.047)
Tertiary education		0.477*** (0.027)	0.476*** (0.027)	0.477*** (0.027)
Satisfaction with income		0.012 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)
Political interest		0.519*** (0.014)	0.519*** (0.014)	0.519*** (0.014)
Position within labour force[b]				
Students		0.446*** (0.053)	0.446*** (0.053)	0.445*** (0.053)
Unemployed		–0.097 (0.051)	–0.098 (0.051)	–0.099 (0.051)
Not in labour force		–0.120*** (0.035)	–0.120*** (0.035)	–0.120*** (0.035)
Urbanisation		0.082*** (0.010)	0.080*** (0.010)	0.082*** (0.010)
Country-level variables				
Average non-institutionalised participation (2002–2008)		4.606*** (0.388)	4.740*** (0.371)	5.032*** (0.389)
Unemployment rate in 2009			0.034 (0.018)	
Change in unemployment (2009–2010)				0.128* (0.051)
σ^2_{u0}	0.648	0.090	0.079	0.072
ICC	0.165	0.027	0.023	0.021
Deviance	49,171	45,527	45,527	45,525

Notes

The dependent variable is the probability to become active in non-institutionalised political participation: probability to participate in no activity = 0; probability to participate in at least one activity = 1. Entries are logit coefficients of a multilevel logistic regression. All models include 46,748 individuals on the first level and 25 countries on the second level.

a Reference category is secondary education.

b Reference category is in paid work.

Significance: *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.

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random slopes (for the models with random slopes see Tables 7.A2 and and 7.A3 in the Appendix). In both models we found that the effects of age, sex and tertiary education are country-specific. Only the effect of primary education compared to secondary education does not vary across the 25 democracies. Consequently, citizens with primary education have a smaller probability to become engaged in non-institutionalised political participation, compared to citizens with secondary education, and this difference is stable across the 25 countries under study.

Next, we investigate whether the variance of these random slopes can be explained by the economic crisis. Therefore, we tested the effects of the interactions between the three sources of inequality and the two indicators for the economic crisis. The results of the interactions with unemployment in 2009 can be found in Table 7.3 and the results of the interactions with the change in unemployment are presented in Table 7.4.

However, the cross-level interaction effects in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 can only be meaningfully interpreted for the situation in which one constitutive variable equals zero, while the other constitutive variable changes by one unit (Brambor *et al*., 2005). Therefore, we also present the interaction effects graphically since we are interested in the interaction effects for the moderating variables having values other than zero, in particular the unemployment rate in 2009 that has not been zero in any country. To assess the effect of age at different levels of the crisis indicators, both the constitutive effects and the interaction effect are used to compute marginal effects. To determine the uncertainty of estimates we rely on simulations (Brambor *et al*., 2005).

Figure 7.5 presents the marginal effect of age on the probability to participate in non-institutionalised political participation, moderated by unemployment in 2009 (Figure 7.5a) and by the change in unemployment between 2009 and 2010 (Figure 7.5b).

We see in both graphs that age has a positive effect on non-institutionalised political participation, a result which contradicts hypothesis 2a and previous findings (Marien *et al*., 2010; Stolle and Hooghe, 2011). However, we do not find any indication for the hypothesis that this effect has been moderated by the economic crisis. The confidence intervals are in both graphs so wide that the effect of age could just as well be stable across the countries. Hence, there is no evidence supporting hypothesis 2b.

Models II (Table 7.3) and II (Table 7.4) suggest that there is a significant cross-level interaction between sex and both crisis indicators. These effects are plotted in the two graphs in Figure 7.6, which indicate the marginal effect of sex on the probability to engage in non-institutionalised political participation depending on the severity of the economic crisis, operationalized by the unemployment rate in 2009 (Figure 7.6a) and the rise in unemployment between 2009 and 2010 (Figure 7.6b). In these graphs, the effect can be seen as significant if the confidence interval does not include the zero. We find for both indicators a significant effect until a certain level of unemployment and change in unemployment respectively: Figure 7.6a shows a negative effect for sex (men are coded ‘1’), until a level of unemployment of about 10 per cent in 2009. Also, Figure 7.6b shows a negative effect of sex up

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Table 7.3 Models including cross-level interaction with unemployment in 2009 as crisis indicator

	Probability to participate in non-institutionalised forms of political participation		
	Model		
	I	*II*	*III*
Constant	–5.023***	–5.076***	–5.086***
	(0.383)	(0.258)	(0.256)
Individual-level variables			
Age	0.043***	0.047***	0.047***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age^2	–0.001***	–0.001***	–0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex (Male = 1)	–0.148***	–0.369***	–0.150***
	(0.024)	(0.099)	(0.024)
Level of education[a]			
Primary education	–0.532***	–0.487***	–0.505***
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Tertiary education	0.479***	0.479***	0.428**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.150)
Satisfaction with income	0.005	0.012	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Political interest	0.520***	0.519***	0.518***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Position within labour force[b]			
Students	0.425***	0.444***	0.449***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Unemployed	–0.102*	–0.100*	–0.094
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Not in labour force	–0.114**	–0.116***	–0.116***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Urbanisation	0.083***	0.083***	0.082***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Country-level variables			
Average non-institutionalised participation (2002–2008)	5.009***	4.930***	4.720***
	(0.349)	(0.437)	(0.408)
Unemployment in 2009	0.017	0.023	0.031
	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Cross-level interactions			
Age*unemployment in 2009	0.000		
	(0.001)		
Sex*unemployment in 2009		0.029*	
		(0.011)	
Tertiary education*unemployment in 2009			0.009
			(0.017)
σ^2_{u0}	0.340	0.075	0.083
σ^2_{age}	0.000		
σ^2_{sex}		0.017	
$\sigma^2_{tertiary\ education}$			0.056
Deviance	45,427	45,507	45,487

Notes

The dependent variable is the probability to become active in non-institutionalised political participation: probability to participate in no activity = 0; probability to participate in at least one activity = 1. Entries are logit coefficients of a multilevel logistic regression. All models include 46,748 individuals on the first level and 25 countries on the second level.

a Reference category is secondary education.

b Reference category is in paid work.

Significance: *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.

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Table 7.4 Models including cross-level interaction with change in unemployment (2009–2010) as crisis indicator

	Probability to participate in non-institutionalised forms of political participation		
	Model		
	I	*II*	*III*
Constant	–5.183***	–5.038***	–4.988***
	(0.227)	(0.204)	(0.204)
Individual-level variables			
Age	0.050***	0.046***	0.047***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age^2	–0.001***	–0.001***	–0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex (Male = 1)	–0.148***	–0.236***	–0.149***
	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.024)
Level of education[a]			
Primary education	–0.529***	–0.485***	–0.504***
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Tertiary education	0.479***	0.479***	0.425***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.069)
Satisfaction with income	0.004	0.012	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Political interest	0.521***	0.519***	0.518***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Position within labour force[b]			
Students	0.424***	0.444***	0.449***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Unemployed	–0.104*	–0.100*	–0.0948
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Not in labour force	–0.115**	–0.116***	–0.116***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Urbanisation	0.083***	0.083***	0.082***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Country-level variables			
Average non-institutionalised participation (2002–2008)	5.114***	5.134***	4.941***
	(0.381)	(0.419)	(0.413)
Change in unemployment (2009–2010)	0.260**	0.088	0.094
	(0.092)	(0.052)	(0.055)
Cross-level interactions			
Age*change in unemployment (2009–2010)	–0.003		
	(0.001)		
Sex*change in unemployment (2009–2010)		0.102***	
		(0.027)	
Tertiary education*change in unemployment (2009–2010)			0.072
			(0.043)
σ^2_{u0}	0.254	0.070	0.080
σ^2_{age}	0.000		
σ^2_{sex}		0.012	
$\sigma^2_{tertiary\ education}$			0.049
Deviance	45,426	45,499	45,483

Notes

The dependent variable is the probability to become active in non-institutionalised political participation: probability to participate in no activity = 0; probability to participate in at least one activity = 1. Entries are logit coefficients of a multilevel logistic regression. All models include 46,748 individuals on the first level and 25 countries on the second level.

a Reference category is secondary education.

b Reference category is in paid work.

Significance: *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.

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

a)



b)

Figure 7.5 Marginal effect of age on probability to become involved in non-institutionalised political participation as crisis indicators change.

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

a)



b)

Figure 7.6 Marginal effect of sex on probability to become involved in non-institutionalised political participation as crisis indicators change.

to a rise in unemployment of about 1.5 percentage points. In sum, this means that women have a higher probability to become active in non-institutionalised forms of participation in countries that were relatively spared by the crisis (i.e. had an unemployment rate of less than 10 per cent in 2009 or a change in unemployment of less than 1.5 percentage points). The effect in those countries supports hypothesis 3a. However, in countries that were severely affected by the economic crisis, the effect of sex on the probability of non-institutionalised political participation is no longer statistically significant. Consequently, we can state that in countries that were severely affected by the crisis, sex is not only a weaker predictor for the probability to become engaged in non-institutionalised political participation, but also that it is no predictor at all for non-institutionalised participation in those countries. While women are more active than men in countries that were less affected, the composition of participants in countries that were severely hit is balanced with respect to sex, supporting hypothesis 3b.

Figure 7.7 shows a positive effect of tertiary education, compared to secondary education on non-institutionalised political participation, supporting hypothesis 4a. In Figure 7.7a, however, the confidence interval is too broad to draw conclusions on the moderating effect of the economic crisis. Figure 7.7b with the rise in unemployment, however, indicates more clearly that the positive effect of tertiary education becomes even stronger the more severely a country is affected by the crisis. There is thus no evidence for hypothesis 4b that claims that the level of education becomes a weaker predictor for non-institutionalised participation in countries that were severely hit by the crisis – on the contrary. Citizens with secondary education have a higher probability to become engaged compared with those with primary education and this difference does not vary across the 25 countries. On top of this, citizens with tertiary education are more likely to participate compared to their peers with secondary education and this effect becomes even stronger the more a country is affected by the crisis.

Discussion and conclusion

It was the aim of this chapter to investigate whether the financial and economic crisis affected the stratification of non-institutionalised political participation along age, sex and education level in Europe. Based on preliminary findings that indicate that young citizens, men and low-skilled workers are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of the financial and economic crisis, we argued, in line with grievance theory, that these groups of citizens become especially involved in non-institutionalised political participation. If this was the case, this might alter the traditional composition of participants in those countries that were more severely hit by the crisis. Building on this line of reasoning we argued that in those countries young citizens, men and low-skilled workers would become more engaged compared to their peers who live in countries that were relatively spared by the crisis.

The literature claims that young citizens are generally more attracted by non-institutionalised forms of political participation, which results in a negative effect of age on non-institutionalised participation. Starting from these previous findings

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

a)



b)

Figure 7.7 Marginal effect of tertiary education on the probability to become involved in non-institutionalised political participation as crisis indicators change.

we thus assumed that this negative effect of age would be amplified in countries that are severely affected by the crisis, as younger citizens become even more engaged in these activities. However, we did not find a negative linear effect of age, but instead a curvilinear relationship between age and the probability to participate in non-institutionalised ways. The youngest segments of the population are thus less likely to become involved compared to their middle-aged peers. Furthermore, despite the fact that this effect of age on non-institutionalised participation differs from country to country, this variation cannot be explained by the financial and economic crisis. Put differently, the indicators of the crisis do not moderate the relationship between age and the probability to participate. So despite the rising youth unemployment rate in, particularly, southern European states, young citizens in those countries do not participate more than their peers who live in countries that were comparatively spared by the crisis. As a consequence, non-institutionalised political participation is still biased with respect to age and the financial and economic crisis neither mitigated nor reinforced this distortion.

The difference between male and female levels of engagement, on the other hand, is balanced in countries that were more affected by the crisis. Generally, women are more likely to participate in non-institutionalised forms of political participation and this is still visible in countries that were relatively spared by the economic crisis. However, the effect of sex on non-institutionalised political participation disappears in countries that were harder hit by the crisis. With respect to sex there is thus indeed more participatory equality in those countries. However, given that men are already more active in institutionalised forms of political participation, the reverse effect of sex on non-institutionalised forms was perceived as a female compensation for that inequality leading to a more inclusive political society. Therefore, this result might reinforce pre-existing gender inequalities.

Regarding the level of education, which has been depicted as the most important source of inequality, we also find no evidence for our hypothesis. While we argued that this stratification factor would become less important as a predictor for engagement in non-institutionalised participation in countries that were hardly hit by the crisis, we instead found that the positive effect of having tertiary education is even enhanced in those countries. While low-skilled workers are particularly vulnerable to the economic crisis, it is their highly educated peers that increasingly engage.

Summarising these results, we can conclude that the sole experience of vulnerability and collective deprivation does not translate directly into engagement. Mobilization of citizens as well as the social identity of these vulnerable groups could explain why the young and the less educated do not become engaged, but whether this is indeed the case remains a question for future research. Another question that should be investigated in future research is how sustainably the crisis affected the distribution of non-institutionalised participation along sex. We found that sex no longer predicts political participation in countries that were severely affected by the financial and economic crisis. However, it seems plausible that with economic recovery the gender distribution relapsed back to the traditional pattern in which women are more engaged than men in non-institutionalised participation. Whether this is the case remains to be studied.

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Appendix

Table 7.A1 Models including interactions between stratification factors and unemployment

	Probability to participate in non-institutionalised forms of political participation			
	Model			
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*
Constant	–5.047*** (0.198)	–5.039*** (0.196)	–5.053*** (0.196)	–5.039*** (0.196)
Individual-level variables				
Age	0.047*** (0.005)	0.046*** (0.004)	0.047*** (0.004)	0.046*** (0.004)
Age^2	–0.001*** (0.000)	–0.001*** (0.000)	–0.001*** (0.000)	–0.001*** (0.000)
Sex (Male = 1)	–0.150*** (0.024)	–0.145*** (0.025)	–0.149*** (0.024)	–0.149*** (0.024)
Level of education[a]				
Primary education	–0.487*** (0.047)	–0.487*** (0.047)	–0.457*** (0.048)	–0.487*** (0.047)
Tertiary education	0.477*** (0.027)	0.477*** (0.027)	0.478*** (0.027)	0.478*** (0.028)
Satisfaction with income	0.012 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)
Political interest	0.519*** (0.014)	0.518*** (0.014)	0.519*** (0.014)	0.519*** (0.014)
Position within labour force[b]				
Students	0.448*** (0.054)	0.445*** (0.053)	0.448*** (0.053)	0.446*** (0.053)
Unemployed	–0.060 (0.161)	–0.068 (0.070)	–0.064 (0.052)	–0.096 (0.057)
Not in labour force	–0.121*** (0.035)	–0.119*** (0.035)	–0.123*** (0.035)	–0.120*** (0.035)
Urbanisation	0.082*** (0.010)	0.082*** (0.010)	0.082*** (0.010)	0.082*** (0.010)
Age*unemployment	–0.001 (0.004)			
Sex*unemployment		–0.061 (0.095)		
Primary education*unemployment			–0.485* (0.194)	
Tertiary education*unemployment				–0.013 (0.113)
Country-level variables				
Average non-institutionalised participation (2002–2008)	5.032*** (0.388)	5.033*** (0.388)	5.032*** (0.389)	5.032*** (0.389)
Change in unemployment (2009–2010)	0.128* (0.051)	0.128* (0.051)	0.128* (0.051)	0.128* (0.051)
σ^2_{u0}	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
Deviance	45,525	45,525	45,518	45,525

Notes

The dependent variable is the probability to become active in non-institutionalised political participation: probability to participate in no activity = 0; probability to participate in at least one activity = 1. Entries are logit coefficients of a multi-level logistic regression. All models include 46,748 individuals on the first level and 25 countries on the second level.

a Reference category is secondary education.

b Reference category is in paid work.

Significance: *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.

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Table 7.A2 Models including random slopes for age, sex, primary and tertiary education with unemployment in 2009 as crisis indicator

	Probability to participate in non-institutionalised forms of political participation			
	Model			
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*
Constant	–5.256***	–5.120***	–5.337***	–5.111***
	(0.257)	(0.243)	(0.267)	(0.247)
Individual-level variables				
Age	0.047***	0.047***	0.046***	0.047***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age^2	–0.001***	–0.001***	–0.001***	–0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex (Male = 1)	–0.148***	–0.127**	–0.150***	–0.150***
	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Level of education[a]				
Primary education	–0.531***	–0.487***	–0.505***	–0.506***
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.048)
Tertiary education	0.479***	0.478***	0.479***	0.500***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.056)
Satisfaction with income	0.005	0.012	0.011	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Political interest	0.520***	0.519***	0.518***	0.518***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Position within labour force[b]				
Students	0.425***	0.443***	0.446***	0.449***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Unemployed	–0.103*	–0.098	–0.102*	–0.094
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Not in labour force	–0.114**	–0.116***	–0.120***	–0.116***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Urbanisation	0.083***	0.083***	0.081***	0.082***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Country-level variables				
Average non-institutionalised participation	5.006***	4.941***	5.193***	4.720***
(2002–2008)	(0.349)	(0.438)	(0.409)	(0.408)
Unemployment in 2009	0.045**	0.028	0.048**	0.034
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
σ^2_{u0}	0.348	0.075	0.092	0.083
σ^2_{age}	0.000			
σ^2_{sex}		0.027		
$\sigma^2_{primary\ education}$			0.035	
$\sigma^2_{tertiary\ education}$				0.056
Deviance	45,428	45,512	45,523	45,487
Goodness-of-fit statistics (compared to the model with random intercepts but no random slope)				
χ^2 (df = 2)	99.56	14.93	4.91	40.07
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	0.086	<0.001

Notes

The dependent variable is the probability to become active in non-institutionalised political participation: probability to participate in no activity = 0; probability to participate in at least one activity = 1. Entries are logit coefficients of a multilevel logistic regression. All models include 46,748 individuals on the first level and 25 countries on the second level.

a Reference category is secondary education.

b Reference category is in paid work.

Significance: *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.

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Table 7.A3 Models including random slopes for age, sex, primary and tertiary education with change in unemployment between 2009 and 2010 as crisis indicator

	Probability to participate in non-institutionalised forms of political participation			
	Model			
	I	*II*	*III*	*IV*
Constant	–5.034***	–5.068***	–5.071***	–5.023***
	(0.215)	(0.197)	(0.201)	(0.199)
Individual-level variables				
Age	0.047***	0.047***	0.046***	0.047***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age^2	–0.001***	–0.001***	–0.001***	–0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex (Male=1)	–0.148***	–0.127**	–0.150***	–0.150***
	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Level of education[a]				
Primary education	–0.531***	–0.485***	–0.500***	–0.504***
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.066)	(0.048)
Tertiary education	0.480***	0.479***	0.479***	0.501***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.055)
Satisfaction with income	0.004	0.012	0.010	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Political interest	0.520***	0.518***	0.518***	0.518***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Position within labour force[b]				
Students	0.424***	0.443***	0.445***	0.449***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Unemployed	–0.103*	–0.100*	–0.101*	–0.095
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Not in labour force	–0.115**	–0.116***	–0.120***	–0.116***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Urbanisation	0.083***	0.083***	0.081***	0.082***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Country-level variables				
Average non-institutionalised participation	5.117***	5.131***	5.216***	4.945***
(2002–2008)	(0.382)	(0.427)	(0.412)	(0.414)
Change in unemployment (2009–2010)	0.116*	0.117*	0.118*	0.126*
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.051)
σ^2_{u0}	0.282	0.071	0.078	0.082
σ^2_{age}	0.000			
σ^2_{sex}		0.027		
$\sigma^2_{primary\ education}$			0.034	
$\sigma^2_{tertiary\ education}$				0.056
Deviance	45,430	45,510	45,524	45,485
Goodness-of-fit statistics (compared to the model with random intercepts but no random slope)				
χ^2 (df=2)	95.59	14.68	1.37	39.86
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	0.504	<0.001

Notes

The dependent variable is the probability to become active in non-institutionalised political participation: probability to participate in no activity=0; probability to participate in at least one activity=1. Entries are logit coefficients of a multilevel logistic regression. All models include 46,748 individuals on the first level and 25 countries on the second level.

a Reference category is secondary education.

b Reference category is in paid work.

Significance: *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.

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Notes

1. The ESS also includes data on Ukraine. However, as we have no comparable information available on the economic variables for Ukraine, it could not be included in this analysis.
2. In particular, this variable captures the potential future labour force, as it comprises not only respondents who indicated that they are in education but also respondents who are in community or military service.
3. In particular, this variable accounts for respondents who indicate that they are permanently sick or disabled, retired, or doing housework, looking after children or other persons.
4. This second measure was obtained by substracting the unemployment rate in 2010 from the unemployment rate in 2009. Positive values thus reflect a rise in unemployment while negative values indicate a decline.
5. The error variance in logit models is fixed to $\mathrm{Var}(\varepsilon|x)=\frac{\pi^2}{3}$. The first–level residual variance σ_e^2 in multilevel logit models is by assumption $\sigma_e^2 == \frac{\pi^2}{3} \approx 3.29$ (Snijders and Bosker 1999, 225).

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8 Economic crisis and democratic legitimacy

Jan Eichhorn, Jakob Hensing and Christine Hübner

Introduction

In a context where deeper integration of EU member states is seen by many as a necessary response to the Euro crisis, the title question is highly relevant: "Whose political union?" is it that is actually being talked about. Proponents of closer integration typically claim that a monetary union would require a completed economic union in order to succeed, thus suggesting the need for integration of economic governance. This leads many commentators to argue that in order to achieve such stronger coordination of economic activities across the member states it would be necessary to establish deeper political integration at the European level to overcome problems caused by differences in national policy making. Arguably the most commonly stated formula for addressing the crisis within the existing framework appears to be (1) to create a stronger political union, which is able (2) to deepen the economic union, in order (3) to enable the monetary union to be successful.

This proposition omits the discussion of a crucial prior question: Would a stronger political union be considered equally legitimate across all member states? Stated differently, if the European Union is meant to be understood as a democratic body, to what extent is the political culture across member states cohesive enough to permit a deeper political integration that is perceived as legitimate by the citizens? So far, the debate about legitimacy and the democratic deficit has mostly focused on the presence or absence of representative institutions in the EU. The question of democratic legitimacy, however, is not simply a matter of institutional design: it emanates from every individual citizen's perception of legitimate institutions and thereby addresses the societal foundations of a democratic polity.

Our investigation aims to widen the focus of the debate. Analysing survey data from all EU member states, we seek to explore whether and how evaluations of political legitimacy differ between people across the European Union. Our focus lies on understanding how national-level differences in political culture, both articulated and practised, affect how individuals in different member states come to evaluate the legitimacy of national and European political institutions. Identifying which national-level expressions of political culture

moderate the political evaluations of individuals helps us to highlight the necessary foundations of – as well as potential barriers to – democratically legitimate political integration and open up avenues for future research. Differences in the evaluation of the legitimacy of national institutions and the supranational European Union would be indicative of differences in political culture manifestations between countries, as both national and supranational institutions form related, but not interchangeable, pathways of decision making in the European Union. Legitimising relationships through national institutions and directly with the European Union matter equally. Variation between member states in how either type of legitimising evaluation is formed by citizens may point to divergences in the formation of political cultures and may therefore act as barriers to democratically legitimised integration. Starting from the individual citizen's perception of legitimacy, this chapter makes a particular contribution to the debate by exploring both articulated and practised political values across the range of all EU member states.

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Democratic legitimacy and political culture in the European Union

The question of whether the EU suffers from a democratic deficit has been discussed extensively. Arguments in this debate typically emanate from explicitly normative vantage points rooted in political theory (see Føllesdal, 2006). In this vein, those who regard the European Union as a political system and thus as a "polity" (e.g. Hix and Høyland, 2011) tend to apply relatively demanding standards of democratic legitimacy (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix, 2006). Others, in contrast, have argued that such questions of democratic legitimacy do not arise in the context of the EU, as long as it essentially remains a regulatory agency where "politics and economics are kept as separate as possible" (Majone, 1998, p. 5). Finally, some scholars maintain that if measured against the actual realities in contemporary nation states rather than against an ideal derived from democratic theory, the EU fares comparatively well on democratic legitimacy (Moravcsik, 2002). From this basic framing of the debate, it is apparent that the "democratic deficit" is not simply a matter of institutional arrangements, but fundamentally related to the question of what kind of political community the EU is or aspires to be.

Accordingly, the notion of European identity and its relationship to democratic legitimacy has also been discussed in greater depth. In the context of the ill-fated constitutional convention in the early 2000s, Kalypso Nicolaidis described this debate as one between intergovernmentalists, who believed that the EU would never accomplish the kind of common identity that allowed nation states to be truly democratic polities, and supranationalists, who believed in the emergence of a European identity and therefore advocated the establishment of traditional institutions of representative democracy at the European level. She noted that

> although the issue seemed largely institutional, the two camps were really asking a fundamental philosophical question: if democracy requires a demos

> – a group of individuals who have enough in common to manage their affairs collectively – is there, or can there be, a single European demos?
>
> (Nicolaidis, 2004, p. 100)

Nicolaidis proposes to resolve the debate by introducing the notion of European "demoi-cracy":

> The EU is neither a union of democracies nor a union as democracy; it is a union of states and of peoples – a "demoi-cracy" – in the making. It appeals to a political philosophy of its own – transnational pluralism – rather than to some extended notion of the nation-state. And however paradoxical, recognizing that its different needs require a different model is in fact a way to honour the nation-state's role as a cornerstone of national democracy.
>
> (Ibid., p. 101)

Empirically, this implies an important consequence for bottom-up approaches in which we want to understand people's political attitudes and participation: we need to analyse both the attitudes of people towards institutions of the European Union as well as with regards to their own respective member states. Political culture in the European Union needs to be conceptualised both within member states in terms of orientations towards national political institutions (as one channel affecting supranational policy) and on the level of supranational institutions themselves.

In many ways, the debate about democracy in Europe also mirrors broader discussions about democracy beyond the nation state. A pattern similar to the one described by Nicolaidis is visible in the debate on legitimacy and global governance, where sceptics identifying the absence of a global demos (such as Dahl, 1999) encounter optimists who discern signs of an emerging cosmopolitan political community (Linklater, 1998). Despite these apparent parallels, the European case has generally been seen in a somewhat more optimistic light. The interdependence between EU member states is significantly greater than among states worldwide, the region is culturally and socio-economically much less diverse than the entire globe, and it shares a common (if conflictual and violent) historical legacy. Although attempts to promote a European public sphere through Europeanised media outlets have not been success stories, at least a measure of "Europeanisation" of national public spheres has been observable over time. National media today report widely on issues and perspectives from other member states (with some variation in extent), and tend to accurately reflect the extent to which decision making on a given policy field occurs at the community level (Koopmans and Erbe, 2004).

Meanwhile, questions on the coherence and convergence of *political culture* in Europe have attracted comparatively little explicit attention in the debate on the democratic deficit. While Imig and Tarrow (2001) discuss the issue of transnational political mobilisation in Europe, national differences in political attitudes and in practices of political participation within Europe remain under-explored in the debate on democracy in the EU. This is astonishing, given

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that the concept of political culture was developed in the 1960s with the precise purpose of analysing the socio-cultural preconditions and underpinnings of democracy. As Almond and Verba argued in their foundational study, a "democratic form of a participatory political system requires as well a political culture consistent with it" (Almond and Verba, 1989, p. 3). Political culture is defined in their study as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation" (ibid., p. 13), with an emphasis on "specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system" (ibid., p. 12). Political culture is thus conceptualised in an understanding that reflects shared attitudes of members of a particular political entity – implying the need for "bottom-up" analytical approaches. The thrust of Almond and Verba's argument was that a democratic polity can only be stable if sustained by a "civic culture", which they described as a mixture of strong participatory orientations with a certain degree of political apathy, the latter engendering some patience and acquiescence with the policy-making process run by elected officials.

There is an apparent theoretical link between political culture, participation and questions of legitimacy. As Fritz Scharpf (2009, p. 5) has argued, legitimacy is "the functional prerequisite for governments which aim to be simultaneously effective and liberal". Scharpf proposes to structure debates around legitimacy in terms of input-oriented and output-oriented legitimising beliefs. Input-oriented arguments refer to the institutional settings that enable "government by the people", i.e. beliefs in the normative justification of institutions even if those may not serve to further one's individual preferences. This allegiance to democratic institutions despite the fact that they may work to the individual's disadvantage is also referred to as "loser's consent". Scharpf points out that this kind of legitimacy presupposes trust in the benevolence of fellow citizens in the collectivity, so that being part of a minority on a given policy question is not experienced as a threat. This trust typically arises from commonalities in history, culture, language, etc., and it is in his view insufficiently developed in Europe to allow for an increase in input legitimacy through institutional reforms (Scharpf, 1999, p. 9). Output-oriented legitimacy, in contrast, arises from substantive problem-solving capacity – referring to the "effective" aims of governments requiring legitimacy to successfully address these aims, according to Scharpf (2009, p. 5). This type of legitimacy does not require a "thick" common identity, but rather the perception of a range of common interests that can be pursued through collective action. It can be expressed in terms of expectations of particular (for example, economic) outcomes from the system's arrangements or in terms of a generalised expectation that people or organisations will work cooperatively and not against one's own benefit. Such positive expectations result in strengthened (output-oriented) legitimacy, as "those with greater faith in people are psychologically prepared to accept the democratic process" (Lane, 1959, p. 164). Scharpf (1999) argues that although output-oriented arguments alone are insufficient to create democratic legitimacy, this is currently the only option for the European Union, as it lacks the preconditions for the type of input legitimacy

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that are present in the nation state. Both input and output legitimacy, Scharpf suggests, manifests itself as "trust in institutional arrangements" (Scharpf, 2006, p. 1) that ensure the responsiveness of governing processes to the preferences of the governed (input) as well as the provision of solutions to their substantive problems (output). This view implies that empirically observed differences in institutional confidence and levels of democratic participation between member states would present a barrier to political integration.

Following Scharpf's arguments we propose the following hypotheses:

H1a: Respondents with more positive input-legitimacy oriented evaluations would have more positive evaluations of political institutions.

H1b: The relationship between positive input-legitimacy oriented evaluations and evaluations of political institutions are more pronounced for national institutions than EU institutions.

H2a: More positive output-legitimacy oriented evaluations are associated with more positive evaluations of political institutions.

H2b: The relationship between positive output-legitimacy oriented evaluations and evaluations of political institutions are more pronounced for EU institutions than national institutions.

One may expect that publics will tend to regard political institutions as legitimate (especially in terms of input legitimacy) if these conform to their expectations regarding the political process. Any particular form of institutional design is unlikely to be regarded as similarly legitimate in all cultural contexts. This argument strongly relates to Scharpf's concerns whether there would be "loser's consent" in a European polity. Individuals may not only be alienated by the involvement of other individuals with whom they do not have a strong feeling of shared identity, but also by the fact that political choices are made through institutions that are not supported by their political culture. In addition, choices of institutional design are much more enduring and more difficult to change than substantive policy choices. A situation where large parts of the European public saw themselves confronted with political institutions that are incompatible with their attitudes towards the function of the political system would therefore be problematic considering goals of deepening political integration.

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In relation to the discussion of the relationship between legitimacy-oriented evaluations and evaluations of political institutions we may therefore formulate the following hypothesis:

H3: In countries where evaluations of the political system are more positive on average, the effect of personal legitimacy orientations on evaluations of political institutions would be enhanced.

Furthermore, if the expectations of what constitutes legitimate government differ with regards to orientations towards respective member state governments, expectations about their behaviour in representing countries at the European level are likely to vary as well. We propose that such differential expectations matter even when they are subtle and all related to the democratic realm as in the European context. Barriers to functioning political integration based on compatible political cultures arise both from differences in expectations towards domestic governments as well as towards supranational institutions – even if all of them are democratic. The same is true with respect to output legitimacy. Whether the policies of an institution are conducive to the pursuit of a perceived "common good" cannot be discussed without reference to cultural contexts. If people differ on their understanding of what the role of (democratic) political institutions in society should be, can these institutions deliver policy outputs that are regarded as desirable across cultural contexts?

In the light of this question, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H4: In countries where the normative emphasis on a democratic system is more pronounced, the strength of the relationship between legitimacy orientations and evaluations of political institutions would be increased compared to countries where the normative emphasis on a democratic system is weaker.

Finally, it is crucial to extend the focus beyond mere cognitive orientations of people in order to understand the formation of attitudes towards the legitimacy of political institutions at the national and European level. To gain a comprehensive understanding we also have to consider political practice and the extent of participation of people in the respective context. While contingent on other factors, the potentially positive social and political benefits of engagement in civic associations have been discussed for a variety of contexts (Putnam, 1993; Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Teorell, 2003). Almond and Verba (1963) champion associational engagement as one cornerstone of civic culture that ultimately supports the legitimacy and stability of a democratic system.[1] Others have since highlighted the relevance of considering the actual practice of people's involvement to understand to what

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extent the demos is involved directly with political decision making, thus engaging with their legitimate claims to participation in democratic processes (Inglehart, 1997). Traditionally, participation would have been considered as embodied in representative mechanisms – mainly voting in elections. However, contemporary authors have been championing the role of so-called elite-challenging participatory forms (such as demonstrations and petitions) allowing for engagement beyond electoral cycles and thus acting as emancipatory processes for the people (Welzel *et al*., 2005). Such activities should not be understood as undermining the system, but rather as strengthening it by increasing the democratic legitimacy of the system through more continuous political engagement of self-directed citizens (Dalton, 2008) – a positive attitude also shared by the majority of people in most member states according to a recent survey (European Commission, 2013).

Considering the relevance of civic engagement at both the individual and societal level as highlighted by the studies cited we formulate the following hypotheses:

> H5a: People with greater levels of personal civic engagement would have more positive evaluations of political institutions.

> H5b: In countries with greater levels of civic engagement the effect of legitimacy-oriented evaluations on evaluations of political institutions will be enhanced.

Most studies have so far focused on analysing levels of confidence in national and European institutions and commonly noted a decline in confidence which has been intensified from the onset of the crisis (see, for example, European Commission, 2010). Some studies have investigated this also taking into account national-level context factors. Roth *et al.* (2011), for example, aimed to identify how different macroeconomic contexts affected differential outcomes in explaining the substantial variation in institutional trust between countries. However, the investigation did not engage with differences in political culture to contextualise the evaluations of individuals – a gap we are addressing in this chapter.

Summarising our review above, we can distinguish three areas of influence affecting people's evaluations of democratic legitimacy: input-oriented orientations, output-oriented orientations and political practice. At the core of our investigation we want to establish whether these factors affect attitudes towards the legitimacy of national and European institutions in the same way across all 27 member states or whether particular manifestations of political culture at the national level moderate them (rather than, for example, macroeconomic factors, as explored by Roth *et al*., 2011). The identification of such systematic national-level factors may allow us to identify where barriers exist to a political integration at the

European level that is congruent with the political orientations of its citizens, based on shared views on the democratic legitimacy.

Lastly, in the special case of the European Union where political integration is advanced and has a historical legacy, it seems to be imperative to include a fourth contextual dimension when analysing evaluations of confidence in European institutions in addition to the general manifestations of attitudes to and practised political culture outlined above: A more positive national climate towards the European Union in general may be an important moderator of individual-level evaluations of its institutions. We therefore propose a final hypothesis:

> H6: In countries where attitudes towards the European Union are more positive in general, the relationship between legitimacy orientations and evaluations of EU political institutions will be enhanced.

Approach and method

In order to identify systematic variation in barriers to political integration, we set out with an approach grounded in the variables theoretically discussed above: perceived legitimacy and political practice. The operationalisations chosen aim to be reflective of the three identified individual-level factors (input-legitimacy orientations, output-legitimacy oriented orientations and practised civic engagement) as well as the four aggregate-level domains discussed in the reflections above (evaluations of the system, the normative importance of democracy, levels of civic engagement and general affinity attitudes towards the European Union). As with any secondary data analysis involving existing surveys operationalisations of theoretical concepts can always only be an approximation of the complex concepts envisaged.

Dependent variable and approach to modelling

We use data from the 4th wave of the European Values Study (EVS, 2008) mainly conducted in 2008 for all 27 member states of the European Union. The time point of the data collection was ideal as it allows us to engage with responses that were given before the strongest effects of the Eurozone crisis were felt. These responses have a greater validity in providing a representation of political attitudes generally held by populations in the member states yet unaffected by the differential experience of the subsequent crisis.

In order to approximate orientations reflecting the perceived legitimacy of political institutions we utilised questions allowing respondents to express their degree of confidence in particular institutions. This operationalisation goes back to Scharpf's (2006) initial definition of perceived input as well as output legitimacy being represented by the "trust in institutional arrangements". For the

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national level, our dependent variable was the confidence individuals had in their national parliaments. To investigate whether factors found to influence confidence in parliament would also be relevant for orientations towards the European level we conducted all analyses also with confidence in the European Union as the dependent variable. The variable was dichotomised in both cases, distinguishing between those with positive orientations ("a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence) and those with negative views ("not very much" confidence or "none at all"). This allowed us to use logistic regression frameworks as the basis of our statistical models.[2]

There is great variation across the 27 member states for both dependent variables, as Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show. In some countries fewer than 20 per cent of respondents declare a positive attitude on confidence in their parliament (including Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Czech Republic), while there are countries with over two-thirds of respondents reporting such confidence (Denmark and Luxembourg). Spotting consistent patterns is difficult at face value. While the six countries with the lowest stated confidence in parliament are all Central-Eastern and Eastern European countries, a simple split by region or accession date would not be sufficient. Great Britain's confidence values, for example, are as low as those in Hungary, while Slovenia and Slovakia have values in the upper middle of the range – similar to those of the Netherlands for example. At the same time

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

Figure 8.1 Confidence in national parliaments.

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

Figure 8.2 Confidence in European Union.

2004-accession countries Malta and Cyprus are among the top five countries, just below Sweden. The variation for confidence in the European Union is similarly great and face-value patterns even more difficult to identify. While we find the lowest levels of confidence for five pre-2004 accession countries (Great Britain and Austria with under 30 per cent, and Germany, Finland and Sweden with below 40 per cent expressing confidence), other prior members are found in the middle (such as France) or in the top third (such as Luxembourg and Belgium). Splitting the analysis geographically, we do not find distinctive patterns for confidence in the European Union either: Both Central/Eastern European countries and Mediterranean member states are found in all parts of the scale. Also, a simple split by budget net-beneficiary and contributor countries does not explain the picture. While some net contributors are at the lower end of confidence (such as Germany and the United Kingdom) other net contributors are at the higher end of EU confidence (such as Luxembourg and Italy).

Attributing differences in legitimacy orientations towards parliaments and, in particular, towards the European Union based on simple classifications such as region or accession date may appear to be an obvious approach. However, instead of using predetermined stereotypes we aim to present an analysis that allows us to systematically examine what particular macro-factors may moderate

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individual-level influences on evaluations of legitimacy. We therefore employed a simple two-stage hierarchical model: at the individual level we used a set of indicators to distinguish input and output orientations as well as practised civic engagement, controlled for by socio-demographic variables, to estimate the effects on the dependent variables.

In the light of the theoretical discussion, we extended the model to include country-level indicators to contextualise potential individual-level relationships: normative ideal system, system's evaluation, active political participation, supranational orientations. The four identified national-level factors representing different manifestations of political culture are used to estimate their direct effects and cross-level interactions with the individual-level predictors. An overview of the operationalisations and descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table 8.1 and an overview of the approach to modelling in Figure 8.3.

Individual-level variables

In order to reflect orientations towards the inputs that are relevant for the evaluation of legitimacy we used a combination of two variables in a combined score engaging with views on the political system itself. The first variable seeks to explore the strength of the respondent's support for a democratic system: whether they consider having a democratic system a rather good or bad thing.[3] This is combined with a second variable asking about how the respondents would rate their political system for governing the country generally.

Output orientations are also modelled using a combination of two variables in one score. First, respondents are asked to what extent they associate democracy as a governing system of their country with economic problems – a negative output orientation. The second variable reflects on outcome expectations relating to the European Union: whether people were afraid or not about their country having to pay for the EU in the end, thus resulting in a material loss because of integration.

In order to capture respondents' civic engagement we combine information on associational membership and active political participation. We take into account how many different types of associations respondents were a member of – reflecting a greater breath of their civic networks – and how many different types of political participation they have actively engaged in. The scores are combined with equal weight in one index.

For all models a consistent set of socio-demographic control variables was used. It included variables for sex, age, marital status, education levels, unemployment and income to ensure that the relationships observed for our predictor variables were not sensitive to simple socio-demographic differences between respondents. As there was a substantial amount of missing data for income, imputation was used to estimate the values for the missing cases. Robustness checks were done for all individual-level analyses presented in this chapter and selected multilevel models. The analyses were conducted using all cases with imputed income values and again using only those cases with valid responses.

Table 8.1 Operationalisation of variables

	Operationalisation	*Mean (s.d.)*	*Min…Max*
Control			
Male	0 – Female, 1 – Male	0.44 (0.50)	n/a
Age	In years	48.7 (18.0)	16…108
Married	Dummy: Respondent is married	0.52 (0.50)	n/a
Lower tertiary education	Dummy: Completed lower tertiary education	0.14 (0.35)	n/a
Higher tertiary education	Dummy: Holder of higher tertiary degree	0.08 (0.27)	n/a
Unemployed	Dummy: Respondent is currently unemployed	0.05 (0.23)	n/a
LN income	Monthly household income in €1,000 (PPP), logarithmised, imputed	0.12 (0.94)	−7.77…2.69
Individual			
Input orientations	Mean of the scores of the evaluation of the statement “Having a democratic system” (0: ‘Very bad’ – 3: ‘Very good’, divided by 3 and rating of “how well things are going” with “the system governing the country” (0: ‘Very bad’ – 9: ‘Very good’), divided by 9 [Range 0…1]	0.60 (0.18)	0.1
Output orientations	Mean of the scores of the evaluation of the statement “In a democracy the economic system runs badly” (0: ‘Agree strongly’ – 3: ‘Disagree strongly’, divided by 3 and evaluation of personally being afraid about “Our country paying more and more to the European Union” (0: ‘Very much afraid’ – 9: ‘Not afraid at all’), divided by 9 [Range 0…1]	0.48 (0.22)	0.1
Civic engagement	Mean of the sum of types of associations the respondent is a member of divided by 15 (maximum number) and the sum of forms of political action the respondent has taken part in divided by 5 (maximum number) [Range 0…1]	0.10 (0.13)	0.87
Aggregate			
System evaluation	Country mean of the sum of the scores of the evaluation of the statement “To respect the country’s political institutions and laws” (0: ‘Not important at all’ – 3: ‘Very important’) and the rating of satisfaction “with the way democracy is developing in our country” (0: ‘Not at all satisfied’ – 3: ‘Very satisfied’), divided by 6 [Range 0…1]	0.66 (0.07)	0.51…0.78
Normative democratic	Country mean of the sum of the scores of evaluations of the statements “Having a democratic system” (0: ‘Very bad’ – 3: ‘Very good’) and “Having experts, not government make decisions according to what they think best for the country” (0: ‘Very good’ – 3: ‘Very bad’), divided by 6 [Range 0…1]	0.63 (0.10)	0.46…0.84
Civic culture	Country mean of civic engagement score [Range 0…1]	0.13 (0.13)	0.03…0.74
EU affinity	Country mean of the sum of evaluation scores of fears regarding the European Union (all 0: Very much afraid – 9: Not afraid at all): “The loss of social security”, “The loss of national identity and culture”, “Our country paying more and more to the European Union”, “A loss of power in the world for [country]”, “The loss of jobs in [country]”, divided by 45 [Range 0…1]	0.42 (0.08)	0.29…0.56

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For both, estimates for coefficients did not differ substantially and levels of significance remained equivalent as well. Therefore the analyses presented here use the imputed income variable (logarithmised because of its substantial skew).[4]

Aggregate-level variables

The aggregate level variables employed reflect different manifestations of the prevalent political attitudes in the country, thus forming a picture mirroring its political culture. The variables are split into four groups of two variables each: (1) evaluations of the governing system; (2) normative expressions of the preferred political system; (3) the extent of civic engagement; and (4) orientations towards the European Union.

Considering that we have 27 aggregate level units in our model we can employ a multilevel model meaningfully (Kreft, 1996; Maas and Hox, 2004). Taking into account that it is not a large sample size at level 2 and referring to benchmark studies suggesting it would be ideal to expand the number of aggregate units beyond 30 to model cross-level interactions (Hox, 2010), we took a cautious approach. Most of the bivariate relationships between aggregate predictors were not very substantial (r ranging between 0.03 and 0.21) with the exception of the correlative relationship between normative preferences and civic engagement ($r < 0.65$) and the relationship between system evaluations and normative ideals ($r < 0.7$). We therefore included all four aggregate level predictors as main effects in all multilevel models to ensure that they are controlled for to avoid identifying spurious relationships. However, the sample size was insufficient to simultaneously model all 12 cross-level interaction effects of interest (three individual-level predictors with four aggregate-level variables) for each of the two dependent variables. We therefore modelled the interaction effects for the three individual-level variables separately for each aggregate-level predictor.

The first aggregate-level variable operationalised evaluations of the political system in the light of Hypotheses 1 to 3. It combines information from two measures: first, to what extent people evaluate their system as worthy of support by rating how important they find it that political institutions and laws are respected. The second question then seeks to identify how satisfied or dissatisfied respondents actually are with the way their democratic system develops. The measure combines the two variables with equal weight and uses the mean value at country-level (the correlation between the mean scores of the two variables computed separately at the country level is $r = 0.5$).

The second aggregate-level variable reflects mean attitudes towards democracy and the political system, providing a basic representation of the normative framework of the political culture as a whole in the respective member state. This operationalisation is in line with Hypothesis 4. It combines information from two survey questions: The first variable measures the mean appraisal of democracy as a desirable characteristic of the political system. We contrast this with a variable measuring the approval of experts making decisions in the political system – a consideration that has gained great public attention after the

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instalment of "technocratic" governments for temporary periods in Greece and Italy during the crisis. While these were only temporary and clearly functional, differences in perceptions of and experiences with "technocratic" governments can imply variation in how citizens evaluate democratic values and practice at the national as well as supranational level. Insights on this question can help to reveal variations in the understanding of democracy, in particular revealing when there is a greater willingness to compromise liberal democratic values with functional, technocratic ones (discussed as a possible instrument to distinguish differences in the manifestation of democratic evaluations by Linde and Ekman, 2003). The correlation between the means of the two variables computed separately at the country level is $r=0.81$.

After modelling general attitudinal factors, we incorporated variables reflecting the mean extent of civic engagement of citizens in accordance with Hypothesis 5. For this, we included measures of the variety of citizens' associational membership and their active political participation at the country level.

As discussed above, it makes sense to explicitly reflect on how pronounced the identification of citizens with bodies beyond their nation state may be in general and specifically with regards to evaluating the European Union. We combine information about attitudes towards different influences of the European Union, measuring whether respondents in a country on average are rather more or less afraid of particular consequences including a potential loss of social security, a loss of national identity and culture, their country having to pay more money, a loss of power in the world for their country and a loss of jobs. The mean scores of the five variables computed separately at the country level are correlated highly with each other (between $r=0.66$ and $r=0.89$). Figure 8.3 summarises the approach and combination of variables utilised.



Figure 8.3 Overview of approach to modelling.

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Results

Individual-level variables

Socio-demographic controls

Sex, unemployment and income showed no significant association with confidence in either institution in our models including the three individual-level predictors (see Tables 8.3 and 8.4). There was a significant relationship with age for both institutions – however pointing in opposite directions: While older age was

Table 8.2 Random intercept and slope models with main effects only

Dependant: Confidence in	*1*		*2*	
	Parliament		*EU*	
	Coefficient (s.e.)	*OR*	*Coefficient (s.e.)*	*OR*
Intercept	–0.560 (0.09)***	0.57	0.202 (0.12)	1.22
Societal level				
System evaluations	7.813 (1.38)***	2473	–4.613 (2.81)	0.01
Normative democratic	–0.426 (1.17)	0.65	–0.472 (2.54)	0.62
Civic culture	0.095 (0.53)	1.10	–1.191 (0.99)	0.30
EU affinity	–0.740 (0.81)	0.48	1.105 (1.26)	3.02
Individual level				
Male	–0.046 (0.03)	0.95	–0.049 (0.04)	0.95
Age	0.006 (0.01)***	1.01	–0.005 (0.00)***	0.99
Married	0.012 (0.05)	1.01	–0.065 (0.04)+	0.94
Lower tertiary	0.035 (0.05)	1.04	0.453 (0.05)	1.05
Higher tertiary	0.055 (0.74)	1.06	0.166 (0.06)**	1.18
Unemployed	–0.025 (0.08)	0.98	–0.097 (0.07)	0.91
LN income	–0.001 (0.03)	1.00	0.038 (0.03)	1.04
Input orientations	3.711 (0.26)***	40.90	2.435 (0.15)***	11.42
Output orientations	0.620 (0.17)***	1.86	1.770 (0.20)***	5.88
Civic engagement	–0.502 (0.24)*	0.61	–0.385 (0.19)+	0.69
Random component				
Intercept	0.149***		0.389***	
Input	1.605***		0.415***	
Output	0.644***		0.980***	
Practice	1.228***		0.700***	

Notes
*** $p \leq 0.001$.
** $p \leq 0.01$.
* $p \leq 0.05$.
+ $p \leq 0.10$.
Calculations done using HLM 6.06. Multilevel logistic regression models were applied computed using restricted maximum likelihood estimation. Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses followed by odds ratios. Non-binary variables are grand-mean centred. Data comes from the European Values Study (2008). *N*: 26,289 individuals in 27 countries.

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Table 8.3 Cross-level interactions for confidence in national parliaments

Dependant: Confidence in	*1*		*2*		*3*		*4*	
	Parliament		*Parliament*		*Parliament*		*Parliament*	
	Coefficient (s.e.)	*OR*	*Coefficient (s.e.)*	*OR*	*Coefficient (s.e.)*	*OR*	*Coefficient (s.e.)*	*OR*
Intercept	–0.561 (0.08)***	0.57	–0.563 (0.08)***	0.57	–0.561 (0.09)***	0.58	–0.560 (0.09)***	0.57
Societal level								
System evaluations	6.898 (1.50)***	989	7.827 (1.39)***	2,508	7.826 (1.38)***	2,505	7.818 (1.38)***	2,485
Normative democratic	–0.463 (1.17)	0.63	–1.112 (1.10)	0.33	–0.418 (1.17)	0.66	–0.415 (1.16)	0.66
Civic culture	0.115 (0.53)	1.12	0.108 (0.54)	1.11	–0.264 (0.53)	0.77	0.092 (0.53)	1.10
EU affinity	–0.733 (0.81)	0.48	–0.746 (0.80)	0.47	–0.744 (0.80)	0.48	–0.601 (0.87)	0.55
Individual level								
Male	–0.047 (0.03)	0.95	–0.046 (0.03)	0.95	–0.046 (0.03)	0.95	–0.046 (0.03)	0.95
Age	0.006 (0.00)***	1.01	0.006 (0.00)***	1.01	0.006 (0.00)***	1.01	0.006 (0.00)***	1.01
Married	0.011 (0.05)	1.01	0.012 (0.05)	1.01	0.012 (0.05)	1.01	0.012 (0.05)	1.01
Lower tertiary	0.035 (0.05)	1.04	0.035 (0.05)	1.04	0.035 (0.05)	1.04	0.035 (0.05)	1.04
Higher tertiary	0.054 (0.07)	1.06	0.057 (0.07)	1.06	0.055 (0.07)	1.06	0.055 (0.07)	1.06
Unemployed	–0.024 (0.08)	0.98	–0.025 (0.08)	0.98	–0.025 (0.08)	0.97	–0.025 (0.08)	0.98
LN income	–0.001 (0.03)	1.00	–0.001 (0.03)	1.00	–0.001 (0.03)	1.00	–0.001 (0.03)	1.00
Input orientations	3.710 (0.24)***	40.90	3.715 (0.24)***	41.00	3.713 (0.25)***	41.00	3.711 (0.26)***	40.90
Output orientations	0.604 (0.14)***	1.83	0.610 (0.14)***	1.84	0.615 (0.16)***	1.85	0.619 (0.17)***	1.86
Civic engagement	–0.510 (0.25)*	0.61	–0.510 (0.25)*	0.60	–0.505 (0.24)*	0.60	–0.507 (0.24)*	0.60
Cross-level interactions								
System evaluations X								
Input orientations	8.512 (3.18)*	4,973*						
Output orientations	7.461 (2.00)***	1,738***						
Civic engagement	–3.069 (3.43)	0.05						
Normative democratic X								
Input orientations			6.264 (2.38)*	526				
Output orientations			4.979 (1.43)**	145				
Civic engagement			–0.728 (2.12)	0.48				

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Civic culture X								
Input orientations					3.534 (2.58)	34.3		
Output orientations					2.305 (1.50)	10.0		
Civic engagement					–0.536 (0.58)	1.53		
EU affinity X								
Input orientations							–1.530 (3.28)	0.22
Output orientations							–0.934 (2.64)	0.39
Civic engagement							–0.205 (3.33)	0.81
Random components	*Variance*	*PRE (pre interaction)*	*Variance*	*PRE (pre interaction)*	*Variance*	*PRE (pre interaction)*	*Variance*	*PRE (pre interaction)*
Intercept	0.146***		0.145***		0.147***		0.150***	
Input	1.313***	0.18	1.290***	0.20	1.449***	0.10	1.673***	–0.04
Output	0.391***	0.39	0.414***	0.36	0.574***	0.15	0.670***	–0.04
Practice	1.237***	–0.01	1.299***	–0.06	1.299***	–0.06	1.301***	–0.06

Notes
*** $p \leq 0.001$.
** $p \leq 0.01$.
* $p \leq 0.05$.
+ $p \leq 0.10$.
Calculations done using HLM 6.06. Multilevel logistic regression models were applied computed using restricted maximum likelihood estimation. Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses followed by odds ratios. Non-binary variables are grand-mean centred. Data comes from the European Values Study (2008). *N*: 26289 individuals in 27 countries.

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Table 8.4 Cross-level interactions for confidence in European Union

Dependant: Confidence in	*1*		*2*		*3*		*4*	
	EU		*EU*		*EU*		*EU*	
	Coefficient (s.e.)	*OR*	*Coefficient (s.e.)*	*OR*	*Coefficient (s.e.)*	*OR*	*Coefficient (s.e.)*	*OR*
Intercept	0.201 (0.12)	1.23	0.207 (0.12)	1.23	0.201 (0.12)	1.22	0.203 (0.12)	1.22
Societal level								
System evaluations	–4.771 (2.86)	0.01	–3.812 (2.98)	0.02	–4.654 (2.85)	0.01	–4.607 (2.82)	0.01
Normative democratic	0.096 (2.54)	1.10	–0.302 (2.28)	0.74	–0.454 (2.56)	0.63	–0.467 (2.54)	0.63
Civic culture	–1.114 (1.00)	0.33	–1.318 (1.00)	0.27	–0.723 (1.03)	0.49	–1.191 (0.98)	0.30
EU affinity	1.210 (1.26)	3.35	1.211 (1.25)	3.36	1.122 (0.88)	3.07	1.223 (1.52)	3.99
Individual level								
Male	–0.049 (0.04)	0.95	–0.049 (0.04)	0.95	–0.049 (0.04)	0.95	–0.049 (0.04)	0.95
Age	–0.005 (0.00)***	0.99	–0.005 (0.00)***	0.99	–0.005 (0.00)***	0.99	–0.005 (0.00)***	0.99
Married	–0.065 (0.35)$^{+}$	0.94	–0.065 (0.35)$^{+}$	0.94	–0.065 (0.35)$^{+}$	0.94	–0.065 (0.35)$^{+}$	0.94
Lower tertiary	0.046 (0.05)	1.05	0.044 (0.05)	1.05	0.046 (0.05)	1.05	0.045 (0.05)	1.05
Higher tertiary	0.165 (0.06)**	1.18	0.165 (0.06)**	1.18	0.166 (0.06)**	1.18	0.165 (0.06)**	1.18
Unemployed	–0.097 (0.07)	0.91	–0.096 (0.07)	0.91	–0.097 (0.07)	0.91	–0.097 (0.07)	0.91
LN income	0.038 (0.03)	1.04	0.039 (0.03)	1.04	0.039 (0.03)	1.04	0.039 (0.03)	1.04
Input orientations	2.432 (0.15)***	11.40	2.430 (0.15)***	11.40	2.432 (0.15)***	11.40	2.435 (0.15)***	11.40
Output orientations	1.774 (0.20)***	5.89	1.773 (0.20)***	5.89	1.774 (0.20)***	5.89	1.772 (0.20)***	5.88
Civic engagement	–0.342 (0.18)$^{+}$	0.71	–0.318 (0.17)$^{+}$	0.73	–0.377 (0.19)$^{+}$	0.69	–0.385 (0.19)$^{+}$	0.68
Cross-level interactions								
System evaluations X								
Input orientations	0.991 (1.47)	2.69						
Output orientations	1.820 (2.03)	6.17						
Civic engagement	–3.911 (2.00)$^{+}$	0.02						
Normative democratic X								
Input orientations			1.816 (2.20)	6.15				
Output orientations			3.224 (2.72)	25.10				
Civic engagement			–7.689 (2.48)**	0.00				

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Civic culture X								
Input orientations					1.060 (0.59)$^{+}$	2.89		
Output orientations					–0.112 (1.58)	0.89		
Civic engagement					–0.304 (1.16)	0.74		
EU affinity X							–0.907 (1.80)	0.40
Input orientations							–2.231 (2.44)	0.11
Output orientations							0.736 (2.08)	2.09
Civic engagement								
Random components	*Variance*	*PRE (pre interaction)*	*Variance*	*PRE (pre interaction)*	*Variance*	*PRE (pre interaction)*	*Variance*	*PRE (pre interaction)*
Intercept	0.389***		0.389***		0.391***		0.393***	
Input	0.426***	–0.03	0.416***	–0.00	0.413***	0.00	0.435***	–0.05
Output	0.997***	–0.02	0.973***	0.01	1.030***	–0.05	0.996***	–0.02
Practice	0.612***	0.13	0.477***	0.32	0.743***	–0.06	0.734***	–0.05

Notes
*** $p \leq 0.001$.
** $p \leq 0.01$.
* $p \leq 0.05$.
+ $p \leq 0.10$.
Calculations done using HLM 6.06. Multilevel logistic regression models were applied computed using restricted maximum likelihood estimation. Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses followed by odds ratios. Non-binary variables are grand-mean centred. Data comes from the European Values Study (2008).
N: 26,289 individuals in 27 countries.

associated with greater levels of confidence in national parliaments, it was associated with lower confidence in the European Union. Being married was marginally significant and negatively related to confidence in the European Union, but unrelated to confidence in national parliaments (however, the effect was not very substantial). Higher tertiary education degree holders were more likely to have greater confidence in the European Union, but there was no association with confidence in national parliaments.
associated with the level of confidence in national parliaments and the European Union. More positive input- and output-orientations were associated with greater levels of confidence in both institutions respectively (in support of Hypotheses H1a and H2a). Comparing the size of the effects for the two different dependent variables we find that the relationship between input orientations and confidence in national parliaments was relatively more pronounced than the relationship between input orientations and confidence in the European Union (thus also supporting Hypothesis H1b). Conversely, the relationship between output orientations and confidence in the European Union was more pronounced than the relationship between output orientations and confidence in national parliaments (confirming our expectations formulated in Hypothesis H2b).

The relationship between civic engagement and confidence in the two political institutions is similar in direction but different in substance. Contrary to our expectations (Hypothesis 5a) greater personal civic engagement is actually related to lower levels of confidence in both political institutions. This negative effect is slightly greater in strength for national parliaments. This seems counter-intuitive at first – however, it may be explained by considering different causal mechanisms. Following civic culture literature above we assumed that those who had more civic engagement would be more supportive of political institutions. However, it is also plausible that actually those who have less confidence in these institutions would be more likely to find alternative forms of civic networks and participate in forms of active political participation external to those institutions.

Country-level variables

Evaluations of the political system

In addition to showing a significant direct positive relationship with confidence in parliament (but not in the European Union), country-levels of the evaluations of the political system were an important moderating factor for the previously identified individual-level relationships. The moderation patterns differed between the two dependent variables. For confidence in national parliaments both input- and output orientations were significantly moderated by system evaluations. More positive system evaluations at the country level were associated with a significant enhancement of the positive effect of both of these evaluations on confidence in national parliaments. However, there was no significant moderation effect of the relationship between personal civic engagement and confidence in parliament.

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The opposite holds true for confidence in the European Union. While there was no significant moderation of the personal-level attitudinal variables, the civic engagement effect was moderated substantially. In countries with comparatively more positive system evaluations personal civic engagement was associated even more strongly with lower confidence in the European Union. This may imply that when satisfaction with the status of the political system within a country is higher people could rely less on the European Union – whereas in countries where the national political system is evaluated less favourable confidence in the European Union as an alternative actor may be higher.

We found that Hypothesis 3 held for national parliaments, but it did not for the European Union. Differences in the political climate, reflected in evaluations of the political system, affected the relationship of attitudinal factors with national institutions. For confidence in the European Union only personal civic engagement was affected.

Normative system preferences

A similar pattern to the above also emerged for differences between countries in normative system preferences. These moderated attitudinal orientations in relation to confidence in national parliaments, but civic engagement in relation to confidence in the European Union. Hypothesis 4 therefore only holds partially. As expected, when country-levels of normatively embracing a democratic system (in contrast to preferring an expert-led one) were higher, both input- and output-oriented legitimacy evaluations were associated with greater levels of confidence in national parliaments. The same cross-level interactions were not significant for confidence in the European Union however. Stronger country-level normative endorsements of democratic systems were associated with a stronger negative effect of personal civic engagement on confidence in the European Union – similar to the previous context factor.

Civic engagement

Contrary to Hypothesis 5b there were hardly any significant moderation effects of country levels of civic engagement for confidence in either of the two institutions. The only exception was the relationship between input orientations and confidence in the European Union showing a marginally significant positive interaction effect between country-level civic engagement and input orientations: In countries where civic engagement was more prevalent positive input orientations were more strongly associated with greater confidence in the European Union. The effect size was not particularly large, however – the importance of the relationship should therefore not be overstated.

EU affinity

Hypothesis 6 was falsified: The degree of country-level European affinity did not moderate any of the individual-level relationships. While this was not necessarily

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expected for confidence in national parliaments, it is somewhat surprising to see that the average national level extent of worries about the European Union did not seem to affect how individuals form their evaluations of confidence in it.

Discussion

From the mere descriptive statistics of levels of confidence in national and EU institutions and indicators of political culture (attitudes towards political systems, democratic norms, civic engagement) we can assume that there is a complex pattern of how confidence in institutions is formed. While varying levels of input- and output-orientations can be seen as different mainly in terms of relative magnitude of effects, we observe distinctive variation between our independent variables representing attitudinal orientations and actual practice. This leads us to assume that there is substantial variation in the domains of manifestations of political culture between the countries of the European Union.

In our analysis, we find further support for Scharpf's established framework of both input and output legitimacy being building blocks of confidence in political institutions: measures of the two types of legitimacy are positively associated with confidence in political institutions. Further in support of our Hypotheses 1 and 2, the effect of input legitimacy is more pronounced at the national than at the EU level. While national political institutions benefit more from a common identity and political culture (input legitimacy) than the EU, the opposite holds true regarding output legitimacy orientations: they have a stronger effect on confidence in the EU than national parliaments. This supports Scharpf in his assessment of the current status of EU-institutions with citizens: in addition to input-orientations, confidence in EU-institutions depends strongly on evaluations of output legitimacy – to a greater extent than confidence in national parliaments. In the light of this finding, reportedly eroding levels of trust in the European Union during the onset of the Euro crisis gain a new interpretation, as monetary integration and the common currency can be seen as one dominant factor in citizen's evaluation of the successful functioning of EU institutions (output legitimacy).

When identifying how far country-level manifestations of political culture affect evaluations of political legitimacy, we find substantial differences for the construal of legitimacy for national parliaments and the EU respectively. The wide variation in attitudinal orientations and actual political practice between citizens in the EU member states has different effects on their evaluations of input- and output legitimacy at the national and the EU level:

- An overall positive political system evaluation in a country seems to benefit trust in national institutions, but less so European institutions. This finding could mean that the concept of loser's consent for legitimacy evaluations is less pronounced at the European than at the national level. The link between national political attitudes and confidence in EU institutions seems more complex and very different from what can be observed for confidence in national parliaments.

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- Our results also show that the country level of democratic norms does not affect how input and output evaluations of individuals affect their confidence in the EU – while a moderation effect for confidence in national parliaments is found. This finding hints towards the fact that citizens' interpretations of the European Union can be very different from how national parliaments are regarded.
- Contrary to our expectation, differences in attitudes towards the European Union between countries do not systematically impact people's confidence in the EU as an institution within countries. The building blocks of legitimacy at the European level may be more complex than at the national level.

These findings suggest that at the country – and at the individual – level, different understandings of the concept of the "European Union" exist: it is not really one political union, but rather several interpretations of it. People bring different frames of reference and experiences with governance at the supranational level to the table – as individuals or in terms of differences in country-level political culture manifestations. Such differences can present barriers to further political integration at the EU level. The results also underline the importance of not treating the EU analytically just like a nation state: legitimacy pathways run through national parliaments and supranational institutions at the same time. The evaluations of confidence of individuals differ substantially between the two and both need to be considered carefully to comprehend the differences in political culture between people across member states.

If we want to understand why certain people have greater or lesser confidence in national and European institutions, it is not enough to use simple national classifications. But neither is it sufficient to consider only differences between individuals. Both future research as well as the public discourse on political integration needs to consider the evaluations of people in the context of their respective political cultures, distinguishing different spheres of personal evaluations and manifestations of political culture.

A starting point to such a discourse and to overcoming barriers to integration can be found in the special link between personal civic engagement and formation of legitimacy at the EU level. We want to highlight this relationship because of its complex nature and the opportunities it presents for the public discourse, practical implications and future research. Contrary to our hypotheses, personal civic engagement is associated with lower levels of confidence in political institutions in general – a relationship that is impacted by countries' patterns of normative political orientations and system evaluations at the level of the European Union. In countries where citizens subscribe strongly to democratic norms, civic engagement is even more negatively associated with trust in EU institutions. We may find people using forms of civic engagement as a substitute for a perceived lack of control over what is decided at the European level. This suggests that the causality may be more complex: Those who have less confidence in the European Union may be more likely to actually become civically active.

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This approach to understanding the results would also provide a meaningful interpretation of the moderation effect observed: In countries with stronger democratic norms, citizens who feel less confident in trusting the European Union as political actor may feel more empowered to act on these norms and thus have a greater likelihood of becoming engaged in civic activities.

This discussion illustrates that even the much-researched concept of civic engagement may be ill-defined in the broad context of European integration and its various member states. Before continuing the process of European integration and – most certainly – before designing further European institutions and quasi-national political instruments, there should be an emphasis on understanding public discourses and divergences between countries to tie such loose ends together. The true underlying motivations for citizens to engage with and trust the institutions of the European Union need to be investigated and discussed broadly. Our findings show that such a debate has to include perspectives of the individual and national level and should certainly not focus merely on face-value differentiators such as accession dates or economic indicators.

Limitations and avenues for future research

Any quantitative, empirical analysis requires a degree of abstraction in the operationalisation of concepts. We encountered some limitations in our work based on the availability of data and the scope of the analysis. The European Values Survey was rich in relevant variables, yet the chosen items have to be understood as approximations of the theoretical concepts employed. In future work it would be insightful to expand the analysis to engage with a greater set of multi-item constructs through latent variable modelling which may allow for the construction of indicators that reflect a greater degree of complexity. This could also help in addressing the needs for further engagement with the question of what actually motivates citizens to trust in European institutions or not. In particular the two country-level variables that did not see any or hardly any significant relationships – civic culture and EU affinity – could be revisited in future research. It may well be that the effects found here are accurate reflections of existing (non-)relationships. However, there are other options to operationalise civic engagement, for example, following a connectedness approach by Paxton for association membership (Paxton, 2007). General attitudes towards the European Union could potentially be modelled in less negative expressions (fears), but rather through positive evaluations of identification, for example.

Causality, of course, is also an issue with regards to interpretation. Any cross-sectional analysis only allows for causal inferences based on their underlying theoretical assumptions. However, the relationship between confidence in the European Union and personal civic engagement (moderated through national civic culture) could very plausibly be seen as a relationship that is multi-causal – requiring other methods to engage with further. In particular longitudinal approaches can help shed light on this relationship in future research.

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Any such further research calls for multi-level approaches: it is important to investigate the building blocks of legitimacy at the European level from the perspectives of individual citizens, in the light of national political cultures as well as in a broader European context as manifestations of political culture differ across all of these levels.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have engaged with how citizens evaluate the legitimacy of national and European political institutions in the light of the discourse on further European political integration. Our results illustrate the need to consider individual-level and national differences in political culture manifestations between European Union member states in order to understand how legitimacy evaluations are constructed differently across the European Union. There is substantial variation in political attitudes and actual political practice between individuals in and the countries of the European Union. We show that these differences matter: They present potential barriers to political integration as they affect how people in different countries of the European Union develop their evaluations of political legitimacy regarding national and EU institutions. Especially differences in country-level evaluations of the political system and the extent of normative preferences for democracy substantially moderate individual-level processes.

These legitimacy differences may pose a barrier to a political union as the foundation of economic and monetary integration if not addressed. Great divergence in understandings of what constitutes legitimacy for national and supranational bodies would render it extremely difficult to construct a singular structure that resonates positively with the political orientations and expectations of its citizens from an array of distinctively manifested political cultures. Addressing this concern, however, is crucial when aiming to develop structures that are considered legitimate by publics across Europe. Whether this is achievable through a singular structure or requires a different way of thinking about how to properly engage with a "demoi-cracy" (Nicolaidis, 2004) may be a question that should be at the foreground of discussions of how to achieve a European Union whose engagement with its member states is as sophisticated as its engagement with its citizens.

Notes

1 The exact mechanisms through which associational membership affects political values and practices form a broad field of enquire and debate. Discussions about which associations have any or what sort of civic benefit or to what extent it can be realised greatly qualify a uniform premise built on membership in any form of association (see, for example, Hanks and Ekland 1987; Olsen 1972; Paxton 2002; Wollbaek and Selle 2003). While we acknowledge this qualification, it would be beyond the particular scope of this chapter to engage more extensively with the debate. However, it could form a subsequent, additional investigation.

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2 All calculations were done using HLM 6.06.
3 For the precise operationalisation of this and all other variables please refer to the overview in Table 8.1.
4 Detailed results on the imputation and robustness checks can be obtained from the authors upon request.

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Part IV

Case studies

Higher scarcity and value change

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9 Greece in times of crisis

Shaping political identification

Alexia Katsanidou

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Introduction

Since their debut at the French Assembly during the revolution, the terms 'left' and 'right' have connoted two distinctive political ideologies and lifestyles, which have persisted through time. Voters, politicians, journalists and political scientists alike use these terms to describe political preferences. Parties, candidates and voters are mapped onto the left–right dimension, which is used as a 'political Esperanto' (Laponce, 1970). The political 'left' represents socially progressive and economically redistributive values, while the political 'right' stands for socially conservative and economically liberal values. Overall, this offers a schema of political identification that is recognizable and accepted as a common research tool. To a large extent, its semantics also structures real-world political debate.

Despite this, recent real-world events such as the European financial crisis have put their mark on the structure of party competition, by introducing new issue dimensions and challenging the meanings associated with the dominant left–right dimension. This study examines how deeply economic and political crises affect the way people identify with politics. Specifically it explores how the current crisis shapes the content of left–right identification and imposes a new dimension of political identification.

The current financial crisis has disrupted the normal course of politics, and caused confusion in the political arena. Various mechanisms have been set in motion, such as high salience of the economy, low clarity of blame allocation, a loosening of party loyalties and high insecurity. Our hypothesis is that these changes have reset the meaning of left–right identification. Voters have had to base their understanding of the political spectrum on issues that allowed maximum differentiation among parties on the two extremes of the spectrum, shaping their left–right identification. This is in line with findings suggesting that left–right identification is influenced by current conflicts within a political system (Adams, De Vries and Leitner, 2012; Adams, Green and Millazo, 2012; Freire, 2006). Based on this, we test the idea that the issue creating the highest tension between the two extremes of the left–right dimension affects voters' left–right identification the most.

At the same time, the crisis made the economy the single most important issue across Europe. This issue was framed as a trade-off between two potential solutions: severe austerity measures on the one hand, and the rejection of austerity policies imposed by the EU on the other. The increase in the salience of the economy could potentially boost the importance of traditional left–right concerns in shaping left–right identification (for salient issues shaping left–right identification, see De Vries *et al*., 2013, p. 228). However, this could only be the case if party competition on this issue followed the existing left–right identification structure. In the opposite case, i.e. if party competition did not follow the patterns expected, in terms of left–right structures, it would be reasonable to expect the creation of a new dimension. This new dimension is highly salient and orthogonal to the left–right identification, and works as an instrument to help voters cope with the complexities of the financial crisis and make political decisions. We expect that this new dimension will be informed mainly by individual positions on the economy.

Why did the bailout and the austerity measures that come with it become a separate issue from the existing left–right divide? We propose that the necessary and sufficient conditions for an issue to be incorporated into left–right identification are high and persistent salience, parallel mapping and the persistence of partisan loyalty. This theory takes us a step closer to the creation of a comprehensive conceptual framework explaining the dynamics of left–right identification and the role of political agenda and electoral circumstances. The case of Greece during the severe financial crisis offers a unique configuration of the conditions described above: high salience of the economy combined with an absence of parallel mapping and an absence of party loyalties.

The Greek elections of 2012 offer an excellent case in point to test these propositions. The crisis had hit the country severely, influencing the political agenda and forcing political parties to position themselves on new crisis-related issues. Proposals for solving the crisis seemed to involve a trade-off between two extremes: one side supported the bailout agreements proposed by the Troika – a body consisting of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – and the other side opposed these agreements (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012b). Party loyalties could not function as a low-cost information source, and new parties kept splitting off in the period between the 2009 and 2012 elections, because of disagreement on the new dimension. Voters were left to decide for themselves, based on their own economic positions, what the best solution to the financial crisis was. At the same time, the main issues differentiating political parties on the left–right dimension were socio-cultural issues such as immigration, the legalization of drugs and policing.

These propositions are tested using individual-level data from the voting advice application ‘Choose4Greece’. The study is based on an analysis identifying the content of left–right and bailout agreement self-placement. The analysis shows, first, that voters’ self-placements are strongly linked to cultural issues, more so than to socio-economic issues. Socio-economic issues remain a significant anchor

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for left–right identification, but their strength is significantly lower than that of cultural issues. This finding is in line with recent work connecting cultural issues with left–right identification (De Vries *et al*., 2013), but also with older work showing that economic values played only a very small role in shaping left–right identification in Greece, even in the 1990s (Freire, 2008). The second finding confirms the existence of a 'crisis solution' dimension, which is mainly based on positions on the economy, and only to a small extent on left–right identification.

These findings bring us a step closer to understanding the mechanism connecting the changes in the political agenda and the dynamics of voters' left–right identification. De Vries *et al.* (2013), having showed that the issue basis of left–right identification has a dynamic nature, theorize that there is a connection between the salience of an issue and its importance in shaping identification with politics. Our results make it clear that issue salience is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an issue to influence left–right identification. Structuring the two extremes of an issue along the same lines as left–right polarization is an additional condition that needs to be fulfilled. The lack of this condition leads to the emergence of an additional dimension which is highly salient for voting behaviour.

In the following section, we begin by discussing left–right identification and its function in Western Europe, then go on to analyse the role of salience, persisting party loyalties, and the potential to be mapped onto the political space as conditions that determine the inclusion of an issue in the left–right schema. We then introduce the Greek election of 2012 as a case in point. After describing our methodological approach, emphasizing the special challenges posed by VAA (voting advice application) data, we present our findings on the meaning and content of the left–right and bailout dimensions, and discuss the implications for research on elections and representation.

Theory

General review of the determinants of left–right self-placement

According to Fuchs and Klingemann (1989), left–right identification is the predominant device for measuring and summarizing the ideological positions of both individual citizens and political parties. It functions as an organizing element of the shared political consciousness between mass publics and elites in a society (Kroh, 2003; Laponce, 1970; Van der Eijk, 2001). Identification on the left–right dimension entails three main components: social, values and partisan (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976). The social component captures the influence of position in the social structure (occupation, religion and geographical location) on individual left–right identification. The values component stresses the influence of individual attitudes towards the major value conflicts in Western European democracies – for example, the role of the state in the economy, the role of religion in the state, traditional lifestyles or 'new politics' (Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1995) – on individual left–right identification. Finally, the partisan

component reflects the impact of partisan loyalties on left–right identification (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1997).

Despite the minor but persistent importance of social factors (Freire, 2006, 2008), most research on left–right identification has focused on the role of values and issue conflicts as key determinants (Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990; Knutsen, 1998; Lachat, 2008). This body of literature investigates how issue mobilization by political parties has shaped voters' left–right identification, assessing the importance of elite mobilization and the changing nature of the left–right divide. As new political issues gained importance on the political agenda, the concept of the 'left' became connected with post-materialist values (Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990, p. 213). On the other side of the spectrum, the 'right' emphasizes agenda issues related to immigration and law and order (Bale, 2003, p. 69). The work of Huber (1989) made it clear that conflicts and debates observed within a political system at a given time influence the left–right identification of citizens.

Previous research on the determinants of left–right self-placement in Greece

The Greek case is no different, in that left–right identification plays a significant role. After the fall of the junta in 1974, the class divide dominated Greek politics. The two main parties, PASOK and New Democracy, represented the two sides of this political conflict, which was also reflected in the importance of left–right identification (Vernardakis, 2011). The 'left' represented support for redistributive economic measures and a high degree of state intervention. The 'right' represented support for a market economy. Political parties identified with the labels 'left' and 'right' which led to a high significance of the partisan component for left–right identification. This is in line with Freire's finding (2008) that the partisan component is the single most important predictor of left–right identification.

The policy positions of these political parties have changed over time, but the labels 'left' and 'right' have persisted (Ellinas, 2013; Gemenis, 2010). There has been a slow but steady convergence with regard to the economic dimension (Vasilopoulos and Vernardakis, 2011), and attitudes to new cultural issues (Gemenis and Dinas, 2010). Over the past 30 years, the political agenda has changed and party profiles have been updated to include positions on new issues. Issues like nationalism and immigration (Ellinas, 2013), as well as issues associated with the environment and the New Politics agenda (Gemenis, 2010), have entered the scene and forced all parties to take positions. Meanwhile, all the political parties have continued to use left–right semantics in their public discourses.

As parties were the main agents for the top-down flow of new ideological cues, changes in their policy positions also led to changes in the meaning of left and right for their partisans. The new issues that prominently entered the political agenda and the parties' platforms slowly became part of left–right identification. The left–right divide always represented the main differences between

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political parties, keeping them in their original positions on the left–right spectrum. This allowed left–right identification to consistently be the strongest predictor of party choice in Greece (Dinas, 2008; Freire and Costa Lobo, 2005; Karyotis and Rüdig, 2015; Nezi, 2012).

At the time of the crisis, issues such as traditional lifestyles, immigration, the environment and the role of the church had been established as part of left–right identification, and differentiated the two extremes of the spectrum. My hypothesis is that, at the time of the 2012 elections, left–right identification was mainly explained by positions on socio-cultural issues.

The bailout dimension, and why it is not expected to be incorporated into left–right identification

The two 2012 elections were a huge shock for the party system. They reshaped the party system by pushing the two major contesting poles from the familiar PASOK–New Democracy schema to the new SYRIZA–Golden Dawn constellation. The libertarian leftist party SYRIZA mainly differentiated itself from the other extreme of the spectrum, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, on cultural issues. The positions of SYRIZA and Golden Dawn on economic issues did not differ much.

The severe financial crisis once again brought to light the importance of the issue of the economy, and shaped a new political debate around the proposed solution. The issue developed as the trade-off between two extremes: the positions supporting and opposing the bailout agreements proposed by the Troika (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012b). Political parties were forced to position themselves on new crisis-related issues. The constant media attention to the crisis and the bailout agreement, and the dramatic changes in daily life which they caused, made this issue the single most important factor for structuring party competition (Katsanidou, 2013) and predicting voter choice in the May and June 2012 elections (Nezi and Katsanidou, 2014).

The question that arises here is: why did the bailout become a separate issue to the existing left–right divide? The bailout divide mainly involves economic issues, which used to be the traditional basis for left–right self-placement. In the following section we theorize step by step the necessary conditions for an issue to be incorporated into left–right identification, focusing on three conditions: (1) high and persistent salience; (2) parallel mapping; and (3) the persistence of partisan loyalty.

How issues become part of left–right identification

Salience is a key factor influencing which issues structure voter preferences (Steenbergen *et al*., 2007; Zaller, 1992). Regardless of how an issue has entered the political agenda, whether via a bottom-up grass-roots approach or a strategic top-down mechanism,[1] the mobilization of a new policy issue is followed by voter identification with it. A newly politicized issue connects with people's

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interests and daily lives, and political parties strive to draw public attention to it, framing it as a new controversy (De Vries and Marks, 2012). Thus cues offered and made salient by parties drive voter preferences and identifications. Recent research has shown that the content of left–right identification adapts to incorporate changes in issue salience, namely the emergence of new issues and the declining importance of others (De Vries *et al*., 2013, p. 228). These findings are in line with older studies, which have claimed that left–right identification has a strong integrative capacity, readily incorporating new salient issues and changing substantive meanings to adapt to new political contexts (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Van der Eijk *et al*., 2005). High and persistent salience of new issues appearing on the agenda, or a renewed salience of old existing issues, is a necessary condition for these issues to shape the content and meaning of left–right identification (De Vries *et al*., 2013).

The first condition enabling the economy to have a high impact on left–right identification, the condition of salience, was definitely fulfilled in the Greek case. The issue of the bailout became the most salient for the 2012 elections (Dinas and Rori, 2013), and all political parties were forced to take a position on this matter. In fact, several parties split and re-formed because of the bailout divide. However, party positions on the bailout agreement were mainly informed by strategic considerations (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012b), and did not coincide with the existing left–right division.[2]

This brings us to the second condition, that of parallel mapping. The mechanism through which new issues enter left–right identification passes through its partisan component. As a political issue becomes salient, political parties tend to incorporate it into their existing ideological profile. This can be seen as an attempt to ensure ideological consistency and minimize electoral risk (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Hinich and Munger, 1993). As a result, the issue becomes associated with the existing party profile. For example, a party that places itself on the 'right' will brand its position on the new issue as the 'right-wing' position, offering voters a new definition of what it means to be on the 'right'.

Salient political divisions have to follow the same patterns as left–right divisions in order to be incorporated into left–right identification. In other words, the two extreme positions on the new issue should map onto the two extremes of the left–right dimension. The same parties that place themselves on one extreme of the bailout division should also be placed on one extreme of the left–right identification. Following the same pattern reduces the possibility of confusion, and enables the absorption of the new issue into the party profile.

Assuming the new salient issue is of great importance for current affairs, parties and voters will be confused about the new demand posed by the society and what is now required of them, and will need to find a solution to resolve the inconsistency (Stimson *et al*., 2012, p. 296). Parties choose which side of the issue they will support, which may not map onto the existing left–right divisions. The absence of the parallel mapping condition will result in the new issue forming a new dimension of political contestation. To what extent this new dimension structures party competition will depend on its salience for current affairs.

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In the case of the bailout dimension in Greece, the new dimension captured opinions about the bailout agreement and cross-cut the existing left–right dimension for parties and voters. It structured the party system by putting the centripetal political forces originally occupying the middle ground of left–right identification on one side of the spectrum, and the centrifugal political parties originally occupying the two extremes of the spectrum on the other. The new and extremely salient issue did not fulfil the condition of parallel mapping, forcing the creation of a new dimension.

The third condition, that of persisting party loyalties, is relevant because the bailout was a new issue entering the political agenda. The complexity of politics forces voters to find shortcuts in the form of attitudinal cues (Feldman and Conover, 1983; Popkin, 1991). For cues on new issues, voters can rely on actions and information delivered by the parties they support (Feldman and Conover, 1983; Popkin, 1991; Zaller, 1992). These cues can help form opinions with very low cost of information (Hinich and Munger, 1993; Zaller, 1992). A voter shaping an attitude on a new issue can rely on the cues provided by his preferred party. Through this mechanism, primary political identifications – namely left–right identification – are updated by including issues that are new in the political agenda.

When we observe a loosening of party loyalties, the mechanism connecting new issues and left–right identification by using cues from parties is not expected to work. The mass–elite linkage enters a phase of disequilibrium, and the new issue cannot be absorbed by the primary dimension of political identification. The absence of the condition of persisting party loyalties implies the absence of the top-down mechanism of opinion formation. The lack of partisan cues to help form opinions on significant issues disorients citizens and causes great instability in the political system.

To return to the case of Greece, the crisis caused a dramatic loosening of party loyalties. New parties kept splitting off in the period between the 2009 and 2012 elections, because of disagreement about the new dimension. The effective number of parties at the electoral level jumped from 3.16 to 9, while electoral volatility went from 9.8 to a phenomenal 48.4. Under these conditions, the mechanism connecting new issues and left–right identification by using cues from parties did not function, and the left–right structure could neither absorb nor influence the new dimension. The condition of persisting party loyalties had been broken. We therefore hypothesize that left–right identification will have very little impact on people's individual positions on the bailout dimension.

For the bailout division in Greece, it was clear that the condition of persisting salience was fulfilled. However, the absence of the conditions of parallel mapping and persisting party loyalties hinders the incorporation of the new salient issue into the major dimension of political identification. How, then, can positions in relation to this newly emerged dimension be explained? The bailout agreement has two components. On the one hand, it refers to the content of the solution to the crisis: the neoliberal austerity policies put forward by the Troika. On the other hand, the discourse around the bailout agreement touches upon

national pride and the European question (membership of the EU and the Eurozone). Political discourse portrayed the bailout agreement as a loss of sovereignty and a capitulation to external actors. There were calls for Greece to leave the eurozone, go back to the national currency, and potentially also leave the EU in order to regain its lost national pride. We therefore hypothesize that an individual's position on the bailout dimension will be determined by his or her position on economic and European issues.

To summarize our theoretical discussion, our hypothesis is that political identification in Greece in 2012 was divided into two dimensions, which were anchored in different issues and not dependent on each other. Our expectations are formally hypothesized as follows:

H1: Identification on the left–right dimension is mainly explained by socio-cultural issues.

H2: Placement on the left–right dimension does not influence placement on the bailout dimension.

H3: Individual positioning on the bailout dimension is explained mainly by positions on economic and EU issues, and not so much by positions on socio-cultural issues.

Data and method

To test these hypotheses we use the only data related to the Greek 2012 elections available at the time of writing,[3] the voting advice application (VAA). 'Choose4Greece' offers variables on demographics, self-placement on various dimensions of interest, as well as a unique battery of 30 attitude questions on prominent agenda issues.[4] VAAs are internet-based applications offering voting advice based on calculating the ideological congruence between voters and political parties (Gemenis, 2013), which makes voters more willing to answer correctly. Contrary to traditional surveys, users answer an online questionnaire with the expectation of receiving advice in return.

Although Choose4Greece offers the only available dataset, we would like to look into some general methodological problems arising from the use of VAAs. Data quality, usually an issue for internet-based surveys, was thoroughly addressed by the Preference Matcher team.[5] The dataset contained 75,294 cases after the cleaning process. Data representativeness was a bigger problem. VAAs are not representative, since users self-select into the sample. Users belong to the

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younger, more highly educated, technologically able strata of the population. This issue is addressed through the use of a demographic weight. The study applies survey weights that construct cross-classifications of the weighting variables, making the data representative of the Greek population in demographic terms.[6]

However, self-selection poses a more difficult problem: political interest and, perhaps, party identification may influence whether someone would fill in a voting advice application or not. The sample is effectively a convenience sample, which is by no means representative of the voting population in Greece. Capturing respondents with above-average political interest is not a major concern for this study, though; in fact, it can be used constructively. For this exercise, a representative sample is not necessary, only a sample providing a certain degree of variance. Our goal is to explain identification on the left–right dimension and positioning on the bailout dimension. Using politically interested individuals reduces the noise and provides clearer results. This allows us to analyse the content of ideological dimensions, but does not permit inferences about the impact of these dimensions on the election outcome.

For the study of political identification and its relationship to socio-economic, socio-cultural, and European issues, OLS regression was used. We ran an analysis on a demographically weighted sub-sample of 45,508 cases that had no missing values. The two dependent variables 'left–right' and 'bailout identification' were constructed with two self-placement questions. These questions used a scale from –100 to +100, which was rescaled to a variable ranging from 0 to 2 to match the range of the independent variables more closely.

The independent variables are all additive indexes based on responses to policy statements, ranging from 'completely disagree' to 'completely agree'. The responses were recoded to represent the same opinion direction. Three indexes were created: socio-economic, socio-cultural and European. All indexes were constructed with the following steps: the analysis revealed one factor for every index with an eigenvalue higher than one. The summated rating scales were constructed from four socio-economic, five socio-cultural and two European issues.[7] All items added in the indexes had factor loadings higher than 0.5. The reliability and dimensionality of this scale was examined using Cronbach's alpha (all higher than 0.6). Control variables include age, gender and education level.

Results

The case of Greece in 2012 fulfils only one of the three conditions for left–right identification to absorb new issues, that of high salience. The economy can be seen as the single most important issue in the 2012 national elections. The condition of parallel mapping and the condition of persisting party loyalties are notoriously not fulfilled, given the high volatility and the explosion in the effective number of parties. The results in Table 9.1 reflect these conditions. The first model shows left–right identification being anchored mainly in socio-cultural issues and less in

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Table 9.1 Explaining self-placement on left–right and bailout dimensions in 2012 election

	Left–right self-placement	*Bailout self-placement*	*Bailout self-placement*
Constant	1.20***	0.17***	0.17
Socio-economic dimension	0.19 (0.17)***	0.33(0.27)***	0.31 (0.25)***
Socio-cultural dimension	–0.48 (–0.49)***	0.08 (0.08)***	0.14 (0.13)***
EU issues		0.30 (0.36)***	0.29 (0.35)***
Left–right self-placement			0.11 (0.10)***
Demographics			
Age	–0.01 (–0.02)	0.04 (0.05)***	0.04 (0.05)***
Education	0.00 (0.00)	0.04 (0.09)***	0.04 (0.09)***
Gender (male)	0.05 (0.05)***	0.05 (0.04)***	0.05 (0.04)**
N	44,508	44,508	44,508
R-squared	0.27	0.28	0.28

Notes
* $p<0.05$.
** $p<0.01$.
*** $p<0.001$.
b coefficients, betas in parentheses.

socio-economic issues. A typical one-unit change in the socio-cultural issues index brings a leftward shift of 0.48 points on the left–right scale. In contrast, a one-unit change in the socio-economic issues index results in a shift to the right of only 0.19 points. Our first hypothesis, that left–right identification has a strong basis in socio-cultural issues and a weaker basis in socio-economic issues, can be confirmed.

The 2012 elections reshaped the political system and paved the way for a new polarization between the leftist SYRIZA and the extreme right Golden Dawn party. Their rhetoric further consolidated understandings of the left–right divide, as the main differences between the two political parties relate to socio-cultural issues. As far as the economy is concerned, they both support economic growth measures and are strongly opposed to the bailout agreements. This new polarization may be one reason why issues that allow the maximum differentiation between the two extremes have become predominant.

The dependent variable in the second model is self-placement in terms of the bailout issue, to allow the testing of hypotheses 2 and 3. In line with our third hypothesis, the socio-economic issues index and EU issues index explain self-placement on the bailout issue better than positions on the socio-cultural issues index. A one-unit change on the socio-economic index results in a 0.33-point change towards the pro-bailout end of the scale. Similarly, for EU issues, a single-unit change produces a 0.30-point pro-bailout change. The impact of a one-unit change in socio-cultural issues is statistically significant but is very small, resulting in only a 0.08-point pro-bailout change.

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When controlling for left–right identification, we have to reject hypothesis 2, since left–right self-placement has some influence. A one-unit change on the left–right scale produces only a 0.11-point change in the bailout scale. A right-wing individual is more likely to be pro-bailout as well. Even though they are not completely independent of one another, the impact of the left–right dimension on bailout position is small. However, the superiority of the socio-economic and EU indexes remains. What changes is that the socio-cultural dimension increases its impact from 0.08 to 0.14.

The economy, framed as the bailout agreement debate, is salient and independent from the primary political identification schema. It provides a new divide, which is only partially influenced by left–right identification. In fact we see a similar pattern when looking at political parties. The leftist party SYRIZA has considered entering into a government coalition with other parties on the anti-bailout side of this divide, such as the populist right-wing party ANEL. The fact that they belong to opposing camps of the left–right division does not stop them from considering governing together. They are basing a potential common government programme on their proposals for the economy, exit from the bailout agreements and complete abandonment of austerity measures. Simultaneously, both these parties have signalled their unwillingness to cooperate in a government coalition with neighbouring parties on the left–right spectrum who place themselves on the pro-bailout camp. These developments on the party level reinforce the citizens' view that these two dimensions are independent from each other.

Demographic control variables are all significant for the bailout dimension, but only gender has a significant impact on left–right identification, with men more likely to classify themselves as being on the right and pro-bailout than women. Age and education also have a small pro-bailout impact.

Overall our results show that, when the condition of high salience of the economy is fulfilled, but the two other conditions of parallel mapping and persisting party loyalties are missing, the economy is not incorporated into the meaning of the left–right divide. Salience is not enough to make an issue dominate in determining left–right identification. The lack of the other two conditions has forced the economy to emerge as a new dimension, given its overpowering salience. Positions on this issue dimension, i.e. support for or opposition to the bailout agreement, were determined by positions on socio-economic and EU issues. The existence of a partially cross-cutting dimension of political identification can be attributed to the impossibility of it being absorbed by the left–right dimension.

Discussion

This study has explored the influence of an economic and political crisis on how people identify with politics. Using the only available data from the Greek 2012 elections, we have shown how the economy as an issue develops under the condition of high salience. The link between economic issues and left–right identification was

found to be weak, while cultural issues played the most significant role in determining left–right positioning. The economy shaped a new dimension of contestation, which was only weakly anchored in left–right identification, and was mainly informed by socio-economic and EU issue positions. We explain these findings building on previous studies, which show salience to be the key factor enabling issues to be incorporated into the overarching left–right schema. We theorize that salience is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, and we add two more conditions that need to be fulfilled: that of parallel mapping and that of persisting party loyalties. Our results show that a society undergoing a severe economic but also political crisis, such as that experienced by Greece, does not provide the conditions necessary for smooth political identification. Issues traditionally connected to left–right identification lose their power to explain this identification. When they become salient again, they cannot be absorbed by the previously all-absorbing schema, but forcibly create a new dimension of political identification.

These findings are important for a number of reasons. First, because they make it clear that the high salience of an issue is not enough to influence how people identify with politics. This adds to the debates on the meaning of the left–right divide and the dimensionality of the political space. Testing a crisis case such as Greece in 2012 furthers our understanding of how and under what conditions issues enter the main dimension of political identification.

Second, there are implications for the field of political representation, where the link between citizens and elites is based on specific dimensions. Lefkofridi *et al.* (2014) use the left–right and authoritarian–libertarian dimensions to demonstrate the existence of a significant number of left-authoritarian voters who remain unrepresented due to the lack of like-minded parties. Our findings show that these left-authoritarian voters would have identified themselves as anti-bailout/right-wing within the Greek system. Looking at recent developments in Greek politics, there were several ways parties could position themselves on this ‘opinion package’ (the right populist Independent Greeks and the extreme right Golden Dawn), allowing for congruence on both dimensions (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012a). In fact, under the new categorization there should be no voters in the Greek political system facing the problem of underrepresentation.

Third, a significant methodological implication has to do with the common practice of matching parties with voters on various ideological dimensions. On top of the existing problems of this matching mechanism in studies of electoral behaviour and representation (for discussion, see Katsanidou, 2013), a further problem is added. Voters in Greece in 2012 had a very different understanding of left–right than what is traditionally expected. Thus, when matching voters with parties, this has to be done with care, matching voter self-placement on the left–right spectrum with the positions of parties on the socio-cultural dimension, and voter self-placement on the bailout dimension with the positions of parties on the left–right issues dealt with in the bailout agreements. Alternatively, the self-placement questions should be avoided altogether, and replaced

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with additive indexes of questions representing specific predefined ideological dimensions (Gemenis, 2013).

However, this study has limitations which should not be ignored. First, the type of data used came from a self-selected sample. These tend to be citizens with a higher interest in politics and therefore potentially different to a random sample of the population. Further research should replicate this study when other data become available. Second, it would be interesting to see whether the crisis had an impact on the content of left–right identification in other countries, and whether their political space underwent similar changes. This would make it possible to test the three conditions for shaping left–right identification in different contexts. Third, focusing more on Greece, research is needed to investigate the impact of the supply side and the political discourse on the transformation of voters' political space. Did the party political space also change? Do these changes reflect the changes in the voters' political space? Has the quality of representation improved due to the new ideological divisions? Such questions could be explored in future work on the Greek political space and in comparisons of the content of left–right identifications.

Appendix

Content of dimensions

All items are measured on a four-point scale from 0 (completely disagree) to 4 (completely agree). Items were recoded to reflect the direction of the scale.

Socio-economic dimension (0 economic left – 2 economic right)

- Priority should be given to economic growth even if this leads to a wider gap between rich and poor.
- Privatization will help reduce the deficit.
- To combat unemployment, workers must accept the new forms of flexible working conditions (e.g. part-time jobs).
- Co-funding of universities by private investors will have negative effects on higher education.

Socio-cultural dimension (0 authoritarian – 2 libertarian)

- Strong policing in town centres should be implemented to tackle crime.
- Possession of soft drugs (e.g. cannabis) for personal use should be decriminalized.
- Reducing defence spending (e.g. closing military camps) will provide resources for the welfare state.
- Granting Greek citizenship on favourable terms to second-generation immigrants will encourage further immigration to Greece.
- Multiculturalism in Greece is a positive phenomenon.

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EU dimension (0 anti-European – 2 pro-European)

- Greece's exit from the eurozone would help address the economic crisis.
- Greece should leave the European Union.

Table 9.A1 Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	*Mean*	*Standard deviation*	*Min.*	*Max.*
Left–right self-placement	61,140	0.91	0.50	0	2
Bailout self-placement	61,140	0.64	0.58	0	2
Socio-economic dimension	71,687	0.81	0.46	0	2
Socio-cultural dimension	71,644	0.99	0.55	0	2
EU issues	72,608	0.46	0.65	0	2
Age	65,626	0.57	0.65	0	2
Education	62,156	2.05	0.75	0	3
Gender (male)	68,342	0.59	0.49	0	1

Notes

1 For a discussion on different ways in which issues enter the political agenda, see De Vries *et al*. 2013: 226–227.

2 The parties that positioned themselves as being in favour of the bailout agreement were PASOK, the liberal Drasi, the populist party LAOS and the New Democracy splinter group DISY, while New Democracy and the leftist party DIMAR supported a pro-bailout government without openly approving the bailout agreement itself. The opponents of the bailout were left-wing parties such as SYRIZA and ANTARSYA, the communist party KKE, the right-wing populist ANEL, the extreme right Golden Dawn and a series of short-lived splinter groups (for a detailed discussion, see Dinas and Rori, 2013; Gemenis and Nezi, 2015).

3 The financial crisis only exacerbated one of the major problems of conducting political behaviour research in Greece: the lack of national election studies. Before the crisis, researchers resorted to using pre-election surveys conducted by polling companies (Dinas, 2008; Karyotis and Rüdig, 2015; Nezi, 2012; Vasilopoulos and Demertzis, 2013), which are less than ideal for use in political research. This luxury disappeared due to the financial straits of the polling companies. Two studies conducted by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (one survey with the CSES component and the VAA 'Help me Vote') did not make their data available until January 2014, too late to be incorporated into this study.

4 The VAA was designed and launched by the 'Preference Matcher' consortium (www.preferencematcher.org).

5 The Preference Matcher team excluded all cases in which users spent less than two seconds answering each of the 30 attitude questions, all cases with less than three seconds spent on three or more of the 30 attitude questions, all cases with less than 120 seconds spent on all of the 30 questions put together, and all cases in which the respondent answered 15 successive attitude questions in the same way. To address the issue of multiple responses per respondent, the VAA installed a cookie on users' web browsers and transformed the user IP number into a unique identifier that could not be traced back to the user. These identifiers were used to remove multiple entries. Subsequent entries from the same identifier were retained only if the demographic information given suggested that this was a different user.

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6 For the VAA sample, the raking weight was constructed with the following variables: (1) number of residents per region; (2) a variable indicating 36 demographic categories, which was in turn created by cross-classifying census data on age, gender and education.
7 The wording of the questions used can be found in the Appendix.

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10 Portugal in times of crisis

Value change and policy representation

André Freire, Emmanouil Tsatsanis and Inês Lima

Introduction

In the Portuguese legislative election of September 2009, the centre-left PS (Socialist Party),[1] which had been governing with an overall majority of seats, lost a considerable number of MPs (Freire 2010; Magalhães 2012). The second government led by the PS prime-minister José Sócrates was therefore a minority one. Its agenda presented some continuity with the goals of the previous mandate: the enhancement of the economy's performance and reducing the unemployment rates, the modernization of the country and, last but not least, the consolidation of public finances. The government also aimed to strengthen investment in social services and social protection at a time of economic crisis.

However, the deepening international crisis and its impact on Portugal led to a significantly different pattern of government action vis-à-vis the original electoral manifesto. Specifically, faced with that crisis situation, the government implemented a series of measures aimed at reducing public expenditure (PEC I-III: Stability and Growth Pact I-III) during 2010. Both President Cavaco Silva (elected with support of right-wing parties and voters mainly) and the new leader of the centre-right PSD (Social Democratic Party),[2] Passos Coelho, were supportive of such measures (the latter supporting them in Parliament).

The three consecutive austerity packages negatively impacted people's views of government. However, trust in government declined also due to a series of political scandals involving the prime-minister (Magalhães 2012). The second victory of the incumbent President in January 2011 was another setback for Sócrates. No longer needing to ensure institutional cooperation, because he was entering his second and final consecutive term, the President increased his criticism of the government, the political position of which was already weak.

At the beginning of 2011, the austerity measures had still not had a strong positive impact on the economic situation (Magalhães 2012). In March 2011, however, a fourth austerity package was announced by the minister of finance without the participation or knowledge of other parties or the President – a move that would allegedly cost the government the support of the PSD. On 23 March, following Parliament's rejection of PEC 4 – *Stability and Growth Pact 4*, which was rejected by the entire opposition, from the left – Left Bloc (BE, *Bloco de*

Esquerda)[3] and the orthodox Communist Party (PCP)[4] – to the right – the PSD and the CDS-PP,[5] Sócrates resigned.

Sócrates had openly avoided seeking external aid. However, the odds of having to resort to external assistance were known to be very high should the government fall. In fact, in the spring of 2011, the country was targeted for a direct intervention from the Troika: the Portuguese bailout by the IMF, ECB and EC. Formally, this agreement was only signed by the PS government, but in fact it had the agreement of the PSD and the CDS-PP. The BE and the PCP refused to even attend the meetings prior to the agreement.

Cavaco Silva scheduled new elections for 5 June. The party manifestos were quite eloquent about the differences in the marketplace of political ideas in the 2011 electoral campaign. The PS manifesto presented seven strategic goals that were already present in their 2009 manifesto: to improve the qualifications of the workforce; to encourage energy efficiency; to improve the export sector; to invest in science; to extend the digital network to cover the entire country; and to increase the quality of the healthcare system and social infrastructures. In contrast, the PSD produced a programme concerned with restoring international credibility and to develop Portugal by means of a series of cuts in state expenditure, privatizations and cuts to the social security system. The deregulation of the job and rental markets was also part of this party's manifesto.

The CDS-PP chose *This is the moment* as the title of its very to-the-point manifesto. The major concerns were: to reduce the debt and strengthen the public finances (by selling the state's assets); to foster economic growth (by deregulating the job market and stimulating the creation of self-employment); to avoid social exclusion (in particular through the action of private institutions from the social and volunteer sectors); and to allow social mobility through meritocracy.

On the left of the ideological spectrum, the BE and the PCP defended the idea that the debt should be audited and renegotiated, since the current aid programme helps the owners of the nation's debt rather than the country itself and would, in this way, harm national sovereignty.

Overall, the result of the 2011 election was a serious defeat for all of the parties on the left, a defeat that paved the way for the most neoliberal government in Portuguese history, due especially to a significant move to the right of the PSD. Additional and more recent evidence shows that the current right-wing government has been using this crisis and the Troika bailout as a 'window of opportunity' to pass a radical neoliberal programme that would have been much more difficult to enforce without the protection of Troika umbrella (Moury and Freire 2013). This further move to right of the PSD, both in the 2011 elections and especially by the end of 2012 (the more recent mass survey), can be clearly witnessed in Figure 10.1.

But in the 2011 elections voters also voted for stability; the right-wing parties have shown they can cooperate and that they are willing to do so: as expected, they formed a coalition government very quickly and in a very discrete and orderly fashion. On the other hand, on several occasions since the democratic

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

Figure 10.1 Left–right placement of Portuguese parties according to voters' perceptions, 1978–2012 (source: data 1978–2008 elaborated by authors from: Freire 2010; PNES (Portuguese National Election Study) 2011; Freire *et al*. 2012).

transition (and since 2005) the left has shown that the different left parties are unable and/or unwilling to cooperate with each other (March and Freire 2012). Moreover, based on a preliminary analysis of the Portuguese National Election Study 2011, Pedro Magalhães (2012) showed that voters' options were not so much based on policy preferences (which have ever since been shown to be mostly pro-state intervention in the economy and, especially, in the provision of social services; Freire 2009) but much more based on (negative) performance evaluations of the incumbent (PS) government.

Considering the context just described, this chapter examines the effects of the economic crisis on representation linkages between politicians and voters in Portugal. One central question is whether the move of the right-wing parties (especially the PSD) further to the right, in terms of their policy agenda, is reflected in the attitudes and behaviour of Portuguese political figures, in particular MPs. If so, are the same trends observed among voters? In other words, can a *leadership* effect be detected in the representation process (also described as 'representation from above'). Or, on the contrary (i.e. if the right-wing parties moved to the right but the voters stayed in their previous positions or even moved in the opposite direction), has the crisis led to a greater discrepancy between the representatives and the represented, accentuating the signs of a crisis in representation? To theoretically frame the chapter we rely on theories about crisis exploitation, political representation and 'leadership democracy'.

To test our hypotheses we have a rich set of surveys: namely, four surveys of both voters and MPs, two fielded in the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis and the other two after the effects of the crisis were deeply felt by both the voters and the MPs (2012/2013). Using the 2008 economic crisis as a 'quasi-experiment', these four sets of surveys will allow us to perform a crucial test on the effects of a deep economic crisis on value change and political representation.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the theory and the hypotheses. In the third section we describe data and methods. The fourth section analyses the changes in both MPs' and voters' value orientations, and how the representation link between the representatives and the represented evolved between 2008 and 2012/2013, in terms of policy preferences (economic and non-economic). The chapter ends with conclusions.

Theory and hypotheses

The fundamental focus of our chapter is about how the parties' and MPs' ideological moves and strategic changes relate to political representation, namely to theories of 'representation from below' and 'representation from above'/'leader democracy'. There is a branch of studies about political representation (see Powell, 2004) that follows the path laid out by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes in their celebrated article in the *American Political Science Review* (1963). These authors established a tradition of empirical research into political representation in which the underlying assumption is that the congruence between the political preferences of the elected representatives and those they represent, particularly when the preferences of the elected representatives correspond with the behaviour of the legislators in parliament, is a key part of the quality of political representation. That is to say the higher the degree of congruence between the preferences of the electorate and the deputies, the higher the probability the electorate will feel themselves to be well represented and the higher the probability the legislators (and the government) will act in accordance with the people's preferences, which is a basic axiom of any representative democracy (Manin *et al*. 1999).

As with 'the responsible party model' (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999), the congruence model can also be associated with a populist vision of democracy, particularly because of the bottom-up perspective it adopts in respect of the political representation process, which places a great deal of emphasis on the electorate's preferences and on the need for congruence between the actions of the deputies and their constituents as a crucial aspect of the quality of political representation. However, some empirical studies have shown there is also a structuring of policy preferences made from the top (i.e. by the elected representatives and the parties) which is a type of 'representation from above' (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996).

These different models of representation are not only related with different visions of the relations between the represented and the representatives, and of the role of the MP in the representation link, they are also related with different

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visions of democracy and of the role that the political leaders have in each one of them. According to Körösényi (2009), who contrasted the major assumptions and the fundamental perspectives about the democratic process of two 'visions of democracy', the so-called 'classical democracy' vision (or the 'aggregative-pluralist democracy'; see Körösényi 2005) and the 'leader democracy' vision, the neglect of leadership in the 'classical vision' is due to the fact that it contradicts some of its fundamental assumptions (Femia 2009; Körösényi 2009; Slomp 2009). In the latter vision of democracy the political and electoral processes are mainly conceived as *bottom-up* processes: citizens' preferences (i.e. 'the will of the people') are the fundamental input in the political-electoral process, and the representatives have first and foremost to take those preferences into account and, at least to a certain extent, act as 'delegates' to enforce them in the legislative process. *Responsiveness* is thus the major function provided by the elections in the representative process. In contrast, in 'leader democracy' the political and electoral processes are generated by the political leaders, and 'the popular will' is 'an empty space' (i.e. it is not an exogenous element in the political and electoral processes) in the sense that it is shaped by the action of political leaders. Policy programmes are presented by leaders not by citizens, political supply structures public opinion, and voters are there mainly to select leaders and to make them accountable to the citizenry. Thus, according to 'leader democracy', to provide for *accountability* is the major function of elections in the representative process. To put it another way, the political and electoral processes are mainly conceived as *top-down*, from leaders to citizens, and not the other way around. "In this way, issue-vote cannot be separated from their role, since instigation, agenda-setting and manipulation of preferences are among the primary roles of leaders" (Körösényi 2009, p. 99).

Scenarios and hypotheses concerning the impact of the crisis

We see these two models of democracy as ideal-types; thus we believe that the two are not necessarily completely incompatible in practice. Considering what we said before in terms of ideological moves of the major parties in 2011 and afterwards (i.e. that since 2011 there has been a clear move to the right in terms of policy agenda by the right-wing parties, especially the PSD, clearly beyond the parties' manifestos and even beyond both the original government programme and the original Troika agreement), we see four scenarios in terms of concurrent moves of the voters (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996, pp. 104–105).

1. If the position of MPs (2008 to 2012/2013) moves towards that of the voters, and positions of the latter are either stable or reinforced in the same direction, we can talk about bottom-up/from-below representation.
2. If the position of voters (2008–2012) moves in a direction towards that of the MPs (2008), and positions of the latter are either stable or reinforced in the same direction, we can talk about top-down/from-above representation.
3. 'Confluential dynamic representation' occurs when both voters and MPs

move close to each other in opinion when departing from different starting points.

4 'Disconnecting dynamic representation' occurs when voters and MPs move in opposite directions, but departing from a similar initial position. As Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996, p. 107) opinion positions and stable relations between voters and representatives are of course theoretically and empirically possible: "dynamic representation does not necessarily mean change. Unchanging possible […] and should be characterized as 'steady-state dynamic representation' ".

Based on these four scenarios, we formulate four major hypotheses. We believe that given the move of the right-wing parties (and probably their MPs) to the right, especially in terms of economic left–right values (see below for a theoretical and operational definition), the more probable situation is that (right-wing) voters either stay still or move in the opposite direction, thus a 'disconnecting dynamic representation' scenario is the most probable on the right: Hypothesis 1 (H1). This expectation relies on some basic facts of Portuguese politics. Portuguese voters, overall and across parties, have always displayed more pro-state intervention economic values (fighting inequalities, strong role of the state in education, health and social security, etc.) in the economic left–right dimension, and also more authoritarian (conservative) values in the authoritarian–libertarian dimension (see Freire 2008, 2009; Freire and Belchior 2011, 2013; see also Knutsen 1997).

In terms of the move of the left-wing parties' MPs, we expect a probable move to the left in terms of value preferences in the economic left–right dimension, especially among the radical left parties (BE and PCP). Due to economic crisis and the dominance of neoliberal proposals as solutions espoused by both the Troika and the right-wing parties, we expect that the left-wing MPs will trend to stress core positions concerning inequalities and the role of the state in education, health and social security (economic left value orientations). This might affect the PS less because it has been shown to be the most congruent party in terms of MPs–voters congruence concerning the economic left–right dimension (at least when we do not take into account voters' heterogeneity). On the contrary, it has been shown the radical left parties are significantly to the left of their electorates (at least when we do not take into account voters' heterogeneity) (Belchior and Freire 2013, pp. 281–282; Freire and Belchior 2013, p. 10). Radical left voters are not only more moderate than their MPs (Belchior and Freire 2013, pp. 281–282; Freire and Belchior 2013, p. 10), they are also much less sophisticated and ideological, and thus there are few reasons to think that at least in the first years of the crisis voters will react in a clear ideological way. Thus, our second hypothesis predicts also a 'disconnecting dynamic representation' scenario on the radical left: Hypothesis 2 (H2).

Overall, these several elements incline us to predict an increase in polarization, across the economic left–right value dimension, at the elite (MPs)/party level but which is not matched with a similar move at the level of voters: Hypothesis 3 (H3).

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Of course, this H3, as well as the other three hypotheses, is more grounded in what we know about Portuguese politics than in structured theory. However, besides the evidence cited before and that can be said to support this hypothesis, we also know that in 2011 left–right economic issues had no significant impact on the citizens' vote and that it was almost determined by performance evaluations of the incumbent government (see Magalhães 2012, 2014), unlike what happened in 2005 and 2009 (Freire 2009, 2010, 2013), although evidence rooted in content analysis of party manifesto data revealed that there was more party polarization at the supply side level in 2011 than in the previous 2005 and 2009 elections (see Magalhães 2014).

Finally, considering that this crisis will give increasing salience in economic left–right issues (and underlying value divides), and will not give front stage to cultural values (like the ones related with the authoritarian–libertarian divide), we expect little change across the authoritarian–libertarian value dimension of conflict. We expect that the right-wing MPs will remain clearly more aligned (more congruent) with their voters that the left-wing MPs vis-à-vis their constituents, as previous studies have shown (Belchior and Freire 2013; Freire and Belchior 2013): Hypothesis 4 (H4).

Some people might ask: what are the links between the parties', the MPs' and the voters' ideological positions? First of all, we should underline that studies about political representation usually analyse congruence between MPs' and voters' policy preferences as a measure of the quality of representation. Second, of course, the parties are much larger and heterogeneous entities than their parliamentary groups, so we might expect significant differences between the two entities. However, in countries like Portugal dominated by two major catch-all parties (PS and PSD), as well as by a cadre-party (CDS-PP), a mass party (PCP) and a movement party (BE), which all have fairly centralized and exclusive methods of selection candidates for legislative elections (Freire and Teixeira 2011; Teixeira and Freire 2011), we should expect high levels of congruence between the parties and their respective parliamentary groups. Moreover, considering that, with the exception of the PCP (the only mass party), Portuguese parties are much stronger 'on the institutions' than 'on the ground', analysing the MPs/parliamentary groups as a point of reference for the parties' ideological positioning is a pretty adequate choice.

Data and methods

Our empirical investigation relies on the use four surveys conducted in Portugal in 2008 and in 2012/13. The mass surveys relied on multi-stage probabilistic samples of Portuguese citizens living on the mainland and aged 18 or over (*N*2008 = 1,350; *N*2012 = 1,209) (see Freire and Viegas 2008a; Freire *et al.* 2012). The same questionnaires were also used in the same years to survey the Portuguese MPs (mid 2008; June 2012–May 2013) (see Freire and Viegas 2008b; Freire *et al.* 2013). Of course, some might argue that to be strictly precise in measuring change in both MPs' and voters' preference before and after the economic crisis the ideal situation would be to have panel data. On the one hand,

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we acknowledge that our data is far from ideal in this respect, but on the other hand we consider that our data also furnishes adequate evidence to measure change in policy preferences because if a parliamentary group changes in its composition (and with reflection on the overall ideological orientations of MPs) that is an indicator of the party's ideological shifts, and that is what is more relevant here. The same can be said for the changes in the aggregates named 'party voters'. In addition, the fact that we group voters by party identification and not previous vote helps us to deal with the problem of voting choice volatility across elections given that identification tends to be more stable than the act of voting. However, we acknowledge that this does not completely address the problems of group comparability across the two points in time. Given the available data we think that this is the best possible strategy in terms of comparing the preferences of party voters before and after the crisis.

To measure issue preferences and their underlying value orientations we asked both MPs and electors to state their level of agreement or disagreement (scale 1 to 5) to several issue statements (see Tables 10.1 and 10.2). But before

Table 10.1 Battery of issues named economic left–right values (economic left–right index), 2008 and 2012

Voters	*Deputies*
Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people.	Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people.
Education should mainly be provided by the state.	Education should mainly be provided by the state.
Healthcare should mainly be provided by the state.	Healthcare should mainly be provided by the state.
The present levels of social protection must be kept the same even if that means increasing taxes	The present levels of social protection must be kept the same even if that means increasing taxes
Greater efforts would have to be made to reduce income inequalities.	Greater efforts would have to be made to reduce income inequalities.
Economic growth is more important than balancing the state budget.	Economic growth is more important than balancing the state budget.

Sources: Data elaborated by the authors using Voters and Deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas (2008a, 2008b) and Freire *et al.* (2012, 2013).

Notes

2008:

1 Voters' index – Cronbach's Alpha: 0.681 (after removing the variable for the creation of the Economic Left–right Index 2008: "The present levels of social protection must be kept the same even if that means increasing taxes." Cronbach's Alpha: 0.754).

2 Deputies' index – Cronbach's Alpha: 0.691 (after removing the variable for the creation of the Economic Left–right Index 2008: 'Greater efforts would have to be made to reduce income inequalities'. Cronbach's Alpha: 0.714).

2012/2013:

1 Voters' index – Cronbach's Alpha: 0.443 (after removing the variable for the creation of the Economic Left–right Index 2012: "Present levels of social protection must be kept the same even if that means increasing taxes." Cronbach's Alpha: 0.528).

2 Deputies' index – Cronbach's Alpha: 0.850.

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Table 10.2 Battery of issues named authoritarian–libertarian values (authoritarian–libertarian index), 2008 and 2012/2013

Voters	*Deputies*
Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment.	Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment.
Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law.	Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law.
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.	People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.
Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy.	Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy.
Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.	Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.

Sources: Data elaborated by the authors using Voters' and Deputies' surveys in Freire and Viegas (2008a, 2008b) and Freire *et al*. (2012, 2013).

Notes

2008:

1 Voters' index – Cronbach's Alpha: –0.011.

2 Deputies' index – Cronbach's Alpha: 0.573 (after removing the variable for the creation of the Authoritarian-Libertarian Index 2008: "Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment." Cronbach's Alpha: 0.614).

2012/2013:

1 Voters' index – Cronbach's Alpha: –0.009.

2 Deputies' index – Cronbach's Alpha: 0.667.

proceeding a definition of values is due. Values are not directly observable conceptions of the desirable world (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995, pp. 21–47). When forming an opinion, often the individuals (either ordinary citizens and/or political elites) will rely on general ideological schemas and/or value orientations to evaluate specific issues (Gunther and Kuan 2007, pp. 263–266). Thus, values are a kind of organization of general principles that help citizens save information costs, cope with the complexities of the political world and arrive at political decisions. In terms of the 'funnel of causality' metaphor for voting, values are said to be long-term predispositions and are located near the base of the funnel (Thomassen 2005, pp. 7–17). On the contrary, issues are usually considered to be short-term factors. However, position issues "are often a reflection of the same domains of conflict as the value dimensions just discussed" (Thomassen 2005, p. 17).

When talking about sets of conflicting values, a distinction is often made between value conflicts related to 'old' and 'new' politics. The value conflicts characteristic of 'old' politics are those related to the major industrial and pre-industrial cleavages, respectively class and religion: the conflict over what here we call 'left–right economic values', and which others refer to the division between 'left and right materialism' (Knutsen 1997), and the conflict between religious versus secular values, respectively. As for the value conflict embedded in the 'new' politics setting, some (Inglehart 1997) argue about a major conflict between 'materialist and post-materialist values' in modern societies, while others contend

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the major axis of value conflict characteristics in the 'new' politics setting is between 'libertarians and authoritarians' (Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003).

Following the previous work by one of us in Freire and Belchior (2013), the issue statements referred to above were arranged in two subsets that can be said to measure the underlying 'economic left–right' and the 'libertarian–authoritarian' value divides (Tables 10.1 and 10.2). We also used the same issues for both years (2008–2012/2013) and levels (voters and MPs) to enrich and update our comparative analysis. All scales were recoded so that higher value means either economic right or authoritarian positions. After applying the Cronbach Alpha to each dimension, we have arrived at two additive indexes of position preferences. Note that for the creation of both indices for some of the years we removed one of the variables in order to increase the internal consistency of the variables within the indices (see notes to Tables 10.1 and 10.2). All the solutions are either good ('economic left–right value' dimension for MPs)[6] or at least reasonable/acceptable ('libertarian–authoritarian value' dimension for MPs; 'economic left–right value' dimension for voters). The most problematic situation concerns the 'libertarian–authoritarian value' dimension for voters: serious doubts can be raised here about the existence of a latent variable, i.e. of an underlying value orientation. However, trying to come to alternative solutions with PCA (Principal Components Analysis) we arrived at no better solution, and several tests were made (see data in Appendix). Considering this, in the following sections we use the composite indicator 'economic left–right values' for comparing voters and MPs across levels and time (Table 10.1); however, for the case of indicators of the 'libertarian–authoritarian' value divide (see Table 10.2), we compare voters and MPs across levels and time, item by item.[7]

MPs' and voters' issue attitudes and underlying value orientations, 2008 to 2012/2013

Voters' and MPs' positions on the economic left–right index

There has been a long debate in political science concerning the content of the left–right divide; however, there has always been a correlation, at least at the level of voters, between the left–right dimension and classical economic issues related to the class cleavage (e.g. Freire 2008; Knutsen 1997). However, this correlation has been traditionally weaker in Portugal due to a number of factors, such as comparatively low levels of education, political interest, political sophistication and, above all, low polarization at the party level (Freire and Belchior 2013, p. 7; also Freire 2008; Freire and Belchior 2011). Nevertheless when comparing the positions of MPs and voters on the economic left–right index for the 2008 dataset, it was interesting to observe a high degree of congruence between representatives and the electorate (data not shown due to restrictions of space), especially on the left (Figure 10.2) (see also Freire and Belchior 2013, p. 9).

This image is not reproduced in the case of the 2012 for the overall sample (data not shown due to restrictions of space): the masses remained pretty much

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

Figure 10.2 Voters' and deputies' positions on economic left–right index of value orientations by party (5 economic right; 1 economic left) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and MPs surveys included in Freire and Viegas 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
BE: $t(76)=1.77$, $p=0.081$
CDS-PP: $t(30)=0.95$, $p=0.351$
CDU: $t(142)=1.32$, $p=0.189$
PSD: $t(228)=0.30$, $p=0.764$
PS: $t(467)=1.66$, $p=0.099$

b *MPs 2008–MPs 2012:*
BE: $t(12)=2.88$, $p=0.014$**
CDS-PP: $\mathrm{t}(19)=-0.01$, $p=0.99$
CDU: $t(15)=2.51$, $p=0.024$**
PSD: $t(39)=-3.56$, $p=0.001$**
PS: $t(44)=3.42$, $p=0.001$**

c *Voters 2012–MPs 2012:*
BE: $t(12)=-4.19$, $p=0.001$**
CDS-PP: $t(28)=2.92$, $p=0.007$**
CDU: $t(9)=-4.72$, $p=0.001$**
PSD: $t(112)=8.49$, $p=0.000$**
PS: $t(45)=-3.38$, $p=0.002$**

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1=\mu_2$)

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leftist (mode of around 1.9 in a 1–5 scale); the MPs became more polarized (moved from a single mode, around 1.9, to bimodal distribution, with one mode around 1.5 and another mode around 3.2).[8] Even though the positions of voters remain virtually unchanged, there is a marked move of MPs to more economically rightist positions. This seems to confirm H2 concerning more polarization at the elite level, but not at the mass level, in this first dimension. Examining Figure 10.2 and the movements by party across this 'economic left–right value dimension', it becomes clear that the rightward move among MPs can be attributed mostly to the MPs of PSD, which was the only parliamentary party group that exhibited a move to the right, and this was a statistically significant move (the only one relevant on the right). However, due to its size the entire MP sample appears to have moved rightwards in economic terms, confirming the perceptions of voters that have identified a move of PSD to the right. In other words, PSD appears responsible for a situation approximating a case of 'disconnecting representation'. A stark move to the right on economic issues by the major governing party that is followed neither by the electorate at large nor by the parties' own voters. This seems to confirm H1 about the expected moves on the right (MPs and voters).

There is a similar situation reproduced by the other parties but in a different direction. Whereas the positions of voters for every single party remains stable from 2008 to 2012, MPs of PS, BE and CDU (Unitary Democratic Coalition, a coalition of the PCP and the Greens) make significant movements to the left. In other words, the image of more polarization in 2012/2013 vis-à-vis 2008 among MPs is confirmed in terms of the economic left–right value divide, even though no such dynamic appears to exist at the level of public opinion. Thus, H2, concerning the expected moves on the left (MPs and voters), is also confirmed. The same can be said about the confirmation of H3: economic left–right polarization increased between 2008 and 2012/2013 but mainly at the elite level.

Voters' and MPs' positions on cultural issues

In terms of the items associated with positions on cultural issues, the first observation that we can make is that there is not much change in the several items, both at the voters and the MPs levels, between 2008 and 2012, but especially for the case of voters, as predicted by H4. This is especially the case for the items related with 'the protection of the environment', 'stiffer sentences for those who break the law' and 'immigrants are good for Portuguese economy' – see Figures 10.A3, 10.A6 and 10.A8 in the Appendix.

In the case of environmental protection, the only relevant moves are at the elite level: leftwing MPs are in 2012/2013 more distant from their rightwing peers, especially due to the move of the latter to authoritarian pole/less enviromental protection, than they were in 2008 (see Figure 10.A3). As for the immigration issue, there is almost not a single relevant move (except for a PSD move to the authoritarian pole) between 2008 and 2012/2013, either for voters or for MPs (see Figure 10.A6; and the right-wing MPs remain closer to their constitutents than their left-wing peers. Regarding the authority issue, 'stiffer sentences

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for those who break the law', changes are almost entirely concentrated in MPs (except for a move of CDS-PP voters to the authoritarian/conservative pole/less tolerant towards immigrants) and show a move to the the authoritarian/conservative pole all across the board, especially on the left (unexpectedly, the MPs from this area are in 2012/2013 closer to their voters than they were in 2008: 'confluential dynamic representation'). Overall for these three items, the lack of relevant moves, especially at the level of voters but in some cases also for MPs, in the items associated with the second dimension confirms H4: not much change is expected on positions on cultural issues, meaning that the right-wing MPs will remain clearly more aligned (more congruent) with their voters than the left-wing MPs vis-à-vis their constituents, as previous studies have shown.

Only for the sake of illustration and because these are two rather salient and controversial issues in Portuguese politics, we show here the results concerning the 'abortion issue' (Figure 10.3) and the 'same-sex marriages issue' (Figure 10.4). As for the 'the abortion issue', we can see that except for the small but significant moves of the BE, PS and PSD voters towards the libertarian pole (pro-choice), between 2008 and 2012/2013, no other move is relevant. Thus, considering the above mentioned moves apart, this evidence basically confirms H4. In 2012/2013, we can see that, with the exceptions of BE and PS (same average position of both voters and MPs), the communist MPs are much more libertarian/'pro-choice' than their voters (but with a smaller distance vis-à-vis what happens on the right) and the right-wing MPs are much more authoritarian/'pro-life' than their constituents.

In terms of the same-sex marriage issue, we can see that the only significant moves happen in the case of the PSD's and PS' electorates (moves towards the libertarian pole) and PS' MPs (similarly). This is again more evidence that, apart for the three moves mentioned, H4 is basically confirmed. Moreover, in this issue, in 2012/2013, the elites are clearly more libertarian than their constituents, especially on the left (confirming again H4).

Value orientations appear to be much more uniform across the electorate in relation to economic issue preferences (recall Figure 10.2 above). Moreover, in 2008 MPs from left parties were more congruent vis-à-vis their voters in the economic left–right divide than right-wing MPs (Belchior and Freire 2013; Freire and Belchior 2013; see also Figure 10.2). In 2012/2013, right-wing incongruence is reinforced for the economic left–right divide, especially in the case of PSD. However, in terms of the issues authoritarian–libertarian divide, the situation is more mixed since we also analysed levels of congruence item by item. For same-sex marriage, the right is clearly more congruent than the left. But in the case of the abortion issue, with the partial exception of PCP (MPs more libertarian than their voters; but less distance between MPs and voters than on the right), the left (BE and PS) is more congruent than the right (MPs more authoritarian than their voters). As for 'environmental protection', there are few differences between voters and MPs (except BE: MPs defending more protection than their voters; and PSD: MPs defending less protection than their voters). Concerning 'the immigration issue', all MPs are more libertarian than their voters, but this is



Figure 10.3 Voters' and deputies' positions (by party) on item "Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion" (1 completely agree; 5 completely disagree) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and MPs surveys included in Freire and Viegas 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
BE: $t(65)=2.531$, $p=0.014$**
CDS-PP: $t(35)=1.32$, $p=0.20$
CDU: $t(163)=0.48$, $p=0.63$
PSD: $t(279)=2.30$, $p=0.02$**
PS: $t(598)=4.68$, $p=0.00$**

b *MPs 2008–MPs 2012:*
BE: $t(14)=0$, $p=1$
CDS-PP: $t(19)=1.55$, $p=0.14$
CDU: $t(11)=1.50$, $p=0.16$
PSD: $t(36)=-0.32$, $p=0.75$
PS: $t(58)=-0.07$, $p=0.94$

c *Voters 2012–MPs 2012:*
BE: $t(10)=-1.46$, $p=0.18$
CDS-PP: $t(25)=4.29$, $p=0.00$**
CDU: $t(15)=-5.75$, $p=0.00$**
PSD: $t(78)=3.94$, $p=0.00$**
PS: $t(43)=-0.77$, $p=0.44$

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1=\mu_2$)

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

Figure 10.4 Voters' and deputies' positions (by party) on item "Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law" (1 completely disagree; 5 completely agree) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and MPs surveys included in Freire and Viegas 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
BE: $t(82) = -1.51$, $p = 0.14$
CDS-PP: $t(32) = 1.73$, $p = 0.09$
CDU: $t(162) = 0.94$, $p = 0.35$
PSD: $t(269) = 3.97$, $p = 0.00$**
PS: $t(540) = 3.46$, $p = 0.00$**

b *MPs 2008–MPs 2012:*
BE: $t(7) = 1.53$, $p = 0.17$
CDS-PP: $t(10) = 1.61$, $p = 0.14$
CDU: $t(17) = 1.90$, $p = 0.08$
PSD: $t(44) = 0.26$, $p = 0.80$
PS: $t(120) = 5.53$, $p = 0.00$**

c *Voters 2012–MPs 2012:*
BE: $t(72) = -12.99$, $p = 0.00$**
CDS-PP: $t(33) = -1.53$, $p = 0.14$
CDU: $t(29) = -9.36$, $p = 0.00$**
PSD: $t(82) = -1.73$, $p = 0.09$
PS: $t(88) = -14.73$, $p = 0.00$**

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1 = \mu_2$)

even more pronounced on the left. Regarding 'the authority issue', contrary to 2008, in 2012 all MPs are rather congruent (in general authoritarian mood) vis-à-vis their voters (except for the PS: more libertarian than its voters).

Measuring voters'-MPs' congruence with measures that take into account heterogeneity of the groups

Since Achen (1978), and until Golder and Stramski (2010), passing through Belchior and Freire (2013), it has been shown that to measure 'collective congruence' (groups of party elites versus groups of party voters) it makes a difference whether one uses relative or absolute measures.[9,10] A summary of the existent measures, their characteristics, their strengths and their shortcomings is shown in a paper by Belchior and Freire (2013, p. 278, Table 10.1). As can be seen there, relative congruence is generally better in terms of the validity of the measurements, since it takes voter dispersion into account; this way it is possible to control for voter distributions within parties, and to better compare congruence across parties. Moreover, in terms of the relative measures of congruence 'centrism' is the best one because it has the highest level of validity: it is the one that best controls for voter variance.[11] Considering the choice of 'centrism' as our best measure of congruence, before passing to the data analysis we need to present the calculations. In the present chapter, *Centrism* measures how MPs actually represent the political preferences of their voters by taking into account the mean position of voters. *Centrism* is composed of the combination of two different measures, calculated separately by parties: it is the difference between the measure of *proximity* (i.e. the difference between each individual voter and the mean position of MPs in each party, squared: only absolute differences are considered) and the *variance* with regard to the position of the electorate (between each individual voter and the mean position of all voters for each party). *Proximity* refers to the similarity of the party's position to that of its voters. That is:

$$\hat{S}j = \sum(aij - rj)^2/nj$$

where aij is the position of voter ai in party j, rj the mean position of the elite in that party, and nj the size of the sample; and,

$$\hat{Y}j^2 = \sum(aij - \bar{a}j)^2/(nj - 1)$$

measures the variance for the electorate, where $\bar{a}j$ is the mean position of the voters; and

$$\hat{C}j = \hat{S}j - \hat{Y}j^2$$

is the measure of the *centrism* in party j. As in the previous measure and for the same reasons, for centrism we also disregard the signs and all values therefore become positive. High *centrism* values indicate a mismatch between the voters and the elite; low values indicate the reverse (Belchior and Freire 2013: 279).[12]

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Using the measure of 'centrism', we can see that in 2008 the left-wing MPs are clearly the more congruent representatives, vis-à-vis their constituents, in the 'economic left–right value dimension' (see Figure 10.5). Except for the 'environmental protection issue' (only for the contrast between the left and CDS-PP, not for PSD, which is equal to the left) and the 'abortion issue' (CDS-PP is less congruent than the left; but PSD is more congruent than the left), we can say that apart from the CDS-PP in the two previous cases, the right was usually more congruent than the left (especially among the radical left parties) in terms of the 'authoritarian–libertarian value dimension'.

In 2012/2013, this overall picture generally did not change much. On the 'authoritarian–libertarian value dimension', the right-wing MPs (especially the CDS-PP but also the PSD) remain more congruent vis-à-vis their constituents than the left-wing MPs (especially the radical left parties), except in the 'abortion issue' (only for CDS-PP vs. the left: the latter is more congruent than the former in this issue) and the 'environmental protection issue' (again for CDS-PP vs. the left: the latter is more congruent than the former in this issue). Thus, concerning this value divide the measures of 'relative congruence' confirm H4: there is not much change in the non-economic value divide.



Figure 10.5 Congruence between deputies and voters in terms of 'economic left–right' value orientations taking into account heterogeneity among voters ('centrism') in 2008 and 2012 (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and MPs surveys included in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al.* 2012, 2013).

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

Figure 10.6 Congruence between deputies and voters in terms of cultural issue orientations (issue by issue) taking into account heterogeneity among voters ('centrism'), 2008.



Figure 10.7 Congruence between deputies and voters in terms of cultural issue orientations (issue by issue) taking into account heterogeneity among voters ('centrism'), 2012/2013 (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and MPs surveys included in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

However, in the 'economic left–right value dimension' there are some relevant changes. First, the CDS-PP remains the least congruent party (contrary to absolute measures of congruence: PSD was the least congruent party), followed closely by PSD. However, from 2008 to 2012/2013 the incongruence in the case of CDS-PP declined considerably, while in the case of PSD it increased considerably. However, the point of departure of CDS-PP in 2008 was rather high and thus, in spite of the decline, it remained the least congruent party. Second, the radical left MPs are less congruent in 2012/2013 than in 2008, like the PSD, and this decrease in congruence seems to be the result of an elite increase in polarization (radical left vs. PSD) not matched by similar move of their constituents (confirming H3).

Conclusions

The present study has revealed that to the extent that a disconnect between representatives and voters has emerged since the outbreak of the economic crisis in Portugal ('disconnecting representation'), in terms of substantive issue preferences and their underlying value divides, caused mainly by the departure of conservative MPs (PSD and CDS-PP, the former move is patent in terms of the absolute and the relative measures of congruence, in the case of the latter it is only evident when we use the relative measures of congruence) towards a more economically rightist direction (confirming H1). However, both the absolute and 'relative measures of congruence' (i.e. those that take into account the heterogeneity of each group of party voters) also reveal that the radical left is also more incongruent (due to moves to the economic left) vis-à-vis their voters (confirming H2, although not so clearly). Moreover, this data revealed also that the increase in polarization (especially the PSD vs. radical left, and PS to a much lower extent) is mainly a phenomenon that exists at the elite level that is not matched at the voters levels (confirming H3). Additionally, especially the 'relative measures of congruence' reveal that not much change occurred in the 'authoritarian–libertarian value divide', although with some small exceptions, thus confirming H4 (there in not much change in terms of non-economic issues and their underlying values). In the case of these dimensions, and with few exceptions (abortion issue and environmental protect issue, and only in the contrast CDS vs. left), the right is usually more congruent with their constituents than the left, and that remained so from 2008 to 2012/2013.

Unlike the 2008 study (see Freire and Belchior 2013), the incongruence between MPs and their voters is no longer observed primarily in terms of subjective left–right self-placement (see Figure 10.A1 in the Appendix) but also in the economic left–right axis over concrete economic policy preferences and their underlying value orientations. In addition, there are signs of a growing distance between the right-of-centre MPs (PSD) and the MPs of PS and the two smaller leftist parties, especially in the case of the latter. Movements both in the economic left–right axis as well as in the subjective left–right self-placement axis (again, see Figure 10.A1 in the Appendix) indicate a growing polarization among representatives which is not reproduced at the level of voters, confirming H3.

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In general, the economic crisis appears to have a greater impact on MPs rather than the electorate, which appears to be demonstrating mass stability during exceptional times both in terms of ideological preferences as well as underlying value orientations. However, the movement towards the right by the MPs of the major governing party on economic policy (already clearly perceived by voters as shown in Figure 10.1) threatens a significant representation crisis due to increasing levels of incongruence in policy preferences between MPs and their constituents. This trend is exacerbated by a countermovement of the opposition parties, contributing to a growing polarization inside the political elite in Portugal, which negates a projected image during the early stages of the crisis of a political culture among elites based on consensus and mutual accommodation.

Appendix



Figure 10.A1 Voters' and deputies' left–right self-placement (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
$t(1942) = 3.82$, $p = 0.000$**

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:*
$t(128) = -2.32$, $p = 0.022$**

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:*
$t(123) = 1.49$, $p = 0.139$

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1 = \mu_2$)

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

Figure 10.A2 Voters' and deputies' positions on "Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment" (1 completely agree; 5 completely disagree) (sources: data elaborated authors using voter (masses) and deputy (elite) surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
$t(2422) = -1.26$, $p = 0.21$

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:*
$t(202) = -6.81$, $p = 0.00$**

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:*
$t(147) = -1.32$, $p = 0.19$

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1 = \mu_2$)

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

Figure 10.A3 Voters' and deputies' positions (by party) on item "Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment" (1 completely agree; 5 completely disagree) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
BE: $t(75)=-0.08$, $p=0.94$
CDS-PP: $t(35)=0.65$, $p=0.52$
CDU: $t(160)=0.47$, $p=0.64$
PSD: $t(255)=-1.80$, $p=0.07$
PS: $t(555)=-0.21$, $p=0.84$

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:*
BE: $t(14)=0$, $p=1$
CDS-PP: $t(22)=-2.69$, $p=0.014$**
CDU: $t(18)=-1{,}34$, $p=0.20$
PSD: $t(61)=-5.50$, $p=0.00$**
PS: $t(54)=-3.05$, $p=0.00$**

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:*
BE: $t(11)=-2.99$, $p=0.013$**
CDS-PP: $t(32)=0.22$, $p=0.83$
CDU: $t(15)=-1.59$, $p=0.13$
PSD: $t(95)=2.09$, $p=0.039$**
PS: $t(51)=-0.42$, $p=0.68$

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1=\mu_2$)



Figure 10.A4 Voters' and deputies' positions on item "Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion" (1 completely agree; 5 completely disagree) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voter (masses) and deputy (elite) surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:* $t(2477)=9.38$, $p=0.00$**

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:* $t(235)=-2.44$, $p=0.016$**

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:* $t(129)=3.94$, $p=0.00$**

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1=\mu_2$)

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

Figure 10.A5 Voters' and deputies' positions on item "Immigrants are good for the Portuguese economy" (1 completely agree; 5 completely disagree) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
$t(2294) = 2.32$, $p = 0.02$**

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:*
$t(259) = -1.24$, $p = 0.22$

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:*
$t(197) = -10.02$, $p = 0.00$**

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1 = \mu_2$)

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

Figure 10.A6 Voters' and deputies' positions (by party) on item "Immigrants are good for the Portuguese economy" (1 completely agree; 5 completely disagree) (sources: data elaborated the authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
BE: $t(66)=1.35$, $p=0.18$
CDS-PP: $t(31)=0.50$, $p=0.62$
CDU: $t(167)=0.38$, $p=0.71$
PSD: $t(231)=0.64$, $p=0.53$
PS: $t(544)=1.91$, $p=0.06$

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:*
BE: $t(9)=-1.66$, $p=0.13$
CDS-PP: $t(15)=0.61$, $p=0.55$
CDU: $t(14)=0.88$, $p=0.40$
PSD: $t(40)=-2.78$, $p=0.01$**
PS: $t(58)=1.25$, $p=0.22$

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:*
BE: $t(14)=-1.27$, $p=0.23$
CDS-PP: $t(29)=-2.40$, $p=0.023$**
CDU: $t(17)=-5.85$, $p=0.00$ **
PSD: $t(174)=-4.11$, $p=0.00$**
PS: $t(58)=-6.64$, $p=0.00$**

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1=\mu_2$)



Figure 10.A7 Voters' and deputies' positions on item "People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences" (1 completely disagree; 5 completely agree) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
$t(2259)=0.10$, $p=0.92$

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:*
$t(259)=-8.89$, $p=0.00$**

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:*
$t(142)=-1.83$, $p=0.07$

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1=\mu_2$)

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

Figure 10.A8 Voters' and deputies' positions (by party) on item "People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences" (1 completely disagree; 5 completely agree) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
BE: $t(90)=-0.73$, $p=0.47$
CDS-PP: $t(35)=-4.41$, $p=0.00$**
CDU: $t(170)=0.27$, $p=0.79$
PSD: $t(225)=-0.21$, $p=0.84$
PS: $t(488)=-0.76$, $p=0.45$

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:*
BE: $t(10)=-6.54$, $p=0.00$**
CDS-PP: $t(9)=-2.16$, $p=0.06$
CDU: $t(13)=-2.86$, $p=0.013$
PSD: $t(31)=-2.74$, $p=0.01$**
PS: $t(64)=-3.58$, $p=0.00$**

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:*
BE: $t(10)=-1.01$, $p=0.32$
CDS-PP: $t(34)=-0.40$, $p=0.69$
CDU: $t(7)=-0.93$, $p=0.38$
PSD: $t(98)=-0.09$, $p=0.93$
PS: $t(44)=-3.90$, $p=0.00$**

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1=\mu_2$)

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

Figure 10.A9 Voters' and deputies' positions on item "Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law" (1 completely disagree; 5 completely agree) (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal):

a *Voters 2008–Voters 2012:*
$t(2344) = 7.61$, $p = 0.00$**

b *Deputies 2008–Deputies 2012:*
$t(254) = 1.10$, $p = 0.28$

c *Voters 2012–Deputies 2012:*
$t(148) = -8.44$, $p = 0.00$**

** Reject the null hypothesis (H_o: $\mu_1 = \mu_2$)

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

Figure 10.A10 Level of congruence between deputies and voters on item "Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment" taking into account heterogeneity among voters ('centrism') in 2008 and 2012 (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).



Figure 10.A11 Level of congruence between deputies and voters on item "Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion" taking into account heterogeneity among voters ('centrism') in 2008 and 2012 (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

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

Figure 10.A12 Level of congruence between deputies and voters on item "Immigrants are good for the Portuguese economy" taking into account heterogeneity among voters ('centrism') in 2008 and 2012 (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

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

Figure 10.A13 Level of congruence between deputies and voters on item "People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences" taking into account heterogeneity among voters ('centrism') in 2008 and 2012 (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

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

Figure 10.A14 Level of congruence between deputies and voters on item "Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law" taking into account heterogeneity among voters ('centrism') in 2008 and 2012 (sources: data elaborated by authors using voters and deputies surveys in Freire and Viegas, 2008a, 2008b; Freire *et al*. 2012, 2013).

Notes

1 The PS has always been a member of the Socialist International, and has been a member of the European Socialist Group (now Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) at the European Parliament ever since Portugal entered the EEC/EU in 1986–1987.

2 Until the 1990s, the PSD had been associated with the European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Group (ELDR) in the European Parliament. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, it has aligned itself with the conservative European People's Party (EPP). Thus, although the party has several wings (social democratic, liberal or neoliberal and conservative, at least) we can say that we are faced with a centre-right party that oscillates mainly between a neoliberal and a conservative approach: that is the location that several actors and/or sources (experts, party manifestos, voters' perceptions) usually attribute to the party, i.e. centre-right.

3 The new (radical) left party, BE, elected its first MEP at the 2004 European Elections, and another three MEPs in 2009. In the European Parliament, the BE (like the PCP) is a member of the UEL/NGL parliamentary group, although it is more aligned with the more pro-European radical left than the orthodox communists (like PCP), who are a more nationalist left.

4 Founded in 1921, the PCP was a member of the Comintern until the collapse of this organization. In the European Parliament, the PCP is a member of the United European Left/Nordic Green Left (UEL/NGL) parliamentary group.

5 The CDS (now Social and Democratic Centre – Popular Party) was founded as a kind of Christian Democratic Party, although without formal support from the Catholic Church and diverging from the ideal-type of this party family in many dimensions. Following accession to the European Union it joined the EPP. In the early 1990s it began promoting an anti-EU stance, leading to its expulsion from the EPP in 1992. Following this, it joined the Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UPE). After 1997, the party's stance on the European Union changed, culminating with their return to the EPP in July 2004.

6 There are no reasons to suppose that the different item collapsed in each case (to achieve better alphas), MPs versus voters, for LR economic values, is substantively problematic because the more important issue conflicts in this value divide are still equally uncovered in each group, MPs and voters.

7 However, especially for this second dimension, due to restrictions of space only some of the data is presented in the Appendix.

8 We believe that an overall F-test would tell us whether the differences between the different groups of party voters (or of party MPs) are significant as a whole but they would not provide a picture of differences within each party (for example, when comparing BE sympathizers in 2008 with BE sympathizers in 2012, or BE sympathizers in 2012 with BE MPs in 2012). This is why we choose independent samples t-tests instead of an overall F-test.

9 In terms of absolute congruence, one first possibility is the *percentages of agreement* and *differences* between MPs and voters within the five Portuguese political parties, which is the most straightforward measure of absolute congruence. It offers us a general picture of intra-party consonance with regard to policy issues. It is calculated by calculating the different percentages of respondents in the relevant categories of the dependent variable (policy issues in this case) across levels, i.e. party MPs vs. party voters.

10 Another measure for absolute congruence is *means difference*, i.e. the average divergence between MPs and voters' positions regarding policy issues in parties (MPs minus voters) (see Holmberg 1989, pp. 13–23).

11 The other relative congruence measure is the *standardized mean differences* between MPs and their voters' policy issue positions; it is inspired by the work by Converse and Pierce (1986, pp. 963–964). It is

> computed by dividing the differences (MPs minus voters) by the standard deviation of voter distributions within parties. The measure is computed at the party level: for each party/policy issue. This measure disregards the signs of mean differences, since it is the distance between means and not the direction that is relevant to the analysis. Moreover, retaining the signs of the values would lead to situations in which different signs would cancel each other out, thereby erasing the true distance between the two positions. The lower the values of the *standardized mean differences*, the higher the congruence.
>
> (Belchior and Freire 2013, p. 278)

12 Although we follow Achen (1978) very closely in measuring 'centrism', as in our previous paper (Belchior and Freire 2013, p. 286, note 4) 'we consider the median position of citizens instead of the mean in order to overcome the bias that the latter might introduce if the distribution is removed from the normal, which is potentially the case when it comes to citizens'.

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11 Romania in times of crisis

Economic conditions and support for democracy

Mircea Comșa and Claudiu Tufiș

Introduction

This chapter analyses the relationship between economic conditions and support for democracy.[1] While this is an often-researched topic (Cordova and Seligson, 2009; Huang *et al*., 2008; Mishler and Rose, 1999), we believe that the current economic crisis, one of the most significant in several decades, requires a new look at the effects of economic crises on support for democracy. Previous research has shown that the economic context has a strong effect on different aspects of the political domain: political legitimacy depends, in part, on the economic performance of the regime (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Norris, 1999), support for democracy is increased by citizens' positive evaluations of economic performance (Kitschelt, 1992), and confidence in political institutions rises and falls with the economy (Mishler and Rose, 1997).

Given that previous studies have analysed different components of the political system, starting from Easton's model of support for the political system (Dalton, 1999; Easton, 1965), the approach we are using in this chapter is to distinguish between different components of support for democracy, ranging from specific support (confidence in different types of political actors), to middle-range support (confidence in political institutions, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy), to diffuse support (support for democracy as a principle). We treat each of these components as separate outcome variables in models that include the same set of independent variables. By analysing each component of political support separately and comparing the results, we are able to test whether economic crises decrease support for democracy across the board, or if only certain components of support for democracy are eroded during economic crises, while others are immune to such short-term influences.

We analyse here the effect of an economic crisis on support for democracy in the case of Romanian society. There are three main reasons for choosing Romania. First, Romania combines two characteristics that have been indicated as having a possible effect on support for democracy: it is a rather fragile, not yet fully consolidated democracy and, at the same time, it is a country that has felt quite strongly the effects of the current economic crisis. Second, while Romanians have experienced other periods of economic turmoil, these were the

result of adjustments required during the transformation of a state economy into a market economy. The current economic crisis in Romania is the first that cannot be attributed to the post-communist transition process and, as a result, people may be less inclined to quietly accept its negative consequences. We use, thus, Romania as a case study to formulate possible hypotheses, which will be tested later in comparative analyses. Lastly, in analysing the Romanian case, we had the opportunity to use an ongoing panel study (the Romanian Elections Study (RES)) that covers almost four years and that allows us to test our hypotheses regarding the effects of changing economic conditions on support for democracy.

The panel study has three waves, which include both the presidential elections of 2009 and the parliamentary elections of 2012. As we argue below, the waves of our panel study capture the largest part of the economic crisis that affected Romania from 2009 to the present time. Using the panel data, we estimated identical models for each component of support for the political regime we are taking into account (confidence in the presidency, confidence in political parties, confidence in political institutions, satisfaction with the way democracy works, and support for democracy as a political regime), placing the focus on evaluations of economic performance (prospective/retrospective, egocentric/sociotropic) while controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and other variables shown in previous studies to have a significant effect on support for democracy.

Without going into the details presented in the results section, we will mention here that according to the models we estimated, evaluations of economic performance do play a significant role in some dimensions of support for the political regime, the effect being stronger in the case of middle-range support and not significantly different from zero in the case of diffuse support.

Our main contribution to the literature comes from a combination of the substantive and methodological characteristics of our study. Methodologically, the use of panel data allows us to make a stronger argument regarding the significant effects of evaluations of economic performance on support for democracy. More important, however, is the fact that we tested the relationship between the two in Romania, a case that is representative of Central and Eastern European post-communist countries at a specific moment in time, that is, at the exact time the first post-transition economic crisis affected a country that, by all indicators, ended the democratic transition and yet did not become a fully consolidated democracy. If economic turmoil during the post-communist transition could be explained away by politicians as an inherent part of the transition process, this economic crisis could not benefit from such an explanation. Our main finding that the economic crisis negatively affected specific forms of support but failed to affect diffuse support for democracy is encouraging, suggesting that the democratic system is not easily disturbed, even in a democracy that is still insufficiently consolidated.

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Economic evaluations and support for democracy

At the centre of our chapter lies the individual-level relationship between economic evaluations and support for the political regime during periods of significant economic troubles. We proceed in this section by discussing the current views in the literature on support for democracy and on economic evaluations, followed by the results from previous studies regarding the relationship between the two. Next, we offer a very brief description of how the economic crisis started in Romania and the government's initial responses to the crisis, and then we move to formalising our expectations into the four hypotheses we test.

The discussion of support for the political system must start from David Easton. Although some authors have argued for a unidimensional interpretation of political support (see, for instance, Davidson and Parker, 1972; Loewenberg, 1971), Easton's distinction between diffuse and specific support has been widely accepted in the literature (Easton, 1965, 1975). Easton's initial formulation of the model of support for the political system has been modified over time, the most recent modification being proposed by Dalton (1999), Klingemann (1999), and Norris (1999).

We consider this latest version of the model to be detailed enough to capture the relationships we are interested in analysing, so we use the dimensions of political support defined in this model, with minor modifications. At the highest level of conceptualisation, we consider support for democracy as a regime as an indicator of diffuse support for the main principles of the political system (see, among others, Hofferbert and Klingemann, 2001; Maravall, 1997; Plasser *et al*., 1998; Tufiș, 2012). This should be the core dimension of political support, based on the requirement of congruence between people's values and the principles on which the political regime is built (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1989). Being the core dimension, the main expectation with respect to support for democracy is that of inertia, of very slow changes over long periods of time.

The second dimension we are including in our analyses is that of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, interpreted as the support for the performance of the regime, as a middle-range form of support that combines elements of both specific and diffuse support (for a detailed discussion of this dimension, see Linde and Ekman, 2003; Muller, 1970). Unlike the core dimension of diffuse support for the political system, the middle-range dimension introduced here is more susceptible to change over time, most likely as a result of people's evaluations of the performance of the political regime as a whole.

The third dimension represents the most specific form of support for the political system: support for political actors. Given the current context of Romanian politics, which is highly personalised and conflictual, we decided to distinguish among three key political actors – the presidency, political parties, and the main political institutions – measuring support in all three cases as confidence in the corresponding political actor. By comparison to the other dimensions, this one should be the most affected by people's perceptions of the performance of political actors.[2]

We use these three dimensions of support for the political system as dependent variables in the models we are estimating (details about operationalisation and measurement are given in the data and methods section below). The main independent variables we include in the models are those measuring evaluations of the economic situations. The literature distinguishes among different types of economic evaluations based on two different dimensions (see, for instance, Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Markus, 1988).

The first dimension distinguishes between evaluations of the personal economic situation (egocentric or pocketbook evaluations) and evaluations of the national economic situation (sociotropic). The second dimension is based on the reference point for the evaluations of the economic situation: the past (retrospective) or the future (prospective). By combining the two dimensions, the result is a set of four different types of evaluations: evaluations of past economic performance at the individual level (retrospective pocketbook), evaluations of past economic performance at the national level (retrospective sociotropic), evaluations of future economic performance at the individual level (prospective pocketbook), and evaluations of future economic performance at the national level (prospective sociotropic).

All four types of economic evaluations have been used in the literature, and despite ongoing debates on their relative importance (Hibbs, 1993; Nannestad and Paldam, 1997), most scholars agree that perceptions of the state of the economy have a significant role in determining a series of factors related to the political arena in developed democracies, from vote choice (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000) to different forms of support for democracy (Banducci and Karp, 2003; McAllister, 1999; Weatherford, 1987). Some authors (especially Mishler and Rose, 1999) have argued that during the first part of the post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern European countries, support for democracy was more likely to be determined by comparisons to the previous regime rather than evaluations of economic performance. There has been evidence, however, that evaluations of economic performance did have an effect on support for democracy, with the timing of the transition being associated to the relative importance of different types of evaluations (Clarke *et al*., 1992; Lewis-Beck, 1988; MacKuen *et al*., 1992).

Overall, previous studies suggest that at least one type of evaluation should have significant effects on at least one dimension of support for the political system. Most studies suggest that sociotropic evaluations are more important than egocentric evaluations (Criado and Herreros, 2007; Finkel *et al*., 2001), but this is something that needs to be tested in the context of a fragile democracy confronted with its first significant economic crisis. The studies also suggest that specific forms of support should be more significantly affected by these evaluations in comparison to diffuse forms of support (Kotzian, 2010). The stability of diffuse support, however, is another characteristic that needs to be tested in the context of an insufficiently consolidated democracy, especially since some findings suggest that even in developed democracies diffuse support is decreased by negative evaluations of the economy (Newton, 2006; Newton and Norris, 2000; Seligson and Booth, 1993).

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In addition to these two main groups of variables, the models we are estimating also include variables that have been shown in the literature to have an effect on support for the political system. Since we are estimating fixed effects regression models, we have to take into account only time-varying variables; time-invariant variables, such as gender or residence (by design), are not included in the models (more details are included in the data and method section). In our models, we have controlled for socio-economic indicators, such as education, wealth, employment status, and occupational status (Evans and Rose, 2007; Farnen and Meloen, 2000; Grosjean *et al*., 2013; Meyer *et al*., 2008); a general indicator of satisfaction with life (Clarke *et al*., 1992; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979); and an indicator of partisanship (Singh *et al*., 2012).

Before moving on to the section devoted to the hypotheses we are testing here, we believe that a brief description of the timing of the economic crisis in Romania and the first governmental responses to the crisis will help the reader better understand the context that determined our expectations.

Economic crisis in Romania

With the advantage of both hindsight and the availability of macro-economic indicators, it is easy to see now that 2009 was the year the international financial crisis reached Romania. After almost a decade of significant economic growth (from 2000 to 2008 the Romanian economy grew, on average, by 6.5 per cent per year), the Romanian economy contracted by 7.1 per cent in 2009. We see this now, but almost nobody saw it during 2009.

At the end of 2008, most analysts were forecasting another year of economic growth for Romania: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) predicted a 4 per cent increase of the Romanian economy for 2009 (EBRD, 2008, p. 21), the World Bank (WB) predicted a 3.2 per cent increase (World Bank, 2009, p. 151), the European Commission (EC) estimated a 4.75 per cent increase (European Commission, 2008, p. 106), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) saw a 4.8 per cent increase (IMF, 2008, p. 70), and the Romanian National Bank (BNR) estimated a 4.6 per cent increase (Mediafax, 2008). Overall, based on 13 different forecasts, at the end of 2008, the Romanian economy was estimated to grow by an average of 5.1 per cent in 2009 (EBRD, 2008, p. 21). It is not surprising, then, that at the end of 2008, the prime minister (Tăriceanu) was declaring that "the international financial crisis will not have any effects on Romania's economy and its citizens", and the president (Băsescu) was giving a similar, although rather more cautious interpretation, suggesting that Romania was in a position to avoid most negative effects of the financial crisis (Wall-Street, 2011).

Since 2009 was an election year in Romania (elections for the European Parliament were held in the summer and presidential elections were held at the end of the year), most politicians were quite happy to use these positive forecasts as a sign they could conduct business as usual, and instead of warning the population about a possible economic crisis, they continued spending as if the country's economy was still expanding at the rate recorded in previous years.

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Moreover, throughout 2009, the public was exposed to inconsistent messages regarding the state of the economy. Looking only at the president's remarks (remarks that were mirrored by other politicians as well), these changed from "Romania will most likely not be affected by the crisis" (October 2008), to "the televised economic apocalypse is not real" (November 2008), to "we do not need an IMF loan" (January 2009), to "my belief is that Romania will have economic growth in 2009" (March 2009), to "Romania is entering into recession" (June 2009), to "we do not plan to solve the economic crisis because it is a global crisis and Romania depends on what is going on globally" (October 2009), to "we might not be able to pay wages and pensions" (October 2009), to "we will find a formula to pay wages and pensions" (November 2009), and finally to "the peak of the crisis is behind us" (November 2009; Ziua, 2009).

As a result, even though some people may have experienced some effects of the economic crisis during 2009, the perception of the economic crisis was individualised, fragmented, and not yet coalesced into a perception shared by the majority of the population and placed at the front of the public agenda. The year 2010, however, was when it became clear to everyone that Romania was in the middle of a significant economic crisis. And nothing could be more persuasive than the president's announcement that as a result of negotiations with international financial organisations, the government would implement a set of austerity measures intended to balance the budget. These measures, which were intended to be applied for two years, included a 25 per cent cut in all wages in the public sector, a 15 per cent cut to all pensions, and a 15 per cent cut to most social services, including unemployment benefits. The Constitutional Court ruled that the pension reduction was unconstitutional and, as a result, the cabinet increased the VAT from 19 to 24 per cent, a measure that affected everyone but multiplied the burden on public sector employees.

While the wage cuts were reversed two years later, as planned, they generated a number of significant changes in the population. First, and most important for our chapter, the population became aware of the economic crisis affecting the country and started paying more attention to economic issues. Second, many people were taken by surprise by the economic crisis and chose the most obvious scapegoat: the person who announced the austerity measures. Thus, the president recorded a significant decrease in popularity/trust only six months after winning a second term in office. Recently, the president stated in an interview that the cuts needed to be done, even though he was aware that Romanians would never forgive him for that measure (România Liberă, 2012). His perception seems to have been correct; the vengeful public feelings towards the president were used by his political opponents, becoming one of the most important arguments used in political debates since then. Moreover, the president's strategic sacrifice, intended to save the democrat-liberals from being associated with the austerity measures, seems to have been in vain because the democrat-liberals still lost the 2012 elections.

This brief description of the timing of the economic crisis in Romania and of the main austerity measures taken by the government to counter the effects of the crisis should support our argument that even though the economic crisis started

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internationally in 2007, its first effects only reached Romania in 2009. Even so, a widespread perception of an economic crisis affecting Romania was not formed until the beginning of 2010 when politicians, unencumbered by the weight of the presidential elections, felt free to admit that the economy had stalled.

The data that we are analysing coincides with the timing of the economic crisis: the first two waves of data were collected in November and December 2009, right before the implementation of the austerity measures, while the third wave was collected in January 2013. Our panel, thus, covers most of the economic crisis, from its beginning to the present, offering us the chance to analyse and disentangle the effects of changes in people's perceptions of the state of the economy on their support for different dimensions of democracy. Although we have already hinted at the hypotheses we are testing, in the next section we state them explicitly before proceeding to the discussion of the data and methods.

Hypotheses

As we have shown so far, the relationship between people's perceptions of economic performance and their evaluations of future economic performance on the one hand, and support for democracy as measured by different dimensions, on the other hand, represents the main focus of our chapter. Starting from the existing literature, we have developed a set of hypotheses that we test using our data.

It should be mentioned, however, that these hypotheses have been developed, to a certain extent, from analyses of cases that belong to the group of developed democracies, to the group of Latin American democracies, or to the group of post-communist democracies. Since we are testing these hypotheses in the Romanian case, the latter is the obvious comparison group. Even in this case, however, many of the scholars that have included Romania in their analyses have concluded that Romania does not fully fit the post-communist group of countries when it comes to people's attitudes towards democracy (see, for instance, Evans and Whitefield, 1995, p. 496; Mishler and Rose, 1996, p. 560; or Rose and Mishler, 1994, p. 170). To account for the fact that Romanians have a tendency to declare a stronger support for democracy than they actually have, we have taken care to construct a corresponding dependent variable that attempts to eliminate this bias (see details in the data and method section) and, at the same time, we have updated our hypotheses to better fit our expectations.

We have four main expectations from our analyses, which can be formalised in the following hypotheses.

> H1: The experience of the economic crisis will lead to a decrease in support for democracy. The decrease will be stronger for those components that are based on specific support and weaker for those components that are based on diffuse support.

This is the “time” hypothesis, which states our expectation is that support for democracy has decreased from 2009 to 2013, with the magnitude of the decrease depending on the type of support.

H2: The evaluations of economic performance have an effect on support for democracy for all the dimensions of support for democracy that we are studying: positive evaluations will lead to an increase in support for democracy, while negative evaluations will lead to a decrease in support for democracy.

This is the “economic evaluations” hypothesis which states that, controlling for time and other variables, the way people evaluate the economic performance (retrospective/prospective and individual/national) has an effect on support for democracy.

H3: The effect of evaluations of economic performance is dependent upon the type of support: the effect will be stronger for those components that are based on specific support and weaker for those components that are based on diffuse support.

This is the “separate effect on separate dimensions” hypothesis. We indicated above that we will analyse support for democracy by distinguishing among dimensions that range from the most specific ones to the most diffuse ones. Since the most diffuse dimensions of political support are also the most stable, we expect that the effect of economic performance evaluations will decrease as we move from the more specific to the more diffuse dimensions of support for the political system.

H4: The groups that are most likely to suffer during economic crises (low income and low education groups) are more likely to decrease support for democracy across all dimensions in times of economic turmoil.

This is the “social group–time interaction” hypothesis, which states that we expect to see a more significant decrease of support for the political system among low-education and low-income groups.

As argued above, the expectations indicated in these hypotheses take into account the fact that Romania is not yet a fully developed democracy and that Romanians, as a group, have yet to internalise the complete set of democratic values. At the same time, however, we admit that we would not be too upset if

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some components of these hypotheses (at least those related to diffuse support for democracy) were proven wrong by the data because that would signify that at least that part of support for democracy is resistant to short-term pressures, regardless of their intensity.

Data and method

Panel description

Apart from experimental research, the best way to measure change and make inferences about its causes is to use panel data. These data offer multiple advantages: they allow for exploring variation across both time and cases, they offer a way to ameliorate the problem of omitted variable bias, and even short panels, with only two or three time points, are useful for analysis.

The data for our analyses come from a three-wave nationally representative panel study using face-to-face interviews (RES) and administered in Romania between 2009 and 2013. Data for the first wave were collected before the 2009 presidential elections (November 2009). Data for the second wave were collected right after the second round of 2009 presidential elections (December 2009). The third wave took place after the Romanian parliamentary elections held in December 2012 (January 2013). The sample sizes are 1,504 for the first wave, 1,403 for the second wave, and 1,105 for the third wave. Response rates, relative to the previous wave, were 93.3 per cent for the second wave and 78.8 per cent for the third (73.5 per cent if base is the first wave). Considering the socio-demographics, except for one variable (residence in urban or rural areas), the attrition was relatively uniformly distributed. Here, we use variables measured mainly in the second wave (a small number of variables have been measured in the first wave) and in the third wave.

Measurements

In this section we summarise our measurements for the dependent variables. The proposed theoretical distinctions and measurements are largely inspired by the work of Easton (1965) and Norris (1999). We present them in an ordered way, from specific support to diffuse support (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Norris, 2011). Since the Romanian political space is highly personalised and conflictual, we opted for a solution that distinguishes among different types of political actors: the presidency, political parties, and political institutions (for more details about the personalisation of Romanian politics, see Gheorghiță, 2010).

Measurement of confidence in the presidency

"Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust." Since the institution of the presidency is

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highly visible and it is characterised by having a single incumbent, it is unclear if people responding to this question are using the institution or the incumbent as a reference point. The evolution of this indicator over time, however, shows significant short-term variations, suggesting that the incumbent is the key reference point in the evaluation of the institution. Throughout the period of time covered by the panel, Traian Băsescu was the president of Romania.

Measurement of confidence in political parties

The same question as in the case of confidence in the presidency. Trust in political parties is related to the institutional dimension but has some specific content: the level of trust in political parties is lower than the level of trust in the government or parliament (mean of 4.1 vs. 5.2 on a scale from 0 to 10) and the correlation coefficients between trust in political parties and trust in the government and parliament are lower than the correlation between the last two (0.64/0.65 vs. 0.80). Theoretically, this measure should be less affected by changes in the space of political actors.

Measurement of confidence in political institutions

The same question as for confidence in political parties. We considered the government and parliament as the political institutions. The confidence score was computed as an average of the two ratings. The resulting scale ranged from 0, the lowest level of trust, to 10, the highest level of trust. Trust in political institutions has been conceived previously as an expression of support for democracy (Dalton, 2005; Kotzian, 2010; Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Tufiș, 2008a; Voicu, 2005a).

Measurement of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy

"On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Romania?" (The scale ranged from 0, not at all satisfied, to 3, very satisfied.) Previous analyses that used this item (Fuchs *et al*., 1995; Singh *et al*., 2012; Voicu and Bartolomé Peral, 2014) have shown that it can be considered a valid and reliable measure of support for democracy (it refers to the actual political system and is less biased than asking about support for the current government), even though it seems to capture the local implementation of democracy rather than the support for it (Linde and Ekman, 2003).

Measurement of support for democracy as a principle

We used modified versions of a classic question (Inglehart, 2003): "How good or bad is it for Romania to have a democratic political system?" and "How good or bad is it for Romania to be ruled by a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections?" Responses were measured on a 4-point

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Likert scale (very good, good, bad, very bad). Since both items have rather low variance due to responses crowding one end of the scales, we decided to combine the two into a single measure by subtracting the 'strong leader' item from the 'democratic system' item and reversing the scale. The scale of the resulting variable ranges from –3 (low support for democracy) to 3 (high support for democracy). These measures have been previously used in the literature as indicators of diffuse support for democracy (see, for instance, Gibson *et al*., 1992; Hahn, 1991; McIntosh *et al*., 1994; Miller *et al*., 1997; Tufiș, 2008b; Voicu, 2005b).

Analyses and results

Trends in support for democracy over time

Table 11.1 presents the trends over time in the different measures of support for the political system. In the case of the diffuse and middle-range measurements of support (support for democracy and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy), the data show a remarkable stability at the aggregate level between 2009 and 2013. In the case of the more specific indicators, the data indicate a significant decrease of support during the same period of time: trust in institutions decreased by 0.77 points on a 0–10 scale (equivalent to a 7.7 per cent relative decrease), trust in political parties decreased by 1.09 points on a 0–10 scale (a 10.9 per cent relative decrease), and trust in the presidency decreased by 1.97 points on a 0–10 scale (19.7 per cent relative decrease).

It should be noted that the large decrease of trust in the presidency can be explained by two factors. First, since the 2009 measurement was taken right after the winner of the presidential elections was announced, it is very likely that the level of trust recorded at that moment was inflated via the honeymoon effect. Second, the president took upon himself the task of announcing to the population a set of very unpopular austerity measures, which probably explains why 2013 is the first post-communist year in which the level of trust in the presidency is lower than the level of trust in institutions.

Table 11.1 Dynamics of support for democracy in Romania, 2009–2013 (means)

Dependent variable	*2009*	*2013*	*Diff.*
Trust in presidency (0–10)	6.24	4.27	–1.97***
Trust in parties (0–10)	4.68	3.59	–1.09***
Trust in institutions (0–10)	5.64	4.87	–0.77***
Satisfaction democracy (0–3)	1.00	0.97	–0.03
Support democracy (–3–3)	0.45	0.47	0.02

Notes

Common cases, weighted, *t*-test for dependent samples; significance levels: +$p<0.1$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.

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Trends in economic evaluations over time

Table 11.2 presents the trends over time for the different measures of economic evaluations (individual actual; individual/national economy; retrospective/prospective). Satisfaction with life has remained, on the average, unchanged for the period of time included in our analysis. Retrospective evaluations of the state of the economy have improved slightly between 2009 and 2013, probably because by 2013, most of the temporary austerity measures taken during the economic crisis had been lifted.

For all other variables, the data show an increase of negative evaluations: retrospective evaluations of personal economy decreased by 0.13 points on a 0–4 scale (3.2 per cent relative decrease), prospective evaluations of national economy decreased by 0.27 points (6.7 per cent relative decrease), and prospective evaluations of personal economy decreased by 0.20 points (5 per cent relative decrease).

As indicated above, our main interest is in measuring changes within individuals' support for democracy and in estimating the effects of changes in economic evaluations on changes in support for democracy. Considering these objectives and the available data, we are using fixed-effects (FE) panel models. Our choice has a series of justifications. First, FE models can be used to study the causes of changes within a person. Second, because time-invariant characteristics are constant, they cannot cause such changes. Third, we can control for the unobservable or unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the respondents. We did not assume that the FE models are the best models for our data, and we tested the adequacy of random-effects (RE) models as well. For each of the dependent variables, we estimated both an FE and RE model, and completed a series of tests that are used to decide between FE models and RE models (F-test, the LM test, and the Sargan-Hansen test). In all our cases, the tests indicated that the FE models are more adequate for our data.

We estimated all models using the robust and cluster options in order to obtain conservative standard errors. The FE panel models reported in Table 11.3 control for all the time-invariant characteristics of the respondents. In addition to

Table 11.2 Dynamics of economic evaluations in Romania, 2009–2013 (means)

Variable	*2009*	*2013*	*Diff.*
General satisfaction (0–3)	1.14	1.13	–0.01
Retrospective national (0–4)	1.12	1.24	0.12**
Retrospective individual (0–4)	1.56	1.43	–0.13***
Prospective national (0–4)	2.23	1.96	–0.27***
Prospective individual (0–4)	2.30	2.10	–0.20***

Notes

Common cases, weighted, t-test for dependent samples; significance levels: +$p<0.1$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$; Retrospective: 0=much worse now, 4=much better now; Prospective: 0=much worse in the future, 4=much better in the future.

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Table 11.3 Fixed-effects panel model with time interactions: support for political system across five dimensions of support

Model	*Confidence in presidency*			*Confidence in political parties*			*Confidence in institutions*			*Satisfaction with democracy*			*Support for democracy*		
	SD	*EE*	*IE*	*SD*	*EE*	*IE*	*SD*	*EE*	*IE*	*SD*	*EE*	*IE*	*SD*	*EE*	*IE*
Time	–2.04***	–1.90***	–2.00***	–0.96***	–0.70***	–0.57**	–0.67***	–0.47*	–0.38+	–0.03	–0.00	0.02	–0.03	–0.11	–0.14
Time × education			–0.04			0.01			0.05			0.03+			0.00
Time × wealth			0.14			–0.16			–0.15+			–0.06*			0.03
Satisfaction with life		0.28	0.31		0.27	0.24		0.28+	0.24		0.12*	0.11*		0.05	0.05
Retrospective national		0.22	0.22		0.40**	0.42**		0.43**	0.44**		0.16***	0.16***		0.02	0.02
Prospective national		–0.27+	–0.27+		–0.25	–0.26		–0.12	–0.12		0.04	0.04		–0.08	–0.08
Retrospective individual		0.29	0.30		0.00	–0.02		0.17	0.15		–0.03	–0.04		–0.08	–0.08
Prospective individual		0.16	0.14		0.34+	0.38+		0.28	0.30		0.07	0.07		0.12	0.11
Education	0.04	0.05	0.06	–0.01	0.01	0.01	–0.01	–0.01	–0.03	–0.01	0.01	–0.00	0.05	0.07	0.06
Occupation: high	0.46	–0.03	–0.04	0.03	–0.72+	–0.72+	–0.01	–0.52	–0.51	–0.04	–0.04	–0.04	–0.33	–0.45	–0.45
Occupation: low	0.39	0.69+	0.70+	–0.02	–0.08	–0.10	–0.24	–0.17	–0.18	–0.19**	–0.14	–0.14	–0.14	–0.03	–0.04
Unemployed	–0.13	0.09	0.16	0.14	0.50	0.42	–0.40	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.07	0.22	0.16	0.17
Wealth: goods	0.11	0.07	0.00	–0.02	–0.11	–0.03	0.13	0.01	0.09	0.02	–0.01	0.02	0.02	–0.06	–0.07
Respondent evaluation	0.20*	0.22*	0.23*	0.23***	0.14+	0.12	0.15*	0.22+	0.21+	0.04*	0.00	–0.00	0.05+	0.09*	0.09+
Partisanship	0.48+	0.83*	0.81*	0.97***	1.16***	1.19***	0.77***	1.04***	1.07***	0.12*	0.16*	0.17*	0.15	0.13	0.13
Intercept	5.61***	5.24***	5.30***	4.07***	4.09***	4.02***	5.15***	4.98***	4.92***	0.98***	0.96***	0.94***	0.41***	0.45***	0.47***
Adj. R^2	33.7	34.3	34.3	26.7	32.5	32.9	27.3	28.7	28.9	8.4	16.8	17.4	6.9	13.5	13.2
N	2,236	1,594	1,594	2,261	1,608	1,608	2,180	1,558	1,558	2,284	1,625	1,625	1,987	1,435	1,435

Notes
1 Table entries are regression coefficients (xtreg, fe robust cluster).
2 Models – SD: socio-demographics; EE: economic evaluations; IE: interaction effects.
3 *Adj.* R^2 values are computed using the areg command.
4 Significance levels: $+p<0.100$; $*p<0.050$; $**p<0.010$; $***p<0.001$.
5 All independent variables, except for the dichotomous ones (time, occupation, employment, and partisanship) are centred.

the time-varying controls related to socio-demographic characteristics (education, occupational status, unemployment status, wealth) or political ones (partisanship), the models also control for all the unobservable time-invariant characteristics of the respondents. All independent variables, except for the dichotomous ones (time, occupation, employment, and partisanship), are centred.

What do the results say about our hypotheses? The "time" hypothesis (H1) is partially supported by our results. In Table 11.1 we observed a significant decrease in confidence in various political actors (presidency, political parties, and political institutions). This result is confirmed in Table 11.3 as well: the coefficient for time is negative and significant in the models explaining confidence in political actors, but it is not statistically different from zero in the other models, suggesting that the economic crisis may have led to a decrease in specific support for the political system, but it had no effect on middle-range and diffuse support for democracy. Adding economic evaluations variables in the models where time has a significant effect does reduce the size of this effect without managing to eliminate its significance completely. This suggests that the time variable captures a shift in general evaluations that is not captured by the other variables included in the models.

As indicated when we discussed the results presented in Table 11.1, the dramatic decrease of trust in the presidency can be explained by the particularities of politics in Romania during the economic crisis. At the peak of the economic crisis, the government, together with international financial institutions, decided on a set of austerity measures designed to reduce the budgetary deficit. Since everyone knew that the measures were going to be unpopular, the president decided to act as a dam for the wave of discontent that would be generated by the implementation of the new measures. The events of the last years show that the tactic worked: the president is perceived as the one responsible for the austerity measures. This perception is accentuated by the fact that the president's political opponents used this tactic to their advantage, framing most of their political actions as attempts to right the wrongs done by the president, keeping the issue at the top of the public agenda.

So far, the general interpretation for the president's tactic has been that he tried to protect the party that supported him during the elections. The data presented here suggest an alternative explanation. Intended or not, it is possible that the president's tactic, while unsuccessful in protecting his political party, was actually successful in insulating the political system from the negative effects of the austerity measures. Unfortunately, this interpretation cannot be tested with the panel data that are available to us, but it remains open as a possible research question for future studies.

Overall, however, the data suggest that diffuse support for the political system in Romania has not been affected by the first economic crisis experienced during the post-communist transition period. This is good news for Romania because the fate of democracy in recently democratised states is never certain. The fact that Romanians were able to weather a significant economic crisis without losing

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their support for the political system could be seen as proof that democracy is consolidating in Romania. The decrease of specific support for democracy, manifested by less trust in the presidency, political parties, and political institutions, while problematic in itself, is not necessarily a threat to democracy. In recent years, distrust for some components of the political system seems to have become a common characteristic for states across the world, from established democracies in Western Europe to post-communist democracies in Eastern Europe, and to authoritarian regimes in the Arab world.

The "economic evaluations" hypothesis (H2) stated that the way people evaluate economic performance has an effect on their level of support for the political system. It should be noted, in this context, that in addition to a general item of satisfaction with life, we used four different types of economic evaluations (retrospective national, prospective national, retrospective individual, and prospective individual). The results presented in Table 11.3 show that economic evaluations have no significant effects on diffuse support for democracy, indicating that attachment to the idea of democracy is not dependent on perceptions of short-term changes in the state of the economy. This finding is important because it shows that the theoretical expectation of stability at the most diffuse level of support for the political system does hold in the case of a new democracy faced with a significant economic crisis.

Economic evaluations do have a significant positive effect on three dimensions of support for the political system: confidence in political parties, confidence in institutions, and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. It should be noted that out of the four types of economic evaluations we included in the models, only two have significant effects. According to our results, retrospective sociotropic evaluations – those comparing the current situation to the one from four years ago – are the type of evaluations people use to guide their support for democracy. If people perceive that the state of the economy has improved over time, they are more likely to have more support for political parties and institutions and to be more satisfied with the functioning of democracy. Negative evaluations of the national economy, on the other hand, are more likely to decrease trust in political parties and institutions and decrease satisfaction with the way democracy is working. Prospective pocketbook evaluations – those indicating how good individuals expect their economic fortunes to be in the future in comparison with the current situation – also have a significant positive effect, but only in the case of trust in political parties.

Overall, the results presented here partially confirm our second hypothesis (H2): economic evaluations do play a role in influencing support for democracy, but only on those dimensions representing specific or middle-range support. Our results also confirm that some of the findings identified in the existing literature also hold in the Romanian case: retrospective sociotropic evaluations are more important than other types of evaluations, and diffuse forms of support are less likely to be influenced by respondents' perceptions regarding the state of the economy.

The "separate effect on separate dimensions" hypothesis (H3) argues that the effect of economic evaluations will be stronger on more specific forms of

support and weaker on more diffuse forms of support. This hypothesis seems to be disproved by our results. One of the ways to verify whether the data fit our expectations stated in the third hypothesis is to check the change in the R^2 statistic in the model that adds economic evaluations to the analysis. We would expect the set of economic evaluations variables to have a larger contribution to explaining specific support and a smaller contribution, or no contribution at all, to explaining diffuse support.

Our results show that adding the set of economic evaluations variables to the model including only time and socio-demographic control variables leads to the largest R^2 increase in the models explaining support for democracy (8 per cent increase), satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (7 per cent increase), and confidence in political parties (6 per cent increase). The corresponding effect on the R^2 statistic in the models explaining confidence in the presidency and confidence in political institutions is negligible (R^2 changes by approximately 1 per cent). It should be noted, however, that despite the larger increase in R^2 observed in the models explaining middle-range and diffuse support, the total proportion of variance explained by time, socio-demographic characteristics, and economic evaluations, is 1.7 to 2.6 times larger in the models explaining specific forms of support for democracy.

Even though economic evaluations explain a larger share of changes in middle-range and diffuse support for democracy, the model explains significantly less than in the case of specific support for democracy. This is due, in part, to the fact that there is very little variation over time in diffuse support for democracy. This means that the economic evaluations variables do not seem to have a significant role because there is no variation to be explained by these variables.

The "time interaction" hypothesis (H4) is the last hypothesis we tested in this chapter, and it states that we are more likely to observe a decrease in the level of support for democracy among groups that are more likely to suffer during a period of economic crisis. We have considered education and wealth as indicators, expecting low-education and low-income groups to have a higher probability of suffering during the economic crisis by comparison to better educated, wealthier groups.

In order to assess the fit between the data and our expectations derived from this hypothesis, we have computed the predicted values for the dependent variables, taking into account the interactions between time and education (Figure 11.1) and the interactions between time and wealth (Figure 11.2). In both figures, we present the predicted values (together with their associated 95 per cent confidence bands) for 2009 and 2013 at different levels of education and wealth.

The results based on the interactions between time and education show significant differences both across time or across education groups for a specific form of support for the political system (trust in the presidency) and for the middle-range form of support for the political system (satisfaction with the functioning of democracy). In the case of trust in the presidency, low education groups are less likely to trust the presidency than high education groups, both in 2009 and in 2013.

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

Figure 11.1 Time–education interaction effects, predicted values (and 95% confidence bands).

Both groups lost trust in the presidency during the economic crisis, but the loss was larger among the high education groups and smaller among the low education groups. The changes observed in the case of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy offer support to our fourth hypothesis. The predicted values clearly show that the economic crisis has led to a decrease in the level of satisfaction with democracy among the low education group and to an increase in the level of satisfaction among the high education group.

The results based on the interactions between time and wealth (Figure 11.2) indicate that differences between the poorer groups and the richer groups are



Figure 11.2 Time–wealth interaction effects, predicted values (and 95% confidence bands).

minor, at best. In most cases, the predicted values and their associated 95 per cent confidence bands clearly show that wealth has no effect on support for democracy. Between 2009 and 2013, poorer respondents became less trusting in the presidency than richer respondents, indicating a stronger loss of support for one of the main political actors of the political system. In the case of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, the results show that although wealth had a weak positive effect on satisfaction with the way democracy works in 2009, by 2013, the relationship was reversed, with wealth having a weak negative effect

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on the dependent variable. It is possible that the way we measured wealth (number of long-term goods owned by the respondent) underestimates the effect of wealth on support for democracy. This remains to be tested in other datasets, which might include better measures of wealth.

Overall, taking into account all the results presented here, our fourth hypothesis receives only partial support from the data. Groups defined by low education generally became less supportive of the functioning of the political system from 2009 to 2013. In the case of groups defined by wealth, poorer people become less supportive of the political system only when support for political system is measured as confidence in the presidency. It is worth noting that diffuse support for democracy was equally supported by all the respondents, regardless of education or wealth. We consider this non-finding as a positive finding in the sense that it proves that fragile democracies, such as Romania, can survive significant economic crises without people abandoning the idea of democracy.

Discussion and conclusions

In this chapter, we analysed the effect of an economic crisis on support for democracy in Romanian society. We distinguished between different components of support for democracy, ranging from specific support (confidence in presidency, confidence in political parties, confidence in political institutions) to middle-range support (satisfaction with the functioning of democracy) to diffuse support (support for democracy as a principle). We treated each of these components as separate outcome variables in models that included the same set of independent variables. By analysing each component of political support and comparing the results separately, we were able to test whether the economic crisis decreased all dimensions of support for democracy or if only certain components of support for democracy were eroded during the crisis, while others remained immune to such short-term influences.

Using panel data from RES, we estimated the trends over time (2009–2013) in the different measures of support for democracy and economic evaluations. At the univariate level, we observed a decrease in specific support for democracy but not in diffuse support for democracy. In the case of economic evaluations, except for the retrospective evaluation of the national economy, all other measures of economic perceptions (retrospective individual, prospective individual, and prospective national) show an increase of negative evaluations.

Next, we estimated identical models for each of the five components of support for the political regime, placing the focus on evaluations of economic performance (retrospective pocketbook, retrospective sociotropic, prospective pocketbook, and prospective sociotropic) while controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and for other variables shown in previous studies to have a significant effect on support for democracy. The results show that evaluations of economic performance do play a significant role in influencing most dimensions of support for the political regime, with the effect being stronger in

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the case of middle-range support and not significantly different from zero in the case of diffuse support.

Summing up, our analyses showed that the economic crisis in Romania negatively affected confidence in political parties, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, but failed to have a significant effect on diffuse support for democracy. This result is encouraging, suggesting that the democratic system is not easily disturbed by economic shocks, even in a democracy that is still insufficiently consolidated.

Second, our analyses confirmed that when it comes to evaluations of economic performance and their effects on support for the political system, what really counts is the way people evaluate the performance of the economy at the national level in recent years: negative retrospective national economic evaluations generally decrease middle-range support for the political system.

Third, it seems that in some cases, the groups that suffer the strongest the effects of the economic crisis are more likely to become disenchanted and to blame the current political system for their misfortunes. While this effect exists only for groups defined by low levels of education, it is important to be aware that such groups do exist and that their support for democracy is or can be easily lost during periods of economic crisis.

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Appendix

Table 11.A1 Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent, and control variables

Variable	*Description*	*Min.*	*Max*	*Mean 2009*	*Std. 2009*	*Mean 2013*	*Std. 2013*
Education	Years of formal education	0	22	10.76	4.05	11.13	4.28
Wealth	Number of long-term goods	0	7	3.67	2.24	3.85	2.27
High-skilled occupation	High skilled occupation (0=no, 1=yes)	0	1	0.12	0.33	0.14	0.35
Low-skilled occupation	Low skilled occupation (0=no, 1=yes)	0	1	0.39	0.49	0.40	0.49
Unemployed	Unemployed (0=no, 1=yes)	0	1	0.03	0.18	0.02	0.13
Respondent evaluation	Evaluation of R by field operator (interest on subjects discussed, understanding of questions, retrieval of answers) (0=not at all, 10=very much) (averaged score)	0	10	7.59	1.86	7.52	1.85
Partisanship	Partisanship (0=no, 1=yes)	0	1	0.60	0.49	0.47	0.50
General satisfaction	Satisfaction about R's life conditions (0=not at all satisfied, 3=very satisfied)	0	3	1.14	0.70	1.13	0.76
Evaluations							
Retrospective economy	Self-rated actual national economic situation compared to 4/5 years ago (0=much worse now, 4=much better now)	0	4	1.12	0.87	1.24	0.90
Retrospective individual	Self-rated actual personal economic situation compared to 4/5 years ago (0=much worse now, 4=much better now)	0	4	1.56	0.99	1.43	0.91
Prospective economy	Self-rated national economic situation in next 4/5 years ago (0=much worse in the future, 4=much better in the future)	0	4	2.23	0.99	1.96	1.01
Prospective individual	Self-rated personal economic situation in next 4/5 years ago (0=much worse in the future, 4=much better in the future)	0	4	2.30	0.94	2.10	0.98
Trust in							
Presidency	Trust in presidency (0=not at all, 10=very much)	0	10	6.24	2.72	4.27	3.03
Political parties	Trust in political parties (0=not at all, 10=very much)	0	10	4.68	2.42	3.59	2.55
Institutions	Trust in government and parliament (0=not at all, 10=very much) (averaged score)	0	10	5.64	2.43	4.87	2.67
Satisfaction democracy	Satisfaction about the way in which democracy works in Romania (0=not at all satisfied, 3=very satisfied)	0	3	1.00	0.67	0.97	0.74
Support democracy	Having a … in Romania is … (1=very good, 5=very bad) Support for democracy = (5-democratic system) – (5-strong leader) (–3=lowest, 3=highest)	–3	3	0.45	0.91	0.47	1.24

Note
Common cases, weighted.

Notes

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2 Distinguishing the different types of political actors is the first change we brought to the model of political support. The second change is related to political communities. Since the post-communist transition in Romania did not include significant debates on the meaning of the political community, we decided it was not necessary to include this dimension of political support in our analyses.

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12 Conclusions

Hermann Dülmer, Malina Voicu, and Ingvill C. Mochmann

Although the connection between the economy on the one hand and social values and more specific attitudes on the other is well documented in the social sciences (see, for instance, Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, pp. 99–107), the last economic crisis affecting Europe and North America has provided a new opportunity to trace the effects of economic ups and downs on the values and attitudes shared by the general public. Drawing on a larger amount of empirical data deriving from large-scale surveys carried out before and after the economic crisis, as well as on specific national data sets, the present volume builds upon several aspects. Among these is the validity of measurement scales used to measure general value orientations and their stability over time. Variations in orientation towards certain value profiles and in attitudes towards some specific political objects make up a second line followed by some of the contributions. Other chapters develop further the changes in the nexus between basic value orientation and attitudes regarding various aspects of social life. All in all, the work here aims to shed some light on the changes in value orientations that have occurred as a result of economic scarcity.

Based on the evidence provided by the chapters included here, one can draw a number of conclusions regarding the way economic scarcity resulting from a severe economic crisis has impacted on the values and attitudes shared by Europeans. As predicted by the theory, the results of the analyses presented here confirm the expectation that values do not change overnight: they are quite stable, and a short period of economic shortage cannot change the internal structure of the basic value orientations or individual support for certain values. Thus, the measurement model of a European values typology based on Schwartz's basic human value orientations still holds true in spite of the changes in the surrounding context. Moreover, worsening conditions in the economic context do not change the basic value orientations that were internalized during an individual's formative years: people's previous value orientations remain unaffected by the state of economy. This is valid in the short term and as long as a crisis does not cause profound psychological traumata, such as for example in conditions caused by war. However, the longer an economic crisis lasts and the more deeply a country is affected, the greater the likelihood of an imprint, traceable especially on the cohort coming of age over the last ten years. This assumption opens the door for further investigations into generational trends.

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Whereas values have been shown to be quite stable, at least in the short run, attitudes are much more susceptible to, for instance, worsening conditions caused by increases in taxes or cuts in services, in other words to the kinds of measures governments take in times of crisis in order to combat their failing economic performance. The results confirm that the measurement model for trust in political institutions is stable over time. This holds true also for countries that have been unequally affected by the economic crisis. However, the results also show that, in countries most affected by the crisis, trust in political institutions as a central pillar of democracy has been significantly eroded. Whether these short-term effects under the conditions of a protracted and severe economic crisis, as in Greece, might cause a long-term decrease in support for democracy, which in turn may also affect the stability of the political system as a whole, is an important question for future research. The case study of Romania at least gives hope that, even in fragile and relatively young democracies, trust in democracy as a principle is sufficiently rooted in the value systems of its citizens to survive unaffected the consequences of a harsh economic crisis.

All in all, this book provides solid evidence of changes in a broad range of attitudes shared by the general public that are the result of the impact of economic scarcity. Both attitudes towards political objects and attitudes concerning private life are strongly affected by the economic context. The research supports the volatility, when impacted by crisis, of attitudes regarding resource redistribution, immigration, support for European integration, non-institutionalized political participation, and evaluations of the legitimacy of national, compared to European, political institutions. By distinguishing between two dimensions of threat perception associated with immigration, evidence was found that universalism and conservation values have a somewhat greater impact on cultural threat perceptions than on economic threat perceptions. Worsening socio-economic conditions in terms of increasing unemployment rates, however, significantly increased economic threat perceptions, but not cultural threat perceptions. This result confirms that it is necessary to treat economic and cultural threat perception as two distinct concepts. In times of economic crisis caused originally by the banking sector, the proportion of immigrants in itself had no impact on citizens' threat perceptions. This may be because citizens realized that immigrants cannot be blamed for a failure of banks, politicians, and/or the government, or it may be because threat perceptions caused by competition for scarce resources require a perceived economic downturn and at the same time media reports about increasing immigration. Values also affect attitudes toward European integration: as expected, citizens with high preferences for universalism values (favoring social justice and equality) more strongly supported further European integration, whereas citizens with high preferences for security values were less supportive. During the crisis, the nexus between universalism values and support for European integration became stronger in those countries performing rather well economically, with comparably high economic growth rates in relation to countries more severely affected by the crisis. The link between universalism values and support for further European integration turned

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out to be unaffected by the crisis, always stronger the higher the unemployment rate of a country. Since the rise in unemployment came later, after a certain time lag, than the first appearance of the economic crisis between 2007 and 2008, an interesting question for future research is whether these results will hold when comparing the 2006 data with data from, for instance, 2012 instead of 2008, in other words, at a time when the unemployment rate in those countries most affected by the crisis shot up.

If a crisis can change attitudes, then as a consequence we can expect behavior to be affected too. The literature suggests that younger citizens, women, and the more highly educated are usually more likely to engage in non-institutionalized political participation such as signing petitions, public demonstrations, and political consumerism. The economic crisis especially hit young people who suffered from the high youth unemployment rate, men who disproportionally work in severely hit sectors, such as construction, financial services, and car manufacturing, and the less well educated, who are less attractive to the labor market. Despite their greater vulnerability to the consequences of the economic crisis, support was found neither for the expectation that younger people participate most in countries severely affected by high unemployment, nor for the assumption that differences between less well educated and better educated would disappear. Therefore vulnerability does not seem to substitute for civic skills acquired through higher education. However, in accordance with the theoretical assumptions, the effect of gender on the probability of non-institutionalized political participation vanished in countries most affected by the economic crisis. Another question is whether the economic crisis provoked not only political protest behavior but also amplified the call for stronger political union in order to tighten economic integration as a necessary response to the Euro crisis. But is the political culture across member states cohesive enough to permit further political integration, that is to say, a representative democracy beyond the nation state which is perceived as legitimate by the citizens? A potential barrier to further political integration would be, according to this point of view, if differences in citizens' evaluations of democratic legitimacy and the degree of confidence in national parliaments and the European Union were observable between the member states. Empirically it turned out that the impact of input orientations (normative justification of democratic institutions) was stronger for the confidence in the national parliaments than for the confidence in the European Union. Output orientations (economic problem-solving capacity), on the other hand, had a stronger influence on citizen's confidence in the European Union – hence the European Union seems to be more dependent on economic success than national parliaments. If not addressed, such legitimacy differences may pose a barrier to political union as a foundation for economic and monetary integration.

However, one of the main highlights of this book is the investigation into the link between basic value orientations and different attitudes under the impact of economic crisis. Although some work in this direction has been done before (see Davidov *et al*., 2008; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012), the present study – using GDP per capita and unemployment rates as crucial crisis indicators – follows on

these earlier investigations to shed light on the way economic conditions affect the relationship between rather stable basic human value orientations and attitude formation over time. Empirical evidence shows that the influence of self-transcendence values on the attitudes regarding redistribution is increasingly substituted by the impact of conservation values, a result that is rather unexpected according to Inglehart's materialism-postmaterialism theory. The nexus between values and attitudes regarding immigration, as another key political issue in times of crisis, turned out to be quite stable. Whereas the relationship between values and attitudes towards redistribution seems – like an outburst effect – to be immediately related to the crisis that afterwards returns to the initially observed general trend, the nexus between values and attitudes toward immigration seems to be durable. Further research should focus on the link between values and other attitudes and provide better evidence needed in order to develop a stronger theoretical explanation.

For a broader overview of the consequences of the economic crisis it is useful to complete the picture of the cross-country perspective by individual case studies of the most severely hit countries. Greece and Portugal, as two of the hardest hit countries of the Eurozone, and Romania, as a post-communist member of the European Union with a national currency, were selected for this purpose. On the issue of how to solve its deep financial crisis, Greece was split along a divide between proponents of the bailout agreement proposed by the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund) and the opponents of austerity, who regarded the bailout agreement as a loss of sovereignty and a capitulation to external actors. The political parties' positioning on this new crisis-related issue followed strategic considerations which did not coincide with the existing left–right division. For this reason the traditional left–right dimension was unable to assimilate the new economic bailout dimension. Party competition in the 2012 elections in Greece therefore took place along two cross-cutting dimensions, the traditional left–right dimension associated with cultural issues such as nationalism and immigration and the new economic bailout dimension, which after the general elections in 2015 allowed a government coalition of leftist SYRIZA and right populist ANEL parties that was based on anti-bailout politics. Empirical evidence shows that both dimensions exist in the Greek electorate too. No similar crisis-related split of the left–right dimension was observed in Portugal. Instead, as a consequence of the request for a bailout agreement with the Troika in April 2011, the polarization of the politicians on the existing economic left–right dimension became stronger. Since empirically the electorate did not follow their representatives, the crisis exacerbated the division between the voters and their representatives. Whether or not the economic crisis also affected support for democracy is investigated in regard to Romania, a democracy that is younger and less consolidated than Greece and Portugal and which also received financial assistance from the EU (through its Balance of Payment program), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Whereas the economic turmoil during the post-communist transition could be explained away by politicians as an inherent part of the

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process of change, the economic crisis of the last years could not so easily be explained. Nonetheless, the empirical results for Romania showed that while short-term confidence in the presidency, political parties, and political institutions (specific support for democracy) decreased significantly during the crisis, middle-range support as indicated by the satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and long-term, diffuse support for democracy as a principle remained unaffected. Furthermore, negative economic evaluations caused by the economic crisis turned out to reduce specific and middle-range support for democracy but failed to have a significant impact on diffuse support for democracy. These results illustrate that even fragile democracies can survive severe economic crises without their citizens abandoning the idea of democracy.

Although values turned out to be quite stable even in times of crisis, a final look at age cohorts provides deeper insight into long-term change with respect to citizen's attitudes toward European integration and their trust in the European Union, two topics that are central to the future of Europe. Are younger cohorts – so goes the central question – more pessimistic about Europe than the older cohorts? The empirical results of this volume shows clear evidence that this question can be answered "no": unaffected by the crisis, younger people are much more supportive of European integration and have significantly greater confidence in the European Union than older people. This empirical result is cause for optimism regarding the future of Europe. Although the economic crisis hit many European countries quite severely, it also provided the opportunity to show solidarity and to implement required structural reforms in order to increase the economic competiveness and strengthen cohesiveness in Europe. However, to what extent this finding will be replicated in future studies will depend on the opportunities provided to those groups particularly affected by the recession in their respective countries. As a result of the recession, many see themselves facing interruptions to their career and life opportunities. To what extent this may cause growing social inequalities in the population, challenging social cohesion and giving rise to new, or reactivating latent, conflicts at national, European, and even world level, will depend on how successful the economic recovery will be in integrating *all* citizens.

In the meantime the worst of the economic crisis seems to be over. Ireland managed to officially exit the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) financial assistance program on December 8, 2013 (see EFSF 2015a), and Portugal followed on May 18, 2014 (see EFSF 2015b and IMF 2015). In January 2014 Spain successfully left the Financial Assistance program for the recapitalization of financial institutions (see European Commission 2015). Although the situation in Greece remains unstable, it is hoped that the reforms to prevent similar crises in the future introduced by the European Union and its member countries will eventually also serve to strengthen the idea of a common Europe.

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